"Sustaining U.S.-European Global Security Cooperation"
Strategic Forum No. 217 September 2005 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Sustaining U.S.-European Global Security Cooperation by Stephen J. Flanagan Key Points Is the Past Prologue? failure and a search for a second chance. This was hardly the White House view, which saw T Many on both sides of the Atlantic hope he atmosphere and tone of transatlan- the Iraqi elections and the democratic stirrings that European-American relations will resume tic discourse have improved markedly in the Middle East as vindication. Indeed, even a more civil and cooperative course in the in recent months. Sustaining trans- those European governments critical of the aftermath of differences over Iraq. President atlantic security cooperation will require U.S.-led invasion of Iraq have now avowed that George W. Bush’s visit to Europe in February narrowing lingering European-American its stabilization, as well as continued progress in 2005 and subsequent initiatives suggest that differences over threat perceptions, strategy, Afghanistan and the promotion of reform in the restoring transatlantic security cooperation will and military priorities. Muslim world, are shared European-American be a priority of the administration. Given the There is sufﬁcient commonality of as- interests. Transatlantic relations have also ben- acrimony in official exchanges and the vilifica- sessments and interests to fashion comple- efited from U.S. endorsement of EU diplomatic tion in popular media over the past 2 years, not mentary European and American policies efforts to cap the Iranian nuclear program and to mention lingering differences over strategy toward key challenges including countering Franco-American cooperation on Syria. and policy, the wounds will not heal quickly. If terrorism and further proliferation of weapons Operating under the tenet that “the mis- both sides take steps to enhance consultations of mass destruction (WMD); promotion of sion should determine the coalition,” the Bush and are willing to make policy adjustments, Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation and reform administration, during its first term, opted to however, there is hope for fashioning comple- in the wider Middle East; and relations with assemble ad hoc groups of governments that mentary and even some common European China, Russia, and Ukraine. supported its approach to Afghanistan and and American approaches to critical transat- Progress in these areas requires an Iraq, rather than working first through North lantic and global security issues. enhanced transatlantic dialogue, particularly Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mecha- The atmosphere and tone of discourse more systematic U.S.–European Union (EU) nisms. European capabilities for both these have improved in recent months. In his first policy consultations, coupled with a mutual missions were limited, and political support for major foreign policy address after his reelec- willingness to make policy adjustments. Prior- U.S. approaches was uncertain. However, the tion, President Bush expressed a renewed ity should be given to developing convergent demands of postwar stabilization efforts in both commitment to close cooperation with allies. approaches to deal with warnings of imminent countries highlight that the United States is far His visits to the European Commission and the WMD terrorism, failure of diplomatic efforts to better off working with a broad group of allies Council of Ministers signaled a willingness to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, security and and partners from the outset in undertaking work with the European Union (EU) as a fuller governance problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, and such demanding missions. Moreover, NATO still partner. While President Bush secured only the Palestinian Authority, and China’s global enjoys broad bipartisan support among Ameri- modest European contributions for stabiliza- rise and military acquisitions. can political leaders and the public for address- tion efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, his discus- In fashioning an equitable transatlantic ing hard security problems. sions with European leaders had a much more division of labor for the management of global While these developments are encour- positive tone. security affairs, America’s European partners aging, sustaining an effective transatlantic Most European leaders, whose publics have many important nonmilitary assets that relationship over the next 4 years will require clearly preferred a different outcome in the should be factored into the equation. Wash- narrowing lingering European-American dif- November 2004 U.S. Presidential elections, have ington will remain reluctant, however, to treat ferences over threat perceptions, strategy, and generally taken a “wait and see” attitude toward Europe as a full partner until it demonstrates military priorities. There is sufficient common- the Bush administration. While according the signiﬁcant progress on key NATO and EU ality of European and American interests to President a cordial reception in February, many defense improvement goals. fashion complementary policies on such issues Europeans saw the visit as an admission of No. 217, September 2005 Strategic Forum 1 as countering weapons of mass destruction main centers of global power including U.S. Europeans, catastrophic terrorism seems less of (WMD) terrorism and proliferation (particu- allies