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The Bhopal Gas Tragedy_ 1984

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					The Bhopal Gas Tragedy, 1984
  CLN 4U1 Independent Study Unit




                                   Mr. O‟Reilly

                                   June 4th, 2010



                                               1
Table of Contents



Title                       Page Number

Introduction                3

Synopsis                    3-5

Victims and Survivors       5

Union Carbide               5

Union Carbide‟s Statement   6-7

Methyl Isocyanate           8

Health Effects              8-12

Environmental Effects       12- 15

Legal Case                  15- 22

Primary Sources             22-47

Legal Experts               47-59

Sambhavna Clinic            59

Conclusion                  60

Work Cited                  61-65

Bibliography                66-67




                                          2
Introduction

        On December 2nd, 1984 at eleven pm, an operator at the Bhopal Chemical Plant

discovered a leak in an MIC storage tank. MIC also known as Methyl Isocyanate is a toxic

chemical that turns to gas when exposed to water. Through faulty and unsafe equipment at least

1 ton of water entered the tank allowing 40 tons of MIC to escape and plague the surrounding

communities with their sleeping inhabitants. The people of Bhopal awoke to their eyes burning

and were surrounded by dense clouds of poison. Hospitals were overwhelmed by the victims

who were dead or dying and in search of separated family members. Furthermore they were

unable to identify the gas and Union Carbide refused to release that information. It is estimated

that 3800i people died within the first few hours of the contamination and 8000ii died within the

next few days. Union Carbide abandoned the plant without cleaning it up, ignoring the Polluters

Pay Policy. To date the contamination and poisoning of Bhopal continues with the toxic

chemicals still leaching into the soil and well water. Since then, corporate and government

corruption has been exposed but justice has yet to be served. Over half a millioniii people have

been inundated by the toxicity and an estimated 25000iv have died since, from what is commonly

referred to as “that night.v”


Synopsis

        On the night of December 2nd and 3rd 1984, a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal India began

leaking 40 tons of the highly toxic and poisonous gas methyl Isocyanate.


        None of the six safety systems designed to contain such a leak were operational, allowing
        the gas to spread throughout the city of Bhopal. Half a million people have been exposed
        to the gas and 20 000 have died to date as a result of their exposure. More than 120 000
        people still suffer from ailments caused by the accident and the subsequent pollution at
        the plant site.vi



                                                                                                    3
Immediately after the disaster Union Carbide began disassociating itself with its subsidiary

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL)vii claiming they had no knowledge or involvement in the

Bhopal plant when in fact they were aware of the hazardous equipment since 1982viii. They also

tried to place the blame on a “disgruntled worker” and that the incident could only have occurred

as a result of deliberate action and sabotageix. Union Carbide (USA) approved of the proposal for

a methyl Isocyanate plant in Bhopal in 1972x. The managing committee was also aware that the

technology being sent over was “untested” and that there would be contamination of soil and

water due to the surface disposals of chemical wastexi. Union Carbide and its owner, Warren

Anderson was aware of the hospitalizations of several workers due to accidents and “exposures

in the factory and the death of Mohammed Ashraf in December 1981.xii” His death, they

claimed, was the result of his own negligence and refusal to follow mandatory safety

proceduresxiii.


        By 1984, the company was losing money as the demand for pesticides decreased and the

company began making preparations to move the facility to another developing countryxiv.

However, three storage tanks of MIC remained and “although MIC is a particularly reactive and

deadly gas, the Union Carbide plant‟s elaborate safety system was allowed to fall into

disrepair...every safety system that had been installed to prevent a leak of MIC-at least six in all-

ultimately proved inoperative.xv”


        The reality is that MIC is a highly volatile gas which must be stored at zero degrees
        centigrade. Yet the refrigerator unit in the factory had been shut down to cut costs as per
        directions from Union Carbide headquarters in Danbury, USA. Any escaping MIC should
        have entered a caustic-soda scrubber to be neutralized. The scrubber was not operating on
        the night of the disaster. Escaping toxic gases were supposed to go to the flare tower,
        where a pilot flame would burn off the gas. The pilot flame was off and the pipeline to
        the flare tower disconnected. Water sprayers designed to take care of the leaks in the
        atmosphere did not have sufficient pressure to reach the required height...the hazardous

                                                                                                    4
        design of the plant and the blatant lack of safety systems as well as reckless cost cutting
        is sufficient to underline the liability of the US corporations.xvi

Water entered the storage tank of MIC during a routine cleaning. It was “entered into pipes on

the floor of the factory...without placing safety slips at the joints. Water reached Tank E-610.

The exothermic reaction between water and MIC increased the temperature of the tank

converting liquid MIC into gas. The increase in pressure forced open the vent valve letting most

of the MIC to escapexvii” in a time period of between 45 and 60 minutesxviii.


The Victims and Survivors


        The number of dead is unknown and although Union Carbide associate only 3800 deaths

the night of the disaster and the few days following, the “Municipal workers who picked up the

bodies with their own hands, loading them unto trucks for burial mass graves or to be burned on

mass pyres, reckon they shifted at least 15 000 bodies.xix” Survivors claim that at least 8000xx

died within the first week however these numbers “become meaningless when you know the

dying has never stopped.xxi”


Union Carbide


        The Union Carbide Corporation is a chemical corporation. In the 1970s the Indian

government encouraged companies to manufacture within their borders in an effort to initiate

industrializationxxii. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was requested to produce Sevin, and

“as part of the deal, India‟s government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment

come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company‟s

subsidiary.xxiii”




                                                                                                      5
Statement of Union Carbide Corporation Regarding the Bhopal Tragedy


The 1984 gas leak in Bhopal was a terrible tragedy that understandably continues to evoke strong

emotions even 25 years later. In the wake of the gas release, Union Carbide Corporation, and

then chairman Warren Anderson, worked diligently to provide aid to the victims and set up a

process to resolve their claims. All claims arising out of the release were settled 18 years ago at

the explicit direction of and with the approval of the Supreme Court of India.


The Bhopal plant was owned and operated by Union Carbide India, Limited (UCIL), an Indian

company in which Union Carbide Corporation held just over half the stock. The other

stockholders included Indian financial institutions and thousands of private investors in India.

Union Carbide India Limited designed, built and managed the plant using Indian consultants and

workers. In 1994, Union Carbide sold its entire stake in UCIL to MacLeod Russell (India)

Limited of Calcutta, and UCIL was renamed Eveready Industries India Limited (Eveready

Industries). As a result of the sale of its shares in UCIL, Union Carbide retained no interest in -

or liability for - the Bhopal site. The proceeds of the UCIL sale were placed in a trust and

exclusively used to fund a hospital in Bhopal, which now provides specialist care to victims of

the tragedy.


After the disaster, plant owner UCIL obtained permission from the government to conduct clean-

up work at the site and did so under the direction of Indian central and state government

authorities. Eveready Industries continued this remediation effort until 1998. That year, the

Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owns and had been leasing the property to UCIL,

took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any




                                                                                                      6
additional remediation. What additional clean-up work, if any, has been undertaken since that

time is unclear.


Shortly after the gas release, Union Carbide launched an aggressive effort to identify the cause.

Engineering consulting firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc., conducted a thorough investigation. Its

conclusion: The gas leak could only have been caused by deliberate sabotage. Someone

purposely put water in the gas storage tank, and this caused a massive chemical reaction. Process

safety systems had been put in place that would have kept the water from entering into the tank

by accident.


Union Carbide, together with the rest of the chemical industry, has worked to develop and

globally implement Responsible Care to help prevent such an event in the future by improving

community awareness, emergency preparedness and process safety standards.




     This statement by Union Carbide is false and deceitful. Immediately after the disaster

Union Carbide began disassociating themselves with UCIL (Union Carbide India Limited) rather

than trying to help the victims. Furthermore, the consulting firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc was hired

by Union Carbide and his sabotage theory is completely untrue. The disgruntled worker that

Union Carbide tried to blame for the sabotage testified against the accusation which was not

taken seriously in court due to the overwhelming evidence of unsafe equipment and

proceduresxxiv. Union Carbide‟s relationship and ignorance of the contamination and hazardous

procedures at the Bhopal plant is untrue as well. In 1982 Union Carbide sent a team of inspectors

to the Bhopal plant where they observed and recorded many hazardous and dangerous practices



                                                                                                     7
as well as unsafe and untested equipment, however nothing was acted upon and changes did not

occurxxv.


Methyl Isocyanate


        Methyl Isocyanate is a toxic chemical used in the production of plastics, polyurethane

foam, and in this case pesticidexxvi. It is a fragile substance that is usually shipped in a liquid

form but is still easily burned and explosivexxvii. It has a strong odour but can begin to make

people sick before it is smelledxxviii. It is the smallest and most toxic member of the isocyanate

family and was unheard of until the Bhopal disasterxxix. MIC was stored and used in the Bhopal

plant “to manufacture carbamate pesticidexxx” despite its toxicity and highly reactive properties.

On the night of December 2nd, 1984 water entered the tank and the “ensuing exothermic reaction

vaporized MIC, which forced open the valve and it spread over residential areas.xxxi” The long

term health effects are unknown and although numerous researches have been conducted on the

Bhopal survivors it is difficult to determine which effects are MIC related or which were caused

by the ground and water contamination of other chemicals.


        At the time of the disaster the population of Bhopal was approximately 800 000xxxii

people, more than one quarter of which were exposed to the gas. The “magnitude of the disaster

was so enormous that some called it the Nagasaki and Hiroshima of peace time.xxxiii”


Health Effects


        The health effects of Bhopal are divided into the following categories;




                                                                                                      8
    Those directly exposed to the toxic gases in 1984 and suffering from chronic ailment of

       lungs, eyes, brain, immune system, reproductive system, musculoskeletal systems and

       othersxxxiv

    Those with complications of injury caused by gas such as tuberculosis which is much

       more prevalent in the gas affected because of their loss of immunityxxxv

    Children of gas exposed (born after the disaster) with a range of health problems and

       developmental disordersxxxvi

    Those exposed to contaminated ground water with skin, lung, liver, kidney and other

       organ damagesxxxvii

    People with exposure to toxic gases and/or contaminated ground water with cancers of

       the lungs, oesophagus, cervix and othersxxxviii


   The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has concluded that 520,000 people have

poisons circulating in their systemsxxxix, affecting them in varying ways and degrees. “Today,

well over 120,000 chronically ill survivors are in desperate need of medical attention and an

estimated 10 to 15 people are dying every month due to exposure related illnesses.xl” Union

Carbide has continuously attempted to down play the health effects and says on their website

“...severe injury to the lungs is limited to a small percentage of the population and there is no

serious residual eye disease. Medical studies have shown that massive, one-time exposure to

MIC has not caused cancer, birth defects or other delayed manifestations of medical

effects.xli”Other research says otherwise attributing,


       Breathlessness, persistent cough, diminished vision, early age cataracts, loss of appetite,
       menstrual irregularities, recurrent fever, back and body aches, loss of sensation in the
       limbs, fatigue, weakness, anxiety and depression are the most common symptoms among
       survivors. The alarming rise in cancers, TB, reproductive health problems and others


                                                                                                    9
        such as growth retardation among children born after the disaster remain undocumented.
        The official agency for monitoring deaths has been closed since 1992.xlii


There is a contributing lack of research and knowledge about methyl isocyanate and its effects

which does not help the situation or its victims. At the time of the disaster Union Carbide refused

to give out any information about the gas which had been released, its effects or any possible

treatments (which there is not) to the hospitals and medical professionals. This only encouraged

the crisis and prevented the doctors from saving lives, aggravating the panic and conditions.

Union Carbide continues to claim that they have extensive knowledge about methyl isocyanate

and its effects on human volunteers. They have reported this information as “trade secretsxliii”

refusing to share their research with others who only wish to help the still dying victims. “The

ICMR in turn stopped all research into the health effects of the gas in 1994 and is yet to publish

the findings of the 24 research studies it had carried out up to that point involving over 80,000

survivors.xliv”

        Since 1984 numerous governmental hospitals have been constructed in Bhopal that “there

are more hospital beds per 1000 population here than in the USA or Europe.xlv” Yet with all

these hospitals health care and community involvement remain neglected. The hospitals are used

as storage to rarely used equipment, “budgetary allocations to community health services have

remained under 2% and there are no government or BMHT (Bhopal Memorial Hospital Trust-

the hospital built with Carbide‟s money) community health workers.xlvi”As most of the patients

are in need of long term care non-toxic drug alternative medications are necessary because of the

side effects of continual medication. The state government has spent over $43 million on health

care “but has failed to offer sustained relief, leading to the proliferation of private doctors and

nursing homes”xlvii which many cannot afford. Ever since the morning of the disaster drugs for

                                                                                                      10
“temporary symptomatic relief have been the mainstay...the indiscriminate prescription of

steroids, antibiotics and psychotropic drugs is compounding the damage caused by the gas

exposure.xlviii”

        There are severe gynaecological complications with women which are worsened by

social taboos and lack of education. Women are reluctant to receive help and cannot talk about it

openly except in the privacy of their own homes and away from their husbands. One study

conducted at the Sambhavna Clinic examined 190 females aged between 13 and 19 who came to

the clinic between June 1 1999 and March 31, 2000. Of those 190, 113 of them reported

menstrual problems, “including painful and irregular menstrual menses, heavy bleeding and

excessive vaginal secretions.xlix” Furthermore, the toxic chemicals from the poisoned water

supply affects nursing mothers while breast feeding babies, transmitting the toxins from one life

to another.

        Since “that night” more and more generations continue to be affected as children are born

with birth defects. Many pregnant women lost their babies that night while fleeing from the gas,

others lost them gradually. “Within weeks of the disaster, doctors were aware that dozens of

children were being born dead, sometimes not even recognizably human.l”

        In March 1985, a column of frightened mothers-to-be wound towards a government
        hospital with bottles containing urine samples. The women asked for the samples to be
        tested to check whether their babies could be born damaged, and to ask for sodium
        thiosulphate injections to rid their bodies of toxins inhaled on „that night‟.
        Instead of injections, tests, medical advice and kindness they were driven away by police
        with sticks. Ironically, even as these scared women were being chased away, the Indian
        Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was carrying out a double-blind clinical trial to test
        the efficacy of sodium thiosulphate injections as a detoxificant for the gas-exposed. It
        took 22 years for their findings to be published which revealed that sodium thiosulphate
        could have saved tens of thousands of lives.li


                                                                                                11
Health effects of the Bhopal methyl isocyanate gas leak exposure [8, 30-32].lii

                                       Early effects (0–6 months)


Ocular            Chemosis, redness, watering, ulcers, photophobia
Respiratory       Distress, pulmonary edema, pneumonitis, pneumothorax.
Gastrointestinal Persistent diarrhea, anorexia, persistent abdominal pain.
Genetic           Increased chromosomal abnormalities.
Psychological     Neuroses, anxiety states, adjustment reactions
                  Impaired audio and visual memory, impaired vigilance attention and response time,
Neurobehavioral
                  Impaired reasoning and spatial ability, impaired psychomotor coordination.


