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Criminal Law-The accused is liable for all consequences of his

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					380                        PHILIPPINE      LAW JOURNAL

against the Iatter.v' But the principle of interpreting insurance
contracts favorable to the insured is applicable or limited only in
cases of doubt, but not when the intention of the policy is clear.22
And where the language is sufficiently clear to convey the meaning
of the parties, they shall be enforced in the precise terms in which
they are expressed and nothing ought to be imported into the contract
by construction contrary thereto.s" Since accident insurance is pre-
cisely intended to furnish indemnity against accidents and death
caused by accidental means, the language of the policy must be con-
strued with reference to that purpose.s+       There can be no doubt,
therefore, that under the rules of interpretation and construction of
contracts, plaintiff could not recover.


      Criminal Law-The          accused is liable for all consequences of his
wrongful act.

                        PEOPLE     vs.   PIAMONTE,    ET AL.
                       G. R. No. L-5775, Jan. 28, 1954

     The accused is liable for all direct, natural, and logical conse-
quences of his unlawful act.'     Under this rule, two situations can
be distinguished.    First, where the wro.ngful act of the accused ac-
celerates, or contributes to, the action of a physical condition of the
offended party existing at the time of the commission of such wrong-
    21 Young 'Y. Midland Ins. Co., (1915) 30 Phil. 617; Caceres Y. The New India
Assurance Co., (CA) 36 OG 3114, cited in Espiritu & Alvendia, Philippine Com-
mercial Laws Annotated, p. 409.
    22 San Francisco del Monte Pictures Inc., Y. Glen Falls Ins. Co., (1941) 400G

4628.
    23 Young and Caceres Cases, supra, note 21.

    24 Healy Y. Ace. Ass'n (1890) 25 NE 52, 8 LRA 371.

    1 Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony al-
though the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Art. 4, par.
1, R.P.c.
     US. Y. Sornito, 4 Phil. 357 (1905); US. 'Y. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713' (1907); US.
'Y.Brobst, 14 Phil. 310 (1'909); U.S. 'Y. Monasterial, 14 Phil. 391 (1909); US. v.
Zamora, 32 Phil. 218 (1915); People 'Y. Almonte, 56 Phil. 162 (1935); People 'Y.
Cornel, 44 O.G. 3803 (1947); U.S. v. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497 (1921); People 'Y. Cago-
co; 58 Phil. 524 (1933); People 'Y. Rellin, 44 O.G. 1820 (1947); People 'Y. Martin,
G.R. No. L-3002, May 23, 1951; US. 'Y. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22 (1912); os. 'Y. Lu-
ciano, 2 Phil. 96, (1903); US. v. Lugo, 8 Phil. 80 (1907); People 'Y. Reyes, 61 Phil.
341 (1935); People v. Genones, 61 Phil. 382 (1935); People 'Y. Ski Bonkia, 60 Phil.
1 (1934); People 'Y. Vagallon, 47 Phil. 332 (1925); People 'Y. Tumo, 47 Phil. 490
(1925); People 'Y. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931); People 'Y. Montes, 6 Phil. 443 (1906);
V.S. 'Y. Embate, 3 Phil. 640 (1904); US. 'Y. Maysa, 8 Phil. 597 (1908); US. v,
Diana, 32 Phil. 344 (1915); Pepole 'Y. Barbano, 76 Phil. 702 (1946); U.S. 'Y. Escalona,
12 Phil. 54 (1908); U.S. 'II. Baoit, 15 Phil. 338 (1910); U.S. 'Y. Gonealee, 4 Phil.
487 (1905); U.S. 'Y. Regis, 2 Phil. 113 (1903); U.S. 'Y. Bertucio, 1 Phil. 47 (1902);
U.S. v. Capaducia, 4 Phil. 365 (1905); US. ". Bayutas, 31 Phil. 584 (1931).
                                RECENT     DECISIONS                                381

ful act, or vice versa, in producing the consequence in question.s
Second, where the wrongful act of the accused starts a chain of
events culminating in the consequence in question." Such chain of
ev.ents may take place because of the lack of medical attendance.s
or in spite of its presence," or even because of its presence (that
is, medical attendance itself is one of the links in the chain of
events) ; 6 these circumstances are immateria1 to the rule."
     The second situation was present in the case of People v. Pia-
monte, et al.8 In that case, the chain of events were as follows:
1) the victim was wounded by the accused ; 2) the victim was oper-
ated on to save his life, which operation was a success, but his
wounds, as well as the operation, weakened him; 3) his weakened
condition caused a disturbance in his intestines; 4) the disturbance
in his intestines made it possible for him to contract mucuous colitis,
which he in fact contracted; 5) the mucuous colitis caused his death.
The Supreme Court held that the act of the accused was the pro-
ximate cause of death.s                                       : ,,·;t!:':i~j
      2 The physical condition may be a .disease,     See People v. Rellin, 44 O.G. 1820
 (1947); People ,... Martin, G.R. No. L-3002, May 23, 1951.
      The wrongful act may accelerate or contribute to, the action of such physical
condition in producing the consequence. See US. 'V. Luciano, 2 Phil. 96 (1903);
 US. 'V. Lugo, 8 Phil. 80 (1907); People 'V. Sia Bonliia, 60 Phil. 1 (1934); People 'V.
Tumo, 47 Phil. 470 (1925); People v. Illustre, 54 Phil. 594 (1930); U.S. 'V. Embate,
3 Phil. 640 (1904); US. 'V. Gonzalez, 4 Phil. 487 (1905); People 'V. Rodriguez, 23
Phil. 22 (1912).
      Conversely, the physical condition may accelerate or contribute to, the action of
the wrongful act in producing the consequence. For instance, the victim, being a tuba
addict, was of so weak a constitution that his wound did not heal in a lesser number
of days. See US. 'V. Bayutas, 31 Phil. 584 (1931).
      The situation or physical condition of the injured party cannot limit or reduce the
degree of evil caused. US. v. S ornito, 4 Phil. 357 (1905); US. v. Capaducia, 4 Phil.
365 (1905).                                                         I       I

