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					            Criminal Justice in Sudan




A United States Inter-Agency Government Report on the
   Capacity of the Criminal Justice Sector in Sudan




              Report Date: August 2007
                      Unclassified
                   Table of Contents


Acknowledgement…………………………………………………..1

Executive Summary ………………………………………………2

Laws……………………………………………………………………4

Judicial Institutions ………………………………………………7

Law Enforcement………………………………………………….. 12

Prisons……………………………………………………………….. 17

Program Implementation………………………………………… 22

Annex A: Contextual Summary………………………………… 25

Annex B: Assessment Team Information……………….........27

Annex C: Assessment Methodology…………………………….28

Annex D: List of Acronyms……………………………………….29

Annex E: Interviewees……………………………………………..30

Annex F: Sources………………………………………………….. 33

Annex G: End Notes………………………………………………..34




                      Unclassified
                               Acknowledgment


Many diplomatic and criminal justice professionals from varied disciplines
provided their expertise, including the team that completed this survey.

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) particularly
wishes to thank two people who worked skillfully and tirelessly to support this
interagency assessment: Erin Tariot and Makila James. They overcame
political and logistical barriers to secure highly informative interviews with a
range of Sudanese officials. In addition, they joined the team during the
assessment and shared their considerable experience and valuable insights.

Representatives of the Government of National Unity, the Government of
Southern Sudan, and officials of Sudanese organizations also deserve the
assessment team‘s gratitude and a special acknowledgement for offering their
time, and candid responses to our questions. Finally, the team wishes to thank
those members of the international community who contributed to this
assessment. These people are named separately in this document under
Interviewees.




                                   Unclassified                                    1
                              Executive Summary


Establishing and sustaining peace in Sudan is one of the top priorities for
United States foreign assistance in Africa. Atrocities in Darfur, oil mining and
production in the border areas, the ongoing war on terror, and a fragile peace
between the North and South create a tremendous foreign affairs challenge that
must be approached with both a sense of urgency and finely tuned diplomatic
savvy.
                              Assessment Purpose

Although this assessment considers all the political issues contextually, the
scope and purpose of this assessment was to determine how development of the
Government of Southern Sudan‘s (GOSS) criminal justice system could make
unity more attractive and how the USG can support this. There is both a
general and a specific answer to this question. Generally, Southerners want to
see peace dividends, namely development and security. Establishing
functioning courts, effective police, and humane prisons would demonstrate the
benefits of rule of law that might give Southerners pause before voting for
separation. Specifically, police will have an essential role to play in the 2009
elections. Such elections will require police to be able to create a secure
environment during the lead up to and on the day of elections. This
assessment recommends programming options to support the CPA in both of
these ways.

The assessment focused on four sectors: laws, judicial institutions, law
enforcement, and corrections. In addition, the assessment sought answers to
these questions:

      1) How can a criminal justice system program that is limited to GOSS
         assistance promote unity between the North and South?
      2) What is the current capacity of the criminal justice system in the
         South?
      3) What are the current and proposed assistance programs within the
         donor community?
      4) How does the criminal justice system play a role in the broader
         security sector and rule of law context?
      5) What are short and long-term programming opportunities for the US?
      6) What are some of the challenges of implementation?

                                    Findings

Currently, Sudan cannot provide effective criminal justice services in the South
and cannot ensure the rule of law is upheld for its citizens. The ability for any
government to provide internal and external security and judicial services to
uphold the rule of law for its citizens is a fundamental responsibility. Without
this capacity, people will ultimately seek any alternative to the status quo.
Institutional capacity is weak across the board in Southern Sudan despite

                                   Unclassified                                 2
regular support from the international community. Foreign assistance is
needed in all areas of the criminal justice system.

Statutory courts and the Ministry of Legal Affairs (MoLA) do not have the
capacity, technical expertise, or even laws enacted to administer justice, thus
leaving a heavy burden on customary justice that must deal with a migrant
population. Military units assume internal policing security functions with no
police presence or capacity. The civilian police are ill equipped and poorly
trained to take over this function as the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army (SPLA)
begins implementing a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
strategy. Prison conditions are reflective of their own limited infrastructure and
the cascading inabilities of the other justice sector components to provide
professional judicial services. Most prisoners are not convicted felons, but
rather detainees in pre-trial status awaiting a court appearance with limited
representation and no reliable date for trial. Adding to these challenges, the
GOSS is in the midst of a budget crisis due to shrinking oil revenues and is
struggling merely to cover salaries.

                               Recommendations

The assessment team recommends the new US bilateral program begin with a
top-down approach to build institutional capacity, provide the infrastructure
and equipment necessary, and train a professional cadre on the technical skills
needed for a system that serves its people humanely. Building capacity in the
areas of laws, courts, justice, police, and prisons must be approached
holistically if efforts are to be sustained and even noticeable to the public.

US assistance should promote institutional parity when developing criminal
justice systems. Although GOSS government autonomy is defined in the CPA,
critical linkages within the criminal justice system remain. Current US policy
limits assistance in Sudan, but the US can build institutional bridges that
promote parity between North and South through diplomatic and coordinated
efforts in the North and foreign assistance in the South that will bridge the gap
in capacity.

Despite the tremendous challenges, the US should take a comprehensive and
systematic approach to energize the donor effort in support of GOSS building
efforts. While this criminal justice sector assessment only addresses one
necessary element in building a lasting peace in Sudan, the assessment team
hopes that this report will trigger further thought and planning that
incorporates all security sector reform efforts.




                                   Unclassified                                     3
                                       Laws

                                    Overview

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave Southern Sudan the ―right to
control and govern affairs in their region.‖ Legislative authority in the South is
vested in the Assembly of Southern Sudan; however, the Assembly of Southern
Sudan has passed only four laws: Laws that pre-date the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) remain in force until the Assembly passes new legislation. At
the time of the assessment the foundation of Southern Sudan‘s criminal justice
system, including the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
Judiciary Act, and the Police Act and over forty crucial laws, remained un-
passed.

                               Recommendations

      New legislation should enable criminal justice officials to use subpoenas,
       alternative sentencing, and parole. Court jurisdiction should clarify
       ambiguity between courts, including the customary courts, and give the
       flexibility to handle cases. Further involvement in drafting legislation is
       not necessary because USAID and UNDP are already providing this
       support.

      The USG should, however, communicate to donors and the GOSS the
       importance of drafting new legislation addressing certain criminal justice
       issues. Specifically, new legislation should enable criminal justice
       officials to use subpoenas, alternative sentencing, and parole.
       Legislation regarding court jurisdiction should clarify ambiguity between
       courts, including the customary courts. Legislation should be in place
       that gives the judicial and corrections systems the flexibility to handle
       appropriate cases in less resource-consuming ways and gives police
       confidence that witnesses will appear to testify.

                                     Analysis

The Government of Sudan has a robust set of laws drawing on English common
law and sharia law, but many of these laws no longer apply in the South. The
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave Southern Sudan the ―right to
control and govern affairs in their region.‖1 Legislative authority in the South is
vested in the Assembly of Southern Sudan, apart from applicable national
legislation.2 Thus far, the Assembly of Southern Sudan has passed only four
laws: The Law of Interpretation and General Provisions, The Law on Evidence,
The Public Premises Act, and The Investigations Committee Act.

