Yes a citizen of the United States is domicil in the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United States, or the federal enclaves within the several States

Document Sample
Yes a citizen of the United States is domicil in the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United States, or the federal enclaves within the several States Powered By Docstoc
					                    Yes a citizen of the United States
                is domicil in the District of Columbia,
    the territories and possessions of the United States,
                      or the federal enclaves within
                                the several States
                                   ©2011 Dan Goodman




  Before the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen of a State, was under Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America, a citizen of
the United States:

    “ . . . [I]t is insisted that this law deprives the plaintiff in error, a citizen of the
State of Mississippi, one of the privileges of a citizen in the State of Louisiana, and
therefore, is in contravention of the first clause of the second section of the fourth
article of the constitution, which provides that ‘the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.’ . . . .

     . . . The law does not discriminate between citizens of the State and other
persons; it discriminates between contracts only. Such discrimination has no
connection with the clause in the constitution now in question. If a law of Louisiana
were to give to the partners inter sese certain peculiar rights, provided they should
reside within the State, and carry on the partnership-trade there, we think it could
not be maintained that all copartners, citizens of the United States, residing and
doing business elsewhere, must have those peculiar rights by force of the
constitution of the United States, any more than it could be maintained that, because
a law of Louisiana gives certain damages on protested bills of exchange, drawn or
indorsed within that State, the same damages must be recoverable on bills drawn
elsewhere in favor of citizens of the United States.” Conner v. Elliot: 59 U.S. 591, at
592, 594 (1855).
http://books.google.com/books?id=RkcFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA592#v=onepage&q&f=false



  After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the
                                            - 1 -
Supreme Court held that a citizen of a State was separate and distinct from a citizen
of the United States:

      “Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of
the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respective
are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former
which are placed by this clause (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment)
under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they
may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the
amendment.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873).
http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false



In addition:

   “In the Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 36, the subject of the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of a
particular State, was treated by Mr. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the
court. He stated . . . that it was only privileges and immunities of the citizen of
the United States that were placed by the [Fourteenth] amendment under the
protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the privileges and immunities of
a citizen of a State, whatever they might be, were not intended to have any
additional protection by the paragraph in question, but they must rest for their
security and protection where they have heretofore rested.” Maxwell v. Dow: 176
U.S. 581, at 587 (1900).
http://books.google.com/books?id=8toGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA587#v=onepage&q&f=false



And:
   “. . . It is, then, to the Fourteenth Amendment that the advocates of the
congressional act must resort to find authority for its enactment, and to the first
section of that amendment, which is as follows: ‘All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.’

   In the first clause of this section, declaring who are citizens of the United States,
there is nothing which touches the subject under consideration. The second clause,
declaring that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which will abridge the

                                          - 2 -
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,’ is limited, according to
the decision of this court in Slaughter-House Cases, to such privileges and
immunities as belong to citizens of the United States, as distinguished from
those of citizens of the State.” Neal v. State of Delaware: 103 U.S. 370, at 406
(1880).
http://books.google.com/books?id=Y7wGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA406#v=onepage&q&f=false

  So now there is a citizen of a State and there is a citizen of the United States:

    “We come to the contention that the citizenship of Edwards was not averred in
the complaint or shown by the record, and hence jurisdiction did not appear.

   In answering the question, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the
controversy, we must put ourselves in the place of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and
decide the question with reference to the transcript of record in that court.

    Had the transcript shown nothing more as to the status of Edwards than the
averment of the complaint that he was a ‘resident of the State of Delaware,’ as such
an averment would not necessarily have imported that Edwards was a citizen of
Delaware, a negative answer would have been impelled by prior decisions. Mexican
Central Ry. Co. v. Duthie, 189 U.S. 76; Horne v. George H. Hammond Co., 155 U.S. 393;
Denny v. Pironi, 141 U.S. 121; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646. The whole record,
however, may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment of
citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon
diversity of citizenship, and if the requisite citizenship, is anywhere expressly
averred in the record, or facts are therein stated which in legal intendment
constitute such allegation, that is sufficient. Horne v. George H. Hammond Co., supra
and cases cited.

  As this is an action at law, we are bound to assume that the testimony of the
plaintiff contained in the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and recited to
have been given on the trial, was preserved in a bill of exceptions, which formed
part of the transcript of record filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Being a part of
the record, and proper to be resorted to in settling a question of the character of
that now under consideration, Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 648, we come to ascertain
what is established by the uncontradicted evidence referred to.

