LEXSEE 488 A by wuxiangyu


									                                       LEXSEE 488 A.2d 858

                ALDEN SMITH and JOHN W. GOSSELIN, Plaintiffs Below,
                  Appellants, v. JEROME W. VAN GORKOM, BRUCE S.
               UNION CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, MARMON
              GROUP, INC., a Delaware corporation, GL CORPORATION, a
              Delaware corporation, and NEW T. CO., a Delaware corporation,
                                 Defendants Below, Appellees

                                            No. 255, 1982

                                   Supreme Court of Delaware

                 488 A.2d 858; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421; 46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L.
                                     Rep. (CCH) P91,921

                                     June 11, 1984, Submitted

                                    January 29, 1985, Decided

JUDGES:                                             into the defendant New T Company ("New T"),
    Horsey, Justice (for the majority).             a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant,
Herrmann, C.J., and McNeilly, Moore and             Marmon Group, Inc. ("Marmon"). Alternate
Christie, JJ., constituting the Court En Banc.      relief in the form of damages is sought against
McNeilly, Justice, dissenting. Christie, Justice,   the defendant members of the Board of
dissenting.                                         Directors of Trans Union, [*864] New T, and
                                                    Jay A. Pritzker and Robert A. Pritzker, owners
OPINIONBY:                                          of Marmon. n1
                                                                 n1 The plaintiff, Alden Smith,
OPINION:                                                    originally sought to enjoin the merger;
                                                            but, following extensive discovery, the
     [*863] This appeal from the Court of                   Trial Court denied the plaintiff's motion
Chancery involves a class action brought by                 for preliminary injunction by unreported
shareholders of the defendant Trans Union                   letter opinion dated February 3, 1981.
Corporation ("Trans Union" or "the                          On February 10, 1981, the proposed
Company"),        [**2]    originally seeking               merger was approved by Trans Union's
rescission of a cash-out merger of Trans Union              stockholders at a special meeting and the
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                             488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                         46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
        merger became effective on that date.      plaintiffs' stockholdings in Trans Union, in
        Thereafter, John W. Gosselin was           accordance with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
        permitted to intervene as an additional    Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 701 (1983). n3
        plaintiff; and Smith and Gosselin were
        certified as representing a class
        consisting of all persons, other than                   n3 It has been stipulated that
        defendants, who held shares of Trans                plaintiffs sue on behalf of a class
        Union common stock on all relevant                  consisting of 10,537 shareholders (out of
        dates. At the time of the merger, Smith             a total of 12,844) and that the class
        owned 54,000 shares of Trans Union                  owned 12,734,404 out of 13,357,758
        stock, Gosselin owned 23,600 shares,                shares of Trans Union outstanding.
        and members of Gosselin's family owned
                                                       We hold: (1) that the Board's decision,
                                                   reached September 20, 1980, to approve the
[**3]                                              proposed cash-out merger was not the product
    Following trial, the former Chancellor         of an informed business judgment; (2) that the
granted judgment for the defendant directors by    Board's subsequent efforts to amend the Merger
unreported letter opinion dated July 6, 1982. n2   Agreement and take other curative action were
Judgment was based on two findings: (1) that       ineffectual, both legally and factually; and (3)
the Board of Directors had acted in an informed    that the Board did not deal with complete
manner so as to be entitled to protection of the   candor with the stockholders by failing to
business judgment rule in approving the cash-      disclose all material facts, which they knew or
out merger; and (2) that the shareholder vote      should have known, before securing the
approving the merger should not be set aside       stockholders' approval of the merger.
because the stockholders had been "fairly              I.
informed" by the Board of Directors before
voting thereon. The plaintiffs appeal.                 The nature of this case requires a detailed
                                                   factual statement. The following facts are
                                                   [**5] essentially uncontradicted: n4
            n2 Following trial, and before
        decision by the Trial Court, the parties
        stipulated to the dismissal, with                      n4 More detailed statements of facts,
        prejudice, of the Messrs. Pritzker as               consistent with this factual outline,
        parties defendant.       However, all               appear in related portions of this
        references to defendants hereinafter are            Opinion.
        to the defendant directors of Trans
        Union, unless otherwise noted.
                                                       Trans Union was a publicly-traded,
    Speaking for the majority of the Court, we     diversified holding company, the principal
conclude that both rulings of the Court of         earnings of which were generated by its railcar
Chancery are clearly erroneous. Therefore, we      leasing business. During the period here
reverse and direct that judgment be entered in     involved, the Company had a cash flow of
favor of the plaintiffs [**4] and against the      hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
defendant directors for the fair value of the      However, the Company had difficulty in
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                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
generating sufficient taxable income to offset       among the alternatives. The report emphasized
increasingly large investment tax credits            that, despite the overall surplus, the operation
(ITCs). Accelerated depreciation deductions          of the Company would consume all available
had decreased available taxable income against       equity for the next several years, and
which to offset accumulating ITCs.         The       concluded: "As a result, we have sufficient time
Company took these deductions, despite their         to fully develop our course of action."
effect on usable ITCs, because the rental price          B
in the railcar leasing market had already
impounded the purported tax savings.                     On August 27, 1980, Van Gorkom met with
                                                     Senior Management of Trans Union. Van
    In the late 1970's, together with other          Gorkom reported on his lobbying efforts in
capital-intensive firms, Trans Union lobbied in      Washington and his desire to find a solution to
Congress to have ITCs refundable in cash to          the tax credit problem more permanent than a
firms which could not fully utilize the credit.      continued program of acquisitions. Various
During [**6] the summer of 1980, defendant           alternatives were suggested and discussed
Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's                  preliminarily, including the sale of Trans Union
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, [*865]         to a company with a large amount of taxable
testified and lobbied in Congress for                income.
refundability of ITCs and against further
accelerated depreciation.      By the end of             Donald Romans, Chief Financial Officer of
August, Van Gorkom was convinced that                Trans Union, stated that his department had
Congress would neither accept the refundability      done a "very brief bit of work on the possibility
concept nor curtail further accelerated              of a leveraged buy-out." This work had been
depreciation.                                        prompted by a media article which Romans had
                                                     seen regarding a leveraged buy-out by
    Beginning in the late 1960's, and continuing     management.         The work consisted of a
through the 1970's, Trans Union pursued a            "preliminary study" of the cash which could be
program of acquiring small companies in order        generated by the Company [**8]             if it
to increase available taxable income. In July        participated in a leveraged buy-out. As Romans
1980, Trans Union Management prepared the            stated, this analysis "was very first and rough
annual revision of the Company's Five Year           cut at seeing whether a cash flow would
Forecast. This report was presented to the           support what might be considered a high price
Board of Directors at its July, 1980 meeting.        for this type of transaction."
The report projected an annual income growth
of about 20%. The report also concluded that             On September 5, at another Senior
Trans Union would have about $195 million in         Management meeting which Van Gorkom
spare cash between 1980 and 1985, "with the          attended, Romans again brought up the idea of
surplus growing rapidly from 1982 onward."           a leveraged buy-out as a "possible strategic
The report referred to the ITC situation as a        alternative" to the Company's acquisition
"nagging problem" and, given that problem, the       program. Romans and Bruce S. Chelberg,
leasing company "would still appear to be            President and Chief Operating Officer of Trans
constrained to a tax breakeven." The report          Union, had been working on the matter in
then listed four alternative uses of the projected   preparation for the meeting. According to
1982-1985 equity [**7] surplus: (1) stock            Romans: They did not "come up" with a price
repurchase; (2) dividend increases; (3) a major      for the Company. They merely "ran the
acquisition program; and (4) combinations of         numbers" at $50 a share and at $60 a share with
the above. The sale of Trans Union was not           the "rough form" of their cash figures at the
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                           488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                       46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
time. Their "figures indicated that $50 would      without consulting either his Board or any
be very easy to do but $60 would be very           members of Senior Management except one:
difficult to do under those figures." This work    Carl Peterson, Trans Union's Controller.
did not purport to establish a fair price for      Telling Peterson that he wanted no other person
either the Company or 100% of the stock. It        on his staff to know what he was doing, but
was intended to determine the cash flow needed     without telling him why, Van Gorkom directed
to service the debt that would "probably" be       Peterson to calculate the feasibility of a
incurred in a leveraged buy-out, based on          leveraged buy-out at an assumed price per
"rough calculations" without "any benefit of       share of $55. Apart from the Company's
experts to identify what [**9] the limits were     historic stock market price, n5 and Van
to that, and so forth." These computations were    Gorkom's long association with Trans Union,
not considered extensive and no conclusion         the record is devoid of any competent evidence
was reached.                                       that $55 represented the per share intrinsic
    At this meeting, Van Gorkom stated that he     value of the Company.
would be willing to take $55 per share for his
own 75,000 shares. He vetoed the suggestion                  n5 The common stock of Trans
of a leveraged buy-out by Management,                    Union was traded on the New York
however, as involving a potential conflict of            Stock Exchange. Over the five year
interest for Management. Van Gorkom, a                   period from 1975 through 1979, Trans
certified public accountant and lawyer, had              Union's stock had traded within a range
been an officer of Trans Union [*866] for 24             of a high of $39 1/2 and a low of $24 1/4.
years, its Chief Executive Officer for more than         Its high and low range for 1980 through
17 years, and Chairman of its Board for 2                September 19 (the last trading day before
years. It is noteworthy in this connection that          announcement of the merger) was $38
he was then approaching 65 years of age and              1/4 - $29 1/2.
mandatory retirement.
    For several days following the September 5
meeting, Van Gorkom pondered the idea of a
sale. He had participated in many acquisitions         Having thus chosen the $55 figure, based
as a manager and director of Trans Union and       solely on the availability of a leveraged buy-
as a director of other companies. He was           out, Van Gorkom multiplied the price per share
familiar with acquisition procedures, valuation    by the number of shares outstanding to reach a
methods, and negotiations; and he privately        total value of the Company of $690 million.
considered the pros and cons of whether Trans      Van Gorkom told Peterson to use this $690
Union should seek a privately or publicly-held     million figure and to assume a $200 million
purchaser.                                         equity contribution by the buyer. Based on
                                                   these assumptions, Van Gorkom directed
    Van Gorkom decided to meet with Jay A.         Peterson to determine whether the debt portion
Pritzker, a well-known corporate takeover          of the purchase price could be paid off in five
specialist and a social [**10] acquaintance.       years or less if financed by Trans Union's cash
However, rather than approaching Pritzker          flow as projected in the Five Year Forecast, and
simply to determine his interest in acquiring      by the sale of certain weaker divisions
Trans Union, Van Gorkom assembled a                identified in a study done for Trans Union by
proposed per share price for sale of the           the Boston Consulting Group ("BCG study").
Company and a financing structure by which to      Peterson reported that, of the purchase price,
accomplish the sale. Van Gorkom did so
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                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
approximately $50-80 million would remain            Gorkom knew that Pritzker intended to make a
outstanding after five years. Van Gorkom was         cash-out merger offer at Van Gorkom's
disappointed, but decided to meet with Pritzker      proposed $55 per share. Pritzker instructed his
nevertheless.                                        attorney, a merger and acquisition specialist, to
                                                     begin drafting merger documents. There was
    Van Gorkom arranged a meeting with
                                                     no further discussion of the $55 price.