As in any country that purports to be a nation of laws, the first step in
establishing rule of law in Southern Sudan is creating the law itself. Enacting
legislation might appear to be a low priority in the face of security and survival

                                    Unclassified                                     4
requirements of a post-conflict society. But foundational needs such as
establishing democratic security, due process or access to justice cannot be
sustained without the proper legal underpinning. In the case of Southern
Sudan, most of this foundation has yet to be put in place.

Key laws providing the foundation of Southern Sudan‘s criminal justice system,
including the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judiciary Act,
and the Police Act have yet to be passed. At the time of the assessment team‘s
visit, over forty crucial laws had been submitted to the Assembly but not
passed. Draft legislation ranged from personal income taxes to the census for
the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program.

As now structured, laws that pre-date the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) remain in force until the Assembly passes new legislation. They provide
some legal structure, but many important components and protections will be
unrealizable until the relevant laws are passed. For example, there are two
court systems in Southern Sudan, customary and statutory, but the Southern
constitution only lays out the levels of statutory courts and allows for other
courts to be established. The Law on Local Governance is expected to eliminate
the payam court – the court which currently acts as a judicial bridge between
the customary and statutory systems – but it has not been finalized, thus
leaving the formal relationship between customary and statutory courts
unclear.

Because the penal code and criminal procedure code for Southern Sudan are
still in draft, this assessment examines only the updated legal framework of the
criminal justice system currently in place: the Interim National Constitution of
the Republic of the Sudan (2005) and the Draft Interim Constitution of
Southern Sudan (2005).


      Criminal Justice Fundamentals Addressed in the Constitutions

The Interim National Constitution contains a very progressive Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights declares that all persons are ―equal before the law and are
entitled without discrimination, as to race, colour, sex, language, religious
creed, political opinion, or ethnic origin, to the equal protection of the law.‖3
Women and children are specially protected4 and the National Constitution
states that women‘s rights shall be promoted through affirmative action. The
Southern Constitution goes further, instructing all levels of Southern
government to have at least 25 percent of legislative and executive positions be
filled by women.5

Slavery is expressly prohibited6 in Southern Sudan and the freedom of worship,
expression, and association are all protected.7 The Bill of Rights also
specifically lays out elements of a fair trial: the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty, the right to be informed of the reason for arrest, the right to a
timely, fair, and public hearing which the accused can attend, no ex post facto
charges, and the right to a defense.8 Thus, much of the legal foundation
required to build a democratic criminal justice institution is already in place. It

                                   Unclassified                                     5
is important to note, however, that although the existence of such memorialized
laws is a necessary prerequisite for a democratic criminal justice system, it is
not a guarantee that these laws are respected by the criminal justice sector
agents and intermediaries. The laws are currently followed unevenly by the
judiciary, law enforcement and corrections officials, and this issue is explored
further in each of the relevant sections below.

           Criminal Justice Fundamentals Beyond Constitutions

Besides those fundamentals outlined above, virtually every aspect of the
criminal justice system‘s legal framework remains undetermined. Though the
majority of crimes under the old, and acting, Penal Code will probably be the
same as those under the new one, many areas of criminal justice will have to be
established for the first time or changed significantly from what was done
historically. For example, the National Constitution establishes a decentralized
police service organized at three levels: national, Southern, and state.9 The
specific jurisdiction of each, however, will not be officially determined until the
National Police Act is passed. Jurisdiction is imperative when it comes to
effective democratic policing. To further complicate the situation, both the
National and Southern legislatures have drafted their own Police Acts, not
altogether in harmony with each other. These fundamental and unanswered
questions permeate the entire criminal justice system.

The pace at which the Assembly is providing answers was a point of frustration
for some senior Southern Sudanese officials. This was explained in part by the
lack of experience in the legislature and the Assembly‘s discontinuous schedule
that alternates three months in session, three months in recess. Despite the
seemingly leisurely pace, it is reassuring to note that the Assembly has gone
about its important legislative work in a public and transparent manner.

Regrettably, even those laws which have been passed have not been published.
The Ministry of Legal Affairs (MoLA) is responsible for publishing the laws the
Assembly passes but lacks the equipment (i.e., printing press) to do so.
Legislative guidance and imperatives have not been promulgated much beyond
the Assembly itself. Thus, public and professional access to and awareness of
Southern Sudan‘s laws is minimal.




                                   Unclassified                                   6
                             Judicial Institutions

                                    Overview

The criminal justice sector of Southern Sudan faces three key challenges:
staffing, training, and infrastructure. The shortage of judges has prevented
cases from being heard and even in the best of circumstances there is a
persistent backlog. The next most serious challenges are judicial training and
language capabilities. Most judges are assigned from Khartoum, speaking
Arabic, not English, and trained in sharia law, not common law or the
customary law practiced in the lower courts of Southern Sudan. In addition,
there is a serious lack of infrastructure: court houses and communications
systems. There are no law libraries, no court recorder systems or any other
means by which to guide lower courts. That the system works at all speaks to
the integrity and hard work of many judges and courts working with only
minimal resources.

                              Recommendations

      Provide technical training, including in the provinces, for all the key
       participants in the criminal justice system. Support for interpreters and
       translators in the courts is particularly important.

      Develop and support infrastructure projects that complement existing
       donor efforts. Focus on the lower courts handling the largest case volume
       and additionally target these courts to receive basic training in common
       law and specialized training in alternative sentencing and case
       management.

      Support information and knowledge sharing projects for the judicial
       sector. For example, a printing press, or printer and photocopier, could
       be co-shared by the MoLA and the Courts to produce legal
       documentation. To ensure sustainability, projects must consider
       maintenance and logistics requirements, such as generators for an
       assured source of electrical power. Consider supporting donor efforts to
       develop a law library.

                                    Analysis

During the Civil War there were two court systems operating in the South – one
in areas controlled by the SPLA and another in areas controlled by the GOSS.
Most disputes, however, were handled by traditional leaders in customary
courts and this system continues to underpin and influence the judicial
structure today. A single statutory system is now being established but is
currently understaffed, its staff is poorly trained, and the physical
infrastructure is not in place. Not surprising, the traditional customary courts


                                   Unclassified                                    7
continue to play a crucial role in administrating justice while the criminal
justice system contends with this difficult transition. UNDP estimates that 80
percent of cases continue to be handled through customary courts.

                                Statutory Courts

The justice sector of Southern Sudan faces three key challenges: staffing,
training, and infrastructure. In March 2005, only 22 judges existed in all of
Southern Sudan.10 There are now over 100 but this is still insufficient to staff
all the panels at all the levels. The statutory court hierarchy in Southern
Sudan is:

      1 Supreme Court
      3 Courts of Appeal
      10 High (State) Courts
      79 County Courts: Levels 1 – 3

The shortage of judges has often prevented cases from being heard and even in
the best of circumstances there is a persistent backlog. For example, the Court
of Appeals for Greater Bahr el Ghazal has only three of its four judges
appointed. To hear cases at this level there must be a panel of three judges.
One of the judges has been sick for the last month so the panel has been
unable to meet. While there is no question that the number of judges is
insufficient to fill all the benches of all the courts, it is worth examining whether
all these levels of courts are necessary, especially considering they are in
addition to customary courts. The team was unable to determine whether the
many levels actually have different jurisdictions (traffic cases, misdemeanors,
and felonies, for example) or whether the many levels are redundant.

The next most serious challenges are judicial training and language
impediments among the judges, the court and the plaintiffs/accused. Many of
the new judges hired to staff Southern courts are from Khartoum. They speak
Arabic, not English, and were trained in sharia law, not common law, let alone
the customary law practiced in the lower courts. GOSS did make an effort in
this regard, sending a group for legal training in Uganda. Still, all the attendees
reportedly failed the course because they did not speak English.