                                    Late effects (6 months onwards)


Ocular            Persistent watering, corneal opacities, chronic conjunctivitis
Respiratory       Obstructive and restrictive airway disease, decreased lung function.
                  Increased pregnancy loss, increased infant mortality, decreased placental/fetal
Reproductive
                  weight
Genetic           Increased chromosomal abnormalities
Neurobehavioral Impaired associate learning, motor speed, precision



Environmental Damage

          After the gas leak Union Carbide abandoned the factory leaving behind a toxic wasteland.

They refused to clean up the area blaming the government and UCIL and breaking their contract

of lease. They were supposed to leave the property as they found it, however, this was

impossible to do due to the severity of long term pollution both above and below the ground.

Union Carbide violated the Polluters Pay Principle, an environmental policy requiring the costs

of pollution cleanup, etc be paid by those who caused itliii. Today the principle is recognized as a

component of international environmental lawliv, however in 1984 the environment was not the

concern as it is today. Since the opening of the pesticide plant in 1969, chemical waste was

routinely dumped on the property both above and below ground. “Consequently, residues and

waste materials weighing hundreds of metric tons are today contained in five storage areas upon

the surface of the site including an open cycle shed, a soapstone shed, the formulation building

                                                                                                    12
and two godowns.lv” In 1989 the Union Carbide, USA, discovered that the ground water was

highly toxic but did not release this informationlvi. They had approximately 20 different dumping

sites within the premises and also right outside the factory‟s wallslvii. In 1979, they constructed

three solar evaporation ponds which used to overflow each year, flooding neighbouring farms

and causing much damagelviii. When the farmer‟s livestock began dying and getting sick the

Carbide paid the farmers off in an effort to avoid court and the press. In 1981, the ponds began

leaking so managing officials asked for help from the head office in Danbury, Connecticut who

discovered that the ground water was highly toxiclix. Instead of cleaning and solving the problem

they constructed a third pond which they then dumped the “toxic sludge from the two

ponds...and covered it with soil and left.lx”


       Hazardous Waste Materials found on the site are;


               i) Sevin (carbaryl) tar residue

               ii) Napthol tar residue

               iii) Hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH), also known as benzene hexachloride (BHC,

               Lindane) solids

               iv) In process material obtained during dismantling of the formulation plant


                                      “Highly toxic Sevin lies spilled on the ground where the
                                      tank containing it has rusted away. In the event that this
                                      waste were to catch light in one of the fires that have
                                      periodically swept through the site, it would release methyl
                                      isocyanate, the gas which was chiefly responsible for the
                                      deaths and injuries sustained on the night of 2/3rd
                                      December 1984.lxi”




                                                                                                      13
Hazardous chemicals litter the site continuing to poison and endanger more lives. In the past,

fires have swept through the site coming in close contact with these chemicals and waste

disposal areas.


Below Ground


         A former employee of the Union Carbide plant (UCIL) Mr. T. R. Chauhan testified at the

New York District Court that between 1969 to 1984 “a massive amount of chemical substances

formulated in the factory - including pesticides, solvents used in production, catalysts, and other

substances as well as by- products - were routinely dumped in and around the factory grounds.

These were in the form of solid, liquid and gas and caused pollution in the soil, water and air.lxii”




Chemicals dumped by Union Carbide management in and around the factory from
                               1969 to 1984
S.No Chemical                     Amount Use in factory Nature of original pollution
1        Methylene Chloride       100 MT      Solvent            Air
     2   Methanol                 50 MT       Solvent            Air
     3   Ortho-idichlorobenzene   500 MT      Solvent            Air, Water, Soil
     4   Carbon tetrachloride     500 MT      Solvent            Air
     5   Chloroform               300 MT      Solvent            Air
     6   Tri methylamine          50 MT       Catalyst           Air
     7   Chloro benzyl chloride   10 MT       Ingredient         Air, Water, Soil
     8   Mono chloro toluene      10 MT       Ingredient         Air, Water, Soil
     9   Toluene                  20 MT       Ingredient         Air, Water, Soil
    10   Aldicarb                 2 MT        Product            Air, Water, Soil
    11   Carbaryl                 50 MT       Product            Air, Water, Soil
    12   Benzene Hexachloride     5 MT        Ingredient         Air, Water, Soil
    13   Mercury                  1 MT                           Water, Soil
    14   Mono methyl amine        25 MT       Ingredient         Air
    15   Chlorine                 20 MT       Ingredient         Air
    16   Phosgene                 5 MT        Ingredient         Air
    17   Hydro chloric acid       50 MT       Ingredient         Air, Soil
    18   Chloro sulphonic acid    50 MT       Ingredient         Air, Soil
    19   Alpha Naphthol *         50 MT       Ingredient         Air, Soil
    20   Napthalin                50 MT       Ingredient         Air
    21   Chemical waste Tar       50 MT       Waste              Water, Soil
    22   Methyl Isocyanate        5 MT        Ingredient         Air, Water, Soil



                                                                                                   14
In 1999 a Greenpeace report was carried out, the very first that examined the water and soil for

contamination. They tested the water from a hand pump which was found to contain

“chloroform, carbon tetrachloride, hexachloroethane, chlorobenzene, dichlorobenzene and

several types of trichlorobenzene.lxiii” Very little has been done to clean up and stop the

contamination. In June 2005 approximately 380 tons of waste was gathered from different parts

of the factory and kept in a warehouse within the factorylxiv. Although this helps it does not make

a huge difference while thousands of tons remain still strewn and half buried inside the factory,

not to mention the thousands of tons still in the solar pond landfilllxv. When Dow Chemicals

merged with Union Carbide in 1999 they became responsible for cleaning up the contamination

site and accepting responsibility, not for the disaster but for the poisoning that still continueslxvi.


Legal Case


        Numerous attempts have been made to bring justice to Bhopal with the government and

several organizations representing the victims. Charges have been laid in India as well as in the

United States. However, sadly after 36 years very little has been done and Carbide has yet to be

punished while their victims wait for justice to be served.


        Following the disaster it was decided that legal proceeding should be conducted within

India, despite the victim‟s desires. Union Carbide would have had to pay much more if the trial

had been conducted in the United States than in Indialxvii. Warren Anderson flew to Bhopal after

the leak and was arrested along with nine others by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on

December 7th 1984lxviii. One of the others was Keshub Mahindra, Chairman of Union Carbide

India Limited who denied his responsibility and involvement in the Bhopal plant claiming it was

the day to day management who was responsible and that he had no knowledge about unsafe


                                                                                                      15
equipment or procedures. Warren Anderson was released on bail the same day he was arrested

for 25,000 rupees, upon a promise to returnlxix, however even after numerous summons,

Anderson or anyone from Union Carbide has failed to show up to Indian proceedingslxx. Union

Carbide also managed to continuously delay the trial by “raising baseless allegation of

harassment by prosecution.lxxi”Warren Anderson and Union Carbide were charged with culpable

homicide, punishable to ten years in prisonlxxii. The charges were later reduced to death by

negligence which is only punishable to two years in prison or fineslxxiii. There is a great deal of

corruption within India‟s police, government and judicial systemslxxiv. The government has

always supported the corporations in evading their corporate responsibilities in an effort to

support progress (industrialization). “The government failed to stop hazardous technology from

entering the country and the hazardous location of the factory. Its factory inspectors failed to

direct corrective action with regard to hazards present in the factory, retrenchment of workers,

lack of safety training etc.lxxv” After the disaster the government did nothing to determine the

correct death toll or inaugurate a proper system of injury assessmentlxxvi. In March 1985 the

Bhopal Gas Leak Act was instated, enabling the Indian Government to act as the legal

representative of the victims in claims arising or related to the disasterlxxvii. After assuring the

victims the government settled for $470 millionlxxviii, much less than required or promised to the

survivors and was given full responsibility of allocating the funds. Each compensated victim

only received about $2000, not nearly enough to pay for their immediate medical fees as well as

long term care for themselves and their childrenlxxix. The corruption goes deeper in the judicial

system to the Supreme Court Judge who “sanctioned the collusive settlement of 1989 and was

made a member of the International Court of Justice ($1 million a year) through Union Carbide‟s

efforts.lxxx”



                                                                                                       16
        When Dow Chemicals announced their intention to merge with Union Carbide survivor‟s

groups informed the CEO, William Stravropoulos that if they take over Union Carbide then they

are also taking over Carbide‟s legal liabilities regarding the clean-up of Bhopallxxxi. In February

2001 Dow Chemicals successfully merged with Carbide ignoring the organization‟s threats and

has since then been involved in a legal battle that is still on-going. The UCC in the United States

was legally liable to clean-up the contamination site because they designed the waste disposal

system in the Bhopal plant and was thus liable for any toxic contamination this may have

causedlxxxii. Dow Chemicals is not liable for the disaster but rather the poisoning that continues

because of the continued contaminationlxxxiii. In 2005 the Indian Government asked Dow

Chemicals for $22 million for the clean-up to which they replied that they were under no

jurisdiction of the Indian governmentlxxxiv. “Residents of communities with ground water

contamination have filed a case in the US Federal court in New York...seeking clean up costs

and compensation for health and property damage and funds for monitoring health effects. lxxxv”.

A case is also ongoing in India against Carbide‟s subsidiary, UCIL and a verdict is awaited for

June 7th, 2010lxxxvi.


        Legal processes are still ongoing in the United States with Union Carbide and Warren

Anderson; both are respondents in a class action suit filed in the Southern District Court of New

York. Mr. Himanshu Rajan Sharma is the lawyer representing survivor plaintiffslxxxvii. The

plaintiffs consist of seven individual victims as well as five organizations: Bhopal Gas Peedit

Mahila Sangathan (BGPMS), Gas Peedit Nirashrit Pension Bhogi Sangharsh Morcha

(GPNPBSM), Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Stationery Karmachari Sangh (BGPMSKS), Bhopal

Gas Peedit Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti (BGPSSS), and Bhopal Group For Information and

Action (BGIAlxxxviii. The suit was filed on behalf of;


                                                                                                     17
       a. All persons who suffered personal injuries as a result of exposure to the MIC gas

           b. All persons who are entitled to recover damages for losses caused by death of their

           relativeslxxxix

           c. All persons who were exposed to MIC as set forth above but whose injuries have

           not yet manifested themselvesxc

           d. All persons not yet born whose injuries will manifest themselves as congenital

           birth defects resulting from exposure to MICxci

           e. All persons who continue to be exposed to toxic effluents, chemical by-products

           and other hazardous agents as a result of ongoing environmental pollution at Union

           Carbide's facility in Bhopalxcii


The Plaintiffs


       There are sevenxciii individual plaintiffs who were victims of Carbide‟s negligence and

have suffered the consequences since, as well as the organizations working towards justice.

Sajida Bano is a resident of Bhopal who at the time of the disaster lived about four miles

southeast of the plantxciv. Her husband was Mohammad Ashraf, an employee of UCIL and “often

complained to her about the dangerous working conditions at the facility.xcv” On December 25,

1981 he was willed by a phosgene leakxcvi after being asked by “his manager who had assured

him that there was no danger of a phosgene leak. He was kept at the plant dispensary after he

leak and subsequently taken to Hamidia hospital where he died.xcvii” Union Carbide did not

accept responsibility for his death nor did they make the proper safety precautions that would

have prevented the MIC leak. Bano was at the train station coming home from Kanpur on the

night of December 3rd 1984 when “she began to experience a choking sensation and her eyes

began burning and tearing profusely.xcviii” With her two sons she waited in the waiting room

                                                                                                 18
which was “full of people who were unconscious or choking to deathxcix” until she finally

collapsed from the MIC exposurec.She was separated from her sons when she was rushed to the

hospital and subsequently taken to her brother‟s house who went to find her childrenci.Both of

her children were severely ill, Bano‟s eldest son died on the way to the hospital at 9am on

December 3rd, from slow asphyxiationcii. Her only surviving child, Shoed Muhammad “continues

to suffer severe illnesses as a result of MIC exposure and has had to discontinue his studies due

to his physical impairments. Bano herself continues to suffer chronic breathlessness and other

severe exposure-related health problems.ciii”


       Plaintiff Haseena Bi (Bi) was a resident of Bhopal at the time of the disaster whose

husband died ten days after the MIC exposure. In 1990, she moved to Atal Ayub Nagar “one of

the low income residential communities adjacent to the campus of the UCIL facility in

Bhopal.civ” Since she moved there she has been having “chronic abdominal pains, severe burning

sensations, bleeding rashes on her limbs” and her son, daughter-in –law and three grandchildren

“also began exhibiting various symptoms once the family moved to this residential colony. cv”


       Sunil Kumar was 13 years old at the time of the disaster. He lost his mother, father, 22

year old sister, his 18 year old brother, his 10 year old brother, and his two other sisters who

were 6 and 3cvi.


       Since that time, Kumar has suffered numerous respiratory ailments, especially severe
       episodes of breathlessness, which doctors have advised him are the result of MIC
       exposure. He also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, which has made it
       impossible for him to work and hold down a job, and he complains of a constant fear of
       the manifestation of other symptoms of the MIC exposure.cvii




                                                                                                   19
       Dr. Stanley Prem Norton is a former Professor of Zoologycviii who chose to stay on the

night of the disaster and help the medical authoritiescix. He was classified afterwards as being

“permanently injured.cx”


       As a consequence of his exposure to MIC on that night, he has developed ischemic heart
       disease with right bundle block of the heart as well as severe pulmonary edema, a
       respiratory ailment very common amongst the gas exposed population of Bhopal that
       drastically impairs breathing due to fluid from inflammation of mucus membranes in the
       lungs. He also suffers from several neural muscular disorders, cataract and chronic
       asthmatic bronchitis due to gas exposure.cxi

       Asad Khan was seven years old at the time of the disaster and was therefore never added

to any register making her eligible to receive compensationcxii. Ashrad suffers from severe

chronic heart ailment; doctors have also informed him that there is a weakening of the valves of

his heart, which could result in death if he overexerts himself physically.cxiii


       The two other individual plaintiffs are Shiv Narayan Maithil and Devendra Kumar

Yadavcxiv. Maithil suffers from regular indigestion, “complaining of an intense burning sensation

in his stomach and has had great difficulty in eating food.cxv” In 1988 he was diagnosed with

cancer of the esophagus and has had to spend his entire life saving on medical treatmentcxvi.

