MODERN HISTORY – Ireland Quotes
NOTE: To be able to properly reference these for prepared essays you will
 need to get the books to find the page numbers, etc. But these are good
                                 for exams.

                                 CATHOLICS / REPUBLICANS
   Aim “armed struggle to rid Ireland of the British invader.” Walsh
   Catholics felt “trapped…denied their Irish identity…cut off.” w/ Partition. Mallie & McKittrick
   “The Catholic community was politically isolated.” (1921 – 1970) Mallie & McKittrick
   Divis Street Riots (1964), Somme / Easter Rising Comm‟n‟s 1966 “were reminders that communal
    tensions in Northern Ireland could require the deployment of British troops …and the re-opening of
    the „Irish Question‟.” Dixon
   IRA’s Brit Campaign;
                          “the public consciousness would be galvanised – hopefully into action on a
                         British withdrawal.” Coogan
                          “The principal aim was not to kill, but in the bitterness after the end of the 6-
                         month ceasefire in 1975, the orders from Dublin switched to killing.” Coogan
                          “designed to underline the fact that Britain had not yet found an answer to the
                         Irish question.” Coogan
                          “spark off an unimaginable escalation of revenge.” Coogan
                          “absence of response from London had the effect of goading the IRA to see
                         just what action was required to provoke the response which they sought.”
                          Whitelaw‟s philosophy of “accept the casualties” “was a major factor in the
                         IRA‟s decision to have a bombing campaign in England – where the casualties
                         would not be „acceptable‟.” Coogan
   “The IRA seemed to be merely one component…of the Irish problem.” Coogan
   “To understand the IRA is to understand the Irish.” Coogan
   “the IRA blossomed into one of the major guerilla organisations to emerge since WWII.” Coogan
   “If the Catholic‟s stopped hating the Prods, where would the IRA be?” Moor
   “Discrimination and political inertia ensured both a continuity and a steady recruitment tot he IRA.”
   “The obvious analagies between the situation of the Irish Catholics and of the Palestinians…
    meant inevitable contact between the IRA, the PLO and other such organisations.” Coogan
   Bloody Sunday = “a propaganda victory for the Republicans.” = increased USA funding; Walsh

                                 PROTESTANTS / UNIONISTS
   Paisley (during Civil Rights) “appeared to be increasingly justified.” Dixon
   Of Paisley:           “the loudest political voice in Northern Ireland.” Coogan
                          “a dominant figure…with the Bible in one hand and both eyes on the ballot
                         box.” Coogan
                          “His anti-Catholicism was the purest and most virulent available.” Coogan
                          “did more than anyone else in Ireland … to „block the way‟ to a constitutional
                         solution of the problems.” Coogan
   1971 saw “the rise of the Ulster Volunteer Force to a grisly prominence.” Foster
   1990‟s for the first time “loyalist paramilitaries claimed as many victims as the IRA.” Rea & Wright
   Paramilitary Strategy = “more random and untargeted” with “no overall military strategy.” Ardagh
   “The view was that the IRA had full support within their communities.” Smith (Loyalist)

                                  BRITISH GOVT / N.I. GOVT
   “politicians operate under constraints.” (esp O‟Neill) Dixon
MODERN HISTORY – Ireland Quotes
   “The system survived for so long because of Unionism‟s monolithic strength, aided by divisions
    within nationalism, Westminster indifference and the impotence of the south.” Mallie & McKittrick
   “Britain considered the Irish question closed.” Mallie & McKittrick
   Roy Jenkins “argued that history showed, the English did not have a talent for solving the Irish
    problems.” Dixon
   “It has to be doubted whether even a more skilful leader or unionist govt might have been able to
    deliver reform in the face of such structural constraints.” Dixon
   “The British Govt has to share responsibility for creating the climate of constitutional uncertainly.”
   “instead of crippling the IRA, interment boosted its support.” Walsh