Beyond language challenges, observers suggested that some judges are
currently not well-grounded in such basic jurisprudence concepts as standard
of proof or the separation of the prosecutor and trier of fact roles.

Sentencing guidelines and a reliable system for alternative sentencing would be
a boon for Southern Sudan. Currently, the only viable sentence for many is to
be incarcerated because there is no reliable system for work-release,
community service, parole or probation. The composition of the prison
population points to the need for specific training on alternate sentencing.

Administration of the GOSS far-flung judicial system is difficult. The court
support staff is not able to perform the administrative tasks necessary to make


                                    Unclassified                                   8
a court function. A senior judge estimated that he spends five – six hours of his
day on administrative work his staff should be able to handle.

The third challenge is the lack of infrastructure: court houses, office buildings,
communications system, transportation, generators, and residences for the
judges. Court rulings cannot be communicated throughout the system in the
absence of a national communication system among courts. State and county
courts are fortunate if they have a building to hold proceedings. Even the
simple process of serving court notices is difficult without bicycles or motor
vehicles for transportation.

                     Customary versus Statutory Courts

Customary law is based on the ―expression of the customs, beliefs and
practices‖11 of, in this case, the Southern Sudanese. There are over fifty tribes
in Southern Sudan, most with their own set of customary laws and procedures.
A small number of these legal systems have been memorialized in writing, such
as Francis Deng‘s efforts on Dinka law, but the majority remains oral traditions.

Although there are many differences between laws in the various systems, there
are some broad similarities in their orientation and procedures. Customary law
is designed to reconcile individuals or groups and traditional leaders hear cases
and offer their rulings. These rulings are usually intended to compensate the
victim for his or her losses. Thus, a murderer might have to pay a victim‘s
family. The logic behind the payment is one of compensation or making the
victim whole, as versus punishment for committing a criminal offense against
the state. Currently, the aggrieved party decides whether to pursue his or her
case in the customary or statutory court system. In theory, cases can be
appealed from the customary to the statutory system, but the mechanisms for
interaction between the two systems have yet to be fully established.

Advantages of the customary system include its ability to handle a large volume
of cases and – it is argued – to resolve disputes in the best interest of
communities. However, individual rights and due process are more predicable
and better protected through statutory court systems.

There are intriguing and worthy characteristics in the Sudanese customary law
system; however, there are also aspects that are clearly incompatible with
international human rights standards. Laws concerning women and children
are particularly likely to fall into this category. These questionable issues have
yet to be fully addressed, but will have to be reconciled as the GOSS criminal
justice sector matures.

     Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development (MoLA)

The same three challenges in the courts: staffing, training, and infrastructure,
apply to the prosecutors and public defenders but to an even more extreme
degree. In May 2007, MoLA hired 230 prosecutors to go out to the states;
however, most of them do not speak English and had little training in common
law. Far from being able to provide emergency induction training to the

                                   Unclassified                                      9
lawyers, MoLA was unable to even find a physical space for them; they were
sitting outside the ministry under a tree at the time of the assessment. The
European Commission and GOSS have drafted a project plan to support
infrastructure needs, but funding falls woefully short. Prison and court officials
confirmed that there is essentially no public defender service available, and
most Sudanese citizens cannot afford a private defense attorney.

                            Sudan’s Legal Society

While the GOSS judicial system will become less structured around sharia law,
especially in the penal code, the two systems share common interest in
maintaining a professional legal society that can ethically implement court
procedures. The President of the Sudanese Bar Association in Khartoum
stressed the importance of the Southern judicial system, but cautioned against
training to the point of divergence from the North.

The Bar Association opined that they should also have responsibility to monitor
legal professionals in the South in order to support the CPA. They were
particular concerned with the availability of trained legal professionals in the
South and cited the recruiting of 230 prosecutors without a law degree. There
is a South Sudan Law Society and a desire by some legal officials to create a
separate Southern bar, but neither the US nor UN officials have assessed its
oversight and monitoring role within the South legal corps. A Supreme Court
justice commented that the South Sudan Law Society does not presently have
the capacity to monitor legal professionals.

                                  Law Schools

Law schools are plentiful in Khartoum with eighteen colleges offering a four
year law degree based on sharia law. English common law textbooks are
available, but have not been updated in 20 years. Logistics, among other
issues, make it difficult for Southern students to utilize law schools in
Khartoum. Currently, there is no law school in Juba.

      ‘Justice’ in Southern Sudan’s Courts – An Illustrative Example

A recent high-profile case raised concerns over a series of apparent
vulnerabilities and lack of reliability in the Southern Sudanese justice system.
First, police and the convicting judges apparently applied divergent standards
of proof. Second, systemic questions were raised whether Sudanese
jurisprudence possessed a consistent mechanism for judges to be impartial
adjudicators and effective prosecutors at the same time. Third, the current
court hierarchy was bewildering and incomprehensible to observers and
defendants, allowing multiple county judges to assert jurisdiction, and
precipitating inefficient, apparently discriminatory, reexamination of evidence at
the numerous appeal levels.

Despite the efforts of many scrupulous and unswerving Southern Sudanese
justice sector professionals, it is clear that the GOSS must formulate, nurture
and recognize reliable avenues of jurisdiction and due process before the

                                   Unclassified                                   10
criminal justice sector can hope to be viewed as impartial. Fortunately, the
higher courts are staffed with more professional and competent judges -- a
representation of the growing competency of the elite in Southern Sudan
society. At present, GOSS needs a system where the higher courts‘ judgments,
procedural standards and precedents can be passed to lower courts for future
cases.




                                 Unclassified                              11
                                Law Enforcement

                                     Overview

The Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) has made progress but is still not
functional. In most cases it is the SPLA, not the SSPS, which remains
responsible for internal security and day to day law enforcement. Before the
SSPS will be capable of assuming law enforcement responsibility it will need to
meet the challenges of institution building, training, and equipping inherent in
the creating of a modern and accountable democratic police service.

                               Recommendations

      Invest in an effective accountability system by incorporating a secure
       identity card for each SSPS employee and a logistics management system
       for the SSPS; only then provide basic equipment such as handcuffs,
       investigation kits, riot gear, etc.: eventually consider purchasing vehicles.
      Assist the SSPS with systematic training: Develop a police training
       academy that provides basic training to include human rights; provide
       specialized training such as crowd control/elections security and
       investigation skills and directorate focused operations, and
       administration, and institutional training focused on the needs and
       responsibilities of mid-level managers.
      Support regional infrastructure projects as well as building projects to
       provide SSPS noticeable and professional facilities. Priorities should be
       integrated with a combined strategy to support the elections in 2009.
      Integrate DDR strategy with the police assistance strategy.
      Create an integrated criminal justice sector communication system
       including Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) and high frequency
       radio, to allow for vertical communication in each section of the criminal
       justice system (regional, state, and local levels).

                                     Analysis

Court cases, vital as they are to a functioning criminal justice system, touch
only a small percentage of Southern Sudan‘s population. Lack of security, on
the other hand, affects nearly everyone. As elsewhere, Sudan‘s police service is
often the most visible part of a criminal justice system, indeed of the whole
government, and plays a pivotal role in establishing rule of law.

