Torts

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					             Torts
A tort is a civil wrong. The tort
system of liability is central to
 the American legal system.
             Negligence
• The concept of negligence is central to
  the tort system of liability. The
  negligence concept is centered on the
  principle that every individual should
  exercise a minimum degree of ordinary
  care so as not to cause harm to others.
         Who Is Responsible
• Everyone is responsible, not only for the
  result of his or her willful acts, but also for an
  injury occasioned to another by his or her
  want of ordinary care or skill in the
  management of his or her property or
  person. (Cal.Civ.Code § 1714(a).)
  "Negligence is not the act itself, but the fact
  which defines the character of the act, and
  makes it a legal wrong." (Stephenson v.
  Southern Pac. Co. (1894) 102 Cal. 143, 147.)
 NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE-
          DEFINITIONS
• Negligence is the doing of something
  which a reasonably prudent person
  would not do, or the failure to do
  something which a reasonably prudent
  person would do, under the same or
  similar circumstances. It is the failure
  to use ordinary or reasonable care.
  Ordinary or reasonable care is that care
  which persons of ordinary prudence
  would use.
 NEGLIGENCE-ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

• The elements of a cause of action in
  tort for negligence are: (1) a duty to use
  ordinary care; (2) breach of that duty;
  (3) a proximate causal connection
  between the negligent conduct and the
  resulting injury and (4) resulting
  damage. (Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d
  195, 200.)
In other words, the essential elements of
        a claim of negligence are:
• 1. The defendant was negligent;
• 2. Defendant's negligence was a cause
  of injury, damage, loss or harm to
  plaintiff.
      A TEST FOR DETERMINING THE
       QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE
• One test that is helpful in determining whether or not
  a person was negligent is to ask and answer the
  question whether or not, if a person of ordinary
  prudence had been in the same situation and
  possessed of the same knowledge, he or she would
  have foreseen or anticipated that someone might
  have been injured by or as a result of his or her
  action or inaction. If the answer to that question is
  "yes", and if the action or inaction reasonably could
  have been avoided, then not to avoid it would be
  negligence.
 AMOUNT OF CAUTION VARIES
• The amount of caution required of a
  person in the exercise of ordinary care
  depends upon the conditions that are
  apparent or that should be apparent to
  a reasonably prudent person under the
  same or similar circumstances.
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS' GOOD
           CONDUCT
• Every person who is exercising
  ordinary care, has a right to assume
  that every other person will perform his
  her duty and obey the law, and in the
  absence of reasonable cause for
  thinking otherwise, it is not negligence
  for such a person to fail to anticipate an
  accident which can occur only as a
  result of a violation of law or duty by
  another person.
   RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS'
      NORMAL FACULTIES
• A person who is exercising ordinary
  care has a right to assume that other
  persons are ordinarily intelligent and
  possessed of normal sight and hearing,
  in the absence of reasonable cause for
  thinking otherwise.
  DUTY TO ANTICIPATE CRIMINAL
   CONDUCT OF THIRD PERSON
• When the circumstances are such that
  the possibility of harm caused by the
  criminal conduct of a third person is, or
  in the exercise of due care should be,
  reasonably foreseeable, it is negligence
  to fail to use reasonable care to prevent
  such criminal act from causing injury
  or damage.
    EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM IN
  RELATION TO ORDINARY CARE
• Evidence as to whether a person
  conformed or did not conform to a
  custom that had grown up in a given
  locality or business is relevant and
  ought to be considered, but is not
  necessarily controlling on the issue
  whether such person was negligent.
   STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR
            MINOR
• A minor is not held to the same standard of
  care as an adult. A minor is required to
  exercise the degree of care which ordinarily
  is exercised by minors of like maturity,
  intelligence and capacity under similar
  circumstances.
• Minor - n. someone under legal age, which is
  generally 18, except for certain purposes
  such as drinking alcoholic beverages.
 IMPAIRED PHYSICAL FACULTIES-
      AMOUNT OF CAUTION
• The amount of caution required of a
  person whose physical faculties are
  impaired is the care which a person of
  ordinary prudence with similarly
  impaired faculties would use under the
  same or similar circumstances.
