NEW College of Letters Arts and Social Sciences

Document Sample
NEW College of Letters Arts and Social Sciences Powered By Docstoc
					                                                 13th Annual Southern California Philosophy Conference
                                                              Cal Poly Pomona, Saturday November 6th 2010

All sessions will be held at the Collins School of Hospitality Management ; MAP DIRECTIONS; WRITTEN DIRECTIONS; PARKING IS FREE
               Room 79B-1230                                                  Room 79B-1243                              Room 79B-1235, 1227, 1217
               (Conrad N. Hilton Foundation Great Room)                       (Panda Express Classroom)                  (Mary Alice & Richard N. Frank Classroom)
H. Amemiya Board Room, Collins School, Building 79B
9:00-10:20 Chair: Gary Watson, USC                                            Chair: Tony Roy, CSU San Bernardino        Chair: Michael Shim, Cal State LA
               Coleen Macnamara, UC Riverside                                 Robin Jeshion, USC                         Steve Barbone, San Diego State University
               ―Reactive Attitudes: A Form of Moral Address"                  "The Truth about Slurs"                    "Queerly Spinoza"
10:30-11:50 Author Meets Critics                                              Graduate Student Session
               Chair: David Adams, Cal Poly Pomona                            Chair: Masahiro Yamada, CGU                Chair: Gwendolyn Dolske, U of Louvain, Cal Poly
               Paul Hurley, Claremont McKenna College                         Joshua Crabill, USC,                       Christopher Lay, Pitzer College
                 Beyond Consequentialism                                      "A Radical Invariantist Alternative to     "The Zero-Order Temporal Account of
               Critics: Richard Arneson, UCSD                                 Expressivism about Epistemic Modals"       Consciousness Introduced"
                        Michael Cholbi, Cal Poly Pomona                       Commentator: Tim Black, CSUN
Debra Satz, Stanford
"Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale"
Room 79A-1263 (Wine Auditorium)
Overflow room: 79A-1335 (Hideo Amemiya Board Room)
1:30-2:50      Chair: Kayley Vernalis, Cal State LA                           Chair: Grant Marler, CGU/Cal Poly          Chair: Marcia Homiak, Occidental
               Sandra Harding, UCLA                                           Nellie Wieland, Cal State Long Beach       Charles Young, CGU
               "Secularism, Democracy, and Philosophy of                      "Words and 'Words'"                        ―Platonic Moral Psychology without Reason, Spirit,
               Science: Postcolonial and Feminist Issues"                                                                Appetite, and Political Metaphors‖
3:00-4:20                                                                     Author Meets Critics
               Chair: Adam Swenson, CSUN                                      Chair: John Fischer, UC Riverside          Chair: Alex Klein, CSU Long Beach
               Jason Raibley, Cal State Long Beach                            Mark Balaguer, Cal State LA                Marius Stan, Caltech
               "On the Intrinsic Evil of Death"                               Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem     "Leibniz and his Disciples on Action and Reaction:
                                                                              Critics: Anthony Brueckner, UCSB           the Origins of Kant's Third Law of Mechanics"
                                                                                       Robert Gressis, CSUN
4:30-5:50      Graduate Student Session                                                                                  Graduate Student Session
               Chair: Jeff Vanderpool, Fullerton College                      Chair: Dion Scott-Kakures, Scripps College Chair: Ericka Tucker, Cal Poly Pomona
               Michael Tiboris, UC San Diego                                  Peter Graham, UC Riverside                 Kenneth Pearce, USC
               "Risk, Heartedness, and Punishing Lucky Chancy                  "Truth Connections"                       "A Leibnizian Theory of Miracles"
               Attempters"                                                                                               Commentator: Patricia Easton, CGU
               Commentator: John Davis, Cal State Fullerton
Breakfast and lunch will be available in the Hideo Amemiya Board Room.