Like most sectors in Southern Sudan, the Southern Sudan Police Service
(SSPS) is in the early stages of its creation. In the two years since the signing of
the CPA important progress has been made. The current size of the SSPS
represents a significant accomplishment. According to a senior police official,
the GOSS leadership initially envisioned a police service numbering only 5,000.

                                    Unclassified                                   12
This would have prevented the police from ever having been able to assume
their role as guarantors of internal security. The senior police official said that
he convinced GOSS leaders to significantly increase the number of police. Due
to a lack of record keeping the exact size of the SSPS is unknown but it is
estimated to be between 18,000 and 20,000 with plans to increase it to 25,000.
Another accomplishment was the relatively smooth reorganization and
integration of GOS and SPLA loyal police into the new national, regional, and
state police structure.

Significant as these accomplishments are for the SSPS, the police service is still
far from effective. In most cases it is the SPLA, not the SSPS, which remains
responsible for internal security. Before the SSPS will be capable of assuming
its full duties it will need to meet the challenges of institution building, training,
and equipping inherent to creating a police service.

                             Institutional Status of the SSPS

Institutional capacity is a necessary prerequisite to equipping and training
police. Effective policing requires effective organization and administration.
Institutional capacity of the SSPS is very weak. Key components of institutional
capacity are addressed below.

               Organizational Structure: The SSPS is nominally organized into
                six directorates, as shown below. The extent to which police are
                actually functioning according to this structure, however, is
                minimal. SSPS structure at the lower levels has not yet been
                determined.


                              SSPS Organizational Structure

                                     1LTG Makuei Deng Majuc
                                        Inspector General

                                     LTG David Okweir Akway
                                      Deputy Inspector General


   Operations        Crime          Services          Finance &    Administration   Training
                                                       Logistics



               Police Relations: Not only is the SSPS working to define its
                internal organization, but it must also establish its place in the
                larger context. This process is taking place both vertically between
                the state, regional, and national levels, and horizontally between
                police and military at the regional level.
                 (a) GNU – GOSS – States Relations: The specific responsibilities of
                     police at each of the 3 levels and the mechanisms for
                     cooperation have not yet been established. In June of 2007
                     the NCP and SPLM agreed to certain interim provisions
                     regarding policing duties, hierarchy, and training until the

                                         Unclassified                                          13
         National Police Act is passed. The terms of these provisions
         are not yet public.
     (b) SSPS – SPLA Relations: Like the framework for the 3 level
         police system, the relationship between the SSPS and the SPLA
         has, thus far, only been outlined in general terms and has yet
         to become reality. In theory, police are responsible for internal
         security but in practice this still falls to the SPLA. Issues such
         as who will collect customs have not been clarified. Police are
         often unable to ensure that SPLA soldiers obey laws. One
         positive example of police – military cooperation, however, is
         the joint patrolling in Juba. The SSPS and the SPLA have
         formed joint patrol teams that patrol the city at night. When
         the patrol encounters a situation that requires action, the
         SPLA interfaces with SPLA members who might be causing a
         disturbance and the police handle issues with civilians.
   Guiding SSPS Documents: Standard operating procedures, codes
    of conduct, job descriptions, and other documents which build
    institutional capacity are either insufficient or non-existent. This
    is due, in large part, to the lack of legislation.
   Internal tracking: There is no identification system for SSPS
    officials. The exact number of law enforcement officials is
    unknown. This makes it impossible for the police leadership to
    make informed decisions about resource allocation, renders payroll
    susceptible to corruption, and makes it difficult to maintain
    equipment and training records. UNMIS is working on registering
    police but it was unclear to the assessment team how the project is
    going. An official with the UN Police, UNMIS stated that UNMIS
    and the SSPS are providing secure ID to all personnel on SSPS
    payrolls and creating a database with personal and professional
    information, including pay and training records. By June 2007 the
    project had registered over 11,000 people. Off the record
    conversations lead the team to believe the registration project will
    not result in a database or ID cards that could serve as an
    accountability mechanism.
   Procurement: The SSPS, like all GOSS agencies, must submit
    procurement requests centrally at the regional level. This leads to
    long delays in procuring even the most basic supplies and is
    further exacerbated by the lack of lines of communication.
   Recruitment: DDR is the main recruitment mechanism for
    Southern police. Former soldiers are not currently being screened
    before converting to police. UNMIS has approached the SSPS
    about implementing a recruitment procedure that would include
    vetting but it is unclear whether there is the political will for such a
    program.
   Budget: The SSPS suffers from the same budget issues affecting
    the rest of the GOSS. The 2007 budget allocated just over $50
    million (USD) to the SSPS. Of this, $43.7 is marked for salaries
    leaving just over $3 million for operation costs and $3. 4 million for
    equipment and construction. 12 This would not have been an


                           Unclassified                                  14
            adequate budget and with the current budget crisis it will probably
            not all be delivered to the police.

                                    Training

New police recruits receive no formal police training. The United Kingdom‘s
Department for International Development (DFID) has provided some senior
police training, reportedly of high quality. UNMIS has also offered limited
training with mixed results. The significance of this lack of formal training of
the police cannot be overstated. Basic training is the mechanism that
transforms people from civilians or, in the case of most police in Southern
Sudan, from soldiers into professional police officers. Basic training imparts a
sense of proper organizational purpose and identity as well as institutionalizes
the ideals and practices of a police department.

There are particular training needs in Southern Sudan because most police
officers came from the military. In many ways police are still acting as if they
were soldiers. In Rumbek the team observed police marching in a town parade
mirroring SPLA officers in all but the color of their uniforms. The Rumbek
police also greeted the assessment team with professionally skilful drills
accompanied by a bugle. As police, however, the officers are still working to
change their culture from a military orientation aimed at protecting the
government to that of a police force aimed at serving and protecting the people.
Though often adding an aura of professionalism in parades and public drills,
the strict regimentation and former military orientation of the police is not
always reassuring to civilians in non-military situations. UNMIS advisors
commented on citizens‘ suspicions after having been interviewed by overly
assertive police.




                 Figure 3: Rumbek Police Welcome Assessment Team

Regular specialized training is unavailable to police in Southern Sudan. The
lack of three kinds of specialized training struck the team as particularly
damaging to rule of law in Southern Sudan: investigation training, crowd
control, and literacy. Properly handled investigations would improve the quality

                                   Unclassified                                15
of justice available through the courts. Crowd control has already been an
issue when inter-tribal tensions arise. The Turks provided some training in this
but it was not enough. As the 2009 elections approach it will be particularly
important for police to be able to control large gatherings of people. Finally,
illiteracy rates among police are very high. A senior officer estimated that 75
percent of his police cannot read. This affects both the performance of police
duties (for example, writing crime reports) and how training needs to be
conducted.


                        Infrastructure and Equipment

Southern police at both the regional and state levels are operating with an
acute lack of infrastructure and equipment.
          Basic equipment: There is a shortage of all basic equipment
             ranging from handcuffs and police tape to police registers and
             incident reporting forms.
          Buildings: There are insufficient buildings for police operations
             and training. Police lack offices, detention facilities, and housing.
             There is no police academy in Southern Sudan and a Senior Police
             Inspector listed training centers in 6 of the 10 Southern states as
             needing of offices, classrooms, and dormitories.
          Communication: There is no comprehensive communication
             platform for police in Southern Sudan. A senior official informed
             the team that police headquarters in each state has radio
             connection to regional headquarters in Juba but that there is no
             radio connection between the state and county or payam levels. It
             was unclear if the available communication between states and
             headquarters was sufficient.
          Logistics Management: Logistics is controlled by another ministry,
             thus the bureaucratic hurdles for simple logistical support are
             unnecessarily onerous. Further there is no oversight mechanism
             in place.
          Transportation: Police do not have adequate transportation. The
             lack of vehicles hampers their ability to patrol, respond to requests
             for action, transport detainees, and transport police for training.

