MODERN Genocide Incidents

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“MODERN”
Genocide
Incidents
A compilation of resources from
sites you cannot access, organized
by topic.
Prepared by Mrs. Leonhardt, SAMHS Library Media Specialist
GENERAL INFORMATION
 http://www.preventgenocide.org/
(first resource, all information in
following slides is from this site
until you see a new URL)
GENERAL INFORMATION

 The International Campaign to End
Genocide (host of this site) Prevent Genocide
International is a founding member of The International
Campaign to End Genocide (ICEG) a coalition of global
civil society organizations established on May 15, 1999
at the Hague, Netherlands.
General Information
What is Genocide?
 What is Genocide?Testimonies of
Survivors and Eyewitnesses: "A death
march was: anybody who couldn't walk,
stayed back and they shot him. No
question. I had two friends who fell back.
I told them, Don't go to the back. Stay in
the front. That's the best way. I was
holding them up and carrying them for a
long time." (this site provides links to testimonies-
something you might want to further investigate for your project)
General Information
Genocide?
 The legal definition of genocide
 The international legal definition of the crime of genocide is
found in Articles II and III of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
 Article II describes two elements of the crime of genocide:
 1) the mental element, meaning the "intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such", and
 2) the physical element which includes five acts described
in sections a, b, c, d and e. A crime must include both
elements to be called "genocide."
 Article III described five punishable forms of the crime of
genocide: genocide; conspiracy, incitement, attempt and
complicity.
General Information
Genocide?
 "Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
 (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
 Article III: The following acts shall be punishable:
 (a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide. "
General Information
Genocide?
 The law protects four groups - national, ethnical, racial or religious
groups.
 A national group means a set of individuals whose identity is defined
by a common country of nationality or national origin.
 An ethnical group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by
common cultural traditions, language or heritage.
 A racial group means a set of individuals whose identity is defined by
physical characteristics.
 A religious group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by
common religious creeds, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals.
 Usually people are born into these four groups. These four groups
share the common characteristic that individuals are most often
born into the group. While some individuals may change
nationality or religion - or even adopt a new cultural, ethnic or
racial identity - usually people do not choose their group identity.
In genocide people are targeted for destruction not because
anything they have done, but because of who they are.
 Group identity is often imposed by the perpetrators. Perpetrators
of genocide frequently make group categories more rigid or create
new definitions which impose group identity on individuals,
without regard to peoples individual choices.
General Information
Genocide?
 Key Terms:
 The crime of genocide has two elements: intent and action.
―Intentional‖ means purposeful. Intent can be proven directly from
statements or orders. But more often, it must be inferred from a
systematic pattern of coordinated acts.
 Intent is different from motive. Whatever may be the motive for the
crime (land expropriation, national security, territorial integrity,
etc.), if the perpetrators commit acts intended to destroy a group,
even part of a group, it is genocide.
 The phrase "in whole or in part" is important. Perpetrators need not
intend to destroy the entire group. Destruction of only part of a
group (such as its educated members, or members living in one
region) is also genocide. Most authorities require intent to destroy a
substantial number of group members – mass murder. But an
individual criminal may be guilty of genocide even if he kills only
one person, so long as he knew he was participating in a larger plan
to destroy the group.
General Information
Genocide Prevention
 Global News Monitor: Tracking current news on
genocide and items related to past and present ethnic,
national, racial and religious violence. For current and
archived news on ethnic violence and other conflict also
see the weekly Peace Negotiations Watch ( since
Sept. 2002) and the International Crisis Group's monthly
CrisisWatch ( since Sept. 2003).

 The Stockholm Declaration on Genocide
Prevention, January 28, 2004 In this "Declaration
by the Stockholm International Forum 2004" fifty-
five participating governments made seven commitments
in the field of genocide prevention. For more details
and news reports from the Stockholm Conference
including Kofi Annan's genocide prevention
proposals
General Information
Genocide Prevention
 Juan E. Méndez appointed UN Special Advisor on
Genocide 12 July 2004
 UN Documents on Genocide Prevention The
Whitaker Report of July 1985 made specific
recommendations for the United Nations could develop a
capacity to prevent genocide. The Ndiaye Report of
August 1993 made recommendations of how to respond
to the escalating ethnic violence in Rwanda. Find brief
introductions and links to these vital reports, as well as
to the 1999 Srebrenica Report of November 1999 and
Carlsson Report of December 1999 which address the
failure to halt genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda.
General Information
Genocide Prevention
 International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS). Sponsored by Canada's Department of
Foreign Affairs and launched Sept. 14, 2000, the Commission's Dec.
18, 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect, was the culmination
of twelve months of intensive research, worldwide consultations and
deliberation. The report states that sovereign states have a
responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so,
that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of
states. The 12-member Commission was Co-Chaired by Gareth
Evans, head of the International Crisis Group and former Australian
Foreign Minister (1988-96), and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor
to the UN Secretary-General and former Algerian Ambassador to
Germany, France, and the United States. Other Commission
members included Lee Hamilton, former US Congressman from
1965 to 1999, Michael Ignatieff of Canada, Professor of Human
Rights at Harvard University, Cyril Ramaphosa, former Secretary-
general of the African National Congress and Fidel Ramos, President
of the Philippines from 1992 to 1998.
General Information
Genocide Prevention
 International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS). Sponsored by Canada's Department of
Foreign Affairs and launched Sept. 14, 2000, the Commission's Dec.
18, 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect, was the culmination
of twelve months of intensive research, worldwide consultations and
deliberation. The report states that sovereign states have a
responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so,
that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of
states. The 12-member Commission was Co-Chaired by Gareth
Evans, head of the International Crisis Group and former Australian
Foreign Minister (1988-96), and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor
to the UN Secretary-General and former Algerian Ambassador to
Germany, France, and the United States. Other Commission
members included Lee Hamilton, former US Congressman from
1965 to 1999, Michael Ignatieff of Canada, Professor of Human
Rights at Harvard University, Cyril Ramaphosa, former Secretary-
general of the African National Congress and Fidel Ramos, President
of the Philippines from 1992 to 1998.
EAST PAKISTAN:
1971 Genocide of Bengalis
 http://www.bengalgenocide.com/
mughalistan.php
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 http://www.cambodiangenocide.o
rg/genocide.htm
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 When
 1975 to 1979
 Where
 Kampuchea / Cambodia
 Estimated Numbers
 1.7 million people killed out of a
population of 8 million (21% of the
country's population).
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 Background & The Genocide
 Cambodia traditionally has suffered from ethnic
rivalry leading to several exchanges of political
power between the substantial Vietnamese
minority and the Buddhist Khmer majority.
When independence came in 1953, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk took charge of the newly
born state. A revolution led by General Lon Nol
in 1970 temporarily dispelled the government.
This government attempted to suppress the
Communist and Vietnamese presence. In the
meantime, the small Communist group, the
Khmer Rouge, grew in popularity and by 1975
was able to take over, proclaiming the Republic
of Democratic Kampuchea.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 Background & The Genocide
 In asserting its new power, the Party began a
campaign of cleansing from 1975 to 1978. The
Kampuchean Communist Party's interpretation
of the state required destruction of cities and
the foreign-educated elite in order to justify, or
to make rural, the country. The goal was a
centralized communal organization of atheistic
factory workers and peasant farmers free of
external support. Cities were raided and people
relocated to communal farms. Most people were
left to starve or work to death. Although
international organizations offered aid to the
demolished population, the government refused
outside assistance.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 Background & The Genocide

 Ethnically, the targets of the cleansing were
Vietnamese and Chinese nationals, Muslims
(particularly ethnic Chams), and Buddhist
monks. They all were virtually, if not entirely,
eliminated from the population by expulsion,
execution, or starvation.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 Background & The Genocide

 The Vietnamese had long been in conflict with
Kampuchea and responded to the violence
against its nationals. A Vietnamese invasion in
1979 replaced the government with moderate
Communists sympathetic to Vietnam's interests.
The Khmer Rouge became a guerilla
organization and began a civil war that
continued until a tenuous peace was reached in
1991. A new coalition government (excluding
the Khmer Rouge) under United Nations
guidance took power. Cambodia since has taken
steps toward trying members of the Khmer
Rouge as war criminals.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 Background & The Genocide

 International observers have been hesitant to call the
Khmer Rouge's actions genocide. Since the motivation of
the perpetrators was generally political, the case does
not fit in the common United Nations definition for
genocide, but other definitions include the Cambodian
genocide as one of the most horrific. Often, the 1979
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia that deposed Pol Pot
during the America's controversial Vietnam War is
instead the focus of criticism since the US backed the
Lon Nol government as one of its anti-Communism
spheres of influence. Only in the past few years have
international organizations, including the UN, begun to
acknowledge the crimes. The new Cambodian
government is preparing to summon a war crimes
tribunal. Yet, international observers who believe that
the government's court cannot credibly try the Khmer
Rouge perpetrators have asked the United Nations to
mediate.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 The Khmer Rouge and Cambodia: A Chronology
 Courtesy of the Associated Press [http://www.ap.org]

 1949-52
Saloth Sar, later known as Pol Pot, goes to Paris on government
scholarship and becomes absorbed with communist ideology.
 1953
Pol Pot sets up communist party after Cambodia's independence
from France.
 1960-63
Pol Pot becomes party's general-secretary. Flees to jungle to escape
repression by Cambodia's ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
 1967-68
Khmer Rouge takes up arms in support of peasant against a
government rice tax. Army suppresses insurrection.
 1970
Civil war begins after right-wing coup topples Sihanouk.
 1975
Khmer Rouge seizes power, begins doomed experiment in agrarian
communism. Up to 2 million people die over four years from
starvation, overwork and execution.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 The Khmer Rouge and Cambodia: A Chronology
 Courtesy of the Associated Press [http://www.ap.org]