  In the first place, it shows that Edwards, prior to his employment on the New York
Sun and the New Haven Palladium, was legally domiciled in the State of Delaware.
Next, it demonstrates that he had no intention to abandon such domicil, for he
testified under oath as follows: ‘One of the reasons I left the New Haven Palladium
was, it was too far away from home. I lived in Delaware, and I had to go back and
forth. My family are over in Delaware.’ Now, it is elementary that, to effect a change
of one’s legal domicil, two things are indispensable: First, residence in a new

                                          - 3 -
domicil, and, second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made,
except facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is
insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work
the change. Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350.

   As Delaware must, then, be held to have been the legal domicil of Edwards at the
time he commenced this action, had it appeared that he was a citizen of the
United States, it would have resulted, by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that Edwards was also a citizen of the State of Delaware. Anderson
v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694. Be this as it may, however, Delaware being the legal domicil of
Edwards, it was impossible for him to have been a citizen of another State, District,
or Territory, and he must then have been either a citizen of Delaware or a citizen
or subject of a foreign State. In either of these contingencies, the Circuit Court
would have had jurisdiction over the controversy. But, in the light of the testimony,
we are satisfied that the averment in the complaint, that Edwards was a resident ‘of’
the State of Delaware, was intended to mean, and, reasonably construed, must be
interpreted as averring, that the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Delaware.
Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327, 331; Express Company v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342.” Sun
Printing & Publishing Association v. Edwards: 194 U.S. 377, at 381 thru 383 (1904).
http://books.google.com/books?id=tekGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA381#v=onepage&q&f=false



  A citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, is a
citizen of a particular State of the Union. As such he or she owes allegiance to the
particular State:

    “On the trial in the court below the validity of the discriminating provisions of
the statute of Virginia between her own corporations and corporations of other
States was assailed. It was contended that the statute in this particular was in
conflict with that clause of the Constitution which declares that ‘the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States,’ and the clause which declares that Congress shall have power ‘to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.’ The same
grounds are urged in this court for the reversal of the judgment.

    The answer which readily occurs to the objection founded upon the first clause
consists in the fact that corporations are not citizens within its meaning. The term
citizens as there used applies only to natural persons, members of the body
politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the
legislature has prescribed. It is true that it has been held that where contracts or
rights of property are to be enforced by or against corporations, the courts of the
United States will, for the purpose of maintaining jurisdiction, consider the
corporation as representing citizens of the State under the laws of which it is

                                          - 4 -
created, and to this extent will treat a corporation as a citizen within the clause of
the Constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies
between citizens of different States.” Paul v. State of Virginia: 75 U.S. (Wall. 8) 168,
at 177 thru 178 (1869).
http://books.google.com/books?id=-bwGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA177#v=onepage&q&f=false



  A citizen of the United States, under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is a
citizen of the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United
States government, and the federal enclaves within the several States of the Union.
Such a citizen owes allegiance to the United States:

    “This section [the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment]
contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and
naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are ‘all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’ The evident
meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the
jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political
jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate
to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the
other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of
birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually,
as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a
treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.” Elk v. Wilkins: 112 U.S. 94, at 101
thru 102 (1884).

http://books.google.com/books?id=rHEUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false

    “To be ‘completely subject’ to the political jurisdiction of the United States is to
be in no respect or degree subject to the political jurisdiction of any other
government.” United States v. Wong Kim Ark: 169 U.S. 649, at (706), 725
(dissenting opinion of Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justice Harlan) (1898).
http://books.google.com/books?id=4-sGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA725#v=onepage&q&f=false

  Each State of the Union has political jurisdiction also. Both before and after the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment:

    “The first proposition on which counsel insist, in support of the demurrer is, that
this court has no jurisdiction of the case, because it involves the consideration of
questions purely political; that is to say, that the main question to be decided is the
conflicting claims of the two States to the exercise of political jurisdiction and
sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of the two counties which are the
subject of dispute. . . . .

