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					            FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

The Strasburger FCRA Newsletter is   Seventh Circuit Affirms Mortgage Company’s
designed to keep you current on      Summary Judgment as to §1681s-2(a) and §1681s-
FCRA-related legal issues and        2(b) Claims
events. For more frequent updates,   Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. Ill.
see our blog at the FCRA Blog.       2009)
                                     Facts: Plaintiff originally filed suit in Illinois State Court
         PREPARED BY                 alleging that Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”) and
                                     OCWEN Loan Services (“OCWEN”) improperly handled
                                     his mortgage account. Aurora subsequently removed the
                                     case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
                                     Illinois.   Plaintiff alleged multiple claims, including
                                     violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
                                     breach of contract, tortious interference, defamation, and
                                     intentional infliction of emotional distress.        Plaintiff’s
                                     mortgage agreement permitted him to remit his taxes and
                                     insurance premiums directly to the respective entities, but
                                     only if he promptly furnished proof of same to his
          M. Kasey Ratliff           mortgage servicer.        Plaintiff made direct payments     without submitting the required proof, and therefore,
    901 Main Street, Suite 4400      Aurora and later OCWEN made duplicate tax and
         Dallas, TX 75202            insurance payments on Plaintiff’s behalf. They notified
          (214) 651-4708             Plaintiff of a corresponding increase to his monthly
                                     amount due but Plaintiff did not increase the amount he
                                     paid to them each month. The deficiencies led Aurora
            EDITORS                  and OCWEN to report Plaintiff as delinquent to the
                                     consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”).              Defendants
         Erik J. Grohmann            moved for summary judgment as to the FCRA, breach of
          Tiffany L. Cox             contract and tortious interference claims, which the
                                     District Court granted. Plaintiff appealed the decision to
         Marc F. Kirkland
                                     the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, where the judgment
           Paul L. Myers             was affirmed.
          M. Kasey Ratliff               •   Inaccuracy. Pursuant to §1681s-2(a)(1)(A) of the
         Paul W. Sheldon                     FCRA, an entity cannot furnish information to a
                                             CRA if it knows or has reasonable cause to know
      Martin E. Thornthwaite                 the information is inaccurate. Because Plaintiff
                                             failed to comply with his obligations under the
                                             mortgage agreement regarding notification to
                                             . . . continued on next page.
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             FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

Continued from Page 1
       Aurora and OCWEN for tax and insurance payments, the Court held that Aurora and
       OCWEN were not furnishing false information when they informed CRAs that Plaintiff
       was behind on his payments.
   •   Furnisher Duties. Section 1681s-2(b)(1) mandates that after receiving notice of a
       dispute regarding the completeness or accuracy of information provided to a CRA, the
       furnisher must conduct an investigation of the disputed information and report the results
       to the CRA. In the instant case, Plaintiff sent a letter to Trans Union disputing the status
       of his OCWEN account, and asked Trans Union to investigate. Trans Union conveyed
       the dispute to OCWEN in accordance with its obligation under §1681i(a)(1). Because
       OCWEN removed the negative information it reported within thirty (30) days, it complied
       with its obligations under the FCRA.

Court Grants Summary Judgment Against Consumer Because He Failed to Present Any
Evidence that Furnisher Gave False or Inaccurate Information to CRAs
White v. Global Payments, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4839 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 21, 2010)
Facts: Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) and the FCRA. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed Defendant United
Resource Systems, Inc. (“United”) violated the FDCPA and/or the FCRA by attempting to collect
unauthorized amounts; by reporting that Plaintiff owed a debt to CRAs when a reasonable
investigation would have shown that the debt was paid; and by accessing Plaintiff’s consumer
report without a permissible purpose. The Court granted United’s motion for summary judgment
on all claims.
   •   Reinvestigation. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1681s-2(b) claim because United
       confirmed in a letter that the disputed account was paid and that the CRAs would be
       notified. The fact that the account still reported as “open” on a tri-merge credit file was
       not evidence that United gave false or inaccurate information to the CRAs. Further, a
       letter from one of the CRAs indicated that the results of its reinvestigation ended in the
       deletion of the account.
   •   Permissible Purpose. Plaintiff’s § 1681b(a) claim also failed because United provided
       an affidavit that it did not pull Plaintiff’s credit report and that the alleged impermissible
       inquiry on Plaintiff’s credit report was not associated or affiliated with United but instead
       was from an unrelated company with a similar name. Plaintiff provided no evidence to
       the contrary, and the Court granted summary judgment.

