Volume 4 Number 7 First Quarter 2011
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies
Peace and Security Review
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. iii
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS)
House No.: 405, Road No.: 06, DOHS, Baridhara Contents
Editor s Note iii
A War of Terror –The Bali Bombing 2002 1
Copyright Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) James Veitch
A Bengali Infantry Regiment in the Great War 32
No part of this publication may be reproduced or stored, in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, Ashok Nath
Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh
photocopy, or otherwise, without permission of the Editor of the Journal.
Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd)
ISSN 1994-2052 The Aspect of External Support in Insurgency/Terrorism & Proposed
Regional Mechanism for its Diffusion (The Nepalese Experience) 71
Dilip SJB Rana
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Published by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS)
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Peace and Security Review
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. v-vii
Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
International Editorial Board Editorial
Professor Dr. Aseem Prakash, University of Washington, USA;
Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Centre for Political One of the key aspects of the traditional security discourse has been the
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR),
dynamic of interaction among state-actors comprising the international
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;
security system. With a series of conventions among major players starting in
Professor Dr. Syed Anwar Husain, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh;
Professor Dr. Kazunari Sakai, Kobe University, Japan; the post-Napoleonic era and more recent refinements providing the
Dr. Syed Mahmud Ali, Formar Senior Editorial Coordinator, BBC World Service; framework for inter-state engagements, state parties have deemed it their
Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi, Executive Director, Philippine prerogative to both shape and manage international diplomacy and security
Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) affairs over the heads, as it were, of their populaces. National elites engaged
in diplomacy, especially diplomacy of the strategic variety, have operated in
a rarefied atmosphere characterised by gracious civility and convivial
confidentiality. Chancelleries and chanceries have thus existed in a world far
Guidelines to Contributors
removed from the humdrum, often messy and unsubtle, reality experienced
by the average citizen. A well-designed and strongly defended opacity has
The Peace and Security Review is a multi-disciplinary quarterly served as a barrier between what is visible to the citizenry in so far as
journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies international relations are concerned, and what actually takes place.
(BIPSS), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Now, a combination of sophisticated government agencies becoming
The Journal provides a forum for debate and discussion on peace, almost totally reliant on information-technology in sharing information and
security and development issues in national, regional and extra- analyses, and individuals with access to such technology rejecting the
traditional culture of secrecy as a defining framework for their professional
Original write-up between 6000 to 8000 words, not published or lives, the opacity which protected the confidentiality of the diplomatic elite
submitted elsewhere, may be submitted to the Editor of the journal.
has been punctured as never before. The anti-secrecy website, WikiLeaks,
The Chicago Manual of Style should be followed in the write-up
placing notes either at the bottom of the page (footnotes) or at the end repeatedly embarrassed the government of the system-manager, the United
of the essay (endnotes). Table, map and diagrams should be placed in States, in 2010, by leaking thousands of classified documents relating to the
separate sheets. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, more recently, hundreds of thousands of
Contributors are requested to enclose short biographical note and diplomatic cables and despatches between US missions abroad and the
abstract of the article. Department of State in Washington, D.C. Not all the documents were highly
The views expressed in the articles published in the each quarters of classified, but many were. These, especially those dealing with issues on
the Journal not necessarily represent the views and policies of the which the US government s public stance were shown up to have been
Editorial Board or the Institute. incorrect, possibly even deceptive, proved embarrassing.
vi Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Editorial vii
The US government initiated a diplomatic fire-fighting campaign aimed at links which had nourished Nepal's Maoist insurrectionary forces in the
damage limitation. Senior officials briefed their overseas counterparts, decade of the civil war, pointing out that the former rebels enjoyed the luxury
alerting them to some of the 'secrets' about to be revealed. Some damage was of support of not just sub-state communist fellow-travellers such as the
thus limited. But the leaks hammered home a reminder, if one was needed, Revolutionary International Movement and the Coordinating Committee of
that it was not only government-sponsored hackers who posed a threat to Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia, but also government
confidential information. In this technologically diffuse world, official agencies operating under the authority of neighbouring states. South Asia's
reliance on networks, however 'secure,' laid ruling elites open to potential tradition of diplomacy-by-proxy-war would, the General suggests, make it
breaches of IT security. difficult to bring peace to the region.
America's focus on state-actors in the IT realm led to the establishment of It is not all doom and gloom, though. The Swedish historian Ashok Nath
its Cyber-Command, with reportedly thousands of specialists labouring to takes the reader back to the beginning of the previous century when,
devise malware, spyware, trojans and other similarly named sophisticated determined to boost military numbers in the Empire and overcoming post-
instruments which could lurk in the network unbeknownst to 'users,' Mutiny anxieties, British-Indian military authorities raised an infantry
download unauthorised material and, in some cases, even damage entire battalion with Bengali soldiers - the 49th Bengal Infantry - the first modern
networks. The USA is not the only state involved in such offensive IT almost exclusively Bengali-manned army unit. Drawing on historical and
operations; several others have been accused of doing the same. anecdotal evidence, Nath paints a picture of Bengali soldiery struggling with
Governments are also paying attention to defending their own cyber domains contrary tendencies. The unit less than happy combat experience, a shadowy
from such threats. However, as the WikiLeaks episodes demonstrate, a single, mutinous event and its eventual disbandment portended some aspects of
possibly low-ranking, individual with some access to a protected network Bengali military turbulence which were to rock Bangladesh since the
could unleash significant damage. Now that so much has been revealed, it is country's emergence as an independent country.
not clear how freely foreign leaders, diplomats and intelligence officials will
confide in their American interlocutors, and how thoroughly US envoys will Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
be able to brief their Beltway masters in the immediate future. In short, while Editor
the wheels of US diplomacy might not grind to a halt, they might turn a little
more slowly than they have. And given the transitional fluidity at the
systemic level where the current hegemon (or, recent hegemon, more
accurately) operates, this cannot be particularly helpful.
However, cyber-security, or human breaches of IT security, should not
obscure the multiplicity of challenges confronting the security community.
This edition of the Review brings together a selection of analyses
demonstrating the myriad sources of concern for practitioners and students
of the craft. New Zealand-based security analyst and academic James Veitch
retraces the Bali bombings in Indonesia and shows how the context in which
religious extremism transmuted into radical violence in the wake of the fall of
strongman General Suharto is crucial to understanding the processes and
personalities involved. Brigadier-General Dilip Rana, until recently of the
Royal Nepalese Army, unveils the shroud of secrecy cloaking the external
Peace and Security Review
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. ix-xii
A War of Terror –The Bali Bombing 2002
The Bali bombing caught the attention of the world in 2002.
This article seeks to place the bombing in its Indonesian context and to piece
together the chronology of events as the incident and its aftermath unfolded.
It supplies portraits of the main players in the bombing and follows in
particular the story of the three principal characters to their execution. This
article continues the author's interest in the war on terror although in this case
and for reasons outlined in the article the Bali bombing was not a
continuation of the war on terror but an example of what happened as a
result of that war-it was the first step in a war of terror in Indonesia. This is
the first part of a two part article. The second part will follow events until the
end of 2010.
A Bengali Infantry Regiment in the Great War
It used to be said, What Bengal thinks today, India will think tomorrow. At
the outbreak of the First World War, the anxious question arose, how will
Bengal react to Britain s call for help? The winds of change, brought about by
the 1905-11 partition of the Province had effectively sown the seeds of
nationalism, communalism, and dissent. Therefore, Bengal s positive
response, surprising many in the establishment, came in the form of a field
ambulance corps, a signal company and an infantry regiment - the 49th
Bengalis. The latter especially attracted the elite amongst the young men and
it evoked a special sense of Bengali pride. Here was an opportunity to prove
x Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Summaries xi
them-selves, since Bengalis, earlier, were excluded by the British Indian army that such threats can destabilize the region as a whole. Keeping this in mind,
for recruitment into their fighting arms . The 49th Bengalis therefore was a a concerted effort needs to be taken across the region so that a common
unique experiment, being the first all Bengali infantry regiment, it platform can be created to address the transnational security issues.
comprised many educated young men from urban backgrounds, and there
was no segregation amongst the rank and file based on religion - Hindus and
Muslims served together. This structure was quite unlike other Indian The Aspect of External Support in Insurgency/Terrorism & Rroposed
infantry regiments of that era which recruited from the illiterate rural Regional Mechanism for its Diffusion (The Nepalese Experience)
peasantry, compartmentalized into caste or religious based sub units or Dilip SJB Rana
On mobilization the Bengalis were sent to Mesopotamia (present day Iraq) The paper tries to highlight the Nepalese experience of the counter-
to fight the Ottoman Turks. Cultural prejudices from their own British insurgency operations conducted by the Nepalese security forces against the
officers, poor leadership, caste rivalries amongst the Indian officers and a "People's War" conducted by the Nepalese Maoists for a period of one decade
serious incident within the regiment resulted in its disbandment in 1920. and, how the security forces were finally successful at changing the rigid
objectives being followed by the Nepalese Maoists and to force them to accept
the multiparty system of democracy by making them join the main stream
Transnational Security politics of Nepal. The paper analyses the ingredients necessary for a
Challenges and Threats facing Bangladesh successful insurgency, but concentrates on the aspect of foreign support in
Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.) insurgency, specially pertaining to the violent movements being waged by
the Nepalese Maoists in the name of "People's War".
The twenty-first century brings with it an increasingly complex and even The paper analyses how geography, bad governance, neighbor's
more urgent security challenges and the transnational security threat is the pressure tactics and a horde of other issues provided the initial fuel to the
new facet of such security challenges. Indeed, the era of globalization which Nepalese Maoist movement, not to mention the international as well as
has brought greater openness and integration, has also provided a fertile regional linkages that the Nepalese Maoists were able to garner through the
seedbed for the growth of organized crime and an influx of criminal activity Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and the regional umbrella
across the border. Transnational security threats are generally understood as organization called "Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties &
nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threatens the political and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). These parties and organizations
social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation s inhabitants. Such included underground regional organizations like the MCC and PWG of
threats are characterized by an event or phenomenon of cross-border scope, India and various other overt and covert organizations.
the dynamics of which are significantly driven by non-state actors- such as The paper also analyses how India, a neighboring country of Nepal,
international criminals, terrorists, or alien smugglers. Bangladesh, located in initially turned a blind eye to the Nepalese Maoist movement for some of its
between China and India- two would be superpowers-, poised to become vested interests as all the Nepalese Maoist leadership were operating from
either a thriving democracy or a failed state, has been facing burgeoning the secure hideouts in India for a good part of the insurgency period and how
challenges from transnational security elements including terrorism, arms the Indian administration's policy underwent a change, specially after the
and drug smuggling, environmental challenges and so on. But, because of its period of the formation of CCOMPOSA and violent Maoist movements
economic and political vulnerability, Bangladesh can not face-off such started erupting simultaneously in various parts of India in conjunction with
challenges alone. Besides, due to its geo-strategic location, there is a danger the violent movements of the Nepalese Maoist in Nepal. The crackdown of
xii Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Peace and Security Review
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. 1-31
the Indian government on the Nepalese Maoist leadership operating from
India proved to be crucial point for the Nepalese Maoist movement and the
movement started losing its steam once the Maoist leadership was forced to
operate from their home ground in direct confrontations with the relentless
CI operations being conducted by the Nepalese security forces. Ultimately,
the Nepalese Maoists were left with no other options than to join the A War of Terror The Bali Bombing 20021
mainstream politics of Nepal in direct contravention to their earlier stated James Veitch2
objective like "the 'People's War' will terminate only after the capture of state
power through violent means and they will never take a revisionist policy
like that of the UML or the PRC". Introduction
The paper concludes that such violent movements and terrorist
activities are not limited to any geographical limits and can have a migratory The history of extremist activity in Indonesia has a long tail. The
effect in the whole region, if left unchecked, and nations in South Asia should emergence of a number of Indonesian-based radical groups in recent decades
first recognize that such phenomena are a common malice to the whole has prompted concern about the country s propensity to harbour terrorism.3
region and a joint and combined approach as a mechanism should be devised In this vein comments have been made that suggest Indonesia, the world s
by all the nations of South Asia since South Asia seems to be turning into a most populous Muslim county, is a vast archipelago with porous maritime
hub of all violent activities, where such organizations of all hues and shades
1 Research for this article was undertaken by Haley Scovell. Badrus Sholeh, lecturer in
join hands together to make their activities more effective.
International Relations at the Islamic University of Indonesia in Jakarta commented on various
aspects of an earlier draft. Callum Martin assisted with the final editing. This is the first part
of a two- part article. The second part, A war of Terror-The Aftermath of the Bali Bombing, will be
published separately in a subsequent edition of the Journal..
2 James Veitch, until the end of December 2010, taught for four years in the Strategic Studies
degree program in the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington New
Zealand where he introduced courses on security and intelligence studies. Prior to lecturing at
Victoria University of Wellington he taught in the Religious Studies Program at the same
University. He has also taught in Indonesia for more than five years and in Singapore for three.
He is a graduate of the University of Otago in Dunedin New Zealand and holds a PhD from
the University of Birmingham in England. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (FRSA)
and of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain. From January 2011 he took up a position in
Security and Intelligence studies at Massey University Palmerston North, in the Defence and
Security Studies Centre and works from the University's Campus in Wellington. He
completed, in 2010 a six year term on the Government Public Advisory Committee on
Disarmament and Arms Control, serving lately as the deputy Chair to the Minister of
Disarmament. He was the (New Zealand) non-ASEAN Co-chair of the Council for Security
Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) for 2006-2008. He produced a report in 2008 that led
to a review of CSCAP in 2008-2009. He co- chaired CSCAP NZ from 2004-2010. He has been
writing a series of articles about the US led War on Terror.
3 Frost, Frank, Rann, Ann & Chin, Andrew. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. Parliament of
Australia: Parliamentary Library. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/FAD/sea.htm
(accessed 18 May 2010).
2 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 3
borders, a weak central government, separatist movements, corrupt officials, Four factors seem to have driven the unrest leading to the violence. First,
a floundering economy, and a loosely regulated financial system all [the] there was the fall of President Suharto and his new order authoritarian
characteristics which make it fertile ground for terrorist groups. 4 In 2002, the government on 21 May 1998 and the new freedoms that emerged in the
most serious act of violence occurred on the island of Bali. A further series of transition administrations that followed. The lifting of restraints to individual
violent incidents followed.5 The bombings of 2002 were unexpected, striking freedoms enabled pent up racial and religious tensions to explode. Second,
a region of Indonesia that had previously experienced relative peace.6 the 9/11 attacks in 2001 led to subsequent military campaigns by the United
The world s largest population of Muslims resides in Indonesia with the States and other international states in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The
majority following the moderate Shafi i school7 of Sunni Islam. This is the latter fuelled anti-Western sentiments and the former fuelled an internal
second largest branch of Sunni Islam worldwide and is followed in Malaysia struggle among Muslim groups keen to re-establish their identity and their
power basis after decades of suppression. Third, the emergence of these
and Brunei. However, Islam in Indonesia varies in quality and degree of
strong Muslim organisations led to the renewal of Islam at the grass roots
commitment from region to region, and there are notable pockets where other
level for many, and in some areas the linking of this renewal with the Darul
faith traditions are stronger: Hinduism in Bali, Catholicism in Flores, Timor
Islam movement active from time to time since independence, that
and Papua, and Protestantism in Eastern Indonesia including Papua and in
envisioned a Muslim Indonesia founded on the Shari a.10 Fourthly, the
the Batak area of North Sumatera.
unresolved Palestine - Israel conflict has never been far from Muslim minds
Indonesia s constitution shrewdly expressed in Pancasila allows for a
and constantly fuels anti- American and anti Israel sentiment.
limited degree of religious freedom.8 However, it sometimes seems that this
Three violent episodes stand out during this period of unrest: the 2002 Bali
freedom provides and allows scope for some or for all the radical Muslim bombing, the 2005 Bali bombing, and the 2009 Jakarta bombing. Although
groups across the country to re-create themselves. Intolerance over the differences remain as to what the primary objective was in each of the three
freedom of religion has been a factor in many of the attacks, especially those attacks, a thread of similarity seems to suggest that Australian andUnitedand
found to have drawn their inspiration from militant Islamic organisations United States or to put it more generally, Western interests in Indonesia were
outside Indonesia such as al-Qaeda, and from the main internal group the focus of these bombing episodes.11 This article concentrates on the 2002
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and its partners who have been connected with or bombing-its background, the bombing itself and the subsequent events that
responsible for the bombings.9 led to the execution of three of the bombers.
Two movies and a television documentary about the Bombing illustrates
4 Ibid. the different ways in which it has been viewed one from an Indonesian
5 Ramakrishna, Kumar & Seng Tan, See. (2003). After Bali: the Threat of Terrorism in perspective and the other from an Australian perspective. The films are the
SouthEast Asia. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies: Nanyang Technological
Long Road to Heaven and Fool Me Twice Bali Bombings as False Flag and the SBS
University, Singapore. World Scientific.
6 documentary was entitled Inside Indonesia s War on Terror.
Kipp, Rita Smith. (2004). Indonesia in 2003: Terror s aftermath. Asian Survey, 44, No.1.
Jan/Feb 2004. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4128563; Sherlock, Steven. (2002). The Bali Indonesian officials and the families of the victims viewed the first film
Bombings: Looking for explanations. Parliament of Australia, 14 October. when it was ready for release in 2007 and before it became available for public
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/FAD/bali.htm (accessed 29 March 2010). viewing. It was banned from being shown to the Bali public by a film
See also Dijk, C. van (Cornelis) Rebellion under the banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia 10 van Bruinessen, Martin, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post Soeharto Indonesia. Accesed
The Hague: M. Nijhoff,1981 from:http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies_isl
8 For a discussion of Pancasila, its background and the scope of its usage see: amic_radicalism.htm.Seealso See also Dijk, C. van (Cornelis) Rebellion under the banner of
http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/86.htm Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia 1981,The Hague
9 Bajoria, Jayshree. (2010). Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Council on Foreign Relations, 14 January. 11 McBeth, John. (2009.) What made Jakarta suicide bombers tick. Asia Times, 29 July.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17882/ (accessed 29 March 2010). http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KG29Ae01.html (accessed 10 May 2010).
4 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 5
censorship board that maintained the Balinese were not yet ready to see the Event has Context
traumatic event on film. The board also noted that showing the film might
undermine the Bali tourism industry.12 The film attempts to balance all the An event like the 2002 bombing occurs in a context. It will not happen unless
different views about the bombing the terrorists, the victims, the families of the circumstances are favourable. In this case, the context was provided by
the victims and the foreign reactions. It covers the period before the the bombings and unrest that had already taken place. Well-organised
explosions, the 2002 bombing and concludes with the trials of the explosions had already occurred with loss of life and damage to buildings in
perpetrators. other parts of Indonesia. The following overview is instructive.
The second film follows a different line suggesting a conspiracy of sorts In September 2000, a bomb exploded in the car park of the Jakarta stock
and argues that the official interpretation of the bombings blaming Al- exchange killing ten and injuring sixteen. On Christmas day that same year
Qaeda and its then shadowy counterpart JI was only part of the truth. The bombs exploded at 11 churches across Indonesia killing nineteen and injuring
film draws on the analysis made by Robert S. Finnegan who was at the time over one hundred. The first Bali bombing occurred on 12 October 2002. Two
editor of the Jakarta Post. His observations and conclusions were set out in an suicide bombers claimed the lives of two hundred and two people when they
article published on 3 January 2003, developed more fully in the film and exploded two bombs outside busy nightclubs in the Kuta district of Bali and
amplified in an interview given in August 2009.13 another near the United States consulate in Denpasar, Bali s largest city.16
The SBS TV Dateline production was shown in Australia on 12 October Two hundred and forty others were injured. Later that year three died in
2005 and a transcript was published two days later. This gives some credence Makassar and eleven were wounded. In April 2003, a bomb exploded at the
to the issues raised in the second film. The program transcript includes a main international airport in Jakarta injuring eleven. In August 2003, there
conversation with the late Abdurrahman Wahid a former President. It records was an attack on the Marriot hotel in Jakarta that killed twelve and injured
his view of the involvement of Indonesian military intelligence and police in one hundred and fifty. In 2004, there was an attack on the Australian Embassy
the 2002 incident. It also suggested, from other interviews, that some form of that killed twelve and injured more than a hundred. On 1 October 2005,
state terrorism was involved in the Sulawesi conflict and may therefore also another coordinated suicide and car bombing attack struck the Bali districts
have been involved in the bombing.14 of Kuta and Jimbaran, killing twenty and injuring one hundrewdhundred
Obviously, there is yet more detail and information to be excavated from and twenty nine In May 2005, a bomb killed at least nineteen and injured
studies of the 2002 bombing but the existence of two films and the transcript forty at a market in Tentena in Central Sulawesi. On August 25, that same
of a documentary TV film that attempt to piece together the details and in year a bomb exploded at a market in Ambon wounding seven. Then on 17
doing so put different interpretations on these indicates that the debate will July 2009, two bombs, set minutes apart, detonated at the Marriot and the
continue.15 As always when intelligence services, police, military and Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta, killing seven.17 Out of these bombings three
political interests are involved, it is difficult to separate facts from fiction and stand out the bombing of 2002 and the bombing of 2005, both occurring on
reality from myth. Bali, and the 2009 Jakarta bombings of the two western hotels. Of these, the
2002 incident is pivotal
12 Bali bans bombings movie. TVNZ, 22 February.
Before examining the 2002 bombing, it is important to provide some more
http://tvnz.co.nz/content/1001391/425822.html?cfb3=3 (accessed 18 June 2010).
13 Bali bombing: an investigator s analysis, The Jakarta Post Jan 03, 2003 and the interview has of the context. Seldom discussed in relation to the attacks in Bali and Jakarta,
been accessed from Southeast Asia Independent Media, August 11,2009.
14 For the transcript see: http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=1085 16 Bali death toll set at 202. (2003). BBC News, 19 February. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
15 There is a third film, entitled The Healing of Bali, produced in Australia in 200,3 that tells the pacific/2778923.stm (accessed 29 March 2010).
story of the bombing from a Balinese point of view. See: 17 Fatal blasts hit Jakarta hotels. (2009). BBC News, 17 July.
http://aso.gov.au/titles/documentaries/healing-bali/ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8155084.stm (accessed 29 March 2010).