Pritzker at the latter's home on Saturday,
                                                     However, the number of shares of Trans
September 13, 1980. Van Gorkom prefaced his
                                                     Union's treasury stock to be offered to Pritzker
presentation by stating to Pritzker: "Now as far
                                                     was negotiated down to one million shares; the
as you are concerned, I can, I think, show how
                                                     price was set at $38 -- 75 cents above the per
you can pay a substantial premium over the
                                                     share price at the close of the market on
present stock price and [**12] pay off most of
                                                     September 19. At this point, Pritzker insisted
the loan in the first five years. *** If you could
                                                     that the Trans Union Board act on his merger
pay $55 for this Company, here is a way in
which I think it can be financed."                   proposal within the next three days, stating to
                                                     Van Gorkom: "We have to have a decision by
    Van Gorkom then reviewed with Pritzker           no later than Sunday [evening, September 21]
his calculations based upon his proposed price       before the opening of the English stock
of $55 per share. Although Pritzker mentioned        exchange on Monday morning." Pritzker's
$50 as a more attractive figure, no other price      lawyer was then instructed to draft the merger
was mentioned. However, Van Gorkom stated            documents, to be reviewed by Van Gorkom's
that to be sure that $55 was the best price          lawyer, "sometimes with discussion and
obtainable, Trans Union should be free to            sometimes not, in the haste to get it finished."
accept any better offer. Pritzker demurred,          [**14]
stating that his organization would serve as a
                                                         On Friday, September 19, Van Gorkom,
"stalking horse" for an "auction contest" only if
                                                     Chelberg, and Pritzker consulted with Trans
Trans Union would permit Pritzker to buy
                                                     Union's lead bank regarding the financing of
1,750,000 shares of Trans Union stock at
                                                     Pritzker's purchase of Trans Union. The bank
market price which Pritzker could then sell to
                                                     indicated that it could form a syndicate of
any higher bidder. After further discussion on
                                                     banks that would finance the transaction. On
this point, Pritzker told Van Gorkom that he
                                                     the same day, Van Gorkom retained James
would give him a more definite reaction soon.
                                                     Brennan, Esquire, to advise Trans Union on the
     [*867]     On Monday, September 15,             legal aspects of the merger. Van Gorkom did
Pritzker advised Van Gorkom that he was              not consult with William Browder, a Vice-
interested in the $55 cash-out merger proposal       President and director of Trans Union and
and requested more information on Trans              former head of its legal department, or with
Union. Van Gorkom agreed to meet privately           William Moore, then the head of Trans Union's
with Pritzker, accompanied by Peterson,              legal staff.
Chelberg, and Michael Carpenter, Trans
                                                         On Friday, September 19, Van Gorkom
Union's consultant from the Boston Consulting
                                                     called a special meeting of the Trans Union
[**13] Group. The meetings took place on
                                                     Board for noon the following day. He also
September 16 and 17. Van Gorkom was
                                                     called a meeting of the Company's Senior
"astounded that events were moving with such
                                                     Management to convene at 11:00 a.m., prior to
amazing rapidity."
                                                     the meeting of the Board. No one, except
   On Thursday, September 18, Van Gorkom             Chelberg and Peterson, was told the purpose of
met again with Pritzker. At that time, Van           the meetings. Van Gorkom did not invite Trans
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                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
Union's investment banker, Salomon Brothers         [**16]
or its Chicago-based partner, to attend.                Ten directors served on the Trans Union
    Of those present at the Senior Management       Board, five inside (defendants Bonser, O'Boyle,
meeting on September 20, only Chelberg and          Browder, Chelberg, and Van Gorkom) and five
Peterson had prior knowledge of Pritzker's          outside     (defendants     Wallis,    Johnson,
offer. Van Gorkom disclosed the offer and           Lanterman, Morgan and Reneker).             All
described its [**15] terms, but he furnished no     directors were present at the meeting, except
copies of the proposed Merger Agreement.            O'Boyle who was ill. Of the outside directors,
Romans announced that his department had            four were corporate chief executive officers
done a second study which showed that, for a        and one was the former Dean of the University
leveraged buy-out, the price range for Trans        of Chicago Business School. None was an
Union stock was between $55 and $65 per             investment banker or trained financial analyst.
share. Van Gorkom neither saw the study nor         All members of the Board were well informed
asked Romans to make it available for the           about the Company and its operations as a
Board meeting.                                      going concern. They were familiar with the
                                                    current financial condition of the Company, as
    Senior Management's reaction to the
                                                    well as operating and earnings projections
Pritzker proposal was completely negative. No
                                                    reported in the recent Five Year Forecast. The
member of Management, except Chelberg and
                                                    Board generally received regular and detailed
Peterson, supported the proposal. Romans
                                                    reports and was kept abreast of the accumulated
objected to the price as being too low; n6 he
                                                    investment tax credit and accelerated
was critical of the timing and suggested that
                                                    depreciation problem.
consideration should be given to the adverse
tax consequences of an all-cash deal for low-           Van Gorkom began the Special Meeting of
basis shareholders; and he took the position that   the Board with a twenty-minute oral
the agreement to sell Pritzker one million          presentation. Copies of the proposed Merger
newly-issued shares at market price would           Agreement were delivered too late for study
inhibit other offers, as would the prohibitions     before or during the meeting. n7 He reviewed
against soliciting bids and furnishing inside       the Company's ITC and depreciation problems
information [*868] to other bidders. Romans         and the efforts theretofore made to solve [**17]
argued that the Pritzker proposal was a "lock       them. He discussed his initial meeting with
up" and amounted to "an agreed merger as            Pritzker and his motivation in arranging that
opposed to an offer." Nevertheless, Van             meeting. Van Gorkom did not disclose to the
Gorkom proceeded to the Board meeting as            Board, however, the methodology by which he
scheduled without further delay.                    alone had arrived at the $55 figure, or the fact
                                                    that he first proposed the $55 price in his
                                                    negotiations with Pritzker.
          n6 Van Gorkom asked Romans to
      express his opinion as to the $55 price.
      Romans stated that he "thought the price                n7 The record is not clear as to the
      was too low in relation to what he could            terms of the Merger Agreement. The
      derive for the company in a cash sale,              Agreement, as originally presented to the
      particularly one which enabled us to                Board on September 20, was never
      realize the values of certain subsidiaries          produced by defendants despite demands
      and independent entities."                          by the plaintiffs. Nor is it clear that the
                                                          directors were given an opportunity to
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                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
      study the Merger Agreement before                 Attorney Brennan advised the members of
      voting on it. All that can be said is that    the Board that they might be sued if they failed
      Brennan had the Agreement before him          to accept the offer and that a fairness opinion
      during the meeting.                           was not required as a matter of law.
                                                        Romans attended the meeting as chief
                                                    financial officer of the Company. He told the
    Van Gorkom outlined the terms of the
                                                    Board that he had not been involved in the
Pritzker offer as follows: Pritzker would pay
                                                    negotiations with Pritzker and knew nothing
$55 in cash for all outstanding shares of Trans
                                                    about the merger proposal until [*869] the
Union stock upon completion of which Trans
                                                    morning of the meeting; that his studies did not
Union would be merged into New T Company,
                                                    indicate either a fair price for the stock or a
a subsidiary wholly-owned by Pritzker and
                                                    valuation of the Company; that he did not see
formed to implement the merger; for a period
                                                    his role as directly addressing the fairness
of 90 days, Trans [**18] Union could receive,
                                                    issue; and that he and his people "were trying
but could not actively solicit, competing offers;
                                                    to search for ways to justify a price in
the offer had to be acted on by the next
                                                    connection with such a [leveraged buy-out]
evening, Sunday, September 21; Trans Union
                                                    transaction, rather than to say what the shares
could only furnish to competing bidders
                                                    are worth." Romans testified:
published information, and not proprietary
information; the offer was subject to Pritzker           I told the Board that the study ran the
obtaining the necessary financing by October        numbers at 50 and 60, and then the subsequent
10, 1980; if the financing contingency were         study at 55 and 65, and that was not the same
met or waived by Pritzker, Trans Union was          thing as saying that I have a valuation of the
required to sell to Pritzker one million newly-     company at X dollars. But it was a way -- a
issued shares of Trans Union at $38 per share.      first step towards reaching that conclusion.
    Van Gorkom took the position that putting
Trans Union "up for auction" through a 90-day       Romans told the Board that, in his opinion, $55
market test would validate a decision by the        was "in the range of a fair price," but "at the
Board that $55 was a fair price. He told the        beginning of the range."
Board that the "free market will have an                Chelberg, [**20] Trans Union's President,
opportunity to judge whether $55 is a fair          supported Van Gorkom's presentation and
price." Van Gorkom framed the decision before       representations.     He testified that he
the Board not as whether $55 per share was the      "participated to make sure that the Board
highest price that could be obtained, but as        members collectively were clear on the details
whether the $55 price was a fair price that the     of the agreement or offer from Pritzker;" that
stockholders should be given the opportunity to
                                                    he "participated in the discussion with Mr.
accept or reject. n8                                Brennan, inquiring of him about the necessity
                                                    for valuation opinions in spite of the way in
                                                    which this particular offer was couched;" and
          n8 In Van Gorkom's words: The "real
                                                    that he was otherwise actively involved in
      decision" is whether to "let the
                                                    supporting the positions being taken by Van
      stockholders decide it" which is "all you
                                                    Gorkom before the Board about "the necessity
      are being asked to decide today."
                                                    to act immediately on this offer," and about
                                                    "the adequacy of the $55 and the question of
[**19]                                              how that would be tested."
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                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
    The Board meeting of September 20 lasted         the agreement prior to its signing and delivery
about two hours. Based solely upon Van               to Pritzker.
Gorkom's oral presentation, Chelberg's                   ***On Monday, September 22, the
supporting representations, Romans' oral             Company issued a press release announcing
statement, Brennan's legal advice, and their         that Trans Union had entered into a "definitive"
knowledge of the market history of the               Merger Agreement with an affiliate of the
Company's stock, n9 the directors approved the       Marmon Group, Inc., a Pritzker holding
proposed Merger Agreement. However, the              company. Within 10 days of the public
Board later claimed to have attached two             announcement,      dissent     among     Senior
conditions to its acceptance: (1) that Trans         Management over the merger had become
Union reserved the right to accept any better        widespread.        Faced      with   threatened
offer that was made during the market test
                                                     resignations of key officers, Van Gorkom met
period; and (2) that [**21] Trans Union could        with Pritzker who agreed to several
share its proprietary information with any other     modifications of the Agreement. Pritzker was
potential bidders. While the Board now claims        willing to do so provided that Van Gorkom
to have reserved the right to accept any better      could persuade the dissidents to remain on the
offer received after the announcement of the         Company payroll for at least six months after
Pritzker agreement (even though the minutes of       consummation of the merger.
the meeting do not reflect this), it is undisputed
that the Board did not reserve the right to              Van Gorkom reconvened the Board on
actively solicit alternate offers.                   October 8 and secured the directors' approval
                                                     of the proposed amendments -- sight unseen.