 CARE REQUIRED FOR SAFETY OF
            MINOR
• Ordinarily it is necessary to exercise greater caution
  for the protection and safety of a young child than
  for an adult person who possesses normal physical
  and mental faculties. One dealing with children must
  anticipate their ordinary behavior. The fact that
  children usually do not exercise the same degree of
  prudence for their own safety as adults, or that they
  often are thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty
  to exercise a proportional vigilance and caution on
  those dealing with children, and from whose conduct
  injury to a child might result.
  NEGLIGENCE PER SE--VIOLATION OF
   STATUTE, ORDINANCE, OR SAFETY
              ORDER
• The violation of a law or statute that results in injury to another
  may constitute negligence per se. However, just because a
  statute has been violated does not mean that the violator is
  necessarily liable for any damage that might be ultimately
  traced back to the violation. "The doctrine of negligence per se
  does not apply even though a statute has been violated if the
  plaintiff was not in the class of persons designed to be
  protected or the type of harm which occurred was not one
  which the statute was designed to prevent." (Olsen v.
  McGillicuddy (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 897, 902-903) Mere "but for"
  causation, is simply not enough. The statute must be designed
  to protect against the kind of harm which occurred.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--
        DEFINITION
• Is negligence on the part of a plaintiff which,
  combining with the negligence of a
  defendant, contributes as a cause in bringing
  about the injury. "Contributory negligence is
  conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls
  below the standard to which he should
  conform for his own protection, and which is
  a legally contributing cause cooperating with
  the negligence of the defendant in bringing
  about the plaintiff's harm." (Rest. 2d Torts, §
  463.)
     Contributory Negligence
• Traditionally, any amount of
  contributory negligence on the part of a
  plaintiff, no matter how small, operated
  as a total bar to recovery. However, the
  modern rule of comparative negligence
  has softened the harsh effect of the
  traditional rule.
• The majority of states have now
  abrogated the "all-or-nothing" rule of
  contributory negligence and have
  enacted in its place general
  apportionment statutes calculated in
  one manner or another to assess
  liability in proportion to fault. Hence, in
  most jurisdictions, contributory
  negligence is no longer a total bar to
  plaintiff's recovery.
• Contributory negligence, if any, on the part of the
  plaintiff does not bar a recovery by the plaintiff
  against the defendant but the total amount of
  damages to which the plaintiff would otherwise be
  entitled shall be reduced in proportion to the amount
  of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. (Li v.
  Yellow Cab (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804) In California, the
  doctrine of last clear chance is abolished, and the
  defense of assumption of risk is also abolished to
  the extent that it is merely a variant of the former
  doctrine of contributory negligence.
           Federal Sphere
• In the federal sphere, comparative
  negligence of the "pure" type has been
  the rule since 1908 in cases arising
  under the Federal Employers' Liability
  Act (see 45 U.S.C. § 53) and since 1920
  in cases arising under the Jones Act
  (see 46 U.S.C. § 688) and the Death on
  the High Seas Act (see 46 U.S.C. § 766).
   CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--
FORGETFULNESS OF KNOWN DANGER
• If a plaintiff voluntarily proceeds into a
  dangerous situation of which he or she
  had previous knowledge, but
  momentarily forgot the danger, such
  forgetfulness is not in itself
  contributory negligence unless under
  all the circumstances it shows an
  absence of ordinary care not to have
  kept the danger in mind.
 RECOVERY FOR INTENTIONAL HARM
 NOT DIMINISHED BY CONTRIBUTORY
            NEGLIGENCE
• Contributory negligence, if any, on the
  part of the plaintiff does not reduce any
  recovery by the plaintiff against the
  defendant for an injury caused by
  misconduct of the defendant, if the
  defendant intended to inflict harm upon
  the plaintiff.
   CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--
            MINORS
• In California, a minor under the age of five years is
  incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of
  law. Contributory negligence, if any, on the part of
  the minor over the age of five years does not bar a
  recovery against the defendant but the total amount
  of damages to which the minor would otherwise be
  entitled is reduced in proportion to the amount of
  negligence attributable to the minor. The negligence,
  if any, of the parents, or either of them, does not bar
  or reduce recovery of damages for injuries to the
  minor.