      3 U.S. v. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 (1907);       US. v. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310 (1909);
People v. Almonte, 56 Phil. 54 (1931); People v, Quiamzon, 62 Phil. 162 (1935);
People v. Cornel, 44 O.G. 3803 (1947); People v, Barbano, 76 Phil. 702 (1946);
US. 'V. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497 (1921); People v. Cagocco, 58 Phil. 524 (1933); People
v. Reyes, 61 Phil. 341 (1935); People v. Genones, 61 Phil. 382 (1935); People v.
Turno, 47 Phil. 490 (1925); U.S. v. Montes, 6 Phil. 443 (1906); US. v. Escalona,
 12 Phil. 54 (1908); U.S. 'V. Regis, 2 Phil. 113 (1903).
      ,j, U.S. 'Y. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54 (1908); U.S. v. Baoit, 15 Phil. 338 (1910); US.
'V. Bertucio, 1 Phil. 47 (1901).

      5 U.s. 'V. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 (1907); People v. Almonte, 56 Phil. 54 (1931);

People v. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162 (1915); People v, Genones, 61 Phil. 382 (1935);
among others.
      6 In People v. Quianson, 62 Phil. 162 (1935), improper treatment of the wounds

caused death of the victim.
       7 ct. cases cited under footnotes 4, 5, and 6.

       8 G.R. No. L.5775, Jan. 28, 1954.

      9 Compare the case under comment with the following cases wherein the Supreme

Court held that the act of the accused was the proximate cause of death:
       U.S. Y. Somite, 4 Phil. 357l (1905): The accused gave several blows to the de-
ceased. The latter fell to the groOundand was taken to the nearest house and put on
382                         l'I'ULrrrINEj   LAW   JQURNAL


     The holding of the Supreme Court, taken together with pre-
vious decisions, clarifies the extent of the proximate cause rule in
criminal law. It appears that, as long as the consequence can be
traced through a chain of events from the act of the accused, said
accused would be liable for such consequence. Rulings on this point
in this jurisdiction seem to point out only two exceptions, namely:
1) where the consequence arose from the fault or carelessness of
the assaulted party; 10 and 2) where the consequence arose from in-
 bed. He was bleeding in the mouth and nose, had a high fever, and was unconcious.
 He never arose until his death 8 days later. Held: death resulted from the blows.
       U.S. v. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 (1907); Death was caused by hemorrhage and ner-
 vous concussion or condition following the wounding of the victim.
       U.S.v. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310 (1909): Victim was hit early in the morning and
 not long afterwards died at the door of his sister's house 200 yards away.
      People v, Almonte, 56 Phil. 54 (1931: The victim _waswounded and while under-
 going treatment walked around in his hospital room due to his nervous condition. This
caused hemorrhage which in turn caused his death.
      People v. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162 (1935): While his wound was being treated,
the victim removed the drainage tube due to his nervous condition, which act was con-
tributory to his death. Accused held liable for such death.
      People v. Cornel, 44 O.G. 3803 (1947): The wound of the victim was infected
with tetanus from which he died several days later.
      People v. Barbano, 76 Phil. 702 (1946): The offended party suffered a stab
wound involving the heart and left lung, which produced pneumonia, from which he
died about a week later.
       U.S. v. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497 (1921): The accused attacked the deceased while
beth were en a boat. The deceased, because of his fright, jumped into the water and
drowned.
      People v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524 (1933): The accused hit the deceased, from which
blow the deceased fell. The latter's head hit the pavement and he died as a result
thereof.
       U.S. v. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22 (1912): The accused struck the victim in the
stomach. The victim got up with the help of two witnesses, but had gene only 20
brazos when he again fell down and died.
      People v. Reyes, 61 Phil. 341 (1935): The victim's wound caused shock, from
which he later died.
      People v. Genones, 61 Phil. 382 (1935): The accused gave the victim a blew
en the cheek, as a result of which the latter fell. By r«;asonof the fall, the victim had
an abortion accompanied by hemorrhage, from which she died.
      People v, Sia Bonkia, 60 Phil. 1 (1934): The accused maltreated the victim, as a
result ,of which the victim collapsed and died.
      People v, TUTInO, 47 Phil. 490 (1925): Blows given b~ the accused to the victim
caused internal hemorrhage which in turn caused death.
      U.S. v. Montes, 6 Phil. 443 (1906): The accused struck the victim across the back
with some instrument and also kicked him in the abdomen. These blows ruptured
the spleenic artery, which caused internal hemorrhage, which in turn caused death.
      U.S. v. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54 (1908) : The victim was wounded on the wrist. This
was fellowed by a fever from which he died 60 days later.
      U.S. 'Y. Regis, 2 Phil. 113 (1903): The victim's wound weakened him. As a re-
sult, he contracted diarrhea from which he later died.
      10 U.S. v. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 (1907), citing the decision of the Supreme Court

of Spain of May 30, 1892, excepts consequences which owe their origin to acts or
                                 RECENT     DECISIONS                                 383

cidents entirely foreign to the act executed.P The above holding
further clarifies the distinction between the proximate cause rule in
criminal law and the proximate cause rule in tort law,12