                                                     The Board also authorized the employment of
          n9 The Trial Court stated the              Salomon Brothers, its investment          [*870]
      premium relationship of the $55 price to       banker, to solicit other offers for Trans Union
      the market history of the Company's            during the proposed "market test" period.
      stock as follows:                                  The next day, October 9, Trans Union
                                                     issued a press release announcing: (1) that
      *** the merger price offered to the            Pritzker had obtained "the financing
      stockholders of Trans Union represented        commitments       [**23]        necessary     to
      a premium of 62% over the average of           consummate" the merger with Trans Union; (2)
      the high and low prices at which Trans         that Pritzker had acquired one million shares of
      Union stock had traded in 1980, a              Trans Union common stock at $38 per share;
      premium of 48% over the last closing           (3) that Trans Union was now permitted to
      price, and a premium of 39% over the           actively seek other offers and had retained
      highest price at which the stock of Trans      Salomon Brothers for that purpose; and (4) that
      Union had traded any time during the           if a more favorable offer were not received
      prior six years.                               before February 1, 1981, Trans Union's
                                                     shareholders would thereafter meet to vote on
                                                     the Pritzker proposal.
   The Merger Agreement was executed by
Van Gorkom during the evening of September               It was not until the following day, October
20 at a formal social event that he hosted for       10, that the actual amendments to the Merger
the opening of the [**22] Chicago Lyric              Agreement were prepared by Pritzker and
Opera. Neither he nor any other director read        delivered to Van Gorkom for execution. As
                                                     will be seen, the amendments were
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                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
considerably at variance with Van Gorkom's              ***On February 10, the stockholders of
representations of the amendments to the Board      Trans Union approved the Pritzker merger
on October 8; and the amendments placed             proposal. Of the outstanding shares, 69.9%
serious constraints on Trans Union's ability to     were voted in favor of the merger; 7.25% were
negotiate a better deal and withdraw from the       voted against the merger; and 22.85% were not
Pritzker agreement.        Nevertheless, Van        voted.
Gorkom proceeded to execute what became the            II.
October 10 amendments to the Merger
Agreement without conferring further with the          …
Board members and apparently without                     [HN2] Under Delaware law, the business
comprehending the actual implications of the        judgment rule is the offspring of the
amendments.                                         fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. §
    ***Salomon Brothers' efforts over a three-      141 (a), that the business and affairs of a
month period from October 21 [**24] to              Delaware corporation are managed by or under
January 21 produced only one serious suitor for     its board of directors. n11 Pogostin v. Rice,
Trans Union -- General Electric Credit              Del. Supr., 480 A.2d 619, 624 (1984); Aronson
Corporation ("GE Credit"), a subsidiary of the      v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 811 (1984);
General Electric Company. However, GE               Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, Del. Supr., 430
Credit was unwilling to make an offer for Trans     A.2d 779, 782 (1981). In carrying out their
Union unless Trans Union first rescinded its        managerial roles, directors are charged with an
Merger Agreement with Pritzker.           When      unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation
Pritzker refused, GE Credit terminated further      [**30] and its shareholders. Loft, Inc. v. Guth,
discussions with Trans Union in early January.      Del. Ch., 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (1938),
                                                    aff'd, Del. Supr., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
    In the meantime, in early December, the         (1939). The business judgment rule exists to
investment firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts        protect and promote the full and free exercise
& Co. ("KKR"), the only other concern to            of the managerial power granted to Delaware
make a firm offer for Trans Union, withdrew its     directors. [HN3] Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
offer under circumstances hereinafter detailed.     supra at 782. The rule itself "is a presumption
     On December 19, this litigation was            that in making a business decision, the directors
commenced and, within four weeks, the               of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
plaintiffs had deposed eight of the ten directors   good faith and in the honest belief that the
of Trans Union, including Van Gorkom,               action taken was in the best interests of the
Chelberg and Romans, its Chief Financial            company." Aronson, supra at 812. Thus, the
Officer. On January 21, Management's Proxy          party attacking a board decision as uninformed
Statement for the February 10 shareholder           must rebut the presumption that its business
meeting was mailed to Trans Union's                 judgment was an informed one. Id.
stockholders. On January 26, Trans Union's
Board met and, after a lengthy meeting, voted
to proceed with the Pritzker merger. The Board                   n11 [HN4] 8 Del.C. § 141 provides,
also approved for mailing, "on or about January              in pertinent part:
27," a Supplement to its Proxy Statement. The                    (a) The business and affairs of every
Supplement purportedly [**25] set forth all                  corporation organized under this chapter
information relevant to the Pritzker Merger                  shall be managed by or under the
Agreement, which had not been divulged in the                direction of a board of directors, except
first Proxy Statement.
                                                                                             Page 10
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
     as may be otherwise provided in this            preparation for a decision derives from the
     chapter or in its certificate of                fiduciary capacity in which he serves the
     incorporation. If any such provision is         corporation and its stockholders. Lutz v. Boas,
     made in the certificate of incorporation,       Del. Ch., 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381
     the powers and duties conferred or              (1961). See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra;
     imposed upon the board of directors by          Guth v. Loft, supra. Since a director is vested
     this chapter shall be exercised or              with the responsibility for the management of
     performed to such extent and by such            the affairs of the corporation, he must execute
     person or persons as shall be provided in       that duty with the recognition that he acts on
     the certificate of incorporation.               behalf of others. Such obligation does not
                                                     tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing.     But
                                                     fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires
                                                     more than the mere absence of bad faith or
    [HN5] The determination of whether a             fraud. Representation of the financial interests
business judgment is an informed one turns on        of others imposes on a director an affirmative
whether the directors have informed themselves       duty to protect those interests and to proceed
"prior to making a business decision, of all         with a critical eye in assessing information of
material information reasonably available to         the type and under the circumstances present
them." Id. n12                                       here. See Lutz v. Boas, supra; Guth v. Loft,
                                                     supra at 510.          Compare Donovan v.
                                                     Cunningham, 5th Cir., 716 F.2d 1455, 1467
        n12 See Kaplan v. Centex                     (1983); Doyle v. Union Insurance Company,
     Corporation, Del. Ch., 284 A.2d 119,            Neb. Supr., 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36
     124 (1971), where the Court stated:             (1979); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont,
                                                     N.Y. App., 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138, [**33]
     Application of the [business judgment]          141 (1912).
     rule of necessity depends upon a showing            Thus, [HN7] a director's duty to exercise an
     that informed directors did in fact make a      informed business judgment is in [*873] the
     business judgment authorizing the               nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a
     transaction under review. And, as the           duty of loyalty. Here, there were no allegations
     plaintiff argues, the difficulty here is that   of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof
     the evidence does not show that this was        thereof.    Hence, it is presumed that the
     done. There were director-committee-            directors reached their business judgment in
     officer references to the realignment but       good faith, Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., Del.
     none of these singly or cumulative              Ch., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929), and
     showed that the director judgment was           considerations of motive are irrelevant to the
     brought to bear with specificity on the         issue before us.
                                                         The standard of care applicable to a
                                                     director's duty of care has also been recently
    [HN6] Under the business judgment rule           restated by this Court. In Aronson, supra, we
there is no protection for directors who have        stated:
made "an unintelligent or unadvised judgment."
Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, Del. Ch.,
19 Del. Ch. [**32] 326, 167 A. 831, 833              While the Delaware cases use a variety of
(1933). A director's duty to inform himself in       terms to describe the applicable standard of
                                                     care, our analysis satisfies us that [HN8] under
                                                                                              Page 11
                             488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                         46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
the business judgment rule director liability is     determining whether their decision to accept
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.        the Pritzker proposal was an informed one.
(footnote omitted)                                   Thus, the defendants contend that what the
                                                     directors did and learned subsequent to
473 A.2d at 812.                                     September 20 and through January 26, 1981,
                                                     was properly taken into account by the Trial
    We again confirm that view. We think the
                                                     Court in determining whether the Board's
concept of gross negligence is also the proper
                                                     judgment was an informed one. We disagree
standard for determining whether a business
                                                     with this post hoc approach.
judgment reached by a board of directors was
an informed one. n13                                     The issue of whether the directors [**36]
                                                     reached an informed decision to "sell" the
                                                     Company on September 20, 1980 must be
           n13 Compare Mitchell v. Highland-         determined only upon the basis of the
       Western Glass, supra, where the Court         information then reasonably available to the
       posed the question as whether the board       directors and relevant to their decision to accept
       acted "so far without information that        the Pritzker merger proposal. This is not to say
       they can be said to have passed an            that the directors were precluded from altering
       unintelligent and unadvised judgment."        their original plan of action, had they done so
       167 A. at 833. Compare also Gimbel v.         in an informed manner. What we do say is that
       Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599,         the question of whether the directors reached an
       aff'd per curiam Del.Supr., 316 A.2d 619      informed business judgment in agreeing to sell
       (1974), where the Chancellor, after           the Company, pursuant to the terms of the
       expressly reiterating the Highland-           September 20 Agreement presents, in reality,
       Western Glass standard, framed the            two questions: (A) whether the directors
       question, "Or to put the question in its      reached an informed business judgment on
       legal context, did the Signal directors act   September 20, 1980; and (B) if they did not,
       without the bounds of reason and              whether the directors' actions taken subsequent
       recklessly in approving the price offer of    to September 20 were adequate to cure any
       Burmah?" Id.                                  infirmity in their action taken on September 20.
                                                     We first consider the directors' September 20
…                                                    action in terms of their reaching an informed
                                                     business judgment.
    The defendants argue that the determination
of whether their decision to accept $55 per              On the record before us, we must conclude
share for Trans Union represented an informed        that the Board of Directors did not reach an
business judgment requires consideration, not        informed business judgment on September 20,
only of that which they knew and learned on          1980 in voting to "sell" the Company for $55
September 20, but also of that which they            per share pursuant to the Pritzker cash-out
subsequently learned and did over the                merger [**37] proposal. Our reasons, in
following four-month [*874] period before the        summary, are as follows:
shareholders met to vote on the proposal in              The directors (1) did not adequately inform
February, 1981. The defendants thereby seek          themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forcing
to reduce the significance of their action on        the "sale" of the Company and in establishing
September 20 and to widen the time frame for         the per share purchase price; (2) were
                                                                                           Page 12
                           488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                       46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the        been liberally construed to include reports of
Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at     informal personal investigations by corporate
a minimum, were grossly negligent in               officers, Cheff v. Mathes, Del. Supr., 41 Del.
approving the "sale" of the Company upon two       Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964). However,
hours' consideration, without prior notice, and    there is no evidence that any [**39] "report,"
without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.     as defined under § 141 (e), concerning the
                                                   Pritzker proposal, was presented to the Board
    As has been noted, the Board based its
                                                   on September 20. n16 Van Gorkom's oral
September 20 decision to approve the cash-out
                                                   presentation of his understanding of the terms
merger     primarily on        Van     Gorkom's
                                                   of the proposed Merger Agreement, which he
representations. None of the directors, other
                                                   had not seen, and Romans' brief oral statement
than Van Gorkom and Chelberg, had any prior
                                                   of his preliminary study regarding the
knowledge that the purpose of the meeting was
                                                   feasibility of a leveraged buy-out of Trans
to propose a cash-out merger of Trans Union.