  DUTY OF PASSENGER FOR OWN
            SAFETY
• One who is simply a passenger in a motor
  vehicle and has no right to the control or
  management of such vehicle nevertheless
  has the duty to exercise the same ordinary
  care for his or her own safety and protection
  as a person of ordinary prudence would take
  under the same or similar circumstances.
  The passenger has the duty of doing
  whatever a person of ordinary prudence in
  the same situation would do to inform or
  warn the driver in an effort to prevent an
  accident.
 DUTY OF PASSENGER FOR OWN
           SAFETY
• Contributory negligence, if any, by the
  passenger does not bar recovery
  against the defendant but the total
  amount of damages to which the
  passenger would otherwise be entitled
  shall be reduced in proportion to the
  amount of negligence attributable to
  the passenger.
  RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- NECESSARY
   CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION
• Res ipsa loquitur is the name of a
  doctrine that permits a trier of fact to
  infer the existence of negligence in the
  absence of direct evidence of
  negligence. For the doctrine to apply it
  must be shown that:
    RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- NECESSARY
 CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION (Continued)

• First, that it is the kind of accident or injury
  which ordinarily does not happen unless
  someone is negligent;
• Second, that it was caused by an agency or
  instrumentality in the exclusive control of the
  defendant over which the defendant had the
  exclusive right of control originally, and
  which was not mishandled or its condition
  otherwise changed after defendant
  relinquished control; and
    RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- NECESSARY
 CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION (Continued)

• Third, that the accident or injury was
  not due to any voluntary action or
  contribution on the part of the plaintiff
  which was the responsible cause of
  plaintiff's injury.
 RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- PRESUMPTION
          OF NEGLIGENCE
• If the foregoing circumstances are
  established, the trier of fact must find
  from the happening of the accident or
  incident involved that a cause of the
  occurrence was some negligent
  conduct on the part of the defendant.
          Negligence - Duty
• Duty concerns whether a person has a
  legal obligation to act, and a
  corresponding legal liability for failing
  to act, in a particular circumstance. The
  existence of a duty is a question of law
  for the court. (Isaacs v. Huntington
  Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112,
  124.)
     RISK IMPORTS RELATION
• The seminal case on duty is (Palsgraf v. Long Island
  R. Co. (1928) 248 N.Y. 339 [162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R.
  1253]) While Mrs. Palsgraf stood on a platform of
  defendant's railroad, a man carrying a package of
  fireworks wrapped in a newspaper attempted to
  board a moving train. A railroad employee assisted
  him, and the package was dislodged, fell and
  exploded. The shock threw down platform scales
  many feet away, and these struck Mrs. Palsgraf.
  Palsgraf established that in analyzing questions
  regarding the scope of an individual actor's duty, the
  courts look to whether the relationship of the parties
  is such as to give rise to a duty of care and whether
  the plaintiff was within the zone of foreseeable harm.
  (Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., supra.)
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.
• "The damaged plaintiff must be able to
  point the finger of responsibility at a
  defendant owing, not a general duty to
  society, but a specific duty to him."
  (Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., , 62 NY2d
  523, 527.) "The risk reasonably to be
  perceived defines the duty to be
  obeyed." (Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co.,
  supra.). In other words, foresee ability
  of risk defines the scope of duty.
 THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE
VARIES WITH THE FORESEEABILITY OF
       THE POSSIBLE HARM.
• The kind and number of hazards encompassed
  within a particular duty depend on the nature of the
  duty. Where an individual breaches a legal duty and
  thereby causes an occurrence that is within the
  class of foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to
  prevent, the individual may be held liable, even
  though the harm may have been brought about in an
  unexpected way. Conduct is considered negligent
  when it tends to subject another to an unreasonable
  risk of harm arising from one or more particular
  foreseeable hazards (Rest.2d Torts § 281).
 THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES
    WITH THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE
      POSSIBLE HARM (CONTINUED)
• When the person is harmed by an occurrence
  resulting from one of those hazards, the negligent
  actor may be held liable. In contrast, where the harm
  was caused by an occurrence that was not part of
  the risk or recognized hazard involved in the actor's
  conduct, the actor is not liable. For example: A gives
  a loaded pistol to B, a boy of eight, to carry to C. In
  handing the pistol to C, the boy drops it, injuring the
  bare foot of D, his comrade. The fall discharges the
  pistol wounding C. A is subject to liability to C, but
  not to D. (Rest.2d Torts § 281 comment f)
 THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES
    WITH THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE
      POSSIBLE HARM (CONTINUED)
• Under the common law, as a general rule, one
  person owed no duty to control the conduct of
  another Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 315), nor to warn
  those endangered by such conduct (Rest.2d Torts,
  supra, § 314, com. c.; Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.
  1971) § 56, p. 341) The courts have carved out an
  exception to this rule in cases in which the
  defendant stands in some special relationship to
  either the person whose conduct needs to be
  controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable
  victim of that conduct (see Rest.2d Torts, supra, §§
  315-320).
 THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES
    WITH THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE
      POSSIBLE HARM (CONTINUED)
• As explained in section 315 of the
  Restatement Second of Torts, "a duty of care
  may arise from either (a) a special relation ...
  between the actor and the third person which
  imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
  third person's conduct, or (b) a special
  relation ... between the actor and the other
  which gives to the other a right of
  protection." (Tarasoff v. Regents of
  University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425,
  435)
 DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL

• A person who, without negligence on his or
  her part, is suddenly and unexpectedly
  confronted with peril arising from either the
  actual presence of, or the appearance of,
  imminent danger to him or herself or to
  others, is not expected nor required to use
  the same judgment and prudence that is
  required in the exercise of ordinary care in
  calmer and more deliberate moments.
 DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL
          (Continued)
• His or her duty is to exercise the care that an
  ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the
  same or similar circumstances. If at that moment he
  or she does what appears to him or her to be the
  best thing to do, and if his or her choice and manner
  of action are the same as might have been followed
  by any ordinarily prudent person under the same
  conditions, he or she does all the law requires of him
  or her. This is true even though in the light of after-
  events, it should appear that a different course
  would have been better and safer.
RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE CAUSING
   THE PERILOUS SITUATION
• When a situation of peril such as that described
  above is caused by someone's negligence, and the
  person in peril, acting under the impulse of fear,
  makes an instinctive and reasonable effort to escape
  and, in so doing, injures himself or herself or a third
  person, the negligence that caused the peril is
  deemed to be a cause of the injury. This is true even
  though it might have appeared, or after the event it
  may appear, from the viewpoint of another person,
  that the effort to escape was unwise or that the
  person in danger would not have been injured no
  one would have been injured if that effort had not
  been made or had been made differently.
   VOLUNTARY UNDERTAKING--
    "GOOD SAMARITAN" RULE

• A person who is under no duty to care
  for or render service to another but
  who voluntarily assumes such a duty,
  is liable to the other for injury caused
  by a failure to exercise ordinary or
  reasonable care in the performance of
  that assumed duty.
       Good Samaritan Rule

n. from a Biblical story, if a volunteer comes to the aid of
an injured or ill person who is a stranger, the person
giving the aid owes the stranger a duty of being
reasonably careful. In some circumstances negligence
could result in a claim of negligent care if the injuries or
illness were made worse by the volunteer's negligence.
Thus, if Jack Goodguy sees a man lying by the road, a
victim of a hit and run accident, and moves the injured
man, resulting in a worsening of the injury or a new
injury, instead of calling for an ambulance, Goodguy may
find himself on the wrong end of a lawsuit for millions of
dollars.