6 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 7
are the conflicts in Ambon and Central Sulawesi from 1999. These appear to Lashkar Jihad established in 2000 appeared first in Ambon. Its activities
have played a critical role in the accelerated growth of militant Islam in spread into Maluku. Thalib was the key to its early success.20 He preached
Indonesia prior to the 2002 bombing. Salafi Islam21 and made this the basis for his appeal to supporters to join the
The map that follows presents the geography of Indonesia. jihad to stop the spread of Christian and western interests and agendas in
Eastern Indonesia. His movement, Lashkar Jihad, encouraged and supported
continuing conflict by training foot soldiers to create and engage in Muslim-
Christian conflicts.22 Thalib and Lashkar Jihad were also responsible for a
tightening of Islamic law throughout Indonesia, particularly in Java as they
turned their attention to social and moral issues.23 Not surprisingly, he had
contact with al-Qaeda influence facilitated by the fledgling JI movement out
of Jahore. Allegedly, emissaries from al- Qaeda offered Lashkar Jihad support
if it followed al-Qaeda s ideology, Thalib refused, saying the ideology did not
align with true Islam. Nevertheless, his movement was well funded a
matter which suggests outside support, and this enabled him to recruit many
young Muslims enthusiastic to join the jihad in Ambon and Central
Between 1999 and December 2002 nine thousand people, both Christian
and Muslim, are estimated to have been killed in the conflicts in the Moluccas
with many more injured and yet more forced to abandon their villages and
homes. Two thousand died in the Sulawesi conflict between 1999 and
2002.The turbulent nature of the situation in Poso at the time created an ideal
http://www.divetrip.com/photos/indomap2.gif (accessed 17 May 2010) environment for the organisation to recruit new members.25 Training camps
in Maluku and Poso were thus an integral part of the mobilisation and
The Rise of Jihad recruitment of Jemaah Islamiyah member26 and were a highly efficient means
20 Hasan, Noorhaidi. (April 2002). Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era
The conflict in Sulawesi, along with the 1999 conflicts in Maluku and of Transition in Indonesia. Indonesia, Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell
Ambon between Christians and Muslims, helped build a jihad movement University. 73, pp145-169; Schulze, Kirsten. (Spring 2002). Laskar jihad and the Conflict in
Ambon. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 9(1), pp 57-69.
and to provide the fertile base for the later bombings. The leader of Lashkar 21 See the article on Salafi Islam at, http://islamicweb.com/beliefs/creed/Salafi_Dawah.htm
Jihad, the movement behind the Maluku and Sulawesi conflicts was Ja far 22 Ibid.
23 Analysis: Indonesia s Islamic radicals. (2001). BBC, 15 November.
Umar Thalib.18 He played a critical role aided and abetted by dissonant
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1657514.stm (accessed 25 May 2010).
elements within the military and police who actively encouraging the spread 24 Ibid.
of jihad.19 25 Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. (2003).
Navy Department Library, 18 November.
18 See the useful study by Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in
(accessed 2 July 2010).
Post-New Order Indonesia, 26 Abuza, Zachary. (2007). Shifting focus- Jemaah Islamiyah s long-term agenda towards
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/13369/1/Dissertation+Noorhaidi.pdf Islamism. Jane s Intelligence Review, 1 July.
19 Sholeh, Badrus. (2007). Jihad in Maluku. In A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in http://www.simmons.edu/academics/undergraduate/political-
Southeast Asia (2007), Edited by Tan, T.H. Andrews. Edward Elgar Publishing. science/docs/Abuza_shifting_foucs_.pdf (accessed 2 July 2010).
8 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 9
of organising and training JI members from all over Indonesia. A number of conflict is often attributed to a drunken brawl between Christian and
those involved in the subsequent bombings spent time in a Poso training Muslim youths that would escalate into widespread violence and
camp.27 There are also reports that links were established between the camps heightening of religious tensions in Sulawesi.32
in the region with the Muslim led insurgency in the Southern Philippines and Another contributing source of tension might well have resulted from the
in further areas to the east in Indonesia s Halmahera region where Muslims recent change in Bupati, or local governor, of Poso. It had been agreed by all
and Christian clashed. However, Central Sulawesi provided a pivotal centre parties that the office of Bupati alternate between Muslim and Christian
for the development of the jihad movement across the country. When the leadership. However, in this case, the retiring Bupati, a Muslim, insisted that
unrest subsided in this area, Laskar Jihad attempted to extend its activities to one of his family members should take his position and this flew in the face
Papua and to Aceh but with little success. Under Government pressure of tradition.33 Christians felt the discrimination was not only a betrayal of
Thalib dropped out of the leadership and out of sight soon after the Bali
earlier agreements about power sharing but was also grossly unfair. Tensions
bombing of 2002.28
began to run high
The Conflict in Central Sulawesi
The violence grew in three stages.34 The first began with the Christian and
Muslim youth attacks in December 1998. Following rioting and destruction of
property, the situation was calmed. The second stage occurred in April 2000
Central Sulawesi, is a region situated between a Muslim South and a
when Muslims aggrieved by the earlier incident launched an attack against
Christian North. The region increased its ethnic diversity during the Suharto
Christian homes. This resulted in more widespread violence and destruction
era with Government sponsored settlement programs that eventually
of property and people from both sides killed. The situation was
replaced the Christian majority with a Muslim majority in key areas. This
compounded by the arrival of Laskar Jihad forces from outside the region,
reversal of power and control brought with it new tensions. Prior to 1998 both
estimated to be around 7,000 fighters. They arrived to support the local
sides had existed together in a relative though uneasy peace but on Christmas
Muslim community in their conflict with Christians. Eventually, military and
Eve 1998 an incident occurred that led to a breakdown of the peace resulting
police interventions calmed the situation. The third stage commenced May
in a series of bloody confrontations.29 Versions of what initially happened in
2000 when Christians raided Muslim villages in retaliation for the April
Poso, a major city in the region, vary depending on the source. Muslims claim
attacks.35 This resulted in more destruction with deaths on both sides. Again,
that a Protestant youth, Roy Runtu Bisalembah, stole into a mosque and
the situation was calmed through military and police intervention.
stabbed a young Muslim boy, Ahmad Ridwan, who was asleep.30 Christian
Nevertheless over 2,000 Christians and Muslims died and many more were
sources state that Ridwan was stabbed by Runtu in a different setting and
injured.36 Eventually all the parties signed a Government sponsored peace
then ran to a mosque following the attack.31 Both sides seem to agree that the
32 Analysis: Roots of Sulawesi conflict. (2001). BBC News, 20 December.
incident was instigated by alcohol thus the commencement of the regional
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1719964.stm (accessed 13 May 2010).
27 Jemaah Islamiyah. Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups. http://www.armed- 33 Sulawesi: The Conflict in Central Sulawesi. Building Human Security in Indonesia.
groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=9 (accessed 2 July 2010). http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_sulawesi_conflict.php (accessed 2
28 See the interesting article by Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, Salafi Da wa Movement after the July 2010); Ecip, Sinansari Waru, Darwis. (2001). Kerusuhan Poso yang Sebenarnya.
Dissolution of Laskar Jihad , http://ern.pendis.kemenag.go.id/DokPdf/ern-iv-02-eng.pdf Jakarta: Global Mahardika Netama. P. 24-25.
29 Veitch, James. Human tragedy in Sulawesi Indonesia: 1998-2002. In A Handbook of 34 Ploughshares Armed Conflicts Report Indonesia-Sulawesi 1998 updated January 2005.
Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (2007), Edited by Tan, T.H. Andrews. Edward http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-IndonesiaSulawesi.html
Elgar Publishing. 35 Aragon, Lorraine, op cit., 2001; The Conflict in Central Sulawesi. Building Human security
30 Indonesia: breakdown: four years of communal violence in Central Sulawesi. (2002). in Indonesia. http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_sulawesi_conflict.php
Human Rights Watch. 14(9),14. New York. (accessed 14 May 2010).
31 Ibid, 14. 36 Analysis: Roots of Sulawesi conflict, op cit., 2001.
10 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 11
accord at a reconciliation conference on 19-20 December 2001.37 But in spite Central Sulawesi contributed to the historical, and present, uneasy balance
of this agreement, unrest and clashes continued. between Muslims and Christians. 45 The senior Pastor of the main Protestant
Three members of the minority Catholic community, Fabianus Tibo, Church Rinaldy Damanik was also imprisoned in 2003, on somewhat
Marinus Riwu and Dominggus da Silva were tried by a court and eventually dubious charges, in an attempt to try to settle the tensions. He spent part of
sentenced to death for masterminding attacks which resulted in the his imprisonment in Jakarta where he met Abu Bakar Bashir who was, at the
subsequent deaths of over 70 people.38 The attacks allegedly planned by the time, serving a term of imprisonment and the two were able to discuss issues
three were tied into the 1998 Christmas Eve incident.39 The three were around the unrest. But in spite of the attempts to resolve these conflicts the
executed by firing squad on 22 September 2006.40 The highly contested death underlying problems represented by this conflict remained. In various ways
sentences caused rioting and unrest in Central Sulawesi among Christian the context for what was to follow was determined in this conflict.46
Catholics and Protestants alike. The Catholic Church had appealed for
pardons with no effect. The Government stood firm. The Vatican described Bali 200247
the executions as a defeat for humanity. 41 Protestants joined Catholics
nationally and internationally in seeking pardons and in protesting the death On the evening of October 12, 2002, three orchestrated bombing attacks
sentences. There was a widespread view both international and from within claimed the lives of 220 people.48 The first two attacks occurred in the busy,
legal circles in Indonesia, that the sentences were not safe and that the three resort district of Kuta where several popular nightclubs were located. That
were paying the price for the destruction and the clashes between Christian night the clubs were very busy with several hundred people, mainly tourists,
and Muslim in the region. There was also the suspicion that the death enjoying the music and atmosphere. Just after 11:00pm, an almost
sentences on three Catholics were necessary to clear the way for the eventual simultaneous attack by a suicide bomber and a planted car bomb detonated
executions of the three Muslim Bali bombers. and ripped through two popular nightclubs. The suicide bomber, with an
The executions brought to the surface issues regarding the apparent explosive in a backpack, walked through Paddy s Pub and triggered a bomb
inconsistent arrests and convictions of Catholics and Muslims.42 Catholics causing people to scatter and flee.49 Only seconds after, a white Mitsubishi
questioned whether Muslims were receiving preferential treatment. Since the van, equipped with a remote-controlled car bomb, exploded outside the Sari
1998 Sulawesi conflict, a very low number of Muslims have been convicted of Club just across the street from Paddy s Pub.50 Later it would be shown that
offences and the ones who were, received mild sentences.43 There have also the suicide bombing in Paddy s Pub was intended to move people toward the
been questions as to whether the three Catholics executed were actually the exits thus placing them in even closer proximity to the Sari Club blast.51
masterminds behind the attacks.44 These feelings of religious inequality in 45 Veitch, James, op cit., Human Tragedy in Sulawesi Indonesia: 1998-2002. P.122.
46 For an interesting human rights perspective see Harris Azhar and Syamsul Alam Agus,
37 Malino Declaration can be accessed from
Agus, Poso :An Area Put to Conflict. Accessed from www. internal-displacement.org
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64BRC3?OpenDocument 47 A day by- day diary of events written from a personal view by an ABC TV journalist who
38 Executions spark Indonesia unrest. (2006). BBC, 22 September.
happened to be holidaying at the time in Bali with his family provides a good record. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5368922.stm (accessed 14 May 2010); Aragon, Lorraine, op cit.,
Alan Atkinson, Three Weeks in Bali: A Personal Account of the Bali Bombing. December 2002,
ABC Books, Sydney.
39 Ibid. 48 http://www.lookingattheleft.com/2008/11/bali-bombing-victims-rip/
40 Ibid; Three Catholics executed in Indonesia. CI News, 22 September. 49 Ibid.
http://www.cinews.ie/article.php?artid=2702 (accessed 14 May 2010). 50 Ibid; Bali Bombings 2002. Australian Federal Police.
41 Ibid. http://www.afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous_operations/bali_bombings_20
42 Ibid. 02 (accessed 30 March 2010).
43 Ibid. 51 Ressa, Maria A. (2003). Seeds of Terror: An eyewitness account of al-Qaeda s newest center of
44 Ibid. operations in Southeast Asia. Simon and Schuster: New York, NY.
12 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 13
Survivors recounted how the blasts obliterated the nightclubs. The Sari in only slight building damage.59 The bomb was filled with human waste to,
Club was demolished by the car bomb explosion while the fire it started as the Australian Government suggested, inflict maximum moral
destroyed what was left of Paddy s Pub.52 Richard Poore, a camera operator damage. 60 The maps below show the relative positions of the two explosions
who was staying at a hotel one kilometre away from Sari Club, told BBC and the second gives more detail of the main explosions at Kuta beach.
News that the blast resulting from the car bomb was so powerful that it
nearly destroyed his hotel.53
The car bomb was the largest explosive used in a JI attack. Over a ton of
chemicals were in twelve filing cabinets stacked in the van.54 The bomb had
four back-up means of detonation. This car bomb killed 202 people, injuring
hundreds more, and destroyed homes and buildings far removed from the
scene of the explosion.55 Of those who survived several hundred suffered
horrific burns and were taken to the local Sanglah hospital, Bali s best
medical facility.56 The number of people requiring immediate care was too
great for the hospital to handle and consequently many were flown to
hospitals in Australia. Those who died were from 21 countries, among them
88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, and 28 Britons.57 The high number of
Australian causalities may be linked to a rugby tournament that had brought
many Australians to the island. October was only the beginning of the tourist Image: Cutting Edge, http://www.cuttingedge.org/NEWS/n1715.cfm
season that brought young Australians to Indonesia for three or four of the
summer months - keen to surf, to chill out and to party in Kuta. Had the Response – Indonesia and Australia
bombers chosen to attack just a couple of weeks later the casualties would
have been far greater.58 The 2002 bombings created a devastating impact. Indonesian President
A third attack occurred a few miles away outside the United States Megawati immediately enacted two pieces of anti-terrorism legislation. These
Consulate building in Denpasar one minute after the car bomb. This laws pertained to the treatment of suspected and convicted terrorists.61
explosion caused considerably less harm, injuring one person and resulting Perpas 1/2002 was enacted 18 October 2002 and Perpas 2/2002 on 4 April
2003.62 The first made it lawful to punish by death an individual who either
52 2002: Dozens killed in Bali nightclub explosion. BBC News.
participated in or abetted an act of terrorism. Perpu 2/2002 allowed Perpu
stm (accessed 31 March 2010). 1/2002 to apply retrospectively to the 2002 Bali bombing incident.63 The
53 Ibid. 59 Bali Bombings 2002, op cit, Australian Federal Police.
54 Conboy, Ken. (2006). The Second Front: Inside Asia s most dangerous terrorist network. 60 Ibid.
Equinox Publishing: Jakarta, Indonesia. 61 Jones, Sidney. (2006). Terrorism, counter-terrorism, and human rights in Indonesia.
55 Wisnu, Andra & Christanto, Dicky, op cit, 2008. Submission to the International Commission of Jurists, Jakarta, 4 December.
56 Ibid. http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/ICGSubmission.pdf (accessed 6 April 2010).
57 Sheridan, Michael. (2008). We killed too many, says Bali bombers. The Times Online, 2 62 Harsawaskita, Adrianus & Laksmana, Evan. (2007). Rethinking terrorism in Indonesia:
March. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3466833.ece (accessed lessons from the 2002 Bali bombing. UNISCI Discussion Papers. Madrid. 15, pp63-85.
30 March 2010). 63 The Amrozi Bali Bombing Case: is Indonesia s anti-terrorism law unconstitutional?
58 The bombers revealed that the first plan was for an attack in July. If that had occurred the October 2003. Department of Parliamentary Library. No. 14.
casualties might have been less. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn14.pdf (accessed 23 June 2010).
14 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 15
lawyers for those convicted of their roles in the bombings were to argue that success in capturing hundreds of suspected terrorists across the country.70
such retrospective application of law was unconstitutional.64 Eventually Alongside the establishment of the Special Detachment Unit Indonesia
being found guilty and having exhausted all appeals three bombers were committed nearly $1 million dollars to US counter-terrorism agencies.71
executed under the new legislation. In declining the final appeals the court The 2002 Bali bombings resulted in the largest killing of Australian
cited the inhumanity of their intent and actions as sufficient evidence that citizens during a period of peace.72 Due to the high number of Australian
they should not receive clemency. Other individuals involved with the deaths, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) quickly responded to the attacks.
bombings at a lesser degree than those executed were tried under common Within 24 hours of the bombings, the AFP and the Indonesian National Police
criminal legislation.65 had begun Operation Alliance an investigation into those responsible.73 This
The introduction of these laws was considered by some to unduly expand combined operation resulted in 33 successful convictions of those who
the authority of the Indonesian police at a time when their public credibility played various roles played in the bombings.74
was not high. A western expert drew attention to three new measures that Immediately following the attacks the Indonesian government was
aroused public concern. Increasing the number of days a suspected terrorist hesitant to draw conclusions about the identity of the terrorists. Although
could be held in custody from two days to seven; expanding prosecution to suspicions soon centred on Jemaah Islamiyah the Indonesian police refused
those convicted of aiding and abetting a terrorist act; slackening rules to arrest the group s leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, citing lack of evidence.75
dictating how evidence can be presented in court by allowing audio and However, at noon on 20 October Bashir was arrested on different charges- for
video evidence, and by permitting cases to be presented based solely on his suspected involvement in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings and the
intelligence reports. In the heightened security situation, the Government attempted assassination of Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.76
considered such an expansion of their authority, a wise precaution.66 The government hesitated to accuse an Indonesian based Muslim group like
The attacks proved disastrous for the tourism industry in Bali with losses JI for fear that such action would incite vigorous protest.77
estimated in the millions.67 In an attempt to regain confidence and economic
strength following the bombings, Indonesia joined the United States, Japan, Responsibility
and Australia in a coalition to address international terrorism.68 In 2004 the
creation, with assistance from Australia, of a special counter-terrorism unit Police General I Made Mangku Pastika led the investigations of the bombing
within the Indonesian National Police was another positive step towards with a western style approach.78 Based on this work his team of international
strengthening Indonesia s position on counter terrorism. This unit, known as experts and Indonesian police were able to arrest thirty three individuals. Six
Special Detachment 88,69 steadily gained a reputation in Indonesia for its of theseis these are Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, Ali
70 U.S.-funded Detachment 88, elite of Indonesia security. (2010). Reuters, 18 March.
64 Ibid. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100318/wl_nm/us_indonesia_usa_security (accessed 6
65 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News. April 2010).
66 Jones, Sidney, op cit., 2006. Terrorism, counter-terrorism, and human rights in Indonesia. 71 Ibid.
67 Realuyo, Celine and Stapleton, Scott. (2004). Response to Bali: an international success 72 Sheridan, Michael, op cit., 2008.
story. Economic Perspectives. http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/ep/ep_sep04/ep_sep04e.pdf 73 Bali Bombings 2002, op cit, Australian Federal Police.
(accessed 6 April 2010). 74 Ibid.
68 Ibid. 75 Casey, Michael. (2002). Pressure intensifies on Indonesia to crack down on extremists after
69 See: Indonesian Police's Detachment 88, http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id37.html. it Bali bombing. San Francisco Chronicle, 15 October.
was called Unit 88 in recognition of the number of Australians killed in the 2002 incident. 76 Bali bomb workings a mark of terrorist? (2002). AP, 22 October.
The Unit has received support from a number of Governments including the United States 77 Ibid.
and Australia. 78 Harsawaskita, Adrianus and Laksmana, Evan A, op cit., 2007.
16 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 17
Gufron, Dulmatin, and Abu Bakar Bashir, would prove critical to the The Key Suspects
investigations.79 Three from this group were subsequently sentenced to
death. Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Imam Samudra, and Ali Gufron were Encep Nurjaman, or as he is better known, Hambali85
executed by firing squad on 9 November 2008 on an island off the coast of
central Java. The three were candid under interrogation readily revealing Hambali has a long history of extremist violent activity connected with
names, locations and a swath of information regarding JI. This lack of Indonesia and with Al Qaeda.86 Some reports suggest the al-Qaeda
restraint suggests to some that the accused lacked fanatical zeal to protect leadership gave him the responsibility of orchestrating and overseeing the
their network. 80 However, the reason they talked so readily may mean no bombings.
more than that the three were supremely confident of the cause they had He was born in a village in West Java on 4 April 1964, the second of
espoused. Their fate at the hands of the law (and they must have hoped for thirteen children. His father was a subsistence farmer. In his twenties, while
the death penalty) would seal their victory. They would have known that still living in Indonesia, he became angry over the treatment of Muslims
under such circumstances nothing would be gained by being uncooperative. which gradually propelled distaste for the Government of President Suharto
They identified the car which held the bombs and the person who drove and what he believed was an unjust, religiously intolerant regime. He was in
it. The leader of the attacks, identified as Hambali (Nurjamin Riduan Afghanistan from 1983 to join the jihad against the Soviet Union army of
Isamuddin), was allegedly given the role by the leadership of al-Qaeda.81 The occupation.87 His attendance at Saudi-run Camp Sada in 1987 was a
discovery of a serial number inside the van that held the bomb led the team determining factor in forming his Hanbali beliefs and radicalized his
to Amrozi, who was candid in his interrogations.82 At his home the team thinking. The camp was run by a friend of Osama bin Laden, Abdul Rasul
found explosive and bomb-making materials identical to the chemicals found Sayyaf and gave Hambali the opportunity to meet supporters of jihad from
in the Bali bombs.83 They also found numerous speeches and pamphlets, over around the world including Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammad
20 in total, written by one of JI s founders, Abu Bakar Bashir, as well as who was later responsible for masterminding Operation Bojinka and the 9/11
literature featuring Osama bin Laden. Amrozi revealed the names of several attacks in New York.88 After leaving Afghanistan, Hambali settled in
individuals involved with the bombings and the names he omitted were Malaysia at Kampong Sungai Manggis in Jahore with the founders of JI,
subsequently found through other leads provided by Amrozi, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Baker Bashir as neighbours and with Imam
fromhisfrom his cell phone usage.84 Samudra alongside for a time. From there he worked at establishing an
85 Later while living in Malaysia took the name Riduan Isamuddin: but he was better known
by his nickname, Hambali Hambali is apparently connected to the name of Imam Ahmad
ibn Hanbali the founder of the Hanbali shool of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam who died in
855. This school is followed by Muslims in Saudi Arabia, in neighbouring countries and in
the holy sites of Makkah and Medina. Hambali like Hanbali was and is a passionate Muslim
who based his life and his thinking on the Qur an and the sunnah, as interpreted by his
79 Barton, Greg. (2004). Indonesia s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam. University deeply committed to the principles of his faith.
of New South Wales: Sydney, Australia. 86 For a more comprehensive account of Hambali s activities see: Profile: Hambali, History
80 Callick, Rowan. (2002). Suicide bombing a new JI tactic. Jakarta Observed, 30 November. Commons,
81 Ressa, Maria A, op cit., 2003. http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=nurjaman_riduan_isamuddin
82 Ibid. 87 Ramakrishna, Kumar. (2009). Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in
83 Ibid. Indonesia. Praeger Security International.
84 Ibid. 88 Ibid, p125.
18 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 19
international network of jihadi contacts. Although Hambali was involved bombings.90 Amrozi admitted to owning the van housing the bomb which
with radical terrorism and attacks a decade prior to 9/11 he was, like the JI detonated outside the Sari Club. He was found guilty of conspiring with
organisation, relatively unknown. He is thought to have visited Ambon and Imam Samudra who was also convicted for his role in the attacks. Upon
Sulawesi during the unrest and to have spent a period in the Southern hearing the guilty verdict Amrozi cheered, punched the air and gave the
Philippines. By 2000 he had emerged on the public stage as JI s key thumbs-up sign to the many gathered in the courtroom. He then proclaimed
strategist .89 In early 2000 he attended the Al-Qaeda sponsored summit in in Arabic, God is great . This was followed by the words, Jews remember
Kuala Lumpur that drew two of the twin tower hijackers and thereafter Khaibar! The army of Mohammad is coming back to defeat you. These
launched his bombings in Indonesia. He spent some months in Cambodia in words referred to the first battle victory of the Prophet Mohammad and his
2002 where he attempted to establish a centre for JI activities in South East forces against Jews in the oasis of Khaibar in 628.91 The Jewish community in
Asia. This was the year of the Bali bombing and financing of the operation the oasis took a large number of casualties. Some Muslims, including Amrozi
came form Al-Qaeda sources via Hambali. He returned to Thailand early in use this story as an incentive to encourage fellow Muslims to band together
2003 having been unsuccessful in his bid to centre his activities in Cambodia to use force to overthrow and destroy the modern state of Israel. More
and was apprehended in a joint Thai- United States raid on 11 August 2003. importantly for Amrozi these words expressed publicly the reason for his
He was transferred to a detention centre for interrogation in Jordan and then involvement in the bombing- he was opposed to the continuing existence of
was shifted to Guantanamo Bay in 2006 where he is now classified as one of Israel as a sovereign state in the Middle East; he was against Israel and on the
fourteen high value detainees . side of the Palestinians: he was anti Jewish. To attack Australians and
Hambali s long-term objective was to facilitate the birth of a caliphate that Americans-who he believed supported Israel- was his way of arousing fellow
would link all Muslims together across colonial boundaries in South East Muslims for a jihad against the State of Israel.92
Asia and bring with it the revival of Islam as the only true faith for all His only complaint and appeal was that he would prefer that his death
human kind to embrace. For Hambali, Hanbali (a 9th century Islamic leader) should result from beheading and not by firing squad.
had articulated the true version of Islam and Hanbali s influence motivated Amrozi s path to jihad was quite different from his brothers, Mukhlas and
and drove Hambali s thinking and his actions. The violence that he Ali Imron. Characterised as a disorganised and unfocused youth Amrozi
facilitated and planned was designed as a wake up call to all Muslims, and failed to complete high school and worked in construction jobs for several
was planned as the first step in recovering a modern understanding of years.93 He worked with several Westerners during this work and grew to
Islamic destiny. In this aspect of his thinking, he aligned himself with the dislike them becoming convinced that they intended to destroy Indonesia
theology of Hanbali and with the Muslim Brotherhood of the twentieth and through their sexual and immoral lifestyle choices.94 Following two failed
twenty-first centuries: both were influences on the jihad in Afghanistan and marriages he set out to join his brother Mukhlas in Malaysia where he taught
became the seminal sources for the theology that was to drive Jemaah at a conservative Muslim school. His plan was to embark upon a life more
90 The Bali Bombing Plotters. (2010). BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2385323.stm (accessed 7 April 2010).
