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					                          ESS & eCentre


                                        PILOT
        STAFF SAFETY WORKSHOP
            Pranburi, Thailand, 1- 6 December, 2002




                          The eCentre training programme is funded by the
                      Japanese Government's Trust Fund for Human Security




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                         1
1-6 December, 2002                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                              BRIEF SUMMARY FOR PARTICIPANTS


Today, humanitarian workers, whether from governments, NGOs, or the UN system, are under serious
and increasing threats in their work in many countries around the world. Many feel unsafe in their work,
while others who do feel safe may need to analyse their own situations and their personal and
organizational vulnerability more closely. This workshop will help you both in analysing the threats that
may affect you in your work as well as provide you with a chance to experience simulated field safety and
security scenarios, and practice the skills required to maximise your own safety in the field.

UNHCR's Emergency and Security Service and the UNHCR eCentre have jointly planned and supported
this workshop on staff safety and security as a pilot event. As a pilot event, the organizers will be asking
much from the participants throughout the workshop in order to evaluate the overall design and any
needed improvements before making this workshop a standard offering to the humanitarian community.
The workshop is a regional event, drawing participants from Asia and the wider Pacific region served by
the eCentre network.

This pilot workshop is designed for those who will find themselves working together in humanitarian
operations in dangerous areas or situations, i.e. the staff of UN(HCR), partner agencies and government
staff. There is a mix of participants, both national and international staff, men and women. Because this is
a pilot workshop, our aim is also to have a mix of some experienced staff as well as less experienced
colleagues. A good working knowledge of English language is essential for full participation.



The objective of the workshop is to increase the skills of humanitarian staff like you in areas
critical to your own safety and security and the security of individuals and organisations around
you.



At the end of this workshop you should have:

♦   An increased ability to identify and assess threats and associated risks to you and your
    organization

♦   Knowledge of tools and approaches that can reduce your vulnerability

♦   An ability to identify and deal with your own stress and the stress of others in your group or
    team

♦   Experienced , through simulation, several situations which will help you perform more calmly
    and safely should these events actually happen to you

♦ Knowledge of the safety and security resources available to you and how to mobilise them.
                                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Table of Contents



                                                          Table of Contents
WORKSHOP AGENDA .............................................................................................................................................5

DAY 1 – SUNDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2002 .................................................................................................................7
   SESSION 1.1. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS ..........................................................................................................8
     Exercise 1.1. Participant Introductions ................................................................................................................8
   SESSION 1.2. ASSIGNMENT OF RADIO HANDSETS, CALL SIGNS AND RADIO PRACTICE .............................................9
     Reading 1.2.1. Standard Radio Communications - Phonetic Alphabet ................................................................9
     Reading 1.2.2. Standard Radio Procedure Words (PROWORDS) .....................................................................10
     Reading 1.2.3. Establishing UN Radio Communications Protocol in Field Situations ......................................13
     Reading 1.2.4. Radio Maintenance and Use Advice...........................................................................................15
     Exercise 1.2.5. Managing Radio Communications in the Field .........................................................................17
DAY 2 – MONDAY, 2 DECEMBER .......................................................................................................................20
     Day 2 Breakfast Reading: Suremia Watch Report for November, 2002..............................................................21
   SESSION 2.1 THREAT, RISK AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ..............................................................................24
     Reading 2.1.1. Risk Assessment Using the Risk Matrix ......................................................................................24
     Exercise 2.1.2. Using the Risk Matrix With Your Own Case study.....................................................................28
     Reading 2.1.3. Acceptance-Protection-Deterrence .............................................................................................29
   SESSION 2.2 ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND ACCEPTANCE .......................................................................................34
     Reading 2.2.1. Image, Acceptance And Reciprocity ...........................................................................................34
   SESSION 2.3. THE UN AND HUMANITARIAN SECURITY SYSTEM..............................................................................46
     Reading 2.3.1. Security in the Field - Information for Staff Members of the United Nations System.................46
   SESSION 2.4 - EXERCISE IN USING THE HUMANITARIAN SECURITY SYSTEM .........................................................79
     Exercise 2.4.1 - Planning an Assessment Mission ...............................................................................................79
DAY 3 – TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2002.............................................................................................................84
     Day 3 Breakfast Reading: Suremia News Service Report ...................................................................................85
   SESSION 3.1. TRAVEL SECURITY..............................................................................................................................87
     Reading 3.1.1. Security Tips for Women (UNICEF - undated) ..........................................................................88
   SESSION 3.2 NEGOTIATION AND CHECKPOINT SKILLS ...........................................................................................92
     Reading 3.2.1. Preventing and Defusing Anger and Hostility.............................................................................92
     Readng 3.2.2. Approaching and Dealing with Checkpoints ..............................................................................106
   SESSION 3.3 - LANDMINE AWARENESS AND SAFETY ...........................................................................................109
     Reading 3.3.1. Landmine and UXO Safety Handbook.......................................................................................109
   SESSION 3.4 BASIC FIRST AID FOR TRAVELERS...................................................................................................110
   SESSION 3.5 - PREPARATION FOR FIELD SIMULATION .........................................................................................111
   SESSION 3.6 - OPTIONAL SESSION ON GPS ..........................................................................................................112
DAY 4 – WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2002....................................................................................................113
      Day 4 Breakfast Reading: Today's News - Security Situation Worsens in Suremia .........................................114
DAY 5 – THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2002 .......................................................................................................116
     Day 5 Breakfast Reading: Suremia Security Reporting Service - Monthly Summary .......................................117
   SESSION 5.1 PERSONAL, HOME & OFFICE SECURITY ...........................................................................................119
   SESSION 5.2 EXTREME SITUATIONS - RAPE AND GENDER-RELATED SECURITY ISSUES .......................................120
     Reading 5.2.1. Rape and Sexual Harassment ....................................................................................................120
   SESSION 5.3 EXTREME SITUATIONS; MOBS, RIOTS, HOSTAGE TAKING, HIJACKING, ACTION UNDER FIRE .........124
   SESSION 5.4 OPEN FORUM ...................................................................................................................................125
DAY 6 – FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2002 ..............................................................................................................126
     Day 6 breakfast Reading: Relief Web Update on Suremia ................................................................................127
   SESSION 6.1 DEALING WITH STRESS ....................................................................................................................128
   SESSION 6.2 REPORTING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT...............................................................................129

UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                                                                           3
1-6 December, 2002                                                                                                                    Pranburi, Thailand
   Reading 6.2.1 Standard Reports and Formats for UNHCR...............................................................................129
   Initial Incident Report (sent as soon as possible - if in doubt, send a report) ................................................130
 SESSION 6.3 PLANNING AND OVERALL SECURITY STRATEGY .............................................................................135
 FINAL EXAM ..........................................................................................................................................................136
 PILOT STAFF SAFETY WORKSHOP EVALUATION FORM..........................................................................142
   Daily Sessions....................................................................................................................................................142
   Information about you .......................................................................................................................................145




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                                                                           Page 4
1-6 December, 2002                                                                                                                            Pranburi, Thailand
                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Agenda




                                  Workshop Agenda

    Session and time                                         Topic

MONDAY, MAY 20 - GETTING STARTED
1.0      0830 - 0845   Workshop Opening
1.1      0845 - 0945   Workshop Overview and Introductions
1.2      1000 - 1100   Personal Preparation - Packing
1.3      1115 - 1200   Personal Preparation - TOR
1.4      1330 - 1500   The International System & Country Team Presentations
1.5      1530 - 1700   Protection 1: International Protection Basics
*        1900 - 2100   Evening Welcome Reception
TUESDAY, MAY 21 - CONTINGENCY PLANNING
2.1      0830 - 0900   Country Team Presentations on Contingency Planning
2.2      0900 - 1000   Contingency Planning
2.3      1030 - 1200   Emergency Math - Key Planning Figures

2.4      1330 - 1500   Contingency Planning Exercise
2.5      1530 - 1700   Contingency Planning Exercise - Continued
WEDNESDAY, MAY 22 - COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY ISSUES
3.1      0830 - 1000   Managing Field Communications
                       Distribution and Check of Field Radios
3.2      1030 - 1200   Security 1. The UN Security System
3.3      1330 - 1500   Security 2. Personal Security
3.4      1530 - 1700   Security 3. Security on the Road

THURSDAY, MAY 23 - SIMULATION
4.1      0800 - 1600   Suremia Simulation - All Day
4.2      1600 - 1700   Simulation Quick Debriefing

FRIDAY, MAY 24 - SIMULATION DEBRIEFINGS
5.1      0830 - 1000   Debrief of Simulation - Humanitarian Results
5.2      1030 - 1200   Program Coordination Debrief of Simulation
5.3      1330 - 1500   Teamwork Skills
5.4      1530 - 1700   Meeting Skills



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                Page 5
1-6 December, 2002                                                                       Pranburi, Thailand
                                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Agenda



SATURDAY, MAY 25 - INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTION ISSUES
6.1    0830 - 1000    Protection 2: Protection in Practice
6.2    1030 - 1200    Protection 3: Protection Open Forum
6.3    1330 - 1500    Assessment 1: Basics, Bias and the Community-Based Approach
6.4    1530 - 1700    Assessment 2: Working with Sectoral Indicators -Sites & Shelter,

SUNDAY, MAY 26 -FREE DAY
MONDAY, MAY 27 -WORKING WITH SPECIALISTS
7.1    0830 - 1000    Assessment 3: Working with Sectoral Indicators - Water & Sanitation
7.2    1030 - 1200    Assessment 4: Working with Sectoral Indicators - Food & Nutrition
7.3    1330 - 1500    Exercise - Analysis of Assessment Data
7.4    1530 - 1630    Working with the Media
7.5    1630 - 1700    Synthesis Exercise Briefing & Task Force Formation

TUESDAY, MAY 28– SYNTHESIS EXERCISE - (WORKSHOP SYNTHESIS SKILLS)
8.1    0830 - 1500    Synthesis Exercise continued
8.2    1530 - 1700    Synthesis Exercise Debriefing

WEDNESDAY, MAY 29 – EXAM, EVALUATION AND NEXT STEPS
9.1    0830 - 1000    Workshop EXAM
9.2    1030 - 1200    Workshop Evaluation - Lessons Learned and next Steps

9.3    1230 - 1300    Closing and Adjourn to Lunch

                                          THANK YOU




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                              Page 6
1-6 December, 2002                                                                     Pranburi, Thailand
                                         International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.1.




Day 1 – Sunday, December 1, 2002



                      Getting Started
        Arrival, Welcome, Introductions, and Getting Acquainted with Your Radio




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                          Page 7
1-6 December, 2002                                                                Pranburi, Thailand
                                              International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.1.




Session 1.1. Welcome and Introductions

Exercise 1.1. Participant Introductions


Find someone in the room that you do not know. Pair off with that person and interview each
other briefly to learn the following information about your partner. Take no more than 5 minutes
for each interview. Use the space provided below for your notes. After you interview one
another be prepared to present your partner to the group.




   Name and title, country of current work or residence




   Chief objectives or expectations for this workshop




   What was the most insecure or unsafe situation you have ever been in?




   What is your greatest fear in the situation where you work right now?




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                               Page 8
1-6 December, 2002                                                                     Pranburi, Thailand
                                             International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.1.




Session 1.2. Assignment of Radio Handsets, Call Signs and Radio
             Practice

Reading 1.2.1. Standard Radio Communications - Phonetic Alphabet



                        Phonetic Alphabet

 A        B           C         D          E              F        G           H            I
Alpha    Bravo       Charlie   Delta      Echo       Foxtrot       Golf       Hotel       India




  J       K            L        M          N              O         P          Q           R
Juliet    Kilo        Lima     Mike     November         Oscar    Papa       Quebec      Romeo




 S         T          U         V          W              X         Y           Z
Sierra   Tango    Uniform      Victor   Whiskey          X-ray   Yankee        Zulu


ITU recommended pronunciation guide for the international phonetic alphabet - bold letters
should be stressed.


A Alfa (AL FAH)                 J Juliet (JEW LEE ETT)                  S Sierra (SEE AIR RAH)
B Bravo (BRAH VOH)              K Kilo (KEY LOH)                        T Tango (TANG GO)
C Charlie (CHAR LEE)            L Lima (LEE MAH)                        U Uniform (YOU NEE FORM)
D Delta (DELL TAH)              M Mike (MIKE)                           V Victor (VIK TAH)
E Echo (ECK OH)                 N November (NO VEM BER)                 W Whiskey (WISS KEY)
F Foxtrot (FOKS TROT)           O Oscar (OSS CAH)                       X X-Ray (ECKS RAY)
G Golf (GOLF)                   P Papa (PAH PAH)                        Y Yankee (YANG KEY)
H Hotel (HOH TELL)              Q Quebec (KEH BECK)                     Z Zulu (ZOO LOO)
I India (IN DEE AH)      R Romeo (ROW ME OH)
PROcedure WORDS (PROWORDS for standard radio communication)




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                               Page 9
1-6 December, 2002                                                                    Pranburi, Thailand
                                                  International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.




Reading 1.2.2. Standard Radio Procedure Words (PROWORDS)



  PROWORD                                             MEANING
ACKNOWLEDGE           Confirm that you have received my message and will comply.

AFFIRMATIVE           Yes/Correct.

NEGATIVE              No/Incorrect.

ALL AFTER             Everything that you (I) transmitted after… (Keyword).

ALL BEFORE            Everything that you (I) transmitted before… (Keyword).

CORRECT (THAT IS      What you have transmitted is correct.
CORRECT)
                      A. An error has been made in this transmission. It will continue with
                         the last word (group) correctly transmitted.

                      B. An error has been made in this transmission. Correct version is…

                      C. That which follows is a correct version in answer to your request for
                         clarification.

WRONG                 Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version is…

DISREGARD THIS        This transmission is an error. Disregard it. This proword shall not be
TRANSMISSION –        used to cancel any message that has already been completely
OUT                   transmitted and for which receipt or acknowledgement has been
                      received.

DO NOT ANSWER-        Stations called are not to answer this call, acknowledge this message,
OUT                   or otherwise to transmit in connection with this transmission.

SILENCE-SILENCE-      Cease all transmissions on this net immediately. Will be maintained
SILENCE!              until lifted.

SILENCE LIFTED        Silence is lifted. The net is free for traffic.

END OF MESSAGE –      This concludes the message just transmitted (and the message
OVER (OUT)            instructions pertaining to a formal message).

END OF TEXT           The textual part of a formal message ends. Stand by for the message
                      instructions immediately following.

FETCH…!               I wish to speak on the radio to that person.

…SPEAKING             Requested person is now using the radio himself.

FIGURES               Numerals or numbers will follow. (This proword is not used with the call
                      signs, time definitions, grid references, bearings, distances, etc.,

UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                 Page 10
1-6 December, 2002                                                                         Pranburi, Thailand
                                                International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.



                      especially in fixed-form reports).

FROM                  A. This is…

                      B. The originator of this formal message is indicated by the address
                         designation immediately following.

TO                    The addressees whose designations will immediately follow are to take
                      action on this formal message.

THIS IS               This transmission is from the station whose designation immediately
                      follows.

OVER                  This is the end of my turn of transmitting. A message is expected. Go
                      ahead.

THROUGH ME            I am in contact with the station you are calling; I can act as a relay
                      station.

MESSAGE PASSED        Your message has been passed to…
TO…

ROGER                 I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.

ROGER SO FAR?         Have you received this part of my message satisfactorily?

WILCO                 I have received your message, understand it, and will comply. (To be
                      used only by the addressee). ROGER and WILCO are never used
                      together.

UNKNOWN STATION       The identity of the station calling or with whom I am attempting to
                      establish communication is unknown.

VERIFY                Verify entire message (or portions indicated) with the originator and
                      send correct version. To be used only at discretion of or by the
                      addressee to which the questioned message was directed.

I VERIFY              That which follows has been verified at your request and is repeated.
                      To be used only as a reply to VERIFY.

WAIT (WAIT-WAIT)      I must pause for a few seconds.

WAIT – OUT            I must pause for more than a few seconds, and will call you again when
                      ready.

WORD AFTER…           The word of the message to which I make reference is that which
                      follows…

WORD BEFORE…          The word of the message to which I make reference is that which
                      precedes…

WORDS TWICE           Communication is difficult. Transmit(ting) each phrase (group) twice.
                      This proword can be used as an order, request or as information.



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                               Page 11
1-6 December, 2002                                                                       Pranburi, Thailand
                                               International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.



OUT                   This is the end of my transmission to you. No answer or
                      acknowledgement is expected.

OUT TO YOU            Do not answer, I have nothing more for you, I shall now call another
                      station on the net.

READ BACK!            Repeat the entire following transmission back to me exactly as
                      received.

I READ BACK           The following is my reply to your request to read back.

SAY AGAIN             A. Repeat all of your last transmission.

                      B. Followed by ALL AFTER, ALL BEFORE, WORD AFTER, WORD
                         BEFORE, etc. means: Repeat…(portion indicated).

I SAY AGAIN           I am repeating my transmission or portion indicated.

SEND!                 Go ahead with your transmission.

SEND YOUR             Go ahead, transmit; I am ready to copy.
MESSAGE!

SPEAK SLOWER!         Reduce the speed of your transmission.

I SPELL               I shall spell the next word, group or equivalent phonetically. (Not used
                      when transmitting coded groups only).

RELAY TO              Transmit the following message to all addressees or to the address
                      designation immediately following.

RELAY THROUGH         Send this message by way of call sign…




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                              Page 12
1-6 December, 2002                                                                      Pranburi, Thailand
                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.




Reading 1.2.3. Establishing UN Radio Communications Protocol in Field Situations


Communications via radios e.g. devices operating on HF, UHF or VHF frequencies are subject to certain
constraints, including physical (distance), technical (compatibility) and legal (government regulation)
among others. Physical constraints mean that in some situations, and without additional technical
support, your communications may be limited to a distance of from only a few kilometres to a total of 100
kilometres. Technical constraints mean that if you are operating on one radio system (HF), you will be
unable to communicate with someone operating on another (VHF). Legal constraints may mean that you
need prior government authorization to even operate a radio system – and even if you do, the
communications may be monitored by the authorities.


With the introduction of increasingly inexpensive satellite phone technologies into many field emergency
situations, it is more common that staff arriving new to a field situation will expect to be able to establish
phone-based, two-way communications and will not be experienced with establishing or operating an
efficient radio protocol. Understanding the above constraints, and adopting a simple but comprehensive
protocol for communications via radios can be an important safety feature in any field situation.
Basic Principles of Radio Protocol
There are three basic, but fundamental principles to follow when establishing a radio communication
protocol for a field situation.
    1. Alphanumeric call signs (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie – Zero, One, Two)
    2. Call signs are location and function specific
    3. Transmission in English (in some cases French) only


    1. Alphanumeric call signs: the use of the alphanumerical system to designate call signs for
       individuals ensures that all users are utilizing simple, number and letter-based identifiers for staff
       on the same radio network. The system ensures simple, multi-syllable identifiers that are easily
       pronounced by speakers of most languages.
    2. Location- and function-specific call signs: When identifier call signs are based on an individual’s
       name, this may lead to confusion when two staff arrive at a duty station with names that begin
       with the same letter. Similarly, when someone is replaced in an operation and the call signs are
       based on names rather than functions, other users on the radio network will not quickly be able to
       communicate with the new replacement as they will be unfamiliar with the call sign identifier.
       Finally, it is much easier to “decode” call signs that are based on personal names, which can
       compromise individual security. Use location first, then function when establishing a radio
       protocol.
    3. Transmission in English or French: it is generally acceptable to use local languages only on
       unregulated, open (or “simplex”) frequencies, and then only when the users understand that
       these frequencies are the least secure communications means available. UN standards require
       that the dominant UN language of the operation, either English or French, be used on official
       radio frequencies.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                     Page 13
1-6 December, 2002                                                                            Pranburi, Thailand
                                                    International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.



Establishing a Radio Call-Sign System

    1. Location: choose a letter from a location name
        •   Islamabad = India
        •   Kandahar = Kilo
        •   Peshawar = Papa
    2. Function: choose a letter from the organisation name:
        •   UNHCR = “HOTEL”
        •   Red Cross = “ROMEO”
        •   IOM = “INDIA”
    3. Function: choose a number to denote responsibility
        •   Head of Office = 1 (“Wun”)
        •   Deputy Head of Office = 1.1 (“Wun Wun”)
        •   Logistics = 4 (“fo-wer”)
        •   Admin = 6 (“seeks”)


It is important to emphasise that the Indicators used for call signs are assigned in a cascading format,
from location, to function (organisation) and function (responsibility). This enables a coherent, logical
framework that can be expanded as new organizations are added to the network, and more staff are
added to each organizations. Actual radio protocols in field situations may vary in some way from the
above, but will always follow a logical framework that is both simple and coherent for proper field
communications.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                   Page 14
1-6 December, 2002                                                                           Pranburi, Thailand
                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.




Reading 1.2.4. Radio Maintenance and Use Advice


The following advice applies to using your VHF (walkie-talkie) radio. It is purposely kept as simple
as possible, and should be valid in most field situations. Following these procedures will help you
get the best performance (and best security) from your radio system.

Communication Range
Communication range for VHF radios is largely dependant on having a line-of-sight or near line-of-sight
path between your antenna and the antenna of the station you want to talk to. If you are having trouble
with weak signals, try some of these tricks:
        •    Hold the radio over your head (antenna is higher).
        •    Climb to a location that is higher, or that has fewer obstructions between you the station you
             are talking to.
        •    Move the radio around the immediate area. It is common for a spot just a few feet away to
             work much better (or sometimes worse).
        •    Ask any other station that hears you to try to relay your call to the base station or the person
             you need to communicate with.
Squelch Setting
The squelch control on your radio quiets the background noise when there is no signal to receive. It
should be adjusted to the point where the noise just quiets. If the control is turned beyond this point, it will
actually reduce the sensitivity of the radio. Many newer radios do not have a user controlled squelch
control. This style of radio will have a MONITOR pushbutton on the side of the radio to unsquelch the
radio for test purposes (to set volume level for example).
Battery Life
Battery life for hand held radios mainly depends on how many minutes the radio is used in the transmit
mode. A typical radio using a high capacity (larger, heavier) battery will usually be specified by the
manufacturer to operate on a 5-5-90 duty cycle for an 8 hour day (5% transmit time, 5% receive time,
90% standby time). To maximize battery life, minimize transmit time. Consider these examples:
    •   5% of an 8-hour day is 24 minutes of transmit time.
    •   If the radio transmits for only 12 minutes, the battery "day" becomes 16 to 20 hours.
    •   If the radio transmits for 30 minutes, the battery "day" becomes only 4 hours.
    •   Keep radio transmissions brief. Let the base station do the talking.
Radio Checks

When you are issued a radio, you will be assigned a channel and a call-sign to use. As you leave your
home office or base, but before you get too far away, make a test call to the communications or security
officer. "Hotel, this Charlie Seven on channel 2". This test will help ensure that you are on the correct
channel, have the volume and squelch set properly, and have a working radio.
If you leave the city or office area, it also is a good idea to make a second test call once you are
1kilometeraway from base. Some radio faults (bad antenna connection, weak battery) will not be evident
when tested close to the base station.
Call Signs




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                     Page 15
1-6 December, 2002                                                                             Pranburi, Thailand
                                                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.



Be sure you have a listing of the call signs and standard channel uses for your radio network. It will be
important to memorize the call-signs you need. When you arrive at the office or are given a radio, make
sure you have a prepared card or pocket reference with the call signs you will need.
Scheduled Calls
One way to extend battery life in certain situations is the SCHEDULED CALL. Leave the radio OFF most
of the time. (Clear this with you security officer - as the situation may require full-time monitoring for
securit reasons) By prior arrangement with your base station or security officer, turn it on every hour and
monitor for 10 minutes for a call. Do not place a call if you are not called (transmitting uses 50 to 100
times as much battery power as monitoring).


Battery Issues
Rechargeable batteries are damaged each time they are left on to the point where the battery is fully
discharged. Check, then double-check that your radio if OFF when you are done with it. Check your
teammate’s radio. Have him or her check yours.


(this text was adapted from California Emergency Search and Rescue Teams Guideline - Pacific Gas & Electric )


Other Advice or notes:




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                      Page 16
1-6 December, 2002                                                                             Pranburi, Thailand
                                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.




Exercise 1.2.5. Managing Radio Communications in the Field


                                             Instructions

Read through each of the short dialogues below. Consider each telecommunications situation carefully.
What is right and what is wrong about each of them?


A. Somewhere in the field, radios beep and hisses…….


   "Juliet Golf, Juliet Golf, this is Whiskey Hotel - Over."

   "I copy you Whiskey Hotel, this is Juliet Golf - Go ahead - Over."

   "Yes, Juliet Golf, I have a problem. I am stuck in traffic driving to the Hotel on the south road and
   cannot meet with that crazy programme officer from UNHCR. He is supposed to be at our office now.
   Can you please tell him I am sorry and I will try to reschedule? – Over."

   "No problem, Whiskey Hotel, I'll tell him – Juliet Golf Out."

   "Thanks Juliet Golf, - Whiskey Hotel Out."




                    What's right                                            What's wrong




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                  Page 17
1-6 December, 2002                                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                                                  International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.




B. At the Field Office, Late at Night
                               Communications Room Radio Set Beeps


    "Delta Tango Base, Delta Tango Base This is Delta Tango 0800. Do you copy? –Over"

    "Uh, Roger, Delta Tango 0800, This is Delta Tango Base and we copy you. - Over."

    "Yeah Delta Tango Base, we have a problem and probably a big delay. We are stuck in traffic, and
    have only made about 30 meters progress in the last 30 mikes."

    "I read you Delta Tango 0800. You are going to miss your curfew. – Can you go back to Delta Tango
    Charlie Base for the night? –Over."

    "Negative, Delta Tango Base, I have been in this queue now for over 2 hours, I really don't want to
    lose my place – Over."

    "I understand that, Delta Tango 0800, but we are waiting for you and it is already after 10:00 PM. Go
    back to Delta Tango Charlie Base – It's too late to be on the road. – Over."

    "Negative, Delta Tango Base, I think the pace is picking up on the road a bit. We should be there
    before midnight. I'll check back in 30 mikes - Over."

    OK Delta Tango 0800 – We'll stand by for your check-in in 30 minutes. – Delta Tango Base Out."

    Delta Tango 0800 – Out."




                    What's right                                           What's wrong




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                 Page 18
1-6 December, 2002                                                                         Pranburi, Thailand
                                                  International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 1.5.




C. Radio message in your car…9:00 PM


                                   "Car radio beeps, then you hear…"


   "Fruitbat, Fruitbat, this is Walrus - Over."

   "Yeah Walrus, this is Fruitbat, What's up? – Over."

   "Listen Fruitbat, the restaurant is packed. Too many UN types. Let's pick another spot. –Over."

   "OK, where do you want to go? - Over. "

   "What about the fish place? – Over."

   "The fish place is OK. But last time we ate there we all got sick remember? –Over."

   "Oh yeah, OK how about the Precious Pistachio? – Over."

   "Sounds good, but I don't know where it is. Over."

   "Across from the Turkish Place - Over."

   "OK, see you there. Fruitbat Out."

   "Walrus Out."


                    What's right                                          What's wrong




*This exercise is adapted from OFDA DART Team management course.




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                                        International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




Day 2 – Monday, 2 December

             Seeing the Bigger Security Picture
 Threat, Risk & Vulnerability, Image & Acceptance, UN & Humanitarian Security System




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                                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.



Day 2 Breakfast Reading: Suremia Watch Report for November, 2002




                                   SUREMIA WATCH No. 27
                                   Monday, December 2, 2002


For the period 31 October - 30 November, 2002


                                                ANALYSIS


On Monday of last week (Nov. 25) there were reports of 32 Free Wassa People's Front (FWPF)
members being hunted by security forces in Wassa Province. There was an allegation that the group was
trading marijuana for weapons with Mardonian rebel forces (MFF) operating in Northern Mountain
Province. Suremian authorities later reported that they had arrested a number of the group and that the
remainder had entered Mardon via the town of Marmot. FWPF is reportedly looking at The southern
breakaway province of Mardon as a model case study for independence and hopes to foster closer links
with the new autonomous South Mardon government even though the region has yet to be recognized by
any other country as a sovereign state.


Muslim intellectuals and community leaders had been working together on a move to negotiate with the
military in the interests of decreasing collective punishment. There were claims that the military had been
burning down a number of villages known to support FWPF as a form of punishment. Sources say that a
number of recent assassinations and kidnappings have been carried out upon members of this group.


This reporting period was noteworthy as:


There were no reported kidnappings. However kidnappings are still occurring in a number of areas in
Wassa and Mar Provinces. Victims and their families have not been reporting the incidents to the
authorities out of fear of retaliation. There has been an increase in the number of buses having their tires
shot out on the Turos-Wassaville road - particularly East of the River Wassa. The Wassaville to Mink road
is also considered a primary target of these attacks. The occupants of the buses are then robbed and a
number have been kidnapped.


Fatalities among Suremian Security Forces have increased. Four security force members were killed
during this reporting period as opposed to two during the previous reporting period.


Wassa and Mar have been the most dangerous provinces in recent months, although similar activity in
Northern Mountain Province is now on the increase. Activity has tripled in the high mountain area
surrounding the village of Marmot during the last two weeks.



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                                REPORTED EVENTS FOR NOVEMBER




                                                                      8
                                                                      8           17
                                                                                  17
                                                               15
                                                               15                      6
                                                                    16
                                                                    16                 6
                      VARES                                                       18
                                                                                  18




                                                                                     M
                                                            NORTH




                                                                                      AR
                                                             11
                                                             11
                                                           MOUNTAIN
                                                                 13
                                                                 13
                                                                                12
                                                                                12
                                                                                       5
                                                                                       5    2
                                                                                            2
              COAST                  CENTRAL                                           7
                                                                                       7    1
                                            9                                               1
                                            9
                                                                                       14
                                                                                       14   3
                                                                                            3




                                                                                       WASSA
                                                              SOUTH
                                                             MOUNTAIN

                                                                                  10
                                                                                  10   4
                                                                                       4




1. 31 October - Wassaville - Two unidentified, armed persons robbed the Suremian Eagle Bank in
   Wassaville. The robbers netted about $2,000 (USD) No reported casualties.