 1978
Vietnam invades Cambodia to stop Khmer Rouge border
attacks. Phnom Penh falls to Vietnamese two weeks later.
 1979
Last time Pol Pot seen by outsiders.
 1991
All Cambodian factions sign peace agreement.
 1993
Khmer Rouge boycotts U.N.-supervised general election.
 April 1996
Unconfirmed rumors that Pol Pot has died.
 August 1996
Government announces Khmer Rouge breakup. Pol Pot's
brother-in-law, Ieng Sary, leads 10,000 guerrillas to defect.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 The Khmer Rouge and Cambodia: A Chronology
 Courtesy of the Associated Press [http://www.ap.org]

 June 13, 1997
Pol Pot reportedly orders top general Son Sen and family
killed; hard-liners split into factions. Officials offer a series
of conflicting accounts on Pol Pot's fate.
 June 20
Former comrades capture Pol Pot, both rival co-prime
ministers say.
 July 1997
A "people's tribunal" held at the guerrillas' last stronghold
in northern Cambodia condemns Pol Pot for crimes that
included the killing of the group's longtime guerrilla defense
minister, Son Sen, and his family.
 August 1996
Government announces Khmer Rouge breakup. Pol Pot's
brother-in-law, Ieng Sary, leads 10,000 guerrillas to defect.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 The Khmer Rouge and Cambodia: A Chronology
 Courtesy of the Associated Press [http://www.ap.org]
 June 13, 1997
Pol Pot reportedly orders top general Son Sen and family
killed; hard-liners split into factions. Officials offer a series
of conflicting accounts on Pol Pot's fate.
 June 20
Former comrades capture Pol Pot, both rival co-prime
ministers say.
 July 1997
A "people's tribunal" held at the guerrillas' last stronghold
in northern Cambodia condemns Pol Pot for crimes that
included the killing of the group's longtime guerrilla defense
minister, Son Sen, and his family.
 April 9
United States offers assistance to any effort to bring Pol Pot
before an international tribunal.
 April 15
Pol Pot dies in his sleep, at 73, Khmer Rouge officials say.
CAMBODIAN: 1975-1979
 The Khmer Rouge and Cambodia: A Chronology
 Courtesy of the Associated Press [http://www.ap.org]
 June 13, 1997
Pol Pot reportedly orders top general Son Sen and family
killed; hard-liners split into factions. Officials offer a series
of conflicting accounts on Pol Pot's fate.
 June 20
Former comrades capture Pol Pot, both rival co-prime
ministers say.
 July 1997
A "people's tribunal" held at the guerrillas' last stronghold
in northern Cambodia condemns Pol Pot for crimes that
included the killing of the group's longtime guerrilla defense
minister, Son Sen, and his family.
 April 9
United States offers assistance to any effort to bring Pol Pot
before an international tribunal.
 April 15
Pol Pot dies in his sleep, at 73, Khmer Rouge officials say.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/
g_guatemala.html
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Before Genocide:
 Guatemala is a mainly mountainous country in Central
America, just south of Mexico and less than half the size
of the UK. It was once at the heart of the remarkable
Mayan civilisation, which flourished until the 10th
century AD. When Spanish explorers conquered this
region in the 16th century, the Mayans became slaves in
their own ancient home. They are still the
underprivileged majority of Guatemala's 12.3m
population.
At the end of the 19th century Guatemala came under
the rule of a dictator who put his country on the
economic map by encouraging landowners to buy and
run coffee plantations. The Roman Catholic church was
deprived of its lands for the purpose, and within 30 years
Americans were the major investors. A powerful army
and police force were set up to protect the wealthy
landowners and their flourishing businesses. The
Indians, with the status of peasants and labourers, saw
nothing of the wealth being generated under a series of
grasping dictators.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Before Genocide:
 But in 1944 the current dictator was overthrown, and a new,
enlightened government introduced reforms which put the
interests of the native people first. Indians in both town and
country were given consideration, social security, and
education. Labourers could now set up workers' unions, and
this gave them political strength as well.
However, attempts at land reform brought Guatemala's 'Ten
Years of Spring' to an end. When the Guatemalan government
planned a programme of compulsory purchase of land so that it
would come under State ownership, the USA, its business
interests threatened, set up a scare: 'hostile communists were
at work'. America organised and trained a corps of eager
Guatemalan exiles, then launched an invasion to bring down
the government. In and after this blood-stained encounter - in
which thousands died - workers' unions and political parties
were suppressed, other reforms cancelled, and dissidents
hunted down for assassination. Many appalled liberals fled into
exile (including the young doctor 'Che' Guevara). A military
dictator was helped to take over the government, followed by a
string of right-wing military leaders dedicated to eliminating
the left wing. In 1962 their policies resulted in a civil war that
was to last over 35 years.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Before Genocide:
 The oppressed people did their best. Despite the civil
war, church leaders helped peasants to reclaim
unwanted marshland, build co-operative villages and
sustain both their traditional culture and new left-wing
politics. Work was done to teach and maintain literacy
and good health practices. A quiet, non-violent
opposition movement for civil rights began to grow.
But so did armed resistance groups. Guerrilla
organisations were founded, adopting Marxist
communist views to justify their use of violence; they
got some backing from Cuba. By 1981 three guerrilla
groups had merged to create Guatemala's United Front,
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).
In that year, a small group of Mayan leaders marched to
Guatemala City and occupied the Spanish Embassy, in
nonviolent protest against government oppression of the
native people. Though the Spanish ambassador urged
the government to respond peacefully, his embassy was
deliberately burned down, killing all the protesters
together with all the Embassy staff (the ambassador
survived).
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Genocide:

 The Guatemalan government, using the Guatemalan
Army and its counter-insurgency force (whose members
defined themselves as 'killing machines'), began a
systematic campaign of repressions and suppression
against the Mayan Indians, whom they claimed were
working towards an communist coup.
Their 2-year series of atrocities is sometimes called 'The
Silent Holocaust'.
In the words of the 1999 UN-sponsored report on the
civil war: 'The Army's perception of Mayan communities
as natural allies of the guerrillas contributed to
increasing and aggravating the human rights violations
perpetrated against them, demonstrating an aggressive
racist component of extreme cruelty that led to
extermination en masse of defenceless Mayan
communities, including children, women and the elderly,
through methods whose cruelty has outraged the moral
conscience of the civilised world.'
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Genocide:
 Working methodically across the Mayan region, the army and
its paramilitary teams, including 'civil patrols' of forcibly
conscripted local men, attacked 626 villages. Each community
was rounded up, or seized when gathered already for a
celebration or a market day. The villagers, if they didn't escape
to become hunted refugees, were then brutally murdered;
others were forced to watch, and sometimes to take part.
Buildings were vandalised and demolished, and a 'scorched
earth' policy applied: the killers destroyed crops, slaughtered
livestock, fouled water supplies, and violated sacred places and
cultural symbols.

 Children were often beaten against walls, or thrown alive into
pits where the bodies of adults were later thrown; they were
also tortured and raped. Victims of all ages often had their
limbs amputated, or were impaled and left to die slowly.
Others were doused in petrol and set alight, or disembowelled
while still alive. Yet others were shot repeatedly, or tortured
and shut up alone to die in pain. The wombs of pregnant
women were cut open. Women were routinely raped while
being tortured. Women - now widows - who lived could
scarcely survive the trauma: 'the presence of sexual violence in
the social memory of the communities has become a source of
collective shame'.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Genocide:

 Covert operations were also carried out by military units
called Commandos, backed up by the army and military
intelligence. They carried out planned executions and
forced 'disappearances'. Death squads (some of which in
time came under the army's umbrella), largely made up
of criminals, murdered suspected 'subversives' or their
allies; under dramatic names, such as 'The White Hand'
or 'Eye for an Eye', they terrorised the country and
contributed to the deliberate strategy of psychological
warfare and intimidation.
URNG's guerrillas could not provide assistance to the
Mayan Indians: there were too few of them. There were
certainly too few to be a real threat to the State, whose
massive and brutal campaign was largely driven by long-
term racist prejudice against the Mayan majority. Of the
human rights violations recorded, the State and the
Army were responsible for 93%, the guerrillas for 3%.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Genocide:

 Throughout the period of the genocide, the
USA continued to provide military support to
the Guatemalan government, mainly in the
form of arms and equipment. The infamous
guerrilla training school, the School of the
Americas in Georgia USA, continued to train
Guatemalan officers notorious for human rights
abuses; the CIA worked with Guatemalan
intelligence officers, some of whom were on
the CIA payroll despite known human rights
violations. US involvement was understood to
be strategic - or, put another way, indifferent
to the fate of a bunch of Indians - in the wider
context of the Cold War and anti-Communist
action.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 After Genocide:

 In 1986 civilian rule and a new constitution were set up,
but the army held on to its power, not least because half
a million Guatemalans were members of army, police or
civil defence forces, many of them responsible for the
civil war's worst brutality.

 Peace talks were set up by the UN in 1991, but made
poor progress. Suspended in1993, they were resumed
in1994 under a new democratic government led by the
country's former human rights ombudsman. An accord
on human rights protection was signed by the
government and URNG. Other issues were discussed
over the next year. A peace agreement was finally
signed in 1996.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 After Genocide:
 Since then Guatemala has been trying to recover from its civil
war, hard to do when so many civilians had taken part in
atrocities and were now shielded by an amnesty law bitterly
resented by victims. There were also many guerrillas and ex-
soldiers to demobilise and resettle. All the same, a policy of
reconciliation was introduced and, with difficulty, maintained.

 Part of the peace agreement was the setting up of The
Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), an investigation into
the atrocities of the civil war. It began work in July 1997,
funded by a number of countries (including the USA, a
generous donor). The army was unable to provide its records
for the period 1981-1983; but the three commissioners
travelled through the country and collected 9,000 witness
statements, protected by a UN confidentiality agreement. The
Commission's mandate was limited - 'reflecting the strength of
the Guatemalan armed forces in the peace negotiations', a
commentator dryly observed: no names of human right
violators could be given, and the Commission's work could
have no 'judicial effects'.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 After Genocide:

 The report, entitled 'Guatemala: Memory of Silence' was
presented in February 1999. Its discoveries clearly
revealed a governmental policy of genocide carried out
against the Mayan Indians. Apart from being carried out
by individuals, unnamed, the genocide was clearly also
the responsibility of a hostile institutional structure.