The result of weak institutional capacity, lack of training, and insufficient
infrastructure and equipment is an ineffective police service that does not have
the confidence of the local population. There is no civilian oversight body that
ensures police respect the rule of law and that the government does not use the
police as agents of oppression.




                                   Unclassified                                 16
                                 Prison System

                                    Overview

Southern Sudan‘s prisoners are not generally involved in planning escapes or
causing violence inside or outside the prison; however, the prison populations
are bloated with debtors, pre-trail detainees, innocent witnesses and
unarraigned people as well as many other unwarranted prisoners. In addition,
reliable physical infrastructure and organized guarding techniques are not
generally in place in Southern Sudan, so any developing security challenges
could be a major liability. The most important challenges facing the Southern
Sudanese prison system, however, are the unacceptable prison living conditions
and the lack of a timely justice process.

                               Recommendations


      Coordinate work across criminal justice sectors to decrease the prisoner
       population: Functioning bail, subpoena, probation, and parole systems
       would remove a substantial percentage of inmates from the system.
       Given poverty levels and potential for corruption, alternatives to money
       should be considered for bail.
      Enable indebted prisoners to work, pay back their debt, and leave the
       prison. Work release or day-work programs could take the form of
       alternates to incarceration. The numerous prison guards could be used
       to supervise work or light industry within the prison.
      As funding becomes available, support a custodial training and
       infrastructure repair team comprised of a senior corrections advisor, a
       facilities maintenance expert/vocational trainer, and a program
       generalist. The team would conduct training at each site on subjects of;
       basic security, prisoner classification, human rights, sanitation, literacy
       and case-file management, and would also assist in identifying local
       revenue generating industries.

                                     Analysis

The interconnectedness of a criminal justice system is perhaps most easily
observed in its prisons and Southern Sudan is no exception. All prison systems
face the same three fundamental challenges:

       1. Maintain control of the prison population;
       2. Respect the human rights of the prison population and the staff; and
       3. Contribute to the overall functioning of a timely and fair justice
          process.

Overcrowded prisons can be the manifestation of problems elsewhere in the
system – courts that do not process cases in a timely fashion, for example, or

                                   Unclassified                                  17
police who use the powers of arrest excessively. At the other end of the
spectrum, prisons that are not able to successfully maintain custody over their
population discourage police and legal professionals from apprehending and
trying people who will only escape. The assessment team was privileged to visit
the GOSS prison system and identified several opportunities where assistance
might bring early progress.

The assessment team toured a prison and its administration offices in Rumbek
and met with the leadership of the GOSS Prison Directorate in Juba. Rumbek
Prison is the central prison for the region of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, which
includes four states, and afforded the team the opportunity to observe the
conditions and functioning of a regional prison. The Prison Directorate meeting
addressed management issues facing the overall prison system.

                                 Prison Security

In Southern Sudan the prison system does not suffer from many security
disruptions. There are very few escapes and prisoners are not often involved in
planning or causing violence inside or outside the prison. This is not due to
strong security measures but is more likely explained by societal norms that
discourage such behavior. The physical infrastructure and the guarding
techniques that enable prisons to maintain control over their populations are
not in place so it is possible that as police become more effective and are able to
arrest more powerful criminals, prisons may develop security problems. At this
time, however, the most important challenges for the Southern Sudanese prison
system are how to provide acceptable living conditions to its population and
how to facilitate a timely justice process.

                               Prison Population

According to Sudanese prison officials and UNMIS corrections advisors, most
inmates in Southern Sudanese prisons fall into 1 of 4 categories: those awaiting
a hearing, debtors, convicted criminals, or the mentally ill. The record system
is not sufficiently developed to be absolutely certain, but it is likely that the
largest group of prisoners is the group awaiting a hearing, followed by the other
three groups in descending order. This is indicative of problems elsewhere in
the criminal justice system.

One prison official in Rumbek estimated that 60 percent of the prison
population was awaiting preliminary hearings before a judge. This is the result
of a backlog in the courts and the lack of an established, consistently available,
bail system which would help alleviate the problem of incarcerating people
awaiting a court appearance. The existence of the second group, debtors, stems
from both a lack of legislation regulating torts and bankruptcy and from the
lack of functioning work programs through the prisons. The issues the
composition of the prisoner population raises about each part of the criminal
justice system will be discussed in their respective sections. For those inmates
who have been convicted of a crime, the most common crimes include stealing,
cattle raiding, murder (often the result of inter-tribal fighting), petty theft and,
for women, adultery. Finally, in Southern Sudan mentally ill people who are

                                    Unclassified                                 18
considered dangerous or are abandoned by their families are brought to
prisons.

Though it is less common, witnesses are also sometimes arrested. A
functioning subpoena system would eliminate this group of prisoners. It would
probably also increase citizens‘ willingness to report crimes to the police.

                              GOSS Prison Budget

The Prison Directorate‘s budget is insufficient. Not only is building a prison
system an enormous undertaking, and not only are budgets across GOSS
tighter than expected due to lower oil revenues, but prisons are—as is the
norm—the lowest budget priority in the criminal justice sector. As a senior
prisons official observed, ―How can you ask for funds to build a jail when people
across the road live in mud huts? How can you request human rights training
for prison officers guarding the guilty when police are unable to receive training
that allows them to protect the people of Southern Sudan?‖

The small budget is further constrained by the excessively large prison staff.
UNMIS corrections advisors estimate that Southern Sudan‘s 4,000 – 5,000
prisoners are guarded and administered by a prison staff of approximately
11,500. One UN official opined that this was the right ratio, but backwards.
Most prison officials came to the prison service through the DDR process and
decreasing their number would be politically challenging. Thus, a large portion
of the prison budget is spent on salaries and unlikely to be changed in the near
future.

                           Conditions in the Prisons

The conditions the team observed in Rumbek Prison were not up to
international standards and conditions in other facilities are reported to be even
worse. The living conditions observed in Rumbek Prison are briefly described
below.

        Living space: One of the two housing facilities for inmates had no roof
         at the time of the team‘s visit so all of the prisoners were sleeping in a
         single forty-by-twenty cell block, on the floor. According to a journalist,
         however, county prisons often consist of holes in the ground where
         prisoners are chained. In Rumbek Prison, inmates had access to toilets
         and showers at all times, however the facilities were not clean.
        Food: The Rumbek Prison contracts with a company to provide food for
         the prisoners, which they cook. Prison officials maintained that there
         was enough food for inmates to eat twice a day, the standard number
         of meals Sudanese eat. The contract did not include enough food,
         however, for the children who were in prison with their incarcerated
         mothers. UNMIS corrections advisors told the team that the reality in
         most prisons was that little to no food was provided and inmates had to
         rely on family to feed them. The kitchen at Rumbek Prison (below) was
         under construction at the time of the team‘s visit.