2. 2 November - Wassa Province - Free Wassa People's Front (FWPF) fighters burnt two trucks in the
   border area near Ash village. No reported casualties.


3. 2 November - Wassaville Refugee Camp (South of Wasaville in restricted access area) - Soldiers
   arrested seven Free Wassa People's Front (FWPF) fighters. They recovered 4 pistols, 57 pistol
   rounds and about 19 million Surem in cash.


4. 2 November - Luck, South Mountain Province - The South Mountain branch of the Suremian Red
   Crescent evacuated two male corpses from the Wassa River. The men were identified as Tuleran
   refugees from the Tuleran town of Putter. Reports indicate that they were killed in a dispute with an
   illegal Wassa River ferry operator.


5. 3 November - Ash border area, Wassa Province - Gun battles between FWPF and Suremian soldiers
   east of Wassaville area resulted in the deaths of one soldier and five FWPF members.
6. 4 November - Xynas, Mar Province - An FWPF attack on a Suremian Border patrol resulted in the
   death of one officer.



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7. 5 November - Wassaville - During a speech in Wassaville city, the military commander for Wassa
   Province warned all residents to stop donating funds and goods to FWPF.


8. 7 November - Mardonian Rebel forces (MFF) attacked soldiers in the Marmot area who were part of a
   routine border security patrol. No casualties were reported.


9. 10 November - The Central Province Red Crescent evacuated a male corpse from the Turos market.
   The body is unidentified, but SIP officers say that the wounds indicate that the man's throat was cut.


10. 20 November - Luck, South Mountain Province - Two male persons found dead in a street in Luck.
    Both were later identified as being residents of Putter, in Tulera.


11. 20 November - Mount, Northern Mountain Province - Gun battles between FWPF and Suremian
    soldiers in the Mount area, resulted in the death of 3 FWPF fighters.


12. 22 November - Po, North Mountain Province - Soldiers shot dead one FWPF member when they
    attacked an FWPF camp on the outskirts of Po town. They recovered one pistol and a dozen rounds.


13. 27 November, - Salt Rock-Po Road, border of North and South Mountain Provinces - Female civilian
    murdered in automobile ambush by an unidentified person 10k East of Salt Rock.


14. 30 November - Wassaville City Hall - Soldiers shot dead two FWPF members when the latter were
    trying to escape from custody.


15. 30 November - Marmot, North Mountain Province - During an incident in the mountain area north of
    Marmot, two civilians were shot dead and five others injured by a launched grenade


16. 30 November - Marmot, North Mountain Province - A routine security patrol discovered four hectares
    of marijuana field in the mountain border area. The military later claimed that Mardonian refugees
    owned the marijuana field.


17. 30 November - Mink, Mar Province - FWPF attacked a vehicle convoy of the Suremian Army
    Administrative Commander for Mink on the Mink-Wassaville Road. Two civilians were shot dead, one
    officer was wounded, and another officer disappeared with his M-16 rifle during the contact.


18. 30 November - Mink, Mar Province - Soldiers raided an FWPF cache in the Mink village area. They
    recovered 513 AK-47 rounds, one computer, one FWPF flag, two Mardonian army camouflage
    uniforms, 25 FWPF tee shirts and one banner. No reported casualties.
                                                  END




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                                                    International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




Session 2.1 Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

Reading 2.1.1. Risk Assessment Using the Risk Matrix


Purpose: To introduce some key aspects relating to risk. This should allow you and your agency or office
to carry out simplified risk assessment within your own organisation


1. Key Aspects


Security of What?
    Affects Personnel, Information, Property – all need to be protected
Risk
    All activities carry some form of risk. Risk management is how we deal with that risk
    Risk can be described in various ways. These include :
        Risk = Threat or Hazard x Vulnerability
        Risk = Probability x likely Impact (seriousness)
    Vulnerability may depend upon race, nationality, age, sex, ethnic group, language, religion, etc.
    It is fairly easy to define individual threats or hazards – these may be a mixture of natural (hazards) or
    man- made security (threats)
    Give examples of threats/hazard in your job :
    How will you find out about threats and hazards? Speak to people. Read the local and international
    press. Discussit colleagues. Look, really listen to what peopl on the street are saying. Analyse not
    only past and present threats but also be pro-active in planning ahead - look for threats that may arise
    due to political events, holidays, etc.
    Security threats tend to come from 5 main sources:
    -   Military & terrorist activities
    -   Politically motivated actions
    -   Criminal action
    -   Action by disaffected population
    -   Action by disaffected staff
    You can use the Risk Matrix to look at each threat or hazard and discuss with colleagues the aspects
    of risk associated with each threat or hazard you list.




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                                                                 RISK MATRIX
                                 VERY
                                 HIGH
                                 HIGH
                                 MEDIUM
SEVERITY OF THE EVENT




                                 LOW
                                 VERY
                                 LOW




                                           VERY          LOW         MEDIUM          HIGH          VERY
                                           LOW                                                     HIGH



                                                    PROBABILITY OF EVENT HAPPENING


Using the Risk Matrix


                        This lets us record both the degree of probability and likelihood of impact, for a more rational
                        understanding of overall risk
                        You will need to plot various threats/hazards on this matrix in order to discuss and
                        understand the relative risk of various events that may occur. This tool and its use as an
                        exercise are subjective, so it is best done by groups in order to get group consensus if
                        possible



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                        After plotting several threats on the matrix, try to determine a line or threshold of acceptable risk
                        (again this will be a very subjective line !)
                        Note that after plotting the threats, you can now rank risks (from highest risk downwards). Remember
                        that this will vary greatly between agencies.
                        The goal of risk management is to push each threat down towards the left-hand corner of the matrix.
                        You should actively look for ways and strategies to accompish this remembering that there may be
                        other factors ready to push threats up towards top right hand corner
                        Regular revisiting this matrix and updating will help show you trends in the overall security
                        environment, as well as help you evaluate if you are really reducing your risk in any significant ways.


                                           SAMPLE RISK MATRIX RECORDED OVER TIME
                                 VERY
                                 HIGH
                                 HIGH
                                 MEDIUM
SEVERITY OF THE EVENT




                                 LOW
                                 VERY
                                 LOW




                                           VERY           LOW         MEDIUM         HIGH          VERY
                                           LOW                                                     HIGH



                                                     PROBABILITY OF EVENT HAPPENING




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Risk Management


      A Risk Management Approach includes the following elements:
          -    Identifies each Risks
          -    Assess Risks :
          -    Each risk can be tackled in one of three ways:
               Risk Prevention
               Risk Reduction
               Risk Acceptance and Preparedness
-     Action
-     Monitor performance/change


To do in Field
      Meet with staff and do Risk Assessment (plot out threats on Risk Matrix)
      Prioritise Risks
      Look at ways of preventing / minimising / accepting and preparing for) main risks


    Further Reading
                                                    Books
-     K. van Brabant, 2000, Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Overseas
      Development Institute, London, UK




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 Exercise 2.1.2. Using the Risk Matrix With Your Own Case study


This exercise will be done by 5 working groups. Each group is required to agree on a situation that at
least two people in the group know well enough to explain it to the others in the same group. If you are in
a group that is discussing a situation that you are not familiar with, your role will be to clarify the situation
by questioning and repeating the threats your own words to be sure you (and the rest of the group) truly
understand the threats and risk being described. Use the matrix below for your own notes. Select one
person form the group to draw up the final matrix on a flipchart for review in plenary.


                        Step 1: brainstorm a list of threats for your groups' situation. (no more than 10 maximum)
                        Step 2: As a group place the threats from you list on the matrix
                        Step 3: Rank the threats from 1-10 on the matrix


                                                   CASE STUDY RISK MATRIX
                            VERY
                            HIGH
                            HIGH
                            MEDIUM
SEVERITY OF THE EVENT




                            LOW
                            VERY
                            LOW




                                       VERY          LOW        MEDIUM          HIGH          VERY
                                       LOW                                                    HIGH



                                                PROBABILITY OF EVENT HAPPENING




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                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.



Reading 2.1.3. Acceptance-Protection-Deterrence


Reprinted here in part from the article NGO Field Security, by Randolph Martin, printed in the Forced
Migration Review from April 1999, issue #4. For the complete articles and other articles and information
about the Forced Migration Review, see their website at: http://www.fmreview.org/


NGO Field Security
Unfortunately, security is often conceptualised in terms of military or police models which appear (albeit
superficially) to emphasise equipment and tactics. While there is much that we can learn from these
models, NGO security is far more complex. Fancy communications gear, logistics capabilities and com-
pound security have their place, but are only a small part of what constitutes security for aid workers.
At IRC, each field office must adapt a local security protocol which includes each of the three elements of
the security triangle: acceptance, protection and deterrence. An effective local security protocol must
balance all three elements. A strong acceptance strategy with supportive protection and deterrence
elements is ideal. However, where local conditions limit the effectiveness of the acceptance strategies, it
is necessary to build stronger protection and deterrence capabilities.


1. Acceptance - softening the threat
This is when the community in which an NGO is working accepts and supports the NGO’s presence, and
out of that acceptance grows security. Lest ‘acceptance’ appear too utopian, note that acceptance
strategies include the security which may be provided by local law enforcement authorities. Some of the
elements of acceptance are:
• The belligerent parties/combatants or the official or de facto authorities in the NGO’s area of work give
their consent to the NGO’s activities.
• The community has a stake in the programme and participates actively.
• The community has been involved in the assessment and design of the programme.
• The community is involved in the evaluation of the programme.
• The NGO’s mission is transparent and broadly communicated.
• The NGO’s activities are perceived as impartial.
• The NGO’s staff and presence are culturally and politically sensitive.
• The NGO’s programme reflects local priorities.
• The NGO has developed good work-ing relationships with local govern-mental authorities, including the
police and military where appropriate.
• The NGO’s programmes reflect basic development concepts and a willingness to invest the time and
effort to involve the community in every facet of project assessment, planning, implementation and
evaluation.




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                                            ACCEPTANCE



                                    THE SECURITY TRAINGLE

                             PROTECTION                     DETERRENCE



Acceptance is the cornerstone of security for NGOs with a development mandate, but is often challenged
under the timeframes and political circumstances in which NGO relief efforts take place. In war-time relief
operations, acceptance by the beneficiary community may seem to be grossly overshadowed by the
hostility of one or more of the combatants. For example, Bosnian acceptance of NGO operations in
Sarajevo was overshadowed by Serb hostility, making it necessary for NGOs to build strong protection
and deterrence strategies. In emergency operations, the pressure to get programmes moving may limit
the ability of staff to thoroughly involve the local community. However, it is imperative that NGOs do not
let a limited vision of mission obscure this critical element in the security triangle and core element in
quality programming: the community’s involvement.


2. Protection - "hardening the target"
This is the element that many people most readily associate with security, though it is by no means the
most important element in the triangle. Elements of ‘protection’ are presented under three main headings:
Protection devices: the materials and equipment needed to provide adequate security, such as:
• Communications equipment
• Reliable vehicles and maintenance facility
• Perimeter security devices including walls, barbed wire and alarm systems
• Flak jackets and helmets
• Use (or non-use) of the NGO emblem (or other symbols)


Operational policies & procedures: the institutional mechanisms which enhance security, such
as:
• Clear and equitable national staff per-sonnel policies - including grievance procedures - which are
communicated to staff and implemented consistently.
Incidents involving disgruntled staff are one of the largest causes of security infractions for NGOs.
• Clear financial policies and procedures including division of responsibility in accounting, and prudent
cash transfer procedures
• Clear vehicle operations policies and strict discipline regarding vehicle operations
• Curfews and no-go zones where appropriate
• Development of and/or participation in a ‘warden system’ or communications pyramid for conveying
emergency messages


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• Communications protocol, training and disciplined radio usage
• Security orientation for incoming staff and routine security briefings for staff including personal security
training
• Convoy operations protocol
• Visitor screening protocol
• Clear and consistent discipline for infractions of security policy, including the inclusion of security
compliance in routine performance reviews


Coordinated operations: the activities which NGOs are able to carry out together, thereby creating
a ‘strength in numbers’ strategy, such as:
• Active membership in NGO coordinating bodies
• Active relationship and coordination with the United Nations
• Collaborative convoy operations
• Integrated communications
• Collaborative monitoring, community policing, etc


Some elements of protection are important in all situations, even in stable settings where acceptance is
the primary strategy. Good communications, sound policy structures and inter-agency coordination are
always the mark of quality operations.
Protection strategies need to be enhanced if conditions deteriorate and become less effective, but should
never be viewed as an alter-native to strong community support.


3. Deterrence - posing a counter threat
Most NGOs are not large enough, nor an appropriately suited actor, to pose a credible counter threat on
their own. The focus of deterrence strategies is the relationships which we are able to build with larger
regional or international institutions:


Diplomatic deterrence: This is the product of an NGO’s relationship to larger international actors who
can exert diplomatic pressure on our behalf, influencing local authorities and actors who either pose
security threats themselves or who are well placed to promote the security interests of the NGOs, but are
not adequately doing so. This is a very important element in the security strategy in any country of
operations. Elements include:
• The quality of our relationship with
key diplomatic missions
• The quality of our relationship with
the United Nations
• The quality of our participation in
NGO coordinating bodies which are capable of presenting a unified front


Guards: The use of guards is a common deterrent strategy at NGO facilities around the world. Oddly,
there are very few instances where NGOs have developed strong professional guidelines for this very
common deterrent force. Uniforms, basic training, incident debriefing and provision of basic equipment

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(ranging from a night stick and flashlight to VHF radios) are among the cornerstones. Coordinated
interagency monitoring greatly strengthens the effect of guards.


Military deterrence: This is the least common form of deterrent strategy, usually appearing in
conjunction with peace-keeping missions when NGOs formally coordinate activities with external inter-
national military forces. We have witnessed this in northern Iraq, in Somalia and in Bosnia. In each case,
NGOs have worked closely with international military coalitions who have provided a military security
umbrella under which NGOs have been able to implement humanitarian assistance programmes.
Needless-to-say, military deterrent strategies are less than ideal and should only be pursued when the
other elements of the security triangle are clearly insufficient.


Threat assessment and response
Threat assessment should accompany any initial programme assessment, and be carried on continually
during programme operations. Like programme assessments, security threat assessments should include
a wide variety of inputs from the United Nations, the embassies and national government, through to
other NGOs, local government and community leaders and finally individuals in the community. In the
simplest terms, it is a matter of identifying what security threats are of the highest probability and greatest
consequence to an NGO’s operations and prioritising resources to these threats accordingly.


The security triangle in practice
There is an appropriate place for each point of the security triangle under any type of security threat, from
land-mines to burglary, even though the emphasis may shift between acceptance, protection and
deterrence.
Liberia, Somalia and Afghanistan are among those countries where car theft has meant not only a loss of
property but a security risk to staff. Learning that one of the enticements to theft of NGO property in these
settings has been the knowledge that NGOs will not retaliate through vendetta, IRC has limited the risk by
renting vehicles from the local community instead of purchasing new vehicles. An indirect benefit of this
approach is that more funds go into the local economy, assuaging an issue which often embitters local
communities. This acceptance strategy focusing on a local community may be of limited use when
travelling between distant locations. In these situations, protection strategies such as sound vehicle
protocols governing routes taken, times of travel, communications en route, use of convoys, etc, become
much more important.


Deterrence strategies also play a role; in Afghanistan, IRC coordinated with several other NGOs to
suspend assistance to a particular district until the community returned several stolen vehicles.
Official harassment is typical in situations where an NGO is assisting a group persecuted by the host
government, or where NGOs are operating across lines of confrontation. Bribery is not a good strategy
here, as it only exacerbates the problem for all concerned over time.
Acceptance strategies can work under these circumstances. During the war in Bosnia, IRC faced great
difficulties bringing assistance into Serb-surrounded Sarajevo. Opening primary health care programmes
and a winter heating programme in Republika Srpska greatly enhanced IRC’s ability to negotiate
passage, while not compromising our man-date in the region.
Similarly, singling out refugee or returnee groups from a larger community which might also be in
desperate need can also undermine security. IRC health programmes in northern Sudan have sought to
provide assistance in a balanced way to Northerners as well as Southerners. Similarly, our ongoing
programmes for Serb refugees in Yugoslavia may provide a degree of acceptance for IRC in post-conflict
Kosovo or for current operations in Montenegro. Protection strategies can also mitigate against official
harassment.


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Training of staff in methods of conflict diffusion is helpful. Staff need to be well oriented in the agency’s
mandate and mission and be able to represent the NGO in a mature and non-threatening way. Finally,
the deterrence strategies centre on the relationship between the NGO and the larger political actors who
may be able to cajole a hostile government when all else fails.


Conclusion
These brief examples suggest rounded strategies for each threat. There are clearly advantages and
disadvantages to any strategy, which must be weighed within the context of each local environment.
In Liberia, for example, the poor quality of rented cars and their drivers eventually posed a greater risk
than car theft, and the policy was abandoned. Thus, flexibility and local control over security policies are
an imperative. When developing security policies, field managers should first identify the key risks in the
local environment based upon probability and consequence. Risks of high probability and/or high
consequence should be the primary focus of agency attention and resources.


Secondly, for each of these key risks, the field manager needs to carefully and creatively consider each of
the three strategies - acceptance, protection and deterrence - in devising an appropriate local response.
Security for humanitarian staff operations is too often viewed in terms of military models or, worse yet,
overlooked as an inevitable and inalterable aspect of working in humanitarian crises. In fact, there is a lot
that can be done to enhance security in humanitarian operations. However, security in humanitarian
operations calls for a new paradigm that weighs not only the familiar equipment and technology of
security but also the dynamics of community support, inter-agency coordination and diplomatic influence.


Randolph Martin is Senior Director
for Operations at the International
Rescue Committee, New York.
1 Dan Smith with the International Peace Research
Institute, The State of War and Peace Atlas, Myriad
Editions Limited, 1997, p13.
2 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 1995, Oxford
University Press, p26.
3 Smith, op cit p26.
4 Van Brabant K ‘Cool ground for aid workers.
Towards better security management in aid agencies’,

Disasters 22 (2), pp109-125, 1998.




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Session 2.2 Organizational Image and Acceptance

                                                                   1
Reading 2.2.1. Image, Acceptance And Reciprocity

(Adapted from ODI and Red R Training Materials)



Problem Statement:

The way in which an agency's presence and actions are perceived and interpreted strongly influences its
security. If there is resistance to its presence or role, that resistance may develop into resentment and
become a potential threat. If perceived by criminals and bandits as a wealthy and soft target, then
agencies and their staff become vulnerable to theft, looting and attack.

Contributing Factors

•   The assumption that most people in our operational environment have an understanding of the
    mandates, nature, role, potential and constraints of humanitarian agencies.
•   The assumption that simply claiming our work is impartial and beneficial is sufficient and does not
    need to be demonstrated.
•   We make many verbal statements about ourselves; nevertheless, we tend to be blind and
    unconscious to the many non-verbal messages we convey.
•   Others may deliberately construct and portray a very different, more negative and potentially
    dangerous image of us.

Preventive Measures

•   Differentiate between the various categories or groups of people who are likely to create an image of
    you.
•   Prioritize which groups you want to have a positive image of you, and what image you want that to be.
•   Develop communications and public relations strategies to convey your desired image to those
    identified as priority groups.
•   Examine the aspects of your appearance, behavior and role in terms of the implicit messages and
    images these contain. Continuously question your appearance, behavior and role in those terms, and
    seek feedback from others.
•   Involve the civilian populations in shaping your role and work. Eliciting a sense of joint responsibility
    will help you achieve a successful program and secure operating environment.

Mitigation

If a problem occurs, you need to

•   clarify the misunderstanding or misinterpretation, if that is the cause of the problem;

1
 Orginal material developed by Koenraad van Brabant; Overseas Development Institute, Portland House, Stag Place, London
SW1E 5DP, UK; +44-171-393-1674; fax: +44-171-393-1699; e-mail: k.brabant@odi.org.uk




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•   correct your appearance and behavior, if that is where the problem originated;
•   counter negative images constructed by others and reaffirm your message, if the problem was caused
    by a disregard for it; and
•   reassess your capacity to shape and control your agency' perception and image of its role in your
    operating environment.


A. DIFFERENT IMAGES

1. The Images Portrayed by an Agency

1.1 What agencies say
Mandates. At one basic level, all humanitarian agencies have a comparable mandate: to save lives,
relieve suffering and distress and, where possible, protect livelihoods. At another level, they have slightly
different, although mostly complementary mandates: some agencies will focus on specific social groups—
women, children, refugees, the elderly and the handicapped—while others will focus on specific sectors
of work—water and sanitation, food security, health and shelter.

Missions: The specific mission in an operational environment may also be different from the general
mission: in certain contexts, for example, an NGO may have combine a longer-term "developmental"
commitment with emergency response, but, in other contexts, that same NGO may limit itself to
responding to the acute emergency, with the intention of withdrawing altogether once the situation has
stabilized

Two common problems are

•   The mission is not clearly defined at the outset, and the agency goes into the operational environment
    without being clear about what it intends to do
•   "Mission creep": as the circumstances change and the agency's work and role develop, new
    responsibilities are added onto the mission in an informal and random way.

An agency has to be able to explain its mandate, its specific mission and its capability and constraints in a
given operational environment. It has to be able to explain this to a variety of audiences: ranging from the
senior government official with whom a Memorandum of Understanding is negotiated, to the suspicious
child soldier at a rebel force roadblock. Clearly, the same language cannot be used in every context.

We can now ask some basic, but important, questions:

•   Are you able to communicate a clear message about your presence and role?
•   Do you have a clear idea what "humanitarian action or assistance" means?
•   Are you clear about your mission, your capabilities and constraints?
•   Can you communicate this clearly in a variety of contexts?
•   Do your staff have a fairly clear understanding of what "humanitarian action/assistance" means and of
    what your mission, capabilities and constraints are?
•   Are changes in your mission consciously considered and decided upon, and are the meanings and
    implications of such changes clearly understood by your staff?
•   Are they clearly communicated to those who need to know?
•   Have you communicated a clear message about your presence and role?




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Humanitarian agencies may assume that others may have more knowledge and understanding about
who they are, why they exist and what their role and responsibilities are than is actually the case.


1.2 How agencies appear and how their role and work is experienced
It is incorrect to assume that other people's perception and interpretation of your presence and role, is
solely derived from what you yourself say. Specific messages and images are conveyed through your
appearance, physical infrastructure and staffing, the behavior of your staff and the intended and
unintended effects of your presence and program work, of which you may well be completely unaware.


2. Alternative Perceptions
Others may very well receive your official message, but also have an alternative perception of your
agency. Put yourself in the position of the power brokers and consider some possible perceptions of
yourself and your staff that are less than flattering:

•   You are perceived as young and rather naive foreigners who are not to be taken too seriously and
    who can be easily manipulated for personal gain.
•   The agency is represented by a woman and, as a woman, she is less deserving of respect and not to
    be taken too seriously; thus, she can be manipulated or even directed around on your terms
•   The agency is represented by a national staff member who comes from a different region, has a lower
    social standing, etc. and who is, therefore, less deserving of respect. As a result, he can be
    manipulated or directed around on your terms.
•   You are foreigners who are ignorant about the subtle history and issues of the conflict and the current
    power politics and, therefore, dangerously open to manipulation by one's enemies.
•   You are foreigners who don't understand anything about the social and cultural environment you are
    working in, and who behave in ways that are not deserving of respect.
•   As organized altruistic behavior does not occur in a given environment, you are obviously just another
    self-serving party who is trying to hide its real motives.

Also put yourself in the position of criminals and bandits, and consider some possible perceptions that are
less attractive:

•   As foreigners you are, per definition, wealthy.
•   As western women you are, per definition, loose about sex.
•   The way your foreign staff dress, party, are intimate in public, etc. confirm that they are loose about
    sex.
•   The way you dress, your vehicles and the way you travel clearly confirms your personal wealth.
•   The way the office looks, the number of staff and cars and the material goods that you handle confirm
    you as a wealthy organization.
•   You travel without protection and your stores are not well guarded; therefore, you are an easy target
•   You identify your offices and your residences with your emblem—a pacifist emblem—therefore, you
    are also a soft target.


3. Counterimages Portrayed by Others
In a tense and politicized environment, others may quite consciously portray, in more or less systematic
ways, a very different and potentially dangerous image of who you are and what your purpose and role is.
You may be portrayed as


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•   an agent of Western imperialism or neo-colonialism;
•   a cover for the CIA or other intelligence service;
•   a cultural imperialist trying to disseminate immoral and destructive western values;
•   a Christian agency intent on proselytizing and converting;
•   a sympathizer and supporter of the enemy; or
•   a cover for the smuggling of weapons and other supplies to the enemy.

The more your presence and role is seen as a threat to the interests of other power brokers, the greater
the risk that they will construct and disseminate a negative image of you that may eventually result in a
threat.


B. PERCEPTIONS AND WHAT INFLUENCES THEM

1. Verbal Communications and Meetings
In the previous sections we have highlighted the importance of developing a clear view of your mission,
principles and role, and of communicating that clearly to different audiences.


1.1 All staff communicate
Individual agency staff communicate may times a day about your agency. Senior representatives may
handle the formal encounters with high officials of the government, the belligerents and other agencies,
but it is the program staff that is most likely to be dealing with local level government officials, with armed
fighters at roadblocks, with local counterparts and with the various populations (target, host, en route).
Further, the drivers run errands, talk to local shopkeepers, chat in the local bar or coffeehouse, and may
be acting as the translator on field trips. They, rather than the managers, may be the ones that probably
interact most with a large number of outsiders. You may want to consider training them on communicating
about your agency, and take corrective action when they make statements that could jeopardize the
overall image and security of the agency.


In Sri Lanka, for example, an agency suspended a Tamil driver who, during a working seminar of the
agency at a hotel, had been boasting to the Sinhalese waiters and room staff that the agency was
planning an important humanitarian intervention in Jaffna, to rescue its urban population that had fled the
town in the face of an offensive by the approaching government army of overwhelmingly Sinhalese
composition. Whereas the comments would have been insensitive in any circumstance in a country riven
by ethnic strife, at the time the national media were vilifying humanitarian agencies and accusing them of
supporting the Tamil rebels, who were under strong military pressure from the government, with
international humanitarian assistance. The media insinuations had created a country-wide climate of
suspicion against foreign agencies, to the point that it had become advisable to liaise with the local police
if one planned a seminar or workshop anywhere. The agency managers, therefore, took care to fully
discuss the affair with the hotel management, to clarify their mission, role and position, and to correct the
partisan image that had been unwittingly been portrayed by the driver.



1.2 Public and restricted fora, on and off the record
Bear in mind that statements made at restricted fora may still find their way into the public domain. This
can relate to statements made at interagency coordinating meetings, at meetings with government
officials or with the leaders of warring groups. There may be all sorts of reasons why a statement is


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"leaked" in a more or less distorted form. Obviously this cannot be fully controlled, but you may want to
pay attention to who participates in a restricted forum, and if you cannot control that, to what you say and
how.

Statements "off the record" to journalists or people who belong to any party involved in the conflict need
to be carefully considered. The best journalists, for example, are aware of the highly sensitive nature of
and the need to safeguard the image of agencies operating in conflict areas. They will use your
information only to strengthen their own overall analysis. The less careful ones, or those in need of a
story, will print the information, but attribute it to a "senior UN" or a "senior NGO" official. The individual
source is not revealed, but an image is portrayed of an alleged line of thought among the humanitarian
agencies. The worst journalists do not respect the difference between "on" and "off" the record.

An agency or group of agencies can choose to make a public statement. The content and, therefore,
impression of a written press release is much easier to keep under control than a press conference or a
live/recorded interview. In press conferences and live interviews questions can be asked that have not
been anticipated, that you have not had time to adequately answer or with insinuations that you cannot
then and there convincingly counter. On the other hand, the refusal to consent to a live interview may be
construed as a sign that you have something to hide. A written press release is, of course, still vulnerable
to editing. In principle, is mainly to shorten them to fit the available space, but bear in mind that many
editors "sharpen" some of the points and positions expressed, removing the nuances that you had
carefully introduced.


1.3 The messages of meetings
Messages and images are not only conveyed during the meeting, but also through the type of meeting
that takes place. Where a meeting takes place, who is invited, what the seating arrangements are, what
the protocol is, etc. are all well known aspects of diplomacy, and also play their role in the practice of
humanitarian agencies.

•   There is a difference between the Ministry of Health calling for a meeting on health, and the
    interagency task force on health doing so.
•   There is a difference between agencies making a joint representation to a government office at the
    government's building, and government representatives attending interagency meetings in UN or NGO
    premises.
•   There is a difference between seeing a rebel commander in his own headquarters and meeting him at
    your field office.
•   Summoning the local elders to one's office or, alternatively, going to see the elders in their own social
    environment conveys very different messages about the existing relationship.
•   Conducting a meeting in an agency meeting room, with everyone sitting on chairs around tables
    arranged in a rectangular format, is different from meeting in a traditional "guesthouse" type of room,
    where everyone sits on carpets and cushions against the wall.

There are also cultural customs to meetings: in certain settings the participants will expect that everyone
can and must speak. Denying someone the opportunity to speak, even if only for lack of time, can be
seen as offending and raise accusations of manipulation.

Who decides how long a meeting can last also, obviously, sends an important message. Sometimes
when people have come to your agency to make what you quickly realize are unacceptable demands, it
may make tactical sense to spend more time than you need to convey your message, until the visitors
want to conclude the meeting themselves. You will have to balance the efficient management of your time
against the effects of appearing brusque and impolite.

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1.4. Diplomatic socializing
It is not uncommon for agency staff to develop relationships, and thereby a good image, through informal
meetings. Informal meetings have the advantage that one can relax in one's role and thereby seek
common ground on an apparently more personal basis. This, too, is standard diplomatic practice.

Government officials are invited to private dinners or parties at the residence of the agency
representative. You play squash or tennis with the brigadier in the local sportsclub. You accept the
hospitality of the tribal leader who has a goat or sheep slaughtered in your honor.