      Criminal Law-Nullum              crimen, nulla. poena sine lege.
                                 PEOPLE     v.   GARCIA
                        G. R. No. L-5631, April 27, 1954
                              PEOPLE    v. QUE Po       LAY
                      G. R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
     There is no crime committed unless the act is penalized by law
prior to its commission.' This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in the cases of People 'v. Garcia 2 and People v. Que Po Lau» In the
former case, the defendant was charged with selling tickets for
paired-number races (popularly known as "llave") of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes, allegedly in violation of Act No. 4130 as
amended by Com. Act No. 301. The Supreme Court held that tickets
for "Have" races of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes are different
malicious omissions imputable to the assaulted party.
     u.s. v. Monasterial, 14 Phil. 391 (1909), excepts consequences which originate
through the fault or carelessness of the injured person,
     11 u.S. v. Monasterial, supra, excludes from the rule those consequences which

are due to incidents entirely foreign to the act executed.
     u.S. v. Regis, 2 Phil. 113 (1903), excludes consequences which are due to ex-
traneous causes.
     12 It is apparent that, outside of the two exceptions mentioned above, the tort    law
doctrine of "efficient intervening cause" has no application in criminal law,
     1 "No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not presscribed by law prior to

its commission." Art. 21, RP.C.
     "Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to re-
press and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation."
Art. 5, par. 2, RP.C.
     "Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies
and misdemeanors, commitred prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code, shall be
punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission."
Art. 366, RP.C.
     Offenses which constitute a sin against morality but which are not crimes under
sanction of criminal law are not punishable. People v, de la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533 (1925).
     It is an elementary rule in penal law that no one should be punished for the
commission or omission of an act not prohibited by law and for which no penalty has
been established. U.s. v. Olsen, 36 Phil. 395 (1917).
     See also: U.S. v. Caballeros, 4 Phil. 350 (1905): Manila Electric Company v.
Halili, 57 Phil. 795 (1933); People 'V. Rivera, 58 Phil. 933 (Unpublished Decision)
 (1933); U.S. v. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447 (1908); U.S. v. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241 (1908);
U.S. v. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67 (1911); U.S. v. Tldylor, 28 Phil. 599 (1914);
People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923); People Y. Carballo, 62 Phil. 651 (1935).
     2 G.R No. L-5631, April 27, 1954.

     3 G.R No. L-6791, March 29, 1954.
384                         PHILIPPINE LAW ,TOURNAI..

from tickets issued by said corporation.       N or are they tickets not
issued by it which represent, or tend to represent, an interest in
tickets issued by said corporation.     Since the law relied upon does
not include "Have" tickets, and there being no other statute penaliz-
ing the act of the defendant, the case consequently was dismissed.
      In the latter case, the defendant was charged with violating
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank of the Philippines.         This cir-
cular requires possessors of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars to sell the same to the Central Bank within one day follow-
ing the receipt of such foreign exchange.     The defendant relied upon
the theory that since said Circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the omission in question, said circular had
no force and effect.     The Supreme Court sustained the defendant,
and held that said Circular No. 20, having been issued for the im-
plementation    of the law authorizing    its issuance, took effect, ac-
cording to settled jurisprudence,   on the fifteenth day after the com-
pletion of its publication in the Official Gazette» Therefore in the
eyes of the law, there was no such circular violated, and the defen-
dant committed no offense."

      Criminal Law-Circumstances    affecting criminal liability.
                          PEOPLE v. MAURILLO
                   G. R. No. L-6480, April 12, 1954
                     PEOPLE v. ALUNDAY, ET AI...
                G. R. Nos. L-6021-6022, April 12, 1954
                       PEOPLE V. LAGAY, ET AL.
                    G. R. No. L-5112, May 14, 1954
                          PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO
                   G. R. No. L-5900, May 14, 1954
                         PBOPLE v. MANANTAN
                  G. R. No. L-5547, April 29, 1954
                      PEOPLE v. LOSEOand RAMOS
               G. R. Nos. L-5508-5509, April 29, 1954.
      Although the circumstances  which affect criminal liability may
be confined within the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on jus-
tifving, exempting, mitigating, aggravating   and alternative circum-
stances/ the facts which may fit into those provisions are so varied
that the Supreme Court is never in want of a case which presents
the challenging question as to whether one or the other circumstance
attended the commission of the crime.
      In the case of People v. Maurillo,z the accused attempted to
prove that the deceased struck him with a pestle, but having dodged
     ·1 "Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication

in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided." Art. 2, Civil Code.
     S "Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies." Art. 3, R.P.C..    Hence the
third element of a felony is that the act or omission must be punishable by law. See
           A
PADILLA, CRIMINALLAW (1953), 25. This requisite is ascribed to the old maxim
"nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege". Guevarra, Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code (1931) 9.
     1 Articles 16-17, respectively.