 The report had recommendations to make: the memory
of the victims should be preserved, there should be
compensation, and the democratic process should be
strengthened. 'The CEH is convinced that construction of
peace, founded on the knowledge of the past, demands
that those affected by the armed confrontation and the
violence connected with it are listened to and no longer
considered solely as victims but as the protagonists of a
future of national harmony.'
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 After Genocide:

 In April 1998 another report, the Catholic Church's
'Recuperation of Historical Memory' (also called 'Never
Again'), had been published, which, like 'Memory of
Silence' placed the responsibility for most of
Guatemala's war crimes squarely on the army. The
report was publicly presented by a noted human rights
campaigner, Bishop Juan Gerardi; two days later he was
murdered. In June 2001 a former head of military
intelligence (a graduate of the School of the Americas)
and two other officers were sentenced to 30 years in
prison for the murder. Guatemala's chief prosecutor,
who secured the conviction, then faced repeated death
threats, and was forced to go into exile. He himself had
taken up the case when the previous prosecutor, also
threatened, had resigned and fled the country.

 Also in June 2001, a legal action on behalf of 12 Mayan
communities succeeded in bringing a charge of genocide
against a former dictator who had seized power in 1982
(ousted by another in 1983).
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 After Genocide:
 In November 1998 three former members of a 'civil patrol'
were tried in the first case arising from the genocide. These
patrollers, with 42 others, had massacred 77 women and 107
children. The younger women were repeatedly raped and then
killed. One 10-year-old Mayan boy, holding his baby brother,
was accosted by a patroller, a man from a nearby town: 'I'm
taking you back home to work for me. But the baby can't come,
he's too small.' Then the man sliced the infant in two. The boy
survived and lived to be one of the few eye-witnesses at the
trial (some witnesses had been threatened with death in the
previous months, by other ex-patrollers still getting protection
from the Army). The patrollers claimed they were elsewhere,
planting trees. They were found guilty and sentenced to death.
But 'civil patrollers come low in the hierarchy,' says a journalist
working in central America, ' and perhaps their lives are
expendable to protect the people who ordered the genocide.'
Meanwhile the traumatised, impoverished survivors and the
men who killed their families continue, somehow, to live in the
same neighbourhoods.

 It is estimated that up to 200,000 people were killed between
1966 and 1990, including the many thousands who died or
'disappeared' in the genocide of Mayan Indians.
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Witness:

 'I was 10 years old. The patrollers pushed me
to the ground with some of the other children
and we were told to stay there and keep our
faces down. I tried to look up and saw my
mother and sister in line with the other
women. One by one they disappeared over the
brow of a hill, and I could hear their screams. I
could see my mother and sister approaching
that brow. I was kicked and told to keep my
head down. When I looked up again, over to
the line of women, my mother and sister were
no longer there. For two years a patroller kept
me prisoner, but then I escaped.'
GUATEMALA: 1981-1983
 Witness:

 'The United States did not bear direct responsibility for
any act of genocide, the Commission said. However, its
government had known what was going on in the
Guatemalan countryside. It had not raised any
objections and had continued to support the Guatemalan
army. In that sense, the United States was implicated. As
for American businesses, the Guatemalan subsidiary of
Coca-Cola had mercilessly pursued the trade union
movement for years, and a dozen union leaders had been
killed. The Commission said that the truth had been told
in its report with the purpose of improving the condition
of the peoples of Guatemala. Individuals and groups had
the right to know who was responsible. While the
Commission was not allowed to name perpetrators or
attribute responsibility, the report indicates times and
names institutions. People could deduce who was in
charge. Everyone knew who had been President and
Chief of Staff of the army in 1982 and 1983. If the
perpetrators were brought to trial, it would be through
the Ministry of Justice. People had every right to bring
the accused to justice, the Commissioner stressed.'
SUDAN-DARFUR: 1982...
 http://www.genocideintervention.
net/areas_of_concern/darfur/whyi
tareaconcern
SUDAN-DARFUR: 1982...
 Why is it an Area of Concern?
 High numbers of violent civilian
fatalities in Darfur and South Sudan
and the combination of indirect
violence due to mass displacement,
limitations on humanitarian aid and
widespread gender based violence,
align with Genocide Intervention
Network’s taxonomy and scale of
violence against civilians.
SUDAN-DARFUR: 1982...
 Quick Facts
 5.6 million
Internally Displaced Persons within Sudan,
2.7 million displaced by the Darfur Crisis.
 More than 200,000
Minimum international UN estimates of
conflict-related fatalities in Darfur since
2003.
 At least 2,500
Killed by Inter-tribal violence in South
Sudan in 2009.
 Four
Warrants issued by the ICC for crimes
committed in Darfur.
SUDAN-DARFUR: 1982...
 Engagement Strategy
 Genocide Intervention Network is working with
partners to ensure the full deployment of the
UNAMID peacekeeping mission, the effective
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and successful peace talks to end the
Darfur crisis.
 Prior to 2009, Genocide Intervention Network
funded civilian protection projects on the ground,
working to develop standards for United Nations
Formed Police Units as well as implementing
income-generating activities to allow women to
purchase firewood instead of risking their safety
through its collection.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 http://www.bosniafacts.info
/web/facts_about_srebrenic
a.php
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Facts about Srebrenica

 In June 2005, during cross-examination of a witness in
the case against Slobodan Milošević[1] at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, the court viewed video footage showing a
Serbian paramilitary unit, calling itself the Scorpions,
execute six Bosnian Muslim men and teenagers captured
after the fall of Srebrenica in 1995. The images of
Serbian soldiers tormenting and then shooting the
Bosnian Muslim prisoners, whose hands were tied
behind their backs and who offered no resistance before
being shot, broke through the wall of silence and denial
about the subject of Srebrenica in Serbia and
Montenegro. The Serbian Government condemned the
killings, and the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor acted
swiftly to detain a number of suspects allegedly
complicit in the murders of these six men.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 There is a multitude of evidence publicly available
that proves that Bosnian Serb and other forces
executed 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim
prisoners from Srebrenica in one week in July
1995. Despite this, there are still many people in
Serbia and Montenegro who try to deny the full
enormity of the crime that Bosnian Serb military,
police and other forces (including, allegedly,
forces from Serbia) committed. They argue that
the actual number of dead is exaggerated, that
‗only‘ around 2,000 died. They also argue that
most of these 2,000 dead were casualties of war—
Bosnian Muslim soldiers killed in battle. Some
who are even bolder, claim that it was a 'crime of
passion'—revenge for all those Serbs killed in the
villages around Srebrenica. Still others claim that
what happened at Srebrenica was not genocide.
The Tribunal has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that each of these claims is wrong.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The massacre that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995 was the
single worst atrocity committed in the former Yugoslavia during the
wars of the 1990s and the worst massacre that occurred in Europe
since the months after World War II. This is why the ICTY, which
was established in 1993 to try those most responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former
Yugoslavia since 1991,[2] has invested a great deal of time and
effort in investigating what happened in Srebrenica and bringing
those responsible to justice. The ICTY has issued indictments
against 19 individuals for crimes committed in Srebrenica, all but
one of which are against high-level perpetrators—those who
planned and ordered the killing operation. So far, the Tribunal has
completed trials and appeals against three accused: General
Radislav Krstić, commander of the Republika Srpska Army (VRS)
Drina Corps, Dražen Erdemović, a VRS soldier with the 10th
Sabotage Detachment and Dragan Obrenović, deputy commander of
the VRS Zvornik Brigade. Erdemović and Obrenović admitted their
participation in the Srebrenica killings. The facts about Srebrenica
contained in the judgements against Krstić,[3] Erdemović[4] and
Obrenović[5] have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.[6]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 In particular, in its proceedings against these three
accused, the Tribunal has found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Bosnian Serb and other forces killed between
7,000 and 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys between
approximately 11 and 19 July 1995. The Tribunal has
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the vast
majority of those killed were not killed in combat, but
were victims of executions. The Tribunal has established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the killings did not occur
in a moment of passion, but were the product of a well-
planned and coordinated operation. Finally, the Tribunal
has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the
killing of 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners was
genocide.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Number of Dead

The Tribunal has determined that the number of
Bosnian men and boys killed in Srebrenica is
between 7,000 and 8,000. In order to come to
this conclusion, the Judges in the Krstić case
accepted and reviewed a great deal of
evidentiary material.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Exhumations

Among the evidence that the Judges used to
establish the number of people the Bosnian Serbs
killed was that from the mass graves where the
victims were buried. The Chamber reviewed
evidence from 21 mass graves that had been
exhumed by the ICTY from 1996 to 2000.[7] Of
these, 14 were ―primary gravesites‖, where the
victims‘ bodies had been buried immediately after
they were killed. Bosnian Serb forces
subsequently disturbed eight of these primary
gravesites in an attempt to cover up their crimes:
during a period of several weeks in September
and October 1995, they removed bodies from the
primary graves and reburied them in other
locations that are referred to as ―secondary
gravesites.‖ Seven of the 21 mass graves were
such ―secondary‖ burial sites.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Determining the exact number of bodies in each of the mass
graves was a very difficult task, which was complicated by
the fact that Bosnian Serb forces mutilated and
dismembered many of the remains when they used heavy
machinery to exhume and rebury them.[8] Thus body parts
from the same person could be found in two separate mass
graves—a primary and a secondary one.