91 The words were translated and reported in an article that appeared in the Australian on 8
August 2003. The article was written by Martin Chulov and was entitled The plot to blast
Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, also referred to as the smiling bomber for his Bali
92 See further Martin Gilbert: In Ishmael s House-A history of Jews in Muslim Lands, 2010
behaviour while on trial, was arrested on 5 November 2002 and received the
New Haven and London, p XIII
death sentence on 7 August 2003 for helping to plan and implement the 93 Ramakrishna, Kumar. (2009). Op.cit.
89 Op.cit p126. 94 Ibid, p130
20 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 21
aligned with Islamic teaching. Psychologist Eric Zillmer highlights that oppose Muslims.104 When answering the question of why the attacks needed
Amrozi displayed characteristics consistent with an ambitent personality.95 to take place in Bali, Samudra stated that the place was not significant in
This term means that a person has no mind of their own; They rely heavily itself. It was a convenient place to target non-Muslims. In support, he quoted
on others as well as on an external structure for guidance in problem a passage from The Quran: And slay them wherever you may come upon
solving. 96 Amrozi s choice to join JI and participate in jihad may have been them (2:191).105 The nightclubs were targeted based on the high density
largely due to this personal characteristic which drove him to become of tourists who frequented them. Samudra expressed remorse over the fact
involved in what he perceived was a significant support group.97 that Indonesians were also killed in the attacks.106 He did not express regret
for the damage the attacks had done to Bali s economy. He made it clear that
Samudra he believed that the tourism industry itself represented immorality.107
Samudra also voiced his hatred for the United States, saying during one of
Imam Samudrawas arrested 21 November 2002 and sentenced to death in his police interrogations: I carry out jihad because it the duty of a Muslim to
September 2003.98 Authorities involved with Samudra s arrest described him avenge, so [that] the American terrorists and their allies understand that the
as the field commander of the attacks.99 Prosecuting lawyers alleged that blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing. 108 In making this
he helped with the planning and was the individual who selected the attack claim he was referring to the Palestine-Israel conflict. Samudra continued his
sites.100 recruitment of followers even while imprisoned. According to police he
Samudra became interested in jihad after reading, at the age of sixteen, used a smuggled laptop computer to communicate with militants to
Allah s Signs in the Afghan Jihad written by Abdullah Azzam, a founding organise a second suicide attack .109 This 2005 Bali bombing attack would
figure of Al-Qaeda.101 He spent the following years fervently planning a trip claim the lives of 20 people and wound several more. A skilled computer
to Afghanistan. He was eager to visit the country that he believed contained engineer with a university degree, law enforcement authorities suspected
the true Islamic leaders and housed the roots of all the great jihad Samudra had received training in bomb building in Afghanistan and had
movements.102 Samudra lived for a time in Sungai Manggis in Malaysia contact with the Taliban.110 Samudra denied any involvement with the
alongside Bashir and Hambali. It was alleged that he was involved in the first terrorist organisations JI or al-Qaeda and expressed gratitude for his death
spate of bombings across indonesiaIndonesia in 2000. While in prison sentence. 111 Like Amrozi, he requested a beheading on the grounds it was
Samudra wrote A Rosella that Eases Pain outlining his justification for the more humane and aligned with Islamic teachings.112
Bali bombing.103 He expressed his belief that the bombing was an essential Samudra recorded and released a two-minute song prior to his execution
element of jihad and that it is the calling of every Muslim to fight those who that gives a clear idea of his motivations. He reportedly had a fellow inmate
95 Ibid, p131 Ambitent tendencies were prevalent in Nazi Germany. The condition is indicative
105 Ibid, p19.
of individuals who are no longer able to rely on their own moral judgments but rather, 106 Ibid.
choose to blindly follow another person direction. 107 Ibid.
108 Fealy, Greg. (2003). Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali bombings.
97 See Amrozi s personal story: Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid, Jakarta 2009
International News for Asian Studies Newsletter. No.31.
98 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News.
http://www.iias.nl/nl/31/IIAS_NL31_0304.pdf (accessed 29 April 2010).
99 Ibid. 109 Sheridan, Michael, op cit., 2008.
100 Ibid. 110 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News; The Bali bomb commander. (2008).
101 Hassan, Muhammad Haniff. (2006). Unlicensed to Kill: countering Imam Samudra s
BBC News, 8 November. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2499943.stm (accessed 7
Justification for the Bali Bombing. Peace Matters: Singapore. April 2010).
102 Ibid. 111 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News.
103 Ibid. 112 Ibid.
22 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 23
record the song using a cell phone and then uploaded the message on to the Mukhlas
internet. Described as the defiant deathbed song, the words were down-
loaded from the internet by many followers with some using it as a ring tone Ali Gufron, also known as Mukhlas, was the older sibling of Amrozi.118 He
to remind them of their hero who had died as a martyr. One person was arrested on 4 December 2002, charged with being the director of the 2002
declared that making the song his cell phone ring tone was a form of Bali bombings and received the death sentence on 2 October 2003,.119 He was
honouring them. He added, the bombers executions only light up the spirit also convicted for organising the bombings, sourcing, sourcing and
of others to keep struggling for Islam."115 116His writing from prison provides preparing the finances of the operation, and confirming the attack sites.
an interesting insight into the thinking that shaped his pathway to Mukhlas was one of 13 children born in the village of Tenggulun in East
martyrdom.117 Java in 1960.120 Although two of the other Bali bombers, Amrozi and Ali
Imron were siblings of Mukhlas, their upbringing and path to violence were
quite separate. Mukhlas upbringing had a profound effect on his ultimate
decision to join JI and become involved with the promotion of radical Islam.
His father was Nur Hasyim, a well-respected member of the community and
113 Wockner, Cindy. (2008). Where the Bali bombers were executed. The Herald Sun, 27 the first resident of Tenggulun to establish an Islamic boarding school.
November. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/where-fate-found-them/story- Mukhlas was educated in these boarding schools, or pesantrens. Eventually
e6frf7l6-1111118152302 (accessed 5 July 2010).
he became a teacher at such a school, Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin, where he
115 Ibid. would meet the founders of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar. He
116 Wockner, Cindy. (2008). Bali bomber Imam Samudra s bizarre song of martyrdom. The maintained his innocence throughout his trials, claiming that he only
Daily Telegraph, 27 November. http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/bali- provided religious support and guidance but was not involved with the
details of the attacks themselves.121 Despite these claims, in a trial involving
(accessed 5 July 2010). The words are as follows:
We Beat Up the United States
the arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir, Mukhlas revealed that he was the operations
I am a martyr; I am a martyr. chief of JI. He also stated that he knew Osama bin Laden well but insisted
My eyes are closed; my chest is wounded. that bin Laden had nothing to do with the 2002 bombings. Adamant that he
Farewell father mother, children, wife, and my relatives. was not guilty of the Bali terrorist attacks, Mukhlas continued to preach and
We will meet again in the hereafter.
provide religious guidance to supporters throughout the time in prison
We will meet in eternity.
In the heavenly realm, we will meet. leading up to his execution. His wife, Farida binti Abas, revealed that before
In the heavenly realm, we will meet. his execution he wrote to her requesting that his youngest son be named after
Jews and Americans are our enemies forever. Osama bin Laden.122 Farida denied that Mukhlas was a terrorist, calling him
America and its allies.
instead a mujahidin. 123 Like the other two, Mukhlas also set out in writing
We will beat them up, and they will fall.
In the heavenly realm, we will meet. 118 Factbox: three men executed for 2002 Bali bombings. (2008). Reuters, 8 November.
In the heavenly realm, we will be happy. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4A72PS20081108 (accessed 14 April 2010).
I am a martyr. 119 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News.
I am a martyr. 120 Ramakrishna, Kumar, op cit., 2009.
My eyes are closed 121 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News.
My chest is wounded. 122 Wockner, Cindy & Athika, Gita. (2008). Bali bomber pledges son to terror. The Daily
Isykariman au mut syahidan (Live noble or martyr in his path). Telegraph, 23 October. http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/national/bali-bomber-
117 Aku Melawan Terroris, Solo, 2004; Mereka Adalah Terroris!, Malang 2005 ( a volume that pledges-son-to-terror/story-e6freuzr-1111117832181 (accessed 7 July 2010).
includes the 2004 publication) and Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur Lara ,Jakarta 2009 123 Ibid.
24 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 25
his sacred dream before his execution in the hope it would be widely Christmas Eve bombings.132 In addtitionaddition, Amrozi and Imron were
circulated.124 also alleged to have assisted in the planning of the 2000 attempted
assassination of the Philippine ambassador.133
Ali Imron, the younger brother of Mukhlas and Amrozi, was convicted on 18
September 2003 for organising the 2002 Bali bombings and sentencedand The executions of Mukhlas, Amrozi, and Imam Samudra caused considerable
sentenced to life imprisonment.125 He is alleged to have placed the small upheaval in both Indonesia and Australia. Indonesia feared a public backlash
explosive outside the United States consulate in Bali. once the men were executed, and arranged for increased security across the
The youngest of 13 siblings, Imron was considered to fall between his two
country. There were also concerns that terrorist acts would escalate as a result
older brothers, Mukhlas and Amrozi.126 Unlike Mukhlas he was not
and security measures were increased around Indonesia and around
immediately drawn to radical Islam and jihad. He credits a specific
Indonesia saround Indonesia s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. These
propaganda video shown to him that described the injustices being
fears proved largely unfounded. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd drew
conducted against Muslims as being a turning point. Imron then travelled to
a thin line by announcing prior to the executions that Australia still rejected
Kuala Lumpur to join his brother Mukhlas at Pondok Pesantren where he
the death penalty.134 He drew disdain from many families of victims and was
became actively involved in preaching jihad. In contrast to his brothers,
accused of being hypocritical in the face of their tragedy.135
Imron expressed regret and repentance for his actions.127
The location and date of the executions was kept secret, even from the
Throughout his trial he cooperated with police requests and gave frank
defence lawyers who may have revealed the details to the public. In early
details of the attacks including how he assembled the bombs.128 He
demonstrated for police how he created the bombs used in the attacks and 2008, both Amrozi and Samudra appealed to the Constitutional Court of
admitted to training and transporting the two suicide bombers who would Indonesia arguing that execution by firing squad was a form of torture. The
detonate inside the Sari Club. Imron even recalled what he said to the suicide court turned down these claims stating that the court must consider not only
bombers as they drove in the van to Sari Club: I told them to get ready to the pain suffered by the condemned men, but the pain suffered by society as
commit the suicide bombings as agreed." Imron s cooperative behaviour a whole. 136 The bombers were required to receive 72 hours notice prior to
served in helping him escape the death penalty. Although he conveyed regret their execution but no one other than the prison authorities, the executioners
Imron did not declare his actions were wrong, maintaining that the US and the bombers and a few members of the Government were aware of when the
its allies were legitimate targets. 131 notice was given.137 For days before the executions the media was filled with
It is important to note that the three Nurhasyim brothers, Amrozi, stories in detail of what would take place.
Mukhlas, and Ali Imron, were also each held to have played a role in the 2000
132 Ramakrishna, Kumar, op cit., 2009.
124 Mimpi Suci Di Balik Jeruji Besi, Jakarta 2009 133 Ibid.
125 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News. 134 Maiden, Samantha. (2008). Rudd confirms death penalty opposition as Bali executions
loom. The Australian, 30 October. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/rudd-
127 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News.
confirms-death-penalty-opposition/story-e6frg6nf-1111117899054 (accessed 7 July 2010).
128 Ibid. 135 Kelly, Joe & Fitzpatrick, Stephen. (2008). Government warned about hypocrisy over Bali
129 Bali bomber Ali Imron gets life in jail. (2003). Lateline, 19 September.
bombers. The Australian, 31 October. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/hypocrisy-
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2003/s948970.htm (accessed 14 April 2010). claim-over-bali-bombers/story-e6frg6t6-1111117906080 (accessed 7 July 2010).
130 Ibid. 136 Ibid.
131 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News. 137 Ibid.
26 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 27
The executions took place at 12:15 am on 9 November 2008 on Nusa strengthening of radical groups who had excessive time to turn the three
Kambangan.138 The protocol for the executions called for three firing squads, bombers into heroes.145
each with 14 members. The bombers were tied to wooden crosses. Before they
were shot, they were asked if they had any last words, prayers, or Other major players in the bombings
messages.139 Apparently, all three accepted their fate without struggle as
they were taken from their cells to the execution ground. 140 In stark There were others not sentenced to death for their actions who also played
opposition to their jubilation at and during their court appearances, t They large roles in the Bali bombings, among them were Dulmatin, Abu Bakar
may have seemed to have been defeated as they faced death having spent a Bashir, Sarjiyo, Idris and Umar Patek. There were also the two suicide
lot of time trying to avoid their death sentence . However, it was their words bombers themselves Arnesen and Iqbal.
Allahu akbar that rang out in the early morning as they faced the firing
squads.141 Once it was daylight, the bombers bodies having been prepared Dulmatin
for burial, were airlifted to their respective villages to be buried. At each
location large numbers of people gathered to celebrate their new status as Dulmatin, also referred to as the genius was alleged to have detonated one
martyrs of the 2002 bombs and to have helped to construct the car bomb that exploded
The executions of Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Mukhlas received a mixed outside the Sari Club.146 The police squad, Special Detachment 88, killed him
response from Indonesians. Although the majority agreed with the during a house raid on 9 March 2010 in Pamulang city.147 He was considered
sentencing some accused the media of glorifying the coverage of the events the last primary suspect in the arrests of those involved with the 2002
leading up to their deaths.142 Indonesian media is one of the most bombings. Indonesian police officers revealed that explosive devices and
unrestricted in South East Asia and came under scrutiny for the manner in detonators were found during the house raid..148 He is believed to have
which it covered the executions.143 Editor of the Jakarta Post, Endy Bayuni, received his Jemaah Islamiyah militant training under one of the
admitted that the situation had been out of control. He wrote, , masterminds behind the 2005 Bali bombings, Azahari Husin.149
originallyOriginally we had a na ve view that if we gave them the space to
speak they would have used the occasion to express remorse, but that Abu Bakar Bashir
instead the men used the freedom as an opportunity to invoke a political
circus.144 They openly justified their actions. Many also believed that the Radical preacher Abu Bakar Bashir150 is well regarded as a founder and
numerous appeals and delays prior to the executions led to the leader of JI by several sources.151 Operationally, he may not have been
138 Allard, Tom & Doherty, Ben. (2008). Bali bombers executed. The Age, 9 November. 145 Bali bomber execution delays strengthening jihadists: analysts. AsiaOne, 7 November.
http://www.theage.com.au/world/bali-bombers-executed-20081109-5ko7.html (accessed 7 http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20081107-
July 2010). 98894.html (accessed 8 July 2010).
139 Allard, Tom & Doherty, Ben, op cit., 2008. 146 Barrowclough, Anne. (2010). Bali bomber mastermind Dulmatin killed in shootout.
140 Ibid. 147 Ibid.
141 The making of martyrs. (2008). Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November. 148 Ibid.
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/10/31/1224956332786.html (accessed 7 July 2010). 149 Barrowclough, Anne, op cit., 2010.
142 Macan-Markar, Marwaan. (2008). Media-savvy ending for Bali Bombers. Asia Times, 18 150 For a profile of Bashir see the BBC :
November. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JK18Ae01.html (accessed 21 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10912588
May 2010). 151 Van Bruinessen, Martin. (December 2002). "The violent fringes of Indonesia's radical Islam."
143 Ibid. ISIM Newsletter. 11, pp7. Ibid; Jemaah Islamiyah. (2009). Council on Foreign Relations, 19
144 Ibid. June. http://www.cfr.org/publication/8948/ (accessed 14 April 2010);
28 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 29
involved in either the planning or the execution of the ensuing violence. they focused on killing Americans whom he believed should pay for what he
There might well have been a deliberate effort made by others to keep him termed, the persecution of Muslims.
out of the planning because of his value as a front person but there is little Amrozi also revealed the names of two others involved with the 2002
doubt that the leadership of JI and its rank and file members drew bombings. They were identified as Idris and Umar Patek.
theological underpinning, encouragement and inspiration from his public
voice. Nevertheless, in spite of this role, along with the 2002 bombings Bashir Idris
is believed to be connected with the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the 2003
bombing attacks on the JW Marriott Hotel, and with the attempted Idris was arrested in June 2003 for robbing a bank.159 He was accused of
assassination of Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.152 Initially aiding and abetting the 2002 bombings and his involvement in the 2003
arrested over speculation of his involvement with JI he was acquitted for lack attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta.160 He was convicted for his part in the
of proof.153 He was again arrested a week following the 2002 bombings but this attack but acquitted on the Bali bombing charges based on the court s
was acquitted of any involvement with the attacks; although, the judge did hesitance in using new terrorist legislation that had just been introduced for
find that Bashir had given his approval of the attacks and sentenced him to fear of applying retrospective law. Idris confessed to the role he played in the
30 months in jail.154 He was released 14 June 2006 after serving just 25 bombings, admitting that he was responsible for detonating the small bomb
months. Some countries were critical of the early release, saying that this was that exploded outside the United States Consulate in Bali.161 In spite of Idris
much too lenient and likely to strengthen terrorist networks in confession and the police labelling him as one of the five key terrorists
Indonesia.155 His recent arrest and detention is the beginning of untangling responsible for the first Bali bombing, Idris is did not serve his full
his role in JI and Indonesia s war of terror. sentence.162 He was sentenced in 2004, to serve ten years but was freed after
Sarjiyo, or Sawad, was another found guilty of playing a key role in the
bombings. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in January 2004 for making Umar Patek remains the most elusive of those implicated in the bombings.164
the bombs that were used in the attacks.156 He received a lesser sentence than He was not initially considered a primary suspect evidence has implicated
the three given the death penalty as his role was seen as indirectly involved him as one of the deputy field commanders .165 He is reported to be the new
as opposed to the others who had a direct impact on the events that leader of a terrorist cell in Aceh, which received extensive funding from
unfolded.157 He revealed that Amrozi was the one to inform him of the plan 159 The Bali Bombing Plotters, op cit., (2010). BBC News.
to bomb the Bali nightclubs.158 Sarjiyo agreed to assist in the attacks because 160 Ibid.
152 Profile: Abu Bakar Ba asyir. (2006). BBC, 14 June. 162 Dunn, Mark. (2010). Only 13 of the 70 Bali bombings and Jakarta embassy terrorists
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2339693.stm (accessed 14 April 2010). remain in prison. The Herald Sun, 16 June.
153 Ibid. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/only-13-of-70-bali-bombings-and-jakarta-
154 Profile: Abu Bakar Ba asyir, op cit., 2006. BBC. embassy-terrorists-remain-in-prison/story-e6frf7l6-1225880137779 (accessed 25 June 2010).
155 Guerin, Bill, op cit., 2006. 163 Ibid.
156 Bali bomb-maker jailed for life. (2004). BBC News, 29 January. 164 Allard, Tom. (2010). Bali bomber led new terrorist gang. Sydney Morning Herald, 11
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3440143.stm (accessed 6 July 2010). March. http://www.smh.com.au/world/bali-bomber-led-new-terrorist-gang-20100310-
157 Ibid. pzdp.html (accessed 26 May 2010).
158 Gartrell, Adam. (2010). Bali bombmaker appeals for clemency. NineMSN, 16 February. 165 Ibid.
30 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 James Veitch A War of Terror - The Bali Bombing 2002 31
Dulmatin.166 Patek has so far avoided capture. After the death of his friend, Their lives were dramatised in the trials and as they travelled to and from the
Dulmatin, in March 2010, Patek is thought to be the last of the main suspects special court in armoured vehicles with police escorts and closed off roads-
in the 2002 bombings who is still on the run. There are reports that place him they were treated as Kings , a Balinese friend remarked. They held the
in the southern Philippines.167 attention of the world s media in the campaigns they ran from their prison.
They planned for a continuation of the violence and organised this by laptop
The Suicide Bombers from their cells. They wrote books and gave interviews (for which they
charged) while incarcerated. Their approaching executions became prime
Two suicide bombers detonated the bombs on the night of the 2002 attacks time news items on radio and TV world- wide. News of their deaths spread
but information regarding their identities is limited. The news that suicide to every part of the globe within seconds of the announcement from the
bombers participated in the attacks was particularly concerning to many prison. In burial, each was recognised and proclaimed, A Martyr .