THE RESCUE DOCTRINE--LIABILITY
        TO RESCUER
• In general, there is no duty to come to the aid
  or rescue of a stranger unless, the rescuer
  negligently created the situation which put
  the stranger in peril and necessitated the
  rescue. The essential elements of the rescue
  doctrine are:
• 1. The defendant engaged in negligent
  conduct;
• 2. Such conduct threatened real and
  imminent serious harm to the person or
  property of another;
THE RESCUE DOCTRINE--LIABILITY
    TO RESCUER (Continued)
• 3. The plaintiff attempted to rescue the
  endangered person or property;
• 4. In attempting such rescue, the plaintiff
  suffered injury, damage, loss or harm; and
• 5. The defendant's negligence was a cause of
  the rescue attempt and of the injuries or
  damage sustained by plaintiff in the course
  of such rescue attempt.
                 Rescue Doctrine
n.
     The rule of law that if a rescuer of a person hurt or put in
     peril due to the negligence or intentional wrongdoing of
     another (the tortfeasor) is injured in the process of the
     rescue, the original wrongdoer is responsible in
     damages for the rescuer's injury. Example: Sydney
     Sparetire speeds on a mountain highway, and skids in
     front of Victor Victim, running Victim's car off the bank,
     trapping Victim in the vehicle. Raymond Rightguy stops,
     ties a rope to the grill of his car, slides down and
     extricates Victim, but on the way up slips and breaks his
     arm, and then finds the grill is badly bent. The negligent
     Sparetire is liable to Rightguy for his broken arm
     (including medical expenses, loss of wages and general
     damages for pain and suffering) as well as the property
     damage to the car grill.
 OTHER SITUATIONS GIVING RISE
           TO DUTY
• Restatement Second of Torts Section
  388 outlines the requirements for
  imposing liability on one who supplies
  a chattel which is known to be
  dangerous for its intended use. No duty
  can exist under section 388 unless
  defendant supplies a chattel to
  defendant to use.
                 Chattel
• n. an item of personal property which is
  movable, as distinguished from real
  property (land and improvements).
 OTHER SITUATIONS GIVING RISE
     TO DUTY (Continued)
• A travel agent has a duty to disclose
  reasonably obtainable material
  information to the traveler unless that
  information is so clearly obvious and
  apparent to the traveler that, as a
  matter of law, the travel agent would
  not be negligent in failing to disclose it.
  (McCollum v. Friendly Hills Travel Ctr.
  (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 83, 945.)
   DUTY OF CARE - OWNERS AND
      OCCUPIERS OF LAND
• The common law determined what duty of care an
  owner of land owed to those coming upon the land
  by classifying the plaintiff either as a trespasser,
  licensee, or invitee and then adopting special rules
  as to the duty owed by the possessor to each of the
  classifications. Generally speaking a trespasser is a
  person who enters or remains upon land of another
  without a privilege to do so; a licensee is a person
  like a social guest who is not an invitee and who is
  privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of
  the possessor's consent, and an invitee is a
  business visitor who is invited or permitted to enter
  or remain on the land for a purpose directly or
  indirectly connected with business dealings between
  them. (Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 136 [156
  A.L.R. 1221].)
   DUTY OF CARE - OWNERS AND
  OCCUPIERS OF LAND (Continued)
• Although the inviter owed the invitee a duty to exercise
  ordinary care to avoid injuring him (Oettinger v. Stewart, supra,
  24 Cal.2d 133, 137; Hinds v. Wheadon, 19 Cal.2d 458, 460-461),
  the general rule was that a trespasser and licensee or social
  guest were obliged to take the premises as they find them
  insofar as any alleged defective condition thereon may exist,
  and that the possessor of the land owed them only the duty of
  refraining from wanton or willful injury. (Palmquist v. Mercer, 43
  Cal.2d 92, 102; see Oettinger v. Stewart, supra, 24 Cal.2d 133,
  137 et seq.) The ordinary justification for the general rule
  severely restricting the occupier's liability to social guests is
  based on the theory that the guest should not expect special
  precautions to be made on his account and that if the host
  does not inspect and maintain his property the guest should
  not expect this to be done on his account. Most courts have
  now rejected the rigid common law classifications and instead
  approach the issue of the duty of the occupier on the basis of
  ordinary principles of negligence.