No members of Senior Management were               Union do not qualify as § 141 (e) "reports" for
                                                   these reasons: The former lacked substance
present, other than Chelberg, Romans and
                                                   because Van Gorkom was basically uninformed
Peterson; and the latter two had only learned of
                                                   as to the essential provisions of the very
the proposed sale an hour earlier. Both general
                                                   document about which he was talking.
counsel Moore and former general counsel
                                                   Romans' statement was irrelevant to the issues
Browder attended the meeting, but were
                                                   before the Board since it did not purport to be a
equally uninformed as to the purpose of the
                                                   valuation study. [HN12] At a minimum for a
meeting and the documents to be acted upon.
                                                   report to enjoy the status conferred by § 141
    Without any documents before them              (e), it must be pertinent to the subject matter
concerning the proposed [**38] transaction,        upon which a board is called to act, and
the members of the Board were required to rely     otherwise be entitled to good faith, not blind,
entirely upon Van Gorkom's 20-minute oral          reliance. Considering all of the surrounding
presentation of the proposal.     No written       circumstances -- hastily calling the meeting
summary of the terms of the merger was             without prior notice of its subject matter, the
presented; the directors were given no             proposed sale of the Company without any
documentation to support the adequacy of $55       prior consideration of the issue or necessity
price per share for sale of the Company; and       therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by
the Board had before it nothing more than Van      Pritzker, and the total absence [**40] of any
Gorkom's statement of his understanding of the     documentation whatsoever -- the directors were
substance of an agreement which he admittedly      duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of Van
had never read, nor which any member of the        Gorkom and Romans, and if they had done so,
Board had ever seen.                               the inadequacy of that upon which they now
    [HN11] Under 8 Del.C. § 141 (e), n15           claim to have relied would have been apparent.
"directors are fully protected in relying in
[*875] good faith on reports made by officers."
                                                             n15 [HN13] Section 141 (e) provides
Michelson v. Duncan, Del. Ch., 386 A.2d 1144,
                                                         in pertinent part:
1156 (1978); aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, Del. Supr., 407 A.2d 211                      A member of the board of directors ...
(1979). See also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers                shall, in the performance of his duties, be
Mfg. Co., Del.Supr., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d            fully protected in relying in good faith
125, 130 (1963); Prince v. Bensinger, Del. Ch.,          upon the books of accounts or reports
244 A.2d 89, 94 (1968). The term "report" has            made to the corporation by any of its
                                                                                            Page 13
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
      officers, or by an independent certified            became informed by virtue of their
      public accountant, or by an appraiser               "review" of the Agreement on October 8
      selected with reasonable care by the                and January 26.
      board of directors ..., or in relying in
      good faith upon other records of the
      corporation.                                     (1)
                                                        [HN14] A substantial premium may
                                                    provide one reason to recommend a merger, but
          n16 In support of the defendants'         in the absence of other sound [**42] valuation
      argument that their judgment as to the        information, the fact of a premium alone does
      adequacy of $55 per share was an              not provide an adequate basis upon which to
      informed one, the directors rely on the
                                                    assess the fairness of an offering price. Here,
      BCG study and the Five Year Forecast.         the judgment reached as to the adequacy of the
      However, no one even referred to either       premium was based on a comparison between
      of these studies at the September 20          the historically depressed Trans Union market
      meeting; and it is conceded that these        price and the amount of the Pritzker offer.
      materials do not represent valuation          Using market price as a basis for concluding
      studies. Hence, these documents do not        that the premium adequately reflected the true
      constitute evidence as to whether the         value [*876] of the Company was a clearly
      directors reached an informed judgment        faulty, indeed fallacious, premise, as the
      on September 20 that $55 per share was a      defendants' own evidence demonstrates.
      fair value for sale of the Company.
                                                        The record is clear that before September
                                                    20, Van Gorkom and other members of Trans
[**41]                                              Union's Board knew that the market had
    The defendants rely on the following            consistently undervalued the worth of Trans
factors to sustain the Trial Court's finding that   Union's stock, despite steady increases in the
the Board's decision was an informed one: (1)       Company's operating income in the seven years
the magnitude of the premium or spread              preceding the merger. The Board related this
between the $55 Pritzker offering price and         occurrence in large part to Trans Union's
Trans Union's current market price of $38 per       inability to use its ITCs as previously noted.
share; (2) the amendment of the Agreement as        Van Gorkom testified that he did not believe
submitted on September 20 to permit the Board       the market price accurately reflected Trans
to accept any better offer during the "market       Union's true worth; and several of the directors
test" period; (3) the collective experience and     testified that, as a general rule, most chief
expertise of the Board's "inside" and "outside"     executives think that the market undervalues
directors; n17 and (4) their reliance on            their companies' stock. [**43] Yet, on
Brennan's legal advice that the directors might     September 20, Trans Union's Board apparently
be sued if they rejected the Pritzker proposal.     believed that the market stock price accurately
We discuss each of these grounds seriatim:          reflected the value of the Company for the
                                                    purpose of determining the adequacy of the
                                                    premium for its sale.
          n17 We reserve for discussion under
                                                        In the Proxy Statement, however, the
      Part III hereof, the defendants' contention
                                                    directors reversed their position. There, they
      that their judgment, reached on
                                                    stated that, although the earnings prospects for
      September 20, if not then informed
                                                    Trans Union were "excellent," they found no
                                                                                            Page 14
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
basis for believing that this would be reflected       Despite    the    foregoing     facts   and
in future stock prices. With regard to past        circumstances, there was no call by the Board,
trading, the Board stated that the prices at       either on September 20 or thereafter, for any
which the Company's common stock had traded        [**45] valuation study or documentation of the
in recent years did not reflect the "inherent"     $55 price per share as a measure of the fair
value of the Company. But having referred to       value of the Company in a cash-out context. It
the "inherent" value of Trans Union, the           is undisputed that the major asset of Trans
directors ascribed no number to it. Moreover,      Union was its cash flow. Yet, at no time did
nowhere did they disclose that they had no         the Board call for a valuation study taking into
basis on which to fix "inherent" worth beyond      account that highly significant element of the
an impressionistic reaction to the premium over    Company's assets.
market and an unsubstantiated belief that the
                                                       We do not imply that an outside valuation
value of the assets was "significantly greater"    study is essential to support an informed
than book value. By their own admission they       business judgment; nor do we state that fairness
could not rely on the stock price as an accurate   opinions by independent investment bankers
measure of value. Yet, also by their own           are required as a matter of law. Often insiders
admission, the Board members assumed that          familiar with the business of a going concern
Trans Union's market price was adequate            are in a better position than are outsiders to
[**44] to serve as a basis upon which to assess    gather relevant information; and under
the adequacy of the premium for purposes of        appropriate circumstances, such directors may
the September 20 meeting.                          be fully protected in relying in good faith upon
    The parties do not dispute that a publicly-    the valuation reports of their management.
traded stock price is solely a measure of the      [*877] See 8 Del.C. § 141 (e). See also Cheff
value of a minority position and, thus, market     v. Mathes, supra.
price represents only the value of a single            Here, the record establishes that the Board
share. Nevertheless, on September 20, the          did not request its Chief Financial Officer,
Board assessed the adequacy of the premium         Romans, to make any valuation study or review
over market, offered by Pritzker, solely by        of the proposal to determine the adequacy of
comparing it with Trans Union's current and        $55 per share for sale of the Company. On the
historical stock price. (See supra note 5 at p.    record before us: The Board rested on Romans'
866.)                                              elicited [**46] response that the $55 figure
    Indeed, as of September 20, the Board had      was within a "fair price range" within the
no other information on which to base a            context of a leveraged buy-out. No director
determination of the intrinsic value of Trans      sought any further information from Romans.
Union as a going concern. As of September 20,      No director asked him why he put $55 at the
the Board had made no evaluation of the            bottom of his range. No director asked Romans
Company designed to value the entire               for any details as to his study, the reason why it
enterprise, nor had the Board ever previously      had been undertaken or its depth. No director
considered selling the Company or consenting       asked to see the study; and no director asked
to a buy-out merger. Thus, the adequacy of a       Romans whether Trans Union's finance
premium is indeterminate unless it is assessed     department could do a fairness study within the
in terms of other competent and sound              remaining 36-hour n18 period available under
valuation information that reflects the value of   the Pritzker offer.
the particular business.
                                                                                             Page 15
                             488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                         46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
          n18 Romans' department study was                 Controller Peterson in creating a feasible
      not made available to the Board until                structure for a leveraged buy-out by a
      circulation     of    Trans      Union's             prospective purchaser; that Van Gorkom
      Supplementary Proxy Statement and the                had not sought advice, information or
      Board's meeting of January 26, 1981, on              assistance from either inside or outside
      the eve of the shareholder meeting; and,             Trans Union directors as to the value of
      as has been noted, the study has never               the Company as an entity or the fair price
      been produced for inclusion in the record            per share for 100% of its stock; that Van
      in this case.                                        Gorkom had not consulted with the
                                                           Company's investment bankers or other
                                                           financial analysts; that Van Gorkom had
    Had the Board, or any member, made an                  not consulted with or confided in any
inquiry of Romans, he presumably would have                officer or director of the Company except
responded as he testified: that his calculations           Chelberg; and that Van Gorkom had
were rough and preliminary; and, [**47] that               deliberately chosen to ignore the advice
the study was not designed to determine the fair           and opinion of the members of his Senior
value of the Company, but rather to assess the             Management group regarding the
feasibility of a leveraged buy-out financed by             adequacy of the $55 price.
the Company's projected cash flow, making
certain assumptions as to the purchaser's
borrowing needs.        Romans would have            [**48]
presumably also informed the Board of his                We do not say that the Board of Directors
view, and the widespread view of Senior              was not entitled to give some credence to Van
Management, that the timing of the offer was         Gorkom's representation that $55 was an
wrong and the offer inadequate.                      adequate or fair price. Under § 141 (e), the
                                                     directors were entitled to rely upon their
    The record also establishes that the Board
                                                     chairman's opinion of value and adequacy,
accepted without scrutiny Van Gorkom's
                                                     provided that such opinion was reached on a
representation as to the fairness of the $55 price
                                                     sound basis. Here, the issue is whether the
per share for sale of the Company -- a subject
                                                     directors informed themselves as to all
that the Board had never previously considered.