Yadav was spending the night at his parents on the night of the disaster with his preganant wife.

She had to be rushed to the hospital and was severely affected by the MIC exposure. She had to

go back to hospital throughout her pregnancy and gave birth to a premature baby who died at the

hospitalcxvii. Doctors concluded that the death was the result of MIC exposurecxviii.


       Five other organizations representing survivors are plaintiff as are “all those exposed on

the night of December 2-3, 1984 in the city of Bhopal, India and their children, if any, who were

exposed to and/or injured by MIC gas through the exposure of their parents, whether through



                                                                                                   20
hereditary in the form of genetic abnormalities or congenital defects or transmissions from the

blood or other bodily fluids.cxix”


Defendants


       Union Carbide and its former Chief Executive Officer, Warren Andersoncxx both face

criminal charges of culpable homicide which “remain pending in Bhopal District Court and has

been declared a “proclaimed absconder” for its failure to appear for trial on those charges,

despite repeated summons and notices to appear”cxxi.


Significance


It was through the efforts of this law suit that secret Carbide documents were discovered,

implementing them with the Bhopal plant and proving that they did indeed have knowledge

about the unsafe technology and hazardous procedures. Some of these documents are included in

the primary source section. The Judge of the case, Keenan has dismissed the case twice. The first

time because of the Bhopal Act was supposed to prevent individuals or organizations outside the

government of India from bringing an action against Union Carbide or Warren Anderson.cxxiiThe

decision was appealed before the Second Circuit Court of Appeal who both agreed and disagreed

with Keenan‟s decision. The second time the case was dismissed by Judge Keenan the reasoning

was that “the plaintiffs claims are untimely and directed at improper parties. Union Carbide has

met its obligations to clean up the contamination in and near the Bhopal plant. Having sold their

shares long ago and having no connection to or authority over the plant, they cannot be held

responsible at this time." This decision was made in 2003 and was appealed. The case is still

ongoing. Another primary source document was written by a group of American Congressmen

dedicated to protecting the environment and intent on bring this American corporation to justice.


                                                                                                  21
Primary Source

                      Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas

                               DAYA R. VARMA1 AND SHREE MULAY2


                           McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada


  Department of Pharmacology and Therapeutics1, and Department of Medicine2, McGill University,

                                    Montreal, QC, Canada H3G 1Y6


RUNNING TITLE: Methyl isocyanate




Correspondence:


D.R. Varma


Department of Pharmacology and Therapeutics


McGill University,


3655 Promenade Sir William Osler,


Montreal, QC


Canada H3G 1Y6


Tel. (514) 398-3632


Fax. (514) 398-7120


E-mail: daya.varma@mcgill.ca


                                                                                              22
Abstract: Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas


Methyl isocyanate (MIC) is the smallest and most toxic member of the isocyanate family and

was unheard of until the Bhopal disaster of December 3, 1984. MIC was stored and used in

Bhopal to manufacture carbamate pesticide while other isocyanates are used primarily for the

manufacture of polyurethane. At the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, MIC was stored

in tanks even though the compound is highly reactive; water entered the MIC-containing Tank

and the ensuing exothermic reaction vaporized MIC, which forced open the valve and it

spread over residential areas. Inhalation of toxic MIC resulted in the death of nearly 8000

people and livestock within 3 days; thousands of survivors were maimed. MIC exerts a wide

spectrum of toxic effects, including sensory and pulmonary irritation which can degenerate into

fatal pulmonary edema as well as reproductive, ocular and neurological toxicity. Researchers

have also found teratogenic, carcinogenic, genotoxic and immunological effects of MIC. These

diverse toxic effects of MIC are most likely a result of its ability to interact with, and damage a

variety of cells. There has been some suggestion that the culprit gas was hydrogen cyanide and

not MIC but this contention is not supported by available data; beneficial effect of sodium

thiosulfate, if any, are due to presence of cyanide in the body from other sources. Treatment of

both short- and long-term toxicity of MIC was essentially to alleviate the symptoms; Indian

doctors and volunteers did what was best under the circumstances. The underground water in the

vicinity of now defunct factory has been found to be contaminated with dangerous chemicals

making it difficult to separate long-term effects of MIC from those caused by ground toxins. The

Bhopal accident was caused because stringent guidelines for operation of hazardous chemical

industries were not followed in more than one way. Although such accidents are more likely to

happen in developing countries, they can happen anywhere and of any magnitude. It is therefore


                                                                                                      23
incumbent upon governments and internal bodies to ensure safety for hazardous chemical and

other industries.


“UCIL (Union Carbide India Limited) said that the leak was plugged 45 minutes after it was

discovered, but by that time much of the town of Bhopal had virtually turned into a gas chamber,

and was a vivid demonstration of what chemical warfare would be like.” Jayaraman (1984)


I. INTRODUCTION


Methyl isocyanate (MIC) is the smallest member of the isocyanate family and the most reactive

and toxic of all. MIC was almost unheard of until on the fateful night December 3, 1984, when

nearly 30 metric tons of this poisonous chemical spewed out the (UCIL) pesticide plant within a

period of 45-60 min. Bhopal turned into a “city of death” wrote the fortnightly India Today

(December 30, 1984). The Journal Nature (Opinion, 1984) vented its anger thus: “…. the

anguish vividly carried round the world by the television cameras seems not to have matured into

the anger, even hysteria, there would have been had the (Bhopal) accident occurred on the edge

of a European city – or in Connecticut” (the headquarters of Union Carbide was in Danbury,

Connecticut).


       There was only one scientific report on MIC toxicity (Kimmerle and Eben, 1964) until

the Bhopal disaster; this led Lancet (Editorial, 1984) to comment:     “In a year‟s time we will

have learnt a lot more about methyl isocyanate – at an appalling price.” As is to be expected, the

Bhopal disaster evoked immense interest amongst journalists, scientists, the corporate world,

lawyers, social activists and the Indian government. A discussion of the toxicology of MIC

necessitates a narrative of different events specific to the Bhopal disaster. However, this chapter

mainly focuses on four aspects. One, why did MIC escape in such huge amounts and can this


                                                                                                   24
reoccur at other places where MIC is manufactured and stored? Two, what are the

physicochemical characteristics of MIC that make it the most toxic of all isocyanates and

deadlier than cyanide? Three, what is the toxicity profile of MIC? Four, what was done and not

done to deal with the tragedy? Other aspects such as social cost, legal implications and issues of

rehabilitation (Budiansky, 1985; Dhara and Dhara, 1995; Varma, 1986) are important; however,

these aspects are not being discussed.


II. BACKGROUND


At the time of the disaster the population of Bhopal was approximately 800,000; more than one

quarter of the population was exposed to toxic gases. The toxicity of a chemical, barely tested in

animal models, was suddenly being observed on unsuspecting thousands of children, women and

men. The magnitude of the disaster was so enormous that some called it the Nagasaki and

Hiroshima of peace time. “This may be how the world will end – not with a bang but with an

ecological whimper”, wrote Abu Abraham in the Sunday Observer, Bombay, December 23,

1984. “India‟s disaster – The night of death” was displayed on the front cover of the Time

magazine (December 17, 1984, New York). Nature (Opinion, 1984) expressed its dismay at the

lack of international concern for this tragedy. Chemical and Engineering News (1985) published

a special issue “Bhopal the continuing story”. A British medical student who had arrived just

one day earlier in Bhopal to start her elective, had this to say (Sutcliffe, 1985): “The dead and

dying arrived by the truckload, others came by rickshaw or were carried by relatives. For some

the effort of the journey itself proved too much, and they died soon after arrival.”




                                                                                                    25
       Bhopal is known as the city of world‟s worst industrial disaster. That might be why the

20th anniversary of the Bhopal episode in 2004 was covered by news media all over the world.

Commentaries appeared in Nature Medicine (Padma, 2005), Science (Crab, 2004), Lancet

(Sharma, 2005) and other journals. By this time the story of MIC and Bhopal had been the

subject of several books and monographs (Eckerman, 2005; Everest 1985; Lapierre and Moro,

2001; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986; Sinha, 2007; Sufrin, 1985) and reviews ( Bucher,

1987; Dhara and Dhara, 1995, 2002; Dhara et al., 2002; Dhara and Gassert, 2002; Dhara and

Kriebel, 1993; ICMR, 1985, 1986, 2004; Lepkowski, 1985; Marwick, 1985; Mehta et al., 1990;

Sriramachari, 2004; Sriramachari and Chandra, 1997; Varma, 1986; Varma and Guest, 1993;

Varma and Varma 2005; Varma and Mulay 2006).


       Given the social dimensions of the tragedy, a documentary “Bhopal beyond genocide”,

directed by Tapan Bose and Suhasini Mulay was produced in 1986 by Cinemart Foundation,

New Delhi. “Bhopal: the Search for Justice” directed by Peter Raymond and Lindalee Tracey

was produced by White Pine Pictures and the National Film Board of Canada in 2004. The play

“Bhopal” by Rahul Varma was staged in Canada and its Hindi version titled “Zahrili Hawa

(poisonous gas)” was staged in Indian cities under the direction of the renowned theatre

personality, Habib Tanweer.


       Soon after the Bhopal accident, the Government of India intervened in two important

areas; it assumed all rights for negotiations about the liability of the Union Carbide Corporation

and subsequently with its new owners Dow Chemical Corporation and second, assured an

investigation into the causes of the disaster as well as comprehensive study on the acute and

long-term effects of exposure of the Bhopal population to MIC or other gases. While the details

of the negotiations are not integral to this chapter, the promised toxicological studies were

                                                                                                 26
scarcely done. Although the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) released approximately

two million dollars for research on MIC toxicity, there is no indication that scientists were

assigned to undertake a systematic study of different areas to unravel the complete picture of

MIC toxicity.


       As time passed three important developments made the study of MIC toxicology

problematic. First, there has been a significant movement of the population, which usually is not

a characteristic of Indian cities. For example, out of 317 children identified in 1985 to have been

exposed to the gas in utero, less than 100 could be traced twenty years later. Second, there is

evidence of contamination of ground water, which makes it difficult to distinguish between

effects due to exposure to toxic gases from those due to ingestion of ground water toxins. Third,

people in Bhopal are looking for relief from their suffering and are not keen on being subjects of

a researcher‟s inquisitiveness; therefore honest scientific inquiry necessitates a rapport with the

population, which the government-commissioned scientists have not been able to establish.


III. THE MAKING OF A DISASTER


The specific details of how MIC escaped from Tank E-610 of UCIL plant in Bhopal have been

described in detail elsewhere (Varadarajan et al., 1985; Varma, 1986; Varma and Varma, 2005).

It is highly unlikely that accident will repeat itself in exactly the way it happened in Bhopal on

December 2-3, 1984. On the other hand, a brief description of the Bhopal episode is relevant in

speculating how such accidents can occur and what needs be done to ensure that they do not any

where else.




                                                                                                      27
       In the case of Bhopal, water entered into pipes on the floor of the factory during routine

cleaning without placing safety slips at the joints. Water reached Tank E-610. The exothermic

reaction between water and MIC increased the temperature of the tank converting liquid MIC

into gas. The increase in pressure forced open the vent valve letting most of MIC to escape to

outside as gas. Various safety measures to neutralize MIC such as caustic soda scrubbers were

not functional or inadequately functional. Even if safety measures were in perfect functioning

order, they could not have handled such a big leak. Fortunately MIC stored in the other two tanks

(E-611 and E-619) was not affected; it was later converted to pesticide in what was termed

“Operation Faith” during December 16 to 22, 1984. The disaster had frightened the people of

Bhopal so much that despite all assurances by the Indian government, almost one-half of the

population left the town, some with their entire belongings, during this exercise.


       An examination of the causes of the Bhopal disaster clearly indicates that the accident

would not have occurred if all necessary precautions had been taken in the maintenance and

operation of the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant. That required continued and apt maintenance,

regular inspection by independent authorities, sufficiently well-trained staff, and location of the

Plant far way from residential areas and not just within one km of the railway station and within

3 km two major hospitals, as was the case in Bhopal.


       Around the time of the Bhopal disaster, MIC was used in the US (West Virginia),

Germany and Japan; at none of these places MIC was stored in large quantities. One can assume

that other cautionary measures were followed more rigorously in these places than in Bhopal

suggesting that developing countries with very poor regulatory processes require more stringent

safety measures than in developed countries.



                                                                                                    28
        Whether or not operation of hazardous industries can be both safe and profitable is

debatable. What is not debatable is that safety must remain the top consideration. There is a

strong case to demand state control of hazardous corporate operations (Varma and Varma 2005)

and global monitoring of potentially toxic materials (Baxter, 1986; Sriramachari and Chandra

1997). Following the cyclohexane explosion in Flixborough in 1974, an Advisory Committee on

Major Hazards was set up in the UK. The European Council Directive (1982) was triggered by

the Sevesco accident of 1976 in Italy. However, the Bhopal disaster of 1984, far worse than the

Flixborough or Sevesco accidents or for that matter any in history has not led to additional

regulations outlining corporate and state responsibilities. MIC is dangerous enough to be treated

at par with nuclear establishments, requiring utmost care in maintenance.cxxiii


Primary Source Response


       This was an excerpt from the 81 page publication that was written by Dr. Varma from

McGill University. It covers extensive insight into Methyl Isocyanate, which was the chemical

leaked in Bhopal and is responsible for thousands of deaths. Dr. Varma wrote about the disaster

and the process of how the gas leaked. He also cleared up the cyanide controversy which was the

belief that people died from cyanide poisoning instead of from methyl isocyanate. This is untrue

because the reactions and symptoms of the two chemicals are very different. The information

gathered from Dr. Varma and his research is mostly used in the section of methyl isocyanate as

well as the background information and synopsis of the disaster.




