Docstoc

POL 8405 International Political Economy

Document Sample
POL 8405  International Political Economy Powered By Docstoc
					                      POL 8405: International Political Economy
                               Professor Ben Ansell
                                    Spring 2010
                                  ansell@umn.edu

         This course is intended to provide students with a broad introduction to current
empirical debates in political economy, with a specific focus on the subfield of
international political economy. Political economy is one of the most fertile areas of
research in both political science and economics and the course will expose students to
both the „classics‟ of postwar political economy and a range of state-of-the-art work.
Since the divide between comparative political economy and international political
economy is arguably arbitrary, in this course we will cover both literatures. Since this is
nominally an IPE course we will spend around twice the amount of time on IPE as CPE.
Which is, in itself, arbitrary… This course, of course, can only be a survey of the
literature and each of these sections could be split off into separate graduate courses. But
to my mind, it is essential not to get lost in the niceties of each research program and to
consider the field more holistically. Your mileage may vary.
         The course splits into three sections. We begin in Section A by examining
comparative political economy – that is, the domestic politics of economic decision-
making and the political consequences of economic distribution. We begin with a brief
overview of this literature‟s progression since the 1960s from the qualitative comparisons
of economic systems of Andrew Shonfeld through to the quantitative / qualitative
synthesis of the Varieties of Capitalism approach. We then turn to four separate areas of
inquiry in CPE: the causes and consequences of economic inequality, the determinants of
public spending, the shaping and effects of regulatory policy, and finally the making of
macroeconomic policy. By the end of this section, students should have a firm grasp over
the key domestic policies engaged in by states, which actors want what policies, and how
political institutions filter those demands. Students should also be wondering exactly how
robust these theories are to economic factors emerging from abroad…
         We then turn in Section B to international political economy. We begin, as with
CPE, with an historical overview of the debates since the 1960s in IPE. We then divide
IPE, again arbitrarily into two sections. In Section B1 we examine domestic policies
related to the international economy: trade policy, international finance policy, and
development strategies. We examine both the domestic impact of globalization on
different economic and political groups in society and the state-level decision to adopt
particular trade, financial, or development policies. This section has a clear link to that
before on CPE, since its focus is largely on how societal or state-level characteristics
affect policy made with regard to economic interactions with other states.
         But how do states actually interact? The last section of the course, Section B2,
examines the IPE literature on state interaction. We begin in a quasi-anarchic
environment and ask how useful a systemic overview of IPE is. Here we consider the
various realist, Marxist, and systemic constructivist approaches dominant in other areas
of international relations, and explore their take on international economic interaction.
We then turn to international institutions in the realm of IPE. We ask three big
institutional questions: where do institutions come from, how does bargaining occur
within (or without) them, and do they matter? Here we focus in particular on the
International Monetary Fund, about which a broad literature has recently developed.
        At root, the focus of this course is on the ability of political economy to answer
focused puzzles. Consequently, the requirements for this course are research focused
rather than literature focused. You will not need to write literature reviews in this course.
However, you will need to develop a twenty to thirty page short research paper (60% of
the grade). You will also need to write two five page research proposals, one in CPE, one
in IPE (30% of the grade). The remaining 10% of the grade will come from participation.

SECTION A: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY

Comparative Political Economy in Overview: Differences in the Industrial World

Shonfeld, Andrew, Modern Capitalism, Chapters 5, 11, 13.

Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, „Reversal of Fortune:
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution‟,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002.

Esping Andersen, Gotha, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Chapter One.

Hall and Soskice, 2001, Varieties of Capitalism, Chapter One

Pontusson, Jonas, Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs Liberal America, Chapters
1, 2, 9.

Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, „Why does the US not have a
European Style Welfare State‟, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.


The Causes and Effects of Inequality

Beramendi, Pablo and Christopher Anderson, Democracy, Inequality, and
Representation. Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12

Iversen, Torben and David Soskice, „Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the
Nineteenth Century‟, World Politics, 2009.

Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. „Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the
Long Run‟, World Politics, 2009.