                                    Unclassified                                 19
                          Figure 1: Rumbek Prison Kitchen


        Medical services: Rumbek Prison had four nurses to care for prisoners
         but did not have a medical dispensary. The Governor of Rumbek
         Prison said that when prisoners need medicine he buys it in the market
         with his own money. Prison staff members are not trained to care for
         the mentally ill.
        Prisoner separation: Prison officials know they are supposed to
         separate prisoners according to gender, age, crime, and legal status but
         they do not have the physical infrastructure to do so completely. To
         the extent it is practiced, separation by gender is most common. There
         is not a separate juvenile system.
        Communication: Prisoners are allowed visitors.
        Recreation: Most prisoners at Rumbek Prison were allowed to walk
         around the prison compound. Prisoners condemned to death, however,
         were in shackles, which the assessment team was told they wear 24
         hours a day, seven days a week. UNMIS corrections advisors informed
         the team that mentally ill people are usually locked up all the time and
         only let out once a day to use the restroom.
        Physical treatment: The team did not examine prisoners for signs of
         physical abuse and thus cannot speak to this directly. No torture
         implements were seen in the Rumbek Prison. A DynCorp contractor,
         however, mentioned reports of prisoners in Juba being beaten
         regularly.

                    The Role of Prisons in Timely Justice

Most of the factors contributing to delays in justice are the responsibility of
other parts of the criminal justice system and simply manifest themselves in
prisons. There are three points in the process, however, where responsibility
for moving a case forward in this system falls to prison officials: initiating
appeals, maintaining clear records of all prisoners, and transporting inmates to
court.

Due to the lack of a functioning public defenders system, prison officials have
come to play a key role in the appeals process. When newly convicted prisoners
arrive at the prison, the receiving prison official asks the prisoner if he accepts

                                   Unclassified                                  20
his sentence. If the prisoner would like to appeal his case, it is the prison
official who files for appeal. Many of the convicted prisoners were sentenced by
customary courts so this appeal is their entry into the statutory court system.
Given the overall poor performance of the courts, the team was unable to assess
if this particular step in the process was functioning well. Noting that most
prison officials are illiterate, and that the record systems are non-existent or
weak, this point is a likely bottleneck.

Record keeping and usage need to be improved. The GOSS Prison Directorate
does not currently know how many inmates it has, much less who is where for
what reason and what length of time. This speaks to the need for a record
keeping system and also highlights the problems caused by the lack of a
communication system. UNODC estimates there are 60 prisons in Southern
Sudan, 33 of which are operational13. Lower level prisons feed into seven
central prisons across the South. On the day the team met with GOSS Prison
Director Tong, the only prison report he had received was from the prison in
Juba. The lack of records can delay justice by ‗losing‘ prisoners.

When the court finally is able to take the next step in a prisoner‘s case, the
prison is often unable to transport the inmate to the court due to the lack of
vehicles and drivers. This either leads to further delays in the justice process or
effectively denies the accused the right to be tried in his presence.




                                   Unclassified                                 21
                                  Conclusions


Sudan cannot currently ensure fair and unbiased criminal justice services in
the South. Nonetheless, the current conditions in the Sudanese criminal
justice sector provide an environment potentially hospitable to reform. The
international community has an ongoing aid program invested in efforts toward
rebuilding the South after years of war. So far, however, the focus has been
largely on humanitarian needs and strengthening the governance capacity of a
new government. In the meantime, criminal justice sector development has
lagged behind and has not received the assistance or resources it needs.

Looking to the 2009 elections, it is important to reiterate that democratic
governance and rule of law must go hand in hand. Ensuring the essentials of
rule of law such as professional policing, access to justice, adequate oversight,
and security forces that are organized under civilian control must be
approached as a crucial element of self-determination, governance building and
security sector reform. United States assistance can and should promote
institutional parity when developing criminal justice systems. GOSS
government autonomy is defined in the CPA; however, critical North-South
linkages within the criminal justice system remain. US assistance efforts can
help build institutional conduits that promote parity between North and South -
- through diplomatic efforts in the North and foreign assistance initiatives in the
South that will bridge the gap in capacity. Strengthening the criminal justice
system‘s capacity must be approached by building each sector evenly and
holistically if efforts are to be sustained and embraced by the public.

                                      Laws

Although Sudan has a rich history of laws drawing on English common law and
sharia law, many of these laws no longer apply in the South. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) intended to act as a springboard to
Southern governance, has elicited incomplete results at best. The Assembly of
Southern Sudan needs to be encouraged to complete its work of memorializing
the new legal code. As it now stands, there is much confusion over which law
to apply where and until the Assembly passes new legislation, the laws
predating the CPA remain in force. In many areas, of course, the mechanisms
to enforce them are lacking.

                              Judicial Institutions

At the highest echelons Southern Sudan enjoys a professionally trained and
principled judiciary; however, they are saddled with judicial institutions sorely
lacking in professional and administrative support. There is no law library,
there are no means available to print court opinions or disseminate
interlocutory guidance to lower courts, and there are minimal resources to train
lower court or administrative officials. The professional judiciary, the majority
of whom were trained in Northern Sudan, generally does not speak the same

                                   Unclassified                                 22
language of most of the potential litigates. In addition, language translation
services are minimal, or totally absent, in the only marginally literate society.
Further exacerbating these weaknesses is a justice system utilizing customary
law with only embryonic integration into the formal common law system of the
appeals courts despite customary law courts hearing the majority of the cases.

Some of the more troublesome judicial inadequacies can be corrected with
modest and targeted foreign assistance. Material and expertise for law libraries,
both written and digital, are generally available and modestly priced. Some
means to print court decisions, a printing press-copier, would greatly speed the
flow of information to the lower courts. Although lines of communication
throughout the country are not fully developed, the effort to promulgate laws as
well as higher courts‘ rulings would not be onerous, and would help speed the
day when all Sudanese courts are much more in harmony. Staffing, training
and infrastructure assistance for the lower courts would then need to follow in
quick order.

                                Law Enforcement

Although effective in some areas, the SSPS is still weak and generally not
functional. The relationship between the SSPS and the SPLA has only been
outlined in general terms, and the DDR strategy has not yet been integrated
with the policing policies. The SSPS is not fully trained and suffer a shortage of
even the most basic law enforcement equipment. The SSPS has deficient
infrastructure, and law enforcement officials have no reliable means to
communicate either vertically or horizontally. Before any meaningful assistance
can be rendered an accountability system must be in place to ensure that the
equipment and material gets to, and is retained by, the officials needing it most.

Once an accountability system is functioning, law enforcement infrastructure
assistance should be addressed as quickly as resources are available. After
setting essential priorities, equipment, buildings, radios and training facilities
could be combined in a municipality approach to quickly leverage the most
benefits to the outlying communities.

                                      Prisons

The prison system in Southern Sudan does not generally suffer from many
security disruptions; however, it does suffer the pernicious effects of an
immature and ineffective criminal justice sector. With an estimated 60 percent
of the prison population awaiting preliminary hearings before a judge, the
prisons have simply become pre-adjudication holding facilities. Because of a
large backlog in the courts and general unavailability of bail, many who find
themselves incarcerated need not be, except for the inadequacies of the entire
justice sector. But specific to the prison system itself, one of the most
important challenges is addressing how to ensure acceptable living conditions
for the prison population.

The prison system has an oversized custodial staff; however, it has a very
limited budget. A means must be found to relieve the over-population of

                                    Unclassified                                     23
custodial officials because the shear size of the guard staff now draws much
needed resources into simply paying salaries. These resources could then be
funneled into processes that will further reduce the prison population. Bail and
subpoena systems would soften the consequences of judicial backlog because
people would be waiting outside of prison, and work-release or training
programs would help ensure the inmates were performing or learning
marketable skills while incarcerated.