The advantage is that you may develop a more relaxed relationship and a personal connection, which
translates into greater understanding and cooperation in the professional sphere. Bear in mind, however,
that the other party may be doing exactly the same thing, and creating a personal connection to keep you
better in check in that professional sphere. There is always the danger of a fundamental dilemma arising:
can you denounce the massacres carried out be rebel troops if you have been socializing with rebel
leaders? Can you accuse the local army unit of human rights violations if every weekend you drink with
the captains and lieutenants in the bar?


2. Agency Appearance
An agency also conveys images through its general appearance. This includes what sort of offices it uses
and where these are located, what sort of transport it uses and even what sort of security measures it
takes.

Where an office is located can convey a message: is it close to the center in the capital, where other
power brokers are housed, or in an ordinary neighborhood?


In Angola, the DHA unit that, between 1993-95, took the lead in coordinating the humanitarian assistance,
found accommodation separate from the main UN building and the UNAVEM building (Angola Verification
Mission), thereby physically symbolizing the independence of the UN's humanitarian mission from its
political and military missions.


How the office looks also conveys a message: an agency in a big building with many floors, heavily
stacked with high tech computers and radio equipment, conveys a different image from one that works
from more modest premises that appear less imposing and more accessible to ordinary people.

The ostentatious display of material wealth, conveyed through expensive offices in the expensive parts of
town and expensive vehicles, may create resentments and stimulate the interest of looters and criminals.


3. Staff Composition
All societies consist of social groupings that distinguish themselves from each other. That can be along
ethnic, religious and/or political lines, in rural-urban terms, in gender terms, in terms of relative wealth and
education, etc. What sort of groupings the staff of your agency is composed of, and who occupies the
senior and junior posts, influences the image of your agency. Where tension or conflict exists between
different social groupings, your staff composition can inspire trust or distrust.

The politics of staffing, therefore, goes further than the question of salary scales or of the relationships
between international and national staff. Especially in conflict situations, group affiliations can acquire
great prominence and come to play a role in the way an agency is perceived. Perceived "unbalanced"

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representation in the overall staffing or the perceived domination of one group in the agency's hierarchy
can give rise to suspicions and accusations that can potentially escalate into threats and violence.

An equal opportunities policy, and a recruitment policy based on skill, may be very defensible in a
western context and under stable circumstances, but may have to be negotiated and argued in a
politicized context with very limited employment opportunities. It may also give rise to an unbalanced staff
composition that creates its own problems.

The one disadvantage of recruiting staff so as to have a defensible "representation" of the various
relevant social groups, is that the agency may be internalizing the conflict that exists between these social
groups. In this instance, the need to clearly argue the agency's position and principles will increase, as
the agency staff have become a primary audience in need of convincing.


4. The Appearance and Behavior of Agency Personnel
Many implicit messages are conveyed by speech and behavioral styles and dress codes. Especially in
cross-cultural understandings, these may lead to misunderstandings that can negatively affect the image
of the agency's staff and, by extension, the agency itself. It is not possible, nor perhaps even necessary,
to provide every international staff member with a thorough training in anthropology, but a good briefing
on and monitoring of interactional styles can help avoid many problems.

In the name for freedom and liberty many taboos no longer exist in western societies, but this does not
mean that western societies have become a better place or that the provision of humanitarian assistance
is the right setting to practice and preach one's own values. It may be worthwhile to bear in mind and to
mention, that one is a "guest" in another country. While, on the one hand, hospitality is lavished on
guests, who are also treated with tolerance, on the other, the guest is expected to respect the host's
sensitivities and to observe key protocol.

It is also relevant to note that the Red Cross/Red Crescent and INGO Code of Conduct in disasters,
published in 1994 and that a large number of agencies have signed on to, states the commitment to
respect culture and custom as one of its ten points. This, then, raises the question whether you in your
agency are prepared to provide guidance and instruction for staff on what constitutes culturally-sensitive
behavior (the better tourist guidebooks now even have a short section on this), and whether you are
prepared to use disciplinary action against staff refusing to show such sensitivity?

The key issue in interactional codes may be: do you show respect to others where it is due, and are you
making others respect you?

Inappropriate behavior by itself may create irritation, anger or resentment, but does not necessarily
translate into a threat. Bear in mind, however, that it is in conflict environments that a humanitarian
agency may become an influential player and power broker. Other power brokers may deliberately create
animosity against you, and will thereby make use of anything that can be seen as offensive.

A primary area of attention are those domains of great cultural sensitivity:

•   Religion. You may not enter a mosque without taking off your shoes. During Ramadan it is important
    to show respect for the changing daily patterns and increased sensitivity of Muslim staff. In some
    Buddhist countries one should not use a Buddha statue as the background for a photograph of friends.
•   Women, particularly the social mixing between men and women. There may be strong cultural
    codes regulating the behavior of women and their interaction with men, especially men with whom
    they have no family relationship. Women may not be expected to appear in a bar or are not allowed to


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    talk to non-related men. There may be more restrictive codes about what is considered "intimate"
    behavior in public, such as holding hands, embracing, kissing, or even any sign of recognition of
    relationship between a man and a woman.
•   Food, and eating and drinking habits. Eating is not only a biological and social act, but also a
    cultural one. There may be restrictions on which food one can eat, with whom one eats (women and
    children may eat separately), how one eats (with the right hand only), etc. There are also differing
    codes about the use of stimulants, especially alcohol. Consuming alcohol together is an important
    social act, but can also create a negative image in certain contexts.

Implicit messages are also conveyed by speech styles. In Highland Ethiopia, for example, social
conventions and interactional patterns stress the recognition of hierarchy and seniority, so that polite and
deferential behavior is expected in body language and speech style, certainly from juniors. A too direct
and "egalitarian" approach will be felt as brusque and impolite and may cause offense. The interactional
ethos of the Somalis, by contrast, is highly egalitarian. In this society, shaped by pastoralist traditions, no
man is, in principle, inherently better than another. Moreover, public speech, some would say, public
rhetoric, is an important component of the art of negotiation. Many western aid workers developed a
negative image of Somalis and felt offended by them, because they present themselves and talk with a
self-confident and sometimes flourishing rhetoric, that for many international aid workers (used to finding
themselves deferentially treated in their positions of authority) appeared provocative. Effective interacting
with Highland Ethiopians and with Somalis, therefore, requires very different styles, as very different
codes are used.

Authority and seniority also have to be acknowledged in Sinhala society in Sri Lanka. A perceived
disrespectful attitude can quickly cause offense and give rise to, at best, a non-cooperative response and,
at worst, an angry outburst against neo-colonial arrogance.

Expressing anger and irritation is, in any context between human beings, a sensitive thing to do. But there
are societies where the social and cultural norms reinforce the prohibition of such expression. Showing
anger and irritation in such a setting is not only shocking in itself, but also because it breaks a strong
social code.

Body decorations are another area often laden with social and cultural messages. Tattoos, earrings for
men, long hair, but also the closely cropped hairstyle of the marines, all may send signals that may or
may not be correctly understood in our own societies and in others. "Skinheads" and the conscious
cultivation of the beard in Islamic movements underline the fact that bodily decorations are not simply a
matter of fashion, but also contain political messages.

If how we dress is an expression of our identity, then we should be able to consciously consider how
others may "read" our dress codes. Presenting yourself in a "shalwar kameez" in Pakistan or Afghanistan
is not the same as presenting yourself in western clothes. For a western man to wear a "sarong" in
Somali society is perfectly acceptable, but for that same man to do so in urban Sri Lanka, where only
working class and lower caste men do so, is to make himself ridiculous. Khaki, safari type clothing may
convey certain images in parts of Africa.

A particularly sensitive area are dress codes for women, which in many patriarchal societies tend to be
prescriptive in terms of covering many parts of the body. Irrespective of whether one agrees with this or
not, it is a fact that many societies articulate their communal integrity in terms of the purity of women.
Women who dress and behave in ways that are different can easily be perceived as a threat or a
corrupting influence on the integrity of a community. Shorts, short skirts, open blouses and sleeveless
shirts, apart from signaling an urban origin in rural areas, can also be seen as socially provocative and
religiously offensive. They may only cause some disapproval; they may also give rise to sexual

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harassment or worse. They can also be used in the rhetorical aggression against an agency by its
opponents, which may generate larger security risks.


5. Presence and Program

5.1 The perception of presence
An agency's image is shaped by if and when it is present during any given situation, and whether it
remains present when the situation becomes more difficult and dangerous. This is an important indicator
of perceived solidarity. Withdrawing at a time when the civilian population remains largely exposed is,
therefore, a very sensitive decision that may leave a strong feeling of abandonment. The question of
sticking it out in dangerous times involves balancing current concerns over effectiveness and security
against future credibility, acceptance and effectiveness. Alternatively, the fact that an agency continues to
work in the belligerent ones territory may give rise to the suspicion by an opponent belligerent that the
agency is, in one way or another, providing special support to that belligerent.


5.2 Institutional amnesia, assessment fatigue and empty promises
A common cause of resentment and negative image formation is the perceived absence of institutional
memory in agencies, assessment fatigue and empty promises.

Populations and other actors notice that new international staff often seem to have to start time and again
from zero and relearn everything about their operating environment, as if the agency is incapable of
institutionalizing its learning. Over time, the fact that the same questions have to be answered or the
same basics explained, may cause resentment and lead to loss of credibility.

"Assessment fatigue" is another cause of resentment. Agencies or interagency missions keep visiting an
area, inquire about the local life and the perceived needs or problems, and then do not take the time to
explain the purpose of an assessment mission and what their interlocutors can and should not expect
from it.

In other instances, agency staff make project promises that then never materialize. Once this happens on
a few occasions, anger is likely to result.


5.3 The politics of allocation and distribution
In socially and politically fragmented or factionalized environments, it may be politically impossible and,
for security reasons, even inadvisable to program according to normally-applicable cost-effectiveness
logic. In principle, a health post must serve refugees or IDPs, as well as the surrounding host population.
In principle, access to the same health post should only be influenced by distance and by the availability
and cost of transport, not by social or political factors; in reality, social and political antagonisms can
effectively prevent access for groups that are theoretically "within reach." Where there is conflict between
groups, there may be no other practical solution than to consider two health posts, two schools, two
boreholes, etc. simply to avoid the conflict that would result if only one resource or service is available.

The Red Cross/Red Crescent and INGO Code of Conduct, as well as the Providence Principles of
humanitarian action, both state that aid priorities will be calculated on the basis of need only. In the
western context, non-discrimination is understood to mean that every needy person will get a share,
whatever group he or she belongs to. Non-discrimination for the populations or for the power brokers in
your operating environment, however, means an "equal share" for the different interest groups.


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In conflicting environments, it may be risky to program on the basis of need only. The agency may
actually cause open conflict to erupt between different groups over its program resources or service,
conflict in which agency property and staff may be at risk. The following are some alternative strategies:

•   Equal share: as mentioned before, the available resources are equally divided among the different
    interest groups.
•   Necessary duplication: where service provision is concerned, each group may have to be given its
    own service infrastructure, e.g. a health post on each side of the dividing line, a school for the refugee
    children and a school for the host population children.
•   Equitable alternation: an agreement is reached that resources or a service are provided on a rotating
    basis, so that all can access them in a fair manner. For example, a mobile health clinic alternates
    between the two social groupings: the host population children attend school in the morning and the
    refugee children in the afternoon, ten houses are first constructed in the territory of one group and
    then ten in the territory of the other group.

The agency may be hereby seen to support the social divide. In conflicts, however, it is often not possible
to provide a resource for common use by groups that have an antagonistic relationship. If one is not
prepared to adopt alternative strategies, then the project may be canceled or the agency engage in
conflict mediation.

One should be wary, however, of agreements that are too quickly reached without more profound
underlying improvements in conflict resolution; as soon as tension and tempers flare up again, the school,
health post or warehouse may be plundered and destroyed as a symbolic act of renewed conflict.

A service provision needs to be seen as relatively fair and defensible by all parties to a conflict. Other
examples can highlight the importance of this principle for an agency's image.


5.5 Controversial programs and resources
In times of need, but also in times of conflict, certain resources are more controversial than others. The
more valued a resource, the higher the potential controversy and the greater the risk of a conflict in which
the agency may be implicated.

Water programs in the arid Somali environment are highly controversial, and conflict easily breaks out
over control over water sources. Thus, an agency wanting to restore the water supply system in Burao,
Somaliland, found itself threatened and intimidated by different factions in the town, each of which wanted
control over this valuable resource. By contrast, water programs in Cambodia are far less controversial.

The repair of houses in villages and towns that became ethnically-divided and segregated in the Bosnian
war is equally controversial. The original owners may have been forced out in a process of ethnic
cleansing, and the houses are now occupied by others belonging to another ethnic group. Any program
for the reconstruction of houses raises the question of whether it consolidates an injustice and is likely to
spark controversy, if not conflict.


5.5 Program effects on patterns of reciprocity and authority
Next to having an awareness of areas of great social and cultural sensitivity and a feel for behavioral and
interactional codes, one does well to pay attention to the intended or unintended effects of ones programs
on patterns of reciprocity and especially authority.




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Conflicts redefine or reawaken group identities, group boundaries and, therefore patterns of reciprocity. In
international wars, larger group identities (national identities) tend to get reinforced, in civil wars it is
smaller group identities that are reinforced (the tribe, or tribal lineage, the ethnic group, etc.), but there are
also patterns of reciprocity that exist within family and neighborhood circles. Ignoring these can create
conflict.

The repair of irrigation canals known as "kareez" in southeast Afghanistan, is potentially conflictual. There
are complex traditions of ownership, use and regulation of the limited overall water supply. These are
easy to overlook or misunderstand, and getting together all the stakeholders may be difficult if several of
them reside as refugees in Pakistan. Sponsoring the repair of the irrigation canals, with and by those that
are present before the refugees return, may create subsequent tensions and conflicts.

The above discussions have mainly considered working across the divide of larger social groupings as
they self-identify in times of conflict. There are, however, social divisions that programs themselves
introduce, which can undermine existing patterns of reciprocity.

Host populations may not make a distinction between themselves and IDPs or refugees if these share the
same larger social identity, but resentment may arise when agencies start focusing their attention and
resources on the refugees and IDPs. Similarly, agencies may be seen to assist the refugees who
repatriate, but not those who stayed and survived during the times of turmoil. This too may give rise to
resentment and tension.

An unintended effect of focusing programs exclusively on women is that they may increase resentment
among the men and, thus, intra-household tension and violence. The unintended effect of designing
programs around the nuclear family may be a weakening of the habit and obligation of reciprocity in the
larger extended family, or among neighbors. Even too much welfare-type distribution of assistance can
create resentment and anger: as one Somali once stated in an angry outburst: "You are reducing our
people to beggars."


The point is that humanitarian assistance may unintentionally undermine existing patterns of reciprocity
that, over time, leave people more vulnerable and therefore resentful.



E. ACCEPTANCE AND RECIPROCITY
Aid agencies can no longer assume that their presence will be welcomed and that they will automatically
be perceived as neutral or impartial. They will have to make a convincing case to local populations and to
belligerents that they not only have a right to be there, but that they are also worth having and respecting.

In order to reduce threats then, an agency may want to operate in ways that do not leave the population
indifferent or turn them against the agency. The agency may seek to operate in ways that are perceived
by the target groups as sensitive, respectful and beneficial. Under such conditions, it is quite likely that
the population will actively try, to the best of its abilities, to share the responsibility for the security of the
agency. This may be by convincing unruly individuals and groups that the agency should be respected
and not stolen from, by forewarning agency staff of possible threats, and by helping with the recovery of
stolen property or a kidnapped staff member.

Where such reciprocity is pursued, agency security can probably not be dissociated from the effort to
extend protection to the civilians. During the Bosnian war, UN and NATO forces often protected aid
convoys and UN troops, but not civilians under fire. This may have been explicable from the viewpoint of


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international politics and the mandate and limitations of UN troops, but it is unlikely to give the
international actors much credibility in the eyes of the local people. In that context, it is not difficult to
imagine an embittered local person not warning international actors about impending danger.


F. COUNTERING A NEGATIVE IMAGE CAMPAIGN
In refugee camps, in the national capital and national media, in areas controlled by one armed group or
another, agencies may get confronted by a deliberate slander campaign that often originates from a party
with a stake in the conflict. The purpose may be simply to intimidate one or more humanitarian agencies
into compliance or withdrawal.

The less people are properly informed about the role and principles of the agency, and the more
indifferent or resentful a population is about their work, the easier it is to create a widespread climate of
opinion that is antagonistic towards the humanitarian agency. Where an agency has left or has created
fertile ground for animosity against it, this can easily be roused by rhetorical agitation. Where the agency
has invested in dissemination and broad public relations, and has a relationship with its target groups, a
slander campaign may have less impact.

The point here is that where there is no understanding of an agency's role and mission, or where some
animosity has already been created, it becomes virtually impossible to effectively counter a slander
campaign when it occurs. Preventive action is once again the key.



(This article has been shortened for inclusion in this workshop guide from the original prepared by Red R)




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Session 2.3. The UN and Humanitarian Security System
Please review pages 324 – 332 of the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies dealing with Staff Safety.


Reading 2.3.1. Security in the Field - Information for Staff Members of the United Nations
System
(reproduced in full from the original except for page numbering system which has been adapted for
inclusion in this text)
                                                           SECURITY IN THE FIELD -
                               Information for staff members of the United Nations System
                                        Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator
                                                      United Nations - New York, 1998
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ...............................................................48
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 48
   THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY CO-ORDINATOR ........................................................................................ 48
     Designated Official............................................................................................................................... 49
     Alternate Designated Official ............................................................................................................... 49
     Representatives of organizations ........................................................................................................ 49
     Field Security Officer............................................................................................................................ 50
     Area Co-ordinators............................................................................................................................... 50
     Wardens............................................................................................................................................... 50
     The Security Management Team ........................................................................................................ 50
     Applicability of security arrangements ................................................................................................. 51
     Peacekeeping forces ........................................................................................................................... 51
     The Security Plan................................................................................................................................. 51
     Security phases ................................................................................................................................... 51
     Security of locally recruited staff members .......................................................................................... 53
     Security phase measures for locally recruited staff ............................................................................. 53
   ARREST AND DETENTION OF STAFF AND/OR DEPENDANTS ............................................................................ 53
   YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES............................................................................................................................. 54
     Before you travel to the duty station .................................................................................................... 54
     Once you arrive at the duty station ...................................................................................................... 55
     Your actions during Security Phases................................................................................................... 55
II. PERSONAL SECURITY GUIDELINES...........................................................................................................56
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 56
   GENERAL .................................................................................................................................................. 56
   AT HOME ................................................................................................................................................... 57
   TRAVELLING .............................................................................................................................................. 58
   DRIVING .................................................................................................................................................... 60
   PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION .......................................................................................................................... 61
III. SURVIVING AS A HOSTAGE .........................................................................................................................61
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 61
   SURVIVAL CONSIDERATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 61
   VICTIM OF AN AIRLINE HIJACKING ................................................................................................................ 63
   POST-RELEASE REACTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 64



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IV. SECURITY FOR CHILDREN ..........................................................................................................................64
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 64
   RULES FOR CHILDREN ................................................................................................................................ 64
   RULES FOR PARENTS ................................................................................................................................. 64
   CHECKLIST FOR BABY-SITTERS ................................................................................................................... 65
   CHILD-WATCH CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................................... 65
V. SECURITY CONCERNS FOR WOMEN..........................................................................................................65
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 65
   SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE STREET ........................................................................................................ 65
   SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK .................................................................................................................. 66
   INDICATIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ........................................................................................................ 66
   RAPE AWARENESS ..................................................................................................................................... 68
VI. COPING WITH STRESS...................................................................................................................................72
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 72
   DEFINITION OF TERMS ................................................................................................................................ 72
   WHAT IS STRESS?...................................................................................................................................... 72
   CUMULATIVE STRESS MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................ 73
   CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT................................................................................................... 74
   SUGGESTIONS FOR FAMILY AND FRIENDS .................................................................................................... 78




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1. The United Nations security management system
Introduction
In each country the primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members of the
United Nations, their spouse and dependants rests with the host government. This responsibility
flows from every government's function of maintaining order and protecting persons and
property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations, their officials and
property, the government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the
United Nations or the government's agreements with individual organizations.
In spite of these responsibilities, there may be instances where the security and protection factors will be
uncertain. To deal with these situations, the organizations of the United Nations have put in place a
system for planning and managing security issues which is aimed at ensuring that there is a coordinated
approach for the protection of staff.
This information booklet has been prepared for distribution to all staff members of the United Nations, as
well as United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, to inform them of the existing security
arrangements and their individual responsibility in this regard. It is based on the Field Security Handbook,
a comprehensive policy document, which has been endorsed by the organizations of the United Nations
system and which is for the use of officials concerned with security. This booklet also contains information
regarding practical, common-sense measures which each staff member can take to minimize the risks
he/she may face.
The security planning and management system of the United Nations comprises several "actors" at
different levels. Some are based at the country level, while others are based at different headquarters
levels. The functioning of this security planning and management system depends on the collaborative
interaction of the various actors in the United Nations system.
The United Nations Security Coordinator
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has appointed a senior official as the United Nations
Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). This official reports directly to the Secretary-General and serves as
his coordinator at United Nations Headquarters. The UNSECOORD is responsible for:
    •   All policy and procedural matters related to security;
    •   Ensuring a coherent response by the United Nations to any emergency situation;
    •   Formulating detailed recommendations aimed at ensuring the security and safety of staff and
        eligible dependants of the United Nations system,
    •   Coordinating, planning and implementing interagency security and safety programmes and for
        acting as the focal point for inter-agency cooperation concerning all security matters;
    •   Assessing on a continuing basis the extent to which staff of the United Nations system and
        operations worldwide are exposed or vulnerable to security problems,
    •   Reviewing security plans formulated ' for United Nations staff in each country and ensuring that
        each duty station has an adequate state of preparedness regarding contingency planning,
    •   On behalf of the Secretary-General, taking all decisions relating to the relocation/evacuation of
        staff members and their eligible dependents from very insecure areas.
    •   Headquarters of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds
The Executive Head of each United Nations organization appoints a Field Security Coordinator at its
headquarters to ensure the necessary liaison between the United Nations Security Coordinator, the
respective organization headquarters and its offices in the field. These individual organization Field
Security Coordinators:
    •   Act as the security focal points for the management of security with respect to their organizations;


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    •   Keep UNSECOORD informed of any security information which comes to their attention;
    •   Support their field offices through periodic contact,
    •   Participate in joint inter-agency security assessment missions,
    •   Ensure that the staff of their organizations comply with system-wide security instructions.
    •   Responsibility for security at the country level
Designated Official
At each duty station, the Secretary -General, in consultation with the executive heads of the other
organizations, appoints one senior official, normally the Resident Coordinator, who is called the
Designated Official for Security. This individual has special responsibility for the security and protection of
all staff members of the organizations and their eligible dependants at the duty station. The Designated
Official shall:
        •   Ensure the security and safety of United Nations personnel in the country;
        •   In this regard, be accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General through
            UNSECOORD,
        •   Constitute a Security Management Team (SMT) to advise him/her on all security-related
            matters;
        •   Prepare, in consultation with the Security Management Team, a security plan for the country-,
        •   Report all security matters to UNSECOORD;
        •   If there is a security phase in effect, grant security clearance for United Nations staff and their
            dependents, if applicable, to enter the country whether on mission or on assignment;
        •   Ensure that all staff members and their dependents are briefed on security measures in place
            at the duty station;
        •   Ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for the security of locally recruited staff
            members-,
        •   Give appropriate security directives to staff members in the expectation that they will be
            followed.


Alternate Designated Official
In the absence of the Designated Official, his/her functions will be assumed by an Alternate Designated
Official, nominated by the Designated Official and Security Management Team and appointed by
UNSECOORD.
Representatives of organizations
At the country level representatives of organizations shall:
        •   Consult with and assist the Designated Official on all matters concerning security and the
            implementation of the country-specific security plan;
        •   Ensure that the Designated Official is provided at all times with updated lists of all staff
            members and their eligible family members;
        •   Ensure that the Designated Official is at all times informed of the whereabouts and
            movements of the organization's staff members and their dependants especially in countries
            where insecurity is high;
        •   Report all incidents which have security implications to the Designated Official;
        •   Comply with all decisions of the Security Management Team.

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Field Security Officer
At duty stations where a full-time security officer is not warranted, one international staff member will
serve as the Field Security Officer. For those duty stations where security is tenuous, a full-time Field
Security Officer will be appointed to assist the Designated Official. The Field Security Officer plays a key
role in organizing and implementing relocations/evacuations of United Nations staff and their eligible
dependants in times of crisis. The Field Security Officer shall:
    •   Assist the Designated Official in carrying out his/her responsibilities with regard to the security of
        staff members and their dependants;
    •   Ensure that all staff members and their dependants are kept fully informed on matters affecting
        their security;
    •   Conduct security surveys of residential areas and premises;
    •   Coordinate United Nations responses to crisis situations on behalf of the Designated Official;
    •   Report all cases in which staff members and their dependants have been victims of conventional
        crime and submit a quarterly incident report recording these cases.
Area Coordinators
Some of the larger countries have specific areas which are separate from the capital city in terms of both
distance and exposure to emergencies. For such areas, the Designated Official and Security
Management Team will appoint Area Coordinators who, on behalf of the Designated Official, will
coordinate and control the security arrangements for the area. Area Coordinators will have responsibilities
similar to those of the Designated Official in their respective area. In addition, he/she will keep the
Designated Official informed of all incidents or developments which have a bearing on the security and
protection of staff members and their dependants.
Wardens
In order to facilitate coordination of the security arrangements, information and instructions, the
Designated Official and Security Management Team will appoint Wardens and Deputy Wardens to
ensure the proper implementation of security in particular, predetermined zones of the city. The zones
covered by a Warden will not be larger than that which would enable him/her to reach staff members on
foot in case of an emergency. Wardens shall:
    •   Ensure the proper implementation of the security plan in their zone of responsibility-,
    •   Visit periodically all domiciles/families of staff members for whom the warden is responsible;
    •   Function as a channel of communication between the Designated Official and staff members in
        their zones;
    •   Ensure that staff members and their dependants in their zones are informed with regard to
        security arrangements and security phases in effect-,
    •   Ensure that security instructions are being followed;
    •   Ensure that United Nations visitors residing temporarily at hotels within their respective zone are
        included in security arrangements.
The Security Management Team
The Security Management Team shall be constituted by the Designated Official to advise him/her on all
security-related matters. The composition and size of the team may vary; however, most representatives
of United Nations agencies, programmes and funds at the duty station are expected to participate. For
duty stations where there are a large number of organizations represented, the Designated Official may
select a limited number of representatives to assist him/her in planning and managing security matters.




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Applicability of security arrangements
Security arrangements apply, in varying degrees, to a wide number of categories of individuals connected
with the work of United Nations organizations. Security arrangements detailed in the Field Security
Handbook are primarily focused on internationally recruited staff members of the United Nations, their
spouse and their dependants, as well as taking into account the situation of locally recruited staff
members, whether nationals or non-nationals of the host country. Most of the security arrangements are
intended to apply to:
    •   All persons in the employ of the organizations, except those who are both locally recruited and
        paid by the hour, their spouse and dependants who are authorized to be at the duty station;
    •   Consultants, officials or experts, including transient personnel, on mission for the organizations of
        the United Nations system;
    •   United Nations volunteers, their spouse and recognized dependants who are authorized to be at
        the duty station; and
    •   United Nations fellows, either non-resident fellows studying in the country, or nationals who are
        on leave from the country of study.