      2 G.R. No. L-6480, April 12, 1954.
                                RECENT     DECISIONS                                385

the blow, he thereupon got his bolo and hacked his assailant to death.
Was there self-defense'? The Supreme Court held that there was
none. It was improbable," according to the Court, for the accused
to have dodged the mow because the accused himself testified that
the deceased struck without warning and while he was standing at
close range."
     In the case of People v. Alundsu), et al.,5 the accused, charged
with robbery in band with homicide, alleged that. they were made
to join the band by force." The prosecution contended that their
claim should be discredited because: 1) they could have easily es-
caped; 2) they received 'P10 each as their share of the loot; and 3)
the other members of the band would not have taken them along in
the commission of the crime in question, for said members of the
band would not have had any confidence in them. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention, holding that: 1) it was not shown
how the accused could have escaped; 7 2) the receipt of 'P10 each 8
      3 In pleading self-defense, the defendant, having admitted the authorship of the

death 'of the deceased, must, in order to avoid criminal liability, prove the justifying
circumstance claimed by him, by clear and convincing evidence. People v. Tolentino,
54 Phil. 77 (1929); People v, Apolinario, 53 Phil. 586 (1933); People v. Gimena, 59
Phil. 509 (1934); People v. Ansayon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946); People v. Bauden, 43 O.G.
2020 (1946); People v. Berio, 59 Phil. 533 (1934); People v. Barbano, 76 Phil. 702
 (1946) .
      4 In the case .of People Y. Ramos, G.R. No. L-5843, May 17, 1954, the Supreme

Court held the claim of self-defense to be improbable because it was proved that the
deceased was unarmed when the accused attacked him. See also U.S. v. Carrero, 9
Phil. 544 (1908); People v. Minda, G.R. No. L-4212, March 27, 1952.
      In the case of People v, Dado, G.R. No. L-5774, March 22, 1954, the defendant
claimed that the deceased approached him and gave him a fist blow on the belly. The
deceased then pulled something from his undershirt, which the accused believed to be
a revolver, and while the deceased thus held the revolver and pointed it at the accused,
the latter held the former's hand with his left, and with the right pulled out a balisong
with which he stabbed the deceased. This theory was rejected by the Supreme Court as
inherently improbable, for it would have been impossible for the defendant to have
opened the balisong with one hand as he held the deceased with the other. Moreover,
not only was there no evidence that the deceased was holding) a revolver, but there was
also lack of motive on his part to attack the accused.
      For other cases where the theory of self-defense was discredited for improbability,
see People Y. Neddo, G.R. No. L-5880, April 29, 1953 and People v. Gammac, G.R.
No. L-5197, Aug. 28, 1953, commented on in Survey of Criminal Law-1953, by Luis
R. Mauricio, XXIX Phil. Law Journal 61, 65; see also People v. Minda, G.R. No. L-
4212, March 27, 1952, commented on in Criminal Law-1952, by Rafael Hernaez and
Ponciano Mathay, XXVIII Phil. Law Journal 41, 46.
      5 G.R. No. L·6021-6022, April 12, 1954.

     ~ The defense invoked compulsion of an irresistible force. Art. 12, par. 5, R.P.c.
      7 Not taking advantage of an opportunity to es.capewould negate compulsion of an

irresistible force. People v. Tan, G.R. No. L-2096, February 6, 1951; People v. Raga-
nit, G.R. No. L-2174, April 18, 1951.
      8 Sharing in the loot may also show conspiracy.  See People v, San Luis, G.R. No.
L-2365, May 29, 1954.
386                          PHILIPPINE       LAW JOURNAL