                                  Road Ahead

With such a potentially ambitious, interrelated criminal justice sector agenda, it
is imperative that finite donor resources be wisely and efficiently coordinated to
achieve best results. Unfortunately, to date the track record on achieving this
has been spotty. On more than one occasion in-country foreign assistance
officials expressed confusion over how to best institutionalize what seem to
them to be disjointed, uncoordinated, and (occasionally) somewhat competing
foreign assistance initiatives.

The team reflected that the initial planning stages of a program would be the
best opportunity for all U.S. foreign assistance donors, as well as the Sudanese
government, to harmonize their objectives and develop strategic priorities that
all understand. Keeping an eye on the ticking-clock of the 2009 elections and
the imperatives of providing a secure platform for self-determination, initial
Department of State assistance efforts can effectively be focused in some quick-
results areas, with the more technical areas to follow just as soon as the GOSS
is able to accept them.

In the end, of course, it will be the Sudanese themselves who must carry the
day and in this regard there is reason for hope, optimism, and encouragement.
The senior Sudanese judiciary is generally professionally trained and willing to
accept the responsibilities of administering the reins of justice. However, law
enforcement and the prison system have yet to fully begin their reforms, but
given time and the right institutional assistance, they already have much of the
people needed for success. Taken together, the lack of enacted legal legislation
and immaturity of the law enforcement system could be the Achilles heel of the
Sudanese criminal justice sector, but it is clear their officials mean to turn
current vulnerabilities into assets and temporary risks into victories. The
interagency survey team looks forward to returning at a later date to measure
their success.




                                   Unclassified                                24
                       ANNEX A – Contextual Summary

Much of Sudanese history since its 1956 independence from Britain has been
dominated by internal conflict. Fighting between the Arab-Muslim government
in Northern Khartoum and the African-animist/Christian South broke out in
1962. It was halted by the Addis Ababa peace agreement in 1972, which gave
the South autonomy. Eleven years later the Northern government undermined
this peace agreement and imposed sharia law throughout all of Sudan. Over the
next two decades this conflict caused an estimated 2 million deaths and
resulted in the displacement of over 4 million people. On January 9, 2005 the
First Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan, Ali Osman Taha, and the
Chairman of the Sudan
People‘s Liberation
Movement/Army
(SPLM/A), Dr. John
Garang, signed the
Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA).

The CPA delineates the
power and wealth sharing
arrangements between
the North and South. The
Northern National
Congress Party (NCP),
headed by President
Omar Bashir, is the
majority party in the
Government of National
Unity (GNU) with 52
percent of the seats in the
National Assembly. The
CPA grants the SPLM 28
percent of the seats and
the rest are divided
between other Northern and Southern political parties. The executive branch
was also restructured to include a president and two vice presidents: the first a
Southerner, the second a Northerner. In addition to giving Southerners a place
in the GNU, the CPA also protects Southern autonomy through the creation of
distinct governing structures (the Government of Southern Sudan, GOSS), the
continued independence of the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army (SPLA), and a
2011 referendum in which Southern voters will decide if they want to remain
part of a united Sudan or secede. The CPA also divides oil revenues from oil
wells in Southern Sudan between GOSS, the GUN, and Northern states. At its
core, the CPA is an agreement designed to make unity attractive.

A key component of ‗making unity attractive‘ is the 2009 election called for in
the CPA. When the CPA was negotiated, Garang‘s vision of a New Sudan, which
would bring democracy to the entire country, was supported by many in the
North and South. For these people, an implicit assumption about the

                                   Unclassified                                25
circumstances which would make unity attractive included Garang winning
presidential elections in 2009. On July 30, 2005 Garang died in a helicopter
crash. SPLM leadership transitioned smoothly to Salva Kiir. Since Garang‘s
death, the number of Southerners who support unity has decreased. In 2006
the National Democratic Institute (NDI) held a series of focus groups across
Southern Sudan in which they found that the ―vast majority of participants‖
favored separating from the North in 2011.




                                 Unclassified                                  26
                  ANNEX B – Assessment Team Information


Team Leader

James Walsh
Department of State
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Assessment Team

Stephanie Funk
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Embassy Khartoum

Keira Goldstein
Department of State
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Richard Miller
Department of Justice
U.S. Embassy Manila

Ereni Roess
Department of State
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs


The team visited Khartoum, Juba, and Rumbek, Sudan from May 11-19, 2007.
For questions on this report, please contact James Walsh at 202-776-8505,
walshja@state.gov.




                                 Unclassified                          27
                    ANNEX C – Assessment Methodology

To address how the US Government can make unity attractive by strengthening
the Government of Southern Sudan‘s capacity to serve its citizens by upholding
the rule of law, the assessment team used the Criminal Justice Sector
Assessment Rating Tool (CJSART) as a framework for its methodology. The
CJSART is a measurement instrument designed to evaluate the sector from a
holistic perspective. The complete Tool considers a country‘s criminal justice
laws, judicial institutions, law enforcement, prison system, border security, and
international criminal justice cooperation. Due to lack of space and limited
resources available at the Consulate General in Juba, the Sudan assessment
team conducted much of their preparatory research and exploratory work out of
country, starting with a three month desk-study which included several
interviews, and discussions with Sudan experts and academics. Following the
desk-study, the assessment team conducted an in-country assessment in the
North and South. Due to limitations mentioned above, the assessment report
only addresses laws, judicial institutions, law enforcement and prisons, with
the hope of a review of Border Security effectiveness at a later date.

CJSART is a collection of open-ended and close-ended questions. The open-
ended questions are broad and designed to gather contextual information about
a country: which groups do not have access to justice, who has a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo, etc. The close-ended questions serve as
structured indicators and assess the existence or absence of the indispensable
building blocks of democratic criminal justice systems. For example, do all
police receive formalized training, or is there a reliable procedure for habeas
corpus? The number of indicators a country meets guides the rating an
assessor assigns to each component. Of course, certain qualities in a criminal
justice system are deemed more important and essential than others. These
qualities, especially under the general areas of self-determination, due-process
and human-rights, are specially marked in CJSART and must be present in
order for a component to score above minimal achievement. The methodology
utilizes a rating index approach in order to establish a baseline that may be
used to measure progress in the future.

Because the criminal justice system in Southern Sudan is in the process of
being established, the number of essential qualities not yet in place was high.
As a consequence, attempting to prioritize the needs and identifying logical
sequencing were particularly important issues for the assessment team.




                                   Unclassified                                   28
                     ANNEX D - List of Acronyms

ABC      Abyei Boundaries Commission
AF/RSA   Regional & Security Affairs, Africa Bureau
CJSART   Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool
CPA      Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR      Disarmament, demobilization, & reintegration
DFID     Department for International Development
EC       European Commission
GNU      Government of National Unity
GOS      Government of Sudan
GOSS     Government of Southern Sudan
INL      Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs
JAM      Joint Assessment Mission
JOSS     Judiciary of Southern Sudan
MDTF     Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOJ      Ministry of Justice
MoLA     Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development
NCP      National Congress Party
NDI      National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
SAF      Sudan Armed Forces
SPLA     Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM     Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSPS     Southern Sudan Police Service
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS    United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNODC    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS    United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID    United States Agency for International Development
USD      United States dollar
USG      United States Government
USIP     United States Institute of Peace
VSAT     Very Small Aperture Terminal




                               Unclassified                            29
                           ANNEX E - Interviewees


Mark Aiken, Prisons/Police Advisor, Rule of Law Team, UNDP: Juba, Sudan

Mage Albrigtsen, Telemedia Communications: Rumbek, Sudan

Brig. Gen. Michael Baruku Arkangelo, Governor of Rumbek Prison: Rumbek,
Sudan

Governor Daniel Awet Akot, Lakes State: Rumbek, Sudan

Maj. Gen. David Okweir Akway, Deputy Inspector General of Southern Sudan
Police (SSPS): Juba, Sudan

Piet Biesheuvel, Police/Justice Adviser Security Sector Development Advisory
Team, Defence Academy of the UK: Shrivenham, Swindon, United Kingdom

Dustin H. Boyd, Judicial Advisor United Nations Mission in Sudan: Khartoum,
Sudan

Ted Dagne, Specialist in International Relations, Congressional Research
Service: Washington, D.C.