                                           CIVIL RIGHTS
   “the agenda was shifting away from civil rights and towards RUC brutality and the need to defend
    nationalist areas.” Dixon
   “the problem was defined as one of helping the Catholics who had suffered for decades under a
    discriminatory Protestant regime.” Mallie & McKittrick
   “Four principal issues which aroused strong Catholic protest during 1964-5.” Coogan
                 Employment, Industry, Railways, Education (incl. University conflict)
                 “More educated Catholics were the last thing the Unionist hierarchy wished to see
                coming out of Derry.” Coogan
   People such as Paisley, Cooke or Hannah, “in times of economic, political or sectarian tension
    arose in stentorian fashion to make a bad situation worse.” Coogan
   “Optimists … portraying it as a period in which Catholics were shifting their allegiances away from
    a united Ireland and towards….the Northern Ireland state.” Dixon
   “Pessimists … emphasise growing conflict over expanding state resources, the impoverishment of
    the Catholic working class and evidence of continuing sectarianism and rising nationalist
    sentiment.” Dixon
   “The Nationalist Party failed to put itself at the head of the civil rights movement and was
    subsequently marginalised when that movement took to the streets.” Dixon
   “The whole affair was a series of blunders and the violence resulted from a breakdown of control
    by the leaders of the march and the controllers of the police.” Purdie
   “the DCAC had been largely successful in policing and organising demonstrations, but in 1969 its
    grip weakened.” Dixon
   “Jack Lynch (Irish PM)… raising fears among unionists of a nationalist agenda behind the civil
    rights movement.” Dixon
   “the surge of antagonism and violence which followed the civil rights marches of Oct 1968 might
    suggest that the optimistic view of the community relations in the 1960‟s was rather superficial.”
   “only direct action appeared to bring about the desired results.” Dixon

                                         PEACE PROCESS
   “It was difficult to see where an agreement might be reached which was capable of being sold to
    both unionists and republicans.” Dixon
   “The British had to play a dual role.” = balance b/w unionists and republicans Dixon
   “Nationalists and unionists have, through politics, mobilisation and the use and threat of terror,
    attempted to shift the political agenda in their direction.” Dixon
   “The attempt to bring paramilitaries into politics has recognised… the power of street politics and
    violence.” Dixon
   “The possibility of a more democratic, open and informed debate about the future of Northern
    Ireland does exist.” Dixon
   Sunningdale 1973;
MODERN HISTORY – Ireland Quotes
               “a political figleaf to cover the real lack of will and hopelessness .. in the Labour
              government.” Coogan
               “still doubt as to whether the pro-power-sharing forces had sufficient support or a
              sufficiently favourable political environment in which to make such a deal work.” Dixon
   Feakle 1974;
               “the most important truce of the decade…the most effective peace movement of the
              decade.” Coogan
   Woman’s Peace Movt 1976;
               “the most publicised response to violence… the biggest mass movement of the
              decade.” Coogan
               “the appearance of being more anti-IRA than anti all forms of violence.” Coogan
               “was used by the Northern Ireland Office as a smokescreen for political inertia and
              ultimately left no lasting imprint on the campaign.” Coogan
               “lost credibility in nationalist areas very quickly….it did not seek to remedy the
              reasons…leadership began to collapse.” Adams
   Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985;
               “The Irish and British Govts both had an interest in redressing nationalist alienation
              and improving security co-operation in order to deal with the republican electoral and
              security threat.” Dixon
               “The Republic would accept the legitimacy of the Union while gaining an Irish
              dimension which would end nationalist alienation.” Dixon
               Thatcher claimed “The AIA failed to deliver any significant imporvement in the
              security situation, and its alienation of unionism led her to regret signing the
              Agreement.” Dixon
               Goodall believes “Thatcher‟s primary motivation in negotiating the AIA was to
              undermine the IRA and win the co-operation of the Republic against terrorism.” Dixon
   Downing Street Declaration 1993;
               “a masterpiece of diplomatic ambiguity.” Mallie & McKittrick

                                           IN GENERAL
   “The roots of the Irish problem lie deep in history.” Mallie & McKittrick
   “The two communities… regard themselves as separate entities.” Mallie & McKittrick
   “After a decade of this the problem had neither gone away nor been solved, but neither had there
    been any formal acknowledgement that they, or more importantly their cause, existed.” Coogan
   “One side wanted full-scale independence; the other a peaceful return to the status quo albeit to a
    reformed and more just one.” Coogan
   “cultural gap = meaningful understanding would have been difficult to arrive at anyhow.” Coogan
   “paramilitaries thrived on poverty.” Walsh
   “The younger unemployed of both communities were an easy target for recruitment.” Walsh

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