 Nevertheless, the forensic experts were able to determine
the minimum number of bodies contained in all the
discovered graves. That number was 2,028 victims.[9] At
the time the Judges in the Krstić trial issued their
Judgement in August 2001, they noted that the Prosecution
had identified 18 other mass graves that had not yet been
exhumed.[10] In other words, the Judges recognized at
that time that 2,028 exhumed bodies do not represent the
sum total of the Bosnian Muslim men and boys killed at
Srebrenica.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Demographic Expert

The Trial Chamber in the Krstić case heard
evidence from a demographics expert whose task
it was to determine the number of people who
have been reported as missing from Srebrenica.
The demographics expert cross-referenced the
list of missing persons of the International
Committee of the Red Cross with other sources,
including lists of those who were missing or
killed before July 1995, and other data that shows
who was alive after. In this way, he was able to
make sure that his figures could only refer to
those who were missing as a result of the
massacres at Srebrenica in July 1995. Based on
this research, he testified that a conservative
estimate of the number of people missing from
Srebrenica is 7,475.[11]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Intercepts

 The Trial Chamber in the Krstić case heard evidence of
intercepted conversations between VRS soldiers, including
the accused, which corroborates the fact that Bosnian Serb
forces killed between 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim
prisoners.
 As has become standard practice in modern warfare, both
the VRS and the Bosnian Army (ABiH) monitored enemy
communications. The VRS had secure means of
communication, but they did not always work and took
longer to set up, so the officers often used unsecured lines
because they were quicker. Intelligence officers from the
ABiH intercepted conversations over such lines and
transcribed them. These recordings were then submitted to
the Tribunal‘s Office of the Prosecutor.[12]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Intercepts

 Determining the authenticity and reliability of such
intercepts is a long and detailed process: the Trial Chamber
heard direct evidence from the Bosnian Army personnel
who were transcribing the conversations. It also heard
about the Prosecution‘s efforts to determine whether the
transcripts were reliable and genuine, including their efforts
to find evidence from other sources to corroborate the
information from the transcripts.[13] As a result, not all the
intercepts could be admitted as evidence, but those that
were showed a conclusive story. Of the intercepts that were
admitted as evidence in the Krstić case, the Trial Chamber
found the following to be particularly significant in
determining the number of Bosnian Muslims the Bosnian
Serb forces took prisoner and killed:
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Intercepts

 One intercepted telephone conversation from
1730 hours on 13 July 1995 shows that in that
moment the Bosnian Serb forces had captured
around 6,000 people.[14] Consistent with this,
around 14 July Colonel Radislav Janković, from
the VRS General Staff, told a Dutch battalion
soldier that they had captured around 6,000
POWs.[15]
 • On 18 July 1995, an unidentified Bosnian
Serb stated in an intercepted conversation that
of the 10,000 military aged men who were in
Srebrenica, ―4,000-5,000 have certainly kicked
the bucket.‖[16]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Intercepts

 The Trial Chamber also had an intercepted conversation
between General Krstić and ICTY accused VRS Colonel Ljubiša
Beara at 1000 hours on 15 July 1995, the middle of the killing
operation. In it, Beara asks Krstić for more men. He states ―I
don‘t know what to do. I mean it, Krle [Krstić‘s nickname].
There are still 3,500 ―parcels‖ that I have to distribute and I
have no solution.‖ Krstić replies, ―Fuck it, I‘ll see what I can
do.‖ From other intercepted telephone conversations, the
Prosecution was able to show that the word ―parcel‖ means
Bosnian Muslim prisoner, and the word ―distribute‖ means to
kill them.[17]

The intercept evidence corroborates the findings of the
demographic expert and the exhumation evidence that shows
that Bosnian Serb forces took prisoner and killed many
thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys, and not just 2,000
as some people in Serbia and Montenegro claim.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Insider Witnesses

 Perhaps the most compelling evidence that the
Tribunal has heard that proves that Bosnian
Serb forces killed 7,000 to 8,000 Bosnian
Muslim men comes from the people who
actually participated in the killing operation. In
the Krstić trial, the Trial Chamber heard from
Dražen Erdemović, a VRS soldier with the 10th
Sabotage Detachment, who participated in one
of the largest executions, which took place at
the Branjevo Military Farm on 16 July 1995.
Erdemović pleaded guilty to participating in
these executions and later testified in the case
against General Krstić.[18] Dražen Erdemović's
description of how his unit killed their victims
assists in getting an idea of how many people
lost their lives during those five days in July.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Insider Witnesses

 In his testimony, Erdemović explained that his unit
received orders on the morning of 16 July 1995 to go
to the Branjevo Military farm. Shortly after they
reached the farm, buses carrying Bosnian Muslim
men began to arrive. Erdemović and the other
members of his unit were given orders to shoot the
prisoners. Erdemović testified that, in his estimate,
they killed between 1,000 and 1,200 Bosnian Muslim
men on that day alone.[19] And the Branjevo Military
Farm was not the only site at which executions took
place: the Trial Chamber examined evidence of mass
executions at a total of nine sites, including the
Branjevo Military Farm.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Insider Witnesses

 a) The Morning of 13 July 1995: Jadar River
(b) The Afternoon of 13 July 1995: Čerska Valley
(c) Late Afternoon of 13 July 1995: Kravica
Warehouse
(d) 13-14 July 1995: Tišća
(e) 14 July 1995: Grbavci School Detention site and
Orahovac Execution site
(f) 14-15 July 1995: Petkovci School Detention Site
and Petkovci Dam Execution Site
(g) 14-16 July 1995: Pilica School Detention Site and
Branjevo Military Farm Execution Site
(h) 16 July 1995: Pilica Cultural Dom
(i) 14-17 July 1995: Kozluk
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Insider Witnesses

All of this evidence points in no uncertain terms to the accuracy of the estimate that
between 7,000 and 8,000 people were executed in Srebrenica in July 1995.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Victims Were Not Battle
Casualties
 In Republika Srpska and Serbia one does not
only hear that the number of dead was much
lower than 7,000 to 8,000. One also hears that
the victims were not civilians or prisoners of
war, but rather soldiers who died in battle.
Therefore, according to them, VRS forces were
abiding by the laws of war and no crime was
committed at Srebrenica.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Victims Were Not Battle
Casualties
 Evidence from the exhumations that the Trial
Chamber reviewed in the Krstić case paints quite a
different picture. It shows that most of the victims
were not killed in combat but in mass executions. In
the mass graves that have been exhumed so far,
Tribunal investigators found 448 blindfolds on or with
the victims’ bodies as well as 423 pieces of cloth,
string or wire that were used to tie the victims’
hands.[20] People who were blindfolded or had their
hands tied behind their backs were obviously not
killed in combat. The Trial Chamber also noted that
some of the victims in the mass graves were
handicapped, and therefore, very unlikely to have
been combatants.[21]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Victims Were Not Battle
Casualties
 Here, again, the testimony of the perpetrators is very
important. Momir Nikolić, VRS Deputy Commander for
Security and Intelligence, said clearly that the VRS did
not treat the prisoners they captured according to the
Geneva Conventions:
 Do you really think that in an operation where 7.000 people
were set aside, captured, and killed that somebody was
adhering to the Geneva Conventions? Do you really believe
that somebody adhered to the law, rules and regulations in
an operation where so many were killed? First of all, they
were captured, killed, and then buried, exhumed once again,
buried again. Can you conceive of that, that somebody in an
operation of that kind adhered to the Geneva Conventions?
Nobody ... adhered to the Geneva Conventions or the rules
and regulations. Because had they, then the consequences of
that particular operation would not have been a total of
7.000 people dead.[22]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Victims Were Not Battle
Casualties
 Dragan Obrenović, who was the commander of the
VRS Zvornik Brigade at the time and who confessed
to his participation in the massacres, stated clearly
that on 13 July 1995 he became aware of the fact
that Bosnian Serb forces captured thousands of
Bosnian Muslim prisoners and that the prisoners were
to be shot.[23] Testifying about his role in the
Branjevo Military Farm executions, Dražen Erdemović
stated that buses carrying Bosnian Muslim prisoners
began arriving there on the morning of 16 July 1995.
He stated that all but one of the prisoners wore
civilian clothes. He also testified that some of them
were blindfolded and had their hands tied. He
described how his unit shot the victims. He stated
that, except for one prisoner who tried to escape,
none resisted before being shot.[24]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Victims Were Not Battle
Casualties
 Testimony from the few victims who survived the
executions also clearly shows that VRS forces were
callously killing civilians or prisoners of war, in serious
violation of international humanitarian law. One of the
survivors of the Branjevo Military Farm executions,
described above, related the moment when he was
confronted by the firing squad:
 When they opened fire, I threw myself on the ground…. And
one man fell on my head. I think that he was killed on the
spot. And I could feel the hot blood pouring over me… I
could hear one man crying for help. He was begging them to
kill him. And they simply said ―Let him suffer. We’ll kill him
later.‖[25]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 The Victims Were Not Battle Casualties
 Lastly, killing an enemy soldier in combat is not a war crime. If
those buried in the mass graves had indeed been soldiers killed
in battle, there would have been no need for Bosnian Serb
forces to execute a massive cover-up campaign.[26] And there is
much evidence that proves that is exactly what they did in
September and October of 1995. In order to cover up their initial
crimes of killing civilians and prisoners of war, the Bosnian Serb
forces committed another crime—they attempted to relocate the
bodies. They used bulldozers and other heavy machinery to
exhume a number of the mass gravesites and move the bodies
to other locations. The Prosecution conducted forensic analysis
of the 21 mass graves that it exhumed and found that some of
the primary and secondary sites were linked. Forensic experts
analyzed the soil, bullets and other materials found in the sites
they exhumed and found that 12 of them were linked to each
other.[27] The Trial Chamber in the Krstić case found that this
evidence demonstrates an extensive campaign to conceal the
bodies of the men who the Bosnian Serb forces killed and buried
in mass gravesites in July 1995. This cover-up attempt shows
not only that Bosnian Serb forces committed horrible crimes, but
also that they were well aware that what they had done was
against the law.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 In the Krstić case, the Trial Chamber heard a lot of evidence that
demonstrated clearly that the Bosnian Serb army mobilized
resources between 11 and 19 July 1995 in order to kill Bosnian
Muslim prisoners.
 • Mobilizing men: In the intercepted telephone conversation between
General Krstić and ICTY accused VRS Colonel Ljubiša Beara at 1000
hours on 15 July 1995, referred to above,[29] Beara asks Krstić for
men to help with the executions. Krstić actually did what Beara asked
him to do: the very next day, 16 July 1995, men from the VRS Bratunac
Brigade arrived to assist members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment
with the executions at the Branjevo Military Farm.[30]
 • Mobilizing fuel: Another intercepted conversation shows that on 16
July 1995 VRS Colonel Popović made a request for 500 litres of diesel
fuel. A VRS Zvornik Brigade document confirms that 500 litres of diesel
fuel was in fact given to Colonel Popović on 16 July 1995.[31]
 • Mobilizing machinery: One victim of the Branjevo Military Farm
executions on 16 July 1995 who survived testified that he heard heavy
machinery in the killing field on 17 July.[32] Aerial photographs of the
area taken on 17 July 1995 show a large number of bodies lying in the
field near the farm, and an excavator digging a hole.[33]
Corroborating the witness‘ testimony and the aerial photographs, VRS
Zvornik Brigade vehicle records show an ULT 220 bulldozer in
operation at Branjevo for eight-and-a-half hours on 17 July 1995, and
the Fuel Dispersal Log shows that 100 litres of diesel fuel was
disbursed to a BGH-700 excavator on 17 July 1995.[34]
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Srebrenica Was an Act of Genocide
 Another objection that we hear frequently in Serbia and
Montenegro is that what happened at Srebrenica is not
genocide. General Krstić‘s Defence made precisely this
claim during his trial. But before discussing the
Defence‘s reasoning and why the Trial Chamber rejected
it, it is first important to look at the legal definition of
genocide, since the term is quite often misused. The
Tribunal‘s Statute defines genocide as:
 any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
 (a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
BOSNIA- 1993-1995
 Conclusion
 Evidence from exhumations, demographic experts, intercepted
communications, documents, victim testimony and perpetrator
testimony led the Trial Chamber to the following irrefutable
conclusions: that Bosnian Serb forces killed between 7,000 and
8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in July 1995; that the
victims were either civilians or prisoners of war; that the
massacre and the subsequent cover-up operation were
planned and well-organised; and that it was an act of genocide.
It is worthy of note that since the Judgement against General
Radislav Krstić was handed down in August 2001, more
evidence has emerged that affirms the Tribunal‘s findings.
Among them is the Report of the Republika Srpska Commission
to Investigate Events in and around Srebrenica from 10 to 19
July 1995. The Commission‘s report, which identifies 32 new
mass graves, found that ―in the period between 10–19 July
1995 many thousands of Bosnians were liquidated, in a manner
that constitutes a serious violation of international
humanitarian law.‖[40]
 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Outreach
outreach@icty.org
http://www.un.org.icty/index-b.html
RWANDA- 1994
 http://www.rwanda-
genocide.org/
RWANDA- 1994
 The 1994 genocide in Rwanda resulted in the systematic
massacre of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in less than
100 days. The events occurred while the international
community closed its eyes.

