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Clarion - tay 1 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****SOLVENCY**** Solvency Frontline Turn: TNW deployment key to deterrence and checking prolif Woolf, Nuclear weapon specialist at the DoD, 8/10/09 (Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) Nonstrategic nuclear weapons have continued to play a role in U.S. and NATO policy. For the United States, the emphasis has shifted from a strategy that emphasized the deterrence of an attack from the Soviet Union and its allies to one that has placed a growing emphasis on the role that nuclear weapons might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies that involved nations other than Russia. For example, former Secretary of Defense Perry stated that, ―maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation (emphasis added).28 Specifically, the United States has maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that ―the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its allies.‖29 These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout the 1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy. Cross-apply their prolif impact Turn: TNW deployment prevents WMD terrorism Woolf, Nuclear weapon specialist at the DoD, 8/10/09 (Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) Nonstrategic nuclear weapons have continued to play a role in U.S. and NATO policy . For the United States, the emphasis has shifted from a strategy that emphasized the deterrence of an attack from the Soviet Union and its allies to one that has placed a growing emphasis on the role that nuclear weapons might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies that involved nations other than Russia. For example, former Secretary of Defense Perry stated that, ―maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation (emphasis added).28 Specifically, the United States has maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that ―the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its allies.‖29 These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout the 1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy. WMD Terrorism means extinction Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States, 2K3 (Yonah, August 28, 2003, The Washington Times, ―Terrorism myths and realities,‖ p. A20) Last week‘s brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation‘s commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still ―shocked‖ by each Clarion - tay 2 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist ―surprises‖? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism‘s expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism ―best practices‖ strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by ―freedom fighters‖ anywhere, ―give me liberty and I will give you death,‖ should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of ―sacred‖ violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah‘s Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden‘s international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to ―unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs.‖ The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel‘s targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a ―ticking bomb.‖ The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein‘s regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: ―Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival.‖ Turn: TNWs key to NATO Woolf, Nuclear weapon specialist at the DoD, 8/10/09 (Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) For NATO, nonstrategic nuclear weapons have played a reduced, but continuing, role in security policy. They have been seen not only as a deterrent to a wide range of potential aggressors, but also as a n important element in NATO’s cohesion as an alliance. In the Press Communique released after their November 1995 meeting, the members of NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group stated that ―Alliance Solidarity, common commitment, and strategic unity are demonstrated through the current basing of deployable sub-strategic [nuclear] forces in Europe.‖30 NATO has also reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons for deterrence. The ―New Strategic Concept‖ signed in April 1999 states that ―to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. ‖31 NATO had also emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons in its strategy in 1997, in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the NATO members assured Russia that it had ―no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,‖ it also stated that it had no need ―to change any aspect of NATO‘s nuclear policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so (emphasis added).‖32 Collapse of NATO Causes Multiple Escalatory Wars John Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, 94 (Political Science Quarterly, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War," 109,5, p. 766-777) Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO Clarion - tay 3 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been biter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe-as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons. Draw a line – Definitional Takeout – Function delineates weapons as Tactical or Strategic - Not range or yield Captain Graffis, USAF chief of operations intelligence, 509th Bomb Wing, 94 (Capt Judy M, Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Ex assistant professor and course director for military theory ,US Air Force Academy. Strategic Use With Care, Aerospace Power Journal –Special Edition, 94 http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/spe94/graffis.html) SALT and START deal with nuclear weapons. As the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has stated, "There is no clear-cut definition of the kind of arms that are 'strategic.' But because of their potential for enormous destruction and their long range, ICBMs, SLBMs [sea-launched ballistic missiles], and heavy bombers assume special importance for arms control."11 According to this statement, it seems that all long-range nuclear weapons are strategic and that all strategic weapons are long-range nuclear weapons. In recent years, however, we have had to take a step back from that analysis and look at the whole (Clausewitzian, if you will) picture. Long-range nuclear weapons are no longer the only weapons that can be used to move directly toward our national security goal. Two primary reasons are that the former Soviet Union is no longer the focus of our military efforts and that technology has advanced-especially in precision guided munitions. Looking at the world as a whole-rather than breaking it down for analysis into the former Soviet Union and everybody else-we see that many countries can threaten our national security and that we have many tools which can confront them. Our recent move from the strategy of "containment" to that of "regional defense" officially recognizes the change.12 To achieve a goal under the regional defense strategy-whether it is to force the unconditional surrender of an enemy or to achieve a more limited purpose-we must be able to see any capability as a possible means of directly accomplishing that objective. It is entirely feasible that in certain situations our logistics or communications systems, rather than weapons, may be the most direct path to the goal. Therefore, we should not use strategic to categorize weapon systems. Many other things and actions can be used in a strategic manner, but labeling certain weapons as strategic may constrain our thinking so that we ignore those possibilities. Instead, we should use strategic to designate actions that will directly support achievement of our goals. The US Air Force, for many years an ardent user of the term strategic to mean long-range nuclear, has already taken major strides toward using the word in its larger, goal-oriented sense. The most obvious evidence is the replacement of SAC and Tactical Air Command (TAC) with Air Combat Command (ACC), a change that explicitly recognizes that every weapon system has strategic and nonstrategic purposes. The USAF's direction can also be seen in AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. In 1979 AFM 1-1 described "strategic aerospace offensive forces" in detail, and the distinction between strategic and tactical weapon systems was clear.13 The 1992 version of AFM 1- 1, however, emphasizes that "strategic attacks are defined by the objective-not by the weapon system employed, munition used, or target location."14 These changes are intended to allow Air Force decision makers as much flexibility as possible in their thinking, an absolute necessity in our decidedly uncertain world . Defense budget submissions have also begun deleting strategic and tactical as force descriptions. Such submissions to Congress previously specified budgets for "major force programs" such as strategic forces and tactical forces. However, Congress--apparently determining that such distinctions are not valuable--now requires that the submissions be in terms of "budget activities," and what had been funded under the strategic and tactical force programs is now funded under operations. Thus, even the all-powerful driving force of the budget has begun to shift away from using strategic. Some Europe-based weapons are capable of strategic missions Kadyshev, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control Studies Senior Researcher, 98 Timur, The Future of Russian-US Arms Reductions: START III and Beyond http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/russia/session9.htm, February 2 - 6, 1998 In theory,strategic nuclear arms are defined as those weapons that can perform strategic missions, such as decisive strikes against military, industrial and political centers of the adversary. Tactical nuclear weapons are those ones that do not possess such capacity. Within the framework of the Russian-American relationship, those weapons that are covered by START Treaties as well as long-range SLCM are no doubt strategic. Also, American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe do possess strategic capacity, but at the same time, the same type of Russian weapons can not perform strategic missions against U.S. territory. Clarion - tay 4 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Guts Solvency – Plan doesn’t remove all nuclear weapons from Europe. No perception or relations advantage Clarion - tay 5 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ---AT: Russia O/W NATO NATO destabilization out-weights potential reciprocal reductions Woolf, Nuclear weapon specialist at the DoD, 8/10/09 (Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) Some argue that reducing or eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would not only address the Air Force‘s operational and security costs associated with their deployment, but also could serve as a signal to Russia of NATO‘s intentions to address Russia‘s perception of the threat from NATO. This, in turn, might encourage Russia to accept negotiated limits or transparency measures on its nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Some also believe that a NATO ―step away‖ from these weapons would encourage Russia to reduce its reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, t he authors of the Task Force study cited above hold a different view. They argue that U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO remain ―a pillar of NATO unity.‖ They argue that these weapons ―convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance.‖64 Removing these weapons from Europe would, therefore, do more to undermine NATO’s political unity and military security than it would to encourage Russia to reduce or contain its nonstrategic nuclear weapons . Clarion - tay 6 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ---EXT: Not All Tactical No solvency – plan only changes mission – the weapons stay where they are Woolf, Nuclear weapon specialist at the DoD, 8/10/09 (Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) Evenduring the Cold War, however, the United States and Russia deployed nuclear weapons that defied the standard understanding of the difference between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. For example, both nations considered weapons based on their own territories that could deliver warheads to the territory of the other nation to be ―strategic‖ because they had the range needed to reach targets inside the other nation‘s territory. But some early Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles had relatively short (i.e., 500 mile) ranges, and the submarines patrolled close to U.S. shores to ensure that the weapons could reach their strategic targets. Conversely, in the 1980s the United States considered sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) deployed on submarines or surface ships to be nonstrategic nuclear weapons. But, if these vessels were deployed close to Soviet borders, these weapons could have destroyed many of the same targets as U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Similarly, U.S. intermediate-range missiles that were deployed in Europe, which were considered nonstrategic by the United States, could reach central, strategic targets in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, some weapons that had the range to reach ―strategic‖ targets on the territory of the other nations could also deliver tactical nuclear weapons in support of battlefield or tactical operations. Soviet bombers could be equipped with nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles; U.S. bombers could also carry anti-ship weapons and nuclear mines. Hence, the range of the delivery vehicle does not always correlate with the types of targets or objectives associated with the warhead carried on that system. This relationship between range and mission has become even more clouded since the end of the Cold War because the United States and Russia have retired many of the shorter and medium-range delivery systems considered to be nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Further, both nations may develop the capability to use their longer-range ―strategic‖ systems to deliver warheads to a full range of strategic and tactical targets, even if longstanding traditions and arms control definitions weigh against this change. Prefer our evidence – we postdate and cite congressional records Clarion - tay 7 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg International Signal Frontline No perception-based solvency- no formal treaty means countries don’t trust withdraw William POTTER, CNS director AND Nikolai SOKOV, senior associate @ CNS, 1-4-01 [―Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Nature of the Problem‖,p. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/tnw_nat.htm] This assessment of the informal TNW regime provides a useful lesson about the inherent limitations of unilateral and/or parallel actions as a method of disarmament. In the last several years, this method has become popular among proponents of disarmament, probably in response to the stalled START II ratification in Russia and disillusionment with the overall progress of US-Russian nuclear arms reductions. Enthusiasm about unilateral actions, however, is as much a sign of desperation as optimism. In fact, opponents of disarmament also promote unilateralism and claim that treaties are not really necessary. One can imagine how the ongoing debate about the ABM Treaty would look if the Treaty were instead an informal regime consisting of unilateral statements by Brezhnev and Nixon. To be sure, unilateral parallel measures may facilitate disarmament by circumventing lengthy formal negotiations and even more difficult ratification processes. They allow countries to implement quickly measures that they are ready to undertake anyway and only need a sign from the other side that their initiative will be reciprocated. At the same time, they overlook the most basic properties of international regimes, which guarantee stability and insure against withdrawal. Unilateral measures only make sense if they are complemented subsequently by formal negotiations, which lead to legally binding agreements replete with verification provisions. In this respect, 1991 and 1992 represent not only the years of achievement on TNW disarmament, but also a period of a missed opportunity: a unique time when the United States was already and Russia was still in favour of TNW reductions. In short, unilateral measures are most effective as a precursor to formal treaties, not as their substitute. No solvency: Verification must include modernization of storage and transportation facilities Larsen, Senior Policy Analyst: Science Applications International, 2001 (Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities pp 99, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk) are, for example, Command and control is not so much an obstacle to NSNW arms control as it is a mutual concern of the nuclear possessor states. There worrisome questions about old or nonexistent permissive action links, pre-delegated launch authority, security practices at storage sites and during transport, and the possibility of theft or accounting mismanagement of manportable systems .6 Clarion - tay 8 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Russian Reductions Frontline Turn: Unilateral reductions prevents Russian reductions Lewis and Gabbitas, Atlantic Council, 99 (George and Andrea, ―What should be done about TNWs‖, occiasional paper, March 1999) The United States and Russia/Soviet Union have significantly reduced their TNW stocks from their peak holdings. All of these reductions have occurred either through unreciprocated unilateral reductions or through the mutual unilateral initiatives of 1991. The great advantage of such mutual unilateral steps is that they can be carried out very quickly by the presidents, without a lengthy or complex negotiation process or the need for ratification, leaving details to be filled in later. Why not simply continue this unilateral process? A number of issues need to be kept in mind when considering such an approach, including: First, the previous TNW reductions were essentially limited to weapons that neither country had any important interest in keeping (of course, this has been true in most, if not all, nuclear reductions to date). It is not clear that either country, and Russia in particular, is immediately willing to part unilaterally with all its remaining TNWs. Second, the effectiveness of some types of unilateral reductions could be limited by the great asymmetry that now exists between Russian and U.S. TNWs (of which there are only two kinds). For example, consider a unilateral U.S. elimination of its nuclear Tomahawk SLCMs: While Russia could conceivably eliminate all its naval TNWs in return, this seems unlikely, given the perceived Russian need for these weapons to counter the U.S. Navy. Thus the U.S. initiative might be met by some more limited step such as a Russian elimination of its nuclear Tomahawk counterpart, the SS-N-21 long-range nuclear SLCM. Such an exchange would eliminate all U.S. naval TNWs while affecting only a small portion of Russia‘s naval TNWs, leaving little incentive for Russia to consider further limits on its naval TNWs. Third, as the previous example illustrates, some significant types of U.S. unilateral reductions, such as reductions in SLCMs or the withdrawal of TNWs from Europe, could interfere with reductions by reducing Russian incentives to negotiate. The U.S. could put pressure on Russia by threatening to reverse such steps if Russia does not respond, but at the risk of a major setback for TNW arms control if it was actually necessary to carry out this threat. A particularly difficult dilemma could be posed if Russia responded, but with a move that fell short of U.S. expectations . Finally, unilateral commitments are not legally binding and may be viewed as more easily reversible than a treaty commitment . Moreover, unilateral reductions may not involve verification or even data exchanges. Despite the 1991 initiatives, only very rough information about Russian holdings of TNWs is currently available, and doubts are sometimes raised about whether Russia is in full compliance with its unilateral commitments. Any uncertainty created by the potential reversibility and lack of verification of any measures on TNWs will likely become more important as strategic weapons are further reduced in number. They won’t reduce – Russian analysis proves Woolf, Nuclear weapon specialist at the DoD, 8/10/09 (Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) Finally, for many in Russia, NATO‘s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 underlined Russia‘s growing weakness and NATO‘s increasing willingness to threaten Russian interests. Its National Security Concept published in 2000 noted that the level and scope of the military threat to Russia was growing. It cited, specifically, as a fundamental threat to its security, ―the desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security.‖ There are also threats in the border sphere. ―A vital task of the Russian Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and its allies.