Peacekeeping forces
With respect to United Nations peacekeeping and special missions, military and civilian personnel are
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and/or the Force
Commander or Chief of Staff, as applicable. Under the terms of their contracts, staff members who are
included in the civilian component of the mission are obliged to serve wherever the Organization
considers necessary.
The Security Plan
The primary management tool for security preparedness at the duty station is the Security Plan, which
must be established by each designated Official and Security Management Team. It describes the
various security measures to be taken and arrangements to be followed in the event of serious criminality
or emergency situations such as hostilities, internal disorder or natural disasters. The aim of a Security
Plan is to detail the responsibilities of specific individuals, the actions to be carried out and the sequence
to be followed to ensure the security of staff members and their eligible family members.
Security phases
The United Nations employs five specific security phases to describe those security measures to be
implemented based on the prevailing security conditions in a given country or in parts of a country. These
five phases are standard for all duty stations and must be included in all Security Plans. Following
consultation with the Security Management Team the Designated Official may declare Phases One and
Two at his/her own discretion and notify UNSECOORD accordingly. Phases Three and Four, normally,
will be declared by the Designated Official only with the authorization of UNSECOORD; and Phase Five
normally will be declared by the Designated Official only when the authorization of the Secretary-General
has been obtained through UNSECOORD.
Phases may be implemented in sequential order or as the situation dictates. Situations may occur where
one part of the country is under a different phase than the remainder Of the country. A "return to normal"
may be implemented by the Designated Official with respect to Phases One and Two. If Phases Three,
Four or Five have been implemented, the decision to return to a lower phase will be taken by
UNSECOORD on the advice of the Designated Official.
         The five Phases of the Security Plan are:
          -   Phase One, Precautionary




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           This phase is designed to warn staff members that the security situation in the country or a
           portion of the country is such that caution should be exercised. All travel into the duty station
           requires advance clearance from the Designated Official.
           -       Phase Two, Restricted movement
           This phase signifies a much higher level of alert and imposes major restrictions on the
           movement of all staff members and their families. During Phase Two all staff members and their
           families will be required to remain at home unless otherwise instructed. No travel, either
           incoming or within the country, will occur unless specifically authorized by the Designated
           Official as essential travel. Phase Two is generally of short duration, after which the Phase will
           return to less restrictive terms or will be increased because of the threat.
           -       Phase Three, Relocation
           Phase Three indicates a substantial deterioration in the security situation, which may result in
           the relocation of staff members or their eligible dependants. When recommending Phase Three
           to UNSECOORD, the Designated Official and Security Management Team may recommend any
           of the following mandatory actions:
               • Temporary concentration of all internationally recruited staff members and/or their eligible
                 dependants in one or more sites within a particular area-,
               • Relocation of all internationally recruited staff members and/or their eligible dependants to
                 alternative locations within the country; and/or
                   Relocation outside the country of all eligible dependants of internationally recruited staff
                   members and/or nonessential internationally recruited staff members The determination of
                   essential staff members for security purposes will be made jointly by the Designated Official
                   and the individual representative of the agencies, programmes or funds at the duty station.
           Special Note: As a result of a recent amendment to the Field Security Handbook, spouses of
               internationally recruited staff members may remain, on a voluntary basis and subject to the
               approval of the Designated Official, at a duty station where Phase Three has been
               declared. Should this option be exercised, no evacuation allowances would be payable for
               the individual concerned. This option applies only to Phase Three and only to spouses of
               internationally recruited staff members, never to other dependants.
               -     Phase Four, Emergency Operations
           Phase Four is to enable the Designated Official to recommend to the Secretary-General,
           through the UNSECOORD, the relocation outside the country of all remaining internationally
           recruited staff members except those directly concerned with emergency or humanitarian relief
           operations or security matters. All other internationally recruited staff members who heretofore
           were considered essential to maintain programme activities will be evacuated at this time.
               -     Phase Five, Evacuation
           The decision to initiate Phase Five - which can only be declared following approval by the
           Secretary-General -signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all remaining
           internationally recruited staff members are required to leave.
           The relocation/evacuation of internationally recruited staff members and/or their eligible family
           members will, in the first instance, normally be to a designated safe haven, either inside the
           country or in another country approved by UNSECOORD. Staff members and/or dependants
           who are relocated/evacuated from a duty station may be entitled to evacuation allowances. (For
           more information regarding this matter, please contact your administrative officer.) Following the
           relocation/evacuation, a decision will be taken within 30 days to:
       •       Authorize their return to the duty station;
       •       Reassign staff members, temporarily or otherwise;



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        •      Authorize their return to their respective home country.
Security of locally recruited staff members
            The question of assistance to locally recruited staff members in times of crisis is of great
            concern to the organizations. Under the existing policy, outlined in the Field Security Handbook,
            locally recruited staff members may be evacuated from the duty station in only the most
            exceptional cases in which their security is endangered as a direct consequence of their
            employment by the organizations of the United Nations. A decision in this regard can only be
            made by the Secretary - General, as recommended by UNSECOORD, based on a
            recommendation by the Designated Official.
            There are, however, security arrangements which the Designated Official and Security
            Management Team must put into place to assist locally recruited staff, as follows:
        •      Maintain an updated list of locally recruited staff members and their eligible dependants at the
               duty station. Ibis information includes the name, nationality, title, index number, address,
               telephone number and names of eligible dependants.
        •      Establish a warden system at the duty station to cover all locally recruited staff members and
               their eligible dependants. Where possible, this warden system is to be integrated into the
               warden system for internationally recruited staff.
        •      Assist any locally recruited staff member who may request house identification with United
               Nations markings.
Security phase measures for locally recruited staff
            During the various phases of the Security Plan, the following measures will apply to locally
            recruited staff members:
            Phase One (Precautionary):
                 Locally recruited staff will be alerted in the same manner as internationally recruited staff,
            Phase Two (Restricted movement): Locally recruited staff do not report to work unless otherwise
                instructed;
            Phases Three (Relocation), Four (Programme suspension) and Five (Evacuation):
                 Depending on the actual situation, and in consultation with UNSECOORD, the Designated
                 Official may:
               • Exceptionally permit local staff to absent themselves from the duty station on special leave
                 with pay or may relocate them to a safe area within the country and authorize payment of
                 Daily Subsistence Allowance for a period of up to 30 days-,
               • Give three months salary in advance and, if necessary, a grant to cover transportation
                 costs for themselves and their eligible dependants.
Arrest and detention of staff and/or dependants
Regrettably, it is commonplace for United Nations staff members or their dependants to be arrested. It is
therefore important that all staff members understand their rights as members of the United Nations in
order to handle more effectively any situation in which these rights are violated. Standard procedures
have been established to ensure that if any staff member or consultant or immediate family member,
whether local or international, is arrested or detained, an immediate report with all the required
information is provided to the UNSECOORD and to the employing organization.
            The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which was adopted by
            the General Assembly on 13 February 1946, governs the rights of United Nations staff and their
            eligible dependants. The relevant sections are:
            Article II, Section 3:


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                "The premises of the United Nations shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the
                United Nations, wherever located and by whomever held, shall be immune from the search,
                requisition, confiscations, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by
                executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action."
            Article V, Section 18:
                 "Officials of the United Nations shall:
                (a) be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts
                performed by them in their official capacity..."
            Article VT Section 22:
                "Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V) performing missions for
                the United Nations shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
                the independent exercise of their functions during the period of their missions, including the
                time spent on journeys in connection with their missions
            When a governmental authority arrests or detains a United Nations staff member - whether
            internationally or locally recruited - or other agent of the United Nations, the United Nations has
            the right to:
        •     Visit the staff member or agent;
        •     Converse with the staff member or agent-,
        •     Be apprised of the grounds for the arrest or detention, including the main facts and formal
              charges;
        •     Assist the staff member or agent in arranging legal counsel for his/her defense-,
        •     Appear in legal proceedings to defend any United Nations interest affected by the arrest or
              detention.
        •     In addition to immediately reporting the incident to United Nations 1- headquarters, the
              Designated Official will contact the government authorities to request:
        •     All relevant information regarding the arrest or detention, including legal grounds or charges
              against the staff member;
        •     Immediate access to the detainee by United Nations representatives;
        •     Immediate access to the detainee by a doctor to evaluate his/her medical condition.
Your responsibilities
The protection that will be afforded by the host government in no way impairs your responsibilities to the
organization you serve and, in particular, the requirement that you shall not seek not receive instructions
from any government or authority external to the organization which you serve. If you are given
instructions by authorities of the host country relative to security or protection which differ from those of
the Designated Official. he/she should be informed immediately. Within these limitations, you should
cooperate with the host government and the organizations in their efforts to assure your security and
protection as well as those of your family members and your property.
               • Relocations/evacuations ordered by the Secretary - General do not necessarily coincide in
                 extent and timing with those recommended by embassies represented at the duty station.
                 If facilities are offered by a government other than the host government, the Designated
                 Official should be consulted before the facilities are accepted. If you follow embassy
                 instructions without prior approval of the Designated Official, you could be subject to
                 disciplinary action.
Before you travel to the duty station
If you are travelling to a new duty station on assignment or on mission, you should consider the following:

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    •   Make sure your documentation is in order. Make copies of all important documents, bring one set
        to the duty station and leave one set outside the duty station with family or friends;
    •   Draw up a power of attorney and give it to a trusted friend/family member in your home country;
    •   Draw up a valid will for each adult family member which specifies arrangements for permanent
        guardianship of minor children in the event both parents die;
    •   Ensure that you are properly equipped for the duty station;
    •   Check the Security Phase in effect at the duty station, if any, and ensure that you have the
        required security clearances;
    •   Ensure that the duty station is aware of your travel plans and, if necessary, will meet you and
        your family upon arrival.
Once you arrive at the duty station
Once you arrive at your new duty station, do the following:
    •   Ensure that you receive a security briefing regarding conditions at the duty station and the
        precautions you should take;
    •   Ask who your warden is, If your warden does not make contact with you, ask to meet him/her as
        soon as possible to discuss the security and evacuation plan as it applies to you,
    •   Ensure you have the telephone numbers and addresses of all officials responsible for security at
        the duty station;
    •   If you are issued with a walkie-talkie, make sure you know how it works, how to keep it
        operational and the list of call signs at the duty station;
    •   Complete the record of internationally recruited staff members and their eligible dependants
        which records information regarding your address and telephone number, the names of your
        dependants, the names of your children's schools, the numbers of your passports and
        laissez-passers, your vehicle registration and license numbers and information regarding any
        medical conditions,
    •   Ensure that you have completed and provided your organization's headquarters with a copy of
        your Inventory of furniture, household effects, automobiles and valuables. This form is mandatory
        if you require compensation for loss of personal effects or for insurance purposes.
Always be prepared
You should at all times ensure:
•   Your passports, laissez-passers, ID cards, visas, family certificates, health certificates and any return
    travel tickets are valid,
•   You have a supply of cash (both local currency and US Dollars) and traveler's cheques on hand,
•   You have a 14-day supply of food, water, candies, flashlights and first-aid kits available;
•   Your vehicle is in good working order and has all the necessary equipment. Get in the habit of refilling
    your gas tank when it is half full.
Your actions during Security Phases
         Phase One (Precautionary):
               •   No unnecessary movement;
               •   Check the validity of your documents,
               •   Inform the Designated Official and your warden if you have any special medical
                   requirements;


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               •    Ensure your vehicles (both official and private) are refueled and in good working order;
               •    Check your food/water supplies,
          Phase Two (Restricted movement):
               • Take your children out of school,
               • Pack one suitcase per person (maximum weight 15 kgs) Consider carefully items you will
                  need - you may find yourself changing climates abruptly,
               • Label each suitcase with your name and the name your organization;
               • Prepare food and water reserves;
               • Update your inventory-,
               • Plan arrangements for any pets you may have.
          Phases Three (Relocation), Four (Programme suspension) and Five (Evacuation):
               •   Comply with all security instructions given by your warden, Designated Official or other
                   security officials;
               •   Leave packing instructions or lists and specify what you wish to be done with your
                   personal effects. If items are for local sale, specify your preferred price;
               •   Leave details regarding your private vehicles, including location, shipping instructions or
                   local sale price; ensure that you have copies of all relevant documentation and a spare
                   set of keys;
               •   Ensure that you have records of rental contracts, payments and deposits for utilities,
                   school fees and bank accounts;
               •   Ensure that you provide the Designated Official with written instructions giving him/her
                   the authority to arrange bank transfers as required;
               •   Make arrangements for pets - they will not be evacuated.


II. Personal security guidelines


Introduction
Personal security is an individual responsibility. The security risk can be reduced by using common sense
and precautionary actions. You - the individual - play the most important role in maintaining your personal
security. These guidelines are provided to assist you in developing good security practices. They are not
all-inclusive and staff members who have further concerns should contact the Security Officer or
Designated Official at their duty station. You should adapt these guidelines to your own duty station,
situation and abilities and use them to assist you in security planning. Although locally recruited staff
members are generally well-versed in dealing with the security and safety aspects of life in their
homeland and city, some of the measures outlined herein may also be of interest to them.


General
The best way to be safe is to avoid trouble in the first place, rather than try to extract yourself later. This
means that you should develop a strong sense of security awareness and adjust your behaviour to take
into account the environment in which you find yourself and the possible risks related to it. Consideration
of the following points will increase your own personal security awareness:




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Do:
•     Follow your instincts. If you feel uncomfortable about a location or a situation, leave immediately-,
•     Learn to notice details about people. In the event of an incident, this will help in giving a good
      description;
•     Always know where you are going. Always behave as though you know where you are going.
      Demonstrate a confidence that you may not necessarily feel;
•     Become knowledgeable about your neighborhood. Where is the nearest police station? Which stores,
      restaurants, businesses are open late at night? Is there a telephone nearby?
•     Keep a low profile;
•     Establish several routes to work and vary your selection of them and the time you depart for work and
      return home. Most incidents take place as the individual either leaves or returns home;
•     Identify routines, such as the regular game of tennis, jogging, social events, etc., and change the time
      at which they occur. Also, beware of routines that cannot be avoided such as picking up children at
      school;
•     Be alert to any evidence of surveillance of your house, office or travel route between the two, serious
      attacks are usually preceded by a period of surveillance;
•     Know your own ability. Be honest with yourself and be aware of your capabilities. You should always
      try to maintain yourself in good physical condition;
•     Call attention to yourself if you are in danger; shout, blow the horn of your vehicle;
•     Be sure that you know what specific security arrangements are in place at your duty station; know
      how the walkie-talkie system operates;
•     At a new duty station find out about customs, how to behave, potential threats and areas to avoid;
•     Learn a few phrases in the local language so that you can signal your need for help; also, learn a few
      phrases in the local language about the United Nations and its role in the country;
•     Rehearse what actions you would take if you were to be confronted. There is no right or wrong way to
      respond to an attack. Each situation will be different. Whether to resist an attacker or not can only be
      your decision. Generally, the following options will be open to you: talk your way out of it; give in to
      the demands made of you; shout for help or yell "fire"; flee; fight. Remember, your life is not worth
      losing for material possessions; and
•     Make sure your level of security is balanced by the level of threat at your duty station.
Do not:
      •   Place yourself in situations which may be expected to attract threats, e.g., political rallies;
      •   Ignore unusual or strange circumstances;
      •   Display cash, keys or other valuables, as this may attract potential robbers;
      •   Establish routines, as they make your movements easy to predict for any observer.
At home
Do not be complacent about your security because you are at home! Your home may be the target of
robbers who might harm you during the commission of a crime. You should carefully assess the physical
security of your home and make improvements as necessary. Considering the following points will
increase your home security:
Do:




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      •   Be sure your doors and locks are strong, and lock your doors, even if you are home and even if
          you leave only for a few minutes;
      •   Make sure your entrance area is well-lit,
      •   Consider making one area of your home a safe haven - some place where you and your family
          can secure yourselves against attack and call for help. This might be a bedroom with a strong
          door and a bolt, or possibly a bathroom. Make sure you have a possible fire exit;
      •   Place shades, curtains or blinds on every window;
      •   Ensure that servants know what security measures you want implemented, such as identifying all
          callers before opening doors; never allowing access to unauthorized visitors without your specific
          approval; never providing information about you over the telephone to anyone; never discussing
          your affairs with anyone; alerting you if they see someone suspicious near the residence;
      •   Ensure your guard knows exactly what you expect: what his patrol should include, how often he
          should patrol and how he should give an alarm in case of trouble. The guard must also know
          what to do in case he is forced to leave the property by intruders, where he should go and what
          he should do when he gets there-,
      •   Get to know your neighbours,
      •   Place telephones away from windows and doors through which you can be observed;
      •   Be wary of unexpected visitors, especially after dark;
      •   Cut back or remove bushes/trees close to the house which might hide an intruder;
      •   In an elevator, stand near the control panel. If threatened, hit the alarm button and press as many
          buttons as you can reach, enabling the door to open at any of several floors,
      •   Before hiring servants, do a background check on the person. Ask for references and check
          them; and
      •   If you find a servant to be dishonest or a thief, dismiss him or her immediately and escort the
          person out of the house. Immediately notify all places where the servant may be purchasing on
          your account (such as stores) that the servant has been fired.
Do not:
      •   Put your name on a mailbox or on a gate post;
      •   Leave valuable items outside and do not leave potential tools for criminals to use against you
          where they can find them, e.g., if you have a ladder, lock it up;
      •   Open your door to strangers;
      •   Permit a stranger to use your telephone; offer to make the call for the person;
      •   Sleep with your windows open unless they have secure bars; and
      •   Entrust servants with keys to your residence; if this is unavoidable, have a special lock to which
          your servants do not have a key and use this lock when you are at home.
Travelling
Travelers are often exposed to particular risk, as they are known to be carrying money, passports and
valuables. They are vulnerable because they are often disoriented and unsure of the safety of their
surroundings. Consideration of the following points will improve your security while travelling:
Do:
      •   Always check the security phase of th e country to which you are travelling and ensure that you
          have the proper security clearances, as required;


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   •      Always inform the United Nations office of your arrival and local contact numbers. Remain in
          touch with the office; ensure you have the telephone number of the Designated Official and
          his/her Deputy;
   •      Before you leave home, let someone know your plans. Leave contact numbers. If you change
          plans, let someone know;
   •      Stay alert - watch your luggage and briefcase. Keep your passport, laissez-passer, airline tickets,
          money and traveler's cheques safe; it is preferable to keep them on your person;
   •      Photocopy airline tickets, passport identification page and relevant visa page, driver's license and
          credit cards you plan to take. Leave one set at home and keep another with you in a separate
          place from the valuables. Leave a copy of traveler cheque serial numbers at home and take a
          copy with you;
   •      If possible, schedule direct flights. Try to minimize time spent in unsecured airport public areas.
          Move quickly from the check-in counter to the secured area;
   •      At the airport be calm, do not allow people to rush you, keep your possessions under control,
   •      Know exactly how you will travel from the airport to the hotel or first business appointment. If you
          are being met at the airport, does the person waiting for you have proper identification?
   •      Stay in larger hotels which have more elaborate security;
   •      Choose a room near the elevator to avoid having to walk down a long, empty corridor. If you feel
          uncomfortable, ask a hotel employee to escort you to your room;
   •      Keep the balcony door or window locked and draw the curtains,
   •      Use a rubber doorstop for added safety (recommended that you carry one as part of your
          luggage). If not available, use a chair to jam the door;
   •      Upon arrival in your room, find the nearest fire escape. Walk from your room counting the doors
          until the fire escape. Imagine how you would reach it if you were crawling in darkness and smoke.
          Read the hotel's fire instructions;
   •      Park in well-lit areas;
   •      If you are attending a conference, remove your name tag as soon as possible to avoid being
          identified,
   •      When first entering your room, check the closets, bathroom and balcony to make sure they are
          not occupied;
   •      Be wary of con artists and people offering to exchange money for you at black market rates-,
   •      Beware of individuals posing as police or security officers who want you to accompany them to
          another location. Obtain proper identification and call the local police to verify. Ask the hotel desk
          to assist you in verifying identities. Before you accompany them, call the Designated Official and
          advise him/her of the situation.
Do not:
   •      If someone knocks on your door, assume the person is who he/she claims to be; call the desk to
          double check. Always use the deadbolt and chain,
   •      Enter your room if you find the door open or unlocked. Return to the desk and ask someone to
          accompany you to your room,
   •      Stay on the ground floor or in a room facing an outside corridor, If possible, book a room between
          the second and seventh floors - above ground level to prevent easy entrance from outside and
          low enough for fire equipment to reach in an emergency;
   •      Display your room key to strangers; and

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      •   Leave the "Please clean my room" sign on your door. It tells people the room is empty. Call
          housekeeping instead.
Walking
           By considering the following points, you will improve your security while walking:
Do:
      •   As you prepare to go out, check that all closures on your bags are shut. Put your wallet in a front
          pocket or under clothing. Carry only the cash you need and divide it;
      •   Always be aware and alert to your surroundings;
      •   Walk nearer to the curb to avoid passing too close to shrubbery, dark doorways and other places
          of concealment;
      •   If you must use a personal stereo, i.e., a Walkman, keep the volume down low enough so that
          you can hear your surroundings;
      •   Keep only those keys on your key chain that you use;
      •   If someone suspicious is behind you or ahead of you, cross and re-cross the street to the other
          side. If in doubt, use whatever means necessary to draw attention to yourself and remember that
          it is much better to suffer the embarrassment of being wrong than to fail to take action if you feel
          threatened;
      •   Mark your keys so they can be identified in the dark; this makes it easier to find the appropriate
          keys quickly;
      •   Carry identification, preferably with blood type
                indicated.
Do not:
      •   Approach the vehicle if a driver pulls up next to you asking for directions, and beware of the
          suggestion to "look at this map",
      •   Be afraid to yell and run in the opposite direction if a car approaches and the driver threatens you;
      •   Hitchhike or accept a ride from a stranger,
      •   Jiggle your keys in your hand unnecessarily, it announces that you are on your way home-,
      •   Take shortcuts through isolated areas;
      •   Walk alone at night;
      •   Talk to strangers;
      •   Have your name or address on your key chain.
Driving
           Being in a vehicle can give you a false sense of security and can possibly make you a target of
           hijackers. Following the tips below can improve your security:
Do:
      •   Whenever possible, travel on well-lit, populated streets. Keep windows rolled up, except for a
          small ventilation space. Keep doors locked;
      •   Be especially alert when you are at a red light or a stop sign. Develop the habit of adjusting
          driving speed to avoid stopping at traffic lights. Be prepared to drive away, sounding the horn, if
          you are threatened-,



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      •   Keep your car in good working order. Make sure you have a full tank of gas, flashlight, inflated
          spare tire, jack, tire iron, basic tool kit, jumper cables, folding shovel, first-aid kit and a gallon of
          potable water, Know where you are going and how to get there. Carry a map with you-,
      •   When parking at night, select a place that will be lit when you return. Check for loiterers before
          leaving the car. Do not park your car on the street if you have access to a garage or a security
          parking area;
      •   Before getting into your car, look inside first to make sure no one is hiding in the back seat. Check
          underneath the car from a distance. When leaving your car, make sure it is locked-,
      •   Think twice before deciding to offer assistance to what may appear to be a stranded motorist,
          regardless of gender.
Do not:
          Drive into your own driveway or park in a deserted area if you suspect that someone is following
          you.
          Make a few turns down active streets. If the car continues to follow you, drive to a location where
          you know you can get help, such as the nearest police station;
          Drive alone at night;
          Panic if someone attempts to force you off the road. Blow your horn constantly to attract attention.
          If you are forced over, as soon as you stop, put your car in reverse and back away. Blow your
          horn and keep the car in motion-,
          Pick up hitchhikers.
          Public transportation
Considering the following points will improve your security while using public transportation:
Do:
          Wait for your train in a designated waiting area during off-hours;
          Sit in the train car that is occupied by the conductor or driver;
          Know the hours of operation of the trains you are using so that you do not need to wait on
          deserted platforms.
          Avoid taking the last train to your destination;
          After getting off the bus or leaving a subway station, always look around to see whether you are
          being followed.
Do not:
          Ride in compartments of trains which are deserted.
III. Surviving as a hostage
Introduction
Over the past few years the number of staff members who have been kidnapped or taken hostage has
increased substantially. Every hostage or kidnap situation is different. There are no strict rules of
behaviour; however, there are a number of steps which you can take to minimize the effects of detention
and enhance your ability to cope and to see the incident through to a successful release.
Survival considerations
These techniques have been successfully employed by others who have been taken hostage:
              • No one can tell an individual whether he or she should resist or not if taken
                hostage/kidnapped. This decision must be made by each person's own assessment of the
                circumstances. Resisting the attempt may be extremely risky. You may be injured if you

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            attempt to resist armed individuals, It is possible that you will immediately be blindfolded
            and drugged.
          • Being taken hostage is probably one of the most devastating experiences a staff member
            can undergo, The first 15 to 45 minutes of a hostage situation are the most dangerous.
            Follow the instructions of your captors. They are in a highly emotional state, regardless of
            whether they are psychologically unstable or caught in an untenable situation. They are in
            a fight or flight reactive state and could strike out. Your job is to survive. After the initial
            shock wears off, your captors are able to better recognize their position. Be certain you can
            explain everything on your person.
            Immediately after you have been taken, pause, take a deep breath and try to relax. Fear of
            death or injury is a normal reaction to this situation. Recognizing your reactions may help
            you adapt more effectively. A hostage usually experiences greatest anxiety in the hours
            following the incident. This anxiety will begin to decline when the person realizes he/she is
            still alive - at least for now - and a certain routine sets in. Feelings of depression and
            helplessness will continue throughout captivity and most hostages will feel deeply
            humiliated by what they undergo during captivity. Most hostages, however, will quickly
            adapt to the situation. Remember your responsibility is to survive.
            Do not be a hero; do not talk back or act "tough". Accept your situation. Any action on your
            part could bring a violent reaction from your captors.
            Keep a low profile. Avoid appearing to study your abductors, although, to the extent
            possible, you should make mental notes about their mannerisms, clothes and apparent
            rank structure. This may help the authorities after your release.
            Be cooperative and obey hostage-takers' demands without appearing either servile or
            antagonistic. Be conscious of your body language as well as your speech. Do not say or do
            anything to arouse the hostility or suspicions of your captors.-Do not be argumentative. Act
            neutral and be a good listener to your captors. Do not speak unless spoken to and then
            only when necessary. Be cautious about making suggestions to your captors, as you may
            be held responsible if something you suggest goes wrong.
            Anticipate isolation and possible efforts by the hostage-takers to disorient you. Your watch
            may be taken away so you are unable to determine whether it is night or day. Nevertheless,
            try to maintain a routine.
            Try to keep cool by focusing your mind on pleasant scenes or memories or prayers. Try to
            recall the plots of movies or books. This will keep you mentally active. You must try to think
            positively. Try to maintain a sense of humour. It will lessen anxiety.
            Ask for anything you need or want (medicines, books, paper). All they can say is no.
            Build rapport with your captors. Find areas of mutual interest which emphasize personal
            rather than political interests. An excellent topic of discussion is family and children. If you
            speak their language, use it - it will enhance communications and rapport.
            Bear in mind that hostages often develop a positive attitude towards their captors. This is
            known as "Stockholm Syndrome", after an incident involving hostages at a Swedish bank.
            In addition, as the hostage identifies with his/her captors, a negative attitude towards those
            on the outside may develop.
            You may be asked to sign notes verifying that you are alive or you may be asked to write a
            "confession" that you or the organization have been involved in nefarious activities. The
            decision to sign these is an individual one based on the situation. Some hostages refuse to
            sign unless the language of the note is changed. This may help bolster your morale and
            make you feel less helpless. It can also serve to command a certain degree of respect from
            the captors.
            Exercise daily. Develop a daily physical fitness programme and stick to it. If possible, stay
            well - groomed and clean.

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                As a result of the hostage situation, you may have difficulty retaining fluids and may
                experience a loss of appetite and weight. Try to drink water and eat even if you are not
                hungry. It is important to maintain your strength.
              • Do not make threats against hostage-takers or give any indication that you would testify
                against them. If hostage-takers are attempting to conceal their identity, give no indication
                that you recognize them.
              • Try to think of persuasive reasons why hostage-takers should not harm you. Encourage
                them to let authorities know your whereabouts and condition. Suggest ways in which you
                may benefit your captors in negotiations that would free you. It is important that your
                abductors view you as a person worthy of compassion and mercy. Never beg, plead or cry.
                You must gain your captors' respect as well as sympathy.
              • If you end up serving as a negotiator between hostage - takers and authorities, make sure
                the messages are conveyed accurately. Be prepared to speak on the radio or telephone.
              • Escape only if you are sure you will be successful. If you are caught, your captors may use
                violence to teach you and others a lesson.
              • At every opportunity, emphasize: that, as a United Nations staff member, you are neutral
                and not involved in politics.
              • If there is a rescue attempt by force, drop quickly to the floor and seek cover. Keep your
                hands over your head. When appropriate, identify yourself
              • Be patient.
Victim of an airline hijacking
Statistics seem to indicate that airline hijacking is on the decline. However, in order to reduce the trauma
and stress related to this experience, all travelers should be prepared for this eventuality. Should you be
hijacked, the following suggestions can help you handle the situation:
Do:
      •   Consider requesting a window or centre seat since passengers in such seats are less accessible
          to the questions and interests of hijackers. In addition, should there be a rescue, those sitting in
          window or centre seats will be less vulnerable to gunfire in the aisles. On the other hand, it is
          easier to exit an aircraft if you are sitting in an aisle seat;
      •   Get rid of anything that you cannot explain or which might offend the hijackers. If you are wearing
          or carrying anything which could provoke or irritate the hijackers, discreetly remove it and get rid
          of it;
      •   Try to remain calm and obey the hijackers;
      •   Have your passport protected with a leather passport case to make the nationality less prominent
          if hijackers order passengers to place their passports in a box which is carried down the aisle in
          order to determine the nationalities of the passengers;
      •   Respond simply if you are asked questions by the hijackers;
      •   Try to appear uninterested as to what is going on around you. Sleep, read a book, etc. When so
          occupied, you will be less influenced by what is going on around you, and hijackers do not bother
          people who are not a threat to them-,
      •   Try to maintain your composure. Fear of death or injury is natural. Recognizing this may help you
          manage the crisis more effectively. Pause, take a breath and attempt to organize your thoughts;
      •   Attempt to do exercises in your seat if the hijacking continues beyond a day; such exercises will
          keep your mind off the incident and will keep your body stimulated;




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    •     In the event of a rescue attempt, slide down in your seat as far as you can or get on the floor, and
          cover your head and arms with a pillow to avoid being injured.
Do not:
    •     Say or do anything which might cause the hijackers to take an interest in you-,
    •     Resist the hijackers. Past experience shows that those who react aggressively place themselves
          at greater risk than those who behave passively;
    •     Make the fact known that you speak the hijackers' language, if this is the case. Although it is often
          assumed that speaking the language could enhance your rapport with the hijacker, prior
          experience indicates that you are better off speaking your native tongue and acquiring information
          by listening to the hijackers' conversations. This could also provide you with information as to
          what the hijackers intend to do next;
    •     Appear sullen or uncommunicative. Doing so depersonalizes you in the eyes of the hijackers and
          could increase your risks.
Post-release reactions
In many cases, former hostages feel bitter about -the treatment they receive after their release. Most
hostages feel a strong need to tell their story in detail. If assistance in this regard is not provided, request
a post-traumatic stress debriefing. Bear in mind that the emotional problems of a former hostage do not
appear immediately. Sometimes they appear months later. Whatever happens, readjustment after the
incident is a slow process requiring patience and
IV. Security for children
Introduction
It is important to remember that at most duty stations children are present. Special efforts must be made
to ensure that the children are protected.
Rules for children
Children must be taught:
          -   To keep a parent in sight in public places and to go to a policeman or store clerk if lost and in
              need of help;
          -   Not to go anywhere with anyone without a parent's permission;
          -   A password known only to family and close friends;
          -   Not to accept packages or letters from people they don't know-,
          -   To know at least key phrases in the local language;
          -   To let someone know their location and plans;
          -   To travel in groups or, at a minimum, in pairs;
          -   To use heavily traveled streets and avoid isolated areas to the extent possible;
          -   To report immediately anyone who molests or annoys them.
Rules for parents
Parents need to:
    •     Teach your child never to get into a car or go into a house without your permission. Never leave
          your child alone in a public place;
    •     Teach your child your home address and telephone number. Children should know how to use
          public telephones. Keep a list of emergency numbers by your phone and make children aware of
          them;


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    •   Train children not to give personal information over the phone, even though the caller purports to
        be a friend;
    •   Explain the importance of never divulging any information in front of strangers;
    •   Caution children to always keep doors locked and never to unlock a door to a stranger without
        adult approval;
    •   Listen when your child tells you he/she does not want to be with someone - there may be a
        reason. Have the child present when you interview a servant/babysitter who will be caring for
        him/her-, observe the child's reaction.
Checklist for baby-sitters
         Baby-sitters and/or care-givers should be instructed to:
•   Ensure that all doors and windows are locked and that doors are not opened to anyone;
•   Not give out any information over the telephone. They should simply state that Mr./Mrs. X cannot
    come to the phone right now, and they should take a message;
•   Never leave children alone, even for one minute;
•   Know the dangers to children posed by matches, gasoline, stoves, deep water, poison and falls;
•   Know the locations of all exits (stairs, doors, windows, fire escapes) and telephones in case of
    emergency;
•   Ask the parents to leave a telephone number where they can be reached;
•   Know the names and ages of the children,
Child-watch checklist
          Post an information list by each telephone. Your baby-sitter/care-giver should be familiar with
          every item, if applicable at the duty station.
             •   Family name;
             •    Address;
             •   Telephone number;
             •    Fire;
             •    Police;
             •    Medical;
             • Parents' office numbers;
             •   Poison-control centre;
             • Neighbours' name, telephone and address.
V. Security concerns for women
Introduction
In spite of all the security precautions which are taken, it is possible that you will become a victim. The
following section outlines some specific concerns ranging from sexual harassment to rape. The purpose
of this section is to increase your awareness and understanding of these issues and provide you with
information which may be useful should you or anyone you know be affected by such incidents.
Sexual harassment on the street
You are sitting on a bus. The man opposite is staring hard. His eyes follow you as you get off. You are
waiting at a stoplight. A man brushes past, lets loose a mouthful of obscenities and melts into the crowd.