Pontusson, Jonas and Lane Kenworthy, „Rising Inequality and the Politics of
Redistribution in Affluent Countries‟, Perspectives on Politics, 2005.
Shayo, Moses, „A Theory of Social Identity with Application to Political Economy:
Nation, Class, and Redistribution‟, American Political Science Review, 2009.

Explaining Public Spending

Iversen, Torben, Capitalism, Welfare, and Democracy. 2005.

Ansell, Ben, „University Challenges: Explaining Institutional Change in Higher
Education‟, World Politics, Jan 2008.

Beramendi, Pablo and David Rueda, „Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation
in Industrialized Democracies‟, British Journal of Political Science, 2007.

Rodrik, Dani, „Why do More Open States have Larger Governments?‟ Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 2000.

Rudra, Nita, „Welfare States in Developing Countries: Unique or Universal?‟, Journal of
Politics, 2007.

Ross, Michael, „Is Democracy Good for the Poor?‟, American Journal of Political
Science, 2006.


Explaining Industrial and Regulatory Policy

Vogel, David, Trading Up. Excerpts

Vogel, Stephen, Freer Markets, More Rules, Excerpts.

Rogowski, Ronald and Mark Kayser, „Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer
Power, American Journal of Political Science. 2002.

LaPorta, Rafael et al, „Law and Finance‟, Journal of Political Economy

Gourevitch, Peter and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control. Chs 1, 2

Pagano, Marco and Paolo Volpin, „The Political Economy of Corporate Governance‟,
American Economic Review, 2006.

Culpepper, Pepper, „Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism‟, World Politics,
January 2005.

Rosenbluth, Frances and Ross Schaap, „The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation‟,
International Organization. 2003.
Explaining Macroeconomic Policy

Iversen, Torben and David Soskice, „New Macroeconomics and Political Science‟,
Annual Review of Political Science. 2006

Iversen, Torben, Contested Economic Institutions, Excerpts.

Wallerstein, Michael, „Wage-setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced
Industrial Societies‟, American Journal of Political Science, 1999.

Hall, Peter and Robert Franzese Jr., „Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence,
Coordinated Wage Bargaining and European Monetary Union‟, International
Organization, 2003.

Copelovitch, Mark and David Singer, „Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and
Inflation in the Industrialized World‟, Journal of Politics, 2007.

Mukherjee, Bumba and David Singer, „Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation
Targeting‟, International Organization, 2008.

Clark, William and Mark Hallerberg, “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and
Electorally-Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy,” American Political Science Review 94,
2 (June 2000): 323-346.

Oatley, Thomas, “How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an
Open Economy.” American Journal of Political Science 43, 4 (October 1999):1003-27.


SECTION B: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:

The Theoretical and Empirical History of IPE

Benjamin Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History.

Review articles in Review of International Political Economy 16(1) 2009, especially
Weaver, Maliniak and Tierney, Keohane, Lake, Farrell and Finnemore, and McNamara


SECTION B1: TRADE, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Trade: Domestic Effects

Rogowski, Ronald, Commerce and Coalitions. Excerpts

Magee, Stephen, Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
Hiscox, Michael, International Trade and Political Conflict

Mayda, Anna and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More
Protectionist Than Others? European Economic Review 49 (6):1393-1430.

Scheve, Ken and Matthew Slaughter, „What Determines Individual Trade Policy
Preferences?‟ Journal of International Economics. 2001.

Hiscox, Michael, „Through a Glass Darkly: Framing Effects and Individual Attitudes
Towards Trade‟, International Organization. 2006.

Hellwig, Timothy, „Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting‟,
Journal of Politics, 2001.


Trade: Domestic Policies

Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff, „Why Democracies Cooperate
More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements‟, International
Organization, 2002.

Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. The Political Economy of Trading States:
Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions.
Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2):165-192.

Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt, „Industrial Location and Protection: The Political
Economy of US Nontariff Barriers‟, American Journal of Political Science, 1999.

Kono, Daniel, „Optimal obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency‟,
American Political Science Review, 2006.

Lohmann, S. and O'Halloran, „Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and
Evidence‟, International Organization. 1994.