out of the large loot showed how insignificant was their role in the
band, and besides, they could not have refused to receive it; and
3) the members of the band would not have cared what sort of per-
sons served them; being instruments of terror, they would not have
hesitated to us any person, confident that there would be no resis-
tance.?
      Where the accused gave himself up and turned in his weapon
only after a police officer had intervened and ordered him to stop,
should the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be con-
sidered in his favor? The Supreme Court, in the case of People v.
Ramos,10 held that it should not be considered as such. This is ne-
cessarily so because voluntary surrender must be spontaneous 11 and
will not be taken into consideration if the defendant was in fact
arrested.'>
      The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is one of those cir-
cumstances into which a great variety of facts may fit in.13   Thus
      9 Passing upon a similar case, the Supreme     Court upheld the defense or irresistible
force where the source of the force, the Hukbalahaps,           "were ruthless killers or execu-
tioners and were in a mood to inflict extreme and summary punishment for disobed-
ience to their command," and where "the place was isolated, escape was at least risky,
and protection by lawfully constituted authorities was out of reach." People v. Regala,
G.R. No. L-1751, May 28, 1951. See also People v. Godinez, 45 O.G. 2524 (1947);
People v. Bagalawis, 44 O.G. 2590 (1949).
      On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Manza.nida, G.R.
No. L-5706, Jan. 29, 1954, found from the proven circumstances that there was no
irresistible force. The accused was charged with treason for serving as a Japanese spy.
He argued that he was himself a prisoner of the Japanese and was taken along with
them as servant, cook and "cargador".           The Court answered this by saying that
"* * *     it was not likely that Japanese patrols, needing every soldier to capture and
even fight guerillas, would be taking along with them prisoners suspected of being
guerillas themselves, because in that case, such prisoners would only be a liability instead
of an asset, necessitating an extra soldier or soldiers to guard them, including space
at the motor vehicle when used by the patrol to go to distant places."           See also People
v. Moreno, 43 O.G. 4644 (1946); People v. Munoz, 45 O.G. 2471 (1947); People v.
Ponce, G.R. No. L-5706, Jan. 29, 1954.
       10 G.R. No.    L-5843, May 17, 1954.
       11 People v, Timbol,   G.R. Nos. L-47471-47472, August 4, 1944; People Y. Coney,
G.R. No. L-4224, Dec. 28, 1951.
       "Voluntary surrender is not available as a mitigating factor where it does not ap-
pear that it was the offender's own idea to send for a police to give himself up. This
ruling seems to be unduly harsh. Why should it make a difference who originally con-
 ceived of the surrender, so long as the offender actually gave himself up before arrest?
 The law requires that the surrender be voluntary and not the result of capture or arrest.
 It is not necessary-it    would be unrealistic to require-that     it be spontaneous.   Assum-
 ing that voluntary surrender, like plea of guilty, is mitigating because it indicates re-
 pentance, still repentance loses none of its moral and physical force because it was
first suggested by another."        Criminal Law: Criminal Liability and Specific Crimes,
By Florentino Feliciano and Antonio Ceniza, XXVII Phil. Law Journal 277, 288.
       12 People Y. Conwi, 71 Phil.     595 (1941).
       13 Insofar  as the aggravating circumstance of dwelling (Art. 14, par. 3, R.P.c.)
is concerned, the problem seems to divide itself into only three main questions.           First,
 there is the question as to whether a specific spot mayor may not be considered part
                                 RECENT     DECISIONS                                387

in the case of People v. Lagay, et al.,14 one victim was attacked in-
side the house, but having fled, was pursued and finally killed out-
side the house.P In the case of People v. FramciecoJ» the accused
threw a lighted stick of dynamite inside the house of his victim.!?
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the aggravating circum-
stance of dwelling should be considered.
     The same may be said of the aggravating circumstance of trea-
chery.t" Thus, where about eighty armed persons ambushed a group
of the dwelling.      Second, assuming that a specific spot may be considered part of the
dwelling, will the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be taken into consideration if
only one phase of the criminal act took place therein?        Third, there is the question
as to whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may be considered at all with
respect to certain crimes.
      In the case of People 'V. Open a, et al., G.R Nos. L.6318-6319, May 17, 1954,
which was a case of rohbery with rape, and People 'Y. Fader, G.R No. L. 5732, March
12, 1954, which was the case of robbery with homicide, the Supreme Court took into
consideration the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.        Dwelling may not be con-
sidered in robbery in an inhabited house which is the dwelling of the offended party,
because this circumstance is inherent in the crime of robbery committed in an inhabited
house.  u.s.     'Y. Cas, 14 Phil. 21, 22 (1909).   However, when the robbery is one which
may be committed inside as well as outside the house, dwelling wi!! be considered, be-
cause the circumstance of dwelling "no es inherente al delito generico de robo, ya que
cabe que se cometa un robo con violencia e intimidacion en una persona fuera de la
habitacion 0 morada de esta."         Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of Decem-
ber 16, 1871. See 2 Viada 331, Question 36, et seq. But it must be borne in mind
that for dwelling to be, aggravating, it must be specially sought.     People 'Y. Guhiting,
G.R. L-2843, May 14, 19;>1;People 'Y. Mendoza, G.R Nos. L-4146AI47, March 28,
1952. Dwelling was considered in robbery: People 'Y. Dayego, G.R No. L.2247, May
10, 1950; People 'Y. Francisco, G.R. No. L.2748, May 10 1950; People 'Y. Ferrer, GR.
No. L.4840, Jan. 20, 1953.
      14- G.R. No. L.5112, May       14, 1954.
      15 Dwelling    was considered where he attack began inside the house and. after the
accused subdued his victim, the former took the latter outside the house for the pur-
pose of killing him. U.S. 'Y. Lastimosa, 27 Phil. 432 (1914).
       However, where the attack began outside the house, and when the victim fled to
his house, was pursued and killed therein, the Supreme Court held that dwelling should
not be aggravating on the ground that it was not specially sought. People 'Y. Mendoza,
GR Nos. L-4146-4147, March 28, 1952.
       16 G.R. No. L.5900, May 14, 1954.