Court Dismisses Plaintiffs’ FCRA Claim as There is No Private Cause of Action for a
Violation of § 1681m
Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3561 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18,
Facts: Plaintiffs alleged a violation of the FCRA when Defendants failed to provide notice to
Plaintiffs of the adverse use of one of the Plaintiff’s consumer reports. Defendants moved for a

              FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

judgment on the pleadings arguing no private cause of action under § 1681m (imposing certain
notice requirements on users of consumer reports), and further that Plaintiffs only remedy for
such a violation would be confined to appropriate administrative enforcement. The Court
agreed and granted the motion.
   •   Subject Matter Jurisdiction. The existence of a private right of action goes to the
       subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Because there is no private cause of action
       under § 1681m, the Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
       FCRA claim and granted the Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Evidence that Plaintiffs’ Son had Previously Used One of Plaintiffs’ Credit Cards Relevant
in Lawsuit Where Plaintiffs’ Ownership of Credit Card in Dispute
Gamby v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, et al., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1157 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 7,
Facts: Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant First National Bank of Omaha (“FNBO”) violated the
FCRA and various state laws related to a credit card account that Plaintiffs claimed FNBO
issued in the name of their son but reported to the CRAs as Plaintiffs’ obligation. During the
course of the litigation, it became clear that FNBO never issued a credit card to Plaintiffs’ son
but that their son used a card issued to Plaintiffs that was sent to the son’s address. After using
the card, Plaintiffs’ son defaulted on the payments and FNBO began reporting the debt to
Plaintiffs’ credit files and initiated collection activity. At trial, FNBO presented evidence relating
to the use of another of Plaintiffs’ accounts by their son. Plaintiffs argued that this evidence
should not have been admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and that the admission of this
evidence entitled them to a new trial. The court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial.
   •   Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The facts surrounding the use of the two accounts are nearly
       identical. With both accounts, Plaintiffs’ son used their credit card; the credit card
       mailing address was switched from Plaintiffs’ address to their son’s; payments were
       made by Plaintiffs even after the address was changed; and Plaintiffs disputed
       ownership of both accounts, claiming the account belonged to their son. Defendant
       argued that this evidence shows that Plaintiffs’ assertion that the account was not theirs
       may not have been a mistake on their part. The Court allowed FNBO to use this
       evidence to show why the subsequently issued credit card was mailed to Plaintiffs’ son’s

Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Second Lawsuit on the Basis of Limitations; Limitations
were Tolled During First Lawsuit
Campbell v. Midland Funding Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2010)
Facts: Plaintiff filed two separate lawsuits arising out of the same set of facts. The first lawsuit
was filed on August 27, 2008, against Trans Union, Equifax, and Experian, alleging violations of
the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq., for allegedly mixing her credit file with a credit file
belonging to another individual. The second lawsuit was filed on January 23, 2009, against a
collection agency and other parties, alleging violations of the FCRA and the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692, et. seq., and common law claims of malicious prosecution, defamation, invasion of

             FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

privacy, and conversion. On July 31, 2009, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint in the
second lawsuit, adding Trans Union as a defendant. Trans Union was then voluntarily
dismissed from the first lawsuit on September 3, 2009. Trans Union filed a motion to dismiss on
the basis of limitations and for failure to state a claim, which the Court denied.
   •   Limitations. Trans Union argued that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint in the second
       lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations and that the statute of limitations was
       not tolled while Trans Union was a party in the first lawsuit. The Court disagreed and
       denied Trans Union’s motion to dismiss. To declare Plaintiff's claim was time-barred
       after Trans Union was added as a party to the second lawsuit only to prevent
       inconsistent judgments would not only be inequitable, but would set an unhealthy
       precedent for future cases. In addition, Trans Union did not claim it would suffer any
       prejudice by being required to defend against Plaintiff's claims in the second lawsuit nor
       was any prejudice apparent to the Court.
   •   Failure to State a Claim. Trans Union argued that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the federal
       notice pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a
       complaint to have "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
       entitled to relief." The Court disagreed and denied Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss.
       The Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s allegations in the second lawsuit were the same as in
       the first lawsuit and that Trans Union answered in the first lawsuit, filed a motion for
       summary judgment, and conducted months of discovery. Trans Union could not now
       contend that the factual allegations were not specific enough to prepare a defense.