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You are walking home at night. You hear soft footsteps behind you, footsteps that quicken when yours
do.
There probably isn't a woman alive who hasn't had one or more of these experiences. In crowded cities
they are often a way of life. "Psychological rape" is the term one sociologist uses to describe these
actions - the stares, leers, crude remarks and other behaviour with which men terrorize and intimidate
women without laying a finger on them. Emotionally, it can be as destructive as its physical counterpart.
The reaction of women - fear, anger, humiliation, vulnerability - is common. Part of the distress springs
from the impersonality of the attack. It is degrading.
How do you cope with stares, leers, muttered obscenities and the like? The only hard and fast rule is stay
out of danger. If, however, you are reasonably safe, you may consider responding with the following:
           (a) Ignore the advance. If a man is just trying to get a
               reaction from you and finds he can't, he may stop,
           (b) If you are in a familiar environment, you may consider answering in kind. If a man is trying
               to shock you with his words, a response in a similar vein may stop him. However, ensure
               you are not within striking distance when you do this;
           (c) Confront him. If you stop and politely ask, "Were you speaking to me?", the annoying party
               may feel embarrassed, especially if his acts were based on fear or insecurity; and
           (d) Most important, release your feelings of anger and indignity fast so that you can put the
               incident out of your mind as soon as possible.
Sexual harassment at work
Sexual harassment extends to a range of behaviour. In all cases, it refers to conduct which is unwanted
by the recipient. It can be defined as any unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual favour or other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature which interferes with work, is made a condition of
employment or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.
Sexual harassment is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and therefore contrary to
the policies of the organizations of the United Nations system. A number of organizations have, in fact,
adopted informal and formal procedures for dealing with cases of sexual harassment. These may be
obtained from local personnel offices. In order to assist you in looking for things which might be signs of
sexual harassment, a checklist has been developed by the Working Women's Institute, New York. The
basic tactic is to be alert and prepared.
Indications of sexual harassment
What is the attitude towards women in your workplace? Are there jokes, comments, graffiti or cartoons
that put women down? Are you referred to as someone's "girl" or called "honey" instead of your name?
Are you taken seriously as a worker? Are you treated like someone's daughter, wife, girlfriend, mother?
Are you complimented more for your looks than for your work? Are you told that a job is too dangerous or
complicated for you? Are you accused of taking a job away from a man?
Does your supervisor, co-worker, colleague use hugs, pats on your back, arm around your shoulder to
make a business-related point? Are sexually suggestive tones, descriptions or body language a part of
work-related discussions?
Are you asked questions about your social or personal life or told about theirs? Is there a supervisor,
co-worker or colleague known for his "harmless flirtation" or "playboy reputation"? Is there a high rate of
turnover among women working for the same man? Do you hear constant compliments about your
clothing, looks, body?
Some common forms of sexual harassment are:
             • Constant invitations for drinks, dinner, dates;
             • Close physical contact while you work;


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             • Kisses at office parties;
             • Receiving lewd cartoons, cards, presents;
             • Obvious sexual gestures directed at you,
             • Uninvited visits to your hotel room during out-of-town trips/missions;
             • Staring at your breasts or other parts of your body;
             • Touches or grabs at your body;
             • Sexual invitations or remarks;
             • Obvious graffiti;
             • Threats or physical assault; and
             • Subtle or forced pressure for sexual favours.
Some common work-related problems that may follow objections to sexual harassment are:
             • Sudden criticism of your work;
             • No work/too much work/dangerous work;
             • Denial of training or educational opportunities;
             • Written up for insubordination or issued warnings;
             • Pressure to quit;
             • Inaccurate job evaluation;
             • Refusal of co-workers to provide training or
               information; and
             • Denial of increment or promotion.
In facing sexual harassment on the job, remember that each job situation is unique. In deciding what
action to take in the short and long term, take time to think about what you want as an outcome and what
risks are involved. Make sure that you feel comfortable with the strategies you decide to follow. What
works best for someone else may not work for you or in your circumstances.
Do let your objections to the sexual harassment be known as soon as possible. Tell the harasser directly
that you do not like what he is doing. How you will phrase it and when you will say it is up to you, but don't
ignore sexual harassment - it won't go away.
If the harasser is not your supervisor, discuss the issue with your immediate supervisor, being specific as
to the type, time and place of the incident. You may also wish to share your experience with someone in
whom you have confidence. This would not only alleviate isolation and self - doubt, and perhaps be a
source of helpful advice, but communicating the information to a third party would also help corroborate
your statements if a formal complaint is made afterwards. However, until you are certain of what you want
to do and what your rights are, don't move too fast or hint at any of your intentions. Trust your instincts
and make decisions that make sense for your situation.
It is essential that you document each incident. Keep a personal log or diary of incidents, dates, actual
conversations, witnesses. Don't leave it at work. Keep lewd cards, notes, presents; take pictures of
graffiti. Voice your objections to the harasser verbally and, if possible, do so in the presence of a witness.
Include statements that indicate your discomfort and link it to the comments or behaviour which interfere
with your job. Follow this up with some form of written correspondence summarizing this objection. Keep
copies for your records. If you have an answering machine/voice mail which provides you with evidence
of sexual harassment, keep the tapes.
Get copies of positive work evaluations or other evidence indicating you are doing a good job. Keep
copies of reports completed; take pictures of projects completed. Think about the way sexual harassment


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is affecting you. What combination of emotional/physical/job-related stress symptoms are you feeling?
Seek medical attention from a private doctor and have these job-related stress symptoms indicated in
your records. If necessary, go up the ladder and make a complaint about sexual harassment verbally and
in writing. Keep a record of your correspondence. "Test the waters" for sympathetic co-workers. Find out
if other women have experienced sexual harassment.
Rape awareness
Introduction
The information contained in this section was prepared with the assistance of St. Vincent's Hospital and
Medical Centre Rape Crisis Programme, New York, New York. Its primary goal is to educate you about
the issues associated with rape and sexual assault in order to reduce the possibilities of your becoming a
victim. Rape is considered the second most violent crime. Homicide is number one. Rape is
psychologically devastating, and it can take years for the victim to recover. Only recently has it become
acceptable to openly discuss this problem. As a result, misconceptions concerning rape and sexual
assault and its victims are being identified and dealt with.
The following terms are working definitions commonly used by professionals who deal with sexual
assault. They arc not legal definitions.
          Sexual assault:
               Any non-consensual sexual act which is forced by one or more persons upon another.
          Rape:
               Sexual intercourse which is achieved without the victim's consent.
         Everyone is a potential victim of sexual assault. Sexual assault is a threat to all women. Rape
         and other sexual assaults have been documented against people as young as two months and
         as old as 97 years. No one can afford to believe that it could never happen to them. It can.
         Sexual assault is a crime of violence. Sexual assault is any sexual act committed against the will
         of another person. This can include physical force and coercion. People who Force sex on
         others are not motivated by sex, they are acting out their desire to hurt and control another
         person.
         Most sexual assaults are committed by an acquaintance of the victim. Sexual offenders are not
         always strangers. Many victims have had some prior contact with their attackers. Sex offenders
         may be casual acquaintances, neighbours, dates or family members. Knowing the attacker does
         not make it any less a violent crime.
         Sexual assault is one of the most under-reported of all violent crimes. Sexual assault is not an
         infrequent crime. It is just infrequently reported.
Tactics used by rapists
The sexual assault attack cycle is divided into five parts:
             • Victim selection:
               Depending on his motivation, the would-be offender selects his victim. The individual is
               either pre - selected or the target of opportunity. In either case, the offender will wait until
               the potential victim is vulnerable or isolated;
             • Approach the victim:
               The would-be offender approaches his victim by (1) tricking the victim into accompanying
               the offender; (2) overwhelming the victim; (3) surprising and jumping the victim;
             • Initiation of the assault:
               The offender maintains control of the victim through mere presence, threats, force;
             • The assault;

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             • The push-off:
              It is here that the attacker decides whether to further physically punish or kill his victim.
Common psychological motivations of the rapist
No single profile provides an answer to why rape occurs. Opportunity, emotional illness, lust - it happens
for all of those reasons, yet often for none of them. Anger is a common thread among all the types of
sexual assault. Broadly speaking, offenders fall into four types: anger, power, sadistic and opportunistic
rapists.
The anger rapist is the most ruthless. Sexual assault becomes a means of expressing and discharging
feelings of intense anger, rage, contempt, hatred and frustration, the assault is characterized by
excessive brutality. Far more physical force is used in the commission of the offense than would be
required simply to overpower and subdue the victim. Sexual assault for this type of offender appears
impulsive more than premeditated. Quite often a precipitating stress can be identified which involves a
significant woman in the offender's life - his mother, wife, girlfriend. The resulting fury is released and
discharged in a sexual assault against a victim who may not be the actual person towards whom the
offender harbours such feelings. Sex becomes a weapon, and rape is the means by which he can hurt
and degrade his victim and, through her, the significant other. Satisfaction and relief result from the
discharge of anger rather than from sexual gratification.
The power rapist employs whatever force is necessary to overpower his victim and gain control over her.
The offender places his victim in a situation through verbal threat, intimidation with a weapon and/or
physical force where she cannot refuse him or resist him, and this provides the offender with a reassuring
sense of power, security, strength, mastery and control. In this fashion, he compensates for underlying
feelings of inadequacy, vulnerability and helplessness. Rapes committed under war conditions usually fall
in this category.
The assault is usually premeditated and preceded by an obsessional fantasy in which, although the victim
may initially resist him, once overpowered, she will submit gratefully. A power rapist may actually look for
an easy victim.
The sadistic rapist eroticizes aggression through a sexual assault. The offender derives satisfaction in the
abuse of his victim. This assault is deliberate, calculated and premeditated. For this offender, anger and
control become sexualized in terms of the offender's finding intense gratification in controlling, hurting and
degrading his victim.
Perhaps the most common reason for rape is opportunity. Frequently, the opportunistic rapist carries out
the assault during the commission of another crime, e.g., a robbery or car-jacking.
Options for the victim during an assault
A rape victim may choose to take any of a number of actions during an assault. In considering what
action to take, the victim must take into consideration the type of rapist, the environment and the person's
own capabilities. A victim may choose one or a combination of the following options:
             - Submit:
               The victims are in fear of losing their lives. The objective here is to survive;
             * Passive resistance:
               Do or say anything to ruin the attacker's desire to have sexual contact with you; and
             - Active resistance:
               Any type of physical force used to fight off the attacker-, includes shouting for help, running
               away or fighting back.
Pros/cons of self-defense and use of weapons
There are conflicting opinions regarding self-defense and the use of weapons. The following
considerations must be borne in mind.


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             • Self-defense techniques:
              Require training and practice. It is a personal decision which each staff member must
              make. It gives you self-confidence and cannot be used against you. It is legal and always
              accessible.
             • Improvised weapons:
              This can be anything accessible. It requires no special training.
             • Mace:
              There are local laws regarding the use of mace which must be respected. It requires
              familiarity and training. Mace has a limited shelf-life. It is not always accessible when you
              need it.
             • Guns:
              It is against United Nations policy for a staff member to carry a weapon unless it is an
              official part of his/her job. Staff members who decide to have a weapon in their homes must
              be in compliance with the local laws of the duty station. Use of weapons requires
              continuous training, and they are not necessarily accessible when you need them. They
              need to be maintained and carefully stored to avoid accidents. Weapons can give you a
              false sense of security and could be used against you.
          It must be stressed that the use of mace or firearms could result in criminal charges and/or a
          civil claim being lodged against the user even if the individual felt justified in its use.
After an attack
After a woman is raped, she must make the decision whether to report the crime. If she chooses to do so,
in most cases the police will question her very carefully on the circumstances of the event. Sometimes the
police are very professional, treat the victim with dignity and respect and explain exactly why they must
ask certain questions. In other instances, policemen have been known to be less sensitive to the victim.
         After talking to the police, the individual will be taken to a hospital for an examination which may
         help to prove that a rape occurred. It is critical that she try to preserve any evidence of the rape,
         including clothing. A rape victim should not wash until after she has been examined. Following
         the examination, she will be provided with treatment for any injuries as well as for venereal
         disease. In some hospitals, she will be given an injection of penicillin as a preventive measure
         against venereal disease. She may be offered information about preventing pregnancy. In some
         locations, information about AIDS may also be provided. Some hospitals may offer counseling;
         however, this is extremely rare. Counseling may be arranged through the United Nations
         Designated Official or the parent organization of the staff member.
         In most cases, if the rapist is caught, the victim can choose to prosecute. If she does, she is in
         for a long ordeal in the courts. Rape is a difficult crime to prove. During any eventual trial, every
         effort is made by the defense to exculpate its client regardless of the means. Often this includes
         delving into the woman's sexual past and bringing out anything to cast doubt on her story. Many
         victims feel that the trauma of a trial is more than they are willing to risk.
         If a woman does not choose to report her rape to the police, one can only guess what happens
         to her. It is well-known that many women do not report the crime because of the difficulties with
         the police they have heard about or because they are feeling too guilty, upset, frightened or
         weak to talk about the rape. Sometimes these women seek help on their own, but they usually
         keep their experiences to themselves.
Stages of recovery
The emotional impact of rape on its victims was first studied in the 1970s. It was found that most of the
victims suffered from an acute stress reaction to a life - threatening situation. While each victim's specific
emotional and physical symptoms varied, they fell into a discernable pattern which became known as the



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Rape Trauma Syndrome. It is virtually identical to Critical Incident Stress. There are four stages the victim
must go through to recover from the experience:
Acute phase: disorganization
The woman may experience an extremely wide range of emotions. The impact of the rape may be so
severe that feelings of shock or disbelief are expressed. Feelings of fear, anger and anxiety may show
through such behaviour as crying, sobbing, smiling, restlessness and tenseness. Alternatively, the
woman may be controlled with her feelings masked or hidden and a calm, composed or subdued
demeanor exhibited.
In many cases, the victim is in a state of shock, is simply unable to believe that the attack has happened.
Some women experience a detached, super - alert state during or just after the attack. Even while it is
occurring they may be memorizing their assailants' physical features or details about his clothing. While
this may be a victim's way of distancing herself from the experience, it also has real survival benefits.
Physical symptoms during the first several weeks following a sexual assault may be evident:
             • Physical trauma from the physical attack;
             • Skeletal muscle tension-,
             • Tension headaches and fatigue;
             • Disruption of sleep pattern;
             • Irritability; and/or gastro-intestinal problems.
Emotional reactions will also be apparent. Women express a wide gamut of feelings as they begin to deal
with the after-effects of rape. These feelings range from fear, humiliation and embarrassment to anger,
revenge and self - blame. Fear of physical violence and death may also be manifested.
The victim should be encouraged to talk about the assault as much as possible to her friends and family
or, if this would be embarrassing for her, to someone she trusts. As the victim turns from fantasy to
handling the realistic problems, there may be a decline in non-specific anxiety.
Outward adjustment
The victim appears to have dealt successfully with the experience, but this phase contains a heavy
measure of denial and suppression. The victim begins to resume her normal activities, and this healthy
response should be encouraged. This is perhaps the most problematic time and the stage most likely to
last, because it is heavily dependent on the victim's state of mind prior to the assault and because she is
extremely vulnerable to the opinions of those around her. She may feel guilty, blaming herself endlessly
for walking down a certain street or acknowledging a greeting. In other words, she turns her anger at the
assailant inward.
Long-term process: reorganization
All victims will experience disorganization in their lifestyles following the sexual assault. Various factors
will affect their coping behaviour regarding the trauma, e.g., ego strength, social network support and the
way people treat them. This coping and reorganization process begins at different times for different
women. The same symptoms are not experienced in the same sequence. This stage is characterized by:
A need to change residences; A need to change telephone numbers; Nightmares; Fear of indoors; Fear
of outdoors (seclusion); Fear of crowds; Fear of people behind them; Sexual fears; Extreme depression;
Anxiety; Insomnia; Apathy; and/or An almost total inability to function normally.
Resolution
During this phase the victim is able to cope with her trauma and integrate the experience into her
emotional make-up. The victim stops wondering "Why did this thing happen to me?" and instead says
"Such things happen. It happened, it's over and now I'm going on." She also learns to direct her rage at
the assailant and not at herself




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VI. Coping with stress
Introduction
The occupational stress inherent in the activities of the United Nations system is an issue which can no
longer be ignored. Staff of the system are increasingly being asked to confront situations without having
developed the appropriate skills to cope with them. There is insufficient awareness of the impact on
alertness, performance and judgement and the resulting negative implications in terms of operational
mistakes and harmful effects on the health of staff exposed to stressful situations. Police, fire-fighters and
emergency medical personnel all experience strong emotional reactions to the emergency and disaster
situations which they are required to manage. For that reason, it is now standard operating procedure in
many countries for these individuals to be provided with appropriate training to enable them to carry out
their functions without adverse effect.
United Nations staff are often exposed to the same types of traumatic situations. It is therefore essential
that all personnel serving in the field be fully briefed regarding all aspects of stress and stress
management. Until such time as all United Nations system staff have been provided with appropriate
training, this document has been prepared to provide some basic information regarding stress
management.
Definition of terms
         Stress:
                Any demand or change that the human system (mind, body, spirit) is required to meet or
                to respond to.
         Distress:
                Any stress that occurs too often (frequency), lasts too long (duration) and is too severe
                (intensity).
         Critical incident:
                An event outside the range of normal human experience which is distressing to almost
                everyone. Such events are usually sudden and life-threatening, and often involve
                physical or emotional loss.
         Cumulative stress:
                Stress which builds up over time. Some issues may be large and of long duration, while
                others may be small or just part of the problems of everyday life.
         De sing:
                A process which allows those individuals involved in a critical incident to describe what
                happened and to talk about their reactions directly after the event - defusing is usually
                carried out by one's peers who have been trained in this area.
          Debriefing:
                A process designed to lessen the impact of a critical incident. It is a structured
                intervention by specially trained personnel. It occurs in an organized group meeting and
                is designed to allow and encourage those involved in a critical incident to discuss their
                thoughts and reactions in a safe, non-threatening environment. Ideally, it takes place 48
                to 72 hours after the critical incident.
What is stress?
Stress can be defined as any change or demand that the human system (mind, body and spirit) is
required to meet or to respond to. There are normal stressors such as those consistent with life:
breathing, blood circulation, walking, eating, talking and playing. These functions are common to
everyone and are part of everyday life. Without these stressors and other physical demands on the
human system, you would not continue to live.


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The more you know and understand about stress, the better prepared you will be to manage and control
its effects. Stress becomes a problem when it occurs too often (frequency), lasts too long (duration), and
is too severe (intensity). In these circumstances, distress occurs. It is extremely important to note that
what may be distressful for one person may not necessarily be distressful for someone else. Your
perception of the event, the degree of threat you feel and the amount of control you have over the
circumstances most often determine the degree of distress you will experience.
Some factors which influence your perception and your control of distress are who you are and what your
past experiences have been. Your education, your skills, your philosophical approach to life, your age,
your sex, your level of physical fitness and your personal esteem are all factors which can influence the
degree to which you will be affected by a given distressful event or a series of events.
Given the frequency, intensity and duration of a situation, anyone can become a victim of stress. In 1936
Dr. Hans Seyle made an important discovery - when threatened, the body always reacts with the same
general adaptive mechanism. He defined this concept as follows:
The alarm phase
In order to understand the effects of both useful and harmful stress, it is necessary to understand the
mechanisms of a basic life-protecting reaction. In the presence of a threatening or dangerous situation,
the person reacts with the "fight or flight" response. This is a reaction which causes our adrenaline to
increase and prepares us to run or to fight. If we respond in a physical manner, such as by running,
fighting or even with verbal aggression, much of the stress-produced fear, anger or hostility can be greatly
reduced or dissipated altogether. The "fight or flight" response is a primitive physical protective reaction.
In today's society, it may not be appropriate to respond to some threats in a physical manner.
The adaptation phase
When a stressor continues without being resolved, the intensity of the alarm stimulus is often lessened
but not lost, and the person enters what Seyle calls the Adaptation Phase. In this phase, vital
biochemical, physiological, psychological and spiritual resources are spent to sustain the person against
the original distressors. However, adaptation or adjustment to the situation is not a solution.
The exhaustion phase
After an undetermined period of time, which varies from person to person, as a consequence of long-term
distressors or daily cumulative stress, an individual may begin to exhibit signs of breaking down. This may
be manifested in the form of physical, mental or behavioural syndromes which are symptoms of
long-term, unresolved distress. Some common symptoms are:


Physical                             Psychological                          Behavioural
Fatigue;                             Memory loss                            Verbal outburst;
Back pain                            Poor concentration;                    Increased smoking;
Headache;                            Decrease in esteem;                    Increased alcohol use;
Ulcer;                               Depression;                            Eating disorders.


Cumulative stress management
What can be done about stress? Most people suffer from cumulative stress which results from a build-up
of stress over time. Some issues may be large and of long duration. Others may be small stressors of
everyday life. Cumulative stress must be recognized before it leads to bum-out. Some of the small daily
frustrations which can lead to cumulative stress are, inter alia:
            • Housing (lack of privacy or comfort, noise, shortage of water, cold heat);
            • Travel (risks, threats, roadblocks);



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             • Food (shortages, lack of variety);
             • Immobility or lack of activity; and
             • Colleagues.
             What should you do?
Cumulative stress first leads to unproductive hyperactivity, then to physical and emotional exhaustion and
finally to burn-out. You must be self-disciplined and know your limits. Accept the fact that you cannot take
care of others without also taking care of yourself, and be aware that everyone is primarily responsible for
his/her own stress. Understand that stress is inherent to duty in the field.
    To manage stress, it is important to learn which distressors affect you most. Once the major sources
    of distress are known, a management and control strategy can be developed to help you avoid the
    potential distressors. As a rule, stress management plans will include learning to do some old tasks in
    a new way. The following guidelines have been effective in stress management strategy
    development:
    •   Learn your major distressors;
    •   Become assertive, not aggressive,
    •   Manage your time well;
    •   Get the sleep you require;
    •   Exercise for endurance and strength at least three times a week;
    •   Eat a balanced diet - portions consistent with your activities;
    •   Avoid excessive use of alcohol, caffeine and nicotine;
    •   Know and practice your philosophical approach to life;
    •   Accept creative challenges;
    •   Plan your free time constructively and productively;
    •   Learn the healing value of relaxation and meditation; and
    •   The more healthy, fit and well you are, the more resilient you will be against all types of distress.
Critical incident stress management
Critical incident stress is an event outside the range of normal experience which is sudden and
unexpected, disrupts one's sense of control, involves the perception of a threat to life and may include
elements of physical or emotional loss. Examples of Critical Incidents are:
• Natural disasters;
• Multiple casualty accidents;
• Sexual or other assault;
• Death of a child;
• Hostage-taking;
• Suicide;
• Traumatic death in family;
• Duty-related death of co-worker;
• War-related civilian deaths;
• Bombing of buildings, mining of roads;



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• Attacks on vehicles/convoys;
• Armed attacks/robberies; and
• Direct/indirect intimidation/threats. While a critical incident may occur anywhere, anytime, there are
occupational groups which are at increased risk of exposure to psychologically traumatic events,
including:
• Fire-fighters;
• Emergency medical personnel;
• Police officers;
• Search and rescue personnel;
• Disaster relief and humanitarian aid workers; and


• United Nations system staff. Critical incident stress is a normal reaction to an abnormal situation.
Reactions may be physical, cognitive or emotional. Reactions may also develop over time. The table
below outlines normal immediate and delayed reactions to a critical incident:


Immediate reactions
Physical                             Emotional                              Cognitive
Nausea;                              Anxiety;                               Confusion
Muscle tremors                       Anger;                                 Inability to decide;
Sweating                             Fear;                                  Impaired thinking;
Dizziness                            Irritability;                          Memory loss.
Chills;                              Guilt;
Rapid heart rate                     Grief,
Hyperventilation;                    Hopelessness;
High blood pressure;


Delayed reactions
Physical                             Emotional                              Cognitive
Fatigue                              Feeling abandoned;                     Decreased attention span;
Startle response;                    Resentment;                            Poor concentration;
Substance abuse;                     Alienation;                            Memory problems;
Sleep difficulties;                  Withdrawal;                            Flashbacks.
Nightmares;                          Numbness;
Restlessness;                        Depression;


The severity of an individual's reactions to a critical incident depends on several factors:
Factors related to the incident                          Factors related to the person
Suddenness;                                              Past experience;


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Intensity;                                                  Personal loss;
Duration,                                                   Perception of threat;
Available social support.                                   Personal coping abilities.


Research and experience provide a variety of techniques to
             assist you both during and after the event.


             During the critical incident:


                • Recognize the signs of critical incident stress,


                •   Maintain a positive attitude;


                • Try to control breathing - slow and regular;


                • Focus on immediate task;


                • Stay in contact with others by talking;


                • Care for yourself - food, water, clothing, rest; and


                • If prolonged exposure, take breaks and rotate tasks.


                After a critical incident:


                - Talk about the event, what you saw, heard, smelled, did,


                - Talk about your reactions, particularly how you felt;


                - Practice stress management techniques, such as:
                    -   Deep-breathing exercises;
                    -   Progressive relaxation;
                    -   Meditation;
                    -   Physical activity;
                    -   Music, reading;




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                -   Humour, to facilitate acceptance of reactions-, and Participate in critical incident
                    stress defusing as soon as possible after the event and later in critical incident stress
                    debriefing.


Critical incident stress defusing
Critical incident stress defusing occurs in a group meeting of those involved, directly after the event. The
purpose of critical incident stress defusing is to allow those involved to describe what happened and to
talk about their reactions, as well as to provide information about normal stress reaction, support services
and details of the follow-up critical incident stress debriefing.


Critical incident stress debriefing


Debriefing is a military term for a report which a subordinate submits on his mission and the conclusions
drawn by his supervisor. By extension, it is used in psychology to describe the detailed account which is
given on return from a mission, concerning the facts and emotions experienced in the field and the
thought to which they give rise. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is a process designed to lessen
the impact of a critical incident. It is not designed to provide counseling, but rather to provide a safe
opportunity to deal with immediate reactions to a stressful, traumatic situation. It includes:


(a) A structured intervention by specially trained members of a critical incident stress team; and


(b) An organized group meeting which allows and encourages those involved in a critical incident to
openly discuss their thoughts and reactions in a safe, non-threatening environment 48 to 72 hours after
the critical incident.


For most people, most symptoms will diminish both in intensity and in frequency within a few days or
weeks. The process will be greatly assisted by a formal debriefing and by discussing concerns with
trusted family members and friends.


Post-traumatic stress disorder
If the above symptoms last more than a month, they may lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
This is a more serious condition, a complication of psychological stress which could be compared to a
wound that will not heal naturally. To be diagnosed, the following factors must be present:


            • Trauma;


            • A persistent tendency to relive the trauma in the form of memories, nightmares, flashbacks
              or intense emotional reactions to any event reminiscent of the trauma',


            • A tendency to avoid any thought, emotion or activity
              which reminds one of the traumatic event,




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             • A marked hyperactivity, accompanied by an exaggerated startle reaction, a quick temper
               and sleep disorders, particularly upon falling asleep; and


             • A persistence of these symptoms for at least a month. Diagnosis and treatment of PTSD
               must be carried out by a specialist.


Suggestions for family and friends
Anyone who has undergone a traumatic experience will be changed by what he/she has experienced. In
the aftermath of this incident, the various emotions which the individual experiences are perfectly normal.
It is the experience/event which is abnormal. The emotional reaction to this experience should be
considered as a psychological wound. As with all wounds, you can best help the individual by:


             • Listening carefully. A person who has overcome a traumatic experience must learn to talk
               about the event and the emotions he/she felt at the time with those closest to him/her;


              • Spending time with the affected person-,


              • Offering your assistance and listening car;


              • Reassuring them that they are safe and normal-,


              •       Helping them with routine tasks like cleaning,
                  cooking, caring for the family;


              •    Allowing them some private time;


              • Not taking their anger or other feelings personally;


             • Telling them you are sorry such an event has occurred, and you want to understand and
               assist them, and


              • Calling for help or support as soon as you feel you
                  need it.