       17 Dwelling   was considered where the accused shot from under the house. People
 'Y. Bautista, 45 O.G. 2084 (1947); U.S. 'Y. Macarinfas,      40 Phil. 1 (1919).. It was
likewise considered       where the accused shot at the house. People 'Y. Cael, G.R. Nos.
L-2961-2964, Jan. 31, 1951.
       18 In PBople 'Y. Dado,     GR. No. L-5774, March 22, 1954, where the attack was
preceded by a fight, the Supreme Court held that there was no treachery.            But in
the case of People 'Y. Maurillo, GR. No. L-6480, April 12, 1954, where the attack was
 sudden; People 'Y. Escares and Macalalad, G.R. No. L. 5562, April 29, 1954, where
 the accused struck the victim from behind with a cane and after the latter was down,
 shot and stabbed him; People 'Y. Unciamo, et al., G.R. No. L-6643, April 29, 1954,
388                        PHILIPPINE      LAW JOURNAL

of cars, "without any danger to themselves, because they were en-
trenched in strategic places on both sides of the road," the Supreme
Court, in People v. Mamantams» held that there was treachery.w
     In the case of People v. Ramos a,nd Loeeo=» the Supreme Court
held that the aggravating circumstance of enseiuumiento ought not
to be considered because Amparo, one of the victims, was not raped
in the presence of her huaband.s-
where the deceased was attacked by one defendant while the former's arms were
held apart by the other two defendants, the Supreme Court held there was treachery.
     There was no treachery where the victim has a chance to prepare. People 'Y. Visa-
gar, G.R. No. L-3384, June 12, 1953. As when the attack was preceded by a heated
discussion or a quarrel. People v. Gonzalez, 76 Phil. 473 (1946); U.S. v. Indica,
3 Phil. 313 (1904).
     Sudden attack generally constitutes treachery. U.S. ". Cabiling, 7 Phil. 469
 (1907); U.S. v. Cornelio, 28 Phil. 457 (1914); People 'Y. Pengzon, 44 Phil. 224
 (1922); People v. Noble, 48 O.G. 2010, (1946); People v. Limaco, G.R. No. L-3090,
Jan. 9, 1951; Feople v. Sy Pio. G.R. Nos. L-3827-3828, Nov. 23, 1951; People v. Agui-
lar, G.R. Nos. L-3248-3249, May 16, 1951; People ". Cael, G.R. Nos. L-2961-2964,
Jan. 31, 1951; People 'Y. Irinco G.R. No. L-3479, July 30, 1951; People ". Holleros;
G.R. No. L-3384, Feb. 14, 1951; People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. L-4192, Dec. 27,
1951; People v. T'amiana, G.R. No. L-3628, Sept. 29, 1951; People 'Y. Garciola, G.R.
No. L-4015, Oct. 30, 1951, People ". Felipe, G.R. L-4619 Feb. 25, 1952; People ".
Avila, G.R. No. L-4640, March 23, 1953; People' 'Y. Almazan, G.R. No. L-4447, April
18, 1952; People v. Casas, G.R. No. L-5873, March 31, 1953; People ". Dosal, G.R.
Nos. L-4215-4216, April 17, 1953.
     Likewise, an attack from behind is usually considered tteacherous. People ".
Yvdoon, 46 O.G. 1003 (1948); People ". Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524 (1933); People 'Y.
Sablan, 46 O.G. S. 11,83 (1949); People 'Y. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 (1939); People 'Y.
Acopio, 58 Phil. 582 (1933»; People v. Mablon, G.R. No. L-5198, April 17, 1953;
People 'Y. Torrecampo, G.R. No. L-5761, Sept. 7, 1953.
     There is also treachery where the victim is bound. U.S. v, De Leon, 1 Phil. 163
 (1902); u.s. V. Lastimosa, 27 Phil. 432 (1914); People 'Y. Madrid, G.R. No. L-
3032, Jan. 3, 1951. Likewise where the victim has his arms upraised. People ". Lasafin,
G.R. No. L-5874, Feb. 11, 1953. Or where the victim has his arms pinned down.
People v, Ascares, G.R. No. L-3527, Aug. 30, 1951.
     19 G.R. No. L-5547, April 29, 1954.

     20 There is treachery where the victim is not aware of the presence of armed men

who had come to kill him. People v. Baysa, G.R. No. L-5190-3, April 29,. 1953. See
XXIX Phil. Law Journal 64. So is there treachery where the accused was so situated
as to incur no risk. People 'Y. Chan, G.R. No. L-4014, Sept. 11, 1951.
     Possibility of risk on the part of the accused which might arise from the victim's
defense appears to be controlling. See Art. 14, par. 16, R.P.c. See also Criminal
Law: Criminal Liability and Specific Crimes, by Florentino Feliciano and Antonio
Ceniza, XXVII Phil. Law Journal 277, 280-281.
     21 G.R. Nos. L-5508-5509, April 29, 1954.