Judith Goldstein. 1988. “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy.” International
Organization 42 (Winter):179-217.

Busch, Marc, Trade Warriors, Excerpts.


International Finance: Domestic Effects

Simmons, Beth, Who Adjusts?

Frieden, Jeffry, „Invested Interests‟, International Organization. 1991.
Verdier, Daniel, „Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets‟, International
Organization, 2003.
U
Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter, „Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of
Production‟, International Organization, 2004.

Jensen, Nathan, „Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political
Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment‟, International Organization. 2003


International Finance: Domestic Policies

Tomz, Michael, Reputation in International Politics

Broz, J Lawrence and Jeffry Frieden, „The Political Economy of Exchange Rates‟,
Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. 2006.

Broz, J Lawrence „Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes‟,
International Organization. 2003.

McNamara, Kathleen, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union,
Excerpts.

Schwartz, Herbert, Subprime Nation, Excerpts.


Development Strategies

Haggard, Stephan, Pathways from the Periphery. Excerpts

Wade, Robert, Governing the Market. Excerpts.

Rudra, Nita, „Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare state in Less Developed
Countries‟, International Organization, 2003.

Wibbels, Erik, 2006, „Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles,
and Social Spending in the Developing World‟, International Organization.

Ross, Michael, „The Political Economy of the Resource Curse‟, World Politics

Dunning, Thad, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes,
Excerpts.

Ansell, Ben, „Teachers, Traders and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public
Investment in Education‟, International Organization, Spring 2008.
Leblang, David, „The Politics of Speculative Attacks in the Developing World‟,
International Studies Quarterly

SECTION B2: INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS

IPE at the Systemic Level

Eichengreen, Barry, Globalizing Capital

Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World
Politics 28 (April 1976), 317-347.

Galtung, Johan, „A Structural Theory of Imperialism‟, Journal of Peace Research 8(2),
1971.

Wallerstein, Immanuel „The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System:
Concepts for Comparative Analysis‟ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16
1974.

Ruggie, John, „Embedded Liberalism‟,

Morrow, James et al, „The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major
Powers 1907-1990‟, American Political Science Review

Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield, „Power Politics and International Trade.‟ American
Political Science Review 87, 2 (May 1993)

Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li and Charles Boehmer, „Investing in the Peace: Economic
Interdependence and International Conflict‟, International Organization, 2001.


International Institutions: Origins

Coase, Ronald, „The Problem of Social Cost‟, The Journal of Law and Economics, 1960.

Bowles, Samuel, Microeconomics Chapters One and Two.

Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action. Chapter One.

Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony, Excerpts

Martin, Lisa and Beth Simmons, „Theories and Empirical Studies of International
Institutions‟, International Organization. 2005.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, „The Rational Design of
International Institutions‟, International Organization, 2001.
Wendt, Alexander, „Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of
Institutional Design‟, International Organization 2001.

Rodrik, Dani, „Why is there Multilateral Lending?‟, NBER Working Paper, 1995.


International Institutions: Bargaining

Putnam, Robert, „Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games‟,
International Organization, 1988.

Stasavage, David, „Open Door or Closed Door? Transparency in Domestic and
International Bargaining‟, International Organization, 2004.

Koremenos, Barbara, „Contracting around International Uncertainty‟, American Political
Science Review, 2005.

Fearon, James, „Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation‟, International
Organization, 1998.

Schoppa, Leonard „The Social Context in International Bargaining‟, International
Organization, 1999.

Powell, Robert, „Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory‟,
American Political Science Review, 1991.

Krasner, Stephen, 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier', World Politics 1991


International Institutions: Effects

Vreeland, James, The IMF and Economic Growth

Thacker, Strom, „The High Politics of IMF Lending‟, World Politics

Simmons, Beth, „International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs‟, American Political Science Review, 2000.

Voeten, Erik, „Clashes in the Assembly‟, International Organization, 2000.

Davis, Christina, „International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for
Agricultural Trade Liberalization‟, American Political Science Review, 2004.

Mansfield, Edward and Eric Reinhardt, “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism
.” International Organization 57, 4:829-862

				
pptfiles pptfiles
About