                                                     information that was reasonably available to
The Board thereby failed to discover that Van
                                                     them. Had they done so, they would have
Gorkom had suggested the $55 price to Pritzker
                                                     learned of the source and derivation of the $55
and, most crucially, that Van Gorkom had
                                                     price and could not reasonably have relied
arrived at the $55 figure based on calculations
                                                     thereupon in good faith.
designed solely to determine the feasibility of a
leveraged buy-out. n19 No questions were                 None of the directors, Management or
raised either as to the tax implications of a        outside, were investment bankers or financial
cash-out merger or how the price for the one         analysts. Yet the Board did not consider
million share option granted Pritzker was            recessing the meeting until a later hour that day
calculated.                                          (or requesting an extension of Pritzker's Sunday
                                                     evening deadline) to give it time to elicit more
                                                     information as to the sufficiency of the offer,
          n19 As of September 20 the directors       either from [*878] inside Management (in
      did not know: that Van Gorkom had              particular Romans) or from Trans Union's own
      arrived at the $55 figure alone, and           investment banker, Salomon Brothers, whose
      subjectively, as the figure to be used by      Chicago specialist in merger and acquisitions
                                                                                            Page 16
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
was known to the Board and familiar with            Indeed, the record compels the conclusion that
Trans Union's affairs.                              the directors had no rational basis for expecting
                                                    that a market test was attainable, given the
    Thus, the record compels the conclusion
                                                    terms of the Agreement as executed during the
that [**49] on September 20 the Board
                                                    evening of September 20. We rely upon the
lacked valuation information adequate to
                                                    following facts which are essentially
reach an informed business judgment as to
the fairness of $55 per share for sale of the
Company. n20                                             The Merger Agreement, specifically
                                                    identified as that originally presented to the
                                                    Board on September 20, has never been
          n20 For a far more careful and            produced by the defendants, notwithstanding
      reasoned approach taken by another            the plaintiffs' several demands for production
      board of directors faced with the             before as well as during trial. No acceptable
      pressures of a hostile tender offer, see      explanation of this failure to produce
      Pogostin v. Rice, supra at 623-627.           documents has been given to either the Trial
                                                    Court or this Court. Significantly, [**51]
                                                    neither the defendants nor their counsel have
   (2)                                              made the affirmative representation that this
    This brings us to the post-September 20         critical document has been produced. Thus, the
"market test" upon which the defendants             Court is deprived of the best evidence on which
ultimately rely to confirm the reasonableness of    to judge the merits of the defendants' position
their September 20 decision to accept the           as to the care and attention which they gave to
Pritzker proposal. In this connection, the          the terms of the Agreement on September 20.
directors present a two-part argument: (a) that         Van Gorkom states that the Agreement as
by making a "market test" of Pritzker's $55 per     submitted incorporated the ingredients for a
share offer a condition of their September 20       market test by authorizing Trans Union to
decision to accept his offer, they cannot be        receive competing offers over the next 90-day
found to have acted impulsively or in an            period.     However, he concedes that the
uninformed manner on September 20; and (b)          Agreement barred Trans Union from actively
that the adequacy of the $17 premium for sale       soliciting such offers and from furnishing to
of the Company was conclusively established         interested parties any information about the
over the following 90 to 120 days by the most       Company other than that already in the public
reliable evidence available -- the marketplace.     domain. Whether the original Agreement of
[**50] Thus, the defendants impliedly contend       September 20 went so far as to authorize Trans
that the "market test" eliminated the need for      Union to receive competitive proposals is
the Board to perform any other form of fairness     arguable. The defendants' unexplained failure
test either on September 20, or thereafter.         to produce and identify the original Merger
    Again, the facts of record do not support the   Agreement permits the logical inference that
defendants' argument. There is no evidence:         the instrument would not support their
(a) that the Merger Agreement was effectively       assertions in this regard. Wilmington Trust Co.
amended to give the Board freedom to put            v. General Motors Corp., Del. Supr., 29 Del.
Trans Union up for auction sale to the highest      Ch. 572, 51 A.2d 584, 593 (1947); II Wigmore
bidder; or (b) that a public auction was in fact    on Evidence § 291 (3d ed. [**52] 1940). It is
permitted to occur. The minutes of the Board        a well established principle that [HN15] the
meeting make no reference to any of this.           production of weak evidence when strong is, or
                                                                                            Page 17
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
should have been, available can lead only to the    GL acknowledges that Trans Union directors
conclusion that the strong would have been          may have a competing fiduciary obligation to
adverse. Interstate Circuit v. United States,       the shareholders under certain circumstances.
306 U.S. 208, 226, [*879] 59 S. Ct. 467, 83 L.
Ed. 610 (1939); Deberry v. State, Del.Supr.,        Clearly, this language on its face cannot be
457 A.2d 744, 754 (1983). Van Gorkom,               construed as incorporating either of the two
conceding that he never read the Agreement,         "conditions" described above: either the right to
stated that he was relying upon his                 accept a better offer or the right to distribute
understanding that, under corporate law,            proprietary information to third parties. [**54]
directors always have an inherent right, as well    The logical witness for the defendants to call to
as a fiduciary duty, to accept a better offer       confirm their construction of this clause of the
notwithstanding an existing contractual             Agreement would have been Trans Union's
commitment by the Board. (See the discussion        outside attorney, James Brennan.             The
infra, part III B (3) at p. 55.)                    defendants' failure, without explanation, to call
                                                    this witness again permits the logical inference
    The defendant directors assert that they
                                                    that his testimony would not have been helpful
"insisted" upon including two amendments to
                                                    to them. The further fact that the directors
the Agreement, thereby permitting a market
                                                    adjourned, rather than recessed, the meeting
test: (1) to give Trans Union the right to accept
                                                    without incorporating in the Agreement these
a better offer; and (2) to reserve to Trans Union
                                                    important "conditions" further weakens the
the right to distribute proprietary information
                                                    defendants' position. As has been noted,
on the Company to alternative bidders. Yet,
                                                    nothing in the Board's Minutes supports these
the defendants concede that they did not seek to
                                                    claims. No reference to either of the so-called
amend the Agreement to permit Trans Union to
                                                    "conditions" or of Trans Union's reserved right
solicit competing offers.
                                                    to test the market appears in any notes of the
    Several of Trans Union's outside directors      Board meeting or in the Board Resolution
[**53]       resolutely maintained that the         accepting the Pritzker offer or in the Minutes of
Agreement as submitted was approved on the          the meeting itself. That evening, in the midst
understanding that, "if we got a better deal, we    of a formal party which he hosted for the
had a right to take it." Director Johnson so        opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera, Van
testified; but he then added, "And if they didn't   Gorkom executed the Merger Agreement
put that in the agreement, then the management      without he or any other member of the Board
did not carry out the conclusion of the Board.      having read the instruments.
And I just don't know whether they did or not."
                                                        The defendants attempt to downplay the
The only clause in the Agreement as finally
                                                    significance of the prohibition against Trans
executed to which the defendants can point as
                                                    Union's actively soliciting competing offers by
"keeping the door open" is the following
                                                    [**55] arguing that the directors "understood
underlined statement found in subparagraph (a)
                                                    that the entire financial community would
of section 2.03 of the Merger Agreement as
                                                    know that Trans Union was for sale upon the
                                                    announcement of the Pritzker offer, and anyone
                                                    desiring to make a better offer was free to do
The Board of Directors shall recommend to the       so." Yet, the press release issued on September
stockholders of Trans Union that they approve       22, with the authorization of the Board, stated
and adopt the Merger Agreement ('the                that Trans Union had entered into "definitive
stockholders' approval') and to use its best        agreements" with the Pritzkers; and the press
efforts to obtain the requisite votes therefor.     release did not even disclose Trans Union's
                                                                                            Page 18
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
limited right to receive and accept higher          subsidiary's oil and gas interests. The Court
offers. Accompanying this press release was a       [**57]       found those factors denoting
further public announcement that Pritzker had       competence to be outweighed by evidence of
been granted an option to purchase at any time      gross negligence; that management in effect
one million shares of [*880] Trans Union's          sprang the deal on the board by negotiating the
capital stock at 75 cents above the then-current    asset sale without informing the board; that the
price per share.                                    buyer intended to "force a quick decision" by
                                                    the board; that the board meeting was called on
    Thus, notwithstanding what several of the
                                                    only one-and-a-half days' notice; that its
outside directors later claimed to have
                                                    outside directors were not notified of the
"thought" occurred at the meeting, the record
                                                    meeting's purpose; that during a meeting
compels the conclusion that Trans Union's
                                                    spanning "a couple of hours" a sale of assets
Board had no rational basis to conclude on
                                                    worth $480 million was approved; and that the
September 20 or in the days immediately
following, that the Board's acceptance of           Board failed to obtain a current appraisal of its
                                                    oil and gas interests. The analogy of Signal to
Pritzker's offer was conditioned on (1) a
                                                    the case at bar is significant.
"market test" of the offer; and (2) the Board's
right to withdraw from the Pritzker Agreement
and accept any higher [**56] offer received                   n21 Trans Union's five "inside"
before the shareholder meeting.                           directors had backgrounds in law and
   (3)                                                    accounting, 116 years of collective
                                                          employment by the Company and 68
    The directors' unfounded reliance on both
                                                          years of combined experience on its
the premium and the market test as the basis for
                                                          Board. Trans Union's five "outside"
accepting the Pritzker proposal undermines the
                                                          directors included four chief executives
defendants' remaining contention that the
                                                          of major corporations and an economist
Board's      collective      experience       and
                                                          who was a former dean of a major school
sophistication was a sufficient basis for finding
                                                          of business and chancellor of a
that it reached its September 20 decision with
                                                          university. The "outside" directors had
informed, reasonable deliberation. n21
                                                          78 years of combined experience as chief
Compare Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc.,
                                                          executive officers of major corporations
Del. Ch., 316 A.2d 599 (1974), aff'd per
                                                          and 50 years of cumulative experience as
curiam, Del. Supr., 316 A.2d 619 (1974).
                                                          directors of Trans Union.           Thus,
There, the Court of Chancery preliminarily
                                                          defendants argue that the Board was
enjoined a board's sale of stock of its wholly-
                                                          eminently qualified to reach an informed
owned subsidiary for an alleged grossly
                                                          judgment on the proposed "sale" of Trans
inadequate price. It did so based on a finding
                                                          Union notwithstanding their lack of any
that the business judgment rule had been
                                                          advance notice of the proposal, the
pierced for failure of management to give its
                                                          shortness of their deliberation, and their
board "the opportunity to make a reasonable
                                                          determination not to consult with their
and reasoned decision." 316 A.2d at 615. The
                                                          investment banker or to obtain a fairness
Court there reached this result notwithstanding
the board's sophistication and experience; the
company's need of immediate cash; and the
board's need to act promptly due to the impact      [**58]
of an energy crisis on the value of the                (4)
underlying assets being sold -- all of its
                                                                                              Page 19
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
     Part of the defense is based on a claim that         officers, certain experts and books and
the directors relied on legal advice rendered at          records of the company.
the September 20 meeting by James Brennan,
Esquire, who was present at Van Gorkom's
request. Unfortunately, Brennan did not appear          ***We conclude that Trans Union's
and testify at trial even though his firm           Board was grossly negligent in that it failed
participated in the defense of this action. There   to act with informed reasonable deliberation
is no contemporaneous evidence of the advice        in agreeing to the Pritzker merger proposal
given by Brennan on September 20, only the          on September 20; and we further conclude
later deposition and trial testimony of certain     that the Trial Court erred as a matter of law
directors as to their recollections or              in failing [**60] to address that question
understanding of what was said at the meeting.      before determining whether the directors'
Since counsel did not testify, and the advice       later conduct was sufficient to cure its initial
attributed to Brennan is hearsay received by the    error.