                                                                                                 29
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––                        x
SAJIDA BANO, HASEENA BI, SUNIL KUMAR, DR.               : Index No.
STANLEY NORTON, ASAD KHAN, SHIV NARAYAN
MAITHIL, DEVENDRA KUMAR YADAV, BHOPAL                   : 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK)
GAS PEEDIT MAHILA UDYOG SANGATHAN
(BGPMUS), GAS PEEDIT NIRASHRIT PENSION                  :
BHOGI SANGHARSH MORCHA (GPNPBSM),
BHOPAL GAS PEEDIT MAHILA STATIONERY                     :
KARMACHARI SANGH (BGPMSKS), BHOPAL GAS
PEEDIT SANGHARSH SAHAYOG SAMITI (BGPSSS),               : AMENDED
and BHOPAL GROUP FOR INFORMATION AND
ACTION (BGIA), on behalf of themselves and all others   : CLASS ACTION
similarly situated,
                                                        : COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
                                                        :
- against -
                                                        : Jury Trial Demanded
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION and WARREN
ANDERSON,                                               :

Defendants.                                             :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                                        :

                                 :
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– X



                                                                                30
Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, bring this action both individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, as survivors and next-of-kin of victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster of
December 2-3, 1984, (the "Bhopal Disaster") against Union Carbide Corporation (hereafter
"Union Carbide" or "the Company"), as well as its former Chief Executive Officer, Warren
Anderson, for grave violations of international law and fundamental human rights, pursuant to
the Alien Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1350), for their unlawful, reckless and depraved
indifference to human life in the design, operation and maintenance of the Union Carbide of
India Ltd. ("UCIL") facility at Bhopal which resulted in the devastating leak of massive amounts
of methyl isocyanate ("MIC") into the city killing thousands and injuring many thousands of its
residents. Union Carbide‟s operation of the UCIL facility evinced a complete disregard of any
emergency-preparedness or minimal safety precautions, resulting in widespread death, severe
permanent physical and psychological trauma, as well as grave risk to life, health and security of
tens of thousands of the residents of Bhopal. Plaintiffs‟ claims are also based on the widespread
and severe contamination and environmental pollution of soil and drinking water caused by
Union Carbide‟s operation of the UCIL facility. These claims are asserted in addition to, and
separate and apart from, Plaintiffs‟ claims arising from the Bhopal Disaster which resulted in
toxic exposure and injury to the same community of victims of the toxic gas release of December
203, 1984. Further, Defendants are also liable for civil contempt, abuse of judicial mandate and
evasion of lawful process, as well as actual and constructive fraud, as a consequence of their total
failure to comply with the lawful orders of the courts of both the United States and India.



                                          THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs

Bano

             1. Sajida Bano ("Bano"), a resident of Bhopal, is a survivor of the Bhopal Gas
                Disaster of December 2-3, 1984. At the time of the Disaster, she resided in Bag
                Umrao Dulha, a residential colony about four miles southeast of the Union
                Carbide plant in Bhopal. Her husband, Ashraf Mohammad Khan, was an
                employee of UCIL and often complained to her about the dangerous working
                conditions at the facility. On December 25, 1981, Ashraf Khan was killed by a
                leak of phosgene at the plant that also severely injured two other employees. The
                leak took place after Ashraf Khan was asked to open a particular valve at the plant
                by his manager who had assured him that there was no danger of a phosgene leak.
                He was kept at the plant dispensary after the leak and subsequently taken to
                Hamidia hospital where he died.
             2. On the night of December 3, 1984, Bano had just arrived at the Bhopal train
                station at 1:30 a.m. from the city of Kanpur where she had gone to visit her
                mother, when she began to experience a choking sensation and her eyes began
                burning and tearing profusely. Around her, many people at the train station began
                falling unconscious or began asphyxiating. With her two sons, she rushed to the
                station‟s waiting room which was full of people who were unconscious or choking

                                                                                                   31
   to death. In the ensuing panic amongst the crowd, she was separated from her two
   children.
3. After she collapsed from exposure to MIC gas, she was carried to a nearby
   hospital from where she was brought to her brother‟s home. Her brother then went
   to the train station to find her two children and bring them back. After finding the
   two boys amongst a large number of people at the train station who were either
   dead or unconscious, he managed to find a lorry driver who, despite the fact that
   his horse was dying from gas exposure, agreed to take the Bano children to his
   home.
4. Both of Bano‟s sons were severely ill and in acute respiratory distress after being
   exposed to the MIC gas. Her eldest son, Arshad Mohammad Khan, died from
   slow asphyxiation on the way to the hospital at 9:00 a.m. on December 3, 1984.
   To this day, Bano‟s only surviving child, Shoeb Mohammad Khan, now 19 years
   old, continues to suffer severe illness as a result of MIC exposure and has had to
   discontinue his studies due to his physical impairments. Bano herself continues to
   suffer from chronic breathlessness and other severe exposure-related health
   problems.

   Bi

5. Plaintiff Haseena Bi ("Bi"), a resident of Bhopal, and her husband, Mohammad
   Khan, lived in Ibrahimganj, house no. 61, in Bhopal at the time of the Disaster.
   Both were exposed to the toxic gases which escaped from Union Carbide‟s
   facility in Bhopal on the night of December 2-3, 1984.
6. Bi‟s husband died as a result of severe complications from exposure-related
   illnesses ten days after the Disaster. In 1990, she moved to Atal Ayub Nagar
   because she could no longer afford to pay rent for her previous accommodation.
   Atal Ayub Nagar is one of the low-income residential communities immediately
   adjacent to the campus of the UCIL facility in Bhopal. Although she had not
   manifested any symptoms as a result of her toxic exposure during the Bhopal
   Disaster, she began suffering from various ailments as soon as she moved to her
   new residence in Atal Ayub Nagar.
7. She has been having chronic abdominal pains, severe burning sensations in her
   stomach as well as all over her body and recurrent, bleeding rashes on her limbs
   ever since she moved to Atal Ayub Nagar. Her son, daughter-in-law and three
   grandchildren also began exhibiting various symptoms once the family moved to
   this residential colony. They had long suspected that these illnesses and physical
   problems were caused by the water which they used for drinking and washing.
8. Bi and her family are forced to use water from the only hand-pump and well in
   the area as there is no other water source near her home from which she could
   conveniently carry water. On November 29, 1999, the Greenpeace/Exeter 1999
   scientific study (described more fully in paragraphs 95 through 105, infra.) tested
   water from this hand pump which was identified as IT9030 and found to contain
   chloroform, carbon tetrachloride, hexachloroethane, chlorobenzene,
   dichlorobenzene and several types of trichlorobenzene.



                                                                                     32
   Kumar

9. Sunil Kumar ("Kumar"), a resident of Bhopal, was orphaned at the age of 13 on
    the night of December 2, 1984 when the Bhopal Gas Disaster occurred. His family
    had moved to Jaiprakash Nagar, a residential colony close to the UCIL facility,
    less than a year before the Disaster.
10. Both his mother, Kusum Devi, and father, Kashiprasad, died as a result of the
    Disaster. Sunil also lost his sister, Pushpa Devi (22 years old); his brother, Anil
    Kumar (18); his younger brother, Santosh Kumar (10); and two sisters named
    Kiran (6) and Sanju (3). All of them died as a result of the Bhopal Disaster on the
    night of December 2nd itself.
11. On the night of the Disaster, Kumar escaped on a truck to a town named Budhni
    near Bhopal where he was hospitalized for a day and then sent to Hoshangabad
    hospital where he was admitted for 15 days. His uncle and brother-in-law were
    finally able to trace his whereabouts through radio announcements and brought
    him back to Bhopal.
12. He came to know of the death of his mother and father and of his two sisters from
    a neighbor and was present at the cremation of their bodies. Unlike many other
    survivors of the Disaster who never really learned what happened to their family
    members due to mass burials and cremations following the incident, Kumar was
    able to learn of the death of his other family members from notices put up by the
    government with photos of unidentified bodies.
13. Since that time, Kumar has suffered from numerous respiratory ailments,
    especially severe episodes of breathlessness, which doctors have advised him are
    the result of MIC exposure. He also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder,
    which has made it impossible for him to work or hold down a job, and he
    complains of a constant fear of the manifestation of other symptoms of the MIC
    exposure.

   Norton

14. Dr. Stanley Prem Norton ("Dr. Norton"), a resident of Bhopal, is a former
    Professor of Zoology at the city‟s Motilal Vigyan College. On the night of the
    Disaster, he was residing in a house adjacent to Bhopal‟s mosque, the Moti
    Masjid, in Khirniwala Maidan, Ward No. 7, which is also in close proximity to the
    Union Carbide facility. Dr. Norton presently resides at B-1/4, Sheetal Nagar,
    Berasia Road, Bhopal.
15. Despite the fact that other residents of Bhopal were fleeing the city in panic on the
    night of December 2, 1984, Dr. Norton chose to stay and help the medical
    authorities cope with the huge influx of victims of MIC gas exposure in the city‟s
    hospitals.
16. Dr. Norton has been classified by the medical examiners of the Indian
    Commission for Medical Research as "permanently injured" as a result of his
    exposure to the MIC gas. As a consequence of his exposure to MIC on that night,
    he has developed ischemic heart disease with right bundle block of the heart as
    well as severe pulmonary edema, a respiratory ailment very common amongst the

                                                                                      33
    gas exposed population of Bhopal that drastically impairs breathing due to fluid
    from inflammation of mucus membranes in the lungs. He also suffers from several
    neural muscular disorders, cataract and chronic asthmatic bronchitis due to the gas
    exposure.
17. Dr. Norton also lost his mother who, according to her doctors, died as a result of
    complications arising from illnesses caused by MIC gas exposure seven years
    after the night of the Bhopal Gas Disaster.

   Asad Khan

18. Asad Dad Khan ("Asad Khan"), a resident of Bhopal, was 7 years old on the night
    of December 2-3, 1984. Since he was a minor at the time of the Bhopal Gas
    Disaster, Asad Khan has never been included in the official registry of Bhopal gas
    victims until recently and has been unable to claim any compensation for his
    injuries.
19. He has been diagnosed by physicians at the Gandhi Medical Center and at the
    Hamidia Hospital in Bhopal as suffering from chronic heart ailments as a result of
    MIC gas exposure. In particular, doctors have informed him that there is a
    weakening of the valves of his heart, which could result in death if he overexerts
    himself physically. Asad Khan is presently 22 years old.

   Maithil

20. Shiv Narayan Maithil ("Maithil"), a resident of Bhopal, was living in MIG-15,
    New Subhash Nagar, Ward No. 39, on the night of December 2, 1984. He woke
    up that night complaining of excessive tearing and burning in the eyes. Like many
    victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster, he initially thought that these symptoms were
    caused by somebody burning chili peppers in the vicinity of his neighborhood.
21. However, within minutes, Maithil began to suffer from a choking cough and
    severe vomiting from the MIC gas exposure and had to be taken to a nearby
    hospital. After that night, he began to suffer regularly from indigestion,
    complaining of an intense burning sensation in his stomach and had great
    difficulty in eating food.
22. Maithil had been to a number of doctors and hospitals in Bhopal in order to seek
    treatment for these persistent symptoms which became a continuous health
    problem after 1986. In 1988, he was diagnosed as having cancer of the esophagus
    by a medical examiner. Two independent physicians at one of the most reputed
    hospitals in India, the Tata Memorial hospital, have confirmed that Maithil‟s
    disease of cancer in the food pipe is almost certainly the result of exposure to MIC
    gas.
23. Maithil has been forced to spend all of his life savings on the medical treatment of
    this cancer and the respiratory ailment of his right lung, pleural influsion, which
    were both the result of gas exposure. In 1989, he was operated on for cancer of the
    esophagus and a large portion of his food pipe was removed, making it difficult
    for him to eat solid foods. Maithil complains that, despite this operation, he
    continues to have great difficulty eating solid foods and maintaining the diet

                                                                                     34
   required to sustain his health. His doctors have advised that he will suffer from
   these disabilities for the rest of his life.

   Yadav

24. On the night of the Disaster, Devendra Kumar Yadav ("Yadav") was residing
    with his parents as well as his wife and daughter at House No. 71, Ghora Nakkas,
    Mangalwara Road, Bhopal. Yadav‟s wife was four months pregnant at the time of
    the Disaster and was very severely affected by exposure to the MIC gas. She was
    treated at the Hamidia hospital immediately following exposure.
25. Due to persistent health problems resulting from the severity of her toxic gas
    exposure, Yadav‟s wife had to be repeatedly hospitalized throughout her
    pregnancy. From December 5, 1984 to December 7, 1984, she was admitted for
    treatment at the M.Y. Hospital in the nearby city of Indore. Subsequently, she
    required further treatment at other hospitals in Bhopal as well as Ujjain.
26. Yadav‟s wife went into labor before the expected date of delivery and was
    admitted to the Sultania Zenana Hospital on April 9, 1985 where she gave birth to
    a male child on April 12, 1985. The child was premature, of low birth weight and
    extremely weak as well as in poor health. Doctors at the Sultania Zenana hospital
    sent the new-born child to Hamidia hospital for emergency treatment and care.
    The child died at the hospital on April 15, 1985.
27. Two independent medical specialists and an expert committee have concluded,
    based on the medical records of the deceased child, that the death of the new-born
    was caused by the exposure of Yadav‟s wife to MIC gas during pregnancy.

   BGPMUS

28. The Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan ("BGPMUS"), a voluntary, non-
    governmental organization in Bhopal, is the grassroots self-help organization
    created by the victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster. All of the members of the
    BGPMUS are victims of the Disaster who reside in Bhopal. The organization has
    been the recognized as the legal representative of the victim community in Bhopal
    in several writ petitions before the Supreme Court of India and continues to have
    official status as an intervenor assisting the prosecution in the criminal case
    against Union Carbide pending in Bhopal District Court. As a representative of
    the interests of gas affected victims, the organization continues to be a member of
    the State Advisory Committee on Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation,
    an agency created by the state government. The vast majority of members of
    BGPMUS continue to reside in the residential colonies surrounding the campus of
    the UCIL facility and, therefore, continue to be exposed to pesticides, toxic
    chemicals and other by-products which have contaminated the soil and water near
    the facility.

   GPNPBSMB




                                                                                       35
29. The Gas Peedit Nirashrit Pension Bhogi Sangharsh Morcha, Bhopal,
    ("GPNPBSM") is a grassroots self-help organization created by the victims of the
    Bhopal Gas Disaster. All of the members of the GPNPBSM are victims of the
    Disaster who reside in Bhopal. For the last thirteen years since its inception, the
    organization has paid special emphasis on protecting the interests of those
    destitute survivors of the Bhopal Disaster who are dependent on pensions from the
    Madhya Pradesh state government for their former employment. The vast majority
    of members of GPNPBSM continue to reside in the residential colonies
    surrounding the campus of the UCIL facility and, therefore, continue to be
    exposed to pesticides, toxic chemicals and other by-products which have
    contaminated the soil and water near the facility.