in Europe, East Asia, Russia, and China. a threat than renewed instability in the Balkans larly vis-à-vis Iran), stabilizing Iraq and Af- The U.S. strategy also called for working with or lingering concerns about the future direction ghanistan, advancing Israeli-Palestinian rec- other governments and institutions to defuse of Russia. This differing assessment has compli- onciliation, promoting reform in the broader regional conflicts in Southeast Asia, Latin cated or slowed counterterrorism policy coordi- Middle East, and dealing with China, Russia, America, and Africa. It recognized that global- nation and operational cooperation and led to and Ukraine. This will require enhanced ization remains a powerful force that interacts the European perception that the U.S. approach transatlantic strategic dialogue, particularly with old and new security problems in ways to counterterrorism is overly militarized. broader and more systematic U.S.–EU policy that can exacerbate nationalist, ethnic, and The ESS also identifies WMD prolifera- consultations, coupled with a mutual willing- religious disputes, as well as facilitate interna- tion as potentially one of the gravest threats ness to make policy adjustments. However, tional terrorism and WMD proliferation. to European security. However, the strategy Washington will look to European progress in The European Security Strategy identi- contends that the existing international treaty narrowing important gaps vis-à-vis the United fies many of the same threats as the NSS, and export control regimes have slowed the States in defense capabilities as a key indicator including global terrorism, WMD proliferation, spread of WMD and delivery systems, reflect- of Europe’s seriousness of purpose in seeking a regional conflicts, state failure, and organized ing much greater satisfaction with these fuller security partnership. crime.3 It also argues that, in an era of global regimes than exists in Washington. That said, threats, global markets, and global media, the ESS does note that the risk of a WMD European security and prosperity depend arms race in the Middle East, the spread of Washington will look on an “effective multilateral system.” The missile technology, and advances in biologi- to European progress ESS underscores the need to develop effec- cal weapons do pose new and serious risks to in narrowing gaps in tive international institutions, processes, and Europe’s security.5 It advocates a strengthened rule-based international order. The EU strategy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), defense capabilities as a places clear emphasis on the word system, stricter export controls, universal adherence key indicator of Europe’s while President Bush has highlighted the to international treaty regimes, and preventive seriousness in seeking a need for “effective multilateral actions,” with engagement when signs of proliferation less concern for process. Despite this common are detected. full security partnership assessment of the key threats, the ESS offers The ESS cites state failure and weak markedly different prescriptions, particularly governance as other key threats to global and with regard to terrorism and nonproliferation. regional stability. It also notes the need for Diverging Strategies From Washington’s perspective, the ESS more effective economic, security, and cultural There are both many commonalities and most European governments approach cooperation through the Barcelona process and important differences between the 2002 terrorism as a much less urgent, persistent with the EU Mediterranean partners, as well as U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which security problem, the manifestations of which a broader engagement with the Arab world. remains operative, and the December 2003 can be addressed most effectively by security European Security Strategy (ESS). While inter- services, police, and the judicial system. While Transatlantic Cooperation national attention focused on the prominence noting that the military has a role in dealing that the U.S. strategy assigned to military with terrorism, the ESS advocates “preventive What can be done to narrow or bridge preemption and building coalitions to combat engagement” as its preferred tool in forestall- transatlantic differences on strategy and secu- terrorism, the NSS was much broader. The ing attacks. There are few signs that 9/11, the rity policy priorities? An intensified, multifac- strategy proposed to use the “unparalleled mili- March 2004 attacks in Madrid, and the July eted, high-level dialogue, initiated early in the tary strength and great economic and political 2005 attacks in London have fundamentally second Bush term, would seem a good way to influence” of the United States to realize a reshaped the threat assessment or security and begin to identify common goals and instru- sweeping neo-Wilsonian transformation of the defense priorities of most European govern- ments on critical issues. Such a dialogue would current global political and economic order by ments. However, the threat of catastrophic ter- be most effective if conducted in NATO, U.S.