 98-06245(E) 020498 030498 (reproduced from original document - SECURITY IN THE FIELD - Information for staff members of
                                        the United Nations System, United Nations




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                             Page 78
1-6 December, 2002                                                                                    Pranburi, Thailand
                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




SESSION 2.4 - Exercise in Using the Humanitarian Security System


Exercise 2.4.1 - Planning an Assessment Mission
A countrywide assessment of IDPs has not been conducted in Suremia for over a year. As a result of
recent massive IDP displacements as well as new refugee influxes into Suremia, the UN DMT has
decided that such a mission must now be undertaken. Your team has been asked to take part in this
inter-agency assessment. Your assignment is to review the Suremia security report issued at the end of
last month, as well as the country and security maps provided by UNSECOORD.
This exercise is conducted in 5 teams. Each team has a mission to accomplish in a different area of
Suremia. Each team is responsible to analyse their own mission, and list any risks that might be involved.
Use all sources of information available to you for your analysis. After listing the risks, or scenarios that
you might realistically expect, prepare an action plan for all activities you will carry out before the mission
(You have 24 hours to prepare). Finally, prepare a route/itenerary and a list of the things you will carry in
your car for this mission. All other information on your specific mission is provided in the 5 short
descriptions that follow for each of the teams.




Group 1.    Your group is to undertake an IDP needs assessment mission to the southern town of Tutu in
            Central Province.
Group 2.    Your group is to undertake an IDP needs assessment mission to the town of Luck in South
            Mountain Province.
Group 3.    Your group is to undertake a refugee needs assessment mission to the northeastern town of
            Xynas.
Group 4.    Your group is to undertake a IDP needs assessment mission to the town of Marmot in North
            Mountain Province.
Group 5.    Your group is to undertake an IDP and refugee needs assessment mission to the eastern
            border town of Ash.


You will have 45 minutes to complete the exercise.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                    Page 79
1-6 December, 2002                                                                            Pranburi, Thailand
                                                                         International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




  Map 2.4.A. Suremia Road Map



       80°                                                                                               84°
                                                                                   Gofer                                                                ld
                       Meskit
                                                                                                                                                      Co
12°
                        Vares
                                                                                                                                         Xynas
                                         Waiver               Bortock
      VARES                                                                               Marmot
                                                     Aksom
                                                                  Blue

                                                                                     Mount                                            Mink

                                         Crosston                 Nadda                                                                         Ash            Souppot

                                                                                                                             Dink
                                                                                                                                                 Wassaville
                                                                                          Salt Rock
                                          TUROS                                                                         Po
                                                                                                                                                                 Wrinkle
                                                                   Dry
                                Dogleg                                           Wapper
             Pontoon                                                                                                    Duston




                                                                                                                                             Wasser
                                                                  Tap
                                                      ne r




                                                                                    Gravelly
                                                  R un




                                                                   Tutu                                                  Umaras
                            Wring


      OCEAN                      Boggy
                                                       Bog                                                                            Luck               Putter



                                           sea port                capitol city              transcontinental rd.
                                                                                             all-weather Rd.
                                                                                             unimproved road.
                                                                                                                    Suremia                                    E
                                           air port                major city                                                   MARDON 1030
16°                                                                                          dry weather track.
                                                                                             unmarked track.
                                                                                                                                                             1027
                                           forested                town
                                                                                                                                 SUREMIA
                                                                                             National Frontier.
                                           mountains
                                                                                                                                    TULERA
                                                                                                                                             1025
                                            0                50            100      150            200            250




  UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                                                                        Page 80
  1-6 December, 2002                                                                                                                  Pranburi, Thailand
                                                                        International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




  Map 2.3.b. Suremia Security Phases Map


       80°                                                                                             84°
                                                                                 Gofer                                                                ld
                       Meskit
                                                                                                                                                    Co
12°
                        Vares
                                                                                                                                       Xynas
                                         Waiver              Bortock
      VARES
                                                    Aksom
                                                                                    IV
                                                                                     Marmot

                                                                 Blue

                                                                                   Mount
                                                                                                       II                              III
                                                                                                                                    Mink

                                         Crosston                Nadda                                                                        Ash           Souppot
                           I                                                                                               Dink
                                                                                                                                                    V
                                                                                                                                               Wassaville
                                                                                        Salt Rock
                                          TUROS                                                                       Po
                                                                                                                                                              Wrinkle
             Pontoon            Dogleg
                                                                  Dry
                                                                               Wapper
                                                                                                                      Duston
                                                                                                                                               IV




                                                                                                                                           Wasser
                                                                 Tap
                                                     ner




                                                                                  Gravelly                   II
                                                  Run




                                                                  Tutu                                                 Umaras                         III
                            Wring


      OCEAN                      Boggy
                                                      Bog                                                                           Luck               Putter



                                           sea port               capitol city             transcontinental rd.
                                                                                           all-weather Rd.
                                                                                           unimproved road.
                                                                                                                  Suremia                                   E
                                           air port               major city                                                  MARDON 1030
16°                                                                                        dry weather track.
                                                                                           unmarked track.
                                                                                                                                                           1027
                                           forested               town
                                                                                                                               SUREMIA
                                                                                           National Frontier.
                                           mountains
                                                                                                                                  TULERA
                                                                                                                                           1025
                                            0               50           100      150            200            250




  UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                                                                      Page 81
  1-6 December, 2002                                                                                                                  Pranburi, Thailand
                                                International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




     Map 2.3.c. Eastern Suremia Security Phases Map




                                                                           Xynas
ck
                  IVMarmot


                                 II                                    III
                    Mount                                            Mink

da                                                                               Ash             Souppot
                                                                                       V
                                                        Dink
                                                                                  Wassaville
                     Salt Rock                   Po
                                                                               IV
                                                                                                     Wrinkle
            Wapper
                                                      Duston
                                                                              Wasser
                                        II
                  Gravelly                                                             III
u                                                      Umaras




     UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                              Page 82
     1-6 December, 2002                                                                      Pranburi, Thailand
                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 2.1.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                     Page 83
1-6 December, 2002                                             Pranburi, Thailand
                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.2.




Day 3 – Tuesday, December 3, 2002

   Personal Safety and Security While Traveling
              Travel, Checkpoints, Landmines, Basic First Aid




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                  Page 84
1-6 December, 2002                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                                                  International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.2.



Day 3 Breakfast Reading: Suremia News Service Report




                    SUREMIANEWSERVICE
                           "Keeping you in the Picture"

Tuesday, December 3, 2002
REPORTING FOR THE WEEK NOVEMBER 25- 31
Politics
Commenting on the Premiere's earlier statement in Geneva, Switzerland, (Nov. 25) expressing a wish to
remain in Europe for extended medical evaluation, Opposition Party spokesman Lizarus Nold, expressed
concern that the Premier "was losing his grip on reality" to take leave now as the country is still facing
many problems. He added that no other Suremianan leader had taken leave during the history of the
government in the country.
Commenting on mounting pressure on Helio Montuz to resign from his post as spokesman of the
People's Rights Consultative Liaison Task Force of the Suremian National Parliament, Primary Speaker
Abraham Saltrock said that Montuz should resign from his position if more than 50% of the members
stood for the call. The statement was addressed during the commemoration of Free Suremia Day (Nov.
30).
Suremian Premiere's Overseas Agenda
The Premier arrived in Jordan on Nov. 27, after a short stopover in Egypt on his flight from New Zealand.
In Egypt, The Premier met with his Egyptian counterpart, President Hosni Mubarak. The two country
leaders expressed their concern over the conflict in the Palestinian territories and condemned the Israeli
occupation.. They also stressed the role that Islamic nations should play to promote peace while sharply
curbing terrorism around the world. During the Jordanian visit, the leaders are expected to discussed
bilateral issues and avenues of cooperation between Suremia and Jordan.
National Security
Suremian Integrated Police (SIP) chief Paulo Wrinkle reminded all visitors to the eastern provinces of
Suremia to complete all necessary documents, and obtain required police clearance for Wassa Province
in particular. Such requirements are needed to guarantee their safety, said Wrinkle. Earlier reports said
that the police in Wassaville arrested two foreigners – reported as being British and US citizens – last
week for travelling without proper permits. They were also reportedly carrying some research documents
related to the NWPF. There is no prosecution plan but the immigration department will likely deport them
home as persona non grata.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                 Page 85
1-6 December, 2002                                                                         Pranburi, Thailand
                                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.2.



Regions
Wassa Province - NWPF spokesman Atom X. in Wassaville reported yesterday that NWPF militia killed
two military SSF personnel in a market in Ash on Saturday. Many of the market’s shops were reportedly
burned down when police returned to search for the killers. Mr. X. said that the attack was launched as
the military often extorted money from residents. However, local military denied the allegation and instead
accused NWPF for being behind all the extortions. Two unidentified corpses with bullet wounds were
found in Luck on Friday and Saturday. National Red Crescent volunteers also found an unidentified dead
body in local bus station in Po on Saturday, Nov. 3..
Central Province - Commander of the Suremian Army’s Strategic Elite Troops (Black Eagles) Lieutenant
General Arlo Angler launched a warning that the military intends to crush separatist movement in the
country, and the NWPF is the “main target.”
The Students' Executive Board in Turos yesterday confirmed their refusal of any military approach
proposed to solve the conflicts in the eastern provinces. They further urged the government to seriously
enforce human rights laws.
North Mountain Province - Police in Mount have recently questioned several Army personnel
concerning the shooting incident near the Marmot gold mine in the Mardon border region on October 31.
The investigation has yet to name suspects involved in the attack.
Meanwhile, Mount’s police chief Major-General Freem Lambeaux cast doubts on the military’s claim that
Mardonian separatists (MFF) were responsible for the shooting of mine workers on October 31.
Lambeaux said the body of the Mardonian man that the military claimed to have shot in a gunfight the day
after the attack was already stiff when he saw him just two hours after he was supposedly shot. ”I myself
saw the body. It was already very stiff when we found it. If it’s already stiff, it must be dead at least 12
hours,” he said. Meanwhile, the Mardonian Institute for Human Rights – which is calling for an
independent investigation, has identified the slain suspect, as according to his family, the man had been
employed by the Suremian Army’s Special Forces (Viper Unit) for at least a year as informer.
South Mountain Province - Many shops in Luck were closed yesterday, following a brawl between local
vendors and army personnel last Saturday. Two army personnel and a vendor were injured. The army
pledged to conduct an investigation on any personnel involved.


                                         Today’s Exchange Rate
                                      October 31, 2002 at 08:30:39

                                    SUREM                  DD/TT
                                     TO:            Sell           Buy
                                      USD          9,075.00    8,975.00
                                      GBP         14,084.65 13,901.65
                                      AUD          4,996.05    4,905.05
                                       JPY            74.59        73.22
                                      DKK          1,194.85    1,170.25
                                      CAD          5,752.15    5,669.15
                                      EUR          8,811.97    8,687.97




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                  Page 86
1-6 December, 2002                                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                               International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.2.




Session 3.1. Travel Security




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                              Page 87
1-6 December, 2002                                                      Pranburi, Thailand
                                                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.3.



Reading 3.1.1. Security Tips for Women (UNICEF - undated)
(this short reading is reproduced in part from an undated UNICEF document - and deals with travel issues
for both men and women)
All of the security advice already provided in the UNICEF Field Security Manual applies to both men
and women. There are, however, a few security issues which are particularly relevant to women. Men
too will benefit from the advice offered here. The problems addressed below generally have to do with
physical assault, including sexual assault. The following points, compiled from various documents
provided by the Office of the UNSECOORD, and the United States Department of State, Office of
Diplomatic Security, focus on avoiding situations where assault may occur and on responding
appropriately if an unwanted event occurs.


Prevention...
general
• Always remain aware of the situation around you. When in public, observe and note the unusual.
• Follow your instincts. If you feel uncomfortable about a location or a person, leave immediately.
• Do not hesitate to express your concerns to those who can help you -- a supervisor, security
   personnel, etc.
• Learn to notice details about people. In the event of an incident this helps in giving a good
    description (e.g., a person's coloring, size, hair style/color, facial hair, scars, tattoos, accent,
    clothing, etc.).
• When you are in unfamiliar surroundings, always behave as though you know exactly where you
   are going. Demonstrate a confidence that you may not necessarily feel. Always walk as though
   you are late for an important meeting.
• You should become knowledgeable about your neighborhood. Where is the nearest police station?
   Which stores, restaurants, businesses are open late at night? Acquaint yourself with local
   proprietors and the locations of nearby telephones.
• Know your own ability. Be honest with yourself and be aware of your capabilities. How far and how
   fast can you run for help? You should always try to maintain yourself in good physical condition.
• Don't hesitate to call attention to yourself if you are in danger: scream, shout, blow the horn of your
   vehicle, yell "FIRE!" as if you mean it.
• At a new duty station find out about customs, how you are expected to behave, dress, potential
    threats and areas to avoid. Are there separate standards for men and women?
• Learn at least a few phrases in the local language so that you can signal your needs for help; also
    learn a few phrases in the local language about UNICEF and its role in the country.
• List only your initials and last name in the telephone directory and on personal checks. Do not put
    your name on a mailbox or on a gate-post.
• If a stranger asks to use your telephone, do not permit him/her to enter. Offer to make the call for
     the person.
• If at all possible, avoid sleeping with the windows open. If you must, secure them with a lock or nail
     so that they will open only a few inches.
• Don't get on an elevator if there is someone on it who makes you feel uneasy.
• If you are on an elevator and someone gets on who makes you feel uncomfortable, get off at the
     next floor.



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                        Page 88
1-6 December, 2002                                                                               Pranburi, Thailand
                                                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.3.



• In an elevator, stand near the control panel. If threatened, hit the alarm button and press as many
    buttons as you can reach, enabling the door to open at several floors.
• If you live in an apartment, avoid being in the laundry room or garage by yourself, especially at
     night.
• Rehearse the actions you would take if you were confronted. There is no right or wrong way to
   respond to an attack. Each situation will be different. Whether to resist an attacker or not can only
   be your decision. Generally, the following options will be open to you:
             •   talk you way out of it;
             •   give in to the demand made of you;
             •   shout for help or yell 'fire;'
             •   flee;
             •   fight.


travelling
• If attending a conference, remove your name tag as soon as possible to avoid being identified.
• In a hotel, choose a room near the elevator to avoid having to walk down a long, empty corridor. If
    you feel uncomfortable, ask a hotel employee to escort you to your room.
• If you feel unsafe in the room, ask to change it.
• Do not display your room key to strangers. If the front desk mentions your room number out loud,
   complain to the manager and, if seriously concerned, insist on a room change.
• If you are not expecting company, tell the front desk and insist that they not give a key to anyone. It
     is not unheard of for a would-be attacker to get your room number, claim it at his/her own, and
     ask for a key.
• When first entering a hotel room, check the closets, bathroom and balcony to make sure they are
   not occupied.
• If someone knocks on your door, don't assume the person is who he/she claims to be; call the desk
     and double-check. Always use a deadbolt chain.


• If you find the door of your room open or unlocked, do not enter. Return to the desk and ask for an
     escort back to your room.
• Beware of individuals posing as police or security officials who want you to accompany them to
   another location. Obtain proper identification and a valid reason to go with them, then call the
   local police station to verify. Ask the hotel desk to assist you in verifying identities. Before you
   accompany them, call the Head of Office or the Designated Official and advise him/her of your
   situation.


in the car
• If for any reason you are uncomfortable about parking or your final destination, keep driving until
     you are safe.
• If someone drops you off by auto, ask the driver to wait until you are safely inside or else ask for an
     escort to the door.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                       Page 89
1-6 December, 2002                                                                             Pranburi, Thailand
                                                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.3.



• When parking at night, select a place that will be lit when you return. Check for loiterers before
   leaving the car. Do not park on the street if you have access to a garage or secure parking area.
• When parking in daylight, always ask yourself, 'Will I want to return here after dark?' even if you
   intend to return in daylight.
• Whenever you are concerned about returning to your car, ask a co-worker, friend, or employee of a
   local business for an escort.
• Never pick up hitchhikers. Think twice before offering assistance to what may appear to be a
   stranded motorist, regardless of gender.
• If you have a flat tire, continue driving until you reach a safe, well-lit, well-traveled area.
• If your car breaks down, put up the hood, lock the doors, and turn on the hazard lights. If the car is
     equipped with a radio, contact the office and give your location. If not, go to the nearest phone
     only if it is safe to do so. Otherwise, wait until someone offers assistance. Don't get out of the car;
     roll the window down slightly and ask the person to call for help.
• If you are confronted by an armed person or persons as you approach your car or while you are
     driving, you may have to choose between going with him/ them or risking injury or death if you
     resist. There is no 'right' answer to this question, but you should think about it before the fact.


walking
• Always carry with you the home and office numbers for the Head of Office, the Designated Official,
    and other UN personnel responsible for security.
• As you prepare to go out, check that all closures on your bags are shut. Put your wallet in a front
   pocket or under clothing. Carry only the cash
• you will need and divide it.
• Wear clothes and shoes that give you freedom of movement.
• You should be especially aware of and alert to your surroundings.
• Whenever possible, avoid walking alone at night.
• Walk next to the curb to avoid passing too close to shrubbery, dark doorways and other places of
   concealment. If possible, walk against traffic.
• Do NOT take shortcuts through isolated areas.
• If you must use a personal stereo, i.e., a Walkman, keep the volume low enough so that you can
     hear events around you. Better yet, do not use one.
• If someone suspicious is behind or ahead of you, cross the street.
• If you feel you're being followed, don't go home; go to a safe place and call for assistance.
• If a driver pulls up alongside you to ask for directions, do not approach the vehicle and beware of
     the suggestion to "look at this map." Respond from a distance.
• If a car approaches and the driver threatens you, scream and run in the opposite direction of the
     car.
• Never hitchhike or accept a ride from a stranger.
• Have your keys ready but do not jiggle them in your hand unnecessarily. This only serves to
   announce to others that you are on your way home. You may want to consider holding your key
   ring so that individual keys jut out between your fingers, creating a potential weapon.



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                          Page 90
1-6 December, 2002                                                                                  Pranburi, Thailand
                                                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 3.3.



• Keep only those keys on your key ring that you use, and do not have your name or address on your
   key ring. Mark your keys so that they can be identified in the dark; this makes it easier to find the
   appropriate keys quickly.
• If you find that a window or door of your home has been forced open or broken into while you were
     out, DO NOT ENTER. The perpetrator may still be inside. Quietly leave the area. Use a public
     phone or a neighbor's phone and call the Head of Office, the Designated Official, or the police for
     help.
• Carry your handbag in a secure manner, under your arm or under a coat, to prevent snatch-and-run
   type thievery.


public transportation
• During off-hours, wait for your train in a designated waiting area.
• Do not ride in compartments or trains that are deserted.
• On a crowded bus or train, improper touching may occur. If so, move away, stomp on the
   aggressor's foot, verbalize your objections, etc.
• If possible, sit in the train car that is occupied by the conductor or drivers.
• Know the hours of operation of the trains you are using so that you do not need to wait on deserted
   platforms. Avoid taking the last train to your destination.
• After getting off the bus or train, always look around to see whether you are being followed.
• Try to have someone meet you at the train station/bus stop or at the lobby of your building if you
    are arriving late in the evening.


social situations
• Use precaution when meeting someone you don't know well. Arrange to go out with a group of
   people you know. Choose public places or places where there will be other people. Never have a
   man pick you up or meet you at your home unless you know him well and trust him.
• Speak up! Communicate your wishes clearly. Do not let anyone assume you are going to have
   intimate relations with him.
• Assert yourself Insist on being treated with respect.
• Avoid the loss of your own sobriety.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                     Page 91
1-6 December, 2002                                                                             Pranburi, Thailand
                                                    International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




SESSION 3.2 Negotiation and Checkpoint Skills

Reading 3.2.1. Preventing and Defusing Anger and Hostility

Based on an InterAction / OFDA training document by Lisa Schirch and Dave Dyck; Eastern Mennonite
University, Conflict Transformation Program, 1200 Park Rd., Harrisonburg, VA 22802; 540/432-4497; fax:
540/432-4449; e-mail: schirchl@emu.edu and dyckd@aslan.emu.edu

Your Goal: To learn how to prevent, defuse and de-escalate security incidents which involve dealing with
angry, hostile people.


The Importance of Respect as a Principle for Security


NGO personnel may find themselves in situations where they need to attempt to defuse aggressive,
angry people. For example, if you are driving across an international border in late afternoon or evening,
you may have to deal with drunken, angry border patrols in some regions.


Demonstrating respect for others is a primary means for de-escalating hostility and aggression. When
faced with anger and the threat of violence, it is of course difficult to respond with respect. When a person
shows initial signs of hostility or begins to respond angrily to an incident, the following general principles
which stem from the “acceptance”, or relationshipfocused dimension of the overall security paradigm are
important to remember:


•   Recognize that the aggressor is often feeling threatened, anxious and fearful, and will respond even
    more aggressively if s/he feels more threatened.


•   Focus on communicating respect with appropriate listening skills and non-aggressive, non-
    challenging body language. The ability to show concern for the specific, personal needs of others
    while maintaining a non-anxious demeanor in the midst of an angry interpersonal encounter, may
    defuse the situation.


•   More specifically, being a good listener of others, in interpersonal exchanges, is a far more powerful
    tool than speaking when trying to defuse hostility. (The components of good listening are detailed
    later in this text.)


•   Cooperate with an armed aggressor's commands, unless they are completely unacceptable. Unless
    the commands given would result in harm to yourself or another member of your team, a general
    attitude which communicates a desire to cooperate in solving the problem is almost always the most
    appropriate response.


•   Attempt to establish some type of significance with the aggressor's humanity and personal dignity.
    When confronted with an unacceptable demand, an appeal to the aggressor's humanity has proven
    effective.



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                   Page 92
1-6 December, 2002                                                                           Pranburi, Thailand
                                                    International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.



•   Remain calm yourself; reduce physiological stress through some form of relaxation; talk calmly to
    yourself using strategies that you have practiced and found effective in the past. Holding an open and
    relaxed body posture communicates respect and attention to the aggressor.


•   To whatever extent you are able, show an interest in resolving the issue or meeting the other’s needs
    and concerns:
        - emphasize willingness to be cooperative and address the issue(s) being raised
        - acknowledge the importance of whatever concern they are expressing


•   Help the other person maintain their dignity
        - reassure him/her that their concerns are legitimate
        - offer the option to pursue the issue/problem later if possible
        - refrain from openly judging his/her behavior.


•   Individual NGO personnel who have strong skills in understanding power dynamics and who
    recognize and use their own power in ways that are assertive but do not threaten others are more
    able to defuse aggressive behavior by giving recognition and respect, in a variety of ways, to these
    aggressive persons. (See Image, Acceptance, and Reciprocity by Koenraad Van Brabant and Power,
    Image, and Security by Schirch and Dyck for more information on this topic).


Factors That Escalate Hostility and Aggression


•   Insecurity: We all experience insecurity whenever we are fearful or feel a loss of control and
    predictability in our lives. When this basic degree of order and safety are threatened, people become
    increasingly volatile and unpredictable.


•   Lack of choices. In general, humans respond with hostility and aggression when they perceive that
    their choices are limited. The sense of powerlessness that comes with feeling that one has little or
    no options often produces violent or hostile responses. Feeling powerful (that is, able to significantly
    influence situations affecting one’s group or person), is a prerequisite to dealing positively with other
    people. Just as a cornered rat fights the dirtiest, so too do humans. When there is dirty fighting,
    someone is usually feeling powerless. This is hard to remember. Cornered people are often
    intimidating and can inflict serious injury. Worse, they mask their powerlessness - from themselves
    as well as others. Nothing suppresses a whimper better than a snarl! This hostility is most likely to
    be directed at you if people feel that either you are responsible, directly or indirectly, for their
    predicament or that you have options that they do not.


•   Unequal power: When one person or group has or is perceived to have more power than another, the
    less powerful person may fee threatened.


•   Flaunting symbols of power: The tangible, concrete things that are associated with having a high
    degree of influence. e.g. hi-tech equipment, expensive vehicles, contextually extravagant lifestyles,
    uniforms, guns, association with Western culture and education, money, understanding of the local



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                   Page 93
1-6 December, 2002                                                                           Pranburi, Thailand
                                                    International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.



    language, etc., may be seen as threatening to people without such resources. (See Module on
    Image, Acceptance and Reciprocity)


•   Disrespectful behavior: Any actions which are considered inappropriate in terms of a lack of
    deference to local customs, leadership, and ethical/moral norms. This behavior is often engaged in
    by those who lack a knowledge of their context and/or themselves and the way they are generally
    perceived by others.


•   Inconsistent Team Behavior: The lack of a systematic, consistent philosophy and approach to issues
    within the community on behalf of personnel associated with the same, and sometimes even different,
    NGOs. In other words, when there is a lack of sufficient communication within and between NGOs.


•   High Levels of Intra-Team Discord and Conflict: The presence of highly conflicted relationships within
    the team can provoke animosity within the community towards certain individuals on the team.


•   Aggressive or Passive Responses: Aggressive or passive responses on behalf of NGO personnel to
    concerns within the community or to the hostility can easily escalate that hostility to deadlier levels.


The Aikido Principle for Defusing Anger


Aikido is a martial art which moves to dissipate the power of the attack by leading the attacker in a new
direction so that the attack is neutralized. Rather than resisting or fighting against an opponent, aikido
realigns the attacked with the direction of the opponent's attack.

While extensive physical training is needed in order to use Aikido moves to defuse a physical attack, the
principle is appropriate for understanding how to defuse verbal anger and aggression. Rather than
opposing your opponents anger and/or needs in a security context, it may be helpful to re-direct their
verbal aggression into a non-threatening form of discussion that can bring a cooperative, problem-solving
approach. The following communication skills outline how to defuse anger with nonverbal, listening and
speaking skills based on the principle of redirecting the energy of the attack.


The Importance of Communication in Preventing and Responding to Hostility
NGO personnel use communication skills in every aspect of their work. Within their organization, NGO
personnel need good communication to make sound decisions and build good working relationships with
one another. With the local population, communication skills are helpful to get through government
bureaucracy, to travel through check points, or to manage one’s own perspectives and emotions.
When dealing with situations that involve the potential for violence, it is imperative that we think critically
and carefully about the way that we communicate about our interests, needs, emotions, limitations, and
purposes to others. Being able to communicate one’s perspective is vital to effective negotiation and
crisis management, and communication skills are of utmost importance when facing hostile or threatening
people.
We often think we have two choices when threatened in a conflict: fight or flee from the situation. These
responses may seem instinctual, but there is another option. Appealing to the other, gathering
information without antagonizing, drawing out underlying needs, concerns and fears, and learning to
make requests and communicate one's own limitations or needs without antagonizing can be very helpful
in communicating with others in an insecure environment. Improving our ability to communicate and
negotiate effectively results in better personal and group outcomes. These outcomes are not only related

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to the immediate task, they also contribute to overall improved relationships and a higher degree of
acceptance of the NGO within the community in which it is active. The ability to communicate skillfully
and appropriately so as to foster acceptance may have a greater impact on security than any other single
factor. In addition, interpersonal skills are considered by some analysts to be the most neglected area of
security training today.


Assumptions and misunderstandings
A factor that often contributes to the breakdown of communication and leads to conflict and even crisis is
the assumptions we all make. In our daily interactions we often misinterpret the behavior of others during
the decoding process of communication. When people are under the stress associated with conflict or
insecurity, the tendency to misinterpret each other is greatly increased. When the above mixture of
ingredients is combined with cross-cultural dynamics, a particularly ripe setting for miscommunication and
assumptions is created. These assumptions can have deadly consequences in settings of vulnerability.

We have a tendency to assume the other’s intention from the effect their action has on us. For
example:


If I am offended, angered, or feel threatened by the actions of another person I will tend to assume
s/he intended me to feel this way.


In the same way, the actor or sender of the message assumes that the other individual receiving it will
correctly interpret the intent of the message or action. Do not let statements like “I thought that...” go
unchecked. Such phrases may be indicators of assumptions that need to be clarified.


Similarly, if you are disturbed by the behavior of another person or group, do not simply make
assumptions about the intent underlying the action. Instead, take responsibility for both inquiring about
their intent and informing them of the effect on you. To communicate effectively and reduce our
vulnerability, we must make our intentions clear and check out our assumptions. By themselves, actions,
tone and words can all mislead.


Non-verbal Communication: Defusing Hostility Through Body Language
Communication research shows that at least 80% of communication is non-verbal (tone and visual). Of
this total, most is communicated through the body. Human beings exchange meaning through eye
movements, facial expressions, body posture, gestures, and proximity. Just as with verbal
communication, there are many languages of nonverbal communication that vary greatly with culture.


Often NGO personnel work in countries where the local language is not their first language. If NGO
personnel do have knowledge of the local languages, it is usually fairly limited. In these situations, to a
great extent, local people rely on understanding the goals of NGOs and their expatriate workers largely by
what they communicate non-verbally.


Because so much of our understanding of a situation and our ability to communicate in that context is
dependent on nonverbal communication, it is particularly important to observe and learn from local people
in the cultural context where your NGO is located. It is usually extremely helpful to have a local person
train new expatriate staff in cultural nonverbal communication. How NGO personnel behave, in terms of
body language, in response to aggression can dramatically affect their ongoing relationship with the local



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 population and can greatly heighten or downgrade the risk in a particular incident. The following list
 highlights several areas which should be given particular consideration.


     We increase our nonverbal communication skills by:
     • Trying to pay extra attention to the nonverbal signals your body is giving when dealing with anger.
       Are you frowning or shaking your head while they talk? Are you receptive to the information
       being shared? Make sure your body posture is open rather than closed, inviting information
       rather than shutting yourself off from the speaker


     •   Being conscious of our facial expressions and our body posture in terms of the local, culturally
         appropriate customs;


     •   Learning what kind of eye contact (from direct to indirect) is appropriate in various settings;


     •   Paying particular attention to the physical distance between you and the person speaking. This
         varies widely according to culture;


     •   Being very sensitive about the kind of gestures you are using. A gesture which communicates
         warmth and acceptance in one culture may mean something highly offensive or communicate
         intense animosity in another;


     •   Being aware of standing eye to eye with a person. Communication specialists stress that
         standing at an angle (sideways) rather than directly across from someone can help keep a
         situation calm and non-adversarial;


     •   Heightening our awareness of all of the above whenever we are dealing with a hostile or
         potentially hostile person.