 Debra Satz, Stanford University, "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale"
What's wrong with markets in everything? Markets today are widely recognized as the most efficient way in general to organize production and distribution in a complex economy.
And with the collapse of communism and rise of globalization, it's no surprise that markets and the political theories supporting them have seen a considerable resurgence. For
many, markets are an all-purpose remedy for the deadening effects of bureaucracy and state control. But what about those markets we might label noxious-markets in addictive
drugs, say, or in sex, weapons, child labor, or human organs? Such markets arouse widespread discomfort and often revulsion.

In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of us as problematic. What
considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates about such markets? What is it about a market involving prostitution or the sale of kidneys that makes it morally objectionable?
How is a market in weapons or pollution different than a market in soybeans or automobiles? Are laws and social policies banning the more noxious markets necessarily the best
responses to them? Satz contends that categories previously used by philosophers and economists are of limited utility in addressing such questions because they have assumed
markets to be homogenous. Accordingly, she offers a broader and more nuanced view of markets-one that goes beyond the usual discussions of efficiency and distributional
equality--to show how markets shape our culture, foster or thwart human development, and create and support structures of power.

An accessibly written work that will engage not only philosophers but also political scientists, economists, legal scholars, and public policy experts, this book is a significant
contribution to ongoing discussions about the place of markets in a democratic society.

Mark Balaguer, Cal State LA. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem
Critics: Anthony Brueckner, UC Santa Barbara; Robert Gressis, Cal State Northridge
Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem: In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will
boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the
libertarian view of free will.

Balaguer claims that the compatibilism debate (the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism) is essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature
of human freedom, most notably "Do humans have free will?" Likewise, the questions "What is free will?" and "Which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility?" are
argued to be irrelevant to substantive questions about the metaphysics of human free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially
boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he argues that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the libertarian question reduces to a
question about indeterminacy—in particular, to a straightforward empirical question about whether certain neural events in our heads are causally undetermined in a certain specific
way. In other words, Balaguer argues that the right kind of indeterminacy would bring with it all of the other requirements for libertarian free will. Finally, he argues that because
there is no good evidence as to whether or not the relevant neural events are undetermined in the way that's required, the question of whether human beings possess libertarian
free will is a wide-open empirical question.

Notre Dame Philosophical Review by Joseph Keim Campbell

Paul Hurley, Claremont McKenna College, Beyond Consequentialism
Critics: Richard Arneson, UC San Diego; Michael Cholbi, Cal Poly Pomona
Beyond Consequentialism: Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy,
and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a
fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral
standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral
standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built
upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he undermines consequentialist arguments against alternative
approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A
moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinct conception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but it does so, Hurley argues,
by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms.

Steve Barbone, San Diego State University, "Queerly Spinoza"
ABSTRACT: While there has been continued active work on a metaphysical account of individuation within Spinoza’s philosophy, much of this work has more focused on whether
the political state is an individual in any metaphysical sense. This line of research does not so much treat the more
personal question of identity, that is, how individual people imagine or understand themselves to be and/or how they are imagined or understood to be by others. The issue has not
been completely ignored, however, and some work – almost always from a feminist perspective – has already made some very important contributions to the question of personal
identity in Spinoza. The issue of sexual identity has received some further attention, and there have been some insights for reading Spinoza through queer lenses. The present
study suggests and argues, however, that such lenses are not needed since the only thing that has prevented our seeing things queerly is the too straight and narrow vision due
either/or to Lockean lenses that are set within dualistic Cartesian frames. Spinoza’s theory of personal identity already is robustly queer, and as such, it can be tremendously
freeing, certainly much more so than many other theories based on Lockean ―I-know-not-what‖ and/or Cartesian dualism.

Peter Graham, UC Riverside, "Truth Connections"
ABSTRACT: Positive epistemic statuses are goods, successes or achievements understood in terms of promoting truth and avoiding error. In this paper I partly taxonomize
a number of such statuses in order to distinguish justification (on the one hand) from two kinds of entitlement.

Sandra Harding, UCLA, "Secularism, Democracy, and Philosophy of Science: Postcolonial and Feminist Issues"
ABSTRACT: A certain kind of anti-democratic secularism creates obstacles for progressive intellectual and social projects, including postcolonial and feminist philosophies of
science. This particular offending kind of secularism, unfortunately the dominant one in the modern West, commits philosophies of science to racist and colonial stances which most
philosophers of science would abhor if they were aware of them. It also positions women and indigenous knowers outside "the modern," wherein moral and political goodness and
scientific rationality are conventionally thought to be uniquely lodged. What are the remedies for this predicament?