– supporting democracy and open markets.1 This rorism does appear to have spawned enhanced EU, and bilateral national channels. Choosing principle has been reflected in the commitment cooperation among intelligence and security the appropriate venue is not a trivial matter, to democratic transitions in Afghanistan and services.4 Still, many in Europe seem to consider but the important point is that Washington Iraq and in the Group of Eight (G–8) initiative the potential for catastrophic terrorism, pos- and its allies recommit themselves to engage in for promoting political, economic, and social sibly including weapons of mass destruction, discussion over strategic issues before national reforms in the wider Middle East.2 The more as rather abstract and aimed more at the U.S. policies are set in stone. realpolitik elements of the strategy called for homeland and overseas interests than at Euro- NATO will remain Washington’s focal developing cooperative activities with the other pean territory and populations. Among some point for consultations on transatlantic secu- rity issues. However, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Se- Stephen J. Flanagan is Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and Vice President for curity and Defense Policy (ESDP) continue to Research at the National Defense University. This paper is adapted from a longer essay in the French journal deepen, and contemporary security problems Politique Americaine, no. 2, Paris, Summer–Fall 2005. 2 Strategic Forum No. 217, September 2005 from combating terrorism to stabilization rity concerns in the broader Middle East; and WMD they might acquire and because of great and reconstruction of failed states require the strategic policies involving Eastern Europe, uncertainty about the deterrence calculus of integration of many elements of national and Russia, and China. various rogue governments. The NSS cites the international power, the need for a more effec- international legal norm that nations need not tive U.S.–EU dialogue and policy coordination Countering WMD suffer an attack before taking military actions has become evident. NATO is not the right to defend themselves against an imminent venue to discuss coordination of actions to The highest political imperative for threat. Administration officials have argued the track terrorist finances or how best to support President Bush in his second term is to prevent concept of imminent threat must be adapted to elections in Afghanistan or Iraq. Moreover, the another catastrophic terrorist attack against the capabilities and objectives of contemporary annual U.S.–EU summits and periodic min- the homeland, particularly a “WMD 9/11.” rogue states and terrorists. However, many gov- isterial and other high-level meetings are no During the 2004 Presidential campaign, this ernments have wondered whether the doctrine longer adequate to sustain effective U.S.–EU was one of the few points where John Kerry and of preemption is limited to rogues and terror- cooperation. During the crisis following the George Bush were in total agreement. There is ists and whether other actions might be subject November 2004 Ukraine elections, the EU High broad transatlantic consensus that the potential to preemption. The Bush administration should Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and acquisition of WMD by terrorists is the gravest consider clarifying which apocalyptic threats then Secretary of State Colin Powell developed threat to our mutual security. Developing some and other circumstances it believes warrant an informal consultation process to coordinate common policies and operational understand- preemptive military action. U.S. and EU actions. Similar steps, includ- ings for addressing this deadly nexus should be Given the enormity of what is at stake, ing the formation of ad hoc contact groups at the top of the list for a renewed transatlantic the United States and European governments of senior officials, should be considered to dialogue. The revelations in early 2004 of the should be planning now how they would expand and regularize U.S.–EU consultations illicit transfer of nuclear weapons technology respond to an imminent terrorist attack and policy coordination across a broad range to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other countries involving WMD. The administration might of issues that impact common interests. by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of propose—in NATO, EU, and bilateral chan- Over the past 15 years, three different U.S. Pakistan’s Khan Research Labs, underscored nels—enhanced intelligence cooperation to administrations have welcomed the develop- the potential for nuclear materials or weapons uncover terrorist plots involving WMD; un- ment of a stronger European role within the to fall into the hands of states that have chal- derstandings on efforts to disrupt execution of Alliance, and the Bush administration, like the lenged international norms and terrorist groups. any such WMD attack plans (including agreed Clinton administration, has broadly supported The ESS advocacy of preventive engage- procedures for rapid, combined military, intel- the emergence of an ESDP that makes a real ment to ameliorate WMD proliferation and ter- ligence, and police operations); and plans for contribution to European capabilities. To be rorism substitutes hope for a strategy. It is evident European-American cooperation on mitiga- sure, Washington’s criticisms of elements of from the Khan operations and other transfers tion efforts in the aftermath of any attack.7 ESDP have occasionally raised doubts about that existing nonproliferation arrangements are porous. Moreover, while preventive engagement U.S. willingness to accept a more equitable might be effective in dissuading certain rogue Iran and Nonproliferation relationship. However, support for greater Eu- ropean integration and an ESDP that comple- regimes from acquiring or using nuclear weap- While Tehran insists it wants nuclear power ments NATO remains strong. ESDP’s value and ons, it is hardly an effective tool for dealing with for energy generation, the bulk of available evi- seriousness will be assessed in Washington on al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. dence suggests that Iran has been attempting— the basis of the missions and capabilities that for over 20 years—to achieve self-sufficiency in EU member governments actually realize. a complete nuclear fuel cycle that could support given the enormity weapons production as well as development of Thus, the progress of the EU’s Operation Althea, which assumed the main stabilization role in of what is at stake, long-range missile delivery systems. Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina previously undertaken by the United States and the IAEA and many international experts as- NATO and to which NATO is providing planning, sess that some of the specific capabilities Iran is European governments developing or seeking are primarily applicable to logistic, and command support under the so- called Berlin-Plus formula, is likely to color U.S. should be planning now a nuclear weapons program. attitudes toward future EU operations.6 While how they would respond Transatlantic agreement exists on the both NATO and the EU are now providing as- strategic objective of preventing Iran from to an imminent terrorist acquiring the complete fuel cycle that would be sistance to the African Union’s monitoring and peacekeeping effort in Darfur, this cooperation, attack involving WMD the foundation of a nuclear weapons capability, which complements recent G–8 initiatives on but policy approaches differ. The United States Africa, was nearly scuttled by efforts of a few EU had pushed to have Iran declared in violation of states to block any NATO involvement. In contrast, the NSS argues that this threat its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Prolifera- Renewed U.S.-European policy coordi- warrants robust preventive measures, includ- tion Treaty, with the attendant threat of United nation should give priority to several issues ing preemptive action as a last resort, because Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions, for including: countering WMD terrorism; Iran’s al Qaeda and other terrorist groups cannot concealing elements of its nuclear program. In nuclear program; Afghanistan, Iraq, and secu- be deterred and would not hesitate to use any late 2004, the United States expressed support No. 217, September 2005 Strategic Forum 3 for the EU–3 negotiations and a willingness to that Allies will take over the entire mission vast challenge, including the EU interactions consider offering Iran certain incentives, such a in Afghanistan, unifying ISAF and the coun- with its Mediterranean partners in the Barce- membership in the World Trade Organization, terterrorism and counterinsurgency missions lona process. The situation is ripe for a sus- to make the suspension of its uranium enrich- of Operation Enduring Freedom, under an tained dialogue leading to a common strategy ment program permanent. At the same time, integrated NATO command. and explicit or implicit burdensharing. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Presi- The role of NATO and Allied national Reform within the Palestinian Author- dent Bush have underscored that all options forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom has been ity since the passing of Yasser Arafat and the remain on the table. controversial, and the Alliance’s future role in Israeli withdrawal from Gaza appear to provide Given the limited progress of negotiations stabilization of Iraq remains uncertain. Given opportunities for reviving a dialogue between and the strong conviction among Iran’s leader- political reservations in Europe about the situ- Israel and the Palestinians on the roadmap ship that the country should be self-reliant for ation in Iraq, as well as the shortage of deploy- to a two-state solution to this conflict. These defense, U.S. and European leaders need to dis- able European forces, it seems unlikely that developments also appear conducive to a more cuss what steps they might take if negotiations NATO will take on much larger responsibilities focused transatlantic dialogue and cooperation. continue to falter or completely collapse. What for stability operations in Iraq. However, in The Bush administration has signaled that the penalties, including Security Council sanc- December 2004, Allied foreign ministers agreed best way to advance the prospects for a durable tions, would Europeans be willing to support to expand to 300 personnel NATO’s training Middle East peace at this point is to help the if Iran refuses to end its fuel cycle program or assistance to Iraq. Over time, assumption of Palestinian Authority enhance its governance, withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation additional missions in Iraq, such as protection rule of law, and control over the security situ- Treaty? NATO should consider the implications of UN personnel, expanded training of police, ation. Here again, both the United States and of a nuclear-armed Iran for mutual defense, or border security, might be effective ways for Europe bring many complementary capabili- particularly if Iran proceeds with development Europe to contribute to this mission. A fuller ties to this process as well as an established of longer-range versions of the