                                          - 5 -
    We consider, therefore, the established doctrine of this court to be, that it has
jurisdiction of questions of boundary between two States of this Union, and that this
jurisdiction is not defeated, because in deciding that question it becomes necessary
to examine into and construe compacts or agreements between those States, or
because the decree which the court may render, affects the territorial limits of the
political jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States which are parties to the
proceeding.” State of Virginia v. State of West Virginia: 78 U.S. 39, at 53 and 55
(1871).
http://books.google.com/books?id=zMEGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false

reaffirmed in United States v. Texas (143 U.S. 621, at 639 thru 640 1892):

    “In United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, the court, referring to Foster v. Neilson,
2 Pet. 253, said: ‘This court did not deem the settlement of boundaries a judicial but
a political question — that it was not its duty to lead, but to follow the action of the
other departments of the government.’ The same principles were recognized in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 and Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511.

    These authorities do not control the present case. They relate to questions of
boundary between independent nations, and have no application to a question of
that character arising between the General Government and one of the States
composing the Union, or between two States of the Union. By the Articles of
Confederation, Congress was made ‘the last resort on appeal in all disputes and
differences’ then subsisting or which thereafter might arise ‘between two or more
States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever;’ the authority
so conferred to be exercised by a special tribunal to be organized in the mode
prescribed in those Articles, and its judgment to be final and conclusive. Art. 9. At
the time of the adoption of the Constitution there existed, as this court said in Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 723, 724, controversies between eleven States,
in respect to boundaries, which had continued from the first settlement of the
colonies. The necessity for the creation of some tribunal for the settlement of these
and like controversies that might arise, under the new government to be formed,
must, therefore, have been perceived by the framers of the Constitution, and,
consequently, among the controversies to which the judicial power of the United
States was extended by the Constitution, we find those between two or more States.
And that a controversy between two or more States, in respect to boundary, is one
to which, under the Constitution, such judicial power extends, is no longer an open
question in this court. The cases of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; New
Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284, 290; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia,
17 How. 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How. 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39,
55; Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall. 395; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479; and
Nebraska v. Iowa, ante, 359, were all original suits, in this court, for the judicial
determination of disputed boundary lines between States. In New Jersey v. New
York, 5 Pet 284, 290, Chief Justice Marshall said: ‘It has then been settled by our

                                          - 6 -
predecessors, on great deliberation, that this court may exercise its original
jurisdiction in suits against a State, under the authority conferred by the
Constitution and existing acts of Congress.’ And in Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S.
39, 55, it was said by Mr. Justice Miller to be the established doctrine of this court ‘that
it has jurisdiction of questions of boundary between two States of this Union, and that
this jurisdiction is not defeated, because in deciding that question it becomes necessary
to examine into and construe compacts or agreements between those States, or
because the decree which the court may render, affects the territorial limits of the
political jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States which are parties to the
proceeding.’ So, in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 287, 288; ‘By the
Constitution, therefore, this court has original jurisdiction of suits brought by a State
against citizens of another State, as well as of controversies between two States. . . .
As to ”controversies between two or more States.” The most numerous class of
which this court has entertained jurisdiction is that of controversies between two
States as to the boundaries of their territory, such as were determined before the
Revolution by the King in Council, and under the Articles of Confederation (while
there was no national judiciary) by committees or commissioners appointed by
Congress.’ “

http://books.google.com/books?id=a-AGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA639#v=onepage&q&f=false

And in State of Missouri v. State of Illinois (180 U.S. 208, at 230 thru 231 1901):

    “In Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39, a bill was filed in this court to settle the
boundaries between the two States. There was a demurrer to the bill. In delivering
the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Miller said:

         ‘The first proposition on which counsel insist, in support of the demurrer is,
       that this court has no jurisdiction of the case, because it involves the
       consideration of questions purely political; that is to say, that the main question
       to be decided is the conflicting claims of the two States to the exercise of
       political jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of the
       two countries which are the subject of dispute. This proposition cannot be
       sustained without reversing the settled course of decision in this court and
       overturning the principles on which several well-considered cases have been
       decided.’

   And, after citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 651; Missouri v. Iowa, 7
How. 660; Florida v. Georgia 17 How. 478, and Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How. 505, the
conclusion of the court was thus expressed:

         ‘We consider, therefore, the established doctrine of this court to be that it has
       jurisdiction of questions of boundary between two States of this Union, and that
       this jurisdiction is not defeated because in deciding that question it becomes

                                           - 7 -
       necessary to examine into and construe compacts and agreements between
       those States, or because the decree which the court may render affects the
       territorial limits of the political jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States
       which are parties to the proceeding.’ “

http://books.google.com/books?id=l9wGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA230#v=onepage&q&f=false

And, there is the following:

    “Section 1333 (a) (3) provides that ‘adoption of State law as the law of the
United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or
jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the
outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the
revenues therefrom.’ Petitioner argues that state-court jurisdiction over this
personal injury case would contravene this provision. This argument again
confuses the political jurisdiction of a State with its judicial jurisdiction.” Gulf
Offshore Company v. Mobil Oil Corporation: 453 U.S. 473, at 482 (1981).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18303575675978186938

  Therefore, a person born in a State of the Union is not subject to the political
jurisdiction of the United States, but rather, to the political jurisdiction of a
particular State.