‖ Consequently, Russia concluded that it “should possess nuclear forces that are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.‖41 The debate over the role of nuclear weapons in Russia‘s national security strategy considered both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. With concerns focused on threats emerging around the borders of the former Soviet Union, analysts specifically considered whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons could substitute for conventional weaknesses in regional conflicts. The government appeared to resolve this debate, in favor of the modernization and expansion of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 1999, shortly after the conflict in Kosovo. During a meeting of the Kremlin Security Council, Russia‘s President Yeltsin and his security chiefs reportedly agreed ―that Moscow should develop and deploy tactical, as well as, strategic nuclear weapons.‖42 Clarion - tay 9 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ---No Reciprocity Russia won’t reduce- empirically proven New York Post, 9/7/09 (Peter Brooks, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/don_get_scammed_by_russia_again_bMq6vAe17UkGwNosvttQoM) AMERICAN and Russian teams will start another round of talks in Vienna as early as today on a new nuclear-arms- reduction pact to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Problem is Russia isn't meeting its obligations on some old arms-control agreements. It's no small matter -- but the question is: Will the Obama administration make an issue of it? Some analysts fear that, with President Obama keen for a nuke-free world, US negotiators might be willing to look the other way to reach an accord with Russia, despite a record of non-compliance with existing arms-control agreements. Sponsored Links So what are the Russkies scamming on? Tactical nuclear weapons: President George Bush (41) and his Soviet/Russian counterparts, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, adopted the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) to dramatically reduce tactical nuke arsenals. Earlier this year, a congressional panel, the Strategic Posture Commission, reported that Russia is "no longer in compliance with its PNI commitments" -- leaving Moscow with what some say could be a 10:1 advantage in "battlefield" nukes. No reduction – Russia considers TNWs crucial to national security Washington Times, 09 (Battlefield nukes not in play; U.S.: Not enough time for consideration before new pact, April 16, 2009, l/n) The Obama administration handed Russia an early arms-control gift last week. It was much more meaningful than the symbolic "reset" button Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gave Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva last month, which was meant to mark a new start to the relationship after years of tension. The gift was not material, but it satisfied a longtime Russian wish - keeping so-called tactical nuclear weapons out of negotiations on arms reductions - and Sergey Kislyak, the Russian ambassador to Washington, was more than happy to receive it. Mr. Kislyak was one of two speakers on a panel during the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's annual nonproliferation conference. The other speaker was Rose Gottemoeller, the new assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance. She will be the chief U.S. negotiator of a follow-on to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Moscow, which expires in December. One of the issues brought up during the session had to do with tactical nuclear weapons, also known as nonstrategic bombs for possible battlefield use that do not require long- distance delivery vehicles, such as missiles, as do strategic weapons. "My own view is that the immediate START follow-on negotiations will not be the area where that issue is immediately pursued," Ms. Gottemoeller said. That comment visibly pleased Mr. Kislyak, who said that Washington and Moscow "have enough work to do now to focus on things that are doable, because when you go to substrategic [arms], there will be a lot of other things that need to be entered into the play." Both officials attributed their intention to exclude tactical weapons from the upcoming post-START negotiations to the lack of sufficient time, given that the two countries want a new agreement to be concluded before the 1991 treaty's expiration. "I certainly believe we should begin exploring the issues with the Russian Federation and decide how to fit that into the agenda," Ms. Gottemoeller said, adding that President Obama believes that "this is an area that should be" dealt with at some point. Critics say, however, that Russia has much more to gain from delaying tactical-arms cuts because it has several thousand such weapons, while the U.S. only has several hundred. "There is real danger in rushing to reduce U.S. nuclear strategic weapons, while at the same time thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons remain available for use against us and our allies that exceed the total remaining strategic U.S. arsenal," said Peter Huessy, president of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense-consulting firm. Both the U.S. and Russia reached the levels required by START at the beginning of the decade, so they set new requirements in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Treaty of Moscow, which was negotiated by the Bush administration. SORT required that both countries reduce their arsenals to levels of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. They’ll pocket unilateral. Russian perception & History prove Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ It is far more likely that the Russians would simply ―pocket‖ the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. NSNF as something they had always demanded. Under both Soviet and Russian rule, Moscow has considered the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe not simply threatening to its security, but politically illegitimate, a symbol of U.S. intrusion into Moscow‘s rightful sphere of influence. 92 From a Russian perspective, the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe would be rectifying an old injustice and imposition, rather than offering a signal for Russian NSNF disarmament. For the Alliance, even if Russian NSNF numbers could thereby be numerically reduced, there would be little or no strategic gain. Russia would then hold a monopoly on NSNF from Clarion - tay 10 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg the Atlantic to the Chinese border. Moscow‘s NSNF holdings would be unverifiable, but would probably remain in the thousands. If drastic reductions in NATO NSNF since 1991 have not led Moscow to resolve the massive uncertainties in the West about Russia‘s NSNF, why should it be expected that complete withdrawal (entirely removing the Alliance‘s leverage) would bring about a response that NATO could regard as satisfactory? Conventional gap prevents unilateral reciprocation Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ Nor is it clear that a unilateral withdrawal of the remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe would, in the words of Potter and Sokov, ―help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives.‖ The spirit of the 1991-1992 initiatives was hopeful improvisation during a period of uncertainty and perceived urgency, in view of events in the Soviet Union and the difficulties in devising a formal NSNF arms control regime. In retrospect, Russians generally dismiss the hopefulness of the early 1990s regarding Russian cooperation with the United States and the West as a whole as ―romantic‖ and ―naive.‖91 In the intervening period, Russian conventional forces have drastically deteriorated, and the utility of NSNF in Russian eyes has correspondingly mounted . It is therefore doubtful whether a unilateral removal of the remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe would somehow ―jump-start‖ negotiations with Russia about its NSNF. Other security motives stop unilateral reciprocation: Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ In other words, while the remaining U.S. NSNF in Europe constitute some of America‘s most important means of bargaining leverage, their value in this regard is inescapably limited by Russia‘s overriding national security priorities. To a significant extent, as indicated earlier, the Russians attribute utility to their NSNF for reasons other than NATO‘s NSNF.93 Russian interests in using NSNF to deter powers other than NATO (such as China), to substitute for advanced non-nuclear precision-strike systems, and to ―de-escalate‖ regional conflicts (among other functions attributed to NSNF) would not be modified by a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNF from Europe . Russian security depends on TNWs – means no reciprocity Larsen, Senior Policy Analyst: Science Applications International, 2001 (Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities pp 109-110, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk) For Russia, NSNW are seen as a useful means of assuaging national security and prestige concerns. They compensate for weakened conventional forces, reply to past and future NATO expansion, protect against NATO intervention in critical regions, and are a response to threats to the homeland from Central Asian or Middle Eastern rogue states and terrorists. As some Russian experts note, ―Russia considers [NSNW] as an important political instrument to answer the U.S. and NATO‘s efforts to attain military superiority. In particular [NSNW] is considered as an equalizer for NATO‘s superiority in conventional weapons.‖4 NSNW is also seen as a hedge against future developments in China, the majority of whose forces are short and intermediate- range and would have to be taken into account by Moscow in agreeing to any NSNW limits. Ultimately, NSNW are also seen as a potential counter to U.S. national missile defense (NMD deployment.5 Russia is reluctant to reduce their TNW arsenal – multiple reasons. Alistair Millar, VP, Fourth Freedom Forum, director D.C. office, 2002 [May, Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_05/millarmay02.asp] Russia‘s reluctance to restrict further its tactical arsenal stems more from demonstrable military need. Russia‘s economic straits have made the cost of maintaining conventional military hardware and supporting personnel unmanageable, and Russia‘s military may be further stressed by future rounds of NATO expansion. Russia has sought to make up for the Clarion - tay 11 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in its military forces by, in 1993, officially abandoning its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict and, in 2000, placing increased emphasis on the combat role its tactical nuclear arsenal would play in a defense of Russia. Russian defense analysts have articulated a number of roles for tactical nuclear weapons, including compensating for weaknesses of conventional forces brought on by economic retraction, serving as placeholders of Russian status and prestige in the post-Cold War world, preventing regional conflicts, and serving as deterrents against strategic escalation.14 Clarion - tay 12 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ---No Verification/Transparency Unilateral assures no transparency. Crisis instability results Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ Comparable problems burden other proposals for a withdrawal of U.S. NSNF. Lewis Dunn and Victor Alessi recently proposed that the United States withdraw its remaining NSNF from Europe in return for Moscow‘s agreement to ―corral‖ its NSNF at central storage sites (thereby, it is argued, reducing the risk of diversion and narrowing Russian deployment and use options). Dunn and Alessi called for ―coordinated unilateral actions‖ by Russia and the United States, rather than the purely unilateral U.S. action proposed by Potter and Sokov. However, one of the results would be the same: the elimination of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. As with the Potter-Sokov proposal, the Dunn-Alessi proposal is grounded in hopes that a U.S. NSNF withdrawal would elicit Russian restraint and transparency.90 In practical terms, however, the U.S./Russian NSNF asymmetry in numbers would probably be magnified; reliable verification of the numbers of Russian NSNF inside (and outside) the ―corrals‖ might well be impossible, especially in a crisis, when it would matter most; and NATO would have lost the political-military ―coupling‖ and other security functions of U.S. NSNF in Europe. Clarion - tay 13 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ---SQ Solves Russian and US committed to reductions in 2010 BBC, 09 (Russian newspaper examines outlook for new Russian-US arms talks, April 6, 2009, l/n) One way or another, Moscow and Washington are prepared, it would seem, for compromise. The influential New York Times believes that the process, on the start of which Obama and Medvedev reached agreement yesterday, will be broken down into two phases. Owing to the imminent expiration of START I, the parties will first concentrate on a document preserving the system of inspections and verification specified by START I and will negotiate a reduction in warheads to roughly 1,500. Next year , possibly, Russia and the United States will arrive at a consensus regarding a reduction in the number of warheads to 1,000 and also limitations on delivery systems and, possibly, tactical nuclear weapons, the publication surmises. But the experts have yet even to sign off on these specific parameters. Clarion - tay 14 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg At: Russia TNW Missions --- 9 Roles for Russia’s nuclear weapons –TNW priority Larsen, Senior Policy Analyst: Science Applications International, 2K1 Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities pp 121-123 http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk The fourth reason for a low level of interest in NSNF arms control is that Russian military doctrine and policy assign several important functions to Russia‘s nuclear weapons and to NSNF in particular. Indeed, depending on how they are counted, at least nine functions for Russia‘s NSNF have been discussed in the professional Russian military literature in recent years, and these discussions seem to have become more intense since early 1999 — that is, since NATO‘s intervention in the Kosovo crisis. The general functions for nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine are to deter aggression and, if that fails, to repel it. The most authoritative statements appear to be deliberately vague about the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons. In January 2000, the national security concept indicated that ―The Russian Federation envisages the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles: use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear weapons, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective.‖12 In April 2000, the new military doctrine stated that ―The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.‖13 Clarion - tay 15 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****RUSSIA ADVANTAGE**** Clarion - tay 16 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Russia Relations Frontline 1. Non-unique: US-Russia relations are high – Cooperation on energy talks, North Korea, the Mid-East Road Map, and Iraq all should have caused the impacts to the advantage. 2. Turn – Russian Nationalism: A. Cooperation with the U.S. over TNWs angers ―New Russian Liberals,‖ and causes a new wave of nationalism. Washington Times, February 3, 98 [lexis] In searching for an acceptable explanation for Russia‘s failures, liberals broke away from ―old liberals‖ and offered a ―new‖ ideology. Since 1996, ― new liberals‖ have been among the most influential politicians in the Kremlin. ―New liberals‖ now operate with an ideology that borrows many elements from the doctrines of communism and nationalism, the most ardent adversaries of liberal reforms in Russia. The first deputy of the premier, Boris Nemtsov (with the approbation of President Boris Yeltsin) became the major advocate of the liberal credo, which has gained in status as the official ideology. ―New liberals‖ still accept the principles of the market economy. However, they reject the ―old liberal‖ belief that Russia must follow the Western model of liberal capitalism. They consider the market insufficient for effective regulation of economic and social life. The new liberal ideology has begun to praise the strong Russian state as a force capable of creating progress in society. Speaking on the eve of the new year, Mr. Yeltsin declared the quintessence of the new official ideology: ―the country‘s continuing problems have been caused by the blind embrace of the Western-style capitalist ideology and the disregard for traditional social values.‖ What is more, ―new liberals‖ now side with Russian exceptionalism. They even go so far as to speak as extreme nationalists, about the new missionary role of the post-communist Russia in the world. In contrast to the Gaidar brand of liberals, ―new liberals‖ are respectfully interested in Soviet history. A December, 1997, issue of Nezavisimaya Gazeta highlighted in the KGB on its 80th anniversary as a glorious organization. Having rejected the West as the paragon for a new Russia , ―new liberals‖ now see the West not as an ally, (as old liberals did when Andrei Kozyrev was minister of foreign affairs), but as a rival. While ―old […cont‘d…] liberals‖ have been silenced, especially on foreign issues, unfriendly attitudes toward the West now are a fixture of Russian public life. Russian ―new liberals‖ use the West as a scapegoat for Russian economic problems. They believe Western countries, especially the U.S., are afraid of Russian economic prosperity and competition. ―New liberals‖ claim that Western financial aid fell far short of what was necessary for Russian economic takeoff. They upbraid Europe and America for the creation of various artificial hindrances for Russian exports to the west and to other countries like Iran and India. ―New liberals‖ are also irritated by Western support for Ukranian sovereignty as well as by the active Western economic relationships with other former Soviet republics, particularly activities in the oil rich area around the Caspian Sea. What is more, most, if not all active politicians, even those who enjoyed unblemished reputations as staunch democrats, for example Galina Starovoitova, now deem it necessary to exhibit a critical attitude toward the West. B. The impact Turns Case - Russian nationalism leading to nuclear war, economic destruction, prolif, and democide DAVID (Prof. Poli Sci @ Johns Hopkins) 99 [Steven, ―Saving America From the Coming Civil Wars‖, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1999, Vol. 78, no. 1 //mac-tjc] If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have Clarion - tay 17 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces . And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war 3. The impact is empirically denied – Strains in U.S.-Russian relations are always resolved – no risk of conflict. Clarion - tay 18 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: Relations High Now Clarion - tay 19 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg AT: Russia is gearing for war Russian military modernization is political, not militarily agressive Financial Times, 07 (London Edition, Seathe the sabres Russian bombers pose political, not military, threats, p. 10, l/n) Pictures of Russian bombers patrolling the Atlantic bring a chill to the hearts of those who recall the cold war. But this emotional reaction should not mean the world faces a new east-west armed confrontation. Nor should the US or European Union be unduly concerned byrecent increases in Russian defence spending. These are political, not military, gestures. President Vladimir Putin's aim is to recover some of the prestige and power lost with the Soviet Union's collapse. The president is exploiting Russia's position as an energy supplier to gather influence, especially in the former Soviet bloc. He is also trying to restore Russia's role as the dominant political force in the former Soviet Union, even at the risk of provoking violence, as in the conflict with Georgia. Finally, he is raising the temperature in the strategic weapons arena, responding, as he sees it, to an increased threat from the US in the form of American plans for anti-missile bases in eastern Europe. He is even questioning the arms control treaties that have underpinned east-west relations for decades. The Kremlin is playing to foreign and domestic audiences. Abroad, it is projecting itself as an alternative power centre in a US-dominated world. At home, it is using patriotism to bolster its popularity before next year's presidential elections. Domestically, the policy is working, boosting Mr Putin's sky-high ratings. Globally, the results are mixed. While there is plenty of antipathy towards the US, notably over Iraq, Russia has not succeeded in exploiting it for its own benefit. The military risks of Russia's sabre-rattling are low. Even with recent increases its defence budget is only 5 per cent of the US's. Russia faces huge managerial difficulties updating its Soviet-era arsenals. While it possesses first-class scientists, its military industry is a shadow of its former self. Kremlin officials know that trying to compete with the US in the cold war broke the Soviet Union - and rightly have no intention of repeating that appalling mistake. However, Mr Putin's belligerence comes at a serious political cost. It poisons the atmosphere between Russia and the west and makes co-operation more difficult, including on issues close to Moscow's heart, notably Islamist terrorism, Middle East stability, nuclear proliferation and the need to review cold war arms control treaties. The best response for the US and the EU is to try to co-ordinate policy towards Russia, tone down the rhetoric and hope the Kremlin adopts a less belligerent tone after next year's election. Clarion - tay 20 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Trojan Horse Frontline Turn: Trojan Horse. More Russian fear due to strategic precision strike Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ Proposals for a unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear forces in Europe are sometimes associated with questionable assumptions. In April 2000, for example, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov argued that ―it may be desirable for the United States to declare its intention unilaterally to return to U.S. territory all of its air-based TNW [tactical nuclear weapons] currently deployed in Europe. This pronouncement, which would lead to the elimination of all U.S. TNW in Europe, could go a long way toward dispelling Russian fears about NATO and could help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives.‖88 The extent to which this initiative would ―go a long way toward dispelling Russian fears about NATO‖ might be limited, however, for Russia‘s greatest misgivings about the Alliance concern its enduring political cohesion; its demographic, economic, and military potential, including the large U.S. and still significant British and French strategic nuclear arsenals; its policies such as an ―open door‖ regarding further enlargement; and its advanced non-nuclear strike capabilities and demonstrated effectiveness in employing them. Indeed, in an effort to infer a rational basis for such an initiative on NATO‘s part, Russian analysts might well conclude that their hypothesis that U.S. and Allied non-nuclear precision strike systems are approaching (or exceeding) the effectiveness of nuclear weapons would be vindicated by the U.S. withdrawal of the remaining NSNF in Europe. The Russian fears about NATO might, in other words, remain virtually unchanged or perhaps even be deepened . Turn: Mixed Message: Russia fears the plan as overwhelming NATO conventional dominance & encourages Russian overreach. Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ It is nonetheless plausible that the Russians would be pleased if the United States unilaterally withdrew its remaining NSNF from Europe if they interpreted it as a lessening of U.S. will and commitment, a decrease in NATO‘s political-military capabilities, and the elimination of the ―coupling‖ and ―transatlantic link‖ and other political-military functions of U.S. NSNF in Europe. The Russians and key observers in NATO Europe might consider the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear presence evidence of America‘s decreased willingness to defend its Allies with nuclear means. Moscow might then expect its European neighbors to become more deferential to Russia, in view of the perceived change in the balance of power and commitments, with unpredictable consequences. The withdrawal of U.S. NSNF could thus have counterproductive and even dangerous geopolitical consequences, because of the conclusions that could well be drawn in Russia and Europe about U.S. security commitments. The risks and costs associated with a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNF from Europe would therefore outweigh the putative gain of assuaging Russian anxieties and suspicions about NATO. Moscow‘s expressed fears are at any rate generally based on misperceptions and misrepresentations about NATO.89 The withdrawal of the remaining U.S. NSNF could create an unstable situation in Europe by sending a message of U.S. disengagement and encouraging Russian great power aspirations and behavior. Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. NSNF would imply that Russian NSNF do not need to be balanced with even a minimum amount of comparable capabilities. This would be a huge misstatement about NATO‘s security interests and requirements. The Alliance would in effect be accepting Russian arguments that (despite NATO‘s conciliatory policies, non-aggressive record toward Russia, and structural need for laboriously achieved unanimity among its 19 members for any operation other than self-defense) NATO is so inherently powerful via other means that it could give up U.S. NSNF in Europe — as if Russian perceptions of NATO as interventionist and hegemonic could only be diminished by this sacrifice of U.S. and Alliance capability and the severing of this transatlantic link . Clarion - tay 21 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: Trojan Horse Fear of precision strike gap means Russia will increase reliance on TNWs Dr. David Yost, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Professor of National Security Affairs, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ The seventh function of NSNF is to substitute for advanced longrange non-nuclear precision strike systems that, Russian authorities hold, ―have begun to approach the role of nuclear weapons‖ in their significance.31 Indeed, some Russian military experts hold that ―Precision weapons are coming close to and in some cases even surpass tactical nuclear weapons in terms of target kill effectiveness. The conditional barrier which separated nuclear and conventional weapons for a long time essentially already has been demolished.‖32 According to a Russian military analysis, ―Modern day longrange, including non-nuclear, strike resources of the eventual enemy allow him to effectively accomplish a sufficiently wide range of offensive missions, including those like complete isolation of the theater of war, combating the second strategic echelon, disorganizing and disrupting military production. Under these conditions, our natural argument in the battle for strategic initiative is still nuclear weaponry.‖33 Similarly, Alexei Arbatov has concluded that ―development and deployment of sophisticated military capabilities, analogous to that of NATO‘s massive, precision-guided, conventional air and naval potential, would for a long time be beyond Russia‘s financial capacity. Therefore, the most probable Russian response, a response that is already taking shape, would be to place even greater emphasis on a robust nuclear deterrence, relying on enhanced strategic and tactical nuclear forces and their C3I systems.‖34 Fear of conventional weakness motivates Russia Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ex NATO Fullbright Research Fellow, Science Applications International Corporation Strategies Group Senior Policy Analyst, Controlling Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 2001, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ David Yost then provides a superbly documented study of recent Russian perspectives on arms control and the role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. He points out that there are a number of reasons why Moscow would be uninterested in considering NSNW limits, not least of which is Russia‘s increasing reliance on nuclear weapons to overcome its economic decline and conventional military weakness. Clarion - tay 22 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****CHINA ADVANTAGE**** China Relations Frontline No China solvency - Too many other conditions Kenneth Allen, Center for Naval Analyses Senior Analyst, ex Henry L. Stimson Center Senior Associate, Controlling Non- strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 20 01, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ Based on discussions with several analysts, the prospects of involving China in discussions on NSNW arms control in the near future are almost non-existent. As a starting point, China does not even acknowledge that it has non-ballistic missile tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, China is still unwilling to even discuss any reductions of its own ballistic missile force, while it continues to modernize its overall force qualitatively and quantitatively. According to one U.S. State Department arms control official, There have been no bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control between the U.S. and China, although the U.S. has proposed a regular ―dialogue‖ on nuclear arms control issues to parallel the on-going dialogue on proliferation. Chinese officials have, at various times, indicated that the disparity between U.S. and Chinese strategic forces is so great that there is, in practice, nothing to negotiate until U.S. (and Russian) strategic nuclear inventories are significantly reduced. They have also emphasized their view that transparency, monitoring, or verification provisions that might be expected in such negotiations are not in China‘s interest. They have also reiterated China‘s own long-standing nuclear disarmament proposal, which calls on states to ―abandon‖ nuclear deterrence, adopt a no-first-use policy, withdraw all nuclear weapons from other countries, halt missile defense research, and conclude a convention on the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. 33 Clarion - tay 23 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****PROLIF ADVANTAGE**** Prolif Frontline – TNW Specific Turn: forward deployed TNWs discourage proliferation. Ramos, former adviser at the Department of Defense, 91 (Thomas F., Strategic Review, Vol 19, No.4, Pg. 41, Fall) Are there any plausible scenarios that would call for the use of nuclear weapons, especially theater nuclear weapons, in the next ear? Before attempting to answer that question, it is important to recognize that there are legitimate reasons for maintaining theater nuclear weapons independent of specific scenarios. The presence of nuclear weapons in forward deployed regions serves the purpose of sending an unequivocal message to all adversaries and allies about American intentions. The very presence of nuclear weapons in forward deployed areas can act as a deterrent against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, deployed theater nuclear forces deter use by a regional adversary of its nuclear weapons, and at the same time, their unequivocal message of U.S. commitment to a common defense helps to dissuade allies from having to deploy their own nuclear capabilities. Alt Causality – regional instability Turn: U.S. TNWs prevent preemption and escalation Quester, prof. in Dept of Govt and Politics at Maryland U, and Utgoff, deputy director of Strategy Forces and Resources division of IDA, 93 (George and Victor, Washington Quarterly, Winter, l/n) nuclear proliferation might be encouraged rather than discoused by such a U.S. failure to Yet the crucial paradox here is that maintain theater nuclear delivery systems. Such systems work to maintain the ablity of the United States to control escalation. First, the United States would be in a better position to discourage and deter any nuclear escalation by another nuclear power, making it to that power’s military disadvantage to use its nuclear weapons . Second, the United States could plausibly itself threaten to escalate whenever some other country perceived a military yor political adventage in its initial advantages with minimum damage to innocent civilian so as to leave the adversary with no good choices except to back off. Clarion - tay 24 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Prolif Frontline – NPT Internal ____ NPT regime will not collapse over the next two decades Perry & Schlesinger, former US Defense Secretaries, 2009 [America‘s Strategic Posture: The final report of the Congressional Commission on the strategic posture of the United States, [William; James], p. http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf] Looking ahead over the next decade or two, we reject the notion that somehow it is inevitable that international nuclear order will collapse. Despite the many challenges in the international security environment, there is no reason to accept as inevitable the collapse of the nonproliferation regime, a cascade of proliferation to new states, an associated dramatic rise in the risks of nuclear terrorism, and a return of competition for nuclear advantage among the major powers. On the contrary—the past successes of the United States and its international partners in meeting and reducing nuclear dangers make us more hopeful for the future. We embrace the possibility that over the next decade or two nuclear dangers will be further reduced. The risks of nuclear terrorism can be reduced through stronger cooperative measures to control their access to materials, technology, and expertise. The major powers can cooperate more effectively in service of nonproliferation, strategic stability among themselves, and steadily diminishing reliance on nuclear weapons. While the United States may not be able to prevent all proliferation, there may be some rollback of current programs and capabilities and also continued restraint by most. The United States and its allies and friends can be made to feel more secure and the pressures on others to seek nuclear weapons diminished. (p. 93) ___ No evidence of fast proliferation – 60 years has only produced nine nuclear weapons states – there’s no warrant for why nations who’ve had technology and watched India, Pakistan, and North Korea proliferate suddenly reverse course ___ No solvency – empirically the NPT fails – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea prove the regime can’t stop anyone ___ No solvency – Nuclear Power A. The NPT ensures the pursuit of nuclear energy Dunn, Senior Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation, 2009 [Lewis, Nonproliferation Review, July, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf] Looking backward, the participants in the 2010 RevCon will address in their own ways the specific issues explored in this analysis. As is to be expected, opinions will vary on how well the NPT has served its goals of preventing proliferation, fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and advancing toward a world without nuclear weapons. Suffice it to suggest: writ large, the NPT remains an essential part of global nonproliferation efforts but has come under increasing proliferation pressures in recent years and has specific nonproliferation mechanisms that need strengthening; the NPT provides an irreplaceable political-legal-cooperative underpinning for increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but also lends itself to misuse by countries seeking nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear programs; and the NPT commits all of the world‘s nations to nuclear disarmament, but the progress that has been achieved so far in pursuing that goal falls far short of what the non-nuclear weapon states expected at the NPT‘s creation four decades ago. B. Latent prolif means nuclear energy triggers prolif Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2009 [Henry, Policy Review, June-July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html, access 6-4-09] With a large reactor program inevitably comes a large number of foreign nuclear experts (who are exceedingly difficult to track and identify) and extensive training, which is certain to include nuclear fuel making.19 Thus, it will be much more difficult to know when and if a state is acquiring nuclear weapons (covertly or overtly) and far more dangerous nuclear Clarion - tay 25 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg technology and materials will be available to terrorists than would otherwise. Bottom line: As more states bring large reactors on line more will become nuclear-weapons-ready — i.e., they could come within months of acquiring nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.20 As for nuclear safeguards keeping apace, neither the iaea‘s nuclear inspection system (even under the most optimal conditions) nor technical trends in nuclear fuel making (e.g., silex laser enrichment, centrifuges, new South African aps enrichment techniques, filtering technology, and crude radiochemistry plants, which are making successful, small, affordable, covert fuel manufacturing even more likely)21 afford much cause for optimism. This brave new nuclear world will stir existing security alliance relations more than it will settle them: In the case of states such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, it could prompt key allies to go ballistic or nuclear on their own. ___ No probability of harm – their evidence merely identifies countries that can proliferation, not would proliferate – they have no warrant for motive ___ No Iran or North Korea modeling Blechman, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and Stimson Distinguished Fellow, 2009 [Barry, Don‘t Reduce the US Nuclear Arsenal Unilaterally: We Need Levers to Move the World Toward Disarmament, 1-21, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=734] Nor would a unilateral reduction help the US contain proliferation. Iran and North Korea will pursue their weapon programs depending on broad strategic, economic, and political considerations, whether the US has 1,000 or 5,000 weapons. In either case, they would be helplessly outnumbered and would depend on a US unwillingness to sustain even a single nuclear blast on its territory to deter American involvement in a regional crisis. ___ The NPT can’t solve – too limited and vulnerable to power politics Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] An anachronism from a bygone era, the NPT is not capable of responding to the challenges of today. Many believe that the NPT should be fixed, but this essay contends that the NPT‘s flaws are too elemental for the treaty to be salvageable. First, the text of the NPT fails to strike a tenable compromise between the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), as the former seem unlikely to ever live up to the ordained goal of full disarmament while some members of the latter continue to exploit NPT loopholes, such as the ability to legally acquire virtual nuclear weapons capacity. Second, the vigor of the NPT is at the mercy of realpolitik, as the members of the United Nations Security Council in particular often subvert the goals of the NPT in order to advance other goals. As such, the international community, including those of a legal mind, should recognize the NPT as a lost cause and begin the process of rebuilding the nonproliferation regime with new foundations in place. ___ States won’t give nuclear weapons to terrorists Boston Globe 2005 [Drake Bennett, 3-20, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/03/20/give_nukes_a_chance?pg=full] John J. Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago and another preeminent realist thinker, describes himself as closer to Waltz than to Allison on the issue. Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz, for example, that nuclear states, no matter how ''rogue,'' are unlikely to give their weapons to terrorists. Whatever its sympathies, Mearsheimer argues, ''Iran is highly unlikely to give nuclear weapons to terrorists, in large part because they would be putting weapons into the hands of people who they ultimately did not control, and there's a reasonably good chance that they would get Iran incinerated'' if the weapon was traced back to the regime in Tehran. ''Any country that gave [nuclear weapons] to terrorists who would use them against the US,'' Mearsheimer adds, ''would disappear from the face of the earth.'' Clarion - tay 26 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: Slow Prolif ___ No fast prolif – 50 years of evidence Boston Globe 2005 [Drake Bennett, 3-20, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/03/20/give_nukes_a_chance?pg=full] KENNETH N. WALTZ, adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, doesn't like the phrase ''nuclear proliferation.'' ''The term proliferation' is a great misnomer,'' he said in a recent interview. ''It refers to things that spread like wildfire. But we've had nuclear military capabilities extant in the world for 50 years and now, even counting North Korea, we only have nine nuclear countries.'' Clarion - tay 27 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: NPT no solv – History _____ NPT has a poor record in preventing proliferation Sherrill, adjunct professor at Florida State University, 2004 [Strategic Insights, May, [Clifton], p. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/may/sherrillMay04.asp] The NPT is a Cold War treaty that has failed to prevent states desiring nuclear weapons from pursuing them. Israel, India, and Pakistan never bothered to join. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya all pursued nuclear weapons programs despite NPT promises. The NPT‘s verification and enforcement regime has been questionable at best, as evidenced by the surprising scope of the now public Libyan program, the inability to detect North Korea‘s highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons program, and the blatant Iranian violations with respect to uranium enrichment programs. ___ No historical evidence of NPT effectiveness Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] Despite the inherent faults of the NPT, even vociferous critics of the NPT believe that this critical treaty has had and more importantly can continue to have a positive impact in stemming the tide of proliferation.8 It is unclear, however, that the NPT has had either a significant impact in curtailing the nuclear ambitions from years past or is relevant in the current era. The aforementioned inability of the NPT to provide any clear guidance on the legality of dual-use technologies regarding NNWS, the required rate of disarmament among NWS, or the prerequisites for sovereign withdrawal from the NPT, have allowed countries to essentially do what they would have done in the absence of the NPT. What is worse, if one is determined to find a causal effect attributable to the NPT, it may be that the NPT has at most functioned as a tool for proliferating nations, providing legal cover for their strategies. Clarion - tay 28 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: NPT no solv – Nuc Power ___ No NPT solvency – Article IV Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] Article IV, in the abstract, is commendable. No one wants the prohibitions on nuclear proliferation to be so draconian as to disallow developing nations from making nuclear technology part of their energy formula. Given the concerns about global warming and the finite amount of fossil fuels, peaceful nuclear energy may be more important than ever. Yet the naïve assumption that there is ―peaceful‖ nuclear energy here and ―martial‖ nuclear energy there has contributed greatly to the impotence of the NPT.4 Dual-use technology has made such a distinction rather worthless, and thus precludes the simple solution that Article IV tantalizingly offers. Nuclear technology, then, is largely an all-or-nothing proposition: once the Pandora‘s box of nuclear energy is opened in a country, there is an aura of inevitability about the development of nuclear weapons; that is, if the nation wants to convert its civilian energy program to military purposes, then there is little in the technological sense to prevent them from doing so. There may indeed be nations that have had large and sophisticated civilian programs and still have refrained from producing nuclear weapons, such as Japan, but there is little question that it is only a matter of political will, and not technological capabilities, that keep such a nation from taking the next step.5 Thus, a nation that may be technically within the confines of the NPT may well be acting contrary to its spirit, using the NPT as a perverse cover for its ultimate ambitions. If the international community truly wants to put a definitive end to nuclear proliferation, the only surefire route would be to embargo the use of all nuclear technology, which is clearly countenanced by no one on any side of the debate, from the United States (see their support for India‘s nuclear program) to Russia (see their support for Iran‘s nuclear program).6 ___ Promoting nuclear power as a reward for not producing bombs fails Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2009 [Henry, Policy Review, June-July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html, access 6-4-09] Consider the suggestion made in the 2008Nunn-Shultz-Perry-Kissinger Wall Street Journal op-ed (a follow-up piece to one they had written a year earlier) that advocated spreading ―civilian‖ nuclear power technology and large reactors to states that promise to forgo nuclear fuel making — a spread that would bring countries within weeks or months of acquiring nuclear weapons. The U.S. and most other states currently claim that all nations have an ―inalienable‖ right to make nuclear fuel.4 As a result, any state that promises to forgo exercising this right today could legally — once it has mastered how to make weapons-usable plutonium or uranium — change its mind and chemically separate weapons-grade material from its reactor‘s spent fuel or enrich the fresh fuel it has on hand without breaking any currently enforced legal requirement. In essence, this is what North Korea did despite pledging in a 1992 North-South denuclearization agreement not to reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium. Also, nuclear fuel-making efforts can be hidden. A small, covert plutonium chemical separation line, for example, might be built in a matter of months and, after a week of operation, produce a crude bomb‘s worth of weapons- usable plutonium per day. And there are ways that fresh and spent nuclear reactor fuel might be diverted to accelerate a bomb-making program without necessarily setting off any inspection alarms.5 All of this suggests that giving states everything they need to build and operate a large reactor, in exchange for pledges not to divert the technology or reactor fuel to make bombs, risks increasing the nuclear threats we already face. ___ PMN: civilian fuel easily convertable Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2009 [Henry, Policy Review, June-July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html, access 6-4-09] Compounding this worrisome prospect are large amounts of weapons-usable materials in military and growing civilian stockpiles that could be quickly militarized to create or expand existing nuclear bomb arsenals. Russia, for example, has at least 700 tons of weapons-grade uranium and over 100 tons of separated plutonium in excess of its military requirements, while the U.S. has roughly 50 tons of separated plutonium and about 160 tons of highly enriched uranium in excess of its military needs. As noted before, China‘s surpluses of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are already estimated to be large enough to allow Beijing to triple the number of weapons it currently has deployed.15 In addition, stockpiles of Clarion - tay 29 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg civilian materials that could be drawn upon to make additional bombs are large or growing. China, for example, is planning to complete two ―commercial‖ reprocessing plants by 2025 that will be able to produce each year enough material to make at least 1,000 crude nuclear weapons.16 Meanwhile, Japan, a nonnuclear weapons competitor of Beijing, already has roughly 45 tons of separated plutonium (much of which is stored in France), 6.7 tons of which is stockpiled on its own soil — enough to make roughly 1,500 crude nuclear weapons. Japan also will soon be separating enough plutonium at its newest commercial reprocessing plant to make between 1,000 and 2,000 crude-weapons-worth of separated plutonium a year. Almost all of this newly separated plutonium will be in surplus of Japan‘s civilian requirements and will be stored in the country.17 As for India and Pakistan, they have no declared military surpluses. India, however, has stockpiled roughly 11 tons of unsafeguarded ―civilian‖ reactor-grade plutonium — enough to make well over 2,000 crude fission weapons — and can easily generate over 1,200 kilograms of unsafeguarded plutonium annually. Pakistan has no such reserve but, like India, is planning to expand its ―civilian‖ nuclear generating capacity roughly twenty-fold in the next two decades and is stockpiling weapons-grade uranium. Both countries are increasing their nuclear fuel-making capacity (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing) significantly. Clarion - tay 30 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: NPT no solv – structure ___ The NPT is doomed to fail Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] The NPT has ultimately failed to create a sustainable regime by which all of the world‘s players feel obliged to follow the rules regarding their nuclear ambitions. Ironically, the NPT contains the seeds to its own destruction: there are the ―haves‖ and the ―have-nots‖ of the Treaty, drawing a contentious line between the leading nations of World War II (and a few newcomers) and all others; there is the provision in Article IV allowing countries to attain virtual nuclear weapons capacity; there is the amorphous provision in Article VI that allows presently armed nuclear nations to disarm according to their own dictates. As time has worn on and technology has naturally become more accessible and cheaper to all nations, the NPT has increasingly become impotent. States occupying the fringes of the world stage are no longer the afterthought scenarios in nuclear war scenarios; quite the contrary, they occupy the center stage of the current drama. ___ Multiple flaws in the NPT that the plan doesn’t overcome Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 [George, Current History, Nov, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/perkovich_current_history.pdf] The first flaw in the nonproliferation regime is the problem of maintaining political legitimacy and the will to enforce rules built on a double standard: one standard, less restrictive, for a few countries that possess nuclear weapons; and another, more demanding, for the vast majority that do not. A second flaw is the political failure of the UN Security Council‘s permanent members to cooperate in enforcing rules in tough cases. Third, the current rules for managing exports and the nuclear fuel cycle need to be updated in light of technological change and experience. Finally, the nuclear weapon states have failed to take seriously a core bargain obliging them to move toward nuclear disarmament. ___ Have/Have-not divide is inevitable – this kills NPT solvency Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] The NPT is usually described as some type of ―grand bargain‖ between the NWS and the NNWS.1 The particular provisions that embody the important trade are Articles IV and VI.2 Through Article IV, the NNWS promise to pursue only ―peaceful‖ uses of nuclear energy and furthermore to ensure that the sharing of such technology will not violate Articles I and II. Meanwhile, the NWS are bound via Article VI to fully disarm themselves. Thus, the NNWS are not to attain nuclear weapons, and the NWS are to give up those weapons which they already have. This neat solution seems too good to be true, and it truly is. As it turns out, neither NWS nor NNWS are content with the other side‘s compliance.3 Both sides can read into the NPT what they wish, and neither side is able to convince or compel the other side to adopt their interpretation. ___ No NPT solvency – Article VI is too hollow Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] Article VI, like Article IV, states a proposition that, on a general level, is unobjectionable. The problem, though, is that the proposition lacks detail. Although Article VI envisions ―strict and effective international control‖ over the process of disarmament of the NWS, other language within the Article cuts quite the other way in its laxity. Rather than imposing a deadline for the complete disarmament, the Article mentions no timeline whatsoever. This deadline looks even weaker when compared to the flaccid ―early date‖ set for the termination of the Cold War arms races, which at least was an attempt to quantify the relevant timeline. Rather than mandating negotiations between the NWS regarding disarmament in any relevant aspect such as time, place, or process, the Article instead leaves the negotiations only to the ―good faith‖ of the parties Clarion - tay 31 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg involved. Yet there is no defined arbiter of ―good faith,‖ leaving the evaluation of the progress of NWS in disarming to endless debate. ___ No solvency – Article X’s opt-out clause Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] Finally, Article X holds yet another chink in the NPT‘s armor. The NPT allows a nation to opt out of the treaty as long as the state, in its own discretion, determines that ―extraordinary events‖ have endangered the ―supreme interests‖ of the country. The threshold for withdrawal may seem high given the ―extraordinary‖ language, but as with the ambiguity surrounding what exactly is a ―peaceful‖ nuclear program given dual-use technology or what precisely ―good faith‖ means regarding disarmament, the actual outlines of Article X are too vague as to be useful. If Article IV is the favorite playground of Iran in its pursuit of ―the bomb,‖ then Article X is the favored tool of North Korea, as it withdrew—without penalty—from the NPT without an apparently grave enough circumstance to justify its departure. Clarion - tay 32 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: No enforcement ___ No enforcement – no domestic will to enforce Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006 [George, Current History, Nov, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/perkovich_current_history.pdf] In the decades since, states have evolved rules and institutions to govern nuclear exports, to safeguard and account for nuclear materials, and to control and even reduce the number of nuclear weapons. But the rules are not self-enforcing, as North Korea‘s October 9 nuclear test, and painful experience in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere have shown. Moreover, states and international agencies must struggle to mobilize the power needed to enforce and adapt the rules as conditions change. Doing so involves difficult trade-offs as states seek benefits commensurate with the options they forgo and the costs they bear. ___ No enforcement or punishment within the IAEA Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] There are two key components to an effective treaty regime, i.e., compliance: verification and, in the event of violation, sanction. Neither of these two critical pieces is actually working within the NPT framework. The verification process, pursued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is haunted by political and technological demons. Meanwhile, the sanctioning process is in an equally disreputable state of repair, subject to the enduring rivalries and whimsical vagaries of the rivals who sit upon the Security Council. Solutions have been proposed to both problems, but there is little hope that either the IAEA or the forces behind effective sanctions will soon be fixed. ___ IAEA lacks intelligence-gathering ability Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] Finally, the IAEA‘s intelligence capabilities have frequently been called into question.12 The counterintelligence methods at the IAEA have never been up to the task of keeping information within the agency, thus leading national intelligence agencies to withhold information from the agency. Meanwhile, the intelligence gathering aptitude of the agency has been revealed as lacking, as seen by how the recent events involving Syria and Israel caught the IAEA by surprise. As the IAEA‘s success depends not only upon its technical proficiency as embodied in the Model Protocol and similar mechanisms, but also upon its ability to gather and receive intelligence, the IAEA is clearly failing on multiple critical fronts. ___ Sanctions fail – Russia and China will block action Duvall, JD Candidate at UVA, 2009 [Kenneth, Perspectives on Global Issues, Spring, http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/0302/relic.pdf] None of the tenets of deterrent punishment have been met, as the sanctions have been neither swift nor severe nor certain. Russia and China have been loath to adopt the United States‘ hard-line stance on Iran and North Korea, respectively.14 On the Russian front, the tortured history of antagonistic relations between the United States and Russia augurs against a hopeful interpretation of recent actions by Russia against Iran. Having lost the Cold War, Russia has only modified rather than completely foregone its ambitions to compete with the United States.15 On the Chinese front, the burgeoning rivalry between the United States and China in general and Chinese concerns with the Korean peninsula in particular mean that there will be no such thing as a perfectly cohesive Sino-American interest.16 Simply put, the natural geopolitical tensions between the United States and both Russia and China are played out in microcosm within these regional proliferation scenarios, which is in kind no different than similar situations in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union took up different sides taken in disputes from the Middle East to Northeast Asia. In fact, the very same nations find themselves in the middle of current struggles between more powerful nations as they did in the past, though the alignments may have changed. Clarion - tay 33 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ___ The international community won’t act quickly enough to stop new dictators who’d use the bomb May, professor of engineering at Stanford and the codirector emeritus of Stanford‘s Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2008 [Michael, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec, BAS database] Nevertheless, if nuclear disarmament were pursued, what would happen if an existential threat to one or another country arose? The emergence of a demagogic leader bent on war, in the vein of Adolf Hitler or Saddam Hussein, who also has nuclear aspirations, could constitute such a threat. If such a threat were to arise, would there be a race to rearm? Could the international community prevent this, and could it act in a timely manner to stop opposing sides from obtaining nuclear weapons? Its record in such cases is poor. The international community did not take timely action in the case of Hitler or Saddam, nor did it confront many of the threats to states with less strategic importance to the major powers. It did not halt several of the more dangerous nuclear-armed states that exist today, and it may not act to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. In general, domestic and international political considerations have typically prevented action from being taken. ___ IAEA lacks enforcement capabilities Kessler, director of the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, and Steward, Research Scientist at Pacific Northwest National Lab, 2009 [Strategic Insights, April, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/kesslerApr09.html] IAEA controls, however, cannot always identify and alert the international community of proliferation. Moreover, even if the Agency identifies a proliferator, it has little to no enforcement power. The burden for managing and punishing proliferators is transferred to nation states acting through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Consensus votes in the UNSC provide the mechanism for invoking sanctions or other restraints on a proliferating nation. Clarion - tay 34 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Euro Prolif ___ Zero chance of Euro proliferation Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, 2009 [Mark, Proliferation Papers, Spring, http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/PP27_Fitzpatrick_Spring2009.pdf] It is doubtful that use would lead countries such as Sweden and Switzerland to again launch nuclear weapons development programs as they did in the 1950s, when they considered the atom to be just the latest evolution of modern weapons technology before they abandoned their programs around 1970.34 Since then, the non-proliferation norm has become so entrenched in the non-nuclear weapons states of Western Europe as to be unshakable even – or perhaps especially – in the event of re-use elsewhere. Clarion - tay 35 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****TERRORISM ADVANTAGE**** Terrorism Frontline No nuclear terrorism – multiple obstacles Chapman, columnist for Chicago Tribune, 08 (Steve, Who's Still Afraid of Osama?: Terrorists can't pull off the big one, 2/8/08, http://reason.com/news/show/124874.html) The events required to make that happen include a multitude of herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment— plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if Al Qaeda could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time—but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al Qaeda, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen. PALS prevents terrorist use Civiak, Head of Science Policy Research at the Congressional Rease3ch Service, Dr. of Physics from Pitt, 06 (Dr. Robert, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: A Slippery Slope to New Nuclear Weapons, www.trivalleycares.org/TVC_RRW_FNL.pdf, January 2006) To prevent accidental or unauthorized initiation of a weapon‘s normal firing systems, U.S. nuclear weapons have so-called enhanced nuclear detonation safety (ENDS) systems. The ENDS system typically includes at least one ―weak link‖ and two ―strong links.‖ All of them must be closed in order to arm and fire the warhead. The weak link is normally closed, but is designed to fail (open), like a circuit breaker, and prevent power from reaching the detonators in an abnormal environment, such as lightening, fire, or physical shock. The strong links generally isolate the systems that arm the warhead and fire the detonators from their power sources using devices such as motorized switches or mechanisms that physically interfere with the implosion until the proper arming sequence is followed. One strong link, called a Permissive Action Link (PAL) requires that the weapon receive properly coded electronic signals. Two different codes must be received simultaneously. This is the ―two man rule,‖ which ensures that any individual acting alone cannot arm a nuclear weapon. 