Think about the following use of nonverbal defusing:


 Security handbooks advise keeping one's hands on the steering wheel and in plain sight when
 approaching border checkpoints. Why is this important? What does this communicate and how
 does it contribute to defusing a potentially dangerous situation? Would one attempt to
 communicate this message verbally? Why or why not?


 (For more on checkpoints, see thenext short reading on Approaching a Checkpoint


 Listening: The Key Defusing Strategy


 Everyone wants to be listened to and to be understood. People often become angry or aggressive only
 after a lengthy period of not being listened to or acknowledged both collectively and individually. By
 listening effectively, people can often defuse an angry or threatening situation.



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Many people think listening is easy. In fact, it often requires years of practice to learn how to listen
effectively. It is very difficult to not make assumptions, judgments, or responses when listening. Yet it is
very important to let yourself focus on listening rather than thinking about your own concerns.


How to listen effectively:
    •   Empathize - put yourself in the other person’s shoes and try to understand how s/he feels.


    •   Listen - for the feelings or emotions of the speaker, the meaning of their message, and the
        specific content they are trying to communicate. Angry people often say aggressive,
        inappropriate, offensive, unfair, unfounded things. Nevertheless, do not lose control of your
        emotions and begin arguing. Do not give into the temptation to start interrupting, correcting, and
        arguing with the angry person. When people are escalating, rational arguments have little to no
        effect except to further provoke their hostility. Instead, focus on the deeper issues the person is
        so eager to communicate. (See discussion below on Aikido listening, reframing positions to
        interests)


    •   Validate - let the other person know that her/his experience is valid. This does not mean that you
        agree with them, only that you have listened to their experiences and can understand why they
        might be feeling the way they do.


    •   Paraphrase - Paraphrasing is restating in your own words the core of what the other has
        expressed in a message. A good paraphrase gets at content and emotions (see below)


    •   Clarify - ask questions to get more information about the problem (see below)


    •   Gather information - try to gain a better understanding about the situation without antagonizing


    •   Recognize your own prejudices- be aware of the way in which your feelings or reactions to a
        person influence your interpretation of what is being said. Change your judgment to curiosity,
        even when what the angry person is saying seems unfair or ridiculous.


    •   Draw out underlying interests - use open-ended, non-threatening questions (see below)


    •   Be Quiet! - Too many people talk too much when facing escalated situations. People usually do
        not want to be told how they should think, feel, or act in the midst of their anger. Often, people
        become angry because of a lack of a sense of control or influence over their own lives. Telling
        them what to do only exacerbates this tension.


    •   Use the other person’s name respectfully (if you know it)


    •   Be prepared to patiently repeat yourself


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    •   Match and lower intensity


Questions as a key element to effective listening


    a. Questions which escalate hostility
        There are many types of questions which we use reflexively which often prove unhelpful and can
        escalate the situation. Some of these questions may be divided into the following types:


WHY - draws out information but, depending on tone, can have the impact of challenging, blaming or
calling upon the other person to justify or defend his/her actions or position. Many “why” questions are
intended to prove wrong-doing. For example, “Why would anyone do that?”


LEADING - is really a disguised statement. The speaker attempts to express his or her opinion through a
question. For example, “Don’t you think, given the implications of not returning the radios, that you would
be better off simply settling this quickly?”


MULTIPLE - is when two or more questions are asked immediately following one another without
adequate time for response. This is often confusing for respondents because they have trouble focusing
on what is being asked. For example, “Is it true you’re intentionally provoking animosity towards our
organization and, if so, are you aware of the legal implications of this and what will happen should this go
to a formal investigation?”


CLOSE-ENDED - invites a one or two word answer, “Are you in a position to make that move?” The
possible responses are often limited to “yes” or “no”. Closed questions narrow the amount of information
that is given and, while sometimes useful, often have the effect of creating an adversarial atmosphere.


ASSUMPTIVE CLOSURE - gives the expected answer in the question.“Now I know you don’t want this
project delayed any longer, right?” or “This is a pretty basic question isn’t it?”


    b. Questions that can defuse hostility
    In effective conflict defusing, questioning can be used to probe for information. It is not used to prove
    a point, to demolish an argument, or to get compliance. As with any technique, there are also helpful
    ways to use questions. When undertaken with care, questioning can help clarify assumptions and
    uncover vital information and effectively defuse a situation.


OPEN-ENDED questions, ones which cannot be answered with a simple “yes” or “no”, move away from
judgment towards curiosity. Open questions invite a longer response, giving a choice of how to respond
and thereby moving the control from the questioner to the responder. This type of questioning may seem
risky because the questioner cannot know exactly what direction the conversation will go. Although this
may seem to be a disadvantage in a purely adversarial environment, open questioning often results in
creation of a more open, co-operative forum. Open questions encourage answers which provide
unanticipated information, reveal interests, and provide clarity for all involved. Open-ended questions are
questions that require more than a "yes" or "no" answer and demonstrate an interest in the other’s
concerns. However, in some cultural contexts, use extreme caution with open questions because they

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can be seen as intrusive, disrespectful and inappropriate. There are a number of different types of open
questions:


    •   Probing questions ask for more information about concerns or emotions.
                “What is it you want to see happen in this situation?”
                “How did your group react to that news from our NGO?”
                         “What are your concerns with the policy?”
                “What are some other possibilities to resolve this situation?” (Brainstorming)


    •   Clarifying statements or questions seek to understand particular aspects of the message.

                "What do you mean by______?" , "Are you saying that ______?"
                                 “Could you help me understand how you came to _______?”


    •   Consequential questions are used to get the speaker to think about the consequences of
        what they are saying. It is a form of "reality testing."
                       “So what do you see as the potential implications of us taking _______?”


Paraphrasing as a Key Approach to Effective Listening


Angry Statement: “You North Americans are all the same…you’re here until some problem erupts and
then you leave! I’m so sick of this happening again and again! Well, this time you can’t just take all your
fancy stuff with you! This equipment was intended for us and this is where it’s staying or somebody is
going to get hurt!”


Paraphrase: “Sounds like you’re really fed up with our pattern of just taking off…”


Paraphrasing is one way to make sure you have understood the intended message. It has a
number of purposes:
1) It provides a climate in which the speaker is more likely to feel understood.
2) It allows you to check to make sure you understand the speaker’s intent.
3) It allows the speaker to correct you if you have misunderstood something, thereby preventing
    misunderstandings.
4) It allows the speaker to correct themselves if they feel they inaccurately expressed what they were
    trying to communicate.
5) It provides you the opportunity to focus on understanding the other person rather than thinking of your
    own response.
6) It conveys to the speaker that you are interested in him or her and what s/he has to say. This often
    allows the person the freedom to continue talking



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Re-Framing Positions to Interests
Reframing, like paraphrasing, is another way to respond to a hostile speaker to let her/him know that you
understand what they are saying. However, unlike paraphrasing, which simply repeats back what has
been said, reframing is a way of changing directions. When faced with hostility, it is natural to push back.
However, rather than opposing your opponent’s anger in a security context, it may be helpful to re-direct
aggression into a non-threatening discussion of their underlying needs. At its best, reframing can elicit a
more cooperative, problem-solving approach to address the concerns and interests rather than the
positions of an attacker.


POSITION - A position is one specific solution to a problem, usually stated as a demand in an attempt to
resolve a conflict. Often the positions of people in conflict are mutually exclusive because each person is
attempting to address only his or her own needs. Positions often arise out of impulses that seem to
demand immediate reaction. Common motives for becoming positional are the desire to be taken
seriously, fear, revenge and unmet expectations from the past.


INTEREST - Interests are often closely connected to an individual’s values and priorities. These values
and priorities can often be identified through an individual’s expression of their underlying wants, needs,
fears, hopes and/or concerns. In expressing their interests, parties in dispute often discover that they
share many more values and concerns than they assumed while in their positional stance and they are
subsequently much less likely to perceive one another in purely adversarial terms.


NEEDS - Undelying the basic human interests, which often arise in disputes are the almost universal
needs for power, approval, justice, inclusion, identity and security, and respect. What is useful in this is
that our needs as human beings are usually the same, even though our interests may tend to move in
different areas, and our spoken positions may be complelety different. (see diagram below)



                                                                             ME            YOU
       POSITION                                            POSITION



      INTEREST                                             INTEREST



    NEED                                                   NEED
                                                                                   US

                                                                            WIN - WIN ZONE




While a judgmental reaction to another’s position often leads to no movement and frustration, a curious
attitude allows us to uncover the interest(s) from which the position of the other person stems. When
NGO personnel learn to speak in terms of their underlying interests, they adopt a much more flexible
approach to conflict and reduce the chances of misunderstanding. You can also defuse potential
aggression by assertively articulating your own interests rather than aggressively pushing your position.




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In reframing the listener takes a statement that is framed, or seen from a perspective of a position that
makes it difficult to redirect anger, and reframes it, or looks at it from a new perspective which might allow
the discussion to move forward. Reframing is a powerful tool. It can demonstrate that you understand
the other person’s interests and turn a potentially destructive comment into a constructive problem-
solving comment.


When speaking to an angry, aggressive person, reframing hears the demanding and accusatory
statements and then reframes by tentatively stating the underlying interests. Instead of stating what they
say they don’t want, the listener focuses on naming what it sounds like they need.


Reframing may also involve:
•   changing the emphasis from differences to common ground
•   changing the emphasis from negative to positive
•   changing the emphasis from the specific to the general or vice-versa


FORMULA TO BEGIN:
     It is important to you that                                 .
     It sounds like                          is important to you.
     So you value                                           .


Notes: Use this space to write out some re-framing statements in your own words:




EXAMPLES:




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                  Page 101
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Statement: An angry person approaches an NGO worker preparing to evacuate and says: “If you leave
here this time, there’ll be trouble- that equipment was intended for us and we’re not letting you take off
with it.”


Interest:   Ongoing use of equipment; loyalty to local population


Reframe: “It sounds like you’re really concerned about the loss of the equipment to get your work done.
Maybe we could talk together about how to address your concerns.”
________________________________________________________________________________


Statement: “Working here is so depressing. Nobody thanks me for my contributions. I have no way of
knowing if I’m even doing an adequate job or not.”


Interest:   Acknowledgment or being valued


Reframe:      “So, receiving feedback and acknowledgment is important for you? In what ways would it be
helpful to you to hear feedback?”
________________________________________________________________________________
Statement: “You’re always checking up on me. It bugs me that you don’t believe I’m working.”
Interest:   Trust
Reframe:     “So, you’d really like me to trust you...”


In crisis situations, the most important re-framing skills to remember are:


•   Reframe a competitive attack into a more cooperative stance;


•   Reframe demands or "positions" on issues into a discussion or focus on how to meet mutual needs.


Assertive Communication: How to Communicate Your Interests



While listening is a powerful skill in defusing anger and aggression, there may be times when you will
need to assert your own needs and interests in a security situation. NGO personnel can sometimes use
speaking or disclosure skills to help defuse an angry person or group before they have escalated.


Be "hard on the issues, but soft on the person”, implies that while it is important to communicate your
viewpoint, it is important to do so in a way which refrains from personal attack on people who disagree
with it. It is important for you to communicate your own perspectives and interests as early as possible
(before a situation escalates to an angry encounter). Therefore, do not be overly cautious to say what
you need or want from a situation, but speak thoughtfully, so that your words will not provoke the person
you are speaking to. When you are actually facing a very angry person, you may need to be more



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cautious about what you say or divulge in that moment. It is often very important to look for a calm
moment to talk/negotiate.
Through careful reflection on how you approach people, you can greatly increase your control over
whether your message is received the way you want it to be and decrease the chances of a hostile
response. Finally, non-aggressive modes of speaking about our perspective and/or needs encourages
others to shift their behavior and do the same. It is important to remember that negotiation is most
appropriate before a situation has grossly escalated.


I/We Messages


When communicating your interests in a tense atmosphere, it is easier to hear a statement in which the
speaker clearly states their perspective or needs (i.e. “I”) than it is to hear a statement which focuses on
the other person or parties (“You!”). Speak from your own experience and needs, rather than what you've
heard others say. Others are less likely to become defensive if you state your own beliefs and
preferences rather than using language that focuses on what you dislike about others or attempt to speak
for people beyond you or your jurisdiction.


Starting a sentence with “I or We” often lowers the level of escalation and tension. A “YOU” message
usually raises the level of pressure and tension. These messages usually blame, accuse, threaten, order,
put-down or make the other person feel guilty.


An “I/We” message has three parts:


When ________ happens, I/We feel/need _________ because it has the effect of ___________on
me/us.


- When (specific behavior) ....
- I or We feel/need (specific feeling or need) .......
- Because (tangible effect or rationale)


Each part plays an important role when we attempt to communicate our concerns and/or influence
another person’s behavior.


1. The “WHEN” element helps separate the person from the problem. This is extremely important for
keeping the discussion in a problem-solving rather than attacking mode. It informs the other person of
the specific behavior that is problematic for you.


2. The “I FEEL” component is important because the speaker is taking responsibility for his/her feelings,
indicating trust in the listener, and clarifying her/his feelings.


3. The “BECAUSE” is most often missed but is crucial when trying to deal with a conflict. The “because”
part of the message pushes the speaker to look beneath a position to clearly define what the situation is
in terms of interests. It also allows the speaker to more easily understand and communicate that interest
rather than position.

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Example:     Instead of saying - “The people in this community are constantly after our equipment and
               vehicles. We may simply have no choice but to withhold our services unless that radio is
               returned.”


              You Might Say - “When our radios disappear, we/I feel concerned and frustrated because
              it becomes very difficult to carry out our work. We’re also aware that the radios are a big
              temptation for local people and I’m eager to hear your thoughts on what we can do to
              solve this problem.”
There are a number of additional principles that can empower you and your organization to share
information more effectively and defuse potentially aggressive encounters before they evolve. They are
as follows:


•   Reflect - step back and think about the situation if possible. Clarify your concerns and feelings.
•   Choose a place and time, when possible, that will facilitate good communication.
•   State your intention to resolve the issues at hand positively. This can help motivate others.
•   Before speaking, try to think of the easiest way it would be for you to hear the message you
    want to communicate.


Making an Assertive Request


There are times when NGO personnel are facing an angry person who does not pose an immediate,
lethal threat. In such situations it may be appropriate to respectfully but assertively request a specific
change in behavior as a condition of continuing a discussion. It is important to remember, however, that
when an individual does pose an immediate, potentially lethal threat because they have a weapon or the
authority to use violence, making an assertive request may not be an appropriate or feasible option.


•   PREFERENCE STATEMENTS: Clearly communicate your preferences or desires rather than stating
    them as demands or forcing others to guess what they are.
    •   My preference is....
    •   If it were up to us...
    •   What I would like is...
    •   From our perspective, it would be helpful if....


•   INTEREST STATEMENTS: Clearly state your wants, needs, fears, and concerns.
    What concerns me is...
    What we really need is... because...


•   PURPOSE STATEMENTS: Disclosing your intentions enables others to understand what motivates
    you and minimizes the opportunity for misunderstanding. It also reduces the chance for others to
    unknowingly operate at cross-purposes.
        •   What I’m trying to accomplish with this policy is...

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         •   We’re out here today because we were hoping to...
         •   I am in the process of trying to locate...
         •   Our intention with this group of people is to...


•    DESCRIBING OBSERVATIONS: Describe what you are currently observing between yourself and
     the other person in a non-positional way. In an unhelpful conversation with a community elder, one
     might say:
     “I’m noticing that we seem to be at an impasse in this conversation. It seems like we’re all getting a
     little tired and frustrated. I’m not sure how to move on. What do you think?”


•    AGREEMENT STATEMENTS: Acknowledge where you agree with the other party in the midst of a
     disagreement. This increases the amount you share in common and reduces the conflict field.
         •   I agree with you that...
         •   We definitely share your concern about...
         •   Your interest in...... makes a lot of sense to me.
         •   We share your hope that…


•    “YES AND ....” NOT “YES BUT...” The word but has been called the “verbal eraser” because
     agreement statements lose their effectiveness if they are followed by a disclaimer such as but. It is
     better to make your agreement statement and then raise your other concerns.
         •   I share your concern about.... and I am also concerned about...
         •   I agree that we should.... and I also think that...


Things to Avoid When Speaking to/Defusing an Angry Person:
•    Blaming - Do not blame. Blaming leads people to become defensive and hostile rather than
     cooperative and understanding.
•    Accusations or Counter-Accusations - Do not accuse. In general, be cautious about starting
     sentences with “You” or “You people” For example, it usually makes people defensive to begin a
     sentence with “You didn’t....” or “Your people always...”
•    Making Assumptions - Don't assume that your perceptions are correct and others are false.
    Acknowledge the assumptions that inevitably underlie all our beliefs. We are often unaware of the
    different ways people experience the world. Individuals perceive the world differently and so react
    differently. Again, change judgment to curiosity.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                    Page 105
1-6 December, 2002                                                                             Pranburi, Thailand
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Readng 3.2.2. Approaching and Dealing with Checkpoints


This short text is taken from the OFDA/InterAction PVO Security Task Force training materials on
Vehicles and Travel. This piece was writtent By Jan Davis, RedR drawing on documentation produced by
CARE, Save the Children, Harlan Hale, and Steve Penny


Checkpoints
It is important to distinguish between the different types of check-points. In normal circumstances check-
points are designed to observe and control vehicle circulation; examine the road worthiness of vehicles;
ensure compliance with driver and vehicle documentation, and to check for stolen cars, unauthorized
drivers and transport of contraband. In insecure areas legitimate check-points also serve to identify
vehicle occupants and the reason for transiting the area. They are also to check for the transport of guns,
explosives, or combatants. Personnel at authorized check-points, therefore, have a job to do, it may not
be that pleasant (especially in extreme weather conditions) and the check-point personnel may feel more
at risk than yourself. If you are co-operative, patient and polite, all your papers are correct and you have a
legitimate job to do then it is in the interests of all concerned to speed you on your way as swiftly as
possible.


However, in many countries personnel on authorized check-points can be underpaid (or not paid at all),
frustrated, scared and they do not see why you should proceed without question or without some
compensation to them. In this situation it is important to remain in the right and to stress the legitimacy of
your position.


Another category of potentially more hazardous check-point is the impromptu barrier erected by
unauthorized or irregular forces for a variety of possible purposes: defining the limits of a territory,
extortion, robbery, car-jacking, assault, kidnapping and/or execution/assassination.


It is therefore, important to recognize the difference between a legal, sanctioned check-point designed to
protect the public safety and a check-point erected for the personal benefit and gain of the check-point
personnel.


It is potentially dangerous to lay down strict guidelines on behavior at different types of check point since
this will vary from country to country. For example, it may be customary to keep the engine running in one
location but it may give the wrong signal in another situation. Therefore, on arrival in a new situation find
out where the check-points are located and ask about the accepted form of behavior. Be aware that
check-points can vary from an official red and white custom made barrier to a piece of string or stones
across a track. Therefore, before traveling find out how to recognize the usual forms of local check-point.


Notwithstanding what has been said above, the accompanying box suggests possible conduct at a check-
point but this should always be checked against recommended local practice.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                    Page 106
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Suggested check-point behavior


Important note:
even though you may have experience from elsewhere, always check local guidelines on check-
point behavior before embarking on a journey for the first time in a new location.


−   You may establish a procedure to radio your position to your agency base on approaching
    each check-point.
−   During the approach quickly appraise the situation and decide on a response.
−   If something looks suspicious then keep your distance, hold back and covertly report by radio.
−   Agree before reaching the check-point who in the vehicle is going to speak and what you are
    going to say. Ensure everyone has the same story as unintentional conflicting remarks can
    create suspicion.
−   Take off sunglasses before stopping. Turn off radio/tape. At night, turn off headlights well
    before check point and turn on an interior light.
−   Slow down. You may not need to stop unless asked to do so – NGO vehicles may be
    automatically waved through.
−   Keep a reasonable distance between vehicles. If there is an incident then a vehicle behind
    can report problems and hopefully evade danger.
−   Be sure you understand the signals given by check-point personnel (e.g. are they waving me
    on or into the side of the road?). Stop if unsure.
−   Be friendly, co-operative and alert.
−   Have all your documents in order – passport/identity card, vehicle papers, driving license,
    permit to travel, cargo manifest.
−   Show identification if requested, but try not to hand it over.
−   Keep your hands visible at all times. Do not make any sudden movements that could be
    misinterpreted. Explain what you are going to do first (e.g. “I have to get my papers from the
    glove compartment”).
−   Never willingly surrender your advantage. Unless otherwise indicated:
       •   Keep your doors locked.
       •   Stay in your vehicle unless strongly requested to get out and then try to remain close to
           the vehicle.
       •   Only switch off the engine if requested or it is the norm to do so.
       •   Open windows just enough to talk through and pass documents.
−   Avoid bribes, ‘a dash’, at all costs. Find out what the local ‘customs’ are prior to getting into a
    compromising situation.
−   Even if you don’t smoke, carry cigarettes and matches, or pens as small acceptable ‘gifts’
    when asked “have you got something for me?”
−   If at all possible, refuse lifts to armed or uniformed personnel.
−   Do not carry contraband: drugs, banned alcohol, undeclared currency, pornography,

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    restricted items. If vehicle and/or baggage is searched, observe closely to prevent
    unauthorized removal and/or planting of any items.
−   Protest strongly, but calmly and politely, at the removal/confiscation of any items from the
    vehicle or occupants – but do not resist if the guard is persistent, violent or armed.
−   Avoid looking back after passing through a check-point as this can create suspicion if
    witnessed. Drive away at a normal speed.
−   When out of view of the check-point and if it is agreed procedure then report clearance of the
    check-point by radio.




Avoid transiting check-points in the late afternoon in tense conflict situations. In many countries soldiers
at check-points may alleviate tension, or boredom, by drinking or taking drugs. In the late afternoon they
may be intoxicated and prone to over-react to otherwise normal behavior, or they may openly threaten
and extort.


Many check-points are legitimate and they can be used to your advantage. Non-threatening check-point
personnel can be a good source of information concerning the road conditions, recent incidents and
possible risks ahead. They can help to update your broad picture of the security situation.


Soldiers may be assigned to a check-point over a period of time. It is an opportunity to establish a rapport
which can be beneficial in a number of ways. Obtaining helpful information on the security situation is one
potential benefit. Another is if the general situation does take a turn for the worse then soldiers who have
got to know you, even in a small way, may be more understanding of what you are trying to do and more
likely to be helpful, or even protective. It is potentially dangerous, however, if you become accustomed to
being waved through a check-point without stopping and without checking with the personnel. One day
the check-point personnel will change and you will have to go through the routine of re-introducing
yourself and explaining what you are doing. It will not be the first time an aid vehicle will have been fired
upon simply because you have become complacent and fail to stop on the day the personnel change!




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SESSION 3.3 - Landmine Awareness and Safety

Reading 3.3.1. Landmine and UXO Safety Handbook
(CARE & United Nations Mine Action Service - Bound Text Distributed separately)




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SESSION 3.4 Basic First Aid For Travelers




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SESSION 3.5 - Preparation For Field Simulation




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SESSION 3.6 - Optional Session On Gps




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Day 4 – Wednesday, December 4, 2002



     Security Simulation and
         Skills Practice
                      All - Day, in-field security simulation




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Day 4 Breakfast Reading: Today's News - Security Situation Worsens in Suremia



Suremian Premier Tightens Wassa Province Security Before
Goodwill Trip

Wednesday, Dec. 4, 2002
Web posted at: 4:18 AM EST (0918 GMT)


Wassaville, Suremia, Dec. 3 (Reuters) - Suremian troops tightened security in the rebellious province of
Wassa on Tuesday on the eve of a visit by the Suremian Premier and after weekend violence that left up
to 10 people dead. Wssaville police spokesman Supporto Lumbar said 1,000 Suremian military troops
and police would be on guard for the Premier's trip, his first to the provincial capital Wassaville, since
becoming the nation's new leader 14 months ago.
The Premier plans to visit Wassa's main city and the mountain resort areas in the south of the Province.
In recent violence, several bodies were found over the weekend, some showing signs of torture and bullet
wounds. Lumbar put the toll at six, while local media said up to 10 people had been killed by unknown
assailants.
An aircraft chartered by Quick Medical Delivery was shot at on Monday as it came in to land at the
Wassaville airstrip, just south of the Suremian Military garrison, the medical NGO said. None of the 8
people on board were hurt. "The aircraft was about to land when it was shot from the edge of the runway,
Dr. Britta Femur, the organization's public relations officer, told Reuters. The aircraft aborted its landing
and flew to Xynas, capital of neighboring province. One shot hit a wing. QMD is a well-established
humanitarian NGO in Suremia and has extensive operations in Wassa Province. Despite the weekend
killings, the resource-rich province was otherwise calm, Lumbar said.


REBELS WARN OF ASSASSINATION
FWPF Rebels late last week warned the Premier that his Vares opponents might try to assassinate him
during the visit, then seek to blame the Free Wassa People's Front (FWPF) fighting for independence.
Political analysts hold little hope that the Premier's one-day trip will do much to placate demands for
independence or resolve decades of military brutality and economic exploitation in a province that poses
one of his toughest challenges.
The Premier's precise agenda in Wassaville is unclear. Officials initially said the Premier would meet a
key demand of religious leaders by declaring Wassa dialect a recognized national language, but later said
the plan had been called off because the law was officially already in place. "I don't think the Premier's
visit will be effective unless he can offer a definite plan followed by the realization of bringing justice for
human rights violations and tackle poverty in Wassa Province," political analyst Fill Langees told Reuters.
"Promises alone won't be effective. The Wassa problem is about poverty and human rights abuses,
therefore it is important to bring perpetrators to court."
A plan to soothe tensions in Wassa largely revolves around greater autonomy for the province's 1 million
people, expected to be implemented next May.


INDEPENDENCE ONLY
But FWPF rebels insist they will only settle for full independence, placing them on a collision course with
the Vares Government's increasingly hard-line stance on separatism.



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Unlike ragtag guerrillas fighting for independence (i.e. the MFF) in other remote mountainous regions
along the northern border of the country, FWPF rebels are well armed and trained, have strong support
from Wassan communities overseas and number in the thousands.
They have regularly clashed with security forces in recent months, making a mockery of a cease-fire that
took effect in July and which expires on March 15.
The Vares government has threatened a crackdown if a new round of peace talks, delayed since
September, fails to take place by then, raising the specter of more violence in a war that is increasingly
killing civilians and aid workers.
In Vares, Bonifacio Sternum, director-general of politics at the Foreign Ministry, said the government was
trying to arrange talks with FWPF rebels before the frayed truce expired.
But Vares would make no concessions, he said.
Defence Minister Ilny Uss has said the prospect of resuming military force carried huge risks but said
Suremia may have no alternative if it is to keep the country united.
Thousands died in military operations in the 1980s during the rule of former President Calavera.




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Day 5 – Thursday, December 5, 2002



               Personal Security
Home & Office, Extreme Situations: Rape, Mobs, Riots, Hostage Taking, and Open Forum




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Day 5 Breakfast Reading: Suremia Security Reporting Service - Monthly Summary




                             SUREMIA SECURITY INFORMATION REPORT
                                     (not for distribution or citation)


Date: Thursday - Dec. 5
Location: Vares, Suremia
Subject : Monthly Suremia Security Assessment


Suremia Security Reporting Service has compiled this report for those clients requesting monthly
security summaries, the following is a synopsis of the month just ended:


1. RECAP
The month opened with concerns over possible terrorist attacks timed to coincide with the Free Suremia
Day celebrations set for Nov, 30. Against a backdrop of heavy security, those celebrations (including a
gathering at the InterContinental Hotel attended by the Mayor of Vares) passed without incident. The
remainder of the month was similarly uneventful. The capital markets, often a barometer for political
instability in Suremia, took a precipitous plunge. The reason was not connected to domestic conditions,
however, but rather the continuing meltdown on Wall Street.
The month ended with moderate concerns about the upcoming National Elections, slated to begin on the
15th of January. Although the military and police are planning to deploy sizable reinforcements around
larger voting centers, major demonstrations are not anticipated.


2. SECURITY FORECAST
As forecast in earlier issues of this report, the remainder of the year is likely to remain unstable. Aside
from some small protesting mobs near the entrance to the Suremian Parliament building in Vares, traffic
disruptions have been minimal thus far. As predicted earlier, the opponents of the Premiere are biding
their time and will probably not get serious about confronting him until next year's session.


There are two potential security issues of note during the current quarter. The first security issue of
concern is the selection of the Central Province Governor. Although a definite date has yet to be
announced, the selection of the governor will probably take place early next month. Already, the protests
against the incumbent have caused traffic disruptions near the City Council building and the Suremian
Military complex in Turos. Those protesting include everybody from students to dissident members of the
Premiere's ruling Suremia First! Party. Although animated, the demonstrators have shown little propensity
for violence. These demonstrations will likely increase in size and pace as the selection date approaches,
and may spill over to the front of Suremian Pearl Restaurant or the Hotel Suremia roundabout. Again,
however, the effect of these disruptions on client operations is expected to be little more than temporary
disruption, and an occasional wait in stuck traffic.


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The second security issue is the promised pronouncement regarding martial law in Wassaville.
Though the government may not stick to its current deadline (beginning of next week), there appears to
be a commitment on the part of the administration to make some kind of hard-line announcement within
the next few days. The Premier is currently in Wassaville on a "good will"" visit to the troubled province.
While this may stop short of a military emergency, the Premiere appears willing to grant the military
greater leeway in handling affairs in the chronically troubled Wassa province.


The effects of such a pronouncement are difficult to predict. Although the military would have greater
latitude in confronting the, Free Wassa People's Front (FWPF), this is no guarantee that they could turn
the tide in that protracted insurgency. After all, there already is a record number of troops in Wassa, and
the military has neither the roster or budget to sustain a meaningful escalation in deployments. Moreover,
the declaration of martial law could prove a public relations debacle for the Vares government, especially
when the U.S. has recently taken steps to improve military-to-military ties. For clients operating in Wassa
Province, this could cause at least short-term discomfort as the security forces flex their muscle, and
FWPF likely responds with more violence. On a more positive note, the Wassa insurgency has almost
fully been contained within that province (except for isolated incidents in North and South Mountain
Provinces) and shows little likelihood of expanding beyond its borders; for clients outside of Wassa, the
effects will be minimal. No changes are foreseen for the area west of the Mountain Provinces.