     22 In U.S.v.   Iglesia and Valdez, '21 Phil. 55 (1911), the wife was raped in front
of her husband. Here the circumstance was held to be ignominia and not enseiiamiento.
                C
See PADILLA, RIMINAL       LAW, 1953 ed., p. 233.
                                 RECENT     DECISIONS                               389

     Criminal Law-F1"USbration in murder and homicide cases as dis-
tinguished from attempt.
                                 PEOPLE    v.   SY PIO
                        G.R. No. L-5848, April 30, 1954
      In the above case, the Supreme Court,   citing the cases of U.S.
'(,'.EJduave,l People v. Dagman,2 and People v. Borinaga,   3 held that,
for a frustrated murder or homicide to exist, it is not necessary that
the accused actually commit all the acts of execution necessary to
produce the death of his victim. It is sufficient that he believed he
had committed all said acts. It is enough that the subjective phase
of the acts necessary to commit the offense had passed, and that
there was a full and complete belief on the part of the assailant that
he had committed all acts of execution necessary to produce the
death of the intended victim. The Court, speaking through Justice
Alejo Labrador, distinguished the above cited cases from the case
at bar:

            "In the case at bar, however, the defendant appellant fired at his vic-
      tim, and the latter was hit, but he was able to escape and hide in another
      room. The fact that he was able to escape, which the appellant must
      have seen, must have produced in the mind of defendant that he was         not
      able to hit his victim at a vital part of the    body. In other words, the
      defendant knew that he had not actually performed all the acts of execu-
      tion necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances it     cannot be
      said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed.
      As it does not appear that the defendant appellant     continued in pursuit,
      and as a matter of fact he ran away afterwards, a           reasonable doubt
      exists in our mind that the defendant had committed      all the acts of exe-
      cution or passed the subjective phase of said acts. This doubt must be
      resolved in favor of the defendant."

     The rulings in this jurisdiction on frustrated murder or homi-
cide seem to recognize three phases in the consummation of said
crimes, namely: (first) an act or acts sufficient in the natural course
of events (second) to produce a wound or injury or wounds or in-
juries sufficient in the natural course of events (third) to produce
death.
     The consummation of the crime of murder or homicide may be
interrupted between the second and third phases. That is, the wound
or injury or wounds or injuries, though sufficient in the natural
course of events to produce death, do not in fact cause death "by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."     4  The
     136 Phil. 209 (1917).
     247 Phil. 768 (1925).
     Z 47 Phil. 768 (1925).

     355 Phil. 433 (1930).
     4 A felony is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution which

would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Art. 6, par. 2,
R. P. C.
390                        fHILIPPINE      LAW JOURNAL

intervention under this circumstance usually consists in timely and
skillful medical treatment,> though perhaps an extraordinarily strong
physical constitution of the victim may also serve the same purpose.
When the crime is thus interrupted between the seco.nd and third
phases, it is considered as frustrated."
     The consummation of the crime of murder or homicide may also
be interrupted between the first and second phases. That is, the
act or acts, though sufficient in the natural course of events to pro-
duce a wound or injury or wounds or injuries (sufficient in the na-
tural course of events to produce death), do not in fact produce such
wound or injury or wounds or injuries "by reason of causes inde-
pendent of the will of the perpetrator." 7 The intervention u.nder
this circumstance may be varied. For instance, the back of a chair
on which the victim was sitting," or the rib of the victim himself 9
may constitute the obstruction. When the crime is thus interrupted
between the first and second phases, it is also considered as frus-
trated.10
       5 U.S. v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209 (1917); People v. Pacis, 48 Phil. 190 (1925); Peo-

ple v. David, 60 Phil. 93 (1934); People v, Hamada, 62 PhiL 112 (1935); People v.
Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 (1926).
       6 The accused did all that was necessary to commit the crime.     If the crime did
not result as a consequence, it was due to something 'beyond his control. U.S. v.
Eduave, 36 Phil. 209 (1917).
       Where the accused inflicted treacherously serious wounds upon the victim, the
 the crime committed was frustrated murder. People v. Pacis, 48 Phil. 190 (1925).
       The defendant, in fIring his revolver at the offended party, hitting him on the
upper left hand part of the body, piercing it from side to side and perforating the
lung, performed all the acts of execution which should have produced his death but
did not produce it by reason of the adequate and timely intervention of medical science,
a cause entirely independent of the defendant's will. Such proven facts constitute
the crime of frustrated homicide. People v. David, 60 Phil. 93 (1934).
       It was only the prompt and skillful medical treatment which the offended party
received that saved his life. The offense committed was therefore frustrated murder.
People v. Honrada, 62 Phil. 112 (1935).
       The victim was wounded by a shot, the bullet: passing through the neck, having
entered the posterior region thereof coming out through the lefr, eye, which was com-
pletely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, the victim did not die. The crime
was frustrated murder, the accused having performed all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not pro-
duce it by reason of causes independent of his will. People v. Mabug-a«, 51 Phil.
967 (1926).
      See People v. Yabot, 45 Phil. 4 (1923): The fact that the victim recovered through
medical treatment does not make the crime either frustrated homicide or murder.
      7 Supra, note 5.

      8 People v, Borinaga, 55 Phil. 433 (1930).

      1) People v. Reyes, 47 Phil. 635 (1925).