  Negligence - Causation In Fact -
    Proximate or Legal Cause

• CAUSE--SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
 – In tort law "cause" is a term of art. A legal
   cause of injury, damage, loss or harm is
   something that is a substantial factor in
   bringing about an injury, damage, loss or
   harm. "An actor may be liable if his
   negligence is a substantial factor in
   causing an injury." (Vesely v. Sager 5
   Cal.3d 153.)
                   CAUSE
from Latin causa 1) v. to make something happen. 2)
n. the reason something happens. A cause implies
what is called a "causal connection" as
distinguished from events which may occur but do
not have any effect on later events. Example: While
driving his convertible, Johnny Youngblood begins
to stare at pretty Sally Golightly, who is standing on
the sidewalk. While so distracted he veers into a car
parked at the curb. Johnny's inattention (negligence)
is the cause of the accident, and neither Sally nor
her beauty is the cause. 3) n. short for cause of
action.
           PROXIMATE CAUSE
• The question of legal responsibility is commonly
  considered in terms of "proximate cause," which is
  ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of causation,
  but with the various considerations of policy that
  limit an actor's responsibility for the consequences
  of his conduct. (See, Prosser, Torts, pp. 311-313.) A
  proximate cause of an injury is a cause which, in
  natural and continuous sequence, produces the
  injury, and without which the injury would not have
  occurred. "The concept of proximate causation has
  given courts and commentators consummate
  difficulty and has in truth defied precise definition."
  (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Ind. Acc. Comm.
  176 Cal.App.2d 10, 20.)
PROXIMATE CAUSE (Continued)
• In the Polemis Case (1921, 3 K. B. 560),
  defendant's worker carelessly allowed a
  plank to fall into the hold of the ship. The
  falling plank struck something and thereby
  caused a spark which in its turn ignited
  gasoline vapor in the hold. The vapor caused
  a fire which destroyed the whole ship. Held:
  The fire was not a reasonably foreseeable
  consequence of allowing the plank to fall.
  However, it was reasonably foreseeable that
  the falling plank would cause some form of
  damage to the vessel.
PROXIMATE CAUSE (Continued)
• Because of this, the court established
  defendant's negligence. Whether the
  particular damage caused by the fire
  was recoverable depended solely on it
  being a direct consequence of the
  negligent act. Although the damage by
  fire could not have reasonably been
  foreseen as a consequence of dropping
  the plank, Defendant was therefore
  liable for the loss of the ship by fire.
PROXIMATE CAUSE (Continued)
• In Wagon Mound 1 (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v.
  Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. [1961] 1 All
  E.R. 404; [1961] A.C. 388; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126; (P.C.)
  and Wagon Mound 2 (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd.
  v. The Miller Steamship Co. Pty. (1966), [1966] 2 All
  E.R. 709; [1967] 1 A.C. 617; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 498 (P.C.)
  the wind and tide carried the oil beneath a wharf
  where welding operations were being carried on by
  employees. After being advised that they could
  safely weld, the employees continued their work.
  Some 55 to 60 hours after the original discharge,
  molten metal set some waste floating in the oil on
  fire. The flames quickly developed into a large fire
  which severely damaged the wharf.
   Wagon Mound (Continued)
• Liability turned on the question of whether the risk of
  fire was foreseeable, since furnace oil has such a
  high boiling point it is unlikely to catch fire under
  normal circumstances. In Wagon Mound 1 and 2, the
  two sequential claimants argued the risks of fire in
  opposite ways. Each of these diametrically different
  presentations of the risk of fire was accepted by the
  very same court as equally true and valid facts. The
  upshot of the two Wagon Mound cases is that a
  defendant will only be liable for damage that is
  reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the
  negligent act. Foreseeable damage being "real or
  very likely " - not far-fetched or fanciful."
        CONCURRING CAUSES
• There may be more than one cause of an injury.
  When negligent or wrongful conduct of two or more
  persons or negligent or wrongful conduct and a
  defective product contributes concurrently as
  causes of an injury, the conduct of each is a cause
  of the injury regardless of the extent to which each
  contributes to the injury. A cause is concurrent if it
  was operative at the moment of injury and acted with
  another cause to produce the injury. It is no defense
  that the negligent wrongful conduct of a person not
  joined as a party was also a cause of the injury.

				
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