Continuing Threats of "clean sweeps."
Twice over the past three years, extremist religious groups in Vares have threatened to "clean sweep"
foreigners (particularly Americans) out of Suremia during periods of bilateral tension. In Marmot, North
Mountain Province, such groups, including MFF incursions into Northern Suremia, have actually
conducted sweeps at an agricultural research station and a missionary school, though no American
citizen has yet been accosted. The threats made by such groups can be extremely unnerving. Moreover,
there is always a chance that a mob targeting Americans would indiscriminately vent against any
expatriate. Still, the track record of these groups is that their rhetoric is worse than their actions. Under
conditions of heightened tension, clients would be advised to restrict their after-hours entertaining to
larger, well-lit, and well-guarded establishments - particularly in the northernmost areas of North Mountain
Province..


Crime statistics are difficult to present as many incidents go unreported. Most provinces have
experienced a decrease in reported crime. Wassaville has seen a rise in crime due to increased robberies
and minor crimes. Crime has also increased in Central Province, particularly in Turos, due to a greater
number of burglaries.

Privacy Policy
This summary is distributed exclusively to clients of Suremia Security Reporting Service and we are
providing it to you for your own internal security analysis. We request that you do not make photocopies
or otherwise distribute this text to anyone outside your organization without our prior consent.

                                                    END




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SESSION 5.1 Personal, Home & Office Security

Please refer to pages XXXX in this text of the UN….. for information on home and office
security.




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SESSION 5.2 Extreme Situations - Rape and Gender-Related Security
            Issues

Reading 5.2.1. Rape and Sexual Harassment
(this short reading is reproduced in part from an undated UNICEF document - and deals with travel issues
for both men and women)
All of the security advice already provided in the UNICEF Field Security Manual applies to both men and
women. There are, however, a few security issues which are particularly relevant to women. Men too will
benefit from the advice offered here. The problems addressed below generally have to do with physical
assault, including sexual assault. The following points, compiled from various documents provided by the
Office of the UNSECOORD, and the United States Department of State, Office of Diplomatic Security,
focus on avoiding situations where assault may occur and on responding appropriately if an unwanted
event occurs.


Facts About Rape...
The following statistics on rape apply to industrialized countries. It is fair to assume that they are no
better elsewhere in the world.
• Rape is one of the most under reported crimes. For every reported rape, an estimated 10 to 20
   rapes go unreported.
• Rape is an act of violence, not sexual passion. It is an attempt to hurt and humiliate, using sex as a
   weapon.
• About one-third of rape victims are assaulted in their own homes, often by someone they know, as
   documented below.
• Victims do not cause rape. It can happen to anyone, any time, and any place regardless of age,
    gender, or behavior.


If You Are Attacked...
A rape victim may choose to take any number of actions during the course of an assault. In
considering which actions to take, the victim must take into consideration the capabilities of the rapist
to succeed, the environment and the victim's own capabilities. A victim may choose one or a
combination of the following options:
• Submit - The victims are in fear of losing their lives. The objective here is to survive.
• Passive Resistance - Do or say anything to ruin the attacker's desire to harm or have sexual
   contact with you (negotiate, stall for time, etc.) *in the hope of avoiding the assault.
• Active Resistance - Any type of physical force used to fight off the attacker, including shouting for
   help, naming away or fighting back.


general tips .
• Keep your head. Stay as calm as possible, think rationally and evaluate your resources and
   options.
• Keep assessing the situation as it Is happening. If one strategy doesn't work, try another.



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• You may be able to turn the attacker off with bizarre behavior such as throwing up, urinating, acting
   crazy, or picking your nose.
• If the attacker has a weapon, you must make an instant decision as to whether you wish to risk
     death or serious injury by resisting.


After an Assault or Rape...
• Go to a safe place and immediately call the Head of Office and/or the Designated Official. The
   sooner you make the report, the sooner you will receive assistance, and the greater the chances
   your attacker will be caught.
• Do not shower, bathe, douche, or destroy any of the clothing you were wearing during the attack.
• Do not disturb anything in the area where the assault occurred. It is important to preserve all
   physical evidence.
• Go to a UN medical unit, or one which the UN recommends, and get medical care. Make sure you
   are evaluated for the risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.
• Call someone to be with you. You should not be alone.
• Write down a description of die attacker and the assault while it is still fresh in your mind.
• Remember that all victims of assault suffer emotional and psychological trauma. It is important to
   realize that, no matter how strong a person you are, you cannot go through this alone. Get
   professional counseling! (The Head of Office can arrange it for you).


Facts About Acquaintance Rape...
The following statistics apply to the United States. It is fairly safe to assume that there is not a vast
discrepancy in the numbers when applied to other countries.
• Approximately 70 percent of rape victims were assaulted by someone they knew previously.
• 85 percent of sexually abused girls under age 14 were molested by someone they knew.
• 27 percent of girls aged 14-19 have been the victims of rape or attempted rape, usually while on a
    date. These victims are the least likely of any age group to report the crime.
• False reports of rape are extremely uncommon, even when a woman accuses a husband or
    boyfriend.


Strategies for Preventing Acquaintance Rape...
• Be aware that acquaintance rape can happen to you.
• Don't deny your instincts or intuition. If you're uncomfortable, get out of the situation quickly.
• Speak up immediately if you believe that a date, colleague or other acquaintance, has improper
   intentions. State your objections and own intentions clearly.
• Learn the general rape prevention strategies provided above. Practice them, and be prepared to
    use them -- even on someone you may have trusted.
• Avoid dangerous or uncomfortable situations, such as leaving a party or getting into a car with
   someone you hardly know or don't trust.
• Do not permit men you hardly know or do not trust to pick you up or meet you at your home. Insist
   on meeting at a neutral, crowded, and well-lit location.


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• Don't reveal personal information to acquaintances.
• Be wary of men who display a violent temper or who won't take "no'" for an answer, even in
   non-sexual situations.


Advice For Men...
• Do not lull yourself into a false sense of security, or view rape as merely 'a women's issue.' Rape
   can happen to anyone, even men.
• Learn the rape strategies above and practice them. They are sound advice for any form of assault,
    not just sexual assault.
• Support the women and girls in your living and working environment. Encourage them to allow you
   to escort them to their cars, the office, their front doors. Listen to and respect their fears and
   concerns.
• Do not ask a woman to meet you at your home or hers, or in a dark isolated area. Chances are you
   will only frighten her and embarrass yourself
• Any woman can say "no" to sexual advances at any time, even your wife or girlfriend. If you persist,
   you are hurting her and in most societies, breaking the law. In all cases, it is morally wrong.
• To confuse rape with normal sex is a sip of ignorance and immaturity. Respect for your partner's
    wishes is a sign of a mature and honest relationship.
• Talk with your male friends about sex and your feelings towards women. Everyone gets confused
    mid frustrated at times. Talking about it is the only correct way - legally and morally - to handle it.
• Remember, it is men who rape; it is men who can stop it.


Advice For Parents...
• Teach all children as much of the preceding advice on assault and prevention as you feel they will
    be able to understand.
• Teach all children that they have a right to say "no," even to adults - and that they must respect
    others' right to say "no."
• Provide more open discussions on sex in the family, schools and in mixed groups. Talk about
    feelings, self-respect and respect for others.
• Encourage young people to talk with others regarding sex and relationships.
• Build self-esteem in both boys and girls. "Real women" don't have to be passive, and "real men"
   don't have to be macho.
• Listen to and believe your child if he/she claims or suggests that he/she has been the victim of rape
    or sexual assault. Children rarely lie about this issue.


Sexual Harassment in the Work Place...
Sexual harassment extends to a range of behavior. In all cases, it refers to conduct which is
unwanted by the recipient. It can be defined as any unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual
favor, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature which interferes with work, is made a
condition of employment or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.
Preventing sexual harassment draws on many of the same measures as avoiding acquaintance rape.
In particular,



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• Do not deny your instincts. Get out of the situation quickly.
• Speak up immediately. Make very clear that you do not appreciate the behavior and will not tolerate
   it. For example, state to your harasser, "This is sexual harassment, and sexual harassment is
   contrary to the policies of UNICEF. "
• Regardless of threats that "no one will believe you" or "I will get even if...," take your concerns to
   your supervisor or his/her supervisor if he/she is the problem.
• Keep a Journal of the facts, including time, place, what was said, physical gestures/contact and the
   names of witnesses, if any.


Sexual harassment is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and therefore contrary
to the policies of UNICEF. For further information on sexual harassment in the work place, including
policy, prevention, reporting procedures, and actions to take, contact the UNICEF office of personnel.


Conclusion...
It is regrettable that there are men who see women as targets for exploitation by one means or
another. That exploitation may be at least unethical and at worst criminal and violent. Hence, women
generally need to be-aware of the potential risks in any situation. They need to think about their
options, and be prepared to act on their decisions. The keys, as discussed above, are to be alert, to
be clear and assertive, and to be ready to make rational but quick decisions in difficult circumstances.




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SESSION 5.3 Extreme Situations; Mobs, Riots, Hostage Taking,
            Hijacking, Action Under Fire




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SESSION 5.4 Open Forum




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Day 6 – Friday, December 6, 2002

                      Dealing with Insecurity
        Stress, Reporting and Information Management, Planning




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Day 6 breakfast Reading: Relief Web Update on Suremia


                           OCHA SUREMIA PRESS EXCERPTS

Provided by OCHA, Vares - Friday, 6 December, 2002
(unofficial translation from local press sources)
                 1. Central Province Governor promises to eradicate corruption
                 2. FWPF activists increasing role in civil government
                 3. Gunfire in Luck sub-district kills a grandmother and granddaughter
                                *****************************
5 November 2002 (Turos Advocate Press - TAP)
Turos - Central Governor's Speech pledges total eradication of corruption. TAP reported on the
Governor's speech and provided key quotes of the text. Many Turos residents complain that they no
longer trust the Governor to bring corrupt businessmen to court. The coordinator of the Centrist People's
Anti-Corruption Front, Louis Razza, remarked on Friday that the current Provincial Attorney, Noel
Contende, is incapable of carrying outs his tasks after himself being indicted by the central
governmment's Fraud Unit in Vares. Observers noted that hundreds of local corruption cases known
widely by the public have not been dealt with since Contende took office in January of 2001. (TAP - 5 Oct.
- p.1A)
                                   **************************
16 November 2002 (Wassa Matters Daily - WMD)
"FWPF still exists in the local parliament and civil government" said the Suremian Integrated Police (SIP)
Commander stated during a speech on Martyr's Day, from the Wassaville Police Station. SIP has noticed
that FWPF sympathizers are still present within the local parliament, government, businessmen, and
society bodies. He underlined that SIP would soon apprehend these officials if found involved in FWPF's
activities. He also acknowledged that a number of SIP members have also betrayed SIP operations in the
past before the passage of legislation calling for heightened security recovery in the provinces of Mar,
Wassa, North and South Mountain. (WMD - 16 Oct. - p. 2)
                                   **************************
28 November 2002 (The Mountaineer)
Gunfire in Luck, South Mountain Province - An elderly grandmother and her grand-daughter were killed in
crossfire shooting between FWPF and SIP forces. The Mountaineer reported that a gun clash between
FWPF and SIP forces in Luck Traumatized a family leaving a grandmother and Grand-daughter killed and
both parents suffering from gunshot wounds. SIP forces deny the incident ever occurred. (The
Mountaineer, Oct. 17, p. 1)
                                   **************************

Compiled by Eileen Paou
Emergency Response Officer
UN OCHA Suremia
email: epaou@un.org
visit www.reliefweb.int



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SESSION 6.1 Dealing with Stress




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SESSION 6.2 Reporting and Information Management

Reading 6.2.1 Standard Reports and Formats for UNHCR
                   SECURITY REPORTING: SOME STANDARD REPORTS IN UNHCR
                   PURPOSE OF            FREQUENCY                ADDRESSEES              RESPONSE OR
                                                                   (Action/TO and
                                                                                         ACTION EXPECTED
   TYPE               REPORT             OR DEADLINE
                                                                       Info/CC)



1. Incident    --Inform management    --Alerting: as soon      From Office Involved:     --Acknowledge and
report:        and others             as possible              Head of Office/Rep,       alert key actors.
alerting                                                       DO/FSO, FSS,
               --Initiate follow-up                                                      --Mobilise support to
                                                               Regional Rep, HQs
               action                                                                    assist office/staff as
                                                               Desk, Regional FSA.
                                                                                         necessary.
2. Incident    --Generate lessons     --Full report: within
report: full   learned                24 hours;                                          --Allow affected
report                                                         From Field Safety         office to manage its
               --Record in incident   --Report on follow-up    Section (FSS):            own situation by
               database               investigation when       Bureau Director,          taking care of
                                      complete
                                                               Exec Office,              external involvement
                                                               UNSECOORD (as
                                                               required, if involves
                                                               death, serious injury
                                                               or arrest of s/m or
                                                               dependant), Joint
                                                               Medical Section,
                                                               Staff Welfare
                                                               Section, Human
                                                               Resources, Public
                                                               Information, Legal
                                                               Affairs Section, as
                                                               applicable


3. Routine     --Provide update on    No Phase: Should         Action/TO: Head of
                                                                                         -Inclusion of key
Security       current risk           be included in           Office/Rep; FSS HQ
                                                                                         points in general
Report         assessment in duty     Monthly General          Officer covering
                                                                                         reporting
               station                SITREP.                  region.
               --Record and analyse   Phases I and II:                                   -Influence on
               incidents during the   Separate report                                    mainstream
                                                               Info/CC. FSO,
               period,                every two weeks (to                                operational
                                                               Regional FSA, Desk
                                      be timed to feed into                              plans/conduct
               --Record safety                                 at Hqs.
                                      General SITREP)
               management
                                      sent by Security                                   -Follow-up by FSS
               measures being
                                      Focal Point (SFP) if                               on resource requests
               taken/under
                                      no FSA.                                            or liaison at HQ
               consideration
               (including MOSS        Phases III to V.                                   -Oversight and
               revisions)             Weekly report from                                 evaluation from FSS
                                      FSA or SFP



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                 Page 129
1-6 December, 2002                                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                                               International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




1.   Initial Incident Report—Alerting: Standard Format
________________________________________________________________________
Initial Incident Report (sent as soon as possible - if in doubt, send a report)

From:


To: Representative, FSS, Headquarters Duty Officer
Cc:


Date:                          Time:


Sender:


Type of Incident:


Location:


Date/Time:


Persons Involved:


Casualties (confirmed/unconfirmed):


Action being taken:


Persons informed (including relatives of those involved if applicable):


Source of Information (reports confirmed/unconfirmed):


Other Information:


Contact details for officer managing the incident:


__________________________________________________________________________




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                             Page 130
1-6 December, 2002                                                                      Pranburi, Thailand
                                                International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.



2.   Incident Report—Full Report: Standard Format

Incident Report (within 24 hours – as required by UNSECOORD)


Date/Time:


Location:


Type of Incident:


UN Staff Involved:


             Name, Nationality, Organisation:


Non-UN Staff Involved:


             Name, Nationality, Organisation:


Short Description of Incident:


Details of loss, damage or destruction to:


             UN Property:


             Personal Property:


Details of any Injuries:




Additional Information, Comments Assessment:




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                              Page 131
1-6 December, 2002                                                                       Pranburi, Thailand
                                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




3. Routine Security Reports: Standard Format
__________________________________________________________________________
Security Situation Report for SUREMIA

Serial: SECREP/SUR/nn/yyyy


Covering Period: (date) to      (date)


Drafted by: (FSA, Asst FSA etc)


Date: dd/mm/yyyy


Current Security Phase(s):


1. GENERAL OVERVIEW

Short introductory paragraph(s) highlighting/drawing attention to:


1.1. Any major development in the overall security situation

        1.2. Any major incident (refer to report below)


        1.3. Any changes in security management (e.g. Phase Change, new MOSS)


SECURITY/STAFF SAFETY ENVIRONMENT

Report any changes which may have implications for staff safety (explaining why), including:


    2.1. The overall political situation (e.g. change of senior ministers, opposition activity)
    2.2. The military situation (as it affects UNHCR staff safety – e.g. approach of armed forces towards
         a UNHCR office or refugee camp). Avoid use of military language or identification of units,
         commanders or types of equipment.
    2.3. The law and order situation (e.g. increases/decreases in particular types of crime, new
         legislation, changes in police methods).
    2.4. Non-malicious threats to health and safety of staff (e.g. epidemics, natural disasters).
    2.5. Forthcoming events (e.g. elections, demonstrations, religious occasions, sensitive anniversaries)


UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                   Page 132
1-6 December, 2002                                                                            Pranburi, Thailand
                                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




3. INCIDENTS summarise incidents during the reporting period (referring to incident reports already
   sent where applicable). For each give: date, location, human deaths/injuries, loss/damage to
   property


   3.1. Political/Military (cause/circumstances) – (e.g. attacks on camps, civil disorder),
        affecting:
       3.1.1.   UNHCR Staff: (a). International (b) National
       3.1.2.   UN Agency staff (a) International (b) National
       3.1.3.   International Organisations and NGOs
       3.1.4.   Refugees
   3.2. Criminal (cause/circumstances) affecting
       3.2.1.   UNHCR Staff: (a). International (b) National
       3.2.2.   UN Agency staff (a) International (b) National
       3.2.3.   International Organisations and NGOs
       3.2.4.   Refugees
   3.3. Accidental (including vehicle, fire etc) or Natural Causes involving death or serious injury to:
       3.3.1.   UNHCR Staff: (a). International (b) National
       3.3.2.   UN Agency staff (a) International (b) National
       3.3.3.   International Organisations and NGOs
       3.3.4.   Refugees
   3.4. Follow-up to incidents reported in previous report (e.g. condition of casualties, arrests made,
        property recovered, damages repaired, responses still outstanding).


4. SECURITY MANAGEMENT
   4.1. Changes to security management personnel (e.g. DO, FSO etc)
   4.2. Meetings of Security Management Team
   4.3. Changes in Security Phase
   4.4. Local measures and restrictions (e.g. roads temporarily out of bounds)
   4.5. Adjustments to MOSS
   4.6. Recommendations
   4.7. Staffing Issues (including planned leave of FSA, Assistant FSA etc)
   4.8. Financial and Resource Management Issues
   4.9. Actions/Responses from HQ still pending/overdue (refer to previous reports)




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                 Page 133
1-6 December, 2002                                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                                                International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.



ANNEXES:


A. Detailed incident reports (if applicable).
B. Incident summary table
C. Local MOSS Table (if changed)
D. MOSS Implementation Chart




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                              Page 134
1-6 December, 2002                                                                       Pranburi, Thailand
                               International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




SESSION 6.3 Planning and Overall Security Strategy




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                             Page 135
1-6 December, 2002                                                      Pranburi, Thailand
                                                  International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




Final Exam

Please take the time to carefully consider your answers, and then choose the answers that you think are
the best of those given (in some instances there may not be a perfect answer). If you do not know, please
mark "I don't know" - do not guess. For questions that require a written response, please be concise, but
clear in your main point or idea. Thank you.



                                            A. 1 k
1. In flat terrain with few hills,
but no repeater station, what
would be a reasonable                       B. 5 k
expectation for the working range
of your VHF hand-held walkie
talkie ? (Mark an X in the box at           C. 20 k
right next to the best answer.)

                                            D. 100k


                                            E. I don't know



2. In the space that follows               A.
letter A at right please spell out
your own family name using
internationally accepted radio
language. Example for Jim Good -
"My family name is Good - I spell -
Golf, Oscar, Oscar, Delta - over."
If you do not know how to do it,
mark an X in box B.
                                            B. I don't know how to do this.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                Page 136
1-6 December, 2002                                                                         Pranburi, Thailand
                                             International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




                                         A. The actual danger or threat
3. Think about your own
personal security risks in the field.
Which of these factors are the            B. Your own vulnerability or weakness related to
most important to you?                  the specific dangers

                                         C. The probability that something bad will
(Choose only 3.)                        actually happen to you - the risk

                                         D. How bad the effects could be: (loss of money,
                                        bruises, wounds, death?)

                                         E. The way that local people think of you (friend,
                                        helper, corrupter, spy?)

                                        A. Evacuation
4. The UN security system
designates 5 phases of increasing
danger to staff in the field. The       B. Emergency Operations
phase names are listed at the
right in no particular order. Use
the boxes to number them from 1         C. Relocation
to 5, with 1 being the least
dangerous phase and 5 being the
worst. Mark the box F. "I don't
                                        D. Precautionary
know" if you are not sure.


                                        E. Restricted movement


                                        F. I don't know


                                        A. Drive faster than normal in order to minimize
5. When traveling by car in             time on the road
dangerous areas (incursions by
rebel forces, known banditry,           B. Drive normally, but use care to survey all areas
mines occasionally laid in roads,       that you pass through for anything out of the
and car-jacking area) you should        ordinary.
do which of the actions listed at
right
                                        C. Document possibly dangerous areas with
                                        camera to warn others

                                        D. Stop and talk to people on the road for advice
                                        whenever possible

                                        E. I don't know.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                           Page 137
1-6 December, 2002                                                                    Pranburi, Thailand
                                          International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




                                     A. Active, planted landmines typically have a
6. Which of the statements at        working life of 1-2 years, after which they are
                                     generally safe to handle
right about landmines are true?
                                     C. Unexploded ordnance (fallen bombs,
                                     unexploded shells, ammunition, etc) are typically
                                     much safer than deliberately planted mines.

                                     D. Some part of a mine will always be visible
                                     above the ground.

                                     E. You should never touch or handle a mine or any
                                     UXO.

                                     F. I don't know.

                                     A. Quickly move the person inside the office,
7. You have found a colleague        protected from view to the outside, and apply
                                     direct pressure to the wound
wounded, by a drive-by shooter,
just outside your office with a
heavily bleeding bullet wound on     B. Quickly move to the person and apply pressure
his upper thigh. He is unable to     to the wound without moving him
walk unaided and is crying out for
help. You should:                    C. Calm the victim down with reassuring words
                                     from inside the building, but do not go outside as
                                     you may expose yourself to risk.

                                     D. Immobilize the leg, but let the wound bleed as
                                     much as possible to avoid infection

                                     E. I don't know what to do.



                                     A. Turn out driving lights, and as you slowly
8. You have been stopped at a        approach the barricade, turn on the inside lights.
military checkpoint. It was not
here when passed by this same        B. Keep your hands out of sight at all times to
road yesterday. It is almost dark    avoid suspicion.
and your car lights are on. Which
                                     C. Turn on your bright driving lights to better
of the actions at right should you
do?                                  illuminate the barricade area

                                     D. Have all papers and passports ready and
                                     visible for immediate inspection

                                     E. I am not sure




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                        Page 138
1-6 December, 2002                                                                 Pranburi, Thailand
                                           International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




                                      A. Remain calm, do not move from your desk.
9. You have a small office with       Phone or radio for assistance
two windows on the second floor
of a 3 story building. When you       B. Move to the roof, to be safe from falling debris
hear explosions near your office
                                      C. Move to the street outside and try to determine
that could be shelling, you should:
                                      the source of the shelling

                                      D. Move to the basement and seek shelter

                                      E. I don't know what to do.

                                      A. Heavy stress is good in these situations since it
10. You are under constant            keeps you sharp and attentive.
stress in a dangerous field
situation. Your office has been       B. Stimulating yourself with extra coffee and
robbed several times, one             cigarettes will help you compensate for lack of
colleague was beaten by local         proper sleep.
community teenagers. Which of
the statements at the right are       C. People that can be "stressed out" should not be
true?                                 allowed to go into tense situations.

                                      D. Stress is a reality of dangerous field conditions,
                                      you must learn to recognize your own, and others'
                                      limits.

                                      E. I am not sure.



11.      Short answer: You have
come under fire while driving in a
rural area known for occasional
armed bandit attacks. The road is
bad, but passable, and your office
is ahead of you 20 k. further down
the road. Briefly describe your
response in the box at right. List
any assumptions you need to
make in order to reach a decision.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                         Page 139
1-6 December, 2002                                                                  Pranburi, Thailand
                                                  International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




                                             A. To catch those responsible.
12.     What is the primary
purpose of incident reporting
system and reporting standards               B. To help build up a picture of real threats and
for humanitarian agencies                    trends over time.
working in unsafe environments?
                                             C. To help verify insurance claims if any are ever
                                             made

                                             D. To notify local police of the situation

                                             E. I don't know.


13. You have been asked to              1.
prepare a short security plan
outline for your new field office in         A.
a chronically insecure area. Use             B.
the points at right as an outline for
your plan. What are the primary              C.
elements you will include in the        2.
plan? Use the structure provided
to prioritize your main points. Do           A.
not add additional points or space           B.
for your outline.
                                             C.


                                        3.
                                             A.
                                             B.
                                             C.


                                        4.
                                             A.
                                             B.
                                             C.


                                        5.
                                             A.
                                             B.
                                             C.


                                             Thank You



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                Page 140
1-6 December, 2002                                                                         Pranburi, Thailand
                      International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                    Page 141
1-6 December, 2002                                             Pranburi, Thailand
                                                             International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




                PILOT STAFF SAFETY WORKSHOP EVALUATION FORM

    Daily Sessions
                          Please rate the workshop sessions in the order they were presented.
                                 (Please try to fill out this section at the end of each day)
                                   The forms will be collected at the end of the workshop)
    5 = Excellent               3 = Average               1 = Poor            0 = Does not apply



                Session                         Content          Presentation          Readings           Exercises/
                                                                                                          Practices

                                                    SUNDAY 1 DEC
1.1: Welcome and Introductions
                                            5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
1.2: Assignment of Radio Handsets,
     Call Signs, and Radio Practice         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0


                                                    MONDAY 2 DEC
2.1: Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability
     Assessment                             5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

2.2: Organizational Image and
     Acceptance                             5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

2.3: The UN and Humanitarian Security
     System                                 5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

2.4: Exercise in Using the Humanitarian
     Security System                        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0


                                                    TUESDAY 3 DEC
3.1: Travel Security
                                            5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
3.2: Negotiation and Checkpoint Skills
                                            5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
3.3: Landmine Awareness and Safety
                                            5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
3.4A: Basic First Aid for Travelers -
    Presentation                            5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

3.4B: Basic First Aid for Travelers -
    Practice                                5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0


                                                  WEDNESDAY 4 DEC
4.1: Suremia Simulation Briefing
                                            5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0        5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0




    UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                       Page 142
    1-6 December, 2002                                                                                Pranburi, Thailand
                                                           International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.



4.2: Suremia Simulation (in field)
                                          5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
4.3 Suremia Simulaiton Debriefing
                                          5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

                                                  THURSDAY 5 DEC

                Session                       Content           Presentation          Readings           Exercises/
                                                                                                         Practices
5.1: Personal, Home, & Office Security
                                          5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
5.2: Extreme Situations - Rape and
     Gender-Related Security Issues       5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

5.3: Extreme Situaitons - Mobs, Riots,
     Hostage Taking, Hijacking, and       5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
     Action Under Fire
5.4: Open Forum - Personal Security
     Concerns                             5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0


                                                    FRIDAY 6 DEC
6.1: Dealing with Stress
                                          5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0
6.2: Reporting and Information
     Management                           5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

6.3: Planning an Overall Security
     Strategy                             5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0

6.4: Initial Course Evaluation
                                          5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0         5 4 3 2 1 0




    Please use this space for any other comments on specific sessions that are not easily made clear using the form
    above.




    UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                       Page 143
    1-6 December, 2002                                                                               Pranburi, Thailand
                                     International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.




Please return this form to the Workshop Co-ordinator at the end of the workshop.




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                   Page 144
1-6 December, 2002                                                            Pranburi, Thailand
                                                   International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.



                                   Information about you

Surname: ____________________________             First Name: _______________________


Male/Female (circle one)                Functional Title: ___________________________


Duty Station or Office Location: ___________________________


Organisation: __________________________________________


Workshop dates: 1- 6 December, 2002


Venue: Pranburi, Thailand,


                Overall Workshop Organization / Administration
                       (the following is to be filled out at the end of the workshop)
     PLEASE CIRCLE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING
                                  STATEMENTS:
                                       Strongly       Agree       Neither     Disagree     Strongly
                                        Agree                     Agree                    Disagree
                                                                    nor
                                                                 Disagree

1. Subject matter was adequately           5            4            3            2            1
   covered
2. Content was suitable for my             5            4            3            2            1
   background and experience
3. Programme was well-paced                5            4            3            2            1
4. Handouts were relevant                  5            4            3            2            1
5. Participants were encouraged            5            4            3            2            1
   to take an active part
6. The programme met my                    5            4            3            2            1
   individual objectives
7. Programme was relevant to my            5            4            3            2            1
   job
8. I would recommend this                  5            4            3            2            1
   programme to my colleagues




UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                 Page 145
1-6 December, 2002                                                                          Pranburi, Thailand
                                                    International Humanitarian Response Training – Session 9.2.


                             PLEASE RATE THE FOLLOWING, AS APPLICABLE

Aspect or Area of the Workshop          Excellent      Good        Average       Bad         Terrible
 9. Lecture method                          5               4         3            2            1
10. Small group sessions                    5               4         3            2            1
11. Film/video                              5               4         3            2            1
12. Meeting space                           5               4         3            2            1
13. Meals/refreshments                      5               4         3            2            1
14. Overall organisation                    5               4         3            2            1
15. Other participants                      5               4         3            2            1


16.   Was the seminar length:        correct?           too short?           too long ?

17.   Were there:    just enough participants?          too few?             too many ?

18.   Do you feel that any particular subject received too much or too little time in this workshop?




19. Do you have any suggestions that you feel could improve this course?




20. Any other comments?




21. What is your overall rating of this course?
Excellent                Good                     Average            Bad                  Terrible

            Please return this form to the Workshop Co-ordinator at the end of the workshop.



UNHCR ESS & eCentre                                                                                     Page 146
1-6 December, 2002                                                                           Pranburi, Thailand