Trial Court over the plaintiffs' objections, we         A second claim is that counsel advised the
consider it only in the context of the directors'   Board it would be subject to lawsuits if it
present claims. In fairness to counsel, we make     rejected the $55 per share offer. It is, of course,
no findings that the advice attributed to him       a fact of corporate life that today when faced
was in fact given. We focus solely on the           with difficult or sensitive issues, directors often
efficacy of the [*881] defendants' claims,          are subject to suit, irrespective of the decisions
made months and years later, in an effort to        they make.          However, counsel's mere
extricate themselves from liability.                acknowledgement of this circumstance cannot
    Several defendants testified that Brennan       be rationally translated into a justification for a
advised them that Delaware law did not require      board permitting itself to be stampeded into a
a fairness opinion or an outside valuation of the   patently unadvised act. While suit might result
Company before the Board could act on the           from the rejection of a merger or tender offer,
Pritzker [**59] proposal. If given, the advice      Delaware law makes clear that a board acting
was correct. However, that did not end the          within the ambit of the business judgment rule
matter. Unless the directors had before them        faces no ultimate liability. Pogostin v. Rice,
adequate information regarding the intrinsic        supra. Thus, we cannot conclude that the mere
value of the Company, upon which a proper           threat of litigation, acknowledged by counsel,
exercise of business judgment could be made,        constitutes either legal advice or any valid basis
mere advice of this type is meaningless; and,       upon which to pursue an uninformed course.
given this record of the defendants' failures, it       Since we conclude that Brennan's purported
constitutes no defense here. n22                    advice is of no consequence to the defense of
                                                    this case, it is unnecessary for us to invoke the
                                                    adverse inferences which may be attributable
          n22 Nonetheless, we are satisfied that    [**61] to one failing to appear at trial and
      in an appropriate factual context a proper    testify.
      exercise of business judgment may
      include, as one of its aspects, reasonable       …
      reliance upon the advice of counsel. This        IV.
      is wholly outside the statutory
      protections of 8 Del.C. § 141 (e)                 Whether the directors of Trans Union
      involving reliance upon reports of            should be treated as one or individually in
                                                    terms of invoking the protection of the business
                                                                                            Page 20
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
judgment rule and the applicability of 8 Del.C.    independent Board of Directors. There were no
§ 141 (c) are questions which were not             allegations and no proof of fraud, bad faith, or
originally addressed by the parties in their       self-dealing by the directors ....
briefing of this case. This resulted in a
supplemental briefing and a second rehearing       The business judgment rule, which was
en banc on two basic questions: (a) whether        properly applied by the Chancellor, allows
one or more of the directors were deprived of      directors wide discretion in the matter of
the protection of the business judgment rule by    valuation and affords room for honest
evidence of an absence of good faith; and (b)      differences of opinion. [**86] In order to
whether one or more of the outside directors       prevail, plaintiffs had the heavy burden of
were [*889] entitled to invoke the protection      proving that the merger price was so grossly
of 8 Del.C. § 141 (e) by evidence of a             inadequate as to display itself as a badge of
reasonable, good faith reliance on "reports,"      fraud. That is a burden which plaintiffs have
including legal advice, rendered the Board by      not met.
certain inside directors and the Board's special
counsel, Brennan.                                  However, plaintiffs have not claimed, nor did
                                                   the Trial Court decide, that $55 was a grossly
    The      parties'    response,     including
                                                   inadequate price per share for sale of the
reargument, has led the majority of the
                                                   Company. That being so, the presumption that
Court to conclude: (1) that since all of the
                                                   a board's judgment as to adequacy of price
defendant directors, outside as well as inside,
                                                   represents an honest exercise of business
take a unified position, we are required to
                                                   judgment (absent proof that the sale price was
treat all of the directors as one as to whether
                                                   grossly inadequate) is irrelevant to the
they are entitled [**85] to the protection of
                                                   threshold question of whether an informed
the business judgment rule; and (2) that
                                                   judgment was reached. Compare Sinclair Oil
considerations of good faith, including the
                                                   Corp. v. Levien, Del. Supr., 280 A.2d 717
presumption that the directors acted in good
                                                   (1971); Kelly v. Bell, Del. Supr., 266 A.2d 878,
faith, are irrelevant in determining the
                                                   879 (1970); Cole v. National Cash Credit
threshold issue of whether the directors as a
                                                   Association, Del. Ch., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A.
Board exercised an informed business
                                                   183 (1931); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co.,
judgment. For the same reason, we must reject
defense counsel's ad hominem argument for          supra; Allen Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel &
                                                   Tube Co. of America, Del. Ch., 14 Del. Ch. 1,
affirmance: that reversal may result in a multi-
                                                   120 A. 486 (1923).
million dollar class award against the
defendants for having made an allegedly               V.
uninformed business judgment in a transaction          The defendants ultimately rely on the
not involving any personal gain, self-dealing or   stockholder vote of February 10 for
claim of bad faith.                                exoneration. The defendants contend that the
    In their brief, the defendants similarly       stockholders' "overwhelming" vote approving
mistake the business judgment rule's               the Pritzker Merger Agreement had [**87] the
application to this case by erroneously invoking   legal effect of curing any failure of the Board to
presumptions of good faith and "wide               reach an informed business judgment in its
discretion":                                       approval of the merger.
                                                       The parties tacitly agree that [HN16] a
This is a case in which plaintiff challenged the   discovered failure of the Board to reach an
exercise of business judgment by an                informed business judgment in approving the
                                                                                            Page 21
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
merger constitutes a voidable, rather than a        to approve the merger. Thus, the defendants
void, act. Hence, the merger can be sustained,      argue that when the Trial Court speaks of
notwithstanding the infirmity of the Board's        finding the Company's shareholders to have
action, if its approval by majority vote of the     been "fairly informed" by Management's proxy
shareholders is found to have been based on an      materials, [**89] the Court is speaking in
informed electorate. Cf. Michelson v. Duncan,       terms of "complete candor" as required under
Del. Supr., 407 A.2d 211 (1979), aff'g in part      Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Del. Supr., 383
and rev'g in part, Del. Ch., 386 A.2d 1144          A.2d 278 (1978).
(1978). The disagreement between the parties
                                                        The settled rule in Delaware is that
arises over: (1) the Board's burden of disclosing
                                                    [HN17] "where a majority of fully informed
to the shareholders all relevant and material
                                                    stockholders ratify action of even interested
information; and (2) the sufficiency of the
                                                    directors, an attack on the ratified
evidence as to whether the Board satisfied that     transaction normally must fail." Gerlach v.
burden.                                             Gillam, Del. Ch., 37 Del. Ch. 244, 139 A.2d
   On this issue the Trial Court summarily          591, 593 (1958). The question of whether
concluded "that the stockholders of Trans           shareholders have been fully informed such
Union were fairly informed as to the pending        that their vote can be said to ratify director
merger. ..." The Court provided no [*890]           action, "turns on the fairness and completeness
supportive reasoning nor did the Court make         of the proxy materials submitted by the
any reference to the evidence of record.            management to the ... shareholders." Michelson
                                                    v. Duncan, supra at 220. As this Court stated in
    The plaintiffs contend that the Court
                                                    Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., Del. Supr.,
committed error by applying an erroneous
                                                    33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57, 59 (1952):
[**88] disclosure standard of "adequacy"
rather than "completeness" in determining the
sufficiency of the Company's merger proxy           The entire atmosphere is freshened and a new
materials. The plaintiffs also argue that the       set of rules invoked where a formal approval
Board's proxy statements, both its original         has been given by a majority of independent,
statement dated January 19 and its                  fully informed stockholders. ...
supplemental statement dated January 26, were
incomplete in various material respects.            In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., supra, this
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that Management's    Court held that [HN18] corporate directors owe
supplemental statement (mailed "on or about"        to their stockholders a fiduciary duty to
January 27) was untimely either as a matter of      disclose all facts germane to the transaction at
law under 8 Del.C. § 251 (c), or untimely as a      issue in an atmosphere of complete [**90]
matter of equity and the requirements of            candor. We defined "germane" in the tender
complete candor and fair disclosure.                offer context as all "information such as a
                                                    reasonable stockholder would consider
     The defendants deny that the Court
                                                    important in deciding whether to sell or retain
committed legal or equitable error. On the
                                                    stock." Id. at 281. Accord Weinberger v. UOP,
question of the Board's burden of disclosure,
                                                    Inc., supra; Michelson v. Duncan, supra;
the defendants state that there was no dispute at
                                                    Schreiber v. Pennzoil Corp., Del. Ch., 419 A.2d
trial over the standard of disclosure required of
                                                    952 (1980). In reality, "germane" means
the Board; but the defendants concede that the
Board was required to disclose "all germane         material facts.
facts" which a reasonable shareholder would             Applying this standard to the record before
have considered important in deciding whether       us, we find that Trans Union's stockholders
                                                                                            Page 22
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
were not fully informed of all facts material to    the Company." What the Board failed to
their vote on the Pritzker Merger and that the      disclose to its stockholders was that the [**92]
Trial Court's ruling to the contrary is clearly     Board had not made any study of the intrinsic
erroneous. We list the material deficiencies in     or inherent worth of the Company; nor had the
the proxy materials:                                Board even discussed the inherent value of the
                                                    Company prior to approving the merger on
    (1) The fact that the Board had no
                                                    September 20, or at either of the subsequent
reasonably adequate information indicative of
                                                    meetings on October 8 or January 26. Neither
the intrinsic value of the Company, other than a
                                                    in its Original Proxy Statement nor in its
concededly depressed market price, was
                                                    Supplemental Proxy did the Board disclose that
without question material to the shareholders
                                                    it had no information before it, beyond the
voting on the merger. See Weinberger, supra at
                                                    premium-over-market and the price/earnings
709 (insiders' report that cash-out merger price
                                                    ratio, on which to determine the fair value of
up to $24 was good investment held material);
Michelson, supra at 224 (alleged terms and          the Company as a whole.
intent of stock option plan held not germane);         (2) We find false and misleading the
Schreiber, supra at 959 (management fee of          Board's characterization of the Romans report
$650,000 held germane). [**91]                      in the Supplemental Proxy Statement. The
                                                    Supplemental Proxy stated:
    Accordingly, the Board's lack of valuation
information should have been disclosed.