29 The other strong link can be closed only by one or more particular environmental events or sequences of events that would occur during the normal delivery of the warhead. Such events may be a deceleration force, a temperature, or a pressure that would normally occur only during delivery. Thus, if terrorists were to somehow obtain a U.S. nuclear warhead, they could not detonate it, without first making complex internal adjustments. In the unlikely event that the terrorists were capable of making the necessary adjustments, the time required would provide a substantial opportunity for the U.S. to recover or destroy the weapon. Clarion - tay 36 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No extinction impact Frost, 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, ―Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,‖ Adelphi Papers, December) An existential threat. When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‗existential threat‘ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level Clarion - tay 37 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: PALs Solves Status quo solves - Permissive Action Links Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 96 (July 1996, l/n) Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are secured by systems similar to the sophisticated ―Permissive Action Links‖ (PALs) used by secure U.S. weapons. PALS prevent unauthorized or accidental use by employing multi-digit code systems to lock nuclear weapons against detonating. The United States provided the Soviet Union with the relevant technical know-how for these devices in the early 1960s. To make a credible threat, terrorists would not only have to seize a nuclear weapon, they would have to number in their ranks someone with specific knowledge about a particular explosive device. That possibility cannot be ruled out, but it is highly unlikely in view of the combination of requirements. Terrorists can’t steal it and even if they could, it’d be useless. John Mueller, department of political science at Ohio State University, 1/1/2008, The Atomic Terrorist, p. http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badkhen 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Smith and Hoffman 1997; Langewiesche 2007, 19). By 2007, even such alarmists at Anna Pluto and Peter Zimmerman were concluding that "It is probably true that there are no 'loose nukes', transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way (2007, 56). It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by al-Qaeda, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material--and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos and director of the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency from 2001 to 2004, "regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously" (2007, 93; see also Kamp 1996, 22; Milhollin 2002, 47-48). Safety devices prevent terrorist use Charles Ferguson, scientist-in-residence at Monterey Institute of International Studies, and William Potter, professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_4faces.pdf Clarion - tay 38 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Assuming that a terrorist group had acquired a weapon protected by PALs or other features preventing easy detonation, the group might attempt to disable or bypass these mechanisms at a safe location prior to transporting the weapon to its final target, or it might make preparations to do so at the detonation site. Unless assisted by sympathetic experts, terrorists would find it difficult, though not necessarily impossible, to master this requirement. Modern PALs, particularly those integrated into the weapon itself, are more difficult to defeat than older-generation PALs, which may still be characteristics of some Russian weapon systems. Facing these impediments, terrorists might attempt to open the weapon casing to obtain fissile material in order to produce their own improvised nuclear device, a strategy discussed in the next chapter. However, the act of prying open the bomb might result in terrorist blowing themselves up with the conventional high explosives associated with nuclear warheads. Security devices will thwart terrorist theft of nuclear weapons The San Francisco Chronicle, April 18, 2004, ―Assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism,‖ p. Lexis Michael May, a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed, and now a professor emeritus at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, said the technological hurdles to a terrorist bomb remain, realistically, quite high. He discounted the possibility terrorists could make use of a stolen warhead because of all the sophisticated security devices built into them. He also said it would be all but impossible for a non-state terrorist group to develop the capability of making its own weapons-grade uranium, because of the industrial infrastructure required Clarion - tay 39 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Russian PALs Solve PALS make Russia nukes useless to terrorists Steven Monblatt, Co-Executive Director, BASIC, 2007, Nuclear Terrorism: A U.S. Perspective, 2007, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN070425.pdf When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, thousands of nuclear weapons were left in poorly secured military sites in four countries. Over the years, there have been a number of reported attempts to obtain nuclear materials from the Soviet armories. In November 2001, for example, the Russian Defense Ministry reported two attempted break-ins at nuclear weapons storage sites. In August 2003 the deputy director of the organization that carries out repair work for Russian nuclear icebreakers and nuclear submarines was arrested in Murmansk for trying to steal nuclear materials. Russian tactical nuclear a weapons are a particular concern because of their portability. Russia still has at least 3,000 of these small but still devastating weapons. While theft of nuclear weapon would be a grave problem for the U.S., modern U.S. and Russian warheads are equipped with sophisticated devices to prevent unauthorized use that terrorists would find extremely difficult to bypass. Karl-Heinz Kamp, dir foreign and security policy, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, BAS, July/Aug 1996, p.34 (MHHAR3428) Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are secured by systems similar to the sophisticated "Permissive Action Links"(PALs) used to secure U.S. weapons. PALs prevent unauthorized or accidental use by employing multi-digit code systems to lock nuclear weapons against detonation. The United States provided the Soviet Union with the relevant technical know-how for these devices in the early 1960s. To make a credible threat, terrorists would not only have to seize a nuclear weapon, they would have to number in their ranks someone with specific knowledge about a particular explosive device. That possibility cannot be ruled out, but it is highly unlikely in view of the combination of requirements. Clarion - tay 40 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Outdated Claims Threats of nuclear terrorism disproved by longevity – threat arguments assume expired claims Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) Warnings about the possibility that small groups could fabricate nuclear weapons have been repeatedly uttered at least since 1946 when A-bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer agreed that "three or four men" could smuggle atomic bomb units into New York and "blow up the whole city" (Allison 2004, 104), a massive and absurd exaggeration of the capacity of atomic bombs of the time. Such assertions proliferated after the 1950s when the "suitcase bomb" appeared to become a practical possibility. And it has now been over three decades since terrorism specialist Brian Jenkins published his warnings about how the "widespread distribution of increasingly sophisticated and increasingly powerful man-portable weapons will greatly add to the terrorist's arsenal" and about how "the world's increasing dependence on nuclear power may provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction" (1975, 33). Or since John McPhee ominously reported that "to many people who have participated in the advancement of the nuclear age, it seem not just possible but more and more apparent that nuclear explosions will again take place in cities" (1974, 3). We continue to wait. Risk of nuclear terrorism decreasing substantially New Scientist, July 26, 2008, p. 8 The threat of nuclear terrorism has similarly diminished: improved security at nuclear facilities, the removal of fissile material from vulnerable sites in former Eastern bloc countries, and a tighter grip on smuggling have made it "hard to devise plausible scenarios for terrorists wiping out humanity with stolen nuclear materials", says William Potter of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. Clarion - tay 41 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Risk Exaggerated The risks of a cataclysmic terror attack are dramatically exaggerated Smil, Distinguished Professor at the University of Manitoba, 05 (Vaclav, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(2): June 2005, 201–236) Car accidents are perhaps the best example of the peculiar attitude with which humans treat voluntary risks that have a high-frequency rate but a low-fatality rate per event. They now cause worldwide nearly 1.2 million deaths a year (WHO 2003), but more than 90 percent of individual events involve the killing of just one or two people; these events are widely reported only when the per-event mortality rate rises (albeit in absolute terms it still remains fairly small): fog- or ice-induced pile-ups of scores of cars causing a dozen or more casualties are the most common instance. In sharp contrast is the attitude toward terrorist attacks: their fatalities are large, their potential dangers are real, but it is our self-inflicted terrorizing that wildly exaggerates both their likely frequency (the notion of ubiquitous complex terrorism) impact(suitcase nuclear bombs devastating cities, new bioterror plagues killing on massive scales). The risks of a terrorist attack are too small to act on Smil, Distinguished Professor at the University of Manitoba, 05 (Vaclav, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(2): June 2005, 201–236) Indeed, Chapman and Harris (2002) argued that the disproportionate reaction to the attacks of 9/ 11 was as damaging as the direct destruction of lives and property. Relative risks are best shown in terms of fatalities per person per hour of exposure, a risk assessment approach that was originally developed by Chauncey Starr (1969). I have used it to calculate a number of relevant US rates for a 15-year period between 1989 and 2004. Their plot in Figure 1 shows the risk of dying because of terrorism in the United States (including all 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center fatalities and the 995 fatalities from the Oklahoma bombing) to be only slightly higher than the risk of dying in a blizzard somewhere in the country. When the deaths of all US citizens attributable to terrorism are included—those from 1996 Saudi Khobar Towers and 1998 East African embassies bombing, from the Yemeni attack on the USS Cole and even from combat in Afghanistan and Iraq—the rate about doubles to 2x10–10, still an order of magnitude below the annual risk of homicide and three orders of magnitude below the annual risk of fatal car accidents. During the first five years of the twenty-first century the US highway death toll exceeded the 9/11 fatalities every single month; at times it was higher in just three weeks. And even one of the worst cases from recently leaked terrorist attack scenarios prepared by the Department of Homeland Security (Jakes 2005) does not imply an extreme risk. Spraying of anthrax from a truck driving through five cities over two weeks was estimated to kill 13,200 people; if these actions were to take place in metropolitan areas with populations of at least 2 million people each and be repeated every ten years, then even such an unlikely recurrence (and high fatality assumptions) would prorate to only 1.5x10–8 fatalities per person per hour of exposure, a risk lower than the risk of dying from an accidental fall and less than 1/30 of the risk due to driving. Many more deaths could be prevented while spending much less per life saved by investing in extreme weather education, safer stairways, and enforcement of lower speed limits and no-drinking-and-driving laws. But disproportionate reactions to fatalities arising from rare, involuntary, and spectacular risks will not be changed easily. Clarion - tay 42 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Can’t Build Bomb Terrorists can’t make a bomb – no technical knowledge Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. Thus, a set of counterterrorism and It is essential to note, however, that making nuclear experts interviewed in 2004 by Dafna Linzer for the Washington Post pointed to the "enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al-Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them." Allison nonetheless opines that a dedicated terrorist group, al-Qaeda in particular, could get around all the problems in time and eventually steal, produce, or procure a "crude" bomb or device, one that he however acknowledges would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97; see also Bunn and Wier 2006, 139; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 61). Terrorist construction impossible – too many steps Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) Because of the dangers and difficulties of transporting and working with plutonium, a dedicated terrorist group, it is generally agreed, would choose to try to use highly enriched uranium (Kamp 1996, 33; Keller 2002; Milhollin 2002, 46-47; Rees 2003, 44-45; Linzer 2004; Allison 2004, 96-97; Goldstein 2004, 131-32; Cameron 2004, 84; Wirz and Egger 2005, 500; Bunn and Wier 2006, 135; Langewiesche 2007, 21-23).8 The goal would be to get as much of this stuff as necessary (more than 100 pounds is required to reach critical mass) and then fashion it into an explosive.9 Most likely this would not be a bomb that can be dropped or hurled, but rather an "improvised nuclear device" (IND) that would be set off at the target by a suicidal detonation crew. The process is a daunting one, and it requires that a whole cascade of events click perfectly and in sequence. This is a key issue. Those, like Allison, who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb, argue that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle--that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But it is vital to point out that while it may be "not impossible" to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them rather quickly does approach impossibility . Let us assess the problem. Empirically disproven – attempts to sell weapons fail Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) Not only could the exchange prove to be a scam, it could also prove to be part of a sting--or become one. Although there may be disgruntled and much underpaid scientists in places like Russia, they would have to consider the costs of detection. A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist was once a national hero for his lead work on his country's atomic bomb. But when he was brought down for selling atomic secrets to other governments, he was placed under severe house arrest, allowed no outside communication or contact, including telephone, newspapers, or internet, and is reportedly in declining health (Langewiesche 2007, 75-76).10 Renegade Russian scientists who happen not to be national heroes could expect a punishment that would be considerably more unpleasant. Once it is noticed that some uranium is missing, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. There is something decidedly worse than being a disgruntled Russian scientist, and that is being a dead disgruntled Russian scientist. Thus even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the sneaky foreign terrorists might well quickly develop second thoughts and go to the authorities. Clarion - tay 43 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Can’t Build Bomb EXT Extend Mueller 7—even if terrorists obtain material they need technical know-how that their scientists don’t have, it took Pakistan 27 years to do it with a state funded program, terrorists have no ability to do this in secret No way terrorists can get bombs all their scenarios about stealing, getting one transfered, or them building one are false Chapman, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, Feb 8, 2008 [Steve, The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility _of_nuclear.html] Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved But remember: After unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. Clarion - tay 44 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Inat Borders Can’t smuggle weapons internationally Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a critical mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces (Langewiesche 2007, 48-50). Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes and, for a considerable fee, opium traders (for example) might provide expert, and possibly even reliable, assistance . But the routes are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of a handful of criminal and congenitally suspicious and careful regulators (Langewiesche 2007, 54-65). If they became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of these might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money likely to be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Moreover, it is not at all clear that people engaged in the routine, if illegal, business of smuggling would necessarily be so debased that, even for considerable remuneration, they would willingly join a plot that might end up killing tens of thousands of innocent people. 11 Size and distinct features makes international transport impossible – multiple reasons Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) The finished product could weigh a ton or more (Mark et al. 1987, 55, 60; Bunn and Wier 2006, 142). Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant country. This would presumably require trusting it to the tender mercies of the commercial transportation system, supplying a return address, and hoping that the employees and policing agencies, alerted to the dangers by news of the purloined uranium, would remain oblivious. Or the atomic terrorists could try to use established smuggling routes, an approach that, again, would require the completely reliable complicity of a considerable number of criminals. The enormous package would then have to be received by a dedicated and technically- proficient group of collaborators. For this purpose, it would be necessary earlier to have infiltrated such people into the country or else to have organized locals. In a still-secret 2005 report, the FBI allowed as how it had been unable to find a single true al-Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the United States after years of devoted and well-funded sleuthing (Ross 2005), something that apparently continues to be true.18 (In interesting synergy, that would be exactly the number of weapons of mass destruction uncovered by the U.S. military in Iraq over the same period.) They don‘t seem to have found any since that time, either. This does not conclusively prove either that there are no such cells in the United States or that al-Qaeda is incapable of infiltrating some in when the need arises, of course. But, while absence of evidence may not be conclusive evidence of absence, it should not be taken to be evidence of existence either . And while it is conceivable that locals could be organized for the destructive enterprise, they would of necessity have to be considerably higher up on brain chain than the ones so far apprehended--higher up, for example, than those who took violent jihadist videos into a store to be duplicated or who schemed to take down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch.19 The IND would then have to be moved over local and unfamiliar roads by this crew to the target site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion. And, finally, at the target site, the crew, presumably suicidal, would have to set off its improvised and untested nuclear device, one that , to repeat Allison's description, would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97). While doing this they would have to hope, and fervently pray, that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there have been no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing, after all this effort, doesn't prove to be a dud. Clarion - tay 45 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Cost Terrorists can’t afford the cost – multiple reasons Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) The discussion so far has neglected to consider the financial costs of the extended operation in all its cumulating, or cascading, entirely, but these could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, and people to pay--or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to The Cause, but t he vast conspiracy requires in addition the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Alarmists Zimmerman and Lewis (2006) suggest the entire caper could be pulled off for $10 million. The conspirators would be lucky to buy off three people with such a paltry sum. Moreover, the terrorists would be required to expose their ultimate goals to at least some of the corrupted, and at that point (if not earlier) they would become potential extortion victims. They could not afford to abandon unreliable people who know their goals (though they could attempt to kill them), and such people would now enjoy essentially monopoly powers ever to escalate their price. T he cost of the operation in bribes alone could easily become ten times the sum suggested by Zimmerman and Lewis. And even at that, there would be, of course, a considerable risk that those so purchased would, at an exquisitely opportune moment of their choosing, decide to take the money and run--perhaps to the authorities representing desperate governments with essentially bottomless bankrolls and an overwhelming incentive to expend resources to arrest the atomic plot and to capture or kill the scheming perpetrators. Clarion - tay 46 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Statistically Impossible Odds are three billion to one – do the math Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) In seeking to carry out their task, would-be atomic terrorists effectively must go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even dispiriting. To bias the case in their favor, one might begin by assuming that they have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of these obstacles even though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances they could successfully pull off the mission come out to be worse than one in a million, specifically they are one in 1,048,567. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the twenty hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion--specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (entirely realistic) level one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same- -or even smaller. For example there may be a few barriers, such as number 13, where one might plausibly conclude the terrorists' chances are better than 50/50. However, there are many in which the likelihood of success is almost certainly going to be exceedingly small--for example, numbers 4, 5, 9, and 12, and, increasingly, the (obviously) crucial number 1. Those would be the odds for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front (2004, 29), he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults (2004, 29-42).21 Putting aside the observation that few, if any, of these appear to have interest in hitting the United States except for al-Qaeda (to be discussed more fully below), the odds would remain long even with multiple attempts. If there were a hundred determined efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one one-hundredth of one percent at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three it would be about one in 50 million. If there were 1000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be less than one percent at the 50/50 level and about one in 50,000 at the one in three level.22 Terrorists can’t surpass the obstacles of using nuclear weapons Chapman, colomist for Chicago Tribune, 08 (Steve, Who's Still Afraid of Osama?: Terrorists can't pull off the big one, 2/8/08, http://reason.com/news/show/124874.html) The events required to make that happen include a multitude of herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment —plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if Al Qaeda could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time—but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al Qaeda, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen. Clarion - tay 47 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – List of Obstacles Lewis, UK Member of Parliament, 06 (Julian, Nuclear disarmament versus peace in the twenty-first century, International Affairs, Volume 82 Issue 4, Pages 667 – 673) Table 1: The atomic terrorist's task in the most likely scenario 1 An inadequately-secured source of adequate quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) must be found 2 The area must be entered while avoiding detection by local police and by locals wary of strangers 3 Several insiders who seem to know what they are doing must be corrupted 4 All the insiders must remain loyal throughout the long process of planning and executing the heist, and there must be no consequential leaks 5 The insiders must successfully seize and transfer the HEU, and the transferred HEU must not be a scam or part of a sting and it must not be of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence 6 The HEU must be transported across the country over unfamiliar turf while its possessors are being pursued 7 To get the HEU across one or more international borders smugglers must be employed, and they must remain loyal despite the temptations of massive reward money even while no consequential suspicion must be generated in other smugglers using the same routes who may be interested in the same money 8 A machine shop must be set up in an obscure area with imported, sophisticated equipment without anyone becoming suspicious 9 A team of highly skilled scientists and technicians must be assembled, and during production all members of the team must remain absolutely loyal to the cause and develop no misgivings or severe interpersonal or financial conflicts 10 The complete team must be transported to the machine shop, probably from several countries, without suspicion and without consequential leaks from relatives, friends, and colleagues about the missing 11 The team must have precise technical blueprints to work from (not general sketches) and must be able to modify these appropriately for the precise purpose at hand over months (or even years) of labor, and without being able to test 12 Nothing significant must go wrong during the long process of manufacture and assembly of the improvised nuclear device (IND) 13 There must be no inadvertent leaks from the team 14 Local and international police, on high (even desperate) alert, must not be able to detect the project using traditional policing methods as well as the most advanced technical detection equipment 15 No locals must sense that something out of the ordinary is going on in the machine shop with the constant coming and going of non-local people 16 The IND, weighing in a ton or more, must be smuggled without detection out of the machine shop to an international border 17 The IND must be transported to the target country either by trusting the commercial process filled with people on the alert for cargo of this sort or by clandestine means which requires trusting corrupt co-conspirators who also know about the reward money 18 A team of completely loyal and technically accomplished co-conspirators must be assembled within, or infiltrated into, the target country 19 The IND must successfully enter the target country and be received by the in-country co-conspirators 20 A detonation team must transport the IND to the target place and set it off without anybody noticing and interfering, and the untested and much-traveled IND must not prove to be a dud Clarion - tay 48 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Small Impact Nuke terrorism doesn’t cause extinction—no nuclear winter Dibb, emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, Feb 6, 2007 [Paul, No reason to live in climate of fear, The Australian, L/N] But how serious are the two threats that are being posed as existential ones: Islamic terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and global warming on the other? It is hard to take seriously the assertion that the threat from terrorism is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, as President George Bush would have us believe. The world has been plagued by terrorism before and while the current bout of extreme Islamic terrorism looks more dangerous, the same could have been said about the anarchists in the late 19th century (who assassinated eight heads of state including US president William McKinley). Even if Islamic terrorists use a nuclear weapon it will not be the end of the world. Let us not kid ourselves that it would compare in any way with the destruction brought about by a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union, which would have killed 160 to 180 million people in the first 24 hours. Indeed, the nuclear winter effect of all-out nuclear war could well have meant the end of the human race. No terrorist threat is comparable to that. Terrorism does not threaten civilization Patrick Buchanan, former Presidential candidate, former senior Ford adviser, MSNBC political analyst, September 21, 2007, ―Is Terrorism a Mortal Threat?‖ http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/09/is_terrorism_a_mortal_threat.html Terrorism, said Powell, is not a mortal threat to America. "What is the greatest threat facing us now?" Powell asked. "People will say it's terrorism. But are there any terrorists in the world who can change the American way of life or our political system? No. Can they knock down a building? Yes. Can they kill somebody? Yes. But can they change us? No. Only we can change ourselves. So what is the great threat we are facing?" History and common sense teach that Powell speaks truth. Since 9-11, 100,000 Americans have been murdered -- as many as we lost in Vietnam, Korea and Iraq combined. Yet, not one of these murders was the work of an Islamic terrorist , and all of them, terrible as they are, did not imperil the survival of our republic. Terrorists can blow up our buildings, assassinate our leaders, and bomb our malls and stadiums. They cannot destroy us. Assume the worst. Terrorists smuggle an atom bomb into New York harbor or into Washington, D.C., and detonate it. Horrible and horrifying as that would be -- perhaps 100,000 dead and wounded -- it would not mean the end of the U nited S tates. It would more likely mean the end of Iran, or whatever nation at which the United States chose to direct its rage and retribution. Consider. Between 1942 and 1945, Germany and Japan, nations not one-tenth the size of the U nited S tates, saw their cities firebombed, and their soldiers and civilians slaughtered in the millions. Japan lost an empire. Germany lost a third of its territory. Both were put under military occupation. Yet, 15 years later, Germany and Japan were the second and third most prosperous nations on Earth, the dynamos of their respective continents, Europe and Asia. Powell's point is not that terrorism is not a threat. It is that the terror threat must be seen in perspective, that we ought not frighten ourselves to death with our own propaganda, that we cannot allow fear of terror to monopolize our every waking hour or cause us to give up our freedom. For all the blather of a restored caliphate, the "Islamofascists," as the neocons call them, cannot create or run a modern state, or pose a mortal threat to America. The GNP of the entire Arab world is not equal to Spain's. Oil aside, its exports are equal to Finland's. Nuclear terrorism won’t cause extinction. Frost, 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, ―Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,‖ Adelphi Papers, December) applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‗existential threat‘ implies that a state such as the U nited S tates An existential threat. When could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the U nited S tates or any other large industrial state, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level Clarion - tay 49 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – Conventional Preferred Conventional weapons preferred Craig Whitlock, Washington Post Foreign Service, July 5, 2007, The Washington Post, ―Homemade, Cheap and Dangerous: Terror Cells Favor Simple Ingredients In Building Bombs,‖ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2007/07/04/AR2007070401814_pf.html Counterterrorism officials have warned for years that Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants have tried to obtain w eapons of mass d estruction, such as a nuclear device or chemical or biological weapons. In response, U.S. military and intelligence agencies have invested vast amounts of money to block their acquisition. So far, however, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have relied almost solely on simple, homemade bombs crafted from everyday ingredients -- such as nail-polish remover and fertilizer -- when plotting attacks in Europe and the United States. The makeshift bombs lack the destructive potential of the conventional explosives that rake Iraq on a daily basis. They are also less reliable, as demonstrated by the car bombs that failed to go off in London last week after the culprits tried to ignite them with detonators wired to cellphones. But other attempts have generated plenty of mayhem and damage, including the kitchen-built backpack bombs that killed 52 people in the London public transit system on July 7, 2005. "It makes no difference to your average person if somebody puts a car bomb out there that is crude or one that is sophisticated," said Chris Driver-Williams, a retired British major and military intelligence officer who studies explosive devices used by terrorist groups. "If it detonates, all of a sudden you've got a very serious device and one that has achieved exactly what the terrorists wanted." The advantages of homemade explosives are that they are easy and cheap to manufacture, as well as difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect. According to one expert, the peroxide-based liquid explosives that an al-Qaeda cell allegedly intended to use to blow up nine transatlantic airliners last summer would have cost as little as $15 a bomb. Terrorists prefer conventional weapons. Whitlock says they’re cheaper, easier to use, and accomplish the same goal. Even if nuclear weapons are desired, conventional weapons sufficiently fulfill terrorist needs. This is empirically proven by the continued use of conventional attacks and the absence of WMD attacks. And, history shows terrorists prefer low-scale, easy to use weapons Mueller, professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, Jan 1, 2008 [John, The Atomic Scientist: Assessing the Likelihood, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF] Keller suggests that "the best reason for thinking it won't happen is that it hasn't happened yet," and that, he worries, "is terrible logic" (2002). "Logic" aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won't happen: the task is bloody difficult. The science fiction literature, after all, has been spewing out for decades--centuries, even--a wealth of imaginative suggestions about things that might come about that somehow haven't managed to do so. We continue to wait, after all, for those menacing and now-legendary invaders from Mars. Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized 20. With parameters like that, he is able to conclude that there is a 29 percent chance of a terrorist atomic bomb being successfully detonated in the next decade. See also the discussions in Posner 2005 and Sunstein 2006, 32. in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005). Clarion - tay 50 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – European Relations Check Relations don’t spillover -- US-European cooperation for war on terrorism will remain strong. Stevenson, Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‗03 (Jonathan, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr, p. Lexis) The good news for Washington is that Europe's lethargy in cooperating on homeland security has more to do with a difference in the way it perceives threats than with any deeper political or social divide. True, Europeans and Americans have recently clashed over particular strategic matters, such as the Israeli- Palestinian crisis, regime change in Iraq, perceived American unilateralism, and various social policies. No doubt they will continue to do so in the months to come. But these broader discrepancies between European and American approaches, profound as they may be, are unlikely to damage day-to-day, nonmilitary counterterrorism cooperation. Indeed, transatlantic coordination in the pursuit and apprehension of those who threaten the United States does not seem to have diminished, and differences in threat perceptions actually appear to be narrowing. Nevertheless, European leaders seem not fully to appreciate an insidious dynamic: that poor European homeland security is now making the United States more vulnerable, and strong U.S. homeland security is making Europe more vulnerable. Until policymakers in Europe start to focus on this reality and push to improve cooperation, countries on both sides of the Atlantic will remain at greater risk. London and airliner bombing prove. Archick ’06 (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Kristin, ―US-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism,‖ CRS Report, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS22030.pdf) The July 2005 terrorist attacks on London‘s mass transport system prompted additional EU efforts to improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation. In December 2005, the EU adopted a new EU counterterrorism strategy outlining EU goals to prevent, protect, pursue, and respond to the international terrorist threat. The EU also set out a plan to combat radicalization and terrorist recruitment. And following the plot, foiled in August 2006, to bomb airliners flying from the UK to the United States, the EU reached political agreement on a package of new measures to improve and harmonize air security among its 25 member states. This inevitable cooperation with Europe is enough to prevent terrorism. Holmes ’03 (Stephen, professor at NYU law school, April, the American Prospect) September 11 attacks were partly planned, organized and That this assumption is fallacious is the very least that might be said. The financed in Europe. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. In other words, Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. As daily press reports also reveal, the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner, arresting scores of suspected terrorists. In other words, despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist, Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush's foreign policy. In our new security environment, despite the prevailing cliche, the United States is not the world's only superpower. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing, and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. Their capacities to respond effectively to today's greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. Europeans' linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U.S. security. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring, infiltration, disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. Dismissing the "platitude" that the United States cannot protect itself without European help, Kagan announces that "the United States can `go it alone."' This is apparently the thinking (if you can call it that) behind the administration's mindlessly denigrating remarks about Europe. True, European leaders can sometimes be hypocritical and foolishly condescending. But let it pass. We cannot afford, for the sake of a frisson, to undermine American security by further poisoning relations with capable allies in a time of unprecedented national peril. Clarion - tay 51 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – AT: Al Qaeda Al Qaeda claims fabricated – the only source has been discredited Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) The degree to which al-Qaeda has pursued a nuclear weapons program may have been exaggerated--often by the same slam dunkers who alarmingly warned us about Saddam Hussein's WMD development . Meanwhile, the media, following conventional patterns, dutifully and mostly uncritically transmit the assertions put forward. In was on a November 14, 2004, 60 Minutes telecast, for example, that former CIA spook Michael Scheuer assured his rapt CBS interviewer that the explosion of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in the United States was "probably a near thing." Bin Laden's reported "Hiroshima" crack and the uranium scam Stressing that "The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons," the 9/11 Commission cites two specific indications that al-Qaeda is seeking nuclear weapons: reports from 1998 "that Bin Ladin's associates thought their leader was intent on carrying out a 'Hiroshima'" and evidence that "al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years" (Kean 2004, 380; see also Allison 2006, 37). Information about the "Hiroshima" crack obviously comes from third-hand reports speculating about Osama bin Laden's mindset. Moreover, the Commission elsewhere notes that the reports suggest he was hoping to inflict "at least 10,000 casualties" (Kean 2004, 116). Many times that many casualties were suffered at Hiroshima, and this could suggest that if bin Laden did utter the word, he was using it as many others have, as a synonym for a "major event," not necessarily an atomic one. The only evidence the Commission supplies to support its conclusion that al-Qaeda had been working on nuclear weapons for at least ten years comes from an episode that took place around 1993 in Sudan when bin Laden's business aides received word that a Sudanese military officer who had been a member of the previous government cabinet was offering to sell weapons-grade uranium. After a number of contacts were made through intermediaries, the officer set the price at $1.5 million, which did not deter Bin Ladin. Al Qaeda representatives asked to inspect the uranium and were shown a cylinder about 3 feet long, and one thought he could pronounce it genuine. Al Qaeda apparently purchased the cylinder, then discovered it to be bogus. But while the effort failed, it shows what Bin Ladin and his associates hoped to do. One of the al Qaeda representatives explained his mission: "it's easy to kill more people with uranium" (Kean 2004, 60). Information about this supposed venture comes mainly, perhaps entirely, from Jamal al-Fadl who defected from al-Qaeda in 1996 after he had been caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. As Lawrence Wright relates in his prize-winning The Looming Tower, Fadl "tried to sell his story to various intelligence agencies in the Middle East, including the Israelis," but only found a buyer "when he walked into the American Embassy in Eritrea" (2006, 197). Although Fadl clearly lied repeatedly in early interviews, some CIA investigators came to trust him, and he spun out his tale about the bogus uranium (Wright 2006, 5). He became a government witness, and by 2001 the government had spent nearly $1 million on him (Mayer 2006). One of his FBI debriefers says, "He's a lovable rogue. He's fixated on money...He likes to please. Most people do" (Mayer 2006).23 In the text of his book Wright narrates the uranium story much the same way as the 9/11 Commission (2006, 191).24 However, Wright also relays the testimony of the man who allegedly actually purchased the substance for bin Laden as well as of a Sudanese intelligence agent. Both asserted that, although there were other various scams going around at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. Perhaps because an alarming tale in the hand is worth considerably more that two debunkings in the bush, Wright buries the conflicting testimony in a backnote (2006, 411-12). Fadl was also a key inspiration for the CIA's notion that bin Laden was developing chemical weapons in Sudan, a supposition that eventually led in 1998 to the destruction by bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant, erroneously suspected of producing such a product (Wright 2006, 282). The loss of the vital medications the plant was actually making in that impoverished country may have led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Sudanese over time (Daum 2001, 19).25 Al Qaeda’s nuclear interest is passive – no actual attempts to acquire Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) If al-Qaeda had any visions at all about obtaining an atomic bomb, these seem to have been at most a distant glint based on some very limited and preliminary probes. That they may have had dreams at all is perhaps "astounding" given the rudimentary state of the group's science capacities, its limited resources, and its severe isolation. Albright argues that the group "was putting together a serious program to make nuclear weapons," but it is difficult to see how one can come to that conclusion from the evidence he supplies. He seems to believe that they were creating something of a state-within-a-state, and that the Taliban government could provide cover while they, unnoticed, put together over time (it took Pakistan 27 years) the infrastructure necessary to build a bomb (including the production of fissile material) while importing the scientists, technicians, and material necessary to carry out the task. Clarion - tay 52 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – AT: Al Qaeda Claims of Al Qaeda’s interest are fabricated – selected mistranslation Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) As a key indication of al-Qaeda's desire to obtain atomic weapons, Allison and many others have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, who had been working on relief and reconstruction programs in the country, reportedly had with Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and two other al-Qaeda officials (Allison 2004, 20-24). Allison's key source for information about these meetings is a front page Washington Post article written by Kamran Khan and Molly Moore and published in late 2001. It is based on information supplied by Pakistani intelligence officers, and the reporters were unable either to interview the scientists, who had been interrogated for two months by that time, or to determine (as the article puts it delicately) "the nature of the investigatory techniques being used." The article says the "lengthy" (Allison uses the word "intense") conversations took place over "two or three" days (Allison says "three") and concerned chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Allison contends that the talks were "especially about" nuclear weapons and that bin Laden was "particularly interested in nuclear weapons," but that emphasis does not appear in the Post article, the source he specifies. The Pakistani intelligence officers interviewed for that article characterize the discussions as "academic," and they also maintain that to be the descriptor the scientists "insisted" on using (see also Baker 2002). They do report, however, that the scientists "described bin Laden as intensely interested in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." This does suggest a degree of fascination with the subject, though I must say that when I have lectured about the effects and operations of such weapons, student interest has characteristically been considerable, maybe even at times intense. Also important: the scientists reportedly said that "bin Laden indicated he had obtained, or had access to, some type of radiological material that he said had been acquired for him by the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" and that he "asked them how the material could be made into a weapon or something usable." (Allison puts this more provocatively: the scientists were told that "Al Qaeda had succeeded in acquiring nuclear material for a bomb.") They then told him "it would not be possible to manufacture a weapon with the material he might have," a response Allison creatively renders as "Mahmood explained to his hosts that the material in question could be used in a dirty bomb but could not produce a nuclear explosion."26 Mahmood had been vocally sympathetic to militant Islamic groups and had advocated sending weapons grade plutonium and uranium to other Muslim states (not terrorist groups), positions that resulted in his being pressured to resign from office in 1999, two years before the conversations took place (Albright and Higgins 2003, 50). He is also something of a mystic, and has recommended that spirits be tapped as a free source of energy and is convinced that sunspots influence major human events, predicting in 1998 that 2002 would be a year of upheaval and that "millions, by 2002, may die through mass destruction weapons, hunger, disease, street violence, terrorist attacks, and suicide" (Fielding et al. 2002; Albright and Higgins 2003, 51). (In quoting this list of calamities, Allison sharpens it for his purposes by leaving out hunger, disease, and street violence.) Mahmood's talents as an economist are equally fanciful: it is his opinion that Afghanistan would have become a strong industrial country within 10 years had the United States not invaded in 2001 (Albright and Higgins 2003, 53). Clarion - tay 53 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – AT: 9-11 Proves Can’t compare- nuclear attacks much harder Muller, Professor of Poly Sci at OSU, 08 (John, THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) The difficulties confronting the 9/11 hijackers were considerable, but they were nothing like those confronting the atomic terrorist. The 9/11 conspirators did maintain extensive secrecy and group loyalty on their daring and risky endeavor, and their planning does seem to have been meticulous. But the size of the conspiracy was very small, they never had to trust strangers or criminals, technical requirements were minimal, obtaining flight training only took the money to pay for it, the weapons they used could legally be brought on planes, and, most importantly, they were exploiting an environment in which the policy was to cooperate with hijackers rather than fight and risk the entire plane--indeed, only a few months earlier three Muslim terrorists, in this case Chechens, had commandeered a Russian airliner and had it flown to Saudi Arabia where they were then overcome by local security forces with almost no loss of life (Kramer 2004/05, 58). Even at that, the 9/11 hijackers failed to accomplish their mission with the last of the four planes . A comparison of the personnel requirements for each case may make this clear. The 9/11 plot necessitated the recruitment and the training (minimal, except for the pilots) of a single group of men who were absolutely loyal to the cause. However, aside from a general physical ability and a capacity to carry out orders, they needed little in the way of additional qualities. In the case of the terrorist bomb, the conspiracy--or, actually, the sequential sets of conspiracies--mandate the enlistment of a much larger number of people, and most of these must not only be absolutely loyal, but also extremely skilled at an elaborate series of technical, organizational, and conspiratorial tasks. Clarion - tay 54 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Terrorism – AT: Bidding Time Non-falsifiable – they can respond to any warranted claim we make with ―they’re just waiting it out.‖ Prefer our logical and well-evidenced arguments. Al Qaeda is not just biding it’s time – they would already attack if they could Mueller, 2006 (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct) Another common explanation is that al Qaeda is craftily biding its time. But what for? The 9/11 attacks took only about two years to prepare. The carefully coordinated, very destructive, and politically productive terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 were conceived, planned from scratch, and then executed all within six months; the bombs were set off less than two months after the conspirators purchased their first supplies of dynamite, paid for with hashish. (Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's attack in Oklahoma City in 1995 took less than a year to plan.) Given the extreme provocation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one would think that terrorists might be inclined to shift their timetable into higher gear. And if they are so patient, why do they continually claim that another attack is just around the corner? It was in 2003 that al Qaeda's top leaders promised attacks in Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. Three years later, some bombs had gone off in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan (as well as in the unlisted Turkey) but not in any other of the explicitly threatened countries. Those attacks were tragic, but their sparseness could be taken as evidence that it is not only American alarmists who are given to extravagant huffing and puffing. No risk of nuclear terrorism—historically proven and recent evidence shows no groups have come close to obtaining a bomb Mueller, professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, Jan 1, 2008 [John, The Atomic Scientist: Assessing the Likelihood, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF] Warnings about the possibility that small groups could fabricate nuclear weapons have been repeatedly uttered at least since 1946 when A-bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer agreed that "three or four men" could smuggle atomic bomb units into New York and "blow up the whole city" (Allison 2004, 104), a massive and absurd exaggeration of the capacity of atomic bombs of the time. Such assertions proliferated after the 1950s when the "suitcase bomb" appeared to become a practical possibility. And it has now been over three decades since terrorism specialist Brian Jenkins published his warnings about how the "widespread distribution of increasingly sophisticated and increasingly powerful man-portable weapons will greatly add to the terrorist's arsenal" and about how "the world's increasing dependence on nuclear power may provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction" (1975, 33). Or since John McPhee ominously reported that "to many people who have participated in the advancement of the nuclear age, it seem not just possible but more and more apparent that nuclear explosions will again take place in cities" (1974, 3). We continue to wait. It is essential to note, however, that making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. Thus, a set of counterterrorism and nuclear experts interviewed in 2004 by Dafna Linzer for the Washington Post pointed to the "enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al-Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them." Allison nonetheless opines that a dedicated terrorist group, al-Qaeda in particular, could get around all the problems in time and eventually steal, produce, or procure a "crude" bomb or device, one that he however acknowledges would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97; see also Bunn and Wier 2006, 139; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 61). In his recent book, Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, William Langewiesche spends a great deal of time and effort assessing the process by means of which a terrorist group could come up with a bomb . Unlike Allison, he concludes that it "remains very, very unlikely. It's a possibility, but unlikely." Also: The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists. And so far there is no public case, at least known, of any appreciable amount of weapons-grade HEU [highly enriched uranium] disappearing. And that's the first step. If you don't have that, you don't have anything. Clarion - tay 55 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg No Nuclear Reactor Terror No capacity for a terrorist attack on nuclear reactors Charles Ferguson, scientist-in-residence at Monterey Institute of International Studies, and William Potter, professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 192-193 Despite these benefits to the attackers, causing a significant radioactive release from a nuclear installation would be a daunting challenge, requiring considerable technical, organizational, and financial resources. Technical skills would be needed to identify relevant buildings and equipment within what are typically large and complex industrial installations; to identify and implement the actions needed to cause a radioactive release; and to defeat all backup safety systems. Organizational requirements would also be very substantial. A ground assault on a nuclear facility would require a sizeable number of assailants, probably divided into teams, a cadre roughly comparable to the 19-man group that executed the 9/11 attacks. Since all U.S. nuclear reactor facilities, except research reactors, are protected by armed guard forces , the assaulting group also would need military-style training to mount a successful attack. Appropriate plan personnel would have to be identified and strategies devised and implemented to gain insider support through ideological indoctrination, bribery, or coercion. Aerial attacks on nuclear facilities would require equally sophisticated planning. If a group of terrorists were to succeed in gaining control of an aircraft, they would also have to be capable of precisely targeting vital plant safety systems, such as the reactor's containment structure, or the spent fuel pools in order to generate substantial off-site release of radioactivity. Significant financial resources would be needed to meet the foregoing technical and organizational requirements. However, the group would not necessarily require the multinational capabilities necessary for nuclear weapon and IND plots involving the transportation of a nuclear weapon or fissile material from locations abroad to the United States. A relatively small number of terrorist organizations are likely to possess the motivations and capabilities to mount an attack on a nuclear facility. The 9/11 attacks are a strong reminder, however, that these abilities could be within the grasp of a well-organized and well-trained terrorist group. Containment structure prevent power plant terrorism from escalating Charles Ferguson, scientist-in-residence at Monterey Institute of International Studies, and William Potter, professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 235-236 Despite fears that most nuclear accidents or even terrorist attacks would result in destruction and harm comparable to the Chernobyl accident, that accident was exceptional. One reason for the extremely severe consequence was the lack of a containment structure. As discussed earlier, all U.S. commercial nuclear power plants use containment structures that would very likely prevent the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity to the environment during an accident or attack, just as the containment protected the public during the 1979 Three Mile Island accident discussed above. Furthermore, U.S. nuclear power plants employ inherently safer designs than that of the Chernobyl plant. Therefore, it is highly improbable that the consequences of a terrorist attack on a U.S. nuclear power plant would approach that of the Chernobyl accident. Safety regulations prevents the impact from getting out of hand Charles Ferguson, scientist-in-residence at Monterey Institute of International Studies, and William Potter, professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 210-211 Nuclear power plant operators have accumulated a vast amount of safety experience through nuclear accident prevention training and planning. In the past several decades, nuclear power has grown into a mature industry. As part of this maturation process, the industry carefully examined the 1979 TMI accident, which resulted in negligible off-site release of radioactivity (as mentioned previously) and the 1986 Chernobyl accident, which resulted in a massive off-site release of radioactivity mainly because the reactor unit was not enclosed inside a containment structure. These accidents provided valuable lessons about nuclear safety. Through study of actual plant operations and numerous computer simulations of plant performance, engineers can predict the likelihood that a particular power plant component would fail due to malfunction. Such failures can occur due to normal wear and tear as well as operator error. To protect against failures arising from equipment malfunction, plant personnel perform preventive maintenance, and to defend against human error, they train thoroughly and frequently. Moreover, the nuclear industry generally has come to embrace a safety culture mentality, which strives to keep safety a high priority. In contrast to a nuclear accident in which one or perhaps two plant component failures initiate an accident, a terrorist attack could target numerous plant components, thereby potentially damaging more than one vital plan system Clarion - tay 56 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg in a short time period. Thus, defending against a terrorist attack might be more demanding than preventing nuclear accidents. However, because hitting multiple targets simultaneously would challenge terrorist capabilities and because redundant safety systems could further obstruct successful terrorist attacks, most nuclear power plants would likely be resilient to terrorist attack or sabotage. Clarion - tay 57 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****AIR POWER TURN**** Airpower Frontline A. Withdraw of TNWs kills air power Smith, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, 01 (James M., Implications for the Air Force, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/Conclusion.pdf) Long-Term: Preparation for Formal Arms Control Initiatives most authors in this book see the prospects for traditional arms control of NSNW on the horizon as slim, the Finally, while US Air Force must begin to prepare for at least the active discussion and consideration of that eventuality . It must also include a realistic assessment and prepare for non-traditional arms controls in the form of multilateral, unilateral, and/or cooperative efforts. This preparation should fully address the variety of definitional options and their associated counting rules to flesh out the issues and complexities these would raise, particularly with regard to any verification regimes or mechanisms under consideration. Many of the definitions and