   BGPMSKS

30. The Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Stationery Karmachari Sangh ("BGPMSKS") is a
    registered trade union of those women survivors who are employed as workers in
    the making of paper stationery as part of the Indian government‟s rehabilitation
    program. For the last thirteen years since its inception the organization has paid
    special emphasis on the issue of the economic rehabilitation of the survivors of the
    Bhopal Disaster. For the last several years the organization has been recognized as
    the legal representative of those few survivors who are employed under
    government rehabilitation programs by the High Court of the State of Madhya
    Pradesh. The vast majority of members of BGPMSK continue to reside in the
    residential colonies surrounding the campus of the UCIL facility and, therefore,
    continue to be exposed to pesticides, toxic chemicals and other by-products which
    have contaminated the soil and water near the facility.

   BGPSSS

31. The Bhopal Gas Peedit Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti ("BGPSSS"), a voluntary, non-
    governmental organization in New Delhi, India, is an advocacy organization
    created by and on behalf of the victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster. The majority
    of the members of BGPSSS are victims of the Disaster who reside in Bhopal and
    those who are not consist primarily of Indian attorneys and activists campaigning
    on behalf of those victims. The organization has been the recognized as the legal
    representative of the victim community in Bhopal in several writ petitions before
    the Supreme Court of India and continues to have official status as an intervenor
    assisting the prosecution in the criminal case against Union Carbide pending in
    Bhopal District Court.

   BGIA

32. The Bhopal Group for Information and Action ("BGIA"), a voluntary, non-
    governmental organization in Bhopal, is a grassroots advocacy and self- help
    organization created in 1986 on behalf of the victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster.
    BGIA attempts to document the ongoing and continuous medical and

                                                                                     36
   environmental toll of the Disaster and works to obtain appropriate medical and/or
   legal relief for its victims. The organization has been the recognized as the legal
   representative of the victim community in Bhopal in several writ petitions before
   the Supreme Court of India and continues to have official status as an intervenor
   assisting the prosecution in the criminal case against Union Carbide pending in
   Bhopal District Court.

   Other Class Members

33. Other Class members, not named as Plaintiffs herein, are all those exposed to
    MIC on the night of December 2-3, 1984 in the city of Bhopal, India and their
    children, if any, who were exposed to and/or injured by MIC gas through the
    exposure of their parents, whether through heredity in the form genetic
    abnormalities or congenital defects or through transmission from the blood or
    other bodily fluids.
34. The Class of Plaintiffs includes those named herein and all others similarly
    situated who themselves or whose family members were the victims and survivors
    of the Bhopal Gas Disaster in India, as well as their heirs and beneficiaries who
    were injured as a consequence of the gas leak caused by Union Carbide. Victims
    and survivors include, but are not limited to (a) those individuals and/or families
    residing in the wards closest to the campus of the UCIL factory that have been
    categorized by the official Indian Government registry as "severely affected"; (b)
    all other survivors of the Bhopal Gas Disaster in India, who suffered physical
    injury as a direct consequence of the events of December 2-3, 1984; and (c) all
    those individuals and/or families residing near the UCIL plant that continue to be
    exposed to toxic chemicals and other by-products as a result of the severe
    environmental contamination of soil and water caused by Union Carbide in
    Bhopal.

   Defendants

35. Union Carbide is a New York corporation with its principal office located at 39
    Old Ridgebury Road, Danbury, Connecticut. Union Carbide operated its plant in
    Bhopal, India, through its affiliate, Union Carbide India Ltd. ("UCIL"), in which
    Union Carbide owned the majority stake of 50.99% and over which it exercised
    complete, effective and pervasive control. Union Carbide is an accused on the
    criminal charges of culpable homicide which remain pending in Bhopal District
    Court and has been declared a "proclaimed absconder" for its failure to appear for
    trial on those charges, despite repeated summons and notices to appear served on
    its corporate officers.
36. Warren Anderson ("Anderson") is the former Chief Executive Officer of Union
    Carbide who presently resides in Florida. On December 4, 1984, Anderson visited
    Bhopal, India along with a technical team and was briefly arrested and released on
    bail. He is also an accused on the criminal charges of culpable homicide which
    remain pending in Bhopal District Court and has been declared a "proclaimed
    absconder" for his failure to appear for trial on those charges, despite repeated

                                                                                    37
   summons to appear for trial having been served on him. A non-bailable arrest
   warrant has been issued for Anderson by the Bhopal District Court and filed with
   Interpol.

                             JURISDICTION AND VENUE

37. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Alien
    Tort Claims Act, in that this proceeding consists of a civil suit brought by aliens
    for torts committed in violation of the law of nations and treaties of the United
    States. This Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in that
    Plaintiffs‟ claims pose a substantial federal question and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1332 in that there is complete diversity between the parties and the matter in
    controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs. Plaintiffs' causes of
    action arise under, among others, the following laws, agreements, resolutions and
    treaties:
a.           Customary International Law;
b.           Common Law of the United States of America;
c.           Common Law of the State of New York;
d.           Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948);
e.           International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
    (December 16, 1966);
f.           Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
    Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified 24 I.L.M. (1985);
g.           International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
    Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966);
h.           Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
    Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (June 16, 1972);
i.           Title 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
38. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties in that (a) Plaintiffs are all
    aliens alleging fundamental violations of international law in accordance with the
    Alien Tort Claims Act, and (b) the Defendants do business within the State of
    New York and have minimum contacts with the State based on purposeful
    availment of the laws of New York and continuous business activities in the
    jurisdiction.
39. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) in that the Defendants do
    business within the District and/or own property within this District pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1391(b). This Court is the only appropriate forum for adjudication of this
    action because Union Carbide, in violation of the conditions of prior dismissal
    from the United States forum and the express orders of the Supreme Court of
    India, refuses to submit to the lawful jurisdiction of the courts of India and is not
    amenable to jurisdiction in any other forum.
40. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs‟ non-federal law claims
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

                            CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS



                                                                                      38
41. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
    who themselves or whose family members were the victims and/or survivors of
    the Bhopal Disaster in India, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 23
    (a), (b)(1)(B) and (b)(3). The Class of Plaintiffs includes those named herein and
    all others similarly situated who themselves or whose family members were the
    victims and survivors of the Bhopal Gas Disaster in India, as well as their heirs
    and beneficiaries who were injured as a consequence of the gas leak caused by
    Union Carbide. Victims and survivors include, but are not limited to (c) those
    individuals and/or families residing in the wards closest to the campus of the
    UCIL factory that have been categorized by the official Indian Government
    registry as "severely affected"; (d) all other survivors of the Bhopal Gas Disaster
    in India, who suffered physical injury as a direct consequence of the events of
    December 2-3, 1984; and (c) all those individuals and/or families residing near the
    UCIL plant that continue to be exposed to toxic chemicals and other by-products
    as a result of the severe environmental contamination of soil and water caused by
    Union Carbide in Bhopal.
42. Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of all individuals who at any time from
    the establishment of the UCIL facility in India to the present reside in the adjacent
    residential communities and neighborhoods whose property has been damaged
    and who have been exposed to toxic chemicals as a result of the discharge of toxic
    effluents and other persistent pollutants into the soil and water in and around the
    Union Carbide plant in Bhopal.
43. There are predominating common questions of law and fact relating to the
    international law claims of Plaintiffs and the Class and subclasses including, but
    not limited to, the following:
a.           did Union Carbide demonstrate reckless or depraved indifference to
    human safety and life in the design, operation and maintenance of its MIC
    facilities in Bhopal as well as its safety mechanisms?
b.           did Union Carbide manifest intentional, reckless disregard of the dangers
    inherent in its policy of operating the Bhopal facility on a subsistence basis with
    inadequate safeguards?
c.           did Union Carbide have knowledge of the serious danger to life and health
    posed by the facility and its history of prior leaks including knowledge of the
    ultrahazardous character of MIC?
d.           did Union Carbide‟s systematic policy of racial discrimination in the
    design, construction and operation of the Bhopal facility cause the Bhopal Gas
    Disaster?
e.           did Union Carbide demonstrate reckless or depraved indifference to
    human life in the manufacturing, storage, treatment and disposal practices at the
    UCIL plant, resulting in severe contamination of the soil and water in and around
    the UCIL plant.
f.           whether Defendants are in breach of Judge Keenan‟s order requiring
    Union Carbide to submit to the jurisdiction of India and in what respect?
g.           whether there has been a toll or waiver of the statute of limitations with
    respect to Plaintiffs‟ causes of action?



                                                                                       39
44. Common questions of law and fact also predominate over any individual issues
    with respect to Plaintiffs‟ state law claims based on environmental contamination
    and pollution of the soil and water surrounding the UCIL plant in Bhopal:
a.           whether Defendant‟s manufacturing, storage, treatment and disposal
    practices at the UCIL plant were negligent;
b.           whether Defendant‟s manufacturing, storage, treatment and disposal
    practices at the UCIL plant constitute intentional malfeasance;
c.           the policies, procedures and guidelines used by the Defendant in
    manufacturing, storing, treating and disposing of chemical products and waste by-
    products of its pesticide production processes;
d.           whether Defendant‟s design, operation and maintenance of the UCIL
    facility was negligent insofar as it directly resulted in the severe contamination of
    the soil and water in and around the UCIL plant in Bhopal;
e.           whether Defendant‟s design, operation and maintenance of the UCIL
    facility constitutes intentional malfeasance directly resulting in the severe
    contamination of the soil and water in and around the UCIL plant in Bhopal;
f.           whether the grounds and surrounding environs of Union Carbide‟s plant in
    Bhopal have been contaminated with chemical by-products, wastes, pesticides and
    other toxins and the extent of such contamination;
g.           whether the persistent pollutants which Defendant has discharged into the
    environment surrounding its Bhopal facility are toxic;
h.           whether Defendant‟s conduct constitutes a nuisance;
i.           whether the Class should receive medical monitoring;
j.           whether Union Carbide is liable for compensatory damages and the
    measure of such damages;
k.           whether Union Carbide‟s conduct was wanton and outrageous;
l.           whether Union Carbide is liable for punitive damages and the amount of
    such damages; and
m.           whether the Class is entitled to equitable relief.
45. While all members of the Class share common questions of law and fact, the
    proposed Class includes the following subclasses divided on the basis of type of
    injury:
a.           All persons who suffered personal injuries as a result of exposure to the
    MIC gas, as set forth above;
b.           All persons who are entitled to recover damages for losses caused by death
    of their relatives, including but not limited to, wives, husbands and children, as a
    result of exposure to MIC as set forth above;
c.           All persons who were exposed to MIC as set forth above but whose
    injuries have not yet manifested themselves;
d.           All persons who have sustained injuries such as neurological,
    psychological or as a result of birth defects in children from exposure to MIC; and
e.           All persons not yet born whose injuries will manifest themselves as
    congenital birth defects resulting from exposure to MIC as set forth above.
f.           All persons who continue to be exposed to toxic effluents, chemical by-
    products and other hazardous agents as a result of ongoing evironmental pollution
    at Union Carbide‟s facility in Bhopal;


                                                                                      40
g.           All persons who have suffered property damage and other losses as a
    result of the continuing environmental pollution and contamination at Union
    Carbide‟s facility in Bhopal.
46. The Class and subclasses represented by Plaintiffs are so numerous that joinder of
    all members is impracticable. The precise number of individuals exposed to MIC
    is not presently known with certainty, but according to the official estimates of the
    Indian Council of Medical Research, an estimated 521, 262 residents of 36
    municipal wards were exposed to the MIC gas. There is also risk of serious injury
    to others in the future.
47. Adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a
    practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members not parties
    to the adjudication. The claims are so numerous and significant that it is likely that
    there would be a limited fund available from Defendants‟ assets inadequate to
    compensate Plaintiffs and the Class for either compensatory or punitive damages.
    Individual litigation of these claims would be entirely impractical and would
    impair the ability of Class members to protect their interests.
48. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the Class and
    subclasses, and the named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests
    of the Class and its subclasses. Plaintiffs' interests do not conflict with those of the
    Class and subclasses, and Plaintiffs are represented by counsel experienced in
    class action litigation. Moreover, since most, if not all, of the victims of the
    Bhopal Disaster continue to reside in the communities surrounding the UCIL
    plant, the Class of those who continue to be exposed to the toxic effluents and
    other environmental contaminants from the Bhopal facility is a subclass of those
    individuals who were exposed to the toxic gas leakage on December 2/3, 1984.
49. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
    adjudication of this controversy.

                                FACTUAL BACKGROUND

50. On the night of December 2, 1984, a deadly gas leak from Union Carbide‟s
    facility killed thousands of people in Bhopal, India and grievously maimed several
    hundred thousand. For those who did not survive, death came in the particularly
    excruciating manner of slow asphyxiation by one‟s own bodily fluids. For those
    who survived, the physical suffering and mental anguish continue. Hundreds of
    thousands continue to suffer from permanent disability and chronic illnesses as a
    result of exposure to Union Carbide‟s toxic gases. This night of unimaginable
    terror and death in Bhopal has generally been recognized as the worst peacetime
    environmental disaster in history.