Instead, the directors cloaked the absence of       At the September 20, 1980 meeting of the
such information in both the Proxy Statement        Board of Directors of Trans Union, Mr.
and the Supplemental         [*891]      Proxy      Romans indicated that while he could not say
Statement. Through artful drafting, noticeably      that $55,00 per share was an unfair price, he
absent at the September 20 meeting, both            had prepared a preliminary report which
documents create the impression that the Board      reflected that the value of the Company was in
knew the intrinsic worth of the Company. In         the range of $55.00 to $65.00 per share.
particular, the Original Proxy Statement
contained the following:                            Nowhere does the Board disclose that Romans
                                                    stated to the Board that his calculations were
                                                    made in a "search for ways to justify a price in
although the Board of Directors regards the
                                                    connection with" a leveraged buy-out
intrinsic value of the Company's assets to be
                                                    transaction, "rather than to say what [**93] the
significantly greater than their book value ...,
                                                    shares are worth," and that he stated to the
systematic liquidation of such a large and
                                                    Board that his conclusion thus arrived at "was
complex entity as Trans Union is simply not
                                                    not the same thing as saying that I have a
regarded as a feasible method of realizing its
                                                    valuation of the Company at X dollars." Such
inherent value.        Therefore, a business
                                                    information would have been material to a
combination such as the merger would seem to
                                                    reasonable shareholder because it tended to
be the only practicable way in which the
                                                    invalidate the fairness of the merger price of
stockholders could realize the value of the
                                                    $55. Furthermore, defendants again failed to
                                                    disclose the absence of valuation information,
                                                    but still made repeated reference to the
The Proxy stated further that "in the view of the
Board of Directors ..., the prices at which the     "substantial premium."
Company's common stock has traded in recent             (3) We find misleading the Board's
years have not reflected the inherent value of      references to the "substantial" premium offered.
                                                                                            Page 23
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
The Board gave as their primary reason in           Board on January 26; much was information
support of the merger the "substantial              known or reasonably available before January
premium" shareholders would receive. But the        21 but not revealed in the Original Proxy
Board did not disclose its failure to assess the    Statement. Yet, the stockholders were not
premium offered in terms of other relevant          informed of these facts. Included in the "new"
valuation techniques, thereby rendering             matter first disclosed in the Supplemental
questionable its determination as to the            Proxy Statement were the following:
substantiality of the premium over an                  (a) The fact that prior to September 20,
admittedly depressed stock market price.            1980, no Board member or member of Senior
    (4) We find the Board's recital in the          Management, except Chelberg and Peterson,
Supplemental Proxy of certain events preceding      knew that Van Gorkom had discussed a
the September 20 meeting to be incomplete and       possible merger with Pritzker;
misleading.    It is beyond dispute that a              (b) The fact that the sale price of $55 per
reasonable stockholder would have considered        share had been suggested initially to Pritzker by
material the fact that Van Gorkom not only          Van Gorkom;
[**94] suggested the $55 price to Pritzker, but
also that he chose the figure because it made           (c) The fact that the Board had not sought
feasible a leveraged buy-out. The directors         an independent fairness opinion;
disclosed that Van Gorkom suggested the $55             (d) The fact that Romans and several
price to Pritzker. But the Board misled the         members of Senior Management had indicated
shareholders when they described the basis of       concern at the September 20 Senior
Van Gorkom's suggestion as follows:                 Management meeting that the $55 per share
                                                    price was inadequate and had stated that a
Such suggestion was based, at least in part, on     higher price should and could be obtained; and
Mr. Van Gorkom's belief that loans could be             (e) The fact that Romans had advised the
obtained from institutional lenders (together       Board at its meeting on September 20 that he
with about a $200 million [*892] equity             and his department had prepared a study which
contribution) which would justify the payment       indicated that the Company had a value in the
of such price, ...                                  range of $55 to $65 per share, and that he could
                                                    not advise the Board that the [**96] $55 per
Although by January 26, the directors knew the      share offer which Pritzker made was unfair.
basis of the $55 figure, they did not disclose
that Van Gorkom chose the $55 price because             ***The parties differ over whether the
that figure would enable Pritzker to both           notice requirements of 8 Del.C. § 251 (c) apply
finance the purchase of Trans Union through a       to the mailing date of supplemental proxy
leveraged buy-out and, within five years,           material or that of the original proxy material.
substantially repay the loan out of the cash flow   n33 The Trial Court summarily disposed of the
generated by the Company's operations.              notice issue, stating it was "satisfied that the
                                                    proxy material furnished to Trans Union
    (5) The Board's Supplemental Proxy              stockholders ... fairly presented the question to
Statement, mailed on or after January 27, added     be voted on at the February 10, 1981 meeting."
significant new matter, material to the proposal
to be voted on February 10, which was not
contained in the Original Proxy Statement.                   n33 The pertinent provisions of 8
Some of this new matter was information                   Del.C. § 251 (c) provide:
which had only been [**95] disclosed to the
                                                                                             Page 24
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
          (c) The agreement required by                  Since     we      have     concluded     that
      subsection (b) shall be submitted to the       Management's Supplemental Proxy Statement
      stockholders     of     each     constituent   does not meet the Delaware disclosure standard
      corporation at an annual or special            of "complete candor" under Lynch v. Vickers,
      meeting thereof for the purpose of acting      supra, it is unnecessary for us to address the
      on the agreement. Due notice of the            plaintiffs' legal argument as to the proper
      time, place and purpose of the meeting         construction of § 251 (c). However, we do
      shall be mailed to each holder of stock,       find it advisable to express the view that, in an
      whether voting or non-voting, of the           appropriate case, an otherwise candid proxy
      corporation at his address as it appears on    statement may be so untimely as to defeat its
      the records of the corporation, at least 20    purpose of meeting the needs of a fully
      days prior to the date of the meeting. ...     informed electorate.
                                                         In this case, the Board's ultimate disclosure
                                                     as contained in the Supplemental Proxy
     The defendants [**97] argue that the notice
                                                     Statement related either to information readily
provisions of § 251 (c) must be construed as
                                                     accessible to all of the directors if they had
requiring only that stockholders receive notice
                                                     asked the right questions, or was information
of the time, place, and purpose of a meeting to
                                                     already at their disposal.        In short, the
consider a merger at least 20 days prior to such
                                                     information disclosed by the Supplemental
meeting; and since the Original Proxy
                                                     Proxy Statement was information which the
Statement was disseminated more than 20 days
                                                     defendant directors knew or should have
before the meeting, the defendants urge
                                                     known at the time the first Proxy Statement
affirmance of the Trial Court's ruling as correct
                                                     was issued. The defendants simply failed in
as a matter of statutory construction.
                                                     their original duty of knowing, sharing, and
Apparently, the question has not been
                                                     disclosing information [**99]          that was
addressed by either the Court of Chancery or
                                                     material and reasonably available for their
this Court; and authority in other jurisdictions
                                                     discovery. They compounded that failure by
is limited. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l
                                                     their continued lack of candor in the
Controls Corp., 2d Cir., 409 F.2d 937, 944
                                                     Supplemental Proxy Statement. While we need
(1969) (holding that a tender offeror's
                                                     not decide the issue here, we are satisfied that,
September 16, 1968 correction of a previous
                                                     in an appropriate case, a completely candid but
misstatement, combined with an offer of
withdrawal running for eight days until              belated disclosure of information long known
                                                     or readily available to a board could raise
September 24, 1968, was sufficient to cure past
                                                     serious issues of inequitable conduct. [HN19]
violations and eliminate any need for
                                                     Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., Del.
rescission); Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter
                                                     Supr., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (1971).
Co., D.R.I., 341 F. Supp. 508, 513-14 (1972),
aff'd, 1st Cir., 482 F.2d 421 (1973) [*893]              The burden must fall on defendants who
(permitting     correction   of     a    material    claim ratification based on shareholder vote to
misstatement by a mailing to stockholders            establish that the shareholder approval resulted
within seven days of a tender offer withdrawal       from a fully informed electorate. On the record
date). Both Electronic [**98] and Nicholson          before us, it is clear that the Board failed to
are federal security cases not arising under 8       meet that burden. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
Del.C. § 251 (c) and they are otherwise              supra at 703; Michelson v. Dunan, supra.
distinguishable from this case on their facts.           ***For the foregoing reasons, we conclude
                                                     that the director defendants breached their
                                                                                                Page 25
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
fiduciary duty of candor by their failure to         [*894] [**101] opinion great emphasis is
make true and correct disclosures of all             directed only to the negative, with nothing
information they had, or should have had,            more than lip service granted the positive
material to the transaction submitted for            aspects of this case. In my opinion Chancellor
stockholder approval.                                Marvel (retired) should have been affirmed.
                                                     The Chancellor's opinion was the product of
                                                     well reasoned conclusions, based upon a sound
    To summarize: we hold that the directors         deductive process, clearly supported by the
of Trans Union breached their fiduciary              evidence and entitled to deference in this
duty to their [**100] stockholders (1) by            appeal. Because of my diametrical opposition
their failure to inform themselves of all            to all evidentiary conclusions of the majority, I
information reasonably available to them             respectfully dissent.
and relevant to their decision to recommend
                                                         It would serve no useful purpose,
the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure
                                                     particularly at this late date, for me to dissent at
to disclose all material information such as a
                                                     great length. I restrain myself from doing so,
reasonable stockholder would consider
                                                     but feel compelled to at least point out what I
important in deciding whether to approve
                                                     consider to be the most glaring deficiencies in
the Pritzker offer.
                                                     the majority opinion. The majority has spoken
    We hold, therefore, that the Trial Court         and has effectively said that Trans Union's
committed reversible error in applying the           Directors have been the victims of a "fast
business judgment rule in favor of the director      shuffle" by Van Gorkom and Pritzker. That is
defendants in this case.                             the beginning of the majority's comedy of
    On remand, the Court of Chancery shall           errors. The first and most important error made
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine          is the majority's assessment of the directors'
the fair value of the shares represented by          knowledge of the affairs of Trans Union and
the plaintiffs' class, based on the intrinsic        their combined ability to act in this situation
value of Trans Union on September 20, 1980.          under the protection of the business judgment
Such valuation shall be made in accordance           rule.
with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra at 712-              Trans [**102] Union's Board of Directors
715. Thereafter, an award of damages may be          consisted of ten men, five of whom were
entered to the extent that the fair value of Trans   "inside" directors and five of whom were
Union exceeds $55 per share.                         "outside" directors. The "inside" directors were
   ***REVERSED and REMANDED for                      Van Gorkom, Chelberg, Bonser, William B.
proceedings consistent herewith.                     Browder, Senior Vice-President-Law, and
                                                     Thomas P. O'Boyle, Senior Vice-President-
                                                     Administration. At the time the merger was
DISSENTBY:                                           proposed the inside five directors had
   McNEILLY; CHRISTIE                                collectively been employed by the Company
                                                     for 116 years and had 68 years of combined
DISSENT:                                             experience as directors. The "outside" directors
                                                     were A. W. Wallis, William B. Johnson, Joseph
    McNeilly, Justice, dissenting:                   B. Lanterman, Graham J. Morgan and Robert
   The majority opinion reads like an                W. Reneker. With the exception of Wallis,
advocate's closing address to a hostile jury.        these were all chief executive officers of
And I say that not lightly. Throughout the           Chicago based corporations that were at least as
                                                                                           Page 26
                           488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                       46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
large as Trans Union. The five "outside"              Directors of this caliber are not ordinarily
directors had 78 years of combined experience     taken in by a "fast shuffle". I submit they were
as chief executive officers, and 53 years         not taken into this multi-million dollar
cumulative service as Trans Union directors.      corporate transaction without being fully
                                                  informed and aware of the state of the art as it
    The inside directors wear their badge of
                                                  pertained to the entire corporate panoroma of
expertise in the corporate affairs of Trans
                                                  Trans Union. True, even [*895] directors
Union on their sleeves. But what about the
                                                  such as these, with their business acumen,
outsiders? Dr. Wallis is or was an economist
                                                  interest and expertise, can go astray. I do not
and math statistician, a professor of economics
                                                  believe that to be the case here. These men
at Yale University, dean of the graduate school
                                                  knew Trans Union like the back of their hands
of business at the University of [**103]
                                                  and were more than well qualified to make on
Chicago, and Chancellor of the University of
                                                  the spot informed business judgments
Rochester. Dr. Wallis had been on the Board
of Trans Union since 1962. He also was on the     concerning the affairs of Trans Union including
                                                  a 100% sale of the corporation. Lest we forget,
Board of Bausch & Lomb, Kodak,
                                                  the corporate world of then and now operates
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
                                                  on what is so aptly referred to as "the fast
Standard Oil and others.