Indonesians as it was the first such incident to occur in Southeast Asia.168 The Bali 2002 was Indonesia s nine-eleven but with a difference. Nine-
bomber alleged to have been responsible for the bombing of Paddy s Bar has eleven was regarded as a symbolic defeat of the United States with the Al
been identified only as Iqbal.169 Samudra revealed the name during police Qaeda hijackers becoming heroes in the Muslim world - their bodies lost
questioning. However, apart from his being young, little else is known forever, incinerated in a foreign land. Bali 2002 was a religious victory for Al
publicly about him. An unfortunate and anonymous end for such a young Qaeda through the actions of its surrogate, Jemaah Islamiya. Indonesian
person! The other bomber was identified as Arnasan, a young man from Java Muslims committed to jihad in the name of Allah successfully carried out
alleged to have formed ties with JI in 2001.170 He was recruited along with their mission and as a result three were executed by their own, Muslim, State.
three others to take part in a group called Team Lima (team five), a suicide Their graves are seen as the graves of martyrs places of inspiration for those
bombing squad created by JI and led by Imam Samudra to drive further who will continue the jihad.
operations.171 Considered the poorest of the boys among Team Lima,
The war of terror in Indonesia from 1999-2002 and beyond to 2009 was
Arnasan was the only person to offer the sacrifice of his own life when the
well planned and executed by a relatively small group of Muslims who were
squad members were asked.172
committed to a cause with which they identified with religious zeal. They
acted in the belief that what they did was not only ordained by Allah but that
it was Allah who empowered them to do what they did. They saw it not as
fanaticism nor an act of blind faith but a conviction that what they were doing
Instead of the suicide bombers becoming martyrs their role faded into the
was the will of Allah and it was done on behalf of and for their own people-
background. Attention fell instead on the three who planned the incident.
the ummah, the nation of Islam.
It is still too early to assess the impact of Bali 2002 but in a very different
167 See Zachary Abuza; Umar Patek: Indonesia s Most Wanted . James Town Terrorism Monitor
context and in the language of the secular western world anthropologist
Vol 1.4. 30, April 201. Accessed from
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/mlm0/feature- Margaret Mead who once wrote- never doubt that a small group of
single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36333&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=469&cHash=afda04 thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only
168 Dhume, Sadanand & Djalal, Dini. (2002). Indonesia learns of Intl terror link after arrest. thing that ever has!
Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 December.
169 Callick, Rowan. (2002). Suicide bombing a new JI tactic. Jakarta Observed, 30 November.
170 Ramakrishna, Kumar, op cit., 2009.
Peace and Security Review Ashok Nath A Bengali infantry regiment in the Great War 33
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. 32-44
remarked, if Britain gets into trouble elsewhere, India in her present temper
would burst into a blaze of rebellion ! Eyebrows were raised towards Bengal,
British India s most populous and political minded province. How would the
There was real cause for concern. Earlier in 1905, the British divided the
A Bengali Infantry Regiment in the Great War huge province of Bengal into a western part (Bengal) and an eastern part
Ashok Nath, FRGS* (Eastern Bengal and Assam). This decision led to a sharp division of minds all
over Bengal and indeed all over India. Many saw the Bengal partition a
calculated move to break the anti-colonial movement, which was particularly
It used to be said, What Bengal thinks today, India will think tomorrow. At the strong in Bengal, and to divide and rule the Bengali-speaking population.1
outbreak of the First World War, the anxious question arose, how will Bengal react to Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy, justified the partition as an
Britain s call for help? The winds of change, brought about by the 1905-11 partition
administrative convenience in order to deliver better governance to the large
of the Province had effectively sown the seeds of nationalism, communalism, and
and populous province of Bengal; the 1905 partition divided the Hindu
dissent. Therefore, Bengal s positive response, surprising many in the establishment,
majority West from the Muslim majority East . In a private letter to the
came in the form of a field ambulance corps, a signal company and an infantry
Secretary of State for India, he wrote:
regiment - the 49th Bengalis. The latter especially attracted the elite amongst the
Calcutta is the centre from which the Congress Party is manipulated
young men and it evoked a special sense of Bengali pride. Here was an opportunity
to prove them-selves, since Bengalis, earlier, were excluded by the British Indian throughout the whole of Bengal, and indeed the whole of India. Its best wire
army for recruitment into their fighting arms . The 49th Bengalis therefore was a pullers and its most frothy orators all reside here. The perfection of their
unique experiment, being the first all Bengali infantry regiment, it comprised machinery and the tyranny which it enables them to exercise are truly
many educated young men from urban backgrounds, and there was no segregation remarkable. They dominate public opinion in Calcutta; they affect the High
amongst the rank and file based on religion - Hindus and Muslims served together. Court; they frighten the local Government, and they are sometimes not
This structure was quite unlike other Indian infantry regiments of that era which without serious influence on the Government of India. The whole of their
recruited from the illiterate rural peasantry, compartmentalized into caste or religious activity is directed to creating an agency so powerful that they may one day
based sub units or regiments. be able to force a weak government to give them what they desire. Any
On mobilization the Bengalis were sent to Mesopotamia (present day Iraq) to fight measure in consequence that would divide the Bengali-speaking population;
the Ottoman Turks. Cultural prejudices from their own British officers, poor that would permit independent centre s of activity and influence to grow up;
leadership, caste rivalries amongst the Indian officers and a serious incident within that would dethrone Calcutta from its place as the center of successful
the regiment resulted in its disbandment in 1920. intrigue, or that would weaken the influence of the lawyer class, who have
Introduction and Pre-War conditions in Bengal
the entire organization in their hands, is intensely and hotly resented by
them. The outcry will be loud and very fierce, but as a native gentleman said
to me my countrymen always howl until a thing is settled; then they accept
The advent of Indian Nationalism much of it pioneered from Bengal had
made the authorities uneasy. When the First World War broke out, it was
The divide (it was hoped) would create an ideological split between the
* Ashok Nath, FRGS, author and historian specializing on the history of war and military Hindus and Muslims of Bengal. An economic fault line already existed:
cultures. His recent book on the History of the Indian Cavalry is acclaimed as the
definitive work on the subject. He studied at St Stephen's College, and at Stockholm s 1 Muntassir Mamoon, Bengal Partition (1905) Reaction in Eastern Bengal, Journal of Social
University. He has taught at S dertorns and Stockholm University, Sweden and has been a Studies, 114 (2007),1-32.
senior research fellow at the United Service Institution of India. 2 Curzon s letter of 2 Feb 1905 to St. John Brodrick, Secretary of State for India.
34 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Ashok Nath A Bengali infantry regiment in the Great War 35
Muslims were poorer, largely peasants and cultivators, concentrated in the government in the defence of the Empire, which for them means, in its
east, virtual serfs of mainly Hindu landlords. Bengali Muslims sought the ultimate evolution, the complete recognition of their rights as citizens of the
panacea of separation in the belief that political power would end this freest state in the world. We may have our differences with the government
discrimination. - and what people have not- but in the presence of the common enemy, be it
The 1905 division was therefore popular among the Muslims in the East, Germany or any other power we sink our differences, we forget our little
who now had their own province. quarrels and close our ranks and offer all we possess in defence of the Great
What the division of Bengal (1905-1911) did not accomplish, however, was Empire, to which we are all so proud to belong with which the future
a separation of Bengalis on regional terms. If anything it strengthened a sense prosperity and advancement of our people are bound up.
of Bengaliness across the region. But what it did affect was the creation of a Meanwhile, many Bengali notables went about harnessing support within
specific regional political framework in which religious identity began to Bengal. For example, Sir Surendranath Banerjea5 toured the province
overrule regional and class identities. Thus for Hindus and Muslims across extensively, encouraging young men to enroll themselves in the army and
Bengal, irrespective of local and class diversities, the region of Bengal now fight for the cause of the Empire. A large number responded to his call.
became the focus of lively- but largely separate and antagonistic identity Writing in his book about this campaign the veteran leader said: The key-
politics.3 note of my address was that of self government, which was the goal of our
political leaders connoted self-defence, and that if we sought the privileges of
Bengal’s response to the First World War imperial citizenship, we must bear its burdens and responsibilities and the
foremost among them was to fight for the defence of the Empire .
War was declared on 4 August 1914, and India rallied to Britain s call. There The appeal went home, and in not one of the numerous meetings that
was a genuine desire to help, self interests notwithstanding. For example were held was there a single dissentient voice heard.
many influentials, the Indian National Congress included, believed the cause Earlier, the authorities permitted only the formation of a medical, signal
of India s independence would best be served by assisting Britain. Maharajas and transport unit from Bengal. ..that they should be associated in
and Nawabs of the numerous Indian Princely states4 on the other hand felt transport duties and in the administration of medical relief and such other
that a show of loyalty to the King Emperor would enhance and strengthen work as the Government deems fit.6
their position within the hierarchy. Therefore offers of financial and military An all Bengali fighting unit therefore was not really a priority of the
help were made from all over the country. Hugely wealthy princes offered Government and it took a certain amount of convincing and political
great sums of money Nepal offered help, even the Dalai Lama in Tibet lobbying before the green light was given for its raising.
offered 1000 of his troops. The reason behind this reluctance stemmed from the fact that the
Equally vocal was the Indian Press in its support, The Bengalee for example establishment did not want non-Europeans to fight in what was initially seen
wrote: as a White Man s War . Earlier in 1854, when Indian soldiers volunteered to
Behind the serried ranks of one of the finest armies of the world, there 5 Sir Surendranath Banerjea (1848 1925) moderate Indian political leader during the British
stand the multitudinous people of India, ready to cooperate with the Raj. Founder of Indian National Association, and the newspaper, The Bengalee. Became a
3 senior leader of the Indian National Congress and its President. Critical to the partition of the
Willem Van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p 86.
4 Bengal Province in 1905, he was in the forefront of the movement to reverse it, which was
Prior to the Partition in 1947, some 560 Princely States existed in India. These strictly
done in 1912. Also known by the sobriquet, Rashtraguru (the teacher of the nation). The
speaking were not part of British India. They had internal autonomy, while the British were
British affectionately called him Surrender Not Banerjea !
responsible for their external affairs. In practice, while the states were indeed ruled by
6 The Englishman, 15 August 1914. ( This newspaper founded in Calcutta in 1811, eventually
potentates with a variety of titles, such as Raja, Maharaja, Nawab, Khan or Nizam, the British
merged into The Statesman)
had considerable influence.
36 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Ashok Nath A Bengali infantry regiment in the Great War 37
fight in the Crimean war7, the offer was politely declined by Whitehall. Much of the youth of Bengal were smitten with a sense of patriotism, to
Indian troops, it was argued should not be made to fight Europeans as this serve in what they believed would fulfill their obligations as responsible
would undermine the concept of white supremacy prevailing in the British citizens of the Empire, seeking a just and respectful place within its nations,
Empire at that time.8 Similarly during the South African Boer War, Indian like home rule in vogue with other colonies of Australia, Canada and New
participation was restricted only to units comprising medical, veterinary and Zealand. Secondly, there was a desire to remove the racial slur on the non
transport services. martial label that had been given to the Bengalis. Their enthusiasm can be
A civilian committee dubbed the Bengali Regiment Committee had gauged by the fact that many a Bengali volunteer prior to signing up earned
been formed at Calcutta (Kolkata) to motivate and create awareness amongst in their civil capacity three times the pay they would get as soldiers13. The
the Bengali youth. It was headed by Maharaja Bijoy Chand Mahtab of shortfall or loss of pay in many cases was covered by contributions or
Bardhaman, a confirmed Raj loyalist; earlier in 1908 he had risked his own donations by other civilians who were prepared to compensate the families of
life, saving Sir Andrew Fraser, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, from an these young men. There was no dearth of volunteers; many had to be turned
assassination attempt. The other notables were Surendranath Banerjea, away, amongst them, Subhash Chander Bose (later famous as Netaji Subhash
Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chowdry9, Shrimati Sarola Devi10, Dr S. P. Chander Bose) who was rejected on grounds of poor eyesight.
Sharvadhikari, A. K. Fazlul Haq11, Dr S. K. Mullick. By September 1916, the Bengali double companies were relocated to
Nowshera in the Punjab for training purposes under the 46th Punjabis. Their
Colonial myths and the creation of a Bengali regiment first phase of training complete the men went to Karachi for their second
phase. Having reached near full strength, the Government decided to
Permission was granted on 7 August 1916 in the form of two companies, also upgrade the unit into a fully fledged infantry battalion. Thus, on 1st July 1917,
known as the Bengali Double Company12. Commanded by Lieutenant S.G. the 49th Bengal Infantry was officially raised at Karachi. The title soon
Taylor, it comprised six Indian VCO s and 218 other ranks. changed to 49th Bengalis. Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Barrett, from the 126th
Baluchistan Infantry14 was appointed commandant with Major V.V.V.
7 Crimean War (Oct 1853 Feb 1856), war fought mainly on the Crimean Peninsula between the Sandiford from the 62nd Punjabis15 as the second in command.
Russians and the British, French, and Ottoman Turkish, with support, from Jan 1855, by the Recruitment had been open to all Bengalis regardless of caste or religion,
army of Sardinia-Piedmont.
most of the men came from noble and well to do families. From records
Ashok Nath, Izzat - Historical Records and Iconography of Indian Cavalry Regiments 1750-2007,
USII, New Delhi 2009, p 74.
available so far it appears that the regiment was primarily dominated by
9 Nawab Ali Chowdhury noted for his valuable contribution to the establishment of the Hindus from the upper strata, Brahmans and Kayasthas communities in
University of Dhaka (1921). He also played an important role in holding the All-India particular. Bengali Muslims while constituting an integral part of the
Muhammadan Educational Conference and in the foundation of All-India Muslim League in
regiment appear to have been in a minority, one reason attributed to this low
1906 at Dhaka.
10 Niece of Rabindra Nath Tagore, a Brahmo Samaj activist, and an accomplished musician and turnout was the influence of the Khilafat movement16.
poetess; she composed many patriotic songs probably the only woman leader in Bengal's 13 A sepoy s pay during 1917 was about Rs 11 pm
militant nationalist movement. Later, a companion to Mahatma Gandhi. 14 Became 1st Bn 10th Baluch Regt in 1922. Allotted to Pakistan in 1947, current designation
11 Abul Kashem Fazlul Huq also known as Sher-e-Bangla (Tiger of Bengal) a well-known
from 1956 as the 6th Bn Baloch Regt.
Bengali statesman in the first half of the 20th cent. He held different political posts including 15 Became 1st Bn 1st Punjab Regt in 1922, Allotted to Pakistan in 1947 and their oldest battalion.
those of General Secretary of Indian National Congress (1918 1919), the first Muslim Mayor Present designation
of Calcutta (1935), Chief Minister of undivided Bengal (1937 1943) , Governor of East 1st Bn The Punjab Regt.
Pakistan(1956 58), he was the key national leader behind the emergence of Bengali 16 The Khilafat movement was a pan-Islamic, fundamentalist political campaign launched by
(especially Muslim) middle class in British India. Muslims in British India to influence the British government and to protect the Caliph of
12 This form of organistion was in vogue in certain Indian Army infantry regiments at that time Islam and the Ottoman Empire.
38 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Ashok Nath A Bengali infantry regiment in the Great War 39
All officers posted into the unit were British, many of the junior lot coming In August 1914, India s Army comprised 77,000 British and 160,000 Indian
from the I.A.R.O (Indian Army Reserve of officers) mainly civilians who had soldiers trained and commanded by British officers. India s armed forces
hastily been given wartime commissions. The commandant Lieutenant were organised basically for the maintenance of internal order and to defend
Colonel Authur Lennard Barrett, a soldier of the old school from an up the sub-continent against external aggression. Small contingents of Indian
country regiment recruiting the so called martial races, made no bones about troops had occasionally been dispatched to other British protectorates, but
his resentment in being posted to a non martial unit .17 India s army was neither designed nor equipped to provide a substantial
Cultural prejudice sometimes bordering in outright racism was not expeditionary force for overseas service. Yet in spite of its inherent
uncommon amongst British officers of the Indian Army. Martial Races was deficiencies this was outside the United Kingdom, the most suitable standing
a designation coined by officials in British India, and increasingly in vogue army immediately available.
after the Second Afghan War of 1878-80. It represented a collective expression The heavy demand for man power and the significant losses suffered in
of beliefs prevalent amongst the British Indian Army officer corps which had the early stages of the First World War led to a change in recruiting policy and
gained wide currency under Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar the so called martial race theory was abandoned due to necessity and in
(Kipling s Bob s Bahadur), a popular Victorian military hero considered to be order to offer scope to other untapped sections of the Indian community for
the main architect of victory over the Afghans. This policy received its recruitment.
ideological justification through a racist ideology influenced by both the Indian officers at that time held a limited position within a regiment
Indian caste system and Social Darwinism, referred to as scientific racism. It known as Viceroy s Commissioned Officers, or VCO. The VCO was a
propounded the theory that the measure of human potential might be judged commissioned officer, wore a distinct officers uniform, and was entitled to
by race. In addition and closely linked to it, there were military and receive a salute from any Indian soldier or non-commissioned officer. He
environmental (climatic) perspectives. All three combined as criteria for functioned either as a platoon leader or company commander, and indeed,
purposes of evaluation and recruitment.18 most of the platoons and companies of Indian regiments were led by such
One major advantage was that since they habitually chose peasant castes soldiers. They had no authority over either white enlisted men of British
as martial, and since these, in addition to being inured to hardship and regiments or even over British officers who might be junior to them. In fact,
amenable to discipline, were uneducated and politically backward, their they were outranked by any holder of the King s commission, and thus by all
loyalty was assured.19 Another advantage was that by defining the educated British or white Colonial officers.21
classes of India as non-martial, the British justified their refusal to The VCOs of the 49th Bengalis comprised a motley collection, many were
commission Indians and assured that only British gentlemen became officers.
former civilians holding some position of authority, or scions of prominent
It must not be forgotten however that the classification of the Indian people
Bengali families while others had been posted in from non combat arms.
into the martial races and non martial was not an invention of the British; it
None had actual combat experience or service with an infantry regiment. The
was the recognition of something already implicit in the Indian social
most respected amongst them, Subedar Major Shalindranath Basu had been
awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal (IDSM) for bravery and a
Despite the pre-war fears of unrest, Britain, in fact, could take many troops
mentioned in dispatches (MID). He was from a prominent Bengali family and
and most of her military equipment out of India as fears of unrest subsided.
had been serving with the Supply and Transport Corps. Earlier, as the much
17 Lt.Col Barrett asked for a transfer and given command of 2/33rd Punjabis. admired secretary of the Mohan Bagan Football Club he had lifted the club s
18 Ashok Nath, Martial Race Theory in the South Asian Context, Milit rhistorisk Tidskrift, Sweden
reputation from obscurity by winning the most prestigious football title of the
19 Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, p 45-52
20 Ashok Nath, Martial Race Theory, p 36. 21 Ibid, p 36.
40 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Ashok Nath A Bengali infantry regiment in the Great War 41
country, the IFA Challenge Shield. The next in seniority was Kumar a distant - and largely successful - venture. While the surrender of Kut-al-
Adhikram Mazumdar, a lawyer by profession and pleader of the Calcutta Amara led in London to the creation of a parliamentary committee of enquiry
High Court. Other prominent personages were Khaza Habibullah the Nawab into operations in Mesopotamia, far more horrific repercussions were taking
of Dacca (Dhaka), Ranoda Prosad Saha22 a well known businessman and place on the ground. Captured Indian soldiers were brutally treated on their
philanthropist from East Bengal. march to Turkish prisoner-of-war camps in Anatolia. Of the 11,800 men who
left Kut-al-Amara with their captors on 6 May 1916, 4,250 died either on their
The war in Mesopotamia way to captivity or in the camps that awaited them at the journey's end.
Despite the setback, the British position in Mesopotamia was far from
Turkey's entry into the war had immediately prompted Britain to open a new hopeless. Indeed, with reinforced troop divisions and a new leader in General
military front in the remote Ottoman province of Mesopotamia (present-day Sir F S Maude, the force mainly comprising Indian troops, again advanced
Iraq). Mainly Indian and with some British troops, sent to the Persian Gulf to rapidly up the Tigris in early 1917.
protect British oil interests at Abadan, made rapid progress inland against Kut-al-Amara was recaptured, and Ctesiphon, where the previous British
weak Turkish resistance. In less than a month, they had occupied the towns advance had been checked, was taken soon afterwards. On 11 March 1917,
of Basra and Kurna. Despite the unforgiving climate, the British Indian forces British and Indian troops finally entered Baghdad. The path was cleared for
under the leadership of General Charles Townshend progressed steadily up an advance into northern Mesopotamia, towards the heart of the Ottoman
the River Tigris taking the town of Kut-al-Amara just south of Mesopotamia's Empire in Anatolia.
major city, Baghdad.
The tide turned quickly, however, at the Battle of Ctesiphon, it was a The 49th Bengalis, field service and some problems
bloody affair, in which Turkish troops defeated Townshend's attacking forces.
More than half of the 8,500 Indian troops who fought at Ctesiphon were killed Additional reinforcements were therefore desperately needed especially to
or wounded. The survivors then endured a dangerous and exhausting retreat guard the overstretched lines of communications, the 49th Bengalis
to Kut-al-Amara without decent medical or transport facilities. undergoing training in Karachi were ordered to mobilize for immediate
Bolstered by 30,000 reinforcements, Turkish troops besieged Townshend's departure to Mesopotamia. Reaching Baghdad towards the end of
forces in Kut-al-Amara before the Allied troops could act on the British War September, 1917 they were assigned to garrison duties along the lines of
Cabinet's advice to withdraw further down the Tigris. The siege of Kut-al- communications. The unhealthy climate did not suit the men and there were
Amara lasted 147 days, before the 11,800 Indian troops inside the garrison several cases of sickness within the battalion. An interesting observation
town finally surrendered on 29 April 1916. confirms this fact in a book by General Sir William Marshal23 when he
Conditions during the siege were appalling. In bitterly cold weather and inspected the regiment in December 1917, as Commander in Chief British
with little medical treatment, many of the soldiers did not survive the winter. Forces in Mesopotamia, and is best described in his own words:
Several attempts were made to relieve the besieged town, but they Shortly after taking over command I went to inspect this unit ( 49th
encountered stubborn Turkish resistance and all ended in failure. Bengalis) and met by Lieutenant Colonel Barrett ( known as) The Boomer
The surrender of Townshend's army in late April 1916 shocked people in on account of the quality of his voice , was taken round the battalion, which
Britain and India, for whom the Mesopotamia campaign had previously been was not drawn up in the ordinary way but dotted about in squads, some
large, some small. On arrival at the first squad Barrett announced; The
22 RP Saha and his son were abducted on 7 May 1971. It is believed they were subsequently
murdered in a genocide carried out by the Pakistan Army and their collaborators targeting 23 Sir William Raine Marshall (1865-1939) served on the Mesopotamian Front as Sir Frederick
Bengali intellectuals especially influential Hindus. Maude's successor, Commander-in-Chief from November 1917 until the end of the war.
42 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Ashok Nath A Bengali infantry regiment in the Great War 43
Measles Squad ; at the second, The Whooping Cough Squad , at the third, dispatch an expeditionary force to Kurdistan, and some 235 soldiers from the
The Scarlet Fever Squad , and so on, through the most known diseases. The 49th Bengalis under their officiating commandant Major Sandiford took part
cr me-de-la cr me of the battalion, those not convalescing from any in this punitive expedition.
particular disease, numbered some sixty-five, but the only men I saw was the The Mesopotamian campaign was largely an Indian Army campaign.
senior Indian officer, a brother of a prominent Bengali politician .24 (This During its four years of fighting in Mesopotamia, more than 31,000 officers
would have been Subedar Major Shalindranath Basu). and men mostly Indians had died in combat or from disease28.