                                     The Bhopal Disaster

51. Around midnight on Sunday, December 3, 1984, a massive leak of highly toxic
    MIC and other toxic chemical by-products spilled out from storage tank number
    610 of the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, blanketing the city for miles with a
    deadly white fog. Thousands were killed instantly from exposure to the gas as

                                                                                         41
    they slept or as they fled through the narrow alleys of the residential areas
    surrounding the plant. Hundreds of thousands were maimed and remain injured to
    this day. Due to the mass burials and cremations following the incident, estimates
    of the number of dead vary widely, but official estimates prepared by the Indian
    government suggest a casualty toll of at least 1,700 individuals in the 48 hours
    following the leak. Unofficial estimates indicate a toll of 6,000 or more fatalities
    in the days immediately following the Disaster. Studies conducted by the Indian
    Council on Medical Research point out that the spontaneous abortion rate in
    Bhopal is 24.2 % or nearly three times the national average: the rate of stillborn
    infants is 26.1 per 1000 deliveries compared to an all-India rate of 7.9 per 1000;
    and, even one year after the Disaster, infant mortality in the city was around 110
    per 1000 births whereas the national average in India is 65.2 per thousand.
52. The Union Carbide facility in Bhopal manufactured pesticides, including an
    insecticide, SEVIN, which is compounded from MIC. MIC was known by Union
    Carbide's officials, management and technical experts to be a very dangerous
    chemical of an extremely volatile and highly toxic nature. When inhaled in the
    form of a gas, its effects on human beings range from asphyxiation, nausea, the
    vomiting of blood, and permanent blindness to damage to the tissues of the lungs,
    kidney, and liver to nervous illnesses and possible genetic defects. As far back as
    1963, confidential research was undertaken at the Carnegie Mellon University in
    Pittsburgh by the Mellon Institute for Union Carbide. That research generated a
    confidential special report to Union Carbide which concluded that "methyl
    isocyanate appears to be the most toxic member of the isocyanate family" which
    "is highly toxic by both preoral and skin penetration routes and presents a definite
    hazard to life by inhalation." Union Carbide‟s own technical manual on MIC,
    dated July 1976, evidences full knowledge of the dangers of MIC: "Methyl
    isocyanate (MIC) is reactive, toxic, volatile and flammable. It is usually stored
    and handled in stainless steel… Any other material may be unsuitable and,
    possibly, dangerous." The manual specifically indicates that certain metals and
    metallic alloys "must be excluded from contact with methyl isocyanate. They
    catalyze a dangerously rapid trimerization. The induction period varies from
    several hours to several days. The heat evolved can generate a reaction of
    explosive violence."
53. On the night of December 2, 1984, UCIL plant employees were ordered by their
    supervisors to conduct a water-washing exercise prescribed by Carbide‟s own
    operational manuals in order to clear certain lines or pipes which were choked
    solid with chemical compounds, residue and corrosive rust. The procedure began
    at 8:30 p.m. on December 2nd and continued until 12:15 a. m., December 3rd. In
    accordance with standard procedure, the hose was connected to a „bleeder
    connection‟ which was directly connected to the Relief Valve Vent Header
    ("RVVH") and started pumping water at an estimated 3,000 litres an hour into the
    line. Because the „bleeder valves‟ which were to discharge the water were choked
    with solid chemical compounds, the excess water backed up in this bleeder
    connection and built up sufficient pressure to flow past the RVVH isolation valve.
    Plant logs indicated that this valve was closed but a 1982 safety audit conducted



                                                                                      42
    by Union Carbide expressly warned Union Carbide officials in America that the
    "MIC shut-off valves routinely leak."
54. Once water entered the RVVH, it would have accumulated until the point that it
    reached the RVVH line‟s maximum height of 20 feet and then begun draining
    back into the system via gravity flow. This in itself could not have led to the entry
    of water into tank 610 since the relief valve on the RVVH would have stopped the
    flow of water and a second rupture disk, which was found to be intact when it was
    checked after the Disaster, would also have blocked any entry route for water into
    tank 610. The water did, however, have an alternative entry route into the tank due
    to the installation of a "jumper" or shunt line joining the RVVH and the PVH
    lines. This design modification was approved by Union Carbide engineers in the
    United States sometime in May of 1983, a year before the Disaster.
55. The final entry barrier to prevent water from entering into tank 610 consisted of
    the pressure valve at the entrance to tank 610 which was known to be faulty. The
    valve was designed primarily to keep the MIC inside the tank under pressure. But,
    as the Company accepts, the valve had been leaking and malfunctioning since
    October 22, 1984 when attempts were made to pressurize the tank. The day before
    the accident, operators had tried to increase the pressure in the tank, but the tank's
    contents again leaked through the pressure valve. In fact, Union Carbide's
    investigating team conceded in its March 1985 report that the toxic gases released
    from tank 610 escaped through precisely this pressure valve and that this "escape
    route (through the safety valve) could also have provided a route of entry for
    water."
56. Union Carbide has publicly conceded that the leak and the subsequent explosion
    were produced by the introduction of water into MIC storage tank number 610.
    About forty tons of MIC stored in tank number 610 then catalyzed violently with
    the water in an exothermic reaction which cauterized the storage tank, rupturing
    the concrete casing of the tank above ground and releasing approximately twenty
    tons of the deadly gas into the atmosphere. Newly discovered evidence obtained
    by the Plaintiffs which was filed by the prosecution in the criminal case against
    the Indian managers of UCIL establishes that one of the senior officials at UCIL,
    J. Mukund, admitted to the Collector and District Magistrate of Bhopal on the
    night of the Disaster itself that the Bhopal facility‟s safety features were incapable
    of handling the magnitude of the release which had occurred.
57. The exothermic „runaway reaction‟ which took place in tank number 610 was
    extraordinarily rapid. The process must have begun sometime around 10:00 p.m.
    when the pressure in tank number 610 was noted to be 2 pounds per square inch
    ("psi"). Around 11:00 p.m., field operators detected that MIC was leaking into the
    atmosphere and the control room operator noticed a pressure rise in tank 610 from
    2 psi to 10 psi. Around 12:15 a.m., field operators reported that a mixture of MIC
    and water continued to leak from somewhere along the RVVH line to their
    supervisors. After determining what they thought to be the location of the leak,
    supervisors terminated the water-washing exercise and ordered a water spray onto
    the leaking point.
58. Between 12:15 a.m. and 12:30 a.m., the pressure reading on the tank reached 30
    psi and, within moments, pressure exceeded the scale at 55 psi. At or about 12:30


                                                                                       43
    a.m., the concrete casing of tank 610 split due to expansion of the tank walls
    caused by internal pressure and both the rupture disk and the safety valve
    unseated. The bulk of the contents of tank 610 were then released through the
    RVVH and VGS lines into the night atmosphere, causing mayhem in the
    surrounding residential colonies. Around 12:50 a.m., the factory alarm sounded,
    alerting workers to a hazardous leak. No warning was given to the thousands
    living near the plant because, sometime in 1982, Union Carbide had decided to
    disconnect its public siren from the factory alarm.
59. Independent research conducted by the Center for Scientific and Industrial
    Research ("CSIR") in India immediately after the Disaster constitutes the most
    authoritative, scientific explanation of the precise nature of the "runaway reaction"
    which took place in tank 610 as well as the extraordinary speed of the reaction. In
    a comprehensive report entitled "Report on Scientific Studies On The Factors
    Related To Bhopal Toxic Gas Leakage" published in December 1985, technical
    experts and scientists of CSIR determined from chemical analyses of the residue
    of tank 610 the precise causes of the Bhopal Disaster which deeply implicate
    Union Carbide for its flawed design of the UCIL plant as well as its reckless
    disregard in operating the facility. This scientific study determined that the entry
    of water alone could not have resulted in the type of runaway reaction which
    occurred, the temperatures reached within the storage tank, the speed of the
    reaction or the chemical by-products found in the residue of the tank. Rather, the
    report concludes that two reactions actually took place within storage tank 610.
    The first was the reaction of MIC with itself, catalyzed by metallic contaminants
    from the carbon steel lines attached to the tank which would have had free entry
    into the tank since it had failed to hold pressure from October 22, 1984 until the
    day of the Disaster. The second reaction occurred due to the entry of water which
    acted as an initiator, supplying heat for the dominant reaction of MIC with itself:
    "The very rapid explosive rise in temperature and pressure in the tank 610, implies
    conditions for a run-away trimerisation reaction already existed. Ingress of water
    and reaction with MIC would generate carbon dioxide and cause mixing. The
    storage tank conditions would then equal those in a well mixed reactor, supplied
    with heat." Based on this analysis, the report found that "[t]he quantum of leakage
    is related not to the quantum of water but to the amount of MIC stored in a single
    container."
60. The report concludes emphatically that Union Carbide‟s policies of reckless
    disregard in the design and operation of the UCIL plant were the key determinants
    in the causation of the Bhopal Disaster: "In retrospect, it appears the factors that
    led to the toxic gas leakage and its heavy toll existed in the unique properties of
    very high reactivity, volatility and inhalation toxicity of MIC. The needless
    storage of large quantities of the material in very large size containers for
    inordinately long periods as well as insufficient caution in design, choice of
    materials of construction and in provision of measuring and alarm instruments,
    together with the inadequate controls on systems of storage and on quality of
    stored materials as well as lack of necessary facilities for quick effective disposal
    of material exhibiting instability, led to the accident."



                                                                                      44
                           Union Carbide‟s "Sabotage" Theory

61. Union Carbide‟s own theory of what it calls the "Bhopal sabotage Disaster" was
    based on its insistence, from the outset, that the cause of the catastrophe "could
    only have been" sabotage. On March 20, 1985, Union Carbide held a press
    conference at its headquarters to release its own report on the Bhopal Disaster
    which stated that water could have been introduced "inadvertently or deliberately"
    into tank 610 at the Bhopal facility. Defendant Warren Anderson then told
    reporters that a disgruntled employee might have deliberately connected a water
    line to the tank. Subsequently, Union Carbide officials and lawyers suggested that
    a Sikh terrorist group called "Black June" could have been responsible for the
    catastrophe in Bhopal.
62. In response to a question from the Times of London, on August 8, 1986, Union
    Carbide stated for the first time that the Bhopal Disaster was "a deliberate act." On
    November 21, 1986, Union Carbide‟s officials stated that they would divulge the
    name of the disgruntled employee who allegedly caused the Disaster at the
    appropriate time in court. On July 2, 1987, at a press briefing in Bombay, Union
    Carbide presented its „evidence‟ of the sabotage theory to the media. On May 10,
    1988, Union Carbide released the results of an investigation it had commissioned
    from Arthur D. Little, Inc. which purportedly confirmed "with virtual certainty"
    its sabotage theory. To date, Union Carbide has never divulged the name of the
    alleged saboteur.
63. Union Carbide‟s „sabotage‟ theory posits that a disgruntled operator entered the
    MIC unit during the workers‟ tea break, disconnected the pressure indicator on
    tank 610 and attached a water hose to the opening. Publicly, Union Carbide
    continues to maintain that an unidentified saboteur caused the Bhopal Disaster
    despite overwhelming evidence that its own policies of reckless disregard were
    responsible. Yet, the Defendants‟ account flatly contradicts the testimony of
    Jackson Browning, Union Carbide‟s former Vice-President for Health Safety and
    Environmental Affairs, who testified before Congress "that the MIC tank line
    fittings are color-coded and that the water line couplings are incompatible with the
    gas line couplings that go into the tank."
64. Furthermore, the operational safety manual of UCIL in 1978 clearly indicated
    that, at 20 degrees Celsius, the temperature of the MIC in storage tank 610, the
    "induction period" required for the exothermic reaction with water alone requires
    at least 23 hours to take effect. When questioned on the glaring inconsistency in
    this version of events by journalists from The Gaurdian (London), Union
    Carbide‟s response was reported in an article dated August 20, 1998 as follows:

   The company has conducted an investigation whose results, it says, "positively
   confirm a reaction time consistent with entry of the water . . . two hours before the
   safety valve unseated." But that is as far as the company goes. It has never

   published any findings from this research, not in the paper to the Institute of

   Chemical Engineers nor in the scientific literature, which would have allowed

                                                                                      45
               independent researchers to verify the claims.

           65. Even if these allegations of sabotage were true, which Plaintiffs deny, Defendant
               Warren Anderson has affirmatively stated, in a March 1985 press conference, that
               it was Union Carbide‟s responsibility to take such precautions as necessary to
               prevent any potential act of sabotage turning into a catastrophe of historic
               proportions. In response to press inquiries regarding his suggestion of sabotage at
               the Bhopal plant, Mr. Anderson stated:

               Well, that‟s always a potential and you have to worry about it. That‟s why you
               need the redundancy… Built into the safety system are a whole series of
               capabilities that can take care of whatever inadvertent action or commission has
               taken place so you‟re not all dependent on just one item to either make it safe or
               make it unsafe.

           66. However, the most telling refutation of the sabotage theory is the fact that Union
               Carbide‟s co-accused in the criminal case have abandoned it. According to an
               article which appeared in The Pioneer newspaper on February 27, 1993, Indian
               managers and officials of UCIL, whose prosecution on charges of culpable
               homicide is presently continuing, have admitted that the water-washing scenario,
               instead of sabotage, caused the Disaster. According to this article, defense counsel
               for the accused informed the Bhopal District Court "that the water did indeed
               enter tank 610 through the Relief Valve Vent Header (RVVH) as a consequence
               of water washing being undertaken by plant personnel instructed to do so by their
               superiors."
           67. Union Carbide has not only misrepresented the scientific evidence of its
               responsibility for perpetrating the worst peacetime environmental catastrophe in
               history, but has continuously attempted to mischaracterize its relationship with its
               Indian affiliate, UCIL, as an „arms-length‟ or contractual provider of technology.
               Not only was UCIL an alter ego or agent of Union Carbide, but the evidence
               demonstrates that Union Carbide exercised complete control over UCIL as part of
               its operation as a multinational enterprise. cxxiv



Primary Source Response

       This is an excerpt from the transcript of the class action complaint which is an on-going

affair in New York. This transcript details the plaintiffs, the defendants and the charges. There

are seven individual plaintiffs as well as several activist survivor groups who are charging Union

Carbide and Warren Anderson. The case has been fairly controversial because it has been

dismissed twice; the case is now waiting for their second appeal. The actions committed by the


                                                                                                    46
defendants go against several laws, agreements, treaties and resolutions such as the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, etc. It

also lists the class action allegations and offers factual background behind the disaster. This

information was very useful in the legal section of the research report and gives details about this

current American trial.


Legal Expert

       Satinath Sarangi lives and works in Bhopal India at the Sambhavna Clinic, a medical

clinic designed for victims of the Bhopal disaster specializing in free, long-term health carecxxv.

Mr. Sarangi was enrolled for his PhD in Metallurgical Engineering until he dropped out in 1984

to help the people in Bhopal and he has been there ever sincecxxvi. He has founded and is a part of

numerous advocacy groups for the survivors and has been pursuing justice since December 3rd of

1984. He has been present at all of the legal proceedings in the last 22 years and written many

reports and publications on the disaster and its medical effectscxxvii. He has also travelled all over

the word giving lectures and raising awareness to this forgotten tragedy.


