Killing and Letting Die _Part Two_

							     Killing and Letting Die (Part Two)
Sullivan against Rachels: It is wrong for doctors to
intend the death of a patient, whether by act or omission.

Key distinction:
Ordinary means of preserving life are all medicines,
treatments, and operations, which offer reasonable hope
of benefit for the patient and which can be used without
excessive expense, pain, and other inconveniences.
Extraordinary means of preserving life are all those
medicines which cannot be obtained without excessive
expense, pain, or other inconveniences, or which, if
used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit.

One who omits ordinary treatment intends death (why
else would this be omitted?). So this is wrong. This is
all that Rachels’s bathtub example shows.
Omitting extraordinary treatment does not imply death
is intended. Death is foreseen, but the intention is to
cease a pointless or excessively costly treatment.

Singer would challenge Sullivan:
 Can we really think that Bland and Cruzan’s deaths
  weren’t intended?
 The ordinary/extraordinary distinction disguises a
  quality of life judgment: extraordinary treatment =
  treatment that prolongs a life not worth living. So
  this is inconsistent with a sanctity of life ethic.