   Political jurisdiction of the United States extends to only the District of Columbia,
its territories and possessions, and federal enclaves with the several States of the
Union:

    “. . . The Constitution provides that ‘Congress shall have power to exercise
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district, (not exceeding ten
miles square,) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of
Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise
like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State
in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings.’ Art. 1, sec. 8.

    The necessity of complete jurisdiction over the place which should be selected as
the seat of government was obvious to the framers of the Constitution. Unless it
were conferred the deliberations of Congress might in times of excitement be
exposed to interruptions without adequate means of protection; its members, and
the officers of the government, be subjected to insult and intimidation, and the
public archives be in danger of destruction. The Federalist, in support of this clause
in the Constitution, in addition to these reasons, urged that "a dependence of the
members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the
government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national

                                          - 8 -
councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government
and dissatisfactory to the other members of the confederacy." No. 43.

    The necessity of supreme legislative authority over the seat of government was
forcibly impressed upon the members of the constitutional convention by
occurrences which took place near the close of the Revolutionary War. At that time,
while Congress was in session in Philadelphia, it was surrounded and insulted by a
body of mutineers of the Continental Army. In giving an account of this proceeding,
Mr. Rawle, in his Treatise on the Constitution, says of the action of Congress: ‘It
applied to the executive authority of Pennsylvania for defence; but, under the ill-
conceived constitution of the State at that time, the executive power was vested in a
council, consisting of thirteen members, and they possessed or exhibited so little
energy, and such apparent intimidation, that the Congress indignantly removed to
New Jersey, whose inhabitants welcomed it with promises of defending it. It
remained for some time at Princeton without being again insulted, till, for the sake
of greater convenience, it adjourned to Annapolis. The general dissatisfaction with
the proceedings of the executive authority of Pennsylvania, and the degrading
spectacle of a fugitive Congress, suggested the remedial provisions now under
consideration.’ Rawle, Constitution of the United States, 113. Of this proceeding Mr.
Justice Story remarks: "If such a lesson could have been lost upon the people, it
would have been as humiliating to their intelligence as it would have been offensive
to their honor." 2 Story Constitution, § 1219.

     Upon the second part of the clause in question, giving power to ‘exercise like
authority,’ that is, of exclusive legislation ‘over all places purchased by the consent
of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts,
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings,’ the Federalist
observes that the necessity of this authority is not less evident. ‘The public money
expended on such places,’ it adds, ‘and the public property deposited in them,
require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor
would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may
depend to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections
and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States
concerned in every such establishment.’ ‘The power,’ says Mr. Justice Story,
repeating the substance of Mr. Madison's language, ‘is wholly unexceptionable, since
it can only be exercised at the will of the State, and therefore it is placed beyond all
reasonable scruple.’

    This power of exclusive legislation is to be exercised, as thus seen, over places
purchased, by consent of the Legislatures of the States in which they are situated, for
the specific purposes enumerated. It would seem to have been the opinion of the
framers of the Constitution that, without the consent of the States, the new
government would not be able to acquire lands within them; and therefore it was
provided that when it might require such lands for the erection of forts and other

                                         - 9 -
buildings for the defence of the country, or the discharge of other duties devolving
upon it, and the consent of the States in which they were situated was obtained for
their acquisition, such consent should carry with it political dominion and legislative
authority over them. Purchase with such consent was the only mode then thought
of for the acquisition by the general government of title to lands in the States. Since
the adoption of the Constitution this view has not generally prevailed. Such consent
has not always been obtained, nor supposed necessary, for the purchase by the
general government of lands within the States. If any doubt has ever existed as to its
power thus to acquire lands within the States, it has not had sufficient strength to
create any effective dissent from the general opinion. The consent of the States to
the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named is, however,
essential, under the Constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the
title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. Where lands are acquired without such
consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded
to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in
that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is
subject to the legislative authority and control of the States equally with the
property of private individuals.” Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe: 114
U.S. 525, at 528 thru 531 (1885).

http://books.google.com/books?id=jN8GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA528#v=onepage&q&f=false

    “. . . This brings us to the question whether Congress has power to exercise
‘exclusive legislation’ over these enclaves within the meaning of Art. I, § 8. cl. 17, of
the Constitution, which reads in relevant part: ‘The Congress shall have Power . . .
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever’ over the District of
Columbia and ‘to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of
the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.’