 The purpose of this site is to centralize access to a collection
of high-quality information resources on the Rwandan
genocide that shed a thorough light on the genocide, from
its design to its enduring fallout in today's Rwanda.

 Now is a better time than ever to help. Other tragic events
in the past years have occulted the aftermath of the
Rwandan genocide in the public eye and the level of support
to the victims has dropped considerably.

 Fifteen years do not erase the stigmata of a mass murder.
Rememberance and support are still essential.
RWANDA- 1994
 "Perhaps there is no better case than
Rwanda of state killing in which
colonial history and global economic
integration combined to produce
genocide. It is also a case where the
causes of the killing were carefully
obscured by Western governmental
and journalistic sources, blamed
instead on the victims and ancient
tribal hatreds."
Excerpt from Richard H.
Robbins's "Global Problems and the
Culture of Capitalism"
RWANDA- 1994
 "Neighbors hacked neighbors in their homes,
and colleagues hacked colleagues to death in
their workplaces. Doctors killed their patients,
and schoolteachers killed their pupils. Within
days, the Tutsi populations of many villages
were all but eliminated, and in Kigali prisoners
were released in work gangs to collect the
corpses that lined the roadsides. Drunken militia
bands, fortified with assorted drugs from
ransacked pharmacies, were bused from
massacre to massacre. Radio announcers
reminded listeners not to take pity on women
and children."
Excerpt from Philip
Gourevitch's "We Wish to Inform You That
Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families:
Stories from Rwanda"
RWANDA- 1994
 How to Help
 Since 1994, multiple organizations have made
valiant attempts to provide sustained relief to
genocide victims, but the level of support has
significantly dropped in the past 5 years. As we
researched the materials selected for this
website, we were on many occasions
impressed by the presence and realism of a
specific non-governmental organization --
Avega-Agahozo. This is the reason why we
have decided to create a gateway to that
specific organization below. Please note that
we cannot accept any contribution on behalf of
Avega. Please contact them directly or visit
their website for information on support and
donations.
RWANDA- 1994
 How to Help
 Avega's Mission:
 To promote the general welfare of the
genocide victims;
 To promote solidarity among members of
the association;
 To carry out activities aimed at helping the
widows;
 To cooperate with organizations that have
the same objectives;
 To uphold the memory of the genocide
victims and to fight for justice;
 To participate in the national reconstruction
and reconciliation process of Rwanda
RWANDA- 1994
 How to Help
 Other organizations with ongoing
relief programs in Rwanda:
 Survivors Fund
 Oxfam
 UNICEF
 Red Cross
 Doctors Without Borders
 CARE
 Food for the Hungry
 RCN Justice & Démocratie
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 http://www.gendercide.org/
genocideinkurdistan.html

 Genocide in Kurdistan
 A dissertation presented in partial
fulfillment
of the Diploma in Legal Studies at the
University of Auckland
 ByHeval Hylan
 Auckland, November 2000
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.0 What is the Kurdish genocide?

 After 16 March 1988, one word came to symbolize the
tragedy of the Kurds -- Halabja. [11] Halabja is the
Kurdish Auschwitz; not because the scale of the
massacre was comparable with that of the Nazi death
camp, but because the victims were chosen merely
because they were Kurdish civilians. [12]
 Halabja was only one of many towns attacked by poison
gas in 1988 dropped by Iraqi forces. The full extent of
the lasting damage suffered by the Kurdish people as a
result of the Iraqi government's use of poison gas is yet
unknown. [13]
 The Kurdish Genocide was centrally planned and
administered by the Iraqi Government against the entire
Kurdish population. In addition, the Kurdish people were
also subjected to deportation, expropriation, abduction,
torture, massacre, and starvation. But these violations
are not the subjects of discussion in this paper. [14]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.1 Incidents
 On the 16th of March 1988, Iraqi bombers attacked the
Kurdish town of Halabja [15] using chemical weapons
and nerve gases such as Tabun and Sarin. These gases
left thousands of civilian's dead, many thousands
wounded, and tens of thousands of people homeless.
[16]
 Including Halabja, there were in total eight Anfal
campaigns between February and September 1988: [17]
 First Anfal: February 23 - March 19, 1988 (Halabja
attacked March 16, 1988) [18]
Second Anfal: March 22 - April 1, 1988 (Qara Dagh)
Third Anfal: April 7 - 20, 1988 (Germian village, Qader
Karam)
Fourth Anfal: May 3 - 8, 1988 (Valley of the Lesser Zab)
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Anfals: May 15 - August 26,
1988 (Mountain Valleys of Shaqlawa and Rawandus)
Final Anfal: August 25 - September 6, 1988 (Badinan)
[19], [20]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2 Intent
 Genocide is a crime characterised by the fact that it forms part
of a wider plan to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular
group. As a crime directed at a group, [21] the genocidal intent
is necessarily associated with mass crimes.
 The specific intent of the accused, as was defined by the
drafters of the Genocide Convention, must be proven, since by
definition intent is a necessary element of the crime. [22]
Accordingly, if one does not possess the specific intent to
destroy a group in whole or in part, then that person would not
be found guilty of genocide[23] but s/he could still be found
guilty of crimes against humanity, a war crime, homicide, or
any of the enumerated crimes in Article II (a)-(e). [24]
 In addition, the International Law Commission (ILC), in
commenting on its draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, stated, in this regard: .".. A general intent
to commit one of the enumerated acts combined with a general
awareness of the probable consequences of such an act with
respect to the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for
the crime of genocide. The definition of this crime requires a
specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the
prohibited acts." [25]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.2.What constitutes the actual 'intent' requirement?
 the Kurds fit into more than one of the four categories,
national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups. This was
also an important issue in the judgments of ICTR. [54] It
is also possible to use the legal test as to whether the
Kurds are a collective ethnic group "stable and
permanent and whose membership is mainly determined
by birth, language, and culture." [55] The Kurdish case
may fit into the ethnic category according to Genocide
Convention, because:
 1. Iraq is a patrilineal society so that one's ethnicity (ie
whether a person is a Kurd or an Arab) is determined at
birth according to their father's ancestry;
 2. one's ethnicity can be judged subjectively, as in the case
of Kurdistan where one's ethnicity is establish through their
society's criteria; [56] and
 3. the fact that most people of Kurdistan carried
identification cards, specifically stating whether or not they
are a Kurd. [57]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.2.What constitutes the actual 'intent'
requirement?
 The Iraqi government's involvement
in the genocidal acts, as disclosed
through documented evidences, were:
 (i) that the Iraqi leaders made speeches
calling for the chemical weapons attacks
upon Kurdish civilians, and referring to
them as saboteurs,
 (ii) that they incited other Kurds to kill
Kurdish civilians, and, finally
 (iii) that they did nothing to prevent
others from committing other acts of
violence specifically targeted at the
Kurdish civilian population, particularly in
Halabja.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.3 Evidence to support the Kurdish case
 There are sufficient documents in both Arabic
and in English, including speeches and
newspaper articles, which present clear
evidence for an argument that, first of all,
there were chemical attacks in Kurdistan, and,
secondly, that the attacks were planned by the
Iraqi Government to destroy the Kurdish
civilians in whole or in part -- in another words,
that the "intent" existed. There are channels to
prove the actus, and then the reus.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.3 Evidence to support the Kurdish case
 First: Speeches. Recorded on audiotape, Ali Hassan al-Majid (known in
Kurdistan as 'Ali Chemical') justified the use of poison gas against the
Kurds in a speech to the cadres of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party.
 He says on the tape: [92] "Who is going to say anything? The
international community? F… them -- the international community and
those who listen to them!" Early in 1987, while ruminating at a
meeting with subordinates (recorded on another tape), [93] Ali Hassan
al-Majid defended himself against the potential critics who might dare
question his 1988 wholesale execution of Kurdish men, women, and
children: "Am I supposed to keep them in good shape? No! I shall bury
them with bulldozers." Then, as if recalling the terms of a debate about
how to settle the Kurds' fate, he added: "Where am I supposed to put
all this enormous number of people? I started to distribute them
among the governorates. I had to send the bulldozers hither and yon."
 In an address to top Ba'ath cadres, he spelled out a "systematic
military plan" designed to surround the Peshmerga (Kurdish guerrilla
fighters) in a small pocket, and attack them with chemical weapons: "I
will attack them with chemicals one day, but I will attack them with
chemicals for fifteen days." [94]
 On another tape, Ali Chemical was recorded bluntly informing a Jash:
[95] "I cannot let your village stand, because [what would happen if] I
attack it with chemical weapons? Then your families would die. You
must leave your villages right now because I cannot tell you the same
day I am going to attack with chemical weapons." [96]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.3 Evidence to support the Kurdish case
 First: Speeches. Recorded on audiotape, Ali Hassan al-Majid
(known in Kurdistan as 'Ali Chemical') justified the use of
poison gas against the Kurds in a speech to the cadres of
Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party.
 He says on the tape: [92] "Who is going to say anything? The
international community? F… them -- the international community
and those who listen to them!" Early in 1987, while ruminating at a
meeting with subordinates (recorded on another tape), [93] Ali
Hassan al-Majid defended himself against the potential critics who
might dare question his 1988 wholesale execution of Kurdish men,
women, and children: "Am I supposed to keep them in good
shape? No! I shall bury them with bulldozers." Then, as if recalling
the terms of a debate about how to settle the Kurds' fate, he
added: "Where am I supposed to put all this enormous number of
people? I started to distribute them among the governorates. I
had to send the bulldozers hither and yon."
 In an address to top Ba'ath cadres, he spelled out a "systematic
military plan" designed to surround the Peshmerga (Kurdish
guerrilla fighters) in a small pocket, and attack them with chemical
weapons: "I will attack them with chemicals one day, but I will
attack them with chemicals for fifteen days." [94]
 On another tape, Ali Chemical was recorded bluntly informing a
Jash: [95] "I cannot let your village stand, because [what would
happen if] I attack it with chemical weapons? Then your families
would die. You must leave your villages right now because I
cannot tell you the same day I am going to attack with chemical
weapons." [96]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.3 Evidence to support the Kurdish case
 Second: Documents. There are tens of documents that
have references to the chemical attacks. It is important
to mention that the documents below have direct
reference to chemical attacks carried out by Iraqi forces.
The first document to mention is a top-secret letter sent
by the Director of the Intelligence Centre of Kalar, a
small Kurdish town in northern Iraq. [97]
 Top Secret - Document No. 9 [98]
 During the month of March 1988, our aircraft bombed the
headquarters of the sabotage [99] bands in the villages of
Saywan (4596) in a chemical strike. This resulted in the
death of 50 saboteurs [100] and the wounding of 20 other
saboteurs.
 [Signed] Captain Kifah Ali Hassan
Director of the Intelligence Centre of Kalar.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.3 Evidence to support the Kurdish case
 Third: Articles in newspaper and magazines.
There are hundreds of articles.
 The following is an extract from an Iraqi and Western
newspaper about the use of chemical weapons in
Kurdistan 1998.
 My eyes became heavy, I had pain breathing, I vomited
8 or 9 times ... Each time I opened a door of a house,
there were children, women, & men agonising & dying.
Mohamad Azizi, 25 years, Le Monde 08/04/1988.