Shahab-3 mis- review of ways to enhance European-American pattern of cooperation, including through the siles that could reach all of Europe. cooperation to stabilize Iraq would be desir- International Quartet. able. The EU has clear strengths in integrating Afghanistan and Iraq important nonmilitary aspects of postconflict Russia, Ukraine, and stabilization to include economic development, There is also transatlantic consensus strengthening civil society, and security sector the Balkans that failure to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq and judicial reforms. There is still much work to be done in is inimical to common security interests. completing the vision, first articulated over Afghanistan has become a critical proving 15 years ago by President George H.W. Bush, ground in judging NATO’s ability to contribute The Broader Middle East of building a “Europe whole and free.” The to international stability beyond Europe’s pe- U.S. and EU security strategies agree heavy-handed Russian interventions in Georgia riphery. NATO’s assumption of command of the that weak governance, undemocratic regimes, and on behalf of Victor Yanukovych during the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and economic rigidity in the broader Middle November 2004 Ukrainian presidential elec- in Afghanistan has been a challenge operation- East are exacerbating economic disparities, tions were stark reminders that democracy has ally. While NATO forces have performed well in social problems, and regional tensions. These not planted deep roots throughout Europe and overall terms, European governments were slow add to a sense of hopelessness that provides a that the potential still exists for new lines of to provide the forces they pledged to expand fertile environment for terrorism and armed division to emerge. Transatlantic cooperation ISAF support for provincial reconstruction conflicts. When the Bush administration first in dealing with the Ukrainian election crisis teams (PRTs) outside Kabul and for the 2004 advanced some of its ideas for strengthen- was exemplary. With President Victor Yushenko presidential elections. This reflects both the ing governance, democratic institutions, civil settled into office, the United States and Europe society, and the rule of law in the broader must craft coherent policies to bolster Ukraine’s Afghanistan has become Middle East, there was great concern in Euro- sovereignty, independence, and integration a critical proving ground pean capitals that various Arab regimes would into NATO, the European Union, and the World perceive this approach as threatening and as Trade Organization. The United States should in judging NATO’s an effort to force certain models of democratic work with European governments to deepen ability to contribute to polity. As consultations ensued, U.S. and Eu- support for Ukraine’s defense and security international stability ropean leaders participating in the G–8 were sector reform and cooperation with neighbors, able to reach consensus on a measured, long- including Russia. It should press NATO allies beyond Europe’s periphery term program to support democratic, social, to offer intensified dialogue to Ukraine over and economic reform in the region under the next several years leading to a membership scarcity of deployable European forces and, in the rubric of the Partnership for Progress and action plan as Kiev is ready. Finally, the United some cases, the lack of political will. Nonethe- a Common Future, and the Forum for the States should encourage the European Union, less, steady progress has been achieved, and Future dialogues among leaders from govern- even as it considers the membership issue, to European governments are expanding sup- ment, business, and civil society. Each side of augment its existing Partnership and Coopera- port for PRTs. Washington continues to hope the Atlantic brings certain strengths to this tion Agreement and European Neighborhood 4 Strategic Forum No. 217, September 2005 policy regarding Ukraine to advance the coun- systems—are precisely what the Chinese need some impressive decisions concerning military try’s integration into Europe in concrete ways. to develop networked capabilities to disrupt capabilities over the past few years, includ- The increasing threats to democracy and U.S. military operations. The enactment of the ing implementation of new NATO and EU open society in Russia, and Moscow’s interfer- anti-succession law by the Chinese National command structures; launch of the Prague ence in the affairs of other neighbors, have People’s Congress in March 2005 was an affir- Capabilities Commitments, the Helsinki Head- raised concerns on both sides of the Atlantic. mation of Beijing’s willingness to use force in line Goals, and the European Defense Agency; Some have called for curtailing engagement dealing with Taiwan and reminded Europeans and development of the NATO Response Force with Russia as a way to dramatize that such of the larger stakes at hand. If the EU presses (NRF) and the European Rapid Reaction Force. behavior has costs. However, an isolated and ahead with lifting the arms embargo, Wash- However, it remains to be seen to what extent beleaguered Russia has the potential to do ington would likely press for tight, transparent these military capabilities will be realized. great harm to common transatlantic interests controls on technology exports of concern. The Procurement plans of most European Allies in advancing freedom and avoiding instability EU