     The power of Congress over federal enclaves that come within the scope of Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17, is obviously the same as the power of Congress over the District of
Columbia. The cases make clear that the grant of ‘exclusive’ legislative power to
Congress over enclaves that meet the requirements of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, by its own
weight, bars state regulation without specific congressional action. The question
was squarely presented in Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S.
285, which involved, as does the present litigation, California's Act and an attempt to
fix the prices at which milk could be sold at Moffett Field. We held that ‘sales
consummated within the enclave cannot be regulated’ by California because of the
constitutional grant of ‘exclusive legislation’ respecting lands purchased by the
United States with the consent of the State (id., at 294), even though there was no
conflicting federal Regulation.

   Thus the first question here is whether the three enclaves in question were

                                         - 10 -
‘purchased by the Consent of the Legislature’ of California within the meaning of Art.
I, § 8, cl. 17.

    The power of the Federal Government to acquire land within a State by purchase
or by condemnation without the consent of the State is well established. Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371. But without the State's ‘consent’ the United States
does not obtain the benefits of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, its possession being simply that of an
ordinary proprietor. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-142. In that
event, however, it was held in Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541, 542,
that a State could complete the ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction of the Federal Government
over such an enclave by ‘a cession of legislative authority and political jurisdiction.’

   Thus if the United States acquires with the ‘consent’ of the state legislature land
within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation for any of the
purposes mentioned in Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, or if the land is acquired without such
consent and later the State gives its ‘consent,’ the jurisdiction of the Federal
Government becomes ‘exclusive.’ “ Paul v. United States: 371 U.S. 245, at 263 thru
264 (1963).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15445050255793327933

    “The question presented for determination in this case relates to the effect of
proceedings taken under the act of March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle private
land claims in California, upon the claims of parties holding concessions of lands in
that State under the Spanish or the Mexican government. By the cession of
California to the United States, the rights of the inhabitants to their property were
not affected. They remained as before. Political jurisdiction and sovereignty over
the territory and public property alone passed to the United States. United States v.
Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 87.” More v. Steinbach: 127 U.S. 70, at 78 (1888).
http://books.google.com/books?id=cWcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q&f=false

    “The purpose of the Lands Act (the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 67
Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. §761 et. seq) was to define a body of law applicable to the
seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed structures such as those in question here on the
outer Continental Shelf. That this law was to be federal law of the United States,
applying state law only as federal law and then only when not inconsistent with
applicable federal law, is made clear by the language of the Act. Section 3 makes it
the ‘policy of the United States’ that the affected areas ‘appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition.’ Section
4 makes the ‘Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United
States’ apply ‘to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.’ Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty &



                                          - 11 -
Surety Company: 395 U.S. 352, at 355 thru 357 (1969).

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14913666495146396286

  Thus, a citizen of the United States, under the Fourteenth Amendment, is a citizen
of the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United States, and
federal enclaves within the several States of the Union.

  Before the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution, had to be a domiciliary for purposes of marriage and
divorce:

     “It is sufficient for this case to say that, according to the express words and
clear meaning of this clause (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1), no privileges are
secured by it except those which belong to citizenship. Rights, attached by the law
to contracts, by reason of the place where such contracts are made or executed,
wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to those contracts, cannot be
deemed ‘privileges of a citizen,’ within the meaning of the Constitution.

    Of that character are the rights now in question. They are incidents, ingrafted by
the law of the State on the contract of marriage. And, in obedience to that principle
of universal jurisprudence, which requires a contract to be government by the law
of the place where it is made and to be performed, the law of Louisiana undertakes to
control these incidents of a contract of marriage made within the State by persons
domiciled there, but leaves such contracts, made elsewhere, to be governed by the
laws of the places where they may be entered into. In this there is no departure
from any sound principle and there can be no just cause of complaint.” Conner v.
Elliot: 59 U.S. 591, at 593 (1855).
http://books.google.com/books?id=RkcFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA593#v=onepage&q&f=false