The unit was sent south to Basra as part of Force D25 and on 9 June 1918, The 49th Bengalis were to remain in Mesopotamia until July 1920,
a shocking incident occurred. The popular Subedar Major Shalendranath guarding the Royal Air Force base near Tamminah. The post war stringent
Basu, along with Jemadar R L Mukerjee and Subedar A K Mittra were shot economic measures that invariably follow required a drastic reduction of the
while they lay asleep in their tents. The former two were seriously injured army. Those units considered unsuitable for retention or with a bad record
while Subedar Mittra succumbed to his injuries shortly afterwards. A naik were the first to be axed; amongst them the 49th Bengalis. They ceased to exist
(NCO) and a sepoy from the regiment purported to have carried out the by 31 August 1920; the men on demobilization returned home to Bengal.
crime were arrested.
A court of enquiry subsequently found that the affair was caused by Conclusion
jealousy, and the crime was an outcome of private spite prompted by alleged
ill-treatment of the other ranks by the Indian officers (VCOs).26 The naik and The 49th Bengalis in many aspects were pioneers well before their time.
sepoy confessed to the firing and the Court considered a third person, Unlike other Indian regiments of that period they were not based along
Subedar D K Sen, also responsible although there was no evidence against religious, caste or community lines, instead an overall Bengali identity
him. Sen was greatly disliked in the regiment and on unfriendly terms with pervaded. It was also the first occasion when a large number of educated men
Subedar Major Basu. It appeared that Jemadar Mukerjee had been shot by many from urban backgrounds were concentrated into one regiment.
mistake for Subedar D P Banerjee. The court also concluded that there was From the evidence currently available the regiment appears to have lacked
no reason to believe that political motives inspired the crime. 27 effective and inspiring leadership, essential for a creating the necessary espirit
The incident was downplayed. No one was really interested in publishing de corps. The manner in which the regiment was presented by its British
this unfortunate episode especially in Bengal. commanding officer to the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in
The war ended on 30 October 1918, with the defeat of the Turkish Armies. Mesopotamia gives an impression that the Commandant did not quite take
During the entire duration of the war, the regiment did not see combat, being his own men seriously. The majority of officers posted to the regiment appear
assigned garrison or guard duties along the lines of communication. The to have been inexperienced. The more senior officers did not wish to serve in
closest chance for action came during the close of the War in mid 1919 when the regiment which they deemed un-martial . The Indian officer cadre, all
a local notable, Sheikh Mahmud al-Barzinji, as governor of lower Kurdistan from non combat arms failed to inspire their men who were educated and
declared Kurdistan an independent state. This prompted the British to required careful handling. In fact one of the causes of the shooting it was
24 Marshall, Lieutenant General Sir William, Memories of Four Fronts. London: Ernest Benn Ltd,
alleged had been on account of the ill-treatment meted out to the other ranks
1929, p 270. by the VCO cadre.
25 The Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia, under the command of Lieutenant- At the time of recruiting it was believed an overall Bengali identity would
General Sir John Nixon, the largest Indian Army force to serve overseas during the Great cement the unit. To an extent of fostering communal harmony amongst
26 India Office Papers, British Library, printed archive. L/MIL/7/7279. 28 The exact breakdown; 11,012 were killed, 3,985 died of wounds, 12,678 died of disease,
27 Ibid. 13,492 were either missing or prisoners and 51,836 wounded.
44 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Peace and Security Review
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. 45-70
Hindus and Muslims it was successful. However on a macro social level it
created problems between the Brahmans and Kayasthas the two dominant
Hindu communities in the regiment, as rivalries amongst them over
promotions soon broke out.
Exposure to overseas service created a broad mentality, political
awareness influencing many who served within its ranks. Amongst them Transnational Security
Kazi Nazrul Islam, one day to become the national poet of Bangladesh, his Challenges and Threats facing Bangladesh
earliest poems were composed while serving with this regiment. Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
From a point of view of historiography, hardly any accounts written by
Indian soldiers documenting their experiences in the First World are known
to exist, except two29 in Bengali, both written by men who had served with Introduction:
The 49th Bengalis were a unique regiment possibly the only one to have Transnational security issues have been of concern to policy makers for quite
amongst its ranks an educated elite - and therefore possibly also a reason for some time now. Global terrorism, human trafficking, small arms proliferation
its failure in the conventional military sense. and other forms of transnational security threats have raised concern among
The author: Ashok Nath, FRGS, is a historian, author and researcher, policy makers for several reasons. First, the negative impacts of such
specializing in the history of war and military culture. Considered an transnational issues do not remain confined to the territorial boundary of a
authority on South Asian armies, his recent book on the History of the Indian state, rather these spill over and affect other countries. Second, in recent
cavalry has been acclaimed as the definitive work on the subject. He taught times, transnational security threats have caused serious damage to the
at S dertorns and Stockholm University and has been a visiting senior economic, social and political development at the systemic level. For instance,
research fellow at the United Service Institution of India / Centre for Armed drug trafficking in Latin America or transnational terrorism in South Asia
Forces Historical Research. He is currently in Bangladesh along with his wife have created significant economic, social and political instability. The third
who is posted with the Swedish Embassy in Dhaka. reason is equally noteworthy. Limitations of national-level legislation and an
absence of adequate transnational collaborative mechanisms or legal regimes
have made it quite difficult to decisively deal with most transnational threats.
Bangladesh faces a host of Transnational Security Threats- starting from
terrorism, arms- and drug smuggling, human trafficking, climate security,
and financial crime to transnational organised crime- that jeopardise its
Major General Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc, (Retd.) is the founder and President of Bangladesh
Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS). Prior to this he served in the Bangladesh Army
for nearly 37 years. General Munir served in important appointments including Military,
Secretary to the President of Bangladesh, Director General and Chief Executive of Bangladesh
Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), the government think tank. General
Munir is also a veteran of UN Peace Support operations and had the distinction of heading the
post election UN monitoring mission in Cambodia. He has recently been inducted into the
29 The two books are 1. Sainik Bangali by Subedar Monbahadur Singh (pub circa1940) and 2. Military Advisory Council for Security Impact of Climate Change, a major body which advises
Polton Jiboner Sriti by Mahbubul Alam (pub circa 1936) NATO and the European Union on the Potential Security Consequences of Climate Change.
46 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 47
already fragile economy and impede social and political development. Transnational security threats have also redefined the role of the military.
Bangladesh is geo-strategically significant for a number of reasons: It is Previously, the US military was primarily responsible for ensuring national
world s 7th most populous nation with more than 150 million people. It is security, while domestic security was in the province of law enforcement
also the third largest Muslim nation in the world in terms of demographic agencies. After the emergence of transnational security threats, these clear-
strength. Bangladesh sits in close proximity to two would be superpowers- cut divisions no longer exist. This poses some profound constitutional and
China and India. Hence, if unchecked, the transnational problems facing security challenges to nation-states.vi
What compounds the scenario is the fact that transnational threats are
Bangladesh will have serious consequences for this entire region. In this
difficult to deter, detect, and control. National boundaries are not effective
regard, this paper identifies the major transnational security threats facing
barriers, and are often used to an adversary s advantage. With little or no tie
Bangladesh, analyses how severe the threats are and recommends measures
to national identity, attribution can be difficult in the event of an attack, and
to effectively address these challenges.
retribution may not be possible. vii
Definition: Transnational Security Threats
Experts believe that the advent of globalisation has rendered
unprecedented economic growth, commerce, and international migration .
Easier communication has expanded the global, national and regional
Transnational security challenges are threats to the security of nations horizons creating new opportunities for most countries. However, at the
characterized by an event or phenomenon of cross-border scope, the same time, globalisation has also opened the floodgates to more sinister
dynamics of which are significantly (but not necessarily exclusively) driven elements , i.e. Transnational Security Threats.viii
by non-state actors (e.g., terrorists), activities (e.g., global economic behavior),
or forces (e.g., microbial mutations, earthquakes). i According to James Transnational security threats to Bangladesh:
Cockayne and Christoph Mikulaschek, international terrorism,
transnational organized crime, climate change and climate-related migration, The transnational security threats challenging Bangladesh which this paper
as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and small focuses on are: terrorism, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, human
arms and light weapons (SALW), are among the most salient transnational trafficking, climate change, water security, financial crime and infectious
security challenges on a global scale .ii
Terrorism and religious militancy:
Paul J. Smith defines transnational security issues as the nonmilitary
threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity
of a nation or the health of that nation's inhabitants .iii Unlike traditional
Terrorism and religious militancy have become a major concern for
security threats such as a nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan, or
Bangladesh. Terrorism and religious militancy in Bangladesh have caused
Serbia's military campaign in Kosovo transnational security threats do not severe damage to the moderate image of the nation. Terrorism has threatened
have a crisis "focal point". The absence of a focal point makes it difficult for people s lives, the country s economy, and Bangladesh s political
policymakers and government leaders to direct their attention and energy establishment and religious pluralism. Terrorism, amid its lethal
effectively.iv manifestation, has generated insecurity and instability within the state and
According to the US Department of Defense, transnational threats are society.
major security threats for the 21st century . These threats are characterised by A number of Islamist Militant Groups and their off shoots have sprung up
their global nature- which means, by definition, that these threats straddle in the country over the course of last two decades. Harkat-ul- Jehad-al-Islami
both the domestic and foreign spheres .v Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jama atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata
48 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 49
Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Hizbut Touhid, Islami Samaj, Hizb-ut Transnational linkages
Tehrir, and Alla r Dal are prominent. These terror outfits maintain and
harbour linkages with other trans-national/international terrorist groups. Intelligence sources reveal that the militant groups active in Bangladesh have
established links with international and regional terror groups and receive
Major terror attacks in Bangladesh support, assistance, training and funds to carry out activities within and
beyond the national boundary. It is alleged, for instance, that the HuJI-B was
Major terrorist attacks in Bangladesh took place in the post 9/11 dateline. formed in Bangladesh drawing inspiration from Al Qaeda and the group
Notwithstanding Bangladesh s Muslim-majority status, the people of this continues to maintain active links with the Al Qaeda network and remnants
land have traditionally sustained close affinity with Bengali language, culture of the Taliban militia.xiv The police in the neighbouring Indian state of Assam
and heritage. Their distinct Bengali identity has been a source of religious suspect that JMB is also trying to expand its operations in Indian Territory.xv
harmony and peaceful co-existence among different confessional The HuJI-B, for its part, is believed to have links with terrorist groups
communities in Bangladesh for many centuries. Extremist and religious based in Pakistan. According to sources, HuJI-B also has connections with
militants oppose the Bengalis secular image, and targeted the traditional insurgent groups operating in Northeast India. Some recent developments
Bengali new year cultural festivities on April 14, 2001. Bomb blasts at a have generated more shocks. According to reports, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
crowded festival, on the morning of the Bengali New Year, claimed nine lives, operatives of Indian and Pakistani nationalities are active in Bangladesh, and
and injuring many others.ix are working to build a strong militant network here. While investigating the
The terrorist groups planned and executed their terror plots in a alleged LeT plot to attack the Indian and US embassies in Dhaka, the
sequential manner within the country and society. After targeting symbols of intelligence agencies have gathered information that the Pakistan-based
Bengali culture, the militants attacked Bangladesh s judicial system. Nine militant group is recruiting cadres from Rohingya refugees in Chittagong.xvi
people including two lawyers and a police constable were killed, and 78 Dhaka Metropolitan Police Commissioner AKM Shahidul Hoque told
others injured on 29 November, 2005, in two suicide bomb attacks by the journalists that a good number of Lashkar operatives are on a covert
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), on Chittagong and Gazipur court campaign to carry out subversive activities in Bangladesh.xvii
premises.x Indian security analysts report that the United Liberation Front of Asom
The JMB targeted the judiciary as a part of its attempts to replace the (ULFA), an ethnic insurgent group from North East India, maintains linkages
current legal system of Bangladesh with Shar ia-based Islamic law. Militants with terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh. It is also reported that ULFA
also attacked the administrative components of the government. The most established its camps in the territory of Bangladesh and that ULFA operatives
noteworthy of these, serial blasts in August 2005, rocked 63 administrative received training at various camps of the HUJI-B. Indian analysts depict an
districts (out of a total 64) of the country within just 30 minutes. Government interesting alliance between Indian Hindu ethnic separatist groups and
establishments were targeted in the attack.xi The country s democratic Islamist terrorist organizations such as the HUJI (B) and the Jamiat-ul-
political parties too were targeted. With an attempt to assassinate the chief of Mujahideen.xviii It must also be mentioned that Bangladesh has facilitated
the then main opposition party and present Prime Minister, Mrs. Sheikh the arrest of a number of top ULFA leaders and subsequently handed them
Hasina, militants launched grenade attacks on a political rally. More than 16 over to India.xix
people were killed and over 200 people were injured in the attack.xii Even
foreign diplomats serving in Bangladesh were not spared. Two people were Government response
killed and the then British High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Mr. Anwar
Choudhury, was among about 70 injured in a powerful bomb blast at Hazrat Bangladesh Government has made serious efforts to thwart the menace of
Shahjalal s Shrine in Sylhet.xiii terrorism. A special force (Rapid Action Battalion) was raised to curb
50 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 51
terrorism in 2004.xx Since then, law enforcement agencies have been able to Transnational criminal organizations
disrupt the command and control structure of several terrorist groups. Top
leaders of the JMB were apprehended, put on trial, convicted, and Globalization, trade liberalization, and faster connectivity have played a
critical role in the development of Transnational Criminal Organizations
executed.xxi Many operatives of HUJI-B and JMB are still on the run. In terms
(TCO). The notion of the global village has fundamentally changed the
of legislative responses, special laws and ordinances were enacted to curb
context in which both legitimate and illegitimate businesses operate. This has
terrorism and terrorist financing in Bangladesh.xxii xxiii Recent statistics
created immense opportunities for transnational criminal activity.
show a dramatic decline in the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist
TCOs from countries all over the world have formed strategic alliances to
attacks in Bangladesh.
traffic in drugs, arms, intellectual property, humans, archeological treasures
However, considering the trans-national nature of global terrorism, and a number of other lucrative but illegal trades. In Bangladesh, for instance,
Bangladesh cannot act alone effectively against terrorism; it needs a well-organized criminal network exists that traffics women and children to
institutionalization of regional/trans-national cooperation, or the adoption of India, Pakistan and the Middle East for prostitution and domestic work,
a collaborative mechanism by the South Asian countries. while children are sent to the Middle East to become camel jockeys.xxv
TCOs and the national security of a country have a close relationship.
Year Civilians Terrorists Total Though it does not pose direct military threats or challenges to the state, drug
2005 26 9 35 trafficking and arms smuggling can cause serious problems.
2006 6 6 12
2007 1 7 8 Arms trafficking:
2008 1 0 1
2009 0 0 0 Illegal firearms trafficking is a serious trans-national problem for
2010* 1 0 1 Bangladesh. Bangladesh is now increasingly being used as a transit route by
trans-national militant and insurgent outfits for smuggling weapons.
Total 35 22 57
* Data till February 1 , 2010
According to intelligence sources, North, South and South-eastern parts of
the country, especially Chittagong, Khagrachhari, Bandarban, Sandwip,
Haluaghat and emerging char islands are being used for transportation of
Table: Fatalities-Islamist Terrorism, 2005-2010xxiv
illegal small arms.xxvi
Exhibit Box: Illegal arms trafficking has also alarmingly picked up in the South-
Major provisions of Anti-terrorism Ordinance (2008) are: western Bangladesh. Law enforcement agency sources have identified 29
points in six border districts where arms traffickers are active in carrying out
Penalty for offences like:
the illicit trade. The districts are Kushtia, Meherpur, Chuadanga, Jhenidah,
* arms running,
Jessore and Satkhira. The smugglers use at least four points on the Kushtia
* financing terror attacks,
border, five in Jhenidah, four in Chuadanga, three in Meherpur, six in
* committing murders and
Satkhira, and seven in Jessore.xxvii
* creating panic and endangering national sovereignty.
Maximum punishment is death sentence. Transnational connections
Punishment for being associated with proscribed organizations.
Financing of terrorism has become a subject of punishment. The smugglers operate across the India-Bangladesh border and local
Creation of special tribunal to put terrorists on trial. (Bangladeshi) gun-runners keep close linkages with their Indian
52 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 53
counterparts. The illegal firearms being trafficked through Bangladesh are arms trafficking over the years. The easy availability of rearms has given rise
mostly made in China, the USA, the Czech Republic and India. They include to different criminal groups which have created serious social problems for
eight-shooter guns, sawn-off rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, the country.
pistols and Indian-made arms like pipe guns, one-shooter guns, musket rifles The traffickers adopt various operational strategies to avoid detection.
and revolvers etc. Sources say the demand for Indian-made firearms is They usually do not smuggle firearms in bulk; rather it this is done in
particularly high due to their low price and wide availability.xxviii piecemeal fashion. They often dismantle or knock down the arms into small
parts for easier trafficking into the country. Later, the arms are assembled and
dispatched to the sales point. According to a report published by the
Bangladesh Development Partnership Center (BDPC), at least 400,000 illegal
and 25,000 licensed guns are used across the country for criminal activities.
South Asia Partnership (SAP) Bangladesh and International Action
Network on Small Arms (IANSA) jointly organised a conference in Dhaka as
part of marking Global Week of Action Against Small Arms in 2006.xxix
Major General Syed Muhammad Ibrahim (Retd.), who presented the keynote
paper in the conference, said that around 128 syndicates in the country were
engaged in criminal activities including gun running, human trafficking,
extortion, prostitution, illegal occupation of land, smuggling of contraband
items, drug peddling, drug dealing and money laundering etc. He also said
that more than six hundred thousand operatives (of whom 40% were under
18 years of age) used four hundred thousand unauthorised weapons to carry
out illegal activities across the country. Religious militants groups and
insurgent outfits of neighbouring countries use Bangladesh s south- and
south-eastern regions as a transit route for arms smuggling business.xxx The
government of Bangladesh and its law enforcement agencies, because of their
limited resources and other constraints, have failed to take decisive action to
curb the illegal commerce.
Map: Arms trafficking routes through Bangladesh. Major arms haul
Because of its geographical location, porous border and poor border On 1 April, 2004, law enforcement agencies of Bangladesh recovered 10 truck-
management, Bangladesh has become a desired transit route for arms loads of arms and ammunition from the jetty of the Chittagong Urea Fertiliser
trafficking in South Asia (See Map 1). In order to protect itself from illegal Factory (CUFF), in the port city of Chittagong. This was the largest arms haul
movements and activities, India started fencing the border in 1986, amid in the country s history. 1, 290 SMGs, 100 Tommy guns, 400 semi-automatic
criticisms of violating international law. By November 2009, 2,677 km of spot rifles, 150 40mm rocket launchers, 2,000 grenade launchers, 840 rockets
fencing had been completed out of an eventual 3,436 km. Nevertheless, a (40mm), 25,020 hand grenades, 6, 392 magazines for SMGs, and 184 million
large section of the border remains unprotected, and this has facilitated illegal rounds of ammunition were recovered.xxxi
54 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 55
Reports said that this huge quantity of arms and ammunition was country vulnerable to trans-border smuggling. Drug trafficking mainly of
smuggled into Bangladesh from a third country and was intended for being heroin, hashish, opium, phensidyl, pathedine or other psychotropic
illegally trans-shipped to recipients in North-eastern India. The incident substances like methamphetamines and precursor chemicals like acetic
showed up the scale of Bangladesh s vulnerability in terms of trans-national anhydride- poses a real challenge to the nation. A host of factors have
arms trafficking. contributed to Bangladesh becoming a lucrative narco-transit-zone for the
trans-national drug trade. Easy access to international air and sea links, and
Name of Offence 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 modest detection and interdiction capability are responsible for large-scale
Arms Act 2,293 2,370 1,836 1,552 1,746 drug trafficking activities in the country.xxxiv
Explosive Act 499 477 595 308 232
Table: Number of registered cases under Arms and explosive acts in
Bangladesh from 2003 to 2007xxxii
The challenge to the state
Arms trafficking pose serious challenges to Bangladesh. It challenges the
democratic practices, governance and development. The national security of
the country is also significantly compromised because of this ominous
phenomenon. It is also a big challenge for regional security and stability.
Many security analysts believe that the internal factors and sub-systemic
dynamics of South Asia have contributed to turn the region into a large illegal
arms trading centre. It may be difficult to stop this illegal trafficking
completely. However, observers suggest that law enforcement agencies must
take into account the supply and demand equation in order to devise effective
mechanisms to arrest these lethal contraband flows. Brigadier General
Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd)xxxiii has identified two important
factors relevant to curbing arms trafficking: First, to realise the universality of
the problem. Individual states in isolation cannot combat the menace of arms
trafficking; they will require collective effort and global response
mechanisms. The second factor is to establish a synergy between
development and security. Development will eradicate the sense of insecurity
of the groups/ individuals who otherwise would resort to violent means.
Bangladesh has become an attractive transit point for narcotics destined for
international markets. Bangladesh s long and porous borders have made the Map: Drug trafficking routes through Bangladeshxxxv
56 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 57
Bangladesh customs officials seized 23.5 kg of low-quality heroin at
Dhaka s international airport on November 12, 2007. A month earlier, the
Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) recovered three kg of heroin from a village in
Sylhet district. The heroin, according to RAB, came from an unknown
location in India to Bangladesh. In October, 2007, RAB made one of the largest
drug busts in the country. In a raid, RAB seized about 130,000 yaba tablets,
with a street value of more than $1 million. Large amounts of drug-making
equipment and raw materials were also recovered.xxxvi
Name of Drug Unit 2006 2007 2008 2009 (April)
Heroin Kg. 16.288 20.856 29.013 21.190
Charash Kg. 0.26 - 0.125 240
Poppy Plant No. - 60038 - 1450210
Illicit Distillation Litre 23582.200 22959.400 23597.600 22671.050
Codeine (Phensidyl) Bottle 46995 28241 53239 58875
Table: Narcotic seizure statistics in Bangladeshxxxvii
Graph: Narcotics related cases registered in Bangladesh.xl
In late December, 2009, a joint team of RAB and the Department of
Narcotic Control (DNC) seized a kilogram of heroin and arrested four
INCB also blamed a lack of resources and training of law enforcement
suspected drug traffickers, including three foreigners, at Uttara in the capital.
agencies for Bangladesh's failure to 'properly implement' its drug control
These instances demonstrated that drug trafficking in Bangladesh has direct
policy. INCB has identified the Chittagong seaport as the 'main exit point for
drugs leaving the country', while the remainder is smuggled out through
According to the latest report (annual report 2008) from the International
Sylhet and Chittagong airports.xli
Narcotics Control Board (INCB), in 2007 anti-narcotic agencies in Bangladesh
According to Bangladesh s DNC, international drug barons and the mafia
made a record seizure of more than 70,000 tablets containing codeine. India is
the main source of tablets containing codeine and codeine-based cough syrup network often find Bangladesh as a safe and alternate trafficking route
(under the brand name Phensidyl) smuggled into Bangladesh. The report when the Indian and Myanmar routes become risky . Bangladesh has a long,
also stated, Pharmaceutical preparations diverted from licit manufacture in remote and porous border with India on three sides and with Myanmar to the
southeast. The three border routes for drug smuggling are as followsxlii:
The western routes with India are
India continue to feed the widespread abuse of such products in South Asia.