      10 Where the accused has attacked the offended party unexpectedly, and the wounds

inflicted by him upon the latter would have caused death had not the weapon whereby
the same were inflicted met with an obstacle, such as the ribs, which prevented its
penetration the lungs and kidneys, the defendant is guilty of frustrated murder. People
"Y. Reyes, 47 Phil. 635 (1925).
                                RECENT     DECISIONS                               391

     The execution of the crime of murder or homicide may also be
interrupted during the first phase. That is, the interruption takes
place before the act or acts are sufficient in the natural course of
events to produce a wound or injury or wounds or injuries (suffi-
cient in the natural course of events to produce death). The in-
tervention under this circumstance may also be varied; and it is the
nature of the intervention that appears to be determinative of the
stage of execution of the crime. If the accu sed does not complete
his act or acts, that is, he does not go so far as to make his act or
acts sufficient in the natural course of events to produce wounds
sufficient in the natural course of events to produce death, because
of his belief that his victim is already dead or would undoubtedly
die, the crime is still considered as frustrated.P     However, if the
factor which intervenes is something other than such belief, the
crime would then be considered as attempted ;12 except, when such
intervening factor is the accused's "own spontaneous desistance,"
in which case there would not even be an attempt.P
     Where the knife of the defendant was aimed at a vital part of the body, but met
with an obstruction, such as the back .of the chair on which the victim was sitting,
the crime was held to be frustrated murder. People ')I. Boringa, 55 Phil. 433 (1930).
     Note that under this circumstance, belief of the accused that the victim is already
dead or would undoubtedly die, appears to be immaterial. Thus in the Borinagd case,
" * * * After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the
back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes
after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do
so because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on
Borinaga, frightening him away. * * *."
     11 "In frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts which he belives ne-

cessary to consummate the crime. '" * '" In the case at bar * '" * the defendant be-
lieved that he had performed all the acts necessary to consummate the crime ,of mur-
der." This surely stamps the crime as frustrated murder.           U.S. ')I. Lim San, 17
Phil. 273 (1910).
     Where the victim escaped further wounds by playing possum, the crime was held
to be frustrated murder. People ')I. Dagnaa, 47 Phil. 768 (1925).
     Where the victim's "assailants left him lying on the ground believing that he
was dead, and it is not shown that death result-ed from the injuries, there being on the
contrary, evidence that he returned home on the following day, the crime should be
qualified as frustrated murder." U ..S ')I. Bastas, 5 Phil. 251 (1905).
     Where the accused only refrained from further attack when he believed that his
victim was dead, the crime was held to be frustrated murder. U.S. 'Y. Poblete, 10 Phil.
578 (1908).
     "After the assault, the two defendants, believing that their victim was dead, took
him out of the town and left him in a ditch. Next morning, the victim regained
conciousness although he was unable to rerum to his house because of his weakness."
The crime was frustrated murder. u.s. ')I. Domingo, 18 Phil. 250 (1911).
     12 "There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony * * *." Art. 6, par. 2, R.P.c.
     13 There would be no attempt if the offender does not perform all the acts of

extension which should produce the felony by reason of "his own spontaneous disist-
an.ce." See Art. 6, par. 3, R.P.c. If the offender thru fear or remorse desists from
continuing his criminal purpose, there would be no attempt. This is a sort of reward
392                         PHILIPPINE     LAW JOURNAL


      As to where the factor of poor aim in firing a gun would fit in,
by the use of the formula stated above, is a ticklish problem. Poor
aim cannot be deemed as an interve.ning factor similar to those men-
tioned above. When the accused is interrupted after firing a poorly
aimed shot, his act cannot he said to be sufficient in the natural
course of events to produce a wound or injury which in the natural
course of -events would be sufficient to cause death. The crime com-
mitted under such circumstances would, therefore, depend upon the
nature of the intervention.    If after firing a poorly aimed shot the
accused does not continue firing because he believes that his victim
is already dead or would undoubtedly die, the crime would be frus-
trated murder or homicide, as the case may be. But if the interven-
ing factor is something other than such belief, the crime would be
attempted murder or homicide. If the intervening factor is the ac-
cused's "own spontaneous desistance," the crime would not be at-
tempted murder or homicide, but physical injuries in the proper
degree.t-
      In the case under comment, the Supreme Court observed that
the fact that the victim was able to escape and hide in another room,
which the accused must have seen, must have produced in the lat-
ter's mind the belief that he was not able to hit his victim in a vital
part of the body, and, therefore, ruled that the crime committed is
attempted and not frustrated murder. However, the            Court also
stated that the defendant did not continue in pursuit, but as a matter
of fact ran away afterwards.      Would not these facts constitute
"spontaneous desistance" and therefore negate an attempt?




      Labor Law-A superintendent performing managerial functions
is also an employee.
          CEBU PORTLAND      CEMENT CO. v. CIR AND PLASMU
                      G.R. No. L-6158, March 11, 1954.
     Before the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance
of any industrial dispute it is necessary that the relationship of em-
granted by law to those who, having one foot on the verge of crime, heed the call of
their conscience and retum to the parh of righteousness.       See GUEVARRA, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE 16 (1931).
      14 See, however,  U.S. '1'. Agoncillo, 33 Phil. 242 (1916), where the Supreme
Court appears to have regarded the poor aim of the accused, or as the Court termed
it, the good luck of the victim, as an intervening factor which prevented a sufficient act
from, producing a wound which in the natural course of events would produce death.
In this case the accused fired four successive shots at close range, but only the second
shot hit the victim on the thigh. The Supreme Court stated that, "*        **    if he did
not succeed in carrying out his vicious intent to kill   * **     notwithstanding that he
performed all the acts conducive thereto and which should have resulted in the death
of the assaulted man, the failure was due to the chance that three of the rfour shots
fired at close range perhaps missed their mark, and to the victim's good luck, all reasons
independent of the will of the aggressor," and held that the crime was frustrated
murder.

				
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