could demonstrate its continued support for are lagging because adequate resources are along the periphery of the former Soviet space. human rights in China by making the lift of not being devoted to military transformation Europe and the United States need to come the embargo contingent upon Chinese ratifica- or defense in general. Only half of European together on a new strategy for conditional tion of the UN Convention on Civil and Politi- NATO governments are allocating 2 percent or engagement of Russia. cal Rights. To enhance stability, the EU could more of gross domestic product to defense. Similarly, as the EU takes responsibility declare its opposition to any effort to change The capabilities gap between the United for maintaining peace in Bosnia, Kosovo’s final Taiwan’s political status quo by force and to States and other Allies is growing. Allies are status and the fragile state of other countries in develop a security dialogue with Taiwan and implementing force structure reductions of the western Balkans warrant expeditious key East Asian governments. 40 to 50 percent, and governments are likely European-American action. Looking to the Above and beyond the arms embargo, to reinvest the resources that supported these frozen conflicts and lingering turmoil in the there is a need for a sustained U.S.-European forces in nondefense programs. This contrasts Caucasus, there are also timely opportunities strategic dialogue on China leading to some with a 35 percent overall increase in the U.S. for the United States and Europe to craft poli- agreed principles or rules of the road.8 Both the defense budget since 2001, including growth cies that would help project prosperity and United States and Europe see great opportunities of 26 percent for procurement and 56 percent stability from Southeastern Europe across the for expanded economic and political engage- for research and development, both designed Black Sea. ment with China. However, Europe derives great to accelerate defense transformation. All of benefit, at no cost, from the enormous burden NATO Europe now spends about $12 billion China Strategy the United States shoulders to maintain stability (USD) annually for research and development, and peace in East Asia. Thus, the EU cannot af- whereas the United States spends about $60 to European leaders seemed surprised by the ford to be cavalier about U.S. security concerns. $70 billion. outcry in Washington over the EU proposal to Given the multifaceted, global nature of China’s NATO’s Prague initiatives were developed lift its arms embargo imposed on China after rise, this discussion should not be limited to as an American challenge to European Allies in China’s role in East Asia and should take place the wake of complaints about Allied exclusion there is a need for a in both U.S.–EU and NATO channels. from the planning and execution of Operation sustained U.S.-European Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Bush strategic dialogue on The Capabilities Gap administration reached the assessment that most Allies had very few forces they could con- China leading to some A key factor shaping Washington’s ap- tribute to the kind of long-range expeditionary proach to transatlantic security relations over agreed principles or rules the next 4 years will be how effective European operations required for Afghanistan. Full devel- opment of the NRF will give NATO a rapidly de- of the road governments are in enhancing their defense ployable force capable of engaging at the most capabilities. NATO and the EU have made stressful end of modern military operations, the Tiananmen massacre. This move, portrayed in Europe as a way to normalize relations with a rising China, was seen in the United States The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members research and strategic gaming organization within the National of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security as a craven effort to advance European trade Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, interests in China, particularly in commercial its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of aviation, with complete disregard for vital U.S. events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal security interests in East Asia. It raised the international security affairs and defense studies. Through an Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at active outreach program, including conferences and publications, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force specter of U.S. military operations in defense INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal of Taiwan or other interests coming under challenges and policy options. can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs. attack by European-made weapons systems. I N S T I T U T E F O R N AT I O N A L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S Moreover, the kinds of systems Beijing might Stephen J. Flanagan seek from Europe—advanced surveillance, James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA command and control, and communications Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press No. 217, September 2005 Strategic Forum 5 thereby narrowing a critical gap in capabilities Conclusion arrangements and division of labor to safeguard and commitment. There is also strong support many common interests. America’s enduring commitment to NATO in the United States for transformation of key el- and partnership with the EU and European gov- Notes ements of