Robin Jeshion, USC, "The Truth about Slurs"
ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the semantics of slurring words. My aim is to put forward a sketch of a semantic theory about slurs, with special attention to two issues, (1)
whether sentences containing slurs can be true and (2) the way slurs can become appropriated.

Christopher Lay, Pitzer College, "The Zero-Order Temporal Account of Consciousness Introduced"
ABSTRACT: Consciousness includes an awareness of itself, or self-awareness, and a close analysis of the way in which subjects are conscious of time, motivated by Edmund
Husserl's theorizing on time-consciousness, reveals a non-representational structure that accounts for that self-awareness. The structure of time-consciousness accounts for the
way in which subjects are conscious of objects, and their own awareness, over time; at any moment of consciousness, subjects are non-representationally aware of not just what is
going on at that instant, but are also aware of the immediate past and the immediate future. Occurrent consciousness takes place against a temporal background of past and future
episodes of consciousness, and this accounts for the self-awareness ubiquitous to normal consciousness. Those who have looked to Husserl's notion of time-consciousness to
account for the self-awareness in consciousness, most notably Dan Zahavi, have overlooked the importance of the temporal background. Understanding the role of the temporal
background in time-consciousness helps us see how seemingly unconscious behaviors fit into the structure of time-consciousness. For instance, instead of attributing the entire
structure of time-consciousness, and thereby self-awareness, to dreamless sleepwalkers, as Zahavi does, I argue that such sleepwalkers lack awareness of the temporal
background, and thus do not have the type of self-awareness that consciousness normally has of its self. Irrespective of such attempts amongst contemporary Husserl scholars to
account for self-awareness in consciousness in terms of time-consciousness, interest in accounting for the self-awareness in consciousness has grown over the past two decades.
 Many, like David Rosenthal and Uriah Kriegel, account for self-awareness in terms of representational content: whenever subjects consciously represent objects, they also
represent themselves representing those objects. But all such answers fall to the misrepresentation objection, the objection that holds that self-representational explanations of self-
awareness cannot coherently account for mismatches in representational contents. I will show how various attempts to defend Kriegel and Rosenthal's respective replies to this
objection fail–and how the temporal account of self-awareness I offer is thereby superior.

Coleen Macnamara, UC Riverside, "Reactive Attitudes: A Form of Moral Address"
ABSTRACT: In "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil‖, Gary Watson characterized both expressed and unexpressed reactive attitudes as forms of moral address. This claim has
been widely endorsed – and indeed to such an extent that it is arguably one the most frequent claims made on behalf of the reactive attitudes. I am among those who champion
Watson’s insight, but a puzzle remains. The claim that expressed reactive attitudes are forms of moral address seems clear enough. But what about resentment, indignation,
gratitude, and approval that remain buried in one’s heart? If I bite my tongue and don’t express my resentment, I am in a very real sense refraining from addressing you. It therefore
seems a bit odd--even unintelligible--to say that the reactive attitudes address their target even when they are not expressed, that is, when they do not address. The aim of this
paper is to make sense of the claim that unexpressed reactive attitudes are forms of moral address. I do this by distinguishing three senses of 'address'. To address may mean: (1)
to communicate to, (2) to direct at, or (3) to call for a reply. I argue that unexpressed reactive attitudes are like an unsent invitation, a dormant form of the third sense of address.

Jason Raibley, Cal State Long Beach, "On the Intrinsic Evil of Death"
ABSTRACT: This paper responds to two, related Epicurean arguments against the evil of death. The first argument is that, since death involves the absence of all sensation, dying
never leads to any outcome that is non-instrumentally bad for the one who dies. Some philosophers have responded to this argument by expanding their conception of extrinsic
value and arguing that dying is extrinsically bad because it deprives its victim of future pleasures. Instead, this paper argues that, using a more holistic conative theory of well-being,
we can establish that the process of dying is directly bad for the one who dies, no matter how it feels. The paper then responds to a second Epicurean argument based on the idea
that there is no time at which death is bad for the one who dies. It argues that, because the timing of one's death determines the length of one's life, using the holistic theory of well-
being already described, we can also explain how this event might impact the welfare-value of one's life, even if (a) one cannot experience one's death, because (b) one does not
exist at the moment of one's death.