Dr. Habib Dahdouh, Rule of Law Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan:
Khartoum, Sudan

Joshua Dao, Commission for the Protection of Rights of Non-Muslims:
Khartoum, Sudan

Mohamed lbraim Eltahir, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Khartoum:
Khartoum, Sudan

Dr. Ali Soleiman Fadhalla, Faculty of Law, University of Khartoum: Khartoum,
Sudan

Awan Andrew Guol, Security Advisor, Lakes State, Rumbek, Sudan

Lt. Gen. Maghzoub Hassan, Director of Training, Republic of Sudan Police
Force: Khartoum, Sudan

Dr. Christina Jones-Pauly, Customary Law Advisor, United States Institute of
Peace: Washington, D.C.

Abdul-Majeed K. Khojali, Training Specialist: Khartoum, Sudan

Marv Koop and colleagues, PACT COP: Juba, Sudan


                                  Unclassified                                 30
Maj. Gen. Angkok Majok Kwol, Director of Training, Southern Sudan Police
(SSPS): Juba, Sudan

Michael Makuei Lueth, Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional
Development of Government Southern Sudan: Juba, Sudan

Justice Rubin Madol, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan: Juba, Sudan

Maj. Gen. Acuil Tito Madut, Director of Administration, Southern Sudan Police
(SSPS): Juba, Sudan

Abdul Majeed, Commission for the Protection of Rights of Non-Muslims:
Khartoum, Sudan

Lt. Gen. Makaei Deng Majuc, Inspector General of Southern Sudan Police
(SSPS): Juba, Sudan

Brig. Gen. Sebit Makalele, Commissioner of Police for Lakes State: Rumbek,
Sudan

Fathi Khalil Mohamed, Advocate and Commissioner for Oaths: Central
Khartoum, Sudan

Steve Morrison, Africa Program Director, Center for Strategic and International
Studies: Washington, D.C.

Ilaria Mussetti, Governance Coordinator, European Commission in the Republic
of Sudan: Khartoum, Sudan

Nata Nathanson, Military Advisor, DynCorp International: Juba, Sudan

Agrrey Nyapola, Rule of Law Corrections Advisor, United Nations Mission in
Sudan: Juba, Sudan

Adeyemi Ogunjemilusi, Deputy Police Commissioner United Nations Mission in
Sudan: Juba, Sudan

Susan Page, Officer in Charge, Rule of Law Unit, United Nations Mission in
Sudan: Khartoum, Sudan

Marisia Pechaczek, Governance and Rule of Law Advisor, Joint Donor Team:
Juda, Sudan

Fatima S. Persson, Judicial Affairs Officer, United Nations Mission in Sudan:
Juba, Sudan

Justice Kukurlopita Marino Pitia, President Court of Appeal for Greater Bahr el
Ghazal: Justice of Southern Sudan: Juba, Sudan

H.E. Awan Andrew Guol Riak, Deputy Governor, Lake State: Rumbek, Sudan

                                  Unclassified                                  31
Tony Rosa, Deputy Chief of Operations, United Nations Mission in Sudan:
Juba, Sudan

1st Lt. Gen. Mahgoub H. Saad, Director General, Republic of Sudan Police
Force: Khartoum, Sudan

Ali Ahmen al-Sayed, National Assembly, Chairman, Peace and Reconciliation
Committee: Khartoum, Sudan

Surendra Sharma, Chief Reform & Restructuring, United Nations Mission in
Sudan: Khartoum, Sudan

Abubaker al-Shingieti, Vice President for Islamic Programs, International Center
for Religion and Diplomacy: Washington, D.C.

Adam Stapleton, UK, Department for International Development (DFID)
Consultant

Sue Tatten, Rule of Law Unit Team Leader, UNDP: Juba Sudan

Dr. Gen. Jalal Tawieri, National Assembly, Chairman, Defense and Security
Committee: Khartoum, Sudan

Graham Thompson, UK, Department for International Development (DFID):
Khartoum, Sudan

Maj. Gen. Agasio Akol Tong, Director of Juba Prisons: Juba, Sudan

Kai Vittrup, Police Commissioner, United Nations Mission in Sudan: Juba,
Sudan

Tammy Michele Washington, Chief Technical Advisor Ministry of Legal Affairs &
Constitutional Development, UNDP: Juba, Sudan

Kamel J. Yatim, The New Millennium, Director of Business Development
Government Relations: Juba, Sudan

Dr. Fred Yiga, Commissioner of Police, Technical Advisor, UNDP: Juba, Sudan

Abd Elbaiem Mohamed Zumrawi, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice for
Sudan: Khartoum, Sudan




                                  Unclassified                               32
                              ANNEX F - Sources

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005.

Cook, Traci. ―Searching for a Path to Peace,‖ National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, April 12, 2006.

Cook, Traci and Thomas Melia, ―On the Threshold of Peace: Perspectives from
the People of New Sudan,‖ National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, December 20, 2004.

Deng, Francis. War of Visions: conflict of identities in the Sudan (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).

Draft Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005.

Government of Southern Sudan 2007 Budget.

Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005.

International Crisis Group. ―Sudan‘s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The
Long Road Ahead,‖ March 2006.

Joint Assessment Mission, ―Governance & Rule of Law.‖ March 2005.

National Defense University Topical Symposium. ―Sudan‘s Peace Settlement:
Progress and Perils,‖ September 2006.

UNMIS, ―Rule of Law and Judicial Systems Advisory.‖ Available from:
http://www.unmis.org/english/Rule%20of%20Law.html.

UNODC, ―Project Concept: Establishing a detainee file management system for
Southern Sudan.‖

World Bank. ―Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds,‖ available from:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SU
DANEXTN/EXTAFRMDTF/0,,menuPK:2193680~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168
435~theSitePK:2193668,00.html

World Vision International. ―A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary
Southern Sudan.‖ March 2004.




                                   Unclassified                                   33
                                         ANNEX G - End Notes

1
    Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 1.2
2
    Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 3.5.6
3
    Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005, article 31
4
    Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005, article 32
5
    Draft Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005, article 20(4)a
6
    Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005, article 30
7
    Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005, articles 38, 39, and 40
8
    Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005, article 34
9
    Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005, article 148
10
     “Governance & Rule of Law,” Joint Assessment Mission. March 2005: p. 49.
11
  “A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary Southern Sudan,” World Vision International. March
2004: p. 6.
12
     GOSS 2007 Budget
13
     UNODC, “Project Concept: Establishing a detainee file management system for Southern Sudan,” p. 1




                                                 Unclassified                                            34

				
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