   1. Were you involved in any of the trials?
          a. I represent one of the three organizations that are assisting the
              prosecution (central bureau of investigation) in the criminal case
              against union carbide and its subsidiaries and officials. So I have
              been present in all the hearings of the criminal case in the last 22
              years.
   2. Union Carbide Officials and Warren Anderson failed to show up for their scheduled court
      dates even after numerous summons. Is this correct?
          a. Yes, this is correct. Warren Anderson was arrested on December 7, 1984
              and then allowed to leave the country (India) after he signed on a
              bail bond agreeing to present himself when the court wanted him to
              face trial. However since then he has never appeared in court despite
              repeated summons. Similar is the story of union carbide corporation.
              Repeated summons were sent to authorized representative of union


                                                                                                    47
             carbide corp. (used to be secretary of the company John McDonald) but
             these have always been ignored.
3.   How did Union Carbide continue to delay the proceedings?
         a. In the criminal proceedings union carbide caused delay by raising
             baseless allegations of harassment by prosecution.
4.   The courts took the view in 1996 that the disaster that had killed thousands and injured
     hundreds of thousands was an “act of God for which no human being was responsible.”
     How could the courts have gotten away with that reasoning?
         a. The courts got away because the prosecution (the cbi) did not do
             anything to challenge the court. and the reason the prosecution did
             not challenge was that the application for dilution of charges was
             brought before the supreme court by Keshub Mahindra who was the
             chairman of union carbide India limited and 30 other Indian
             corporations.
5.   In your opinion, what is the level of corruption in the police, government and judicial
     system involving Bhopal?
         a. It has been very high. In 1984 the chief minister of the state had
             taken money from union carbide for a charity that he ran. Many
             relatives of senior govt officials were given employment in union
             carbide. The Supreme Court judge who sanctioned the collusive
             settlement of 1989 was made a member of the international court of
             justice (1 million $s a year) through union carbide‟s efforts.
6.   How could the charges have been dropped from culpable homicide (punishable to ten
     years in prison) to death due to negligence (punishable to two years in prison or fines)?
     Thousands died and hundreds of thousands are permanently injured, I can‟t grasp how
     this kind of injustice has been overlooked for so many years.
         a. The charges were diluted by a Supreme Court judge named amahmadi on
             September 13, 1996. 0f course it was patently unjust to dilute the
             charges particularly because the judge did not look on to the facts of
             the case at all. The same judge also committed another injustice in
             1994 when he allowed union carbide to sell off its confiscated shares.
             As a reward the judge was made the chairman (which he continues to be)
             of the Bhopal memorial hospital trust after his retirement.
             Charges against union carbide and Anderson were not diluted because
             they were still absconding.
7.   Where is Warren Anderson now? Was he ever convicted of anything or punished in
     anyway?
         a. He lives in the USA, mostly on Long Island in New York. Plays golf, throws
             parties. He has never been convicted or punished.



                                                                                                 48
8. Are criminal proceedings still occurring? All the information that I have found usually
    doesn‟t date later than 2002. What is going on with Dow Chemicals now? Are they still
    being held legally responsible for the disaster?
        a. Criminal proceedings against Indian subsidiary (ucil) and Indian
            officials are continuing. In fact a verdict is awaited on June 7.
        b. Yes, Dow chemical is still being held legally liable not for the
            disaster but for the contamination of soil and ground water.
9. What kinds of attempts have there been to try to clean up the area? How could Union
    Carbide get away with abandoning the factory and leaving all of that chemical waste and
    pollution?
        a. Hardly anything has been done. In June 2005 some 380 tonnes of waste
            was gathered from different parts of the factory and kept in a
            warehouse within the factory. However, thousands of tons of waste
            still lie strewn and half buried inside the factory and thousands of
            tones lie buried in the solar pond landfill. Union carbide violated
            the law and the lease conditions (the land had been taken on lease by
            the company with the guarantee that it would be returned in its
            original condition.) when it upped and left.
10. How was Union Carbide aware of the safety implications of the Bhopal Plant? Did they
    make any effort to try to fix the problem?
        a. Union Carbide, USA and its managing committee knew in 1972 (when the
            proposal for methyl isocyanate plant in Bhopal was approved) that the
            technology being sent to Bhopal was “untested” and that there would be
            contamination of soil and ground water die to surface disposal of wastes.
            UCC, USA and Anderson were informed of the hospitalization of workers
            due to accidents and exposures in the factory and death of Mohammed
            Ashraf in December 1981.
            In May 1982 UCC, USA sent a team from Charleston, West Virginia to do
            a safety audit of the Bhopal factory. The team identified 30 major
            hazard spots. However these were not attended to as this would cost
            money and the corporation had imposed an “economy drive” Same year the
            refrigeration plant (an essential part of the safety system) was
            closed down to save 70 $s a day UCC, USA did nothing to ensure that
            refrigeration system was in place.
            In 1989 union carbide‟s scientists found that the ground water was
            extremely toxic. This information was suppressed.
11. How could this tragedy have been avoided?
                  i. The tragedy could have been avoided by :
                      a. Not producing such hazardous pesticides at all.
                      b. Producing pesticides through safer technology.


                                                                                         49
                    c. Proper design of the plant.
                    d. Regular inspection of factory by government officials
                    e. Safer location of factory
                    f. Proper design including safety system designed for “worst case
                    scenario”
                    g. Proper training of workers
12. What were the medical ramifications of the poisoning? How did it affect people? I‟ve
    read different statistics on the number of those affected, in your opinion how many
    people were poisoned? How many people continue to be affected by the disaster?
        a. More than half a million people were exposed. 572, 000 people have been paid
            compensation for injuries caused by exposure.
            Over 100, 000 exposed people are suffering chronic illnesses today
            Tens of thousands of children have been born to gas exposed parents
            with development disorders.
            Over 30, 000 have been exposed to contaminated ground water. 20, 000
            continue to drink poisoned water.
            According to medical research carried out by the Indian council of
            medical research (ICMR) the gases entered the lungs and the toxins
            crossed the lung barrier to go in to the blood stream and the poisons
            went all over the body and caused damaged to various organs and
            systems.
            I am sending a separate paper on the health impact of toxic exposure.
13. How has life changed in Bhopal? What were the social and psychological implications of
    such a tragedy? How were the people helped by the government? Did they find work?
        a. Majority of the people exposed (more than 70 %) earned their livelihood and
            supported their families through hard physical labour. Thousands of them were
            unable to carry on with their work because they were sick from the gas. Many
            were forced to work because their families were hungry and this made their health
            condition worse. The government made big plans and spent a lot of money to give
            people jobs but these plans were not implemented. Work sheds where 10, 000
            survivors were supposed to be given jobs (in accordance with their health
            condition) were constructed at great cost but these were then handed over to a
            paramilitary force to be used as barracks. The loss of the ability to earn a
            livelihood and the helplessness to do anything about the deteriorating condition of
            the family was a big shock for many people who lost their mental balance.
            Several committed suicide.
14. What are the medical effects today? How have they changed?
                 i. Today we have the following categories of people who are sick from
                    carbide‟s poisons.
                    a. those directly exposed to toxic gases in 1984 and suffering from


                                                                                            50
                    chronic ailments of lungs, eyes, brain, immune system, reproductive
                    system, musculoskeletal system and others
                    b. those with complications of injury caused by gas such as
                    tuberculosis which is much more prevalent in the gas affected because
                    of their loss of immunity
                    c. children of gas exposed (born after the disaster) with a range of
                    health problems and development disorders.
                    d. Those exposed to contaminated ground water with skin, lung, liver,
                    kidney and other organ damages
                    e. People with exposure to toxic gases and / or contaminated ground
                    water with cancers of the lungs, oesophagus, bladder, cervix and
                    others.
15. How many people are affected by the after effects today? I know that there are birth
    defects are these common?
        a. Please see above for the answer to the first question. Birth defects are way more
            common in a number of the communities affected by ground water contamination.
            We are currently carrying out a study covering 7000 families in communities with
            contaminated ground water, 7000 families in communities exposed to toxic gases
            in 1984 and 7000 families who are neither exposed to toxic gases nor
            contaminated ground water. At the end of this study which is likely to take
            another year we will know how many excess birth defects are occurring.
16. Can you tell me about Sambhavna Clinic? How many people do you help?
        a. We have over 23, 500 persons (survivors of gas disaster and people with exposure
            to contaminated ground water and their children) who are registered for medical
            care and this list is growing. Every day we have between 150 and 180 people
            visiting our clinic for medical care. I am attaching a short write up on Sambhavna.
17. There is also a lot of controversy about Dow Chemicals and their legal liability since
    merging with Union Carbide. Can you give me a general overview of this controversy
    and the legal process involved?
        a. Dow chemical announced their intention to merge with union carbide in 1999.
            Survivor‟s organizations then informed the CEO of Dow Chemical Mr William
            Stavropoulos that it they take over union carbide Dow will take over its Bhopal
            related liabilities. Dow chemical went ahead and in February 2001 took over
            union carbide. Union carbide was liable for the toxic contamination (as per the
            principle of “polluter pays”) because UCC, USA had designed the waste disposal
            system in the Bhopal plant and was aware of the toxic contamination as early as
            1981.T as 100 % owner of Union Carbide chemical is liable for the toxic
            contamination in Bhopal according to the principle of “successor liability”. This is
            the view of the survivor‟s organizations and the Indian government. In 2005 the
            Indian government made an application before the state high court asking for 22


                                                                                             51
            million $s from Dow chemical as advance for clean up. In response Dow
            chemical‟s lawyer told the court that because it is an American corporation it was
            not under the jurisdiction of the Indian court. Since 1999 residents of
            communities with ground water contamination have filed a case in the US federal
            court in New York. In this Bhopal residents are seeking clean up costs and
            compensation for health and property damage and funds for monitoring of health
            effects. This case is still ongoing.
18. I‟ve also read that Union Carbide dumped large quantities of chemicals such as Temic,
    Sevin and methylene chloride over and under the ground in Nagar in 1994. Was this over
    a long period of time? Was this before or after the chemical leak? If it was before was
    there any medical symptoms suggesting beforehand that the people were being poisoned?
        a. Union Carbide started dumping hazardous wastes right from the time they started
            operating in 1971. They used to dump these wastes in about 20 spots within the
            factory premises and also right outside the factory walls. In 1977 they built three
            solar evaporation ponds in an area of 14 hectares. From then on much of the waste
            effluent was dumped in to these ponds. The ponds used to overflow every year
            during the rains flooding neighbouring farms and causing much damage. In 1981
            Bhopal plant officials sent telexes to the Danbury, Connecticut head office of
            union carbide seeking help as the solar ponds had started leaking. In 1989 union
            Carbide‟s scientists found that the ground water was highly toxic. In 1996 union
            carbide dumped the toxic sludge from two ponds in to the third pond and covered
            it up with soil and left. Before the disaster in 1984 the only incidents due to
            contamination of ground water were death of cattle in the neighbouring farms. At
            that time union carbide hushed up the matter by paying compensation (out of
            court) to the farmers. The first time the people of Bhopal got to know about
            contamination was after our group (Bhopal group for information and action) got
            samples of water and soil tested at a laboratory in Boston in 1990. The next year
            state government‟s laboratory also reported high degree of contamination.
19. How many industrial accidents have there been with Union Carbide? Why is the
    government allowing them to get away with this?
        a. The first part of the question is not clear to me. The answer to the second part is
            that both union carbide and Dow chemical are very close to the US government
            because they are very close to the pentagon. They have always been. Both
            produced war gases for the world wars and both played significant roles in
            building the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Additionally
            Dow chemical supplied Agent Orange used during the invasion of Vietnam. The
            US government (mainly because of its military clout) has a lot of power over the
            Indian government and can tell the government to go soft against these
            corporations. Also union carbide and Dow are known to have paid huge bribes to
            Indian officials (Dow chemical had to pay 350 thousand $s to the SEC as fine for


                                                                                            52
            bribing Indian officials) which could also be a big reason for govt favouring the
            corporations.
20. What is the government‟s role not only in Bhopal but in other Union Carbide‟s industrial
    accidents and facilities? How did they contribute to the disaster and what was their initial
    response? How has that response changed over the years?
        a. Government‟s role before, during and after the disaster has been always to lend
            support to the corporations and help them in evading legal liabilities. The
            government failed to stop hazardous technology entering the country and the
            hazardous location of the factory. Its factory inspectors failed to direct corrective
            action with regard to hazards present in the factory, retrenchment of workers, lack
            of safety training etc. the government paid no heed to the worker‟s representations
            on unsafe work conditions.
            After the disaster the govt continued to help the corporation by
            bringing down the number of dead and minimizing the health damage
            caused to the people (by not having proper system of injury
            assessment). It did not try hard to get union carbide and Anderson
            [who are both absconding from Indian courts] to face trial in India.
            In 1989 the government made a settlement with union carbide without
            consulting the victims who it represented and let the corporation walk
            away by just paying 470 million dollars.
            The response of the Indian government has remained consistently soft
            towards the corporations. It turns a blind eye to union carbide
            selling its technology in India while it remains absconding.
21. How many legal suits have there been not only in India but in the United States as well?
        a. there are ongoing legal actions in the Bhopal district court Madhya Pradesh state
            high court supreme court of India southern district federal court in New York
22. What happened to Warren Anderson? Is he still held accountable? Have any corporate
    laws changed because of Bhopal and Carbide‟s evasion of corporate responsibility?
        a. Warren Anderson lives at three addresses in USA – Hamptons, Long island, near
            New York, Vero beach in Florida and one in Connecticut. he is still accountable
            and is charged with manslaughter, grievous assault, assault, poisoning and killing
            of animals and other offences .the Indian government sought the help of the us
            state and justice departments in bringing Anderson to trial in an Indian court.
            following this many corporate executives and business associations in the USA
            wrote to the state and justice departments saying Anderson should not be sent to
            India to face criminal charges eventually the us government declined to help to
            bring Anderson to trial.
23. As an American company weren‟t they liable to be charged in the US as well? There are
    international humanitarian laws which were violated, why was no international action
    ever taken?


                                                                                              53
            a. The only international action is the case ongoing (since 1999) in New York. we
                went to the international court of justice and were told that it wasn‟t the proper
                forum (it only dealt with matters between governments of different countries)
   24. I read one of your papers with Barbara Dinham “The Bhopal Gas Tragedy 1984 and the
       Evasion of Corporate Responsibility.” Who was the disgruntled employee that Union
       Carbide tried to place the blame on and what was his reaction to that?
            a. Union Carbide has never mentioned the name of the “disgruntled
                employee” but all indications are that they meant mr. mohan lal verma,
                a mild mannered worker who now works with the government. For the
                first few days (after union carbide started on this propaganda) he
                was scared that union carbide will have him killed (through hired
                killers in the guise of angry survivors) so that he cannot defend
                himself and came and stayed with us for security. He has always been
                confident that union carbide‟s sabotage story will not survive close
                scrutiny.
   25. Are the legal processes still going on with Warren Anderson and Union Carbide?
            a. Yes, union carbide and Anderson remain criminally charged and the criminal case
                against them lies pending. Both are also respondents in the case in New York.
   26. I fail to understand how the Indian government and judicial system could take such little
       interest in the protection of the Bhopal victims and the persecution of those responsible.
       Do you have any insight or ideas about the government and Carbide‟s financial relations,
       etc which could have caused their failure to uphold corporate responsibility?
            a. The main reason is that majority of the victims are poor and without connections
                to people in power. For the people in power (high govt officials, most top judges,
                business leaders etc) the lives of people such as majority victims are expendable.
                And these lives can be sacrificed for progress (industrialization).cxxviii

Legal Expert Response

       Mr. Sarangi is a highly intelligent and knowledgeable source of information regarding the

Bhopal disaster and the legal and medical implications which have continued to this day. He

answered and confirmed both basic questions about the disaster as well as specific health and

legal related ones. For example, he mentioned that he has been present at all of the legal hearings

over the last 22 years and that a new verdict is awaited for June 7th, 2010. He also offered a lot of

information that would not be public knowledge nor would it be available over the internet, such

as the name of the disgruntled employee that Union Carbide attempted to blame for sabotage


                                                                                                  54
over the incident. The man‟s name was Mr. Mohan lal Verma who believed that Union Carbide

was actually going to try to kill him so that we would not be able to testify. The information he

offered was used extensively throughout the report emphasizing information that is not available

through other resources such as the contamination, legal history, and is a personal account of

someone who lives in Bhopal and interacts with the survivors and victims‟ on a daily basis.