Allied forces as another way to narrow ernments in managing transatlantic and global 1 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the the capabilities gap. The new Allied Command security rest on a firm, bipartisan political foun- United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, Transformation was established with tight links September 2002). dation and a clear-eyed assessment of national to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which has a 2 “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with interests. While the damage done to transatlantic leading role in transformation of the U.S. Armed the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa,” June 9, relations over the past few years will take time to 2004, available at <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/33375.htm>. Forces, as a way to advance European transfor- heal, there appears to be shared good will to move 3 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Bet- mation through transfer of lessons learned in beyond the acrimony and find practical ways to ter World: The European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 12, U.S. exercises and experiments with new opera- 2003, available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. address emerging security challenges. Leaders on tional concepts. 4 See Cofer Black, “European Cooperation With the United both sides of the Atlantic have a new opportunity to In the end, U.S. leaders will look to States in the Global War on Terrorism,” testimony before the Sen- resume the kind of exchanges and cooperation that ate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European progress in enhancing capabilities as the most have served our mutual interests so well over the Affairs, March 31, 2004; and Dana Priest, “Help from France Key visible measure of Europe’s commitment to a past five decades. This healing process will require in Covert Operations,” The Washington Post, July 3, 2005, 1. fuller partnership in maintaining transatlantic 5 Council of the European Union, 4. a frank dialogue and willingness to reassess the ef- and global security. The Prague Capabilities 6 For a more detailed discussion of NATO–EU relations, fectiveness of current policies and consider a range Commitments set out eight priority areas for see Leo G. Michel, “NATO and the EU: Stop the Minuet; It’s Time of alternate approaches to these thorny problems. to Tango!” Eurofuture (Winter 2004), available at <www.ndu. action to raise combat effectiveness, including If this process is to be sustained and equi- edu/inss/Repository/EuroFuture-2Winter.pdf>. enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and target 7 For a discussion of the international legal and other table, European governments must be willing to acquisition; strategic air and sea lift; air-to- considerations that make the case for antiterrorist military take on additional burdens of managing global air refueling; and deployable combat support intervention and other preventive actions, see Joseph McMillan, security, to include further military engage- and combat service support units. At the 2004 Apocalyptic Terrorism: The Case for Preventive Action, Strategic ments. However, economic stagnation, exacer- Forum 212 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Istanbul summit, NATO leaders agreed to bated by aging, declining populations in most November 2004), available at <www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ further measures to enhance the operational EU countries, and other internal concerns seem SF212/SF212_Final.pdf>. effectiveness of their forces: specifically, to have 8 Such a dialogue was initiated by the United States and likely to occupy much of Europe’s attention and 40 percent of their national ground forces the European Union in April 2005. See U.S. Department of State, dilute its consensus and capabilities on foreign capable of deploying overseas and 8 percent “The National Security and Foreign Policy Implications for and defense policy. The key challenges for the the United States of Arms Exports to the People’s Republic of capable of being supported in expeditionary United States will be to encourage a fragmented, China by Member States of the European Union,” testimony of missions for up to a year. Absent progress in often reluctant, and not very capable Europe to R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs before these areas, Washington will once again be the House Committee on International Relations and the House become a fuller partner in managing global se- disinclined to look to NATO for addressing Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2005, available at <www. curity affairs, and to find the right institutional pressing security challenges. state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/45146.htm>. Other recent NDU Press publications on U.S. alliance relations Strategic Forum 216 U.S.-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View, by Paul Dibb (August 2005) INSS Occasional Paper 2 U.S.-Japan Relations: Progress Toward a Mature Partnership, by James J. Przystup (July 2005) INSS Occasional Paper 1 NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New Members and Partners, by Jeffrey Simon (March 2005) Strategic Forum 213 Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era? by Rust Deming (November 2004) For on-line access to these and other publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu 6 Strategic Forum No. 217, September 2005