Yaba is currently one of the most popular forms of methamphetamine Darshana and Jibannagar in
abuses in South Asia, including Bangladesh. Yaba contains a mixture of Chuadanga district, Hili and Birol in Dinajpur district, and Moghulhat,
caffeine and about 30 per cent methamphetamine. Law enforcement agencies Aditmari, Durgapur, Fulbari, and Nageshwari in Kurigram, and Nawabgonj,
have reported large seizures of yaba tablets in Bangladesh. This drug is Rajshahi, Meherpur, Debhat and Kaliganj in Khulna district, and Benapole
smuggled into Bangladesh from neighbouring countries such as Myanmar. and Chowgacha in Jessore district.
According to UNODC, 1.2 million methamphetamine tablets originating in Eastern Routes are Akhaura, Jhautala, Sadullahpur, Nawagaon, Singer
Myanmar were seized in Bangladesh in 2007.xxxix bil, Col. bazar, Gangasagar and Kasba in Brahman Baria district, Bibirbazar,
58 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 59
Chagalnaiya, Maharajganj and Gutuma in Feni district, Barkal and Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
Baghaichari in Rangamati district, Chittagong, Teknaff in Cox s Bazar district, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use
and Dighinala, Panchari, and Matiranga in Khagrachhari district. of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,
Northern Routes are Haluaghat(Telikhali/Karaitali/Surjyapur/ of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
Bandarkata/ Munsirhat/ Munshipara) in Mymensing district, Durgapur receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
(Bijoypur and Bhabani area) in Netrokona district, and Bangla Bandha, having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation.
Bhurungabari, Jhenaigati, Sunamgonj and Tamabil. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
Golden Triangle > Bay of Bengal-Bangladesh-India-Pakistan > prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
Middle East > South and South-Eastern Europe > Western Europe> or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
USA>Canada. (Air, sea and land) removal of organs.
Golden Triangle > Bay of Bengal>India>Sri Lanka > Middle East-
Africa > USA>Canada (air and sea). Human trafficking is a crime against humanity. This is a global problem
Golden Crescent > Pakistan>India>Middle East>Mediterranean and Bangladesh is one of the worst victims of human trafficking. The US
region > Europe>USA>Canada. (Air, sea and land). released the ninth annual "Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP)" on 16 June,
Golden Crescent > Pakistan>Middle East>Africa>Europe-USA- 2009. TIP s Bangladesh section has identified Bangladesh as a source and
Canada. transit point for men, women and children trafficked for forced labour and
India > Bangladesh > Middle East > Indian sexual exploitation. Experts have identified several forms of human
Ocean> Europe-USA-Canada. trafficking in Bangladesh; the most common forms are: trafficking for sexual
exploitation, forced prostitution, domestic servitude, forced labour and other
Table: Major International Drug Trafficking Routes.xliii forms of exploitation.xlvi
The figures give a gloomy picture of Bangladesh in terms of human
Since drug trafficking in Bangladesh is a trans-national issue, Bangladesh trafficking. Studies have uncovered that over a million women and children
cannot fight against this in isolation. A joint and collective (both multilateral have been trafficked out of the country in the last 30 years. According to a
and bilateral) mechanism and legal regime are equally important to stopping UNICEF report, approximately 400 women and children in Bangladesh are
drug trafficking in this region. India and Bangladesh have recently signed an victims of trafficking each month. Another study reports that approximately
agreement on fighting terror, organised crime and drug trafficking.xliv 300,000 Bangladeshi children and women between the ages of 12 and 30 have
Similar instruments should also be adopted between and among countries in been trafficked to India alone in the last 10 years. Lawyers for Human Rights
South Asia to effectively fight drug trafficking and drug abuse. and Legal Aid, an organization based in Pakistan, in its annual report reveals
that around 200,000 Bangladeshi girls and women were trafficked to Pakistan
Human Trafficking: over the period.xlvii
The term human trafficking is used to denote a wide variety of crimes and
human rights abuses associated with the recruitment, movement and sale of
people into a range of exploitative or slave-like circumstances. xlv The UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines
trafficking as follows:
60 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 61
Exhibit Box societies adversely and will thus also limit their capacity to engage in
UAE compensates 879 Bangladeshi camel jockeysxlviii peaceful conflict resolution. li
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) handed over to Dhaka compensation Climate change could ultimately impact the availability of fresh and safe
worth $1.43 million for 879 Bangladeshi children who once had been used drinking water, and impose adverse effects on human health and food
as camel jockeys in the Gulf kingdom. A UAE government delegation security around the world. Climate change is now becoming a contributing
called on Bangladesh Home Minister Sahara Khatun and handed over to factor to poverty and forced migration. Similarly, scarcity of water and food
her the compensation package in May 2009. shortage would lead to displacement of population. Many fear that the
The money will be spent for the education, treatment and housing of the cumulative impact of poverty, displacement, competition over limited
children who were once trafficked to the Gulf country and returned home resources and societal stress may go beyond the already limited government
in phases in the last decade as a result of vigorous anti-trafficking capacity to deal with deteriorating conditions and might ultimately lead to
campaign around the world and Bangladesh s own efforts against human conflict.
trafficking, she said.
Climate Change and Bangladesh
Traffickers use 20 main points in 16 southern and south-western districts
of Bangladesh along the Indian border to run their illicit trade. The main
Because of its unique geographic, topographic, demographic and socio-
cross-border trafficking route is the Dhaka-Mumbai-Karachi-Dubai route.xlix
economic characteristics, Bangladesh is regarded as one of the most
Experts also believe that without devising meaningful collaborative
vulnerable countries in the world facing the adverse impacts of Climate
mechanisms among the countries in South Asia, it would be impossible to
stop cross-border flows of human trafficking. Joint efforts are to be made for
Many believe that the anticipated adverse affects of climate change (sea
effective prevention, rescue, and repatriation of the victims, and prosecution
level rise, higher temperatures, enhanced monsoon precipitation, and an
increase in cyclone intensity etc) will exacerbate the existing stresses that
Climate Change and Security:
already hinder development in Bangladesh.
The consequences of Climate Change- increased natural disaster, loss of
agricultural productivity, shortage of safe drinking water, sea level rise,
In the academic arena, Climate Change is now regarded as a major human
territorial, loss, salinity intrusion- may result into state s inability to function
security challenge. Climate change is a complex phenomenon and it affects
many aspects of human life- politics, economics, migration, human rights, and to provide services to its citizens. Then, the worst-case scenario would be
development, trade, and health. Analysts predict that Climate Change can the meltdown of the state machinery and the consequences would be
trigger conflict, instability and cause humanitarian crises. On the top of that, catastrophic. The impact of climate change on the national security of
Climate Change consequences may spill over state borders, and thereby Bangladesh was envisioned in a report published in the New York Times, on
result in possible trans-national tensions or worse. August 8, 2009:
Against the backdrop of globalization, unabated climate change is likely An exercise last December at the National Defense University, an
to overstretch the capacities of a still insufficient global governance system. educational institute that is overseen by the military, explored the potential
According to a GTZ study, climate change can heighten existing social and impact of a destructive flood in Bangladesh that sent hundreds of thousands
political tensions or can lead to new ones. State institutions already of refugees streaming into neighboring India, touching off religious conflict,
overstretched will come under additional pressure, and will find it the spread of contagious diseases and vast damage to infrastructure. It gets
increasingly difficult to perform elementary state tasks. Combined with real complicated real quickly, said Amanda J. Dory, the deputy assistant
growing environmental stress, this will impact the adaptive capacity of secretary of defense for strategy. lii
62 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 63
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC following changes have become a transnational problem and countries should be united to address
been observed in climate trends, variability and extreme events in the emerging negative consequences.
In Bangladesh, average temperature has registered an increasing trend of Water Security
about 1°C in May and 0.5°C in November during the 14 year period from
1985 to 1998. Water security of Bangladesh too has emerged as a transnational issue in
The annual mean rainfall exhibits increasing trends in Bangladesh. recent times. Bangladesh s water security concerns have two dynamics-
Decadal rain anomalies are above long term averages since 1960s. internal and external water security dimensions. The internal source of water
Serious and recurring floods have taken place during 2002, 2003, and 2004. insecurity of Bangladesh include; salinity encroachment, arsenic
Cyclones originating from the Bay of Bengal have been noted to decrease contamination, drawing down of underground fresh water reservoirs.
since 1970 but the intensity has increased. Bangladesh is an overly-populated country. Its huge population size and
Frequency of monsoon depressions and cyclones formation in Bay of extreme population density have made it difficult to sustain even a modest
Bengal has increased. economy. Bangladesh also has an agrarian economy although statistics show
Water shortages has been attributed to rapid urbanization and that its GDP dependence on agriculture has gone down over the past few
industrialization, population growth and inefficient water use, which are years. However, agriculture remains a key accommodating sector to its huge
aggravated by changing climate and its adverse impacts on demand, rural labour force. The entire agricultural sector of the country is highly
supply and water quality. dependent on fresh water for irrigation.
Salt water from the Bay of Bengal is reported to have penetrated 100 km The Himalayan River Basin countries- China, Bangladesh, India and
or more inland along tributary channels during the dry season. Nepal share a common ecology and river system. Being a lower riparian
The precipitation decline and droughts have resulted in the drying up of
wetlands and severe degradation of ecosystems.
Figure: Environmental Destruction, population migration and types of
Considering the scale and magnitude of the problem, it is assumed that
Climate Change and its consequences would pose serious threats to the
Bangladeshi state. Neighbouring countries would face the brunt of the spill-
over impact, i.e. mass migration, and conflict etc. in the event of such
Table: Dependency of major South Asian countries on trans-boundary
environmental catastrophe in Bangladesh. Therefore, Climate Change has
64 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 65
country, availability of river water in Bangladesh depends much on the flow transfers. Bangladesh has a large number of expatriate communities living in
of water from the upstream countries. Fifty four rivers enter Bangladesh from Gulf countries, Europe, other parts of Asia, and elsewhere. A segment of these
India carrying water. The availability of river water in Bangladesh, both wage-earner expatriates use the unofficial channel of Hundi to remit money
during the monsoon and the dry season, is determined by the level of water back home. Hundi is also a popular mode for fund transfers to terrorists, as
flow from upstream. Unilateral withdrawals of river water by up-stream such fund transfers most often leave no trace. Because of Hundi, the
countries will have severe impacts for Bangladesh. Government each year loses a huge amount in potential revenue earnings.
Various Indian reports reveal that the Government of India (GOI) is Other common financial crimes in Bangladesh arelviii:
actively planning to build a water dam on the Barak River in India.lv If the 1. Corruption- Abuse of public power or position for personal/ group gain.
GOI goes ahead and implements the proposed plan, it will generate severe 2. Tax evasion- Remaining outside the tax net, non-disclosure of actual
ecological consequences for Bangladesh. Analysts believe that the dam, income, non-payment of income tax, underhand agreements with the tax
popularly known as the Tipaimukh dam, on the Barak River would result authority, gross abuse of the tax holiday provisions etc.
into the drying up of the Surma and Kushiara Rivers.lvi 3. Loan defaulting- Intentional defaulting, siphoning off money from the
The GOI is also implementing its river linking project to link up major authorized ventures for which the loan was taken, etc.
rivers to hold up water in reservoirs and to channel it from the Northwest to 4. Regular fraud- Pyramid savings schemes, misleading overseas job
northern and southern India.lvii This is already a concern for Bangladeshis as seekers (recently local job seeking has also come under the net). Counterfeit
many believe it would further divert the current flow of water entering notes are also an area of concern.
Bangladesh from India. 5. Smuggling- An estimated amount of US Dollar 1 billion worth of
The proposed dam and the river linking project will render negative dutiable goods are smuggled each year into Bangladesh from India alone.
ecological and environmental changes. There is a high probability that if the
What is a financial crime ?
South Asian states do not address the water sharing issue conclusively, it will
eventually trigger intra-/inter-state conflict across the region. The scarcity of
The term Financial Crime expresses different concepts depending on the
water may generate movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
jurisdiction and on the context. In general, financial crime refers to any
Bangladesh and these IDPs may try to seek refuge and a livelihood beyond
non-violent crime which results in a financial gain to the perpetrators and
the state boundary. Since India virtually encircles Bangladesh from three
loss to others or the state. It includes a range of illegal activities such as:
sides, India is likely to experience an en masse influx of IDPs from Bangladesh.
Corruption (bribery, speed money, kickbacks etc.)
It would be important to examine another aspect of the problem - whether
Financial fraud (accounting, check, credit card, mortgage, insurance
the scarcity of water in this region will lead to inter-state conflict. Since all the
fraud, counterfeit notes, securities or investment fraud, computer fraud
countries in this region are facing acute water scarcity and are having
disputes over sharing of common river- water, there is an increased
probability that the crisis may escalate into conflict.
Circumvention of exchange restrictions
Illegal cross-border fund transfers or capital flight
Abuse of the financial system/institutions etc.
Many believe that Bangladesh is often considered as a safe haven for financial
crime. Hundi (also known as hawala), or a black market money exchange An appropriate legal framework is essential to stop financial crime.
procedure, is a commonly used mode of transaction for cross-border money Bangladesh has a number of legal regimes in place.lix The Bangladesh Penal
66 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 67
Code, Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 (FERA), Income Tax Bangladesh is considered a low HIV/AIDS prevalent country. WHO
Ordinance, 1984, Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 (MLPA) and Anti- estimates that there are 13,000 HIV-positive people in the country and that
Corruption Commission (ACC) Act, 2004 are the laws designed to prevent HIV prevalence rate among adult population is less than 0.01%. Nevertheless,
such crimes. The cumulative impact of globalisation and technology has the country is highly vulnerable as it has in India a neighbouring country
made financial sector very much susceptible to financial crime. Therefore, which hosts over 2.5 million HIV positives (UNAIDS estimate). According to
trans-national collaboration is important in this regard. WHO, the presence of covert multi-partner sexual activity and denial, the low
Money laundering has become a serious concern for Bangladesh in the level of knowledge and low condom use, unsafe professional blood
current period. Terrorist groups use the means of money laundering for donations, lack of a desirable environment and violation of Human Rights, all
financing terrorist and militant activities. It is reported that every year huge may lead to an outbreak of HIV in Bangladesh.lxii
amounts of funds are raised in the Gulf countries in the name of charitable Bangladesh is one of the world s most densely populated countries. The
organisations and the fund raiser, often sympathisers to terror groups, have high population density means rapid spread of infectious diseases in case of
recourse to money laundering for bringing the funds to Bangladesh. The an outbreak. Moreover, the high frequency of natural calamities like floods
Money Laundering Prevention Act-2002 came into force on April 5, 2002 with and cyclones in Bangladesh makes it more susceptible to pandemic
the aim of preventing money laundering.lx Some key aspects of this law are: outbreaks. Many believe that in case of any large-scale movement of
Central Bank of Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Bank, can conduct internally displaced people, fleeing from the affected area of the outbreak,
investigations into any alleged crime of money laundering. Bangladesh will lack any strategic depth (owing to its small size) to
Bangladesh Bank will observe and supervise all financial activities. accommodate such people internally.lxiii Naturally, the IDPs would in that
Establishment of a money laundering court. case try to enter India. Again, it would be reasonable to assume that, in the
Legal seizure of property. face of such an event, India might not allow people from Bangladesh to enter
Provision of punishment for violating the law.
its territory en masse. This impasse may lead to regional conflict.
Government can enter into agreements with a foreign country.
In 1997, the US Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force prepared a
In today s world epidemic diseases are considered as serious threats to
report for the US Department of Defense on DOD Responses to Transnational
national and international security. A study conducted in 1995 revealed that
Threats. Thought it looked into the problem primarily in the context of
emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, especially AIDS, constituted a
transnational terrorism, the Task Force identified three advantages that the
national security threat and a foreign policy challenge. However, when the
transnational actors have: 1) they can have ready access to resources they
UN Security Council held a session on AIDS in Africa and proclaimed that it
posed a serious threat to regional stability and security, the linkages between need; 2) they cannot easily be deterred as they have no specific homeland;
infectious disease and security came to forefront.lxi and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organisational, legal or
Country Cases Deaths % Dead Frequency The task force recommended that the DOD should address transnational
Bangladesh 371 4 1.08% 1 in 93 security threats, an increasingly important class of threats, as a major DOD
India 7012 220 3.14% 1 in 32 mission, and should use existing national security structures and processes to
Nepal 31 1 3.23% 1 in 31 face the challenges. It shows that the transnational security problems are
H1N1 in South Asia: Death Rate per Infection serious threats to nations. Because of the transnational nature of the
Source: www.flucount.org problems, no single state can fight unilaterally against such threats.
68 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 ANM Muniruzzaman Transnational Security- Challenges and Threats Facing Bangladesh 69
In recent times, transnational security problems have been burgeoning in References:
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i David Fidler, Laurie Garrett, Peter Bergen and Dawn Hewett, Report of the Working
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planners can adopt the following measures to establish a common platform
iii Paul J. Smith, Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?
to counteract the transnational security challenges facing Bangladesh. Parameters, Autumn, 2000.
Capacity building of the states: The South Asian states do not have the iv Ibid.
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Strategies, Chapter 1, Special Report of Department of Defense, 2008
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ix The Daily Star, 25 August, 2004.
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xviii B. Raman, op. cit.
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accessed on 31 December, 2009.
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transnational security threats will prove to be a big leap forward to face the xxiv South Asia Terrorism Portal.
challenges. International organizations also have an important role to play in
xxvi The Daily Star, 30 May, 2006.
bringing states to a common platform to address the challenges and in xxvii The Daily Star, 19 February, 2009.
developing effective and comprehensive solutions to those challenges. xxviii Ibid.
xxix The Daily Star, 30 May, 2006.
xxxi The Daily Star, 22 May, 2009.
70 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Peace and Security Review
Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011, pp. 71-92
xxxii Official website of Bangladesh Police.
xxxiii Brig Gen Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd), The author is Editor, Defense and
Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.
xxxiv Dhiraj Kumar Nath, The challenge of containing drug abuse by 2008, The Daily Star, 12
xxxv Department of Narcotic Control (DNC), Bangladesh.
xxxvi International Narcotic control Strategy Report, Volume 1, Year 2008, United States
Department of State.
The Aspect of External Support in
xxxvii DNC, Bangladesh. Insurgency/Terrorism & Proposed Regional
xxxviii The New Age, 30 December, 2009.
Mechanism for its Diffusion
xxxix International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Annual Report 2008.
xl Official website of Bangladesh Police. (The Nepalese Experience)
xli The Daily Star, 8 February, 2010. Dilip SJB Rana*
xlii http://www.dnc.gov.bd/route.html accessed on 15 May, 2009.
xliii DNC, Bangladesh.
xliv Indian Express, 12 January, 2010.
xlv Revisiting the Human Trafficking Paradigm: The Bangladesh Experience; Trafficking
xlvi http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/June/human-trafficking-in- The 10-year-long People s War as an integral and central part of the
bangladesh.html accessed on 17 August, 2009.
Nepalese Maoist Movement in Nepal is perhaps the worst upheaval that the
xlviii Associated Press, May 06, 2009. Nepalese people had to endure after the Anglo-Nepali War of 1814-1816. The
xlix http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_37/04.htm accessed on 17 August, 2009. Anglo-Nepali war being of the conventional nature mostly affected the
l http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/June/human-trafficking-in- armed forces of Nepal and British India; but the people in general were not
bangladesh.html accessed on 17 August, 2009.
affected much. However, the Nepalese Maoist Movement being an
li GTZ, Climate Change and Security Challenges for German Development Cooperation,
Eschborn,April 2008,p.7. insurgency and based on utter violence and ruthless perpetuation of terror,
lii The New York Times, August 8,2009. and with no boundary line drawn between the Maoist combatants and the
liii Ashok Swain, The Environmental Trap: The Ganges River Diversion, Bangladeshi State security forces in contrast to cases of conventional warfare, it became the
Migration and Conflicts in India (Department of Peace and Conflict research, Uppasala
cause of great suffering for the general Nepalese people in almost 70% of the
University, Sweden, 1996) p.20.
liv Aquastat, Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN. Nepalese countryside. It had the most profound traumatic effect on the
lv Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, India, Bangladesh and Tipaimukh Dam . Institute of Peace & population as such where even the women and the children failed to remain
Conflict Studies (IPCS). <http://ipcs.org/article/india/india-bangladesh-and- untouched.
tipaimukh-dam-2945.html>. Accessed on January 2, 2010.
Prominent writers on such phenomenon as insurgency point out that the
principal elements in any insurgency include aspects such as Leadership,
Objectives, Ideology, External Support, Timings, Environment/Geography,
* Mr. Dilip SJB Rana is a career military officer with 36 years of service in the Nepal Army till his
retirement in 2008as GOC, Western Division, NA. He holds a post-graduate certificate from
National Defense College, New Delhi, India and also a Masters Degree in Political Science from
Trivuban University, Kathmandu, Nepal. Mr. Rana is also a graduate of Command and General
Staff Course from CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, USA. Currently, Mr. Rana is employed as a Research
Fellow at the Sangam Institute of Strategic Studies and Policy Analysis.
72 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 73
Organization and Tactics etc. The socio-economic differences and counts because of the reason mentioned above. From the military perspective,
deprivations in the Nepalese society and ethnic diversity in the it requires a minimum of three times the strength of the defenders for an
heterogeneous composition of the people formed the Cause for the Maoist attacker in order to be successful, provided that the attackers are well
movement in Nepal replicating the situations as existed in India for the supported by artillery fire and the weapon systems of both the antagonists
Naxalite movement. The movement found the leadership elements in such are at par. None of the major Maoist attacks were ever supported by artillery
persons as Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Dr. Baburam Bhattari and Mohan Vaidya fire and the weapons of the Maoists were far inferior both in quality and
etc. The inept political leadership, especially from 1990 onwards, created a numbers compared to those of the security forces. However, the Maoists
fertile ground for the Maoist movement to gain momentum steadily and the compensated for these deficiencies by employing far too many numerical
difficult and rugged Nepali mountainous terrain was most favourable for numbers of their combatants and supporting militias to gain tactical
conducting their covert operations. The Outside Support part came from advantage as envisaged in the human wave attacks that Mao Tse-Tung
the Nepalese Maoist leadership enjoying asylum and shelter in India for followed during the course of the peasant s revolution in China against the
most of the 10 years of the insurgency period along with the mutual Kuomintang government forces.
cooperation and support that the Maoist leadership was successful in During the February 2002 Maoist attack in Achham district,
garnering with many of the regional underground elements operating in the simultaneously targeting Mangalsen and Sanphebagar, 5 brigade HQ of the
South Asian region, mainly in India, and also with some like-minded then Royal Nepal Army at Dipayal, Doti district, has the estimate that the
international organizations including regional terrorist organizations. Maoist employed approximately 5,000 personnel including their hardcore
The Maoist movement in Nepal has been a big surprise for not only the combatants, supporting militias and a large number of porters made up from
Nepali people but also for the people of the South Asian region due to its various outlying villages in the Far-Western as well as Mid-Western regions.
rapid development, intensity of violence and ruthless perpetuation of terror.1 In such a scenario, it is quite evident that the Maoist loss of lives could have
From its inception in 1996 to the period of 2004, this movement had already been tremendous even if they achieved a local tactical victory. SD Muni writes
claimed the lives of nearly 10,000 Nepalese people and had been a big blow that In these seven years long operations, the Maoists lost until February
to the fragile economy of a poor nation like Nepal.2 The total loss of lives lost 2001, some 1,500 hardcore and other cadres. Included among them were the
during the Nepalese insurgency period is estimated to be around 16,000 as members of the Party s Politburo and Central Committee, high ranking
per the latest government report. The exact figure of the death toll is difficult women cadres and even children .3 He further adds that the Maoists
to calculate because the Maoist combatants were accused of hiding the beheaded their slain leaders in the areas of operation to avoid their
number of their casualties by taking away the bodies of their dead comrades identification by the government forces. The killings were brutal and carried
and disposing them in secret places in order to give the impression, for out without any consideration for human rights .4 Muni writes that in last
reasons of morale of their combatants and tactical advantage, that they did one year of the civil war, out of a total number of 4,366 persons killed, 4,050
not suffer much during their major confrontations with government security have been Maoists. Thus it can be surmised that the Maoist toll in lives has
forces. far superseded those of the security forces in all the encounters despite a
The Nepal army s assertion that in the entire major Maoist attacks on number of tactical gains that the Maoists were able to achieve.
various field-fortifications of the security forces, the Maoists have suffered Apart from the loss of human lives the Maoist insurgency has done the
very heavy casualties sounds quite credible in spite of lesser number of body greatest possible damage to the economy and the development of the country.