However, it can be concluded that his input and proof about the corruption involved throughout

the legal proceedings is the most valuable and used piece of information throughout the report.

The corruption committed by the police, the government, the United States and most

importantly, the Supreme Court Judge in India who now makes $1 million a year is information

that would not have been available anywhere else.


       Another legal expert that has contributed is a medical source, Dr. Daya Varma from

McGill University, Department of Pharmacology and Therapeutics and Department of Medicine.

He answered questions regarding the gas Methyl Isocyanate, as well as the conspiracy theory

about cyanide poisoning. He attached his latest publication about Methyl Isocyanate in an email

and has recently mailed a few other articles that are not used within this report.




________________________________

> > From: Aleksandra Whistle [aleks_whistle@hotmail.com]

> > Sent: May 28, 2010 1:50 PM

> > To: Daya Varma, Dr.

> > Subject: Bhopal Question


                                                                                                    55
>>

> > Dear Mr. Varma,

>>

> > My name is Aleksandra Whistle and I am a grade 12 student in Ontario. For my law class I

chose to write a research report on the Bhopal Disaster in an effort to bring awareness to the

continuing tragedy. I am already in contact with Mr. Sarangi who has agreed to be an expert on

the case. I was hoping you might be able to give me some details about the medical effects of the

poison on the residents of Bhopal at the time of the tragedy and if you know, how those effects

have either continued or changed over the years. Please return my email, even if you are unable

to do it, as soon as possible I would really appreciate it.

>>

> > Thanks so much,

> > Aleks Whistle

> > From: daya.varma@mcgill.ca

> > To: aleks_whistle@hotmail.com

> > Date: Fri, 28 May 2010 16:53:15 -0400

> > Subject: RE: Bhopal Question



> > Dear Aleks:

> > Soon after the disaster I wrote an article "Anatomy of the methyl isocyanate leak in Bhopal'.

It was published in "Hazard Assessment of Chemicals" Washington: Hemisphere, 1987; edited

by J. Saxena. Of course the article was sent in 1985. It tells technical and political part as well as

immediate health effects. If you cannot get hold of it easily, send me your postal address and I



                                                                                                    56
will mail a xerox copy.

> > I am also attaching the latest review we wrote [ref. Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas, by

Daya R. Varma and Shree Mulay, In Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents"

edited by Rmesh C. Gupta; San Diego: Elsevier293-312]

> > Further, you should ask specific questions and if I have an answer I will provide it.

> > Daya

> From: Aleksandra Whistle [aleks_whistle@hotmail.com]

> Sent: May 29, 2010 10:59 AM

> To: Daya Varma, Dr.

> Subject: RE: Bhopal Question

>

> Hi again,

> Thank you for returning my email so quickly. I do have a specific question for you. Was there

cyanide poisoning, if so how is that related to methyl isocyanate?

> Please return my email as soon as possible,

> Thanks so much

> Aleks



> From: daya.varma@mcgill.ca

> To: aleks_whistle@hotmail.com

> Date: Sat, 29 May 2010 12:09:42 -0400

> Subject: RE: Bhopal Question

>



                                                                                              57
> The ms I sent you deals with this question. When I have your postal address I will mail my

first review and a one-page letter published in Lancet, whic only deals with cyanide controvery.

>

> My very define answer is that no harm in Bhopal can be attributed to cyanide.

>

> It is the myth about cyanide that caught the imagination of Indians (and some non-Indians).

Cyanide is not poisonous enough to have killed anyone if all of methyl isocyanate got converted

into cyanide. Cyanide never produces delayed death; if it does not kill in three to four hours, it

cannot kill. If it was cyanide, everyone who had to die should have died by the morning of

December 3; which was not the case. Bhopal deaths were like 2003 SARS of Toronto.

> Daya



From: Aleksandra Whistle [aleks_whistle@hotmail.com]

Sent: May 29, 2010 3:18 PM

To: Daya Varma, Dr.

Subject: RE: Bhopal Question



Thank you I did read that in your article after I emailed you. My address is

154 King Lane

Hampton, ON

Canada

L0B 1J0cxxix




                                                                                                     58
Thank you so much. I know you deal mostly with the medical aspect of it but do you know what

the international implications of the disaster were? Different laws that were established in

relation to it such as environmental and corporate laws?

________________________________



Legal Expert Response

        Mr. Varma was extremely helpful in understanding the components and health effects of

methyl isocyanate. The publication he emailed also detailed the events of December 2nd and 3rd

of 1984 which filled in some of the gaps regarding how the water entered the storage tank. His

answer was during a routine cleaning.



The Sambhavna Clinic


        “The Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust run by a group of eminent doctors, scientists,

writers and social workers who have been involved with various aspects of the Union Carbide

disaster ever since its occurrence in December 1984.cxxx” The disaster did not end on December

23rd, 1984 but has continued to this day. An estimated 120 000-150 0000 survivors are still

chronically illcxxxi and are poisoning the new generations. With the corporation and government

abandonment the Sambhavna Clinic remains one of the only working medical clinics designed

for long term care of victims. They believe in healing through generating compassion and

awareness and providing a safe environment to its patients. The clinic “stands in about one acre of

medicinal herb garden in the heart of the gas-affected area of Bhopal, half a kilometre from the disused

Union Carbide factory and directly south of JP Nagar, the worst-hit neighbourhood.cxxxii”




                                                                                                           59
Conclusion


        The Bhopal Disaster is undoubtedly one of history‟s greatest tragedies not only because of the

death toll but the deliberate apathy, and ignorance that has become associated with it. The refusal to

accept responsibility and the international and judicial attitudes attributed to this case are just as criminal

as Union Carbide and those responsible. The Government of India did nothing to prevent it, not did they

make it a priority to value the lives that were lost and the lives that continue to be sacrificed in the name

of industrialization. They settled for a mediocre amount which was not nearly enough to be fairly and

justly allocated. Furthermore they refused to punish those responsible for the deaths of thousands and the

maiming of hundreds of thousands, including the unborn. They turned their heads from obvious

corruption specifically that of the Supreme Court Judge and politely „forgot‟ about those left behind. They

forgot about the children who couldn‟t find their families because they were burned in a mass cremation

without proper documentation and identification taking place. Or the pregnant mothers who were

immediately aborted because of the gas and the children whose lives are ruined from chemical

consumption. They have forgotten about the red sign next to the well warning of the waters toxicity but

the residents drinking out of their tar smelling glasses anyway because they do not have any other choice.

This is the reality of the people of Bhopal who cannot afford long term health care and have been ignored

for too long. The disaster may have begun at 11pm on December 2nd, 1984 but it has yet to end; the

abandoned plant is still leaching those toxic chemicals that have murdered so many and the corporations

are still refusing to clean up their own mess. In Bhopal no words are necessary to describe the night of

December 2nd and 3rd of 1984; to everyone it is simply referred to as “that night”; the night which has

changed every other night since.




                                                                                                             60
Work Cited


i
   Broughton, Edward. "The Bhopal Disaster and It's Aftermath." Environmental Health: a Global Access
Science Source 4:6 (2005): 1-6. Web. 28 May 2010. http://www.ehjournal.net/content/pdf/1476-069X-4-6.pdf
ii
    Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20
iii
    Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
iv
    Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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v
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vi
    Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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vii
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viii
     Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
ix
    Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
x
    Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xi
    Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xii
     Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xiii
     What Happened in Bhopal? The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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xiv
     What Happened in Bhopal? The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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xv
     What Happened in Bhopal? The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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xvii
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xviii
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xix
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xxxx
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xxi
     What Happened in Bhopal? The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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xxii
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xxvi
    Methyl Isocyanate. Illinois Department of Public Health, Unknown. Web. 27 May 2010.
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xxvii
       Methyl Isocyanate. Illinois Department of Public Health, Unknown. Web. 27 May 2010.
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xxviii
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      Varma, Daya R. Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas. Montreal, CA: McGill U Department of
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xxxi
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xxxii
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xxxiii
        Varma, Daya R. Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas. Montreal, CA: McGill U Department of
Pharmacology, 2000. Print.
xxxiv
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xxxv
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xxxvi
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xxxvii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xxxviii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
xxxix
        Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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xl
    Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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xli
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Responsibility." Environment and Urbanization 14.1 (2002): 89-99. Print.
xlii
      Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
xliii
      Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
xliv
      Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
xlv
      Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
xlvi
      Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
xlvii
       Dinham, Barbara, and Sarangi Satinath "The Bhopal Gas Tragedy 1984 To? the Evasion of Corporate
Responsibility." Environment and Urbanization 14.1 (2002): 89-99. Print.
xlviii
       Dinham, Barbara, and Sarangi Satinath "The Bhopal Gas Tragedy 1984 To? the Evasion of Corporate
Responsibility." Environment and Urbanization 14.1 (2002): 89-99. Print.
xlix
      Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
l
   Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
li
   Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
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lii
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liii
     Polluter Pays Principle. The Encyclopedia of Earth, 1969. Web. 29 May 2010.
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liv
     Polluter Pays Principle. The Encyclopedia of Earth, 1969. Web. 29 May 2010.
http://www.eoearth.org/article/polluter_pays_principle
lv
     Union Carbide's Factory in Bhopal: Still a Potential Killer. The International Campaign for Justice in
Bhopal, 2002. Web. 25 May 2010. http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20
lvilvi
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lvii
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lviii
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lix
     Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lx
     Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxi
     Union Carbide's Factory in Bhopal: Still a Potential Killer. The International Campaign for Justice in
Bhopal, 2002. Web. 25 May 2010. http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20
lxii
      Union Carbide's Factory in Bhopal: Still a Potential Killer. The International Campaign for Justice in
Bhopal, 2002. Web. 25 May 2010. http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20
lxiii
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
lxiv
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxv
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxvi
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxvii
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxviii
       Bhopal Timeline. Students for Bhopal, 2009. Web. 25 May 2010.
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lxix
      Bhopal Timeline. Students for Bhopal, 2009. Web. 25 May 2010.
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lxx
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxi
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxii
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxiii
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxiv
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxv
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxvi
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxvii
        Union Carbide, . Chronology. Bhopal Information Centre,
2001. Web. 25 May 2010. http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm
lxxviii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxix
       Dinham, Barbara, and Sarangi Satinath "The Bhopal Gas Tragedy 1984 To? the Evasion of Corporate
Responsibility." Environment and Urbanization 14.1 (2002): 89-99. Print.
lxxx
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxi
       Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxiii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxiv
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxv
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxvi
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
lxxxvii
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lxxxviii
         Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.

                                                                                                                  63
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm
lxxxix
       Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm

xc
     Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm
xci
     Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm
xcii
      Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm
xciii
      Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm
xciv
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
xcv
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
xcvi
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
xcvii
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
xcviii
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
xcix
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
c
   United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
ci
    United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cii
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
ciii
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
civ
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cv
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cvi
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cvii
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cviii
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cix
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cx
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxi
     United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html

                                                                                                          64
cxii
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxiii
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxiv
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxv
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxvi
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxvii
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxviii
        United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxix
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxx
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxxi
      United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxxii
       Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm
cxxiii
       Varma, Daya R. Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas. Montreal, CA: McGill U Department of
Pharmacology, 2000. Print.
cxxiv
       United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May 2010.
            http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
cxxv
      Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
cxxvi
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
cxxvii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
cxxviii
        Sarangi Satinath. June 29th, 2010
cxxix
      Varma, Dr. Daya. McGill University. June 29th, 2010
cxxx
      Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20
cxxxi
        Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20
cxxxii
        Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20




                                                                                                           65
Bibliography

Bhopal Timeline. Students for Bhopal, 2009. Web. 25 May 2010.
http://www.studentsforbhopal.org/node/56

Broughton, Edward. "The Bhopal Disaster and It's Aftermath." Environmental Health: a Global
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      http://www.ehjournal.net/content/pdf/1476-069X-4-6.pdf

Dinham, Barbara, and Sarangi Satinath "The Bhopal Gas Tragedy 1984 To? the Evasion of
      Corporate Responsibility." Environment and Urbanization 14.1 (2002): 89-99. Print.

Health Issues. The Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
       http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22
Methyl Isocyanate. Illinois Department of Public Health, Unknown. Web. 27 May 2010.
         http://www.idph.state.il.us/Bioterrorism/factsheets/methyl_isocyanate.htm

Need a Lawyer? Try Ours! Bhopal.net, 2003. Web. 25 May 2010.
       http://www.bhopal.net/static/lawyer.htm

Polluter Pays Principle. The Encyclopedia of Earth, 1969. Web. 29 May 2010.
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Sambhavna Clinic. Bhopal Medical Appeal, Unknown. Web. 25 May 2010.
      http://www.bhopal.org/index.php?id=20

Union Carbide, . Chronology. Bhopal Information Centre,
      2001. Web. 25 May 2010. http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm

Union Carbide's Factory in Bhopal: Still a Potential Killer. The International Campaign for
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Varma, Daya R. Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas. Montreal, CA: McGill U Department of
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        http://bhopal.org/index.php?id=22



                                                                                              66
Primary Sources
United States District Court: Class Action Complaint. Bhopal.net, 4 June 2000. Web. 30 May
2010.
       http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/amendedplaint.html
Varma, Daya R. Methyl Isocyanate: The Bhopal Gas. Montreal, CA: McGill U Department of
       Pharmacology, 2000. Print.

Legal Experts

Sarangi Satinath. Sambhavna Clinic. June 29th, 2010

Varma, Dr. Daya. McGill University. June 29th, 2010




                                                                                             67

				
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