 Al Thawra, the official organ of the Iraqi Government,
states on 29 March 1988:
 No one has the right to dictate to Iraq the type of
weapon it uses to defend itself. Those who talk
about the Geneva Convention (of 1925 on chemical
& biological weapons & to which Iraq is signatory
TKT) must bear in mind that this convention forbid
also the occupation by force of other's lands.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 3.2.4 Conclusion
 It seems that it is not an easy legal task to
interpret whether a genocidal act such as
happened in Kurdistan was intentional, but the
ICTR and ICTY have taken some steps forward
in clarifying "intent." In the Kurdish case, the
indications are there that there was an intent
to destroy the Kurdish population in whole or
in part, and there is enough evidence the
action should be taken. There is a need to
appoint a United Nations Commission of
Experts to investigate alleged acts of genocide
in Kurdistan, as was established in the Rwanda
and Yugoslavia cases. To establish intent in a
paper like this is impossible, as there are to
many conflicting interpretations. What is
needed is an International Criminal Tribunal
for Iraq (ICTI), and this is proposed in the next
chapter.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 4.2 Introduction
 Trials are legal therapy. Virtually all Kurdish
people lost relatives to the genocide, and many
have suffered post-traumatic stress disorder.
Trials will help the Kurds' recovery, through the
therapeutic value of judicial proceedings. In
effect, trials help transform lingering
grievances into past history.
 Bringing genocidal criminals to justice helps
restore the legitimacy of the once-offending
state. Croatian authorities, for example, turned
over to the Hague Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia a number of its suspected war
criminals, in order to enhance its image and
promote its integration into European
institutions.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 4.3 Why the Need for Setting Up an International
Criminal Court for Iraq?
 The setting up of an International Criminal Court for Iraq
could provide the means to put an end to grave
violations in Iraq and to contribute to the restoration
and maintenance of peace. The establishment of an ad
hoc tribunal would undoubtedly represent major
progress towards those goals.
 In asking why there is a need for such a court, there are
three main arguments to the answer, and all are related
to the charge of genocide:
 1. The use of chemical weapons, prohibited by international
law, in Halabja and other parts of Kurdistan in 1988 were
possibly constituted as genocide. [111]
 2. The victims did 'constitute a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group' and that the Iraqi government's actions
were of criminal intent. Also, the number of Kurdish
civilians killed by the use of chemical weapons were of such
magnitude as may constitute a genocidal act.
 3. Genocide in Kurdistan was a threat to and a breach of
peace. [112]
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 4.5 The Question of Political Will
 The political will of the prosecuting (or
extraditing) state will be a critical factor
in the possibility of a prosecution,
particularly where the law does not
allow victims to initiate a criminal
proceedings directly. In the Pinochet
case, [133] British police immediately
executed the arrest warrant sent by
Spain. Austria's decision recognised the
political costs of a break with the
international status quo. [134] Austria
placed its relations with Iraq above its
international treaty obligations.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 5.3 Conclusion
 The Iraqi government leaders who perpetrate genocide and other
mass atrocities are rightly held accountable for the deaths they cause -
- deaths that almost certainly would not have occurred if they had not
planned, authorised, and directed their perpetration. They are also
especially accountable because they acted knowingly, intentionally,
and voluntarily and, thus, deserve criminal punishment.
 International law is not yet fully equipped to answer clearly and
precisely all questions relating to the prosecution and punishment of
individuals for the commiting of such atrocities. The tree is there and
branches are slowly growing but it has not yet attained full maturity.
Nonetheless, genocide crimes are international crimes which entail
individual criminal responsibility and give rise to universal jurisdiction.
 Despite the important moves to create a system of international
criminal justice, there will still remain for the foreseeable future a role
for national courts in prosecuting those suspected of international
crimes who come within their borders. [181]
 Finally, it is also now widely recognised that under international
customary law, and general principles of law, states may exercise
universal jurisdiction over persons suspected of genocide, and crimes
in non-international armed conflict. It is also increasingly recognised
that states not only have the power to exercise universal jurisdiction
over genocide crimes, but also that they have the duty to do so or to
extradite suspects to states willing to exercise jurisdiction. The
Austrian government may argue that the Kurdish genocide hasn't been
recognised internationally. This argument adds strength to the reasons
for establishing an international court for Iraq.
IRAQI KURDS- 1979-2003
 6.0 General conclusion
 The experience of the Kurdish people in the period after the genocide
illustrates an important issue. Unless the consequences of genocide
are addressed in the immediate aftermath of the event, the passage of
time very soon puts survivors at a serious disadvantage. Without the
attention of the international community; without the intervention of
major states seeking to stabilise the affected region; without the swift
apprehension of the guilty; and without the full exposure of the
evidence, the victims stand little chance of recovering from their
losses. In the absence of a response and universal condemnation,
genocide becomes "legitimised.―
Chinese Female Infanticide
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Chinese Female Infanticide
 Case Study:
Female Infanticide Focus:
(1) India
(2) China

 Summary
 The phenomenon of female infanticide is as old as many
cultures, and has likely accounted for millions of gender-
selective deaths throughout history. It remains a critical
concern in a number of "Third World" countries today,
notably the two most populous countries on earth, China
and India. In all cases, specifically female infanticide
reflects the low status accorded to women in most parts
of the world; it is arguably the most brutal and
destructive manifestation of the anti-female bias that
pervades "patriarchal" societies. It is closely linked to
the phenomena of sex-selective abortion, which targets
female fetuses almost exclusively, and neglect of girl
children.
Chinese Female Infanticide
 Case Study:
Female Infanticide Focus:
(1) India
(2) China