1 Rana, Dilip. The Nepalese Maoist Movement in the Context of Terrorism in South Asia . A 3 Muni, SD. Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The challenge & the Response. Rupa & Co, New
thesis submitted to the National Defense College, New Delhi, 2004, p.1. Delhi, 2003, p. 36.
2 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 30 August 2004. 4 Ibid.
74 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 75
During the course of the insurgency, numerous infrastructures like roads, one in unifying the efforts of the Nepalese Maoists with those of other
bridges, government office buildings, power plants, historical sites, road regional radical organizations operating in South Asia, especially those with
construction sites, private factories and even hospitals have been attacked Indian radicals. The Nepal Communist Party (Masal) was the first Maoist
and damaged. The capture of private properties, the forced donation drives, party of Nepal that became the member of the RIM from as far back as 1984.5
the numerous demands and strikes in factories by the sister labor Andrew Nickson writes that Babu Ram Bhattarai was RIM's main contact in
organizations of Maoist Party and numerous Bandhs and Hartals had the Nepal since 1992.6 Both Masal and the Unity Center thus represented Nepal
worst possible effects in the production sector, trade and commerce, thereby in RIM.7 In 1996, Masal was expelled from RIM because of differences, among
hampering the overall economy of the country. Because of such activities, other things, over the RIM committee's support to the CPN (Maoist), which
tourism, which was in the past a major component of the national economy remains the only Nepali Communist party within RIM at present.8
has also suffered greatly. The tangible evidence that the NCP (Maoist) is being supported by RIM is
The reverberating ill-effects of the unfortunate insurgency can still be felt the publishing of NCP (Maoist) movements in Nepal in its journal, A World
at present with a population now having no respect for law and order in the to Win , which is also published in Nepali.9 And then, 'Prachanda' refers
country, the migration trend increasing on account of ethnic agitation due to appreciatively of RIM in his published paper The Great Leap Forward: An
the Maoists fanning the ethnic fire in the past for their vested Inevitable Need of History that was adopted by the CPN (Maoist)'s Second
political/military gains, the criminalization of politics and the politicization National Conference in February 2001 in the following words. ".... Now,
of criminal activities, the fraudulent and irresponsible behavior of politicians, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is there as an ideological foundation for the
total disregard of human rights and the political culture of impunity, creation of a new Communist International. All the communist
environmental degradation in a massive scale, not to mention the social, revolutionaries need to march forward seriously to give it an organized form
cultural, economic and political degradation, all of which seems to be through class and ideological struggle. Today RIM has already emerged as an
pushing the country to the brink of another possible disaster. embryo of it. Everybody has to attempt to refine and develop it. Special
attention must be paid to conducting discussions and interactions with the
Aim revolutionaries outside RIM and uniting them in the movement... 10 Further
down in the paper, 'Prachanda' also acknowledged the role of the 'high level
It is in such a background this paper endeavors to explain the type and effect of theoretical interaction with the RIM committee in the development of the
of the component of external support in the Nepalese Maoist insurgency in 'so called' "Prachanda Path".11
Nepal based on the Nepalese experience of the counter-insurgency The RIM is a worldwide grouping of revolutionary parties committed to
operations conducted by the state and to suggest a possible regional counter the 'scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism-MaoTseTung Thought'. Its
measure to be adopted by all member countries of SAARC since this is a origin can be found in the first international conference of Maoist parties held
common malaise being faced by all SAARC countries in one form or the other at an unspecified location in the autumn of 1980. It was during the second
as the South Asian region seems to be a hub for all violent activities of various conference in London in March 1984 that RIM was formed. The task it laid
dimensions. 5 Thapa, D with Sijapati, B. A Kingdom under Siege. Kathmandu, 2003, p.27.
Role of RIM
Ibid. pp. 28-29.
The external support provided by the Revolutionary Internationalist 10 Thapa with Sijapati, n.5, pp.28-29.
Movement (RIM) to the Nepalese Maoist movement was a very significant 11 Ibid.
76 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 77
before itself was to 'hasten the development of the world revolution the Nepal is critical to India's security, particularly in the background of already
overthrow of imperialism and reaction by the proletariat and the established links between Nepali Maoists on the one hand with Indian
revolutionary masses; the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat insurgents, as well as the LTTE of Sri Lanka on the other. Therefore, India has
in accordance with the necessary stages and alliances in different countries; to extend all other support to Nepal."15
and the struggle to eliminate all the material and ideological vestiges of Even the naming of the Maoists' strategy of 'people's war' as "Prachanda
exploiting society and thus achieve classless society, communism, throughout Path' indicates that the movement has tried to a great extent to emulate Peru's
the world'.12 Now, if the extremist Nepalese party and organization, whose Sendero Luminoso or ' The Shining Path', where the Maoists have followed
origin and development is much later than those of the Indian counterparts, the same strategy in Nepal as the 'Shining Path' did in Peru.16 Comrade
can thus become the member of the RIM, it is quite logical to assume that the 'Prachanda' explaining the contribution of RIM in external exposure of the
radical leftist Maoist parties and organizations of India should also have been Maoist movement said, There was important ideological and political
the members of the RIM. exchange. From the RIM committee we got the experiences of the PCP's
In fact, Mr. Babu Ram Bhattarai's association with such organizations in (Communist Party of PERU) two-line struggle there, and also the experience
India during his study period at the JNU could well have made it possible for in Turkey, the experience in Iran and the experience in the Philippines. We
him to reach out to the RIM through his associations with the Indian radical learned from the experience in Bangladesh and from some experience in Sri
Maoist organizations. In the words of SD Muni, 'It may be useful to keep in Lanka. At the same time we were also having direct and continuous debate
mind that both the Maoist leaders, Babu Ram Bhattarai and 'Prachanda' have with the Indian communists, mainly from the People's War Group (PWG) and
had their early socialization in the revolutionary politics of India; the former Maoist Communist Center (MCC) group. And this helped in one way or
in mobilizing Nepali migrant workers in New Delhi and the latter in another to understand the whole process of People's War."17
Darjeeling, fighting the cause of estate laborers on tea gardens.13 It is just not
a coincidence that these two are conducting the so called 'People's War' in Role of the Regional Radical Organizations
Nepal while staying underground in India where they can be in constant
touch with the Indian radicals to be able to coordinate the regional strategy It is important to study and analyze the origin of the radical Communist
along with their thrust in Nepal. parties of India after their split from their parent organization and relate the
Muni further writes International contacts have also led the Maoists to events with similar pattern of split and origin of the Communist Party of
establish a coordinating mechanism with their other South Asian colleagues. Nepal (Maoists) in 1995 so that a discernable linkage between the radical
There were reports in June 2001saying that the Maoist groups of Nepal, India, Communist parties of India and that of Nepal may be established. The
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have come together by setting up the Nepalese Maoist leadership s sojourn in India for most part of the period of
CCOMPOSA. This was done to advance the cause of the 'people's war' in the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and their activities will also be portrayed and
India and Nepal. One cannot say with certainty if it was due to this presented so that their linkages with foreign elements in the South Asian
mechanism that the November 2001 attacks in Nepal were closely followed region as well as with like-minded international organizations will be
by similar extremist activities in India's Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and Andhra established. The reasons for the migration of the Nepalese Maoist leadership
Pradesh states."14 The last sentence seems to be an attempt to turn a blind eye to Nepal from their safe haven in India in 2005, along with pertinent
to an existing reality. He, however, adds, " However, internal stability of contemporary violent Indian Maoist activities in various parts of India is
12 Thapa with Sijapati, n.5,p. 21. 15 Ibid. p. 56.
13 SD Muni, The Maoist Challenge in Nepal , AAKROSH, Vol.5, No.14, p.52. 16 Muni, n.13, pp.47-48
14 Muni, n.13, p.48. 17 SD Muni, n.13, p.48.
78 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 79
explored in order to identify the general pattern of movement of the Maoists movement, which came to be known later as the Naxalite movement. It can
of both the countries. be noted here that the same thing happened with the Nepalese Maoists when
they split up from its parent organization, the United People s Communist
Origin of the Radical Communist Organizations in India Front (UPCN) in 1995. This movement followed the Maoist concept of
violence as the means of revolution and was even criticized by its own parent
The origin of the Communist Party of India (CPI) can be traced back to 1921 organization, the CPI (M) from which the spilt had taken place. In this
A.D.18 This Party gained its proper status after the Kanpur Summit" of backdrop, Mr. Mazumdar formed the more extremist faction of the
1925.19 Right after independence in India in 1947, the CPI is recorded to have organization called the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) or CPI (ML) under his own
started violent communist agitation in India starting from the Telangana area leadership in 1969.26 This faction followed the guiding principles of
of Hyderabad with approximately 300 guerilla cadres.20 Similarly, West Chairman Mao and was organized into the following three groups with the
Bengal, Bombay, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Travanskar, Tripura and special common objective of establishing "the dictatorship of the proletariat" as
areas of Manipur were also rocked with violent movements of the same against the elected government: -
nature.21 The Indian government launched a determined counter-insurgency (a) The Party
operation against these movements and was able to restore the situation back (b) The Militia
to normal by 1951.22 (c) United Front
The CPI lay low for the next 10 years or so after that. The party was It can be noticed here that the Nepalese Maoists were also organized in
reorganizing during that time period. However, the CPI split up into two more or less the very same lines. The Naxalite movement was directed
main factions, the CPI and the CPI (Marxist), or CPI (M) in 1964 on against the rich farmers in the core area of Naxalbari in West Bengal in which
ideological grounds and under the influence of the former Soviet Union and approximately 15,000 poor farmers had resorted to violent means. The West
the People s Republic of China.23 The CPI was aligned in the lines and Bengal government reacted strongly against this movement and it took the
philosophies of the former Soviet Union and followed the path of the national next 3 years to bring back the situation to normalcy.27
congress along constitutional lines. The CPI (M), on the other hand, followed One distinct effect of the Naxalite movement was felt in Eastern Nepal in
the path of the Maoist philosophy but remaining within the Indian the district of Jhapa. An underground communist faction surfacing as the
Constitutional framework until 1967.24 "Jhapali Gut" waged a similar type of violent movement in Jhapa during the
The more hardcore elements within the CPI (M), however, charged the late sixties.28 It was, however, curbed with strong and timely Nepalese
party for following a "revisionist" policy and rebelled in 1967 against its government actions since it was a movement in isolation with limited
These hardcore elements were influenced with the support from the Naxalites. But one point clearly stands out of this incident
Cultural Revolution that took place in China and were motivated towards the that contrary to the academic fashion of pointing the causes of such radical
path of violence. Mr. Charu Mazumdar took up the leadership of this movements to economic deprivations or disparity-- for the district of Jhapa
was one of the highest food producing district in Nepal and economically far
18 Dasgupta, B. The Naxalite Movement. Bombay, 1974, p.15.
19 Ibid. better off than many other districts it is seen that such movements are also
20 Ibid. p.16. encouraged due to proximity of similar agitations and can be more of a
21 Jawaid, S. The Naxalite Movement in India. New Delhi, 1979, p.22. phenomenon of migration with the aim to gain political power and increasing
22 Dasgupta. op cit. pp.7-12.
23 Ram, M. Indian communism: Split within a Split. New Delhi, 1974, pp.159-210. 26 Ibid. pp.32-35.
24 Ibid. 27 Dasgupta, n.18, p.26.
25 Dasgupta.op cit. pp7-12. 28 SD Muni, The Maoist challenge in Nepal , AAKROSH, Vol.5, No.14, Jan 2002, p.48.
80 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 81
areas of influence rather than the stated aim of setting right socio-economic structure based only on ethnic lines without any due thoughts to the aspect
imbalances or any such radical rhetoric.29 It should not be forgotten that such of sustainability of the State Units can be a recipe of future instability and
movements had not occurred in Nepal even during the 104 years of the Rana vulnerability, which the Nepalese Maoists with firm ideological beliefs can
regime, a period distinct in socio-political disparity. exploit more easily on their lines of the People s War as opposed to a much
The radical organization of the Naxalites underwent a further division stronger unified unitary state structure as Nepal had in the recent past. The
after the death of its leader, Mr. Mazumdar in 1972. The Naxalites were then Maoist strategy of encircling cities by having hold around the countryside is
divided into three distinct factions, the People s War Group (PWG), the likely to be easier in such a scenario. It is a pity that the carrot the Maoists
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Unity hung in front of Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala, the long time PM of Nepal, by
Center), each with its own core and peripheral areas of influence and promising him the first Presidency of a New Nepal (which they later
ideologies. revoked) swayed the old man to acquiesce and in the process the Nepali
However, twenty-nine years later, on 7th of October 1998, the PWG and Congress Party reversed its earlier stand of a Unitary system of governance
the CPI (Unity Center) merged together to form what is known today as in Nepal and accepted the Maoist proposal of the federal system of
Communist party of India (ML-PW) or just PWG in short. Since Jharkhand governance. It seems that the sheer and stupid ambition of Mr. Girija Prasad
and the Palamu areas of Bihar were the activity areas of CPI (Unity Center) Koirala to prove that he was a better statesman and a politician than his own
prior to the merger with the PWG, it was but natural for the PWG to extend charismatic and visionary brother, Mr. BP Koirala (megalomania or infantile
its violent activities in Bihar as well once the merger took place. This fact sibling rivalry?), seems to be at the bottom of all these idiosyncrasies. Sadly,
illustrates that extremist organizations can make mergers if it gives them a other parties joined the same bandwagon after Girija s overturn in this regard
tactical advantage of increasing their areas of influence.30 So, such mergers without much thought to a possible future Maoist action.
can also take a new form transcending national borders for commonality of The PWG's movement in the eighties suffered a great setback because of
aims and purposes. the strong and relentless government actions launched against them,
It should be remembered that the PWG had declared its unity and full especially in 1985 and 1991. As a result, even though the PWG had the
support to various other violent movements launched in Kashmir, Nagaland, declared objective of consolidating the areas from Telangana to
Mizoram, and Manipur including the movements for the demand of Dandakaranya and take them to further heights, the fact remained that their
Bodoland and Gorkhaland in the past. This support was provided in the position at that period had been relegated to the stage of strategic defense.
name of movements for national liberation. This illustrates that even the However, a resurgence of violent activities by MCC and the PWG in their
disintegration of Union of India is acceptable to the radicals as long as they areas of influence, after the start of the new century, is seen to be well timed
gain political power, which they cannot gain through the democratic electoral with the violent activities of the Nepalese Maoists in Nepal.31 This was much
process. Such a policy can be understood to have been followed by the Indian unlikely to be a mere coincidence when all the Nepalese Maoist leadership
radicals with the view that a fragmented India would be more congenial for was stationed in India at that period.
the radicals to launch their violent movements and gain more influence than
a strong and unified India. THE MCC
The above aspect provides insight as to why the NCP (Maoist) were all the
time demanding a republican form of governance in Nepal as one of their The MCC was formed in 20 October 1969. It is an extremist Communist
major demand and that too based on ethnic lines. A fragmented state faction whose aim is to establish ' the dictatorship of the proletariat' by means
29 Dilip Rana, n.1, p.8. 31 PV Ramana, Advantage People s War group , Institute of Peace and conflict Management,
30 Ibid. Art.1061, 18 June 2003, pp.2-3.
82 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 83
of protracted peoples war" and peasant revolution. The NCP (Maoist) s the LITTE that both learned the technologies of complicated land mining and
stated aim also coincides hundred percent with that of the MCC. So, this Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) detonations using sophisticated
cannot be a coincidence and the inference can be drawn that the NCP (Maoist) techniques for detonation. The Nepalese Maoists had also been
leadership during their sojourn in India had formed a nexus with such radical demonstrating excellence in the use of such detonating devices and it points
underground organizations like the MCC and the PWG to wage a joint to the fact that they, in turn, learnt these techniques from these 'fraternal'
struggle in the respective two countries complimenting the activities of each terrorist organizations, mainly the MCC and the PWG because of the
other. 'proximity' of their areas of interest and a common Maoism based
The extremist faction of the Indian communists came into existence revolutionary fervor.36
because of the splitting that occurred in the CPI in 1964 and the further split
that took place in the CPI (M-L) that was headed by Mr. Charu Mazumdar in The People’s War Group (PWG)
1969.32 One faction of the CPI (ML) revolted against Charu Mazumdar and
formed the MCC on more violent ideological grounds based on Maoist Once the CPI disintegrated in the early seventies, various extremist factions
philosophies and principles.33 of the CPI tried the process of reintegration on ideological grounds. The State
The MCC's source of inspiration was mainly the violent Naxalite Committees of CPI (ML) in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu along with a
movement and it made the state of Bihar its main area of operation and has horde of other split-up groups were able to regroup finally to form the "
been targeting the Bihari landlords, the Ranaveer Sena, which was formed for Peoples' War Group " on 22 April, 1980. The PWG's terrorism is based on
the protection of the landlords, along with the security elements of the state 'ideological terrorism' where their thrust is on class based violent movement
government. with the stated aim of establishing a new people's democracy'.37 The
The MCC has patented the rich landlords as ' class enemies' and have similarity of the NCP (Maoist) s stated aim of establishing a new democracy
carried out mass murders in the name of protecting the rights and welfare of in a New Nepal cannot escape scrutiny in this regard. It can, thus, be seen
the peasants. Such atrocities have also been committed by the Nepalese that there is nothing new in the propagated Prachanda Path concept of the
Maoists including capturing of private properties. This faction has also made Nepalese Maoist leadership except for the already established concepts being
frequent calls to all extremist leftist factions to organize and come under a followed by the Indian Maoists, which Pushpa Kamal Dahal has endeavored
common umbrella for effective coordination and actions.34 So there is very to copy and propagate as his new concept.
little doubt to assume that the NCP (Maoist) leadership has also effectively The aim of this Group is two fold in nature. Firstly, it is to establish a social
reciprocated to such a call. As per SD Muni, the MCC has lent 'full support' revolutionary order with the means of people s war" and finally to
to the so-called 'Maoist movement' in Nepal and has been cooperating with consolidate the gains to form a communist regime. An aim typically copied
and assisting the latter to the best possible extent.35 Similar to the Nepalese by the Nepalese Maoists as the NCP (Maoist) follows the same footstep. The
Maoists, the MCC is also engaged fully in increasing its base areas by PWG has been conducting its armed rebellion mainly in Andhra Pradesh and
boycotting the electoral process of the country. It is a well-established fact that in some regions of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The PWG traces its
the PWG and the MCC had secret relations with the LITTE and it was from origin to 1972 after the death of Mr. Charu Mazumdar, the leader of the
Naxalite movement, when the Naxalites split-up into three different factions
32 Dilip Rana, n.1, p.9.
33 Ibid. 36 P Gautam, Interventions , Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and Naga Insurgency in India: Their
34 PV Ramana, PWG s Emerging New Global Linkages , IPCS, Art.1303, 11 February 2004, Ramification. Proceedings of a Seminar held at Nakuchia Tal, Uttaranchal, on May 2-3, 2003,
pp.3-4. Press Institute of India, pp.5-6.
35 Muni, n.3, p.22. 37 Dilip Rana, n.1, p.11.
84 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 85
known as the PWG, the MCC and CPI (Unity Center). On 7th October 1998, the resurgence of violent activities by both the MCC and the PWG in India.
the PWG and the CPI (Unity Center) merged to form the present day CPI This was the result of an attempt by Maoists of South Asia to institutionalize
(ML-PW) and thus enabling the PWG to extend its violent activities to their contacts developed through the Revolutionary International Movement
various parts of Bihar as well. This development points to the new solidarity (RIM).40 The stated objective of this organization is to " Unify and coordinate
that exists between like-minded terrorist organizations, specially the MCC the activities of the Maoist parties and Organizations in South Asia".41 For
and the PWG in particular.38 Today, the PWG has the declared aim of the first time, CCOMPOSA has brought all the terrorist organizations of
extending their influence from Telangana to Dandakaryanya and to take South Asia under a single umbrella. As a result, the actions of the so-called
them to a further height. people's war have become more effective and damaging to both Nepal and
The fact that the Nepalese Maoist leadership was collocated in India at this India. The following 10 parties and organizations professing Maoist beliefs in
period, the employment of sophisticated methods of IED devices by the South Asia became the first members of CCOMPOSA;42 -
Maoist insurgents in Nepal (definitely learned from the PWG and the MCC),
the similarity of aims, objectives and modus operandi of the three Purbo Banglar Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punargathan Kendra)
underground organizations, the simultaneous rise in violent activities of all Bangladesh Samyabadi Dal (ML)
these organizations both in India and Nepal at that period, all point out to the Communist Party of Cyclone (Maoist)
fact that the NCP (Maoist) had formed a nexus with such radical Communist Party of India (M-L) (Naxalbari)
underground organizations in South Asia and were waging their violent Communist Party of India (ML-PW)
activities in a well coordinated manner, complimenting each other s efforts in Maoist Communist Center
the region. Revolutionary Communist Center of India (MLM)
Revolutionary Communist Center of India (Maoist)
The Regional Setting Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
The above-mentioned findings and facts should be corroborated with the On October 17, 2001, the members of the CCOMPOSA issued a joint
regional environment that existed in the South Asian region after the statement in which " the People's War led by the CPN (Maoist) " was hailed
formation of the Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and and claimed that the base areas in India and Nepal will further be created,
Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) in June 2001. Such a Committee expanded and strengthened and expressed their determination and
seems to be the outcome of the MCC s call, as already mentioned above, to all dedication to create South Asian Region as a focal point of world revolution
extremist leftist factions to organize and come under a common umbrella for and to follow the strategy of consolidating the people's liberation movement
effective coordination and action.39 in the region with Maoist revolution. They also called on all revolutionary
forces of the South Asian region to resist the American intervention in
The CCOMPOSA Afghanistan in a united manner. CCOMPOSA also attacked the governing
Bharatia Janata Party of the period as Hindu fascist BJP in India and threats
The formation of the CCOMPOSA in June 2001 was an important posed by Indian expansionists to Bhutan and Bangladesh ".43 It further
development in view of the movements of the NCP (Maoists) in Nepal and
40 Muni, n.13, p.48.
38 PV Ramana, Cross-country Left-wing Network is Real , IPCS, Art.833, 15 August 2002, 41 Muni, n.3, p.22.
pp.2-4. 42 Ibid.