counting rules discussed here and elsewhere could have unintended consequences for other weapons systems and USAF capabilities, and those considerations must be addressed before final plans are implemented. This will require careful advocacy within DoD to ensure that the Air Force’s concerns are raised in the interagency process prior to the final determination of United States negotiating positions or unilateral initiatives. B. Air power key to hedge Hazdra, Major in the US Air Force, 01 (Richard, The Key to U.S. National Security Strategy, Fairchild Paper, August, aupress.au.af.mil/fairchild_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf) In shaping the international environment, the United States must possess a credible military force where military activities include overseas presence and peacetime engagement and the will to use military forc e.2 According to the NDP, overseas presence is the key to a stable international environment.3 Peacetime engagement includes rotational deployments that help sustain regional stability by deterring aggression and exercises with foreign nations that solidify relations with those nations.4 Deployments and exercises both require air mobility in the form of both airlift and air refueling in order to transport the necessary troops and equipment . Peacetime engagement also includes other programs such as the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program where the United States assists members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in dismantling and storing WMD.5 Here, air mobility is the lead component by transporting nuclear weapons to the United States from compliant nations. Airlift also plays a crucial role in responding to threats and crises by enhancing our war-fighting capability.6 The United States may move some forces nearer to a theater in crisis and rapidly deploy other forces into that theater. Depending on the crisis, forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or any combination of military personnel and equipment could comprise the force structure required. Consequently, the United States must airlift these forces along with the needed logistics support. In addition, the focused logistics concept of Joint Vision 2010 requires the transportation of supplies and materials to support these forces within hours or days rather than weeks, a mission solely suited to air mobility. In responding to crises, forces may deploy in support of smaller-scale contingencies which include humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing NFZs, evacuating US citizens, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions. 7 Today, US forces find themselves globally engaged in responding to these contingencies more frequently and maintain longer-term commitments to support these contingencies. In these situations, many deployments occur in the absence of forward basing.8 The loss of forward basing has reduced AMC‘s worldwide infrastructure from 39 locations in 1992 to 12 in 1999.9 Thus, the United States must again use air mobility to deploy forces overseas in a minimum amount of time for an operation to be successful. C. Nuclear War Khalilzad, 95 (Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND policy analyst, Spring 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, ―Losing the Moment?‖) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing Clarion - tay 58 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg cooperatively with the world‘s major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low- level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Clarion - tay 59 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Public Support Internal Air power is crucial to maintain public support for international engagement Meilinger, Retired Air Force Colonel, '03 (Philip S., Dir SAle, Air and Space Power Journal, 3-10, htlp:/Iwww.airpower.maxwell.af.miVairchronicleslapj/apj03/spr03Ivorspr03.html) Just as the Royal Navy defended British economic strength over a century ago, so do our air forces protect our economic security. This is especially true because military strategy has evolved so dramatically over the past decade. The basic factors that shaped our geopolitical environment during the Cold War era have changed. The Soviet threat is gone, but other threats and other commitments remain. In fact, US military deployments have increased fourfold while the size of our military has shrunk by 40 percent. The character of these engagements has also altered. It is ever more essential that the United States maintain strong public support for its actions. This in turn means we must be extremely careful about both inflicting and sustaining casualties. Our military campaigns from the Persian Gulf War to Afghanistan have been marked by remarkably low losses, and the increasing use of precision weapons has limited civilian casualties and collateral damage. essential to maintaining worldwide public support. It is obvious, however, that if such sterilized warfare is our goal, then certain types of strategies, tactics, and weapons are more desirable than others. Precision or nonlethal weapons delivered by air platforms- ideally either unmanned, unseen, or flying beyond the range of enemy fire- are the instruments of choice. To be sure, the process of identifying, tracking, and destroying mobile targets- tanks, trucks, and terrorists- remains one of our most difficult challenges, but this problem is being addressed through the use of a combination of space-, air-, and land-based sensors tied to strike aircraft by satellite. Public support is critical to sustain U.S. leadership Walt, Prof IR - Kennedy School of Gov't at Harvard, '02 (Stephen M., "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls·, Naval War College Review, Spring, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002lspringlart1-sp2.htm) To be sure, there has been a surge of public interest and support in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent war against AI-Qaeda and the Taliban. Yet even here, the United States has relied heavily on proxy forces and remains ambivalent about taking on along-term security role in Central Asia. Unless AI.Qaeda proves more resilient than it now appears, public attention is certain to wane over time. As it does, U.S. leaders will once again find themselves having to weigh their international ambitions against a rather modest level of popular interest and backing. These shifts are not simply a function of partisan politics or of former president William Clinton's delicate relationship with the U.S. military. Rather, they are a direct consequence of America's remarkably favorable world position. Because America is in such good shape, most Americans tend to ignore international politics and to focus their attention on other problems. The point is not that Americans are unwilling to run risks or bear costs; it is that they are reluctant to do so for the kinds of interests that are now at stake. This tendency will discourage any U.S. president from pursuing an activist foreign policy because public support for it will be thin. Paradoxically, the very strength of America's present position reduces public support for using that power in costly or risky ways, except in those (one hopes rare) moments when the United States is attacked directly. Indeed, this policy may even make sense-when the world is already one's oyster, there is not much more to gain.20 Clarion - tay 60 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Asia War Impact U.S. air power deters WMD conflicts throughout Asia and the Middle East Khalilzad and Lesser '98 (lalmayand lan, Senior Researchers - Rand, Sources of Conflict in the 21 st Century, http://www.rand.org/publicationslMRlMR897/MR897.chap3.pdf) This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to alesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has dear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability-fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J.STARS, and tankers-are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modem, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India- Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing SCud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report. The second key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that air and space power will function as a vital rapid reaction force in abreaking crisis. Current guidance tasks the Air Force to prepare for two major regional conflicts that could break out in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. In other areas of Asia, however, such as the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar, the United Slates has no treaty obligations requiring it to commit the use of its military forces. But as past experience has shown, American policymakers have regularly displayed the disconcerting habit of discovering strategic interests in parts of the world previously neglected after conflicts have already broken out. War in Asia escalates to global nuclear war and destroys the world economy Jonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, March 10, 2K, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, Lexis Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. ―Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,‖ said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. ―We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.‖ In an effort to cool the region‘s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia‘s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department. Clarion - tay 61 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg EXT: Air Power Key - Peace Air power deters global conflict Ryan '99 (Michael E., General- USAF, The United States Air Force Posture Statement, 3-25, http://annedservices.house.gov/testimony/106thcongress/99-03-25afposture.htm) an important dimension of shaping and a mission accomplished by the Air Force daily. Preventing conflict-deterrence----is The broad range and forward posture of aerospace forces-whether conventional or nuclear, theater, or CONUS-based – deter aggression and demonstrate US commitment to the international community. During 1998, airmen stood watch in the Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia with forward-based units; maintained around-the-clock alert in order to deter conflict with Peacekeeper and Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile forces in the United States; and flew B-1, B-2, and 8-52 Global Power missions from the US to distant locations, underscoring US commitment and willingness to defend its interests throughout the world. Clarion - tay 62 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Air Power Now The U.S. has total air superiority Posen, Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of its Security Studies Program, 03 (Barry R, During the past academic year, he was a Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2003 (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer, p. 5) (PLANETDEBATE652)) An electronic flying circus of specialized attack, jamming, and electronic intelligence aircraft allows the U.S military to achieve the "suppression of enemy air defenses" (SEAD); limit the effectiveness of enemy radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and fighters; and achieve the relatively safe exploitation of enemy skies above 15,000 feet. Cheap and simple air defense weapons, such as antiaircraft guns and shoulder-fired lightweight SAMs, are largely ineffective at these altitudes. Yet at these altitudes aircraft can deliver precision-guided munitions with great accuracy and lethality, if targets have been properly located and identified. The ability of the U.S. military to satisfy these latter two conditions varies with the nature of the targets, the operational circumstances, and the available reconnaissance and command and control assets (as discussed below), so precision-guided munitions are not a solution to every problem. The United States has devoted increasing effort to modern aerial reconnaissance capabilities, including both aircraft and drones, which have improved the military's ability in particular to employ air power against ground forces, but these assets still do not provide perfect, instantaneous information. Confidence in the quality of their intelligence, and the lethality and responsiveness of their air power, permitted U.S. commanders to dispatch relatively small numbers of ground forces deep into Iraq in the early days of the 2003 war, without much concern for counterattacks by large Iraqi army units. Clarion - tay 63 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****XO CP**** Solvency Presidential action solves TNWs – empirically proven Newhouse, senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information, former assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 04 (John, FNS, Arms Control Association‘s Warnke Conference on the Past, Present and Future of Arms Control, ―Assessing the Record of Arms Control,‖ p. l/n) George Bush senior did most to control nuclear weapons. He and his team negotiated the START treaties. In fact, I made a little list of what they did. They negotiated the START treaties. They also withdrew most of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad. In 1991, Bush ordered the armed forces to eliminate the entire inventory of ground-launched nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval bases. America's strategic bombers would stand down from their alert postures and their nuclear weapons would be removed and stored in secure areas. The short range attack missile program was cancelled, and a moratorium of testing of nuclear weapons was announced. Funding for the Nunn- Lugar program was announced. Clarion - tay 64 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****RUSSIA CONDITION CP**** Text: The USFG should condition ________plan_________ on the reciprocal action of Russian withdraw of its tactical nuclear weapons Solvency: Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 02 [Donald, Federal News Service, July 25, p. lexis] We were surprised on September 11th, and let there be no doubt we will have surprises in the future . Intelligence, despite the efforts and despite how good we are at it, has repeatedly underestimated the capabilities of different countries of concern to us. We have historically had gaps in our knowledge of as much as four, six, eight, 10, 12, in one case 13 years where something occurred in a major country with respect to weapons of mass destruction that we did not know for that many years later. The only surprise is that so many among us are still surprised. The problem is more acute in an age when the spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist states and potentially terrorist networks means that our margin for error is significantly less than it has been. The cost of a mistake could be not thousands of our innocent men, women and children, but hundreds of thousands of lives or even millions . Because of our smaller margin for error and the uncertainty of the future security environment, the U.S. will need flexibility. This new approach to deterrence will help us to better contribute to peace and stability and address the new threats and challenge that we'll face in the 21st century. We've entered a period where cooperation between our countries will be increasingly important to the security and prosperity of both our people. We can work together to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorist movements and terrorist states. We can work together to try to support Russia's economic transformation and deeper integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. This treaty is merely one element of a growing multi- faceted relationship between our two countries that involves not just security, but also increasing political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and other forms of cooperation. The reductions characterized in this treaty will help eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking our way as we build a new relationship. The treaty President Bush has fashioned and the process by which he fashioned it, I believe, are both models for future cooperation between our two countries . We've achieved deep reductions and enhanced the security of both our countries without perpetuating Cold War ways of thinking that hinder a desire for better relations . Clarion - tay 65 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg Treaty Key Legally Binding Treaties Are Key To Shore Up Russian Prestige Diakov, professor of Physics – Moscow Institute of Technology, 02 [Anatoli, Izvestia, March 18, 2002, p. http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/publications/izv031802.htm] Russia and the United States regard the future agreement differently. Russia does not try to conceal its interest in having the agreement. One of the major reasons for this is the intention to use this agreement to confirm a status of an equal partner to the United States, and - if possible - to save an appearance of keeping parity in strategic arms. Of no lesser importance is the hope to assert the concept of interrelation between strategic defensive and offensive arms. These are probably the reasons behind Moscow's persistent demand to give the future agreement a "legally binding" character. In Russian perception, no other kind of document would be able to cope with these problems. Clarion - tay 66 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****POLITICS LINKS**** Poly Cap Link Elimination of TNW’s requires massive political capital The New York Times, December 9, 02 lexis Unfortunately, several powerful House Republicans did their best to hobble the programs before heading home for the holidays. Thanks to the handiwork of these lawmakers, especially Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania and Duncan Hunter of California, financing for urgently needed steps to secure or destroy weapons is jeopardized by inflexible bureaucratic requirements. House opponents have also blocked the transfer of funds for removing weapons materials from countries that weren't part of the former Soviet Union. That is a bad idea. Earlier this year Washington was forced to raise private money to remove bomb-grade uranium from Belgrade, Yugoslavia. House Republicans this year denied the administration the permanent authority it sought to waive record keeping and other restrictions that Russia has not yet been able to meet. They also held up long-term financing for a plant the administration wants to build in Russia to destroy nerve gases. Some of the toxic chemicals are stored in canisters small enough to be carried away in a briefcase. The same site also holds hundreds of chemical warheads designed to be fitted onto Scud missiles. These damaging restrictions can be overturned in the coming session of Congress if the White House is willing to spend political capital doing so. It will have a strong ally in Senator Lugar, who will become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. More money is also needed to protect and eliminate portable tactical nuclear warheads and the small Russian nuclear generators that contain ideal ingredients for terrorist manufacture of radiological dirty bombs. Clarion - tay 67 Pre-Season 09 TNW Neg ****CHINA LINK**** China Appeasement Link Plan appeases China – leaves Taiwan defenseless and limits options Kenneth Allen, Center for Naval Analyses Senior Analyst, ex Henry L. Stimson Center Senior Associate, Controlling Non- strategic Nuclear Weapons Obstacles and Opportunities, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, June 20 01, http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/books/lk/ Although the broad issues of human rights, trade, WMD and missile proliferation, and national and theater missile defense tend to dominate the headlines today, the United States has been concerned with China‘s secretive nuclear weapons program since the 1950s. General Douglas MacArthur advocated a nuclear attack on China during the early stages of the Korean war,6 and President Lyndon B. Johnson considered bombing China prior to the PRC‘s first nuclear detonation in October 1964 to stop the PRC from becoming a nuclear power.7 Since the 1960s, Beijing has consistently used its domestic development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology as a political lever against the U nited States, especially concerning the issue of Taiwan.8 Beijing‘s use of ―missile diplomacy‖ against Taiwan in 1995-1996, the increased deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan since then, and allegations that China stole U.S. nuclear weapons secrets has significantly raised the level of concern about China‘s nuclear capabilities . Although Beijing has become a participant in international arms control negotiations, China‘s strategic arms control focus has been on the arsenals of the U nited States and Russia. While China has become a signatory to several international nonproliferation treaties, China has not made public statement about the numbers or types of weapons in its arsenal; nor does it officially acknowledge possession of tactical weapons .9 Furthermore, Beijing has been reticent to include any discussion of, or limitations on, China‘s nuclear force .
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