 Summary
 The phenomenon of female infanticide is as old as many
cultures, and has likely accounted for millions of gender-
selective deaths throughout history. It remains a critical
concern in a number of "Third World" countries today,
notably the two most populous countries on earth, China
and India. In all cases, specifically female infanticide
reflects the low status accorded to women in most parts
of the world; it is arguably the most brutal and
destructive manifestation of the anti-female bias that
pervades "patriarchal" societies. It is closely linked to
the phenomena of sex-selective abortion, which targets
female fetuses almost exclusively, and neglect of girl
children.
Chinese Female Infanticide
 Background
 "Female infanticide is the intentional killing of
baby girls due to the preference for male
babies and from the low value associated with
the birth of females." (Marina Porras, "Female
Infanticide and Foeticide".) It should be seen
as a subset of the broader phenomenon of
infanticide, which has also targeted the
physically or mentally handicapped, and infant
males (alongside infant females or,
occasionally, on a gender-selective basis). As
with maternal mortality, some would dispute
the assigning of infanticide or female
infanticide to the category of "genocide" or, as
here, "gendercide."
Chinese Female Infanticide
 Background
 Nonetheless, the argument advanced in the maternal mortality
case-study holds true in this case as well: governments and
other actors can be just as guilty of mass killing by neglect or
tacit encouragement, as by direct murder. R.J. Rummel
buttresses this view, referring to infanticide as
 another type of government killing whose victims may total millions
... In many cultures, government permitted, if not encouraged, the
killing of handicapped or female infants or otherwise unwanted
children. In the Greece of 200 B.C., for example, the murder of
female infants was so common that among 6,000 families living in
Delphi no more than 1 percent had two daughters. Among 79
families, nearly as many had one child as two. Among all there
were only 28 daughters to 118 sons. ... But classical Greece was
not unusual. In eighty-four societies spanning the Renaissance to
our time, "defective" children have been killed in one-third of them.
In India, for example, because of Hindu beliefs and the rigid caste
system, young girls were murdered as a matter of course. When
demographic statistics were first collected in the nineteenth century,
it was discovered that in "some villages, no girl babies were found
at all; in a total of thirty others, there were 343 boys to 54 girls. ...
[I]n Bombay, the number of girls alive in 1834 was 603."
Chinese Female Infanticide
 Background
 Rummel adds: "Instances of infanticide ... are usually
singular events; they do not happen en masse. But
the accumulation of such officially sanctioned or
demanded murders comprises, in effect, serial
massacre. Since such practices were so pervasive in
some cultures, I suspect that the death toll from
infanticide must exceed that from mass sacrifice and
perhaps even outright mass murder." (Rummel,
Death by Government , pp. 65-66.)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (1): India
 As John-Thor Dahlburg points out, "in rural India, the centuries-old
practice of female infanticide can still be considered a wise course of
action." (Dahlburg, "Where killing baby girls 'is no big sin'," The Los
Angeles Times [in The Toronto Star, February 28, 1994.]) According to
census statistics, "From 972 females for every 1,000 males in 1901 ...
the gender imbalance has tilted to 929 females per 1,000 males. ... In
the nearly 300 poor hamlets of the Usilampatti area of Tamil Nadu
[state], as many as 196 girls died under suspicious circumstances [in
1993] ... Some were fed dry, unhulled rice that punctured their
windpipes, or were made to swallow poisonous powdered fertilizer.
Others were smothered with a wet towel, strangled or allowed to
starve to death." Dahlburg profiles one disturbing case from Tamil
Nadu:
 Lakshmi already had one daughter, so when she gave birth to a second girl,
she killed her. For the three days of her second child's short life, Lakshmi
admits, she refused to nurse her. To silence the infant's famished cries, the
impoverished village woman squeezed the milky sap from an oleander
shrub, mixed it with castor oil, and forced the poisonous potion down the
newborn's throat. The baby bled from the nose, then died soon afterward.
Female neighbors buried her in a small hole near Lakshmi's square thatched
hut of sunbaked mud. They sympathized with Lakshmi, and in the same
circumstances, some would probably have done what she did. For despite
the risk of execution by hanging and about 16 months of a much-ballyhooed
government scheme to assist families with daughters, in some hamlets of ...
Tamil Nadu, murdering girls is still sometimes believed to be a wiser course
than raising them. "A daughter is always liabilities. How can I bring up a
second?" Lakshmi, 28, answered firmly when asked by a visitor how she
could have taken her own child's life eight years ago. "Instead of her
suffering the way I do, I thought it was better to get rid of her." (All quotes
from Dahlburg, "Where killing baby girls 'is no big sin'.")
Female Infanticide
 Focus (1): India
 A study of Tamil Nadu by the Community Service Guild of Madras
similarly found that "female infanticide is rampant" in the state,
though only among Hindu (rather than Moslem or Christian) families.
"Of the 1,250 families covered by the study, 740 had only one girl child
and 249 agreed directly that they had done away with the unwanted
girl child. More than 213 of the families had more than one male child
whereas half the respondents had only one daughter." (Malavika
Karlekar, "The girl child in India: does she have any rights?," Canadian
Woman Studies, March 1995.)
 The bias against females in India is related to the fact that "Sons are
called upon to provide the income; they are the ones who do most of
the work in the fields. In this way sons are looked to as a type of
insurance. With this perspective, it becomes clearer that the high value
given to males decreases the value given to females." (Marina Porras,
"Female Infanticide and Foeticide".) The problem is also intimately
tied to the institution of dowry, in which the family of a prospective
bride must pay enormous sums of money to the family in which the
woman will live after marriage. Though formally outlawed, the
institution is still pervasive. "The combination of dowry and wedding
expenses usually add up to more than a million rupees ([US] $35,000).
In India the average civil servant earns about 100,000 rupees ($3,500)
a year. Given these figures combined with the low status of women, it
seems not so illogical that the poorer Indian families would want only
male children." (Porras, "Female Infanticide and Foeticide".) Murders
of women whose families are deemed to have paid insufficient dowry
have become increasingly common, and receive separate case-study
treatment on this site.
Female Infanticide
 Focus (1): India
 India is also the heartland of sex-selective abortion.
Amniocentesis was introduced in 1974 "to ascertain birth
defects in a sample population," but "was quickly appropriated
by medical entrepreneurs. A spate of sex-selective abortions
followed." (Karlekar, "The girl child in India.") Karlekar points
out that "those women who undergo sex determination tests
and abort on knowing that the foetus is female are actively
taking a decision against equality and the right to life for girls.
In many cases, of course, the women are not independent
agents but merely victims of a dominant family ideology based
on preference for male children."
 Dahlburg notes that "In Jaipur, capital of the western state of
Rajasthan, prenatal sex determination tests result in an
estimated 3,500 abortions of female fetuses annually,"
according to a medical-college study. (Dahlburg, "Where killing
baby girls 'is no big sin'.") Most strikingly, according to
UNICEF, "A report from Bombay in 1984 on abortions after
prenatal sex determination stated that 7,999 out of 8,000 of
the aborted fetuses were females. Sex determination has
become a lucrative business." (Zeng Yi et al., "Causes and
Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio
at Birth in China," Population and Development Review, 19: 2
[June 1993], p. 297.)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (1): India

 Deficits in nutrition and health-care also overwhelmingly
target female children. Karlekar cites research

 indicat[ing] a definite bias in feeding boys milk and milk
products and eggs ... In Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh
[states], it is usual for girls and women to eat less than
men and boys and to have their meal after the men and
boys had finished eating. Greater mobility outside the home
provides boys with the opportunity to eat sweets and fruit
from saved-up pocket money or from money given to buy
articles for food consumption. In case of illness, it is usually
boys who have preference in health care. ... More is spent
on clothing for boys than for girls[,] which also affects
morbidity. (Karlekar, "The girl child in India.")
Female Infanticide
 Focus (1): India

 Sunita Kishor reports "another disturbing finding," namely "that,
despite the increased ability to command essential food and medical
resources associated with development, female children [in India] do
not improve their survival chances relative to male children with gains
in development. Relatively high levels of agricultural development
decrease the life chances of females while leaving males' life chances
unaffected; urbanization increases the life chances of males more than
females. ... Clearly, gender-based discrimination in the allocation of
resources persists and even increases, even when availability of
resources is not a constraint." (Kishor, "'May God Give Sons to All':
Gender and Child Mortality in India," American Sociological Review ,
58: 2 [April 1993], p. 262.)

 Indian state governments have sometimes taken measures to diminish
the slaughter of infant girls and abortions of female fetuses. "The
leaders of Tamil Nadu are holding out a tempting carrot to couples in
the state with one or two daughters and no sons: if one parent
undergoes sterilization, the government will give the family [U.S.]
\\$160 in aid per child. The money will be paid in instalments as the
girl goes through school. She will also get a small gold ring and on her
20th birthday, a lump sum of $650 to serve as her dowry or defray the
expenses of higher education. Four thousand families enrolled in the
first year," with 6,000 to 8,000 expected to join annually (as of 1994)
(Dahlburg, "Where killing baby girls 'is no big sin'.") Such programs
have, however, barely begun to address the scale of the catastrophe.
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China

 "A tradition of infanticide and abandonment, especially
of females, existed in China before the foundation of the
People's Republic in 1949," note Zeng et al.. ("Causes
and Implications," p. 294.) According to Ansley J. Coale
and Judith Banister, "A missionary (and naturalist)
observer in [China in] the late nineteenth century
interviewed 40 women over age 50 who reported having
borne 183 sons and 175 daughters, of whom 126 sons
but only 53 daughters survived to age 10; by their
account, the women had destroyed 78 of their
daughters." (Coale and Banister, "Five Decades of
Missing Females in China," Demography, 31: 3 [August
1994], p. 472.)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China

 According to Zeng et al., "The practice was largely forsaken in the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s." (Zeng et al., "Causes and Implications," p.
294.) Coale and Banister likewise acknowledge a "decline of excess
female mortality after the establishment of the People's Republic ...
assisted by the action of a strong government, which tried to modify
this custom as well as other traditional practices that it viewed as
harmful." (Coale and Banister, "Five Decades," p. 472.) But the number
of "missing" women showed a sharp upward trend in the 1980s, linked
by almost all scholars to the "one-child policy" introduced by the
Chinese government in 1979 to control spiralling population growth.
Couples are penalized by wage-cuts and reduced access to social
services when children are born "outside the plan." Johansson and
Nygren found that while "sex ratios [were] generally within or fairly
near the expected range of 105 to 106 boys per 100 girls for live births
within the plan ... they are, in contrast, clearly far above normal for
children born outside the plan, even as high as 115 to 118 for 1984-87.
That the phenomenon of missing girls in China in the 1980s is related to
the government's population policy is thus conclusively shown." (Sten
Johansson and Ola Nygren, "The Missing Girls of China: A New
Demographic Account," Population and Development Review , 17: 1
[March 1991], pp. 40-41.)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China