                                                  track". These men were at the time an integral
    William B. Johnson is a University of         part of that world, all professional business
Pennsylvania law graduate, President of           men, not intellectual figureheads.
Railway Express until 1966, Chairman and
                                                       The majority of this Court holds that the
Chief Executive of I.C. Industries Holding
                                                  Board's decision, reached on September 20,
Company, and member of Trans Union's Board
                                                  1980, to approve the merger was not the
since 1968.
                                                  product of an informed business judgment, that
     Joseph Lanterman, a Certified Public         the Board's subsequent efforts to amend the
Accountant, is or was President and Chief         Merger Agreement and take other curative
Executive of American Steel, on the Board of      action were legally and factually [**105]
International Harvester, Peoples Energy,          ineffectual, and that the Board did not deal with
Illinois Bell Telephone, Harris Bank and Trust    complete candor with the stockholders by
Company, Kemper Insurance Company and a           failing to disclose all material facts, which they
director of Trans Union for four years.           knew or should have known, before securing
    Graham Morgan is a chemist, was               the stockholders' approval of the merger. I
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of U.S.      disagree.
Gypsum, and in the 17 and 18 years prior to the       At the time of the September 20, 1980
Trans Union transaction had been involved in      meeting the Board was acutely aware of Trans
31 or 32 corporate takeovers.                     Union and its prospects. The problems created
   Robert Reneker attended University of          by accumulated investment tax credits and
Chicago and Harvard Business Schools. He          accelerated depreciation were discussed
was President and Chief Executive of Swift and    repeatedly at Board meetings, and all of the
Company, director of Trans Union since 1971,      directors understood the problem thoroughly.
and member of the Boards of seven other           Moreover, at the July, 1980 Board meeting the
corporations including U.S. Gypsum and the        directors had reviewed Trans Union's newly
Chicago [**104] Tribune.                          prepared five-year forecast, and at the August,
                                                  1980 meeting Van Gorkom presented the
                                                  results of a comprehensive study of Trans
                                                                                             Page 27
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
Union made by The Boston Consulting Group.           provided that Trans Union might unilaterally
This study was prepared over an 18 month             terminate the proposed merger with the Pritzker
period and consisted of a detailed analysis of       company in the event that prior to February 10,
all Trans Union subsidiaries, including              1981 there existed a definitive agreement
competitiveness, profitability, cash throw-off,      [**108] with a third party for a merger,
cash consumption, technical competence and           consolidation, sale of assets, or purchase or
future prospects for contribution to Trans           exchange of Trans Union stock which was
Union's combined net income.                         more favorable for the stockholders of Trans
At the September 20 meeting Van Gorkom               Union than the Pritzker offer and which was
reviewed all aspects of the proposed transaction     conditioned upon receipt of stockholder
and repeated [**106] the explanation of the          approval and the absence of an injunction
Pritzker offer he had earlier given to senior        against its consummation.
management. Having heard Van Gorkom's                    Following the October 8 board meeting of
explanation of the Pritzker's offer, and             Trans Union, the investment banking firm of
Brennan's explanation of the merger documents        Salomon Brothers was retained by the
the directors discussed the matter. Out of this      corporation to search for better offers than that
discussion arose an insistence on the part of the    of the Pritzkers, Salomon Brothers being
directors that two modifications to the offer be     charged with the responsibility of doing
made. First, they required that any potential        "whatever possible to see if there is a superior
competing bidder be given access to the same         bid in the marketplace over a bid that is on the
information concerning Trans Union that had          table for Trans Union". In undertaking such
been provided to the Pritzkers. Second, the          project, it was agreed that Salomon Brothers
merger documents were to be modified to              would be paid the amount of $500,000 to cover
reflect the fact that the directors could accept a
                                                     its expenses as well as a fee equal to 3/8ths of
better offer and would not be required to            1% of the aggregate fair market value of the
recommend the Pritzker offer if a better offer       consideration to be received by the company in
was made.                                            the case of a merger or the like, which meant
                                                     that in the event Salomon Brothers should find
… the evidence is clear that the intention           a buyer willing to pay a price of $56.00 a share
underlying that language was to make specific        instead of $55.00, such firm would receive a
the right that the directors assumed they had,       fee of roughly $2,650,000 plus disbursements.
that is, to accept any offer that they thought
was better, and not to recommend the Pritzker             As the first step in [**109] proceeding to
offer in the face of a better one. At the            carry out its commitment, Salomon Brothers
conclusion of the meeting, the proposed merger       had a brochure prepared, which set forth Trans
was approved.                                        Union's financial history, described the
                                                     company's business in detail and set forth
    At a subsequent meeting on October 8,            Trans Union's operating and financial
1981 the directors, with the consent of the          projections. Salomon Brothers also prepared a
Pritzkers, amended the Merger Agreement so           list of over 150 companies which it believed
as to establish the right of Trans Union to          might be suitable merger partners, and while
solicit as well as to receive higher bids, [*896]    four of such companies, namely, General
although the Pritzkers insisted that their merger    Electric, Borg-Warner, Bendix, and Genstar,
proposal be presented to the stockholders at the     Ltd. showed some interest in such a merger,
same time that the proposal of any third party       none made a firm proposal to Trans Union and
was presented. A second amendment, which             only General Electric showed a sustained
became effective on October 10, 1981, further
                                                                                             Page 28
                            488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                        46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
interest. n1 As matters transpired, no firm offer   in which the merger would be voted. On
which bettered the Pritzker offer of $55 per        January 26, 1981 the directors held their
share was ever made.                                regular meeting. At this meeting the Board
                                                    discussed the instant merger as well as all
                                                    events, including this litigation, surrounding it.
          n1 Shortly after the announcement of      At the conclusion of the meeting the Board
      the proposed merger in September senior       unanimously voted to recommend to the
      members of Trans Union's management           stockholders that they approve the merger.
      got in touch with KKR to discuss their        Additionally, the directors reviewed and
      possible participation in a leverage          approved a Supplemental Proxy Statement
      buyout scheme. On December 2, 1980            which, among other things, advised the
      KKR through Henry Kravis actually             stockholders of what had occurred at the instant
      made a bid of $60.00 per share for Trans      meeting and of the fact that General Electric
      Union stock on December 2, 1980 but           had decided not to make an offer. On February
      the offer was withdrawn three hours after     10, 1981 [*897] the stockholders of Trans
      it was made because of complications          Union met pursuant to notice and voted
      arising out of negotiations with the          overwhelmingly in favor of the Pritzker
      Reichman family, extremely wealthy            merger, 89% of the votes cast being in favor of
      Canadians and a change of attitude            it.
      toward the leveraged buyout scheme, by
      Jack Kruzenga, the member of senior               I have no quarrel with the majority's
      management of Trans Union who most            analysis of the business judgment rule. It is
      likely would have been President and          the application of that rule to these facts
                                                    which is wrong. An overview of the entire
      Chief Operating Officer of the new
                                                    record, rather than the limited view of bits and
      company. Kruzenga was the President
                                                    pieces which the majority has exploded like
      and Chief Operating Officer of the seven
                                                    popcorn, convinces me [**111]          that the
      subsidiaries of Trans Union which
                                                    directors made an informed business judgment
      constituted the backbone of Trans Union
                                                    which was buttressed by their test of the
      as shown through exhaustive studies and
      analysis of Trans Union's intrinsic value
      on the market place by the respected              At the time of the September 20 meeting
      investment banking firm of Morgan             the 10 members of Trans Union's Board of
      Stanley. It is interesting to note that at    Directors were highly qualified and well
      no time during the market test period did     informed about the affairs and prospects of
      any of the 150 corporations contacted by      Trans Union. These directors were acutely
      Salomon Brothers complain of the time         aware of the historical problems facing Trans
      frame or availability of corporate records    Union which were caused by the tax laws.
      in order to make an independent               They had discussed these problems ad
      judgment of market value of 100% of           nauseam. In fact, within two months of the
      Trans Union.                                  September 20 meeting the board had reviewed
                                                    and discussed an outside study of the company
                                                    done by The Boston Consulting Group and an
                                                    internal five year fore-cast prepared by
    On January 21, 1981 a proxy statement was       management. At the September 20 meeting
sent to the shareholders of Trans Union             Van Gorkom presented the Pritzker offer, and
advising them of a February 10, 1981 meeting        the board then heard from James Brennan, the
                                                                                         Page 29
                           488 A.2d 858, *; 1985 Del. LEXIS 421, **;
                       46 A.L.R.4th 821; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,921
company's counsel in this matter, who                I respectfully dissent.
discussed the legal documents. Following this,        Considering the standard and scope of our
the Board directed that certain changes be made   review under Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287
in the merger documents. These changes made       A.2d 671, 673 (1972), I believe that the record
it clear that the Board was free to accept a      taken as a whole supports a conclusion that the
better offer than Pritzker's if one was made.     actions of the defendants are protected by the
The above facts reveal that the Board did         business judgment rule. Aronson v. Lewis, Del.
not act in a grossly negligent manner in          Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984); Pogostin v.
informing themselves of the relevant and          Rice, Del. Supr., 480 A.2d 619, 627 (1984). I
available facts [**112] before passing on the     also am satisfied that the record supports a
merger. To the contrary, this record reveals      conclusion that the defendants acted with the
that the directors acted with the utmost care     complete candor required by Lynch v. Vickers
in informing themselves of the relevant and       Energy Corp., Del. Supr., 383 A.2d 278 (1978).
available facts before passing on the merger.     Under the circumstances I would affirm the
   CHRISTIE, Justice, dissenting:                 judgment of the Court of Chancery.

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