   “From the view we have taken of the reason of the rule that the foreign law is to
determine the validity of the marriages of our own citizens abroad, it follows that
there is no difference in this matter between marriage and divorce. Both are, in fact,
regulated by the law of the domicil of the parties, and not by the law of the place in
which they may be temporarily sojourning.” Commentaries on the Law of Marriage
and Divorce and Evidence in Matrimonial Suits; Joel Prentiss Bishop; (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company); 1852, Section 150, Page 118. [Footnote 1]
http://books.google.com/books?id=vrsDAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA118#v=onepage&q&f=false

     “The exclusive right, therefore, of each State to determine the matrimonial status
of its subjects, invests its courts with exclusive jurisdiction over causes of divorce
between them. In the language of Judge Story, ‘The doctrine now firmly established
in America upon the subject of divorce is, that the law of the place of the actual bona



                                        - 12 -
fide domicil of the parties, gives jurisdiction to the proper courts to decree a divorce
for any cause allowed by the local law, without any reference to the law of the place
of the original marriage, or to the place where the offence, for which the divorce is
allowed, was committed.’ Story, Conflict of Laws, § 230.” Ibid., Section 720, Page 586.
http://books.google.com/books?id=vrsDAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA586#v=onepage&q&f=false



  After the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen of a State as well as a citizen of the
United States, have to be a domiciliary in a particular State, for purposes of marriage
and divorce:

    “Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce -- jurisdiction,
strictly speaking -- is founded on domicil. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175; Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14. The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this
jurisdictional prerequisite, and, since 1789, neither this Court nor any other court in
the English speaking world has questioned it. Domicil implies a nexus between
person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations
and responsibilities of the utmost significance.” Williams v. State of North Carolina:
325 U.S. 226, at 229 (1945).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11901843596649770914



reaffirmed Sosna v. State of Iowa: 419 U.S. 393, at 407 (1975):
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4796843726517835120

    “With respect to an action for alienation of affections there is a difference
between the two Commonwealths. Massachusetts has retained in modified form the
husband’s common law right to hold liable a defendant who has induced his wife to
deprive him of her consortium. But Pennsylvania has enacted that in that state all
actions for alienation of affections are abolished and that no act within Pennsylvania
shall give rise to an action for alienation of affections. The question is whether
Massachusetts would extend the asserted underlying policy of the Pennsylvania
statute to bar a suit brought in the courts of Massachusetts by a Pennsylvania
husband against a Massachusetts paramour on account of conduct within
Massachusetts.

    In the literal sense of the phrase this is not a question of ‘conflict of laws.’ For
though Pennsylvania has a law governing suits in her courts and conduct within her
borders, she has no law purporting to regulate her domiciliaries right to bring
actions in other states based on conduct outside Pennsylvania. Yet, because of the
somewhat divergent policies of the different states whose interests are involved, the
problem is one which would properly be called one of private international law.
                                         - 13 -
Cheshire, Private International Law (3 rd ed.) pp. 5, 6.” Gordon v. Paker: 83 F. Supp.
40, at 41 (1949).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10043428746144303769



  A citizen of a State can be a domiciliary (domiciled) in a particular State. However,
a citizen of the United States cannot be:

   “As to who are citizens of the State. The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides that –

         ‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
       jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein
       they reside.’

    Therefore when a person who is a citizen of the United States by birth or
naturalization, comes to this State and resides (emphasis not mine) here he is a
citizen of this State. . . .

    Where a citizen of another State comes to this State and resides in some town for
a temporary purpose, though such stay be protracted, he does not thereby become a
citizen of this State. Easterly v. Goodwin, 35 Conn., 286.

   With such a person, his residence here must be in the sense of making it a home
which he has no present intention of abandoning. I think that it must be a
domiciliary residence.” The Residence of a Male Citizen, Opinions of the Attorney-
General; State of Connecticut; Hartford, February 1, 1909; Report of the Tax
Commissioner for Biennial Period 1909 and 1910, pages 52 thru 53. [Footnote 2]
http://books.google.com/books?id=Eb9JAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA52#v=onepage&q&f=false



  “Resides,” as used in Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been
held in the Slaughterhouse Cases, by the Supreme Court to means “bona fide
residence”:

    “One of these privileges is conferred by the very article (Fourteenth
Amendment) under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his
own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence
therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.” Slaughterhouse Cases:
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 80 (1873). [Footnote 3]
http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false



                                        - 14 -
  Since a citizen of the United States cannot be domiciled in any State of the Union,
then a court in any State of the Union cannot grant a dissolution to any couple who
are citizens of the United States. [Footnote 4]