Employer’s Failure to Notify Job Applicant that Decision Not to Hire was Based Upon
Consumer Report Sufficient to State a Claim Under the FCRA
Myles v. Dierberg’s Mkts., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121338 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 2009)
Facts: Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Dierbergs Markets, Inc., Convergys, and Omni Cart
Systems violated the FCRA by failing to notify him of the reason for the adverse action taken
against him – namely, that Defendants failed to hire him based on information contained in his
consumer report. The Court denied Defendant Convergys’ motion to dismiss and held that
Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under the FCRA.
   •   Notification. Pursuant to § 1681m, a user of consumer reports is required to provide
       notice to the consumer when it takes any adverse action against the consumer that is
       based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report.
   •   Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff pled that Defendant Convergys did not notify him that
       it denied Plaintiff employment based upon his consumer report. The Court held that
       Plaintiff stated a claim because Defendant Convergys was put on notice that the
       “adverse action” was that it failed to hire Plaintiff.

              FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s FCRA Claims Against Furnisher Due to Deficient Pleading
Roger Michael Edwards, Jr. v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120163 (E.D. Va. Dec. 24, 2009)
Facts: Plaintiff filed suit against various furnishers and CRAs alleging violations of the FCRA.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Equity One illegally accessed Plaintiff’s credit reports without a
permissible purpose as defined by § 1681b(f). Equity One filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because he did not state any factual basis to support
his claims and that Plaintiff pled no facts to show that Equity One was either willful or negligent
in violating the FCRA. The court granted Equity One’s motion.
   •   Furnisher’s Duties. Plaintiff alleges that Equity One violated the FCRA by using or
       obtaining his consumer report without consent or a permissible purpose and alleges that
       he suffered actual damages. These allegations are merely legal conclusions and a
       recitation of the elements under § 1681b(f). Such hollow language fails to offer any
       factual basis, much less a plausible one, to support liability on Equity One’s part.

Court Certifies Class for Claims Arising Out of Furnisher Data Breach
In Re: Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 119870 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009)
Facts: This class action was brought on behalf of 2.4 million proposed class members who
received a letter from Countrywide concerning a data breach. After several attempts at
approving a suitable notice plan, the Court reviewed the issues of class certification and the
appointment of class counsel.
   •   Class Certification Prerequisite. First, the moving party must satisfy Rule 23(a)’s
       requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.
       The district court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to ensure that the prerequisites of
       Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. A court may not certify a class that fails to satisfy all four
   •   Class Certification Prerequisite. The first requirement for class certification is that the
       class be so numerous that the joinder of all members is impracticable. All parties agree
       that the proposed class contains millions of members. Given this, the court finds that the
       Rule 23(a)(1) requirement is met.
   •   Class Certification Prerequisite. The second requirement for class certification is that
       there are questions of law or fact common to the class. All class members in this
       instance had their private information stored in Countrywide’s databases at the time of
       the data breach. The common questions of law and fact asserted relating to that breach
       are whether Countrywide acted negligently in collecting and storing class members’
       private information; whether Countrywide is a consumer reporting agency as defined by
       the FCRA; whether Countrywide violated the FCRA; whether representative plaintiffs
       and other members of the settlement class have sustained damages and, if so, the

              FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

       proper measure of those damages; and, whether representative plaintiffs and other
       members of the settlement class should be awarded statutory damages. The court finds
       that the above-listed common questions of law and fact exist. The court finds that the
       Rule 23(a)(2) requirement is met.
   •   Class Certification Prerequisite. Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of
       the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. A claim is
       typical if it arises from the same event or practice or a course of conduct that gives rise
       to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same
       legal theory. This requirement is met as the proposed class members were all in a
       position whereby Countrywide may have negligently handled their private information.
   •   Class Certification Prerequisite. The fourth requirement for class certification is that
       the representative parties will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of the
       class. The court notes that all class members have been subjected to the same alleged
       conduct by Countrywide whereby private information was compromised, and the impact
       of this conduct has already or possibly will produce a similar result for all members. This
       action involves an objectively identifiable class. Class members who are fearful of the
       possibility of future identity theft will have been given notice of the settlement and have
       the opportunity to opt out. Settling plaintiffs’ counsel assert extensive experience in
       class litigation, including in the area of data breaches.
   •   Class Certification. In addition to satisfying 23(a)’s prerequisites, the moving party
       must demonstrate that the class fits under one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).To
       satisfy the predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish that the
       issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof predominate over those
       issues that are subject only to individualized proof. The court must determine if the
       questions common to the class are at the heart of the litigation. Whether Countrywide’s
       conduct violated the various laws alleged in the complaints is a question that is common
       to all class members. The proof required focuses on Countrywide’s conduct, not on the
       conduct of individual class members. The generalized evidence available in this case -
       whether Countrywide acted improperly - serves to prove or disprove a common, class-
       wide question.

Court Finds that Plaintiff’s Common Law Claims Against Furnishers are Not Preempted
by § 1681t(b)(1)(F); Denies Furnishers’ Motions to Dismiss
Ori v. Fifth Third Bank, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115985 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2009)
Facts: Plaintiff brought various claims, including violations of the FCRA, common law
negligence and libel, based on Fifth Third Bank’s (“Fifth”) reporting that Plaintiff was delinquent
on his mortgage payments. Plaintiff also brought claims against Fiserv, Inc. (“Fiserv”), a
reseller, for the transmittal of this information to the CRAs. After Plaintiff disputed the delinquent
reporting of his mortgage, he alleged that Fifth and Fiserv received notice of the dispute but did
not investigate or correct the alleged error. Fifth and Fiserv filed motions to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12b(6). The Court denied Defendants’ motions.

              FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

   •   Furnisher’s Duties. If a Plaintiff alleges that he notified a CRA that he disputed
       reported information, he need not also allege that the CRA notified the furnisher of the
       disputed information because it would be unlikely that he would know whether this was
       so. It is reasonable to infer from Plaintiff’s allegation that he notified the CRAs that he
       disputed the accuracy of the information in their reports that the CRAs in turn notified the
       furnisher of the information as the law requires them to do.
   •   Credit Reporting Agency. Although Fiserv contends that it is a reseller rather than a
       CRA, and therefore not subject to most of the duties imposed on CRAs by the FCRA,
       under the FCRA, a reseller is a CRA and the duties imposed by the FCRA on CRAs
       apply to resellers unless specifically exempted.
   •   Preemption. The key interpretive issue is whether, in stating that § 1681t(b)(1)(F)
       preempts requirements and prohibitions imposed under the laws of any state, Congress
       intended to preempt only obligations imposed by the enactments of state legislative or
       administrative bodies, or also requirements and prohibitions embedded in common law.
       § 1681t(b)(1)(F)’s preemption of actions based on obligations “imposed under [state] . . .
       laws” preempts actions based on state statutes or regulations but not actions based on
       common law.
   •   Preemption. Even assuming that the word “laws” is ambiguous, reading 1681t(b)(1)(F)
       and the context of the surrounding language makes clear that Congress intended to
       refer to only positive enactments of legislative or administrative bodies and not common
       law actions.
   •   Preemption. The structure of the FCRA also indicates that Congress did not intend
       § 1681t(b)(1)(F) to preempt state common law claims because another section of the
       FCRA, § 1681h(e), specifically deals with such claims. When Congress amended the
       FCRA in 1996, if it had intended the new provision, 1681t(b)(1)(F), to preempt all tort
       claims, Congress would have had no reason to continue to immunize furnishers from
       certain liabilities as it does in § 1681h(e).

Court Adopts Recommendation of Special Master Regarding Attorneys’ Fees in Trans
Union Corp. Privacy Litigation
In re: Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116173 (E.D. Ill. Dec. 9,
2009); In re: Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116934 (E.D. Ill.
Dec. 9, 2009)
Facts: In August 1998, a putative class action was filed in California state court alleging various
violations of the FCRA by Trans Union Corp. (“Trans Union”). In 2000, after various other
federal and state court lawsuits were filed, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the cases to the federal district court for the Eastern District of Illinois. After two
failed settlement attempts, a third proposed settlement was ultimately approved by the Court in
September 2008 (“Final Settlement”). After Plaintiff’s counsel from Louisiana and Texas
objected to the attorneys fees distribution, the Court appointed a Special Master to submit a
report and recommendation as to the appropriate fee division between all Plaintiffs’ counsel and
investigate ethical issues related to Louisiana counsel. The Court adopted the Special Master’s

             FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

Report in its entirety and ordered a total fee award of $12.98 million to be allotted as follows:
$7,836,683 to Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) counsel; $2,722,360 to Louisiana counsel;
$1,815,319 to Texas counsel; $550,000 to liaison counsel; and $55,638 to the Special Master.
   •   Attorneys’ Fees. The Court followed the Special Master’s recommendations for
       allocation of fees among counsel and applied his application of a percentage basis of
       recovery, cross checked by a rough lodestar analysis.
   •   Ethical Inquiry. The Court found that Louisiana counsel engaged in unprofessional and
       marginally unethical behavior. The Court noted that Louisiana counsel’s padding of her
       time records was inexcusable and her attacks on the MDL and Texas counsel,
       Magistrate Judge Mason, and the Special Master were ceaseless and irresponsible.
       However, the Court “reluctantly” adopted the Special Master’s recommendation not to
       impose sanctions against her.

FCRA Plaintiff Must Allege What Information Supplied by a Furnisher Was Incomplete or
Inaccurate to Survive Dismissal
Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118854 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2009)
Facts: Plaintiff asserted various causes of action under the FCRA, FDCPA, and for common
law fraud, breach of contract and civil conspiracy, among other claims, surrounding the
refinance and future sale of Plaintiff’s home mortgage. Previously, the Court granted
Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, ordering Plaintiff to follow certain procedures
when filing a second amended complaint. After filing his second amended complaint, the
Defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss. As to Plaintiff’s FCRA claim, Defendant
GMAC brought its motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12b(6) for failure to state a claim,
which the Court granted.
   •   Pleadings. Plaintiff failed to assert enough facts to properly allege that GMAC violated
       the FCRA. The Court found that the following statements contained in Plaintiff’s second
       amended complaint did not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8: (1) “Plaintiff
       disputed the completeness or accuracy of information furnished by Defendants to a
       consumer reporting agency”; (2) “Defendants have not reported the disputes to any or
       the entire consumer reporting agencies to which they furnish or have furnished the
       information”; (3) “Defendants’ illegal and negligent submittal of information to reporting
       agencies has slander[ed] Plaintiff’s credit”; and (4) “[t]he acts and practices described
       above constitute violations to 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(a)(3).”
   •   Pleadings. The Court further concluded that Plaintiff’s FCRA claim was insufficiently
       pled to put GMAC on notice of how it allegedly violated the statute. In so concluding, the
       Court found that Plaintiff merely restated the elements of a Section 1681s-2(a)(3) claim
       and failed to assert the following: (1) what information GMAC supplied that was
       incomplete or inaccurate, (2) in what way Plaintiff disputed any information, (3) who the
       consumer reporting agencies were, or (4) any other surrounding facts.

                  FCRA NEWSLETTER • February 5, 2010 • STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

Court Dismisses Plaintiffs’ Truth in Lending and Credit Repair Organizations Act Claims
Zimmerman v. Logemann, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111411 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2009)
Facts: Plaintiffs brought suit against their mortgage broker, appraiser, and lenders alleging that
those parties violated several federal and state laws, including the Credit Repair Organizations
Act (“CROA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) related to their application and execution of
their mortgage. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated TILA by failing to provide
certain disclosures. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants made false or misleading statements
in violation of CROA. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ TILA and CROA claims. The
court granted Defendants’ motion.
    •    Truth in Lending. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that Defendants “failed to comply
         with all requirements” of the “Truth-in-Lending right to cancel notice” and that
         Defendants “failed to deliver disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act…including
         but not limited to, a correct notice of right to cancel” are conclusory allegations that fail to
         identify what Defendants failed to do or disclose what was required by the Act.
    •    CROA. Plaintiffs’ CROA claim is based on an argument that Defendants made a
         “statement,” as defined under the Act, to Plaintiffs about their credit worthiness by
         approving their loan. Even accepting this understanding of a “statement,” such an
         allegation is irrelevant under the Act because the Act does not cover statements to the
         consumer but only statements to creditors.

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