39 PV Ramana, n.34, pp.3-4. 43 Muni, n.3, pp.22-23.
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asserted that the Maoist revolutionary preparation in Sri Lanka was almost answer they got from India was that Nepal should first point out where in
completed and such preparations in Bangladesh were gaining momentum. It India were those Maoist leaders located and then they will apprehend the
is now fully ascertained that the NCP (Maoist) was in close contact with all leaders.46 It is hard to believe that the esteemed Research and Analysis Wing
the underground radical organizations of South Asia and was an active (RAW), the intelligence organization of India, which printed the locations
member of the CCOMPOSA, coordinating its efforts with other radical including the name of streets of the alleged Pakistani ISI (Pakistani
organizations, mainly, the MCC and the PWG. Intelligence) operatives operating from Kathmandu in activities detrimental
The objectives of CCOMPOSA can be seen as providing necessary to Indian security through the Indian Magazine, India Today, in 2000, was
assistance as well as to garner moral, financial, physical and political support unable to locate the whereabouts of the Nepalese Maoist leaders operating
from allied-organizations in India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal and from India, when at present, the Maoist leaders themselves after coming
from those launching 'so called' liberation movements in the region for overboard have admitted that they were all operating from New Delhi and its
bringing the 'people's war' to a decisive mode in the shortest possible time. peripheral areas like Gaziabad, Noida and Gurgaon etc,. So the analysis of
The Maoists of both India and Nepal under the CCOMPOSA are seen to have some Nepalese analysts that the Nepalese Maoists were provided, if not
formulated the strategy to establish nexus with ethnic and separatist forces in active, but then definitely some passive support from the South Block in New
the region by floating the slogan that that the 'people's war' is anti Delhi for the Nepalese government not succumbing to certain Indian
expansionist and anti imperialistic and that regional and ethnic autonomy is demands as a reward for bringing the political change in Nepal in 1990, holds
guaranteed under the 'New People's Democracy'. much water.
The CCOMPOSA also aims at establishing a 'Compact Revolutionary In fact, such demands are alleged to have been made by India to the HMG
Zone' (CRZ) that will join Nepal with parts of India in Bihar, Jharkhand and of Nepal on April 17, 1990 during the period of the Indian embargo imposed
stretching up to Andhra Pradesh to link up with areas under the influence of over Nepal, allegedly for an Indian support for the continuation of the
the PWG.44 SD Muni writes "This zone, if established, can become the base Panchayati regime. Copies of the alleged demand drafts are attached in
for launching a people's war in the whole of India and even in South Asia. Appendices A and B . It is maintained in some scholarly circles in Nepal
This networking with other South Asian Maoist Parties, particularly those in that King Birendra rejected these demands outright in Nepal s interests and
India, has surely provided support to the Nepal Maoists in their current sovereignty, and as a result, the Panchayati political regime underwent a
People's War ".45 So, the nexus of the Nepalese Maoists with the radical change due to the Jana Andolan-I the same year, in which the Nepali
organizations of the South Asian region is thus fully established. Congress and its arch rivals, the leftist parties had joined hands for the first
time in the Nepalese political history for a joint movement against the
Initial Indian Government Support to the Nepalese Maoists Panchayati regime. So, it is very possible that the Indian South Block could
have placed the same demands to the political system re-established as part
Now, the vital question of why India was doing nothing to apprehend the of the reward for Indian support. But, the nature of the demands is such that
Nepalese Maoist leadership during the peak of the insurgency period has to no self-respecting nation can agree to without fermenting huge public outcry.
be tackled. It is alleged by officials of the Nepalese Foreign Ministry of that So, the allegation that the South Block supported to some extent the Nepalese
period that Nepal had requested the government of India to search and Maoist movement, at least for a good part of the initial period, in order to
apprehend the Maoist leaders operating from the soil of India; and, the apply pressure tactics on the Nepalese government cannot be discarded
44 BS Laishram, "Fighting Naxals: Time to Go Beyond Law and Order Perspective", IPCS, Art.
1321, 27 February 2004, pp. 4-5. 46 Interview with Mr.Bekh Bahadur Thapa, Former Nepalese Ambassador to India, 30 August
45 Muni, n.3, p.23. 2010.
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There are also allegations that some of the Nepalese Maoists were It can be concluded that the Indian establishment had supported the
provided clandestine type of training by India at the Indo-Tibetan Border Nepalese Maoists for a good part of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal to apply
Force Training Centre at Chakrata, Dehradun, 40 Km west of the Indian the pressure tactics as had been done in the past to the government of Nepal
Military Academy. This training institution is alleged to have been a training formed after 1990 so as to succumb to the demands made as per the draft
centre initially for Tibetan refugees carrying out clandestine operations inside papers presented in Appendices C and D . In the Fireside programme
Tibet for the Tibet Liberation Movement of the Dalai Lama in the past. At conducted by Mr. Bhushan Dahal in KTV on 2063-12-18 B.S, Mr. Ravindra
present, it is supposed to be a training centre for the border security force Shreshtha, an one time Maoist leader, had given the interview that Mr.
operating in the Indo-Tibetan border. Such feedback was provided by some Baburam Bhattarai had internal relations with the Research and Analysis
Nepalese Armed Police Force personnel who had undergone paramilitary Wing (RAAW), the external intelligence organization of India.50
training at the ITBF Training Centre as per an article published in the However, the South Block policy seems to have undergone a change for
Nepalese vernacular weekly Jana Ashtha. The same sort of information was the better for Nepal once the Indian establishment finally realized the
also reported to have been provided by Gurkha instructors of the Indian intentions of CCOMPOSA and its implications for India with the proposed
Army who were deputed to the ITBF Training Centre for imparting training. concept of the Compact Revolutionary Zone (ZOP) as discussed above. When
The initial response of the Indian government to the Nepalese Maoist India realized that the key to the pressure tactics was hijacked from South
uprising was casual, at best, though it changed dramatically for the better Block by the Indian radical organizations under the CCOMPOSA, then it had
after 2001.47 Ashok Mehta writes, " As for the Government of India, it is fair no other option but to crack down on the Nepalese Maoist leadership
to assume that the South Block and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) have operating from within India and to curtail all the active and passive support
overlooked the neighborhood and simply wished away threats in the that the Maoist insurgency was enjoying from India.51
country's front and backyards Nepal and Sri Lanka re s p e c t i v e l y As a result, the Maoist leadership was forced to migrate inside the
India simply failed to monitor the course of the revolution of Nepal, even Nepalese territory and operate with no Indian government support and the
after it had crept close to Kathmandu. For close to a year, it had no effective Indian government also imposed greater restrictions on the trans-border
Ambassador in Kathmandu."48 movements of the Nepalese Maoists by increasing substantially the
As per SD Muni Like most of the other countries, India also woke up to deployment of its Seema Surakshya Bal (SSB) . The loss of external support
the Maoists' challenge in Nepal after the escalation of violence in November was a great blow to the Nepalese Maoist insurgency and a great force-
2001. Until then, for nearly six years since the February 1996 declaration of multiplier for the Nepalese Security Forces. The Maoist wounded combatants
PW by the Maoists, the government of India's approach to the possible threat used to be taken across the Nepalese border in adjoining Indian territories in
arising from this insurgency was casual. Law and order being treated as a designated areas for treatment in the past. But, after 2005, the SSB started
state subject, the Central government in India absolved itself of any cracking down on such safe heavens and started apprehending the wounded
responsibility in restraining and containing the activities of the Maoists along combatants after their treatment. The fear of the topmost Maoist leaderships
the Indo-Nepal border. Even the June 2001 establishment CCOMPOSA was falling victim to the relentless military operations, the curtailment of the free
taken routine note of by the Indian intelligence agencies without any policy trans-border movements for transportation of arms and personnel, the
decision at the political level."49 separation of contact and cooperation with the fraternal Indian radical
47 Muni, n.3, p.58. 50 Dilip Rana & Prakash Pokhrel, Nepal Army s Insistence/Alternatives on the Question of
48 AK Mehta, Insurgency in Nepal and State Response , AAKROSH, Vol.6, No.19, April 2003, Integration of the Maoist Combatants in NA , A task-force report submitted to the NA HQ
p.55. in 2006, p.6.
49 Muni, n.3, p.58. 51 Ibid.
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counterparts, all these proved to be such obstacles to the Maoist movement in productive for all the nations in South Asia, the following multi-lateral
Nepal that the Maoist leadership was left with no option but to make a soft approach is suggested for all the SAARC countries to adopt in order to tackle
landing in contrast to their stated aims and objectives. The ultimate outcome the common malaise of the whole region as per the decision adopted during
was that the NCP (Maoist) finally decided to join the main-stream politics of the 7th SAARC summit: --
Nepal, a contrasting departure from their earlier stated rigid aim of capturing
the state power through the violent means of their so called people s war . Strategic Level
The ex-PM, Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala in particular, and various other
political parities were trying to take credit for bringing the NCP (Maoist) to Identifying the 'commonality of cause' at the strategic level, the SAARC
the mainstream politics of Nepal after the 12-point understanding of the nations should decide to act with firmness without any deviations in a joint
seven political parties with the NCP (Maoist) at New Delhi on 22 November manner, each complimenting the other in identified areas. The identified
2005. Even India aspires to take certain amount of credit for the result at hand. areas could be organizational (both underground and overt), military,
But the facts and arguments presented so far proves that all these claims are financial, intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda (both offensive
utterly false and, if any institution is to be given credit for making the NCP defensive, and deception), developmental and political.
(Maoist) give up their stated method of capturing the state power through
violent means by forcing them to join the mainstream politics of Nepal, it Operational Level
should be no other than the security forces of Nepal under the erstwhile
leadership of the then Royal Nepalese Army. It is a pity that the great sacrifice Devising various working mechanisms in various identified fields at the
and relentless efforts of the Nepalese Army in this regard has not yet been operational level with a well defined special chain of command in order to
fully recognized by the inept political leadership of Nepal for petty political ensure 'coordination of information and actions'.
interests. But future political history of the nation is definitely going to shed
light to this undeniable fact. Tactical Level
India, however, should be given the credit for changing its ambitious,
highly counter-productive and shortsighted policy vis- -vis Nepal for its own A systematic, determined and ruthless ' implementation of single, combined
vested interests after 2005 onwards when, finally, it started cracking down or joint operations' as the situation demands pertaining to the actions
effectively on the Nepalese Maoist leadership operating from within the identified in various fields should be agreed upon and implemented on
Indian soil and dissected its cooperation with the various Indian radical ground relentlessly. It should be remembered that both Sri Lanka and Nepal
organizations operating within India after their regional aim became crystal have solved their respective problems with military means. So the military
clear through the formation of CCOMPOSA and its stated objectives, one of component of the instrument of national power is most vital and should
which was to create the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) encompassing always be kept effective.
the territory of Nepal with those of India.
First and foremost, all SAARC country governments should come to the same
Based on the Nepalese experience of insurgency/terrorism and its success conclusion that violent movements/terrorist actions in all the countries are
with its counter-insurgency operations and realizing the fact that promoting inter-related, centrally coordinated and orchestrated with a common regional
such violent means as part of a limited national objective is counter- aim that is detrimental to the national interests of all the countries concerned
92 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 93
and that all should devise an effective joint doctrine and methods to address BIBLIOGRAPHY
the common problem hitting at all its relevant organs that gives violent
movements/terrorism sustenance and dynamism. Rana, Dilip. The Nepalese Maoist Movement in the Context of Terrorism in South
Next the organs, which make the violent organizations effective, should be Asia. A thesis Submitted to the National defence College, New Delhi,2004.
Muni, SD. The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response.
identified and measures taken against those identified organs. Once the
Rupa & Co, New Delhi.
organs are identified and methods of dealing with them are determined, Thapa, D with Sijapati, B. A Kingdom under Siege. Kathmandu, 2003.
various mechanisms at the operational level with a joint chain of command Jawaid, S. Indian Communism: Split within a Split. New Delhi, 1974.
can be devised to tackle each organ effectively with the right means. The
SD Muni, The Maoist Challenge in Nepal , AAKROSH, Vol.5, No.14.
organ of leadership can be dealt with efficient intelligence assets coupled PV Ramana, PWG s Emerging New Global Linkages , IPCS, Art.1303, 11
with overt or clandestine tactical operations. The same may apply to their February 2004.
PV Ramana, Advantage People s War Group , IPCS, Art.1061, 18 June 2003.
underground organizations. The various identified false front organizations
P Gautam, Interventions ,Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and Naga Insurgency in
can be dismantled as part of administrative actions, the key players in them India: Their Ramifications. Proceedings of a Seminar held at Nakuchia Tal,
being taken into custody and preventing such organizations from resurfacing Uttaranchal, on May2-3, 2003, Press Institute of India.
PV Ramana, Cross-country Left-wing Network is Real , IPCS, Art.833, 15 August
with other names.
The flow of funds within the respective countries and from abroad should BS Lashiram, Fighting Naxals: Time to go Beyond Law and Order Perspectives ,
be identified by groups set aside for this particular task and once identified, IPCS, Art.1321, 27 February 2004.
AK Mehta, nsurgency in Nepal and State Response , AAKROSH, vol.6, No.19,
such funds should be frozen and the flow channel broken. Information and
intelligence should flow constantly by having appropriate mechanisms Newspapers
dedicated for this task and manned by military, police and intelligence Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 30 August 2004.
personnel at various levels and not relegated to the intelligence organizations
only. The propaganda machinery of violence and their support bases should Appendix A
be identified in each country, region and even internationally and tackled (Refers to page 15 of the Text)
using the proper state organs including diplomatic means.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND HIS MAJESTY S
At the tactical level, all actions demanded in the identified fields should be GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL ON MUTUAL COOPERATION
taken up by the appropriate government organs set aside for such tasks
The government of India and His Majesty s government of Nepal (hereafter also
including relentless and constant tactical operations against militant actions
referred to as the contracting parties),
or their preparations without any respite. The organizations of violence Recalling the unique, age-old and traditional friendship between the peoples of
should be given no chance to gain time in order to reorganize in the pretext India and Nepal based on the bonds of history, geography and of shared social and
of peace talks for reasons of political expediency till their military might has Reaffirming their adherence to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the
been reduced to the stage that it no longer has any significance towards the governments of India and Nepal of 1950, which has ever since been and remains the
innocent population. cornerstone of Indo-Nepal relations,
Keen to sustain and further strengthen the bonds of friendship, good neighborly
relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries and peoples,
Determined to strengthen economic cooperation between them,
Desiring to develop their economies in their own and common interest,
Convinced of the benefits of mutual sharing of scientific and technical knowledge
and experience to promote trade between them,
Have agreed as follows:
94 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 95
The Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any military alliance with any
TREATMENT OF EACH OTHER S NATIONALS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE other State against each other. His Majesty s Government of Nepal, in this respect,
TERRITORIES agree not to enter into any arrangements concerning the matters mentioned in Articles
I to III above with any other State or organization without prior consultations and
Article-I agreement with the government of India.
Subject to such exceptions as may be mutually agreed upon, the Contracting Article-V
Parties undertake not to enact and to repeal any laws, rules, regulations, and
The arrangements envisaged in Articles I to IV above shall have no bearing on the
government orders which restrict the rights and privileges of the nationals of one independent foreign policy of either Contracting Party.
Contracting Party in the territory of the other in matters of residence, ownership of
property, employment, participation in trade and commerce, movement, participation PART-III
in industrial and economic development of such territory and the grant of concessions
and contracts relating to such development and other privileges of a similar nature as TRADE
enjoined by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and
(Agreed Articles on Trade to be included in this part)
the Government of Nepal of 1950 and the Letters exchanged along with the Treaty.
Each Contracting Party shall have the freedom to bring to the notice of the other
any laws, rules, regulations and Government orders of the other Contracting Party (Agreed Articles of Transit to be included in this part)
which may restrict such rights and privileges of its nationals for the territory of the
COOPERATION TO CONTROL UNOTHORIZED TRADE
(Agreed Articles on Cooperation to Control Unauthorized Trade to be included in
In the interest of strengthening their defense capabilities, the Contracting Parties ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND WATER RESOURCES COOPERATION
have agreed to cooperate with each other in the military field. To this end, His
Majesty s Government of Nepal shall consult and enter into suitable protocols with Article-I
the Government of India concerning the acquisition by Nepal of arms, ammunitions
and other materials and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. In the traditional spirit of friendly cooperation between India and Nepal and for
the benefit and welfare of the people of Nepal, the Government of India undertake to
Article-II provide, at the request of His Majesty s Government of Nepal, such developmental
assistance as may be mutually determined by the Contracting Parties from time to
Such cooperation between the Contracting parties in the military field shall time.
include assistance by the government of India by providing arms, ammunition and
other materials and equipment and in coordinating training for the raising of
additional formations and units for the Royal Nepalese Army, on the basis of the Should His Majesty s Government of Nepal decide to seek foreign assistance for
details to be mutually determined by the representatives of the contracting Parties. the development of the natural resources of Nepal or for any industrial project in
Nepal, they shall give first preference to the Government or the nationals of India, as
Article-III the case may be, provided that the terms offered by the Government of India or Indian
The cooperation between the contracting Parties in the military field shall also nationals, as the case may be, are not less favorable to Nepal than the terms offered by
include cooperation in the training of Nepalese Armed Forces personnel. any other State or its nationals or by any international organization and agency.
96 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011 Dilip SJB Rana THE ASPECT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IN INSURGENCY 97
Article-III Part-VI of the Agreement shall remain in force for a period of __________ years
and it may be renewed for further periods of _________ years by mutual consent,
The two Contracting Parties being equally desirous of attaining complete and subject to such modifications as may be agreed upon.
satisfactory utilization of the waters of the commonly shared rivers, undertake to (i)
plan new uses or projects subject to the protection of existing uses on the rivers and Article-V
(ii) cooperate with each other to formulate and modify the planned new uses or This Agreement shall come into force on ______________ 1990 and remain valid for
projects taking into consideration the water requirement of the parties. the same duration of time for which the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the
Government of India and the Government of Nepal of 1950 shall be in force.
Done at Kathmandu on ______________ day of ______________One Thousand
The Contracting Parties agree jointly to plan, construct and manage projects of Nine Hundred and Ninety in two originals each in Hindi, Nepali and English
mutual benefit. In this regard, the involvement of a third party, where felt to be languages all of them being equally authentic. In case of doubt the English text shall
necessary and in the common interest shall be subject to mutual consent. prevail.
For His Majesty s Government for the Government
FINAL CLAUSES of Nepal of India
To facilitate the effective and harmonious implementation of this Agreement, the (Refers to page 15 f the Text)
Contracting Parties shall consult each other regularly, and review the implementation What Nepal Can DO
of this Agreement, within the forum of India-Nepal Joint Commission. They shall Removal of Indian nationals in Nepal from the list of work-permit system and
meet for this purpose at least once in twelve months. other discriminatory measures.
First refusal for India for industrial and other development projects for Nepal,
Article-II especially in the Terai region, subject to Indian terms being as good as foreign bidders
(Clause 4 of Exchange of Letters of the 150 Treaty).
For the purpose of this Agreement, the various parts specified therein are inter- Prior consultations on and first refusal for India with respect to military
related and shall be considered as a whole. procurements/training requirements of Nepal.
Restoration of pre-June 1982 tariff preferences for Indian Exports.
Article-III Political and economic justice for Terraians, e.g., equitable representation in
Rastriya Panchayat, Government jobs ad development expenditures.
Part-I of this agreement shall remain in force for the same duration of time for Re-affirmation by both sides of adherence to the 1950 Treaty.
which the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the What India Can Do
Government of Nepal of 1950 shall be in force. Restoration of pre-March 23,1989 trade preferences for Nepalese exports.
Restoration of revolving standby credits.
Part-II of the Agreement shall remain in force for a period of ten years and it may POL and coal supplies and supplies of essential commodities through quota
be renewed for further periods of ten years by mutual consent, subject to such system.
modifications as may be agreed upon. Lowering mandatory indigenous contents for Nepalese industrial exports from
Part-III of the Agreement shall remain in force for a period of __________ years and present 80% to 60%.
it may be renewed for further periods of _________ years by mutual consent, subject Separate treaties for trade ad transit.
to such modifications as may be agreed upon. Part-IV of the Agreement shall remain Status quo ante for transit facilities.
in force for a period of __________ years and it may be renewed for further periods of Reasonable tariffs for power supplied to India from Karnali and Pancheshwar.
_________ years by mutual consent, subject to such modifications as may be agreed (Would permanently solve Nepal s balance of trade problems vis- -vis India).
upon. Acceptance of Zone of Peace proposal with suitable amendments to their
Part-IV of the Agreement shall remain in force for a period of __________ years clarifications of Clause V, relating to hostile activities .
and it may be renewed for further periods of _________ years by mutual consent,
subject to such modifications as may be agreed upon. Treatment of Indian Nationals in the Kingdom of Nepal
Part-V of the Agreement shall remain in force for a period of __________ years and
it may be renewed for further periods of _________ years by mutual consent, subject 1958: Civil Liberty Act allowing foreigners, including Indians, to buy, lease, hold
to such modifications as may be agreed upon. property in Nepal repealed.
98 Peace and Secutity Review Vol. 4, No. 7, First Quarter, 2011
1959: Nepal Factories and factory Workers act Ch. VI No none Nepali national
shall be employed in any factory except in the prescribed circumstances.
Ch. VIII--- Labor department may order Manager of Factory to remove non-Nepali
employees, and manager duty bound to comply.
1962: Nepal Private Firms Act Non-Nepalis cannot conduct import export
business with third countries.
Agencies Act---Non Nepalis cannot be agents of foreign firms.
1963: Nepal factories ad Factory Workers Rules Non Nepalis can be appointed on
2 year contract if no Nepal is available.
1964: Civil Services Rules No non Nepali can be employed in public service.
Land Reforms Act For the first time HMGN prevented Nepalis from transferring
lands to foreigners, including Indians.
1968: Citizenship Act It was subsequently amended several times. The last was
as part of the third Constitutional amendment of 1983. This introduced discrimination
in the field of employment. Only Nepalese citizens could be employed in certain
establishments. Only Nepalese could set up business houses in which they had to
have a majority share.
1971: Announcement of policy of replacing Indian teachers with Nepalis.
1981: Industrial Enterprises Act--- Foreigners can be employed in Nepali
enterprises for a maximum of twelve years provided no suitable Nepali available.
1983: The third Constitutional amendment, while keeping the residence
requirement of acquisition of citizenship by persons of Nepalese origin to two years,
raised this residence requirement to 15 years for all non Nepalis including Indians.
1987: Work permits required to all foreigners, including Indian nationals. First
implemented in April 1987 for the three districts around Kathmandu extended de
facto to the whole country by September 1988. Indians required to obtain Shram
Swikriti Patra or work-permit as distinct from Parichaya Patra or ID card required
for Nepalese nationals. Despite claims that it applies only to the organized and the
unorganized industrial sector, it has been regularly applied to Indian teachers. They
have been formally informed that their services will be terminated by 1991-92 unless
they got their work permits, which are however being denied to them. They are not
eligible for retirement or other such benefits and are placed at par with other foreign
Self employed Indians have been denied renewal of road permits on grounds of
non-possession of work permits. Small Indian businessmen also unable to obtain
Initially assurance was given that the system would not be extended to Indian
nationals. However, on April 30, 1987, Foreign Minister Upadhyay denied any such