  Marriage is based on domicil of the parties:

   “From the view we have taken of the reason of the rule that the foreign law is to
determine the validity of the marriages of our own citizens abroad, it follows that
there is no difference in this matter between marriage and divorce. Both are, in fact,
regulated by the law of the domicil of the parties, and not by the law of the place in
which they may be temporarily sojourning.” Commentaries on the Law of Marriage
and Divorce and Evidence in Matrimonial Suits; Joel Prentiss Bishop; (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company); 1852, Section 150, Page 118.
http://books.google.com/books?id=vrsDAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA118#v=onepage&q&f=false



  The several States have exclusive authority to legislate on marriage:

    “In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-735 (1878), the Court said: ‘The State . . .
has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved,’ and the same view was reaffirmed in Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 67
(1899).” Sosna v. State of Iowa: 419 U.S. 393, at 404 (1975).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4796843726517835120



  However, the United States can regulate marriages “in the District of Columbia
and the territories (and possessions) of the United States, or where it possesses the
power of exclusive jurisdiction (federal enclaves).” Norman v. Norman: 54 Pac. Rep.
143, 143 thru 144 (1898).
http://books.google.com/books?id=-QwLAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA143#v=onepage&q&f=false

  Since marriage is based on domicil of the parties, and since the United States can
regulate marriages in the District of Columbia, its territories and possessions, or in
the federal enclaves within the several States of the Union, ONLY, and since a citizen
of the United States cannot be a domiciliary (domiciled) in a State of the Union, then
a citizen of the United States is domicil in either the District of Columbia, the
territories and possessions of the United States, or in the federal enclaves within the
several States of the Union.




                                         - 15 -
________________________

Footnotes:



1. And “the status of persons as married or single, is to be determined by the law of
their domicil.” Ibid., Section 150, Page 118.
http://books.google.com/books?id=vrsDAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA118#v=onepage&q&f=false



2. “Residence and domiciliary residence are not the same:

     “This case presents another phase of the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933,
which has been before this Court in a series of cases beginning with Adams Mfg. Co.
v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307. The Act imposes a tax upon ‘the receipt of the entire gross
income’ of residents and domiciliaries of Indiana.” Freeman v. Hewit: 329 U.S. 249,
at 250 (1946).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2416015038270473786

    “ . . . ‘Domicile’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘residence,’ Perri v.
Kisselbach, 34 N.J. 84, 87, 167 A.2d 377, 379 (1961), and one can reside in one place
but be domiciled in another, District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); In
re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 80, 182 N.W. 227, 228 (1921).” Mississippi Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield: 490 U.S. 30, at 48 (1989).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2358461186912284415

    “Residence in fact, coupled with the purpose to make the place of residence
one’s home, are the essential elements of domicile. Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall.
350; Pannill v. Roanoke Times Co., 252 F. 910; Beekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 43
So. 923; Babcock v. Slater, 212 Mass. 434, 99 N.E. 173; Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y.
238, 84 N.E. 950; Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 15.2.” State of Texas v. State of Florida:
306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9265522746177498247



3. Bona fide residence does not mean domicile:

    “ . . . The very meaning of domicil is the technically preeminent headquarters
that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that
have been attached to it by the law may be determined. Bergner & Engel Brewing Co.
v. Dreyfus, 172 Massachusetts, 154, 157. In its nature it is one, and if any case two

                                        - 16 -
are recognized for different purposes it is a doubtful anomaly. Dicey, Conflict of
Laws, 2d ed. 98.” Williamson v. Osenton: 232 U.S. 619, at 625 (1914).
http://books.google.com/books?id=2u4GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA625#v=onepage&q&f=false

    “A person may maintain more than one residence and the fact that one is
maintained for political purposes does not itself prevent the residence from being
actual and bona fide. Intent to maintain a residence is an important factor, but intent
alone does not establish a bona fide residence. There must be actual, physical use or
occupation of quarters for living purposes before residence is established.” Williamson
v. Village of Baskin: 339 So.2d 474 (1976).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13547316696383020452