 The Chinese government appeared to recognize the linkage by
allowing families in rural areas (where anti-female bias is
stronger) a second child if the first was a girl. Nonetheless, in
September 1997, the World Health Organization's Regional
Committee for the Western Pacific issued a report claiming that
"more than 50 million women were estimated to be 'missing' in
China because of the institutionalized killing and neglect of girls
due to Beijing's population control program that limits parents to
one child." (See Joseph Farah, "Cover-up of China's gender-
cide", Western Journalism Center/FreeRepublic, September 29,
1997.) Farah referred to the gendercide as "the biggest single
holocaust in human history."
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China

 According to Peter Stockland, "Years of population engineering,
including virtual extermination of 'surplus' baby girls, has created
a nightmarish imbalance in China's male and female
populations." (Stockland, "China's baby-slaughter overlooked,"
The Calgary Sun, June 11, 1997.) In 1999, Jonathan Manthorpe
reported a study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
claiming that "the imbalance between the sexes is now so
distorted that there are 111 million men in China -- more than
three times the population of Canada -- who will not be able to
find a wife." As a result, the kidnapping and slave-trading of
women has increased: "Since 1990, say official Chinese figures,
64,000 women -- 8,000 a year on average -- have been rescued
by authorities from forced 'marriages'. The number who have
not been saved can only be guessed at. ... The thirst for women
is so acute that the slave trader gangs are even reaching outside
China to find merchandise. There are regular reports of women
being abducted in such places as northern Vietnam to feed the
demand in China." (Jonathan Manthorpe, "China battles slave
trading in women: Female infanticide fuels a brisk trade in
wives," The Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1999.)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China
 Since the first allegations of widespread female infanticide in China connected to
the government's "one-child" policy, controversy has raged over the number of
deaths that can be ascribed to infanticide as opposed to other causes. Zeng et
al. argued in 1993 that "underreporting of female births, an increase in prenatal
sex identification by ultrasound and other diagnostic methods for the illegal
purpose of gender-specific birth control, and [only] very low-level incidence of
female infanticide are the causes of the increase in the reported sex ratio at birth
in China." (Zeng et al., "Causes and Implications," p. 285.) They add:
"Underreporting of female births accounts for about 43 percent to 75 percent of
the difference between the reported sex ratio at birth during the second half of
the 1980s and the normal value of the true sex ratio at birth" (p. 289). The
authors contended that "sex-differential underreporting of births and induced
abortion after prenatal sex determination together explain almost all of the
increase in the reported sex ratio at birth during the late 1980s," and thus "the
omission ... of victims of female infanticide cannot be a significant factor."
Moreover, "Both the social and administrative structure and the close bond
among neighbors in China make it difficult to conceal a serious crime such as
infanticide," while additionally "Infanticide is not a cost-effective method of sex
selection. The psychological and moral costs are so high that people are unlikely
to take such a step except under extreme circumstances" (p. 295). They stress,
however, that "even small numbers of cases of female infanticide, abandonment,
and neglect are a serious violation of the fundamental human rights of women
and children" (p. 296). (2002 update: A recent article by John Gittings of the
UK Guardian cites national census results released in May 2002 that show that
"more than 116 male births were recorded for every 100 female births," but
claims the cause is overwhelmingly sex-selective abortion: "Female infanticide,
notorious in China's past as a primitive method of sex selection, is now thought
to be infrequent." See Gittings, "Growing Sex Imbalance Shocks China", The
Guardian, May 13, 2002.)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China
 In a similar vein, in April 2000, The New York Times reported
that "many 'illegal' children are born in secret, their births never
officially registered." And "as more women move around the
country to work, it is increasingly hard to monitor pregnancies ...
Unannnounced spot checks by the State Statistics Bureau have
discovered undercounts of up to 40 percent in some villages,
Chinese demographers say." (See Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China's
Widely Flouted One-Child Policy Undercuts Its Census", The New
York Times, April 14, 2000.)

 Johansson and Nygren attracted considerable notice with a
somewhat different claim: "that adoptions (which often go
unreported) account for a large proportion of the missing girls.
... If adopted children are added to the live births ... the sex
ratio at birth becomes much closer to normal for most years in
the 1980s. ... Adding the adopted children to live births reduces
the number of missing girls by about half." (Johansson and
Nygren, "The Missing Girls of China," pp. 43, 46.) They add (p.
50): "That female infanticide does occur on some scale is
evidenced by reports in the Chinese press, but the available
statistical evidence does not help us to determine whether it
takes place on a large or a small scale."
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China
 Even if millions of Chinese infant girls are unregistered rather than
directly murdered, however, the pattern of discrimination is one that
will severely reduce their opportunities in life. "If parents do hide the
birth of a baby girl, she will go unregistered and therefore will not have
any legal existence. The child may have difficulty receiving medical
attention, going to school, and [accessing] other state services."
(Porras, "Female Infanticide and Foeticide".)

 Likewise, if a Chinese infant girl is turned over for adoption rather than
being killed, she risks being placed in one of the notorious "Dying
Rooms" unveiled in a British TV documentary. Chinese state orphanages
have come in for heavy criticism as a result of the degrading and
unsanitary conditions that usually pervade them. In one orphanage,
documentary producer Brian Woods found that "every single baby ...
was a girl, and as we moved on this pattern was repeated. The only
boys were mentally or physically disabled. 95% of the babies we saw
were able-bodied girls. We also discovered that, although they are
described as orphans, very few of them actually are; the overwhelming
majority do have parents, but their parents have abandoned them,
simply because they were born the wrong sex." Woods estimated that
"up to a million baby girls every year" were victims of this "mass
desertion," deriving from "the complex collision of [China's] notorious
One Child Policy and its traditional preference for sons." (See Brian
Woods, "The Dying Rooms Trust".)
Female Infanticide
 Focus (2): China
 The phenomenon of neglect of girl children is also dramatically
evident in China. According to the World Health Organization,
"In many cases, mothers are more likely to bring their male
children to health centers -- particularly to private physicians --
and they may be treated at an earlier stage of disease than
girls." (Cited in Farah, "Cover-up of China's gender-cide".)

 The Chinese government has taken some energetic steps to
combat the practice of female infanticide and sex-selective
abortion of female fetuses. It "has employed the Marriage Law
and Women's Protection Law which both prohibit female
infanticide. The Women's Protection Law also prohibits
discrimination against 'women who give birth to female babies.'
... The Maternal Health Care Law of 1994 'strictly prohibits' the
use of technology to identify the gender of a fetus." However,
"although the government has outlawed the use of ultrasound
machines, physicians continue to use them to determine the
gender of fetuses, especially in rural areas." (Porras, "Female
Infanticide and Foeticide".)
Female Infanticide
 How many die?

 Gendercide Watch is aware of no overall statistics on
the numbers of girls who die annually from
infanticide. Calculations are further clouded by the
unreliability and ambiguity of much of the data.
Nonetheless, a minimum estimate would place the
casualties in the the hundreds of thousands,
especially when one takes into consideration that the
phenomenon is most prevalent in the world's two
most populous countries. Sex-selective abortions
likely account for an even higher number of "missing"
girls.
Female Infanticide
 Who is responsible?

 As already noted, female infanticide reflects
the low status accorded to women in many
societies around the world. The "burden" of
taking a woman into the family accounts for
the high dowry rates in India which, in turn,
have led to an epidemic female infanticide.
Typical also is China, where
 culture dictates that when a girl marries she leaves
her family and becomes part of her husband's
family. For this reason Chinese peasants have for
many centuries wanted a son to ensure there is
someone to look after them in their old age --
having a boy child is the best pension a Chinese
peasant can get. Baby girls are even called
"maggots in the rice" ... ("The Dying Rooms
Trust")
Female Infanticide
 Who is responsible?
 Infanticide is a crime overwhelmingly committed by women, both in the
Third and First Worlds. (This contrasts markedly with "infanticide in
nonhuman primates," which "is carried out primarily by migrant males
who are unrelated to the infant or its parents and is a manifestation of
reproductive competition among males." [Glenn Hausfater, "Infanticide:
Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives," Current Anthropology, 25:
4 (1984), p. 501.] It also serves as a reminder that gendercide may be
implemented by those of the same gender.) In India, according to
John-Thor Dahlburg, "many births take place in isolated villages, with
only female friends and the midwife present. If a child dies, the women
can always blame natural causes." (Dahlburg, "Where killing baby girls
'is no big sin'.") In the United States, "every year hundreds of women
commit neonaticide [the killing of newborns] ... Prosecutors sometimes
don't prosecute; juries rarely convict; those found guilty almost never
go to jail. Barbara Kirwin, a forensic psychologist, reports that in nearly
300 cases of women charged with neonaticide in the United States and
Britain, no woman spent more than a night in jail." Much of "the
leniency shown to neonaticidal mothers" reflects the fact that they are
standardly "young, poor, unmarried and socially isolated," although it is
notable that similar leniency is rarely extended to young, poor, and
socially isolated male murderers. (Steven Pinker, "Why They Kill Their
Newborns", The New York Times, November 2, 1997.)
Female Infanticide
 Who is responsible?
 A number of strategies have been proposed and implemented to
try to address the problem of female infanticide, along with the
related phenomena of sex-selective abortion and abandonment
and neglect of girl children. Zeng et al.'s prescriptions for
Chinese policymakers can easily be generalized to other
countries where female infanticide is rife:
 The principle of equality between men and women should be more
widely promoted through the news media to change the attitude of
son preference and improve the awareness of the general public on
this issue; the principle should also be reflected in specific social
and economic policies to protect the basic rights of women and
children, especially female children. ... Government regulations
prohibiting the use of prenatal sex identification techniques for
nonmedical purposes should be strictly enforced, and violators
should be punished accordingly. The laws that punish people who
commit infanticide, abandonment, and neglect of female children,
and the laws and regulations on the protection of women and
children[,] should be strictly enforced. The campaigns to protect
women and children from being kidnapped or sold into servitude
should be effectively strengthened. Family planning programs
should focus on effective public education, good counseling and
service delivery, and the fully voluntary participation of the
community and individuals to increase contraceptive prevalence,
reduce unplanned pregnancies, and minimize the need for an
induced abortion. (Zeng, et al., p. 298.)