     “Our statute 65.02, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. reads, ‘In order to obtain a
divorce the complainant must have resided (emphasis not mine) ninety days in the
State of Florida before the filing of the bill of complaint.’ It is obvious that the word
resided (emphasis not mine) could not properly be construed to encompass
citizenship in a legal sense [domicile] because one may come to this State, establish
a bona fide residence of ninety days, thereafter institute a divorce action and have
it heard and conclusively adjudicated on its merits before he could under the law
become a citizen and enjoy all the privileges of citizenship. On the other hand, a
person might reside in Florida many years and never become a citizen of this State
or renounce his citizenship in a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, failure to renounce pre-
existing citizenship is nothing more than a circumstance to be considered in
connection with the question of the bona fides (emphasis not mine) of the plaintiff’s
residence which is the real test under our statutory law. It is necessary, as provided
in 98.01, Florida States 1941, F.S.A., that a person ‘. . . shall have resided (emphasis
not mine) AND had his habitation, domicile, home, and place of permanent abode
in Florida for one year, and in the county for six months, . . .’ in order to qualify
as a voter and for full-fledged citizenship. Citizenship is not a statutory
jurisdictional prerequisite for divorce and neither of the words ‘citizen’ and
‘citizenship’ can be read into our statute.” Pawley v. Pawley: 46 So.2d 464, at 471
(1950).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15312812472711174511

    “The durational residency requirement under attack in this case is a part of
Iowa’s comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic relations, an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases decided by
this Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact.
In Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 584 (1859), the Court said: ‘We disclaim
altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce. . . .’ In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-735 (1878), the Court said: ‘The
State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage
                                         - 17 -
relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may
be dissolved,’ and the same view was reaffirmed in Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162,
167 (1899). . . .

    The imposition of a durational residency requirement for divorce is scarcely
unique to Iowa, since 48 States impose such a requirement as a condition for
maintaining an action of divorce. As might be expected, the periods vary among
States and range from six weeks to two years. The one-year period selected by Iowa
is the most common length of time prescribed.

     Appellant contends that the Iowa requirement of one year’s residence is
unconstitutional for two separate reasons: . . . and, second, because it denies a
litigant the opportunity to make an individualized showing of bona fide residence
and therefore denies such residents access to the only method of legally dissolving
their marriage. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971). . . . .

   We therefore hold that the state interest in requiring that those who seek a
divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the State. . . .

    Nor are we of the view that the failure to provide an individualized
determination of residency violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), relied upon by appellant, held
that Connecticut might not arbitrarily invoke a permanent and irrebuttable
presumption of nonresidence against students who sought to obtain in-state tuition
rates when that presumption was not necessarily or universally true in fact. But in
Vlandis the Court warned that its decision should not ‘be construed to deny a State
the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide
residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement.’ Id., at 452. See Stams v.
Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). An
individualized determination of physical presence plus the intent to remain, which
appellant apparently seeks, would not entitle her to a divorce even if she could have
made such a showing. For Iowa requires not merely ‘domicile’ in that sense, but
(actual) residence in the State for a year in order for its courts to exercise their
divorce jurisdiction.” Sosna v. State of Iowa: 419 U.S. 393, at 404, 405, 409 thru 410
(1975).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4796843726517835120



4. Therefore, any and all such dissolutions granted by the courts of the several
States are VOID, since the parties, citizens of the United States, cannot under law be
domiciliaries (domiciled) in any of the several States of the Union.



                                        - 18 -

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Description: A citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, is a citizen of a particular State of the Union. As such he or she owes allegiance to the particular State. A citizen of the United States, under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is a citizen of the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions of the United States government, and the federal enclaves within the several States of the Union. Such a citizen owes allegiance to the United States. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, had to be a domiciliary for purposes of marriage and divorce. After the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen of a State as well as a citizen of the United States, have to be a domiciliary in a particular State, for purposes of marriage and divorce. A citizen of a State can be a domiciliary (domiciled) in a particular State. However, a citizen of the United States cannot be. Since a citizen of the United States cannot be domiciled in any State of the Union, then a court in any State of the Union cannot grant a dissolution to any couple who are citizens of the United States. Marriage is based on domicil of the parties. The several States have exclusive authority to legislate on marriage. However, the United States can regulate marriages "in the District of Columbia and the territories (and possessions) of the United States, or where it possesses the power of exclusive jurisdiction (federal enclaves)." Since marriage is based on domicil of the parties, and since the United States can regulate marriages in the District of Columbia, its territories and possessions, or in the federal enclaves within the several States of the Union, ONLY, and since a citizen of the United States cannot be a domiciliary (domiciled) in a State of the Union, then a citizen of the United States is domicil in either the District of Columbia, the territories and possessions