Marius Stan, Caltech, "Leibniz and his Disciples on Action and Reaction: the Origins of Kant's Third Law of Mechanics"
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I examine Kant's early law of action and reaction, in his 1758 New Doctrine of Motion and Rest. I argue that it is a version of a law that ultimately goes
back to Leibniz. Kant's 1758 law of action and reaction takes over and improves this Leibnizian law, which he found in the metaphysical dynamics of Christian Wolff. I begin with an
account of action and reaction in Leibniz’s dynamics (I). Next, I show how these two concepts migrated into the natural philosophy of his disciples Jacob Hermann and Christian
Wolff (II). Part III explains how the young Kant takes over and transforms Wolff’s law of action and reaction. I show that my construal helps explain certain peculiar, non-Newtonian
features of Kant's law of action and reaction in the Critical period. I end with a call to reassess the source and role of Kant’s laws of motion in his a priori mechanics of 1786.

Nellie Wieland, Cal State Long Beach, "Words and 'Words'"
ABSTRACT: There have been two debates concerning the ontology of words: the first is the debate on the nature of the type-token relationship between different linguistic entities
(e.g., words and utterances, sentences and propositions, etc.). The second is the debate on the status of meta-linguistic discourse (e.g., using language to talk about language).
Both of these debates relate (somewhat surprisingly) to recent debates on the extent of context-sensitivity and the semantics-pragmatics divide. In this talk I will discuss some of the
problems facing an ontology of words and other linguistic entities. I will ask what a context-sensitive ontology for linguistic entities might look like, and provide some surprising

Charles Young, CGU, ―Platonic Moral Psychology without Reason, Spirit, Appetite, and Political Metaphors‖
 ABSTRACT: In Republic IV, Plato divides the human soul into three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite. He goes, and he goes on to use political metaphors (ruling, alliance,
agreement, faction, etc.) to describe the relations among these parts in persons who are wise, temperate, courageous, and just. This paper aims to make explicit the psychological
realities he means to be describing using this language.
Joshua Crabill, USC, "A Radical Invariantist Alternative to Expressivism about Epistemic Modals"
Commentator: Tim Black, CSUN
ABSTRACT: In ―Epistemic Modals,‖ Seth Yalcin observes that sentences like the following seem somehow deficient: 'It is raining and it might not be raining.' Clearly, this sentence
sounds bad. Yalcin argues that what explains the apparent deficiency is that sentences of this form are strictly contradictory, and not merely instances of a Moore-paradox. But
according to Benjamin Schnieder, Yalcin's explanation is insufficiently general. Instead, Schnieder proposes an expressivist treatment of epistemic modals which he thinks explain
the original type of sentence, as well as other, more complex cases of embedded sentences containing epistemic modals that he thinks are relevantly similar. In this paper, I argue
that although Schnieder is right to draw our attention to the explanatory gap in Yalcin's account, an expressivist explanation would be problematic in its own right. Taking a cue from
Kent Bach's radical invariantist theory of epistemic modals, I sketch an alternative account which explains the deficiencies of all the relevant sentences, while avoiding the defects of
both Yalcin's and Schnieder's accounts. If the view I sketch is on the right track, then the motivation Schnieder offers for adopting an expressivist theory is mistaken, and we have
instead reason to prefer a radical invariantist treatment of epistemic modals.

Kenneth Pearce, USC, "A Leibnizian Theory of Miracles"
Commentator: Patricia Easton, CGU
ABSTRACT: Most accounts of miracles assume that a necessary condition for an event's being miraculous is that it be, as Hume put it, ―a violation of the laws of nature.‖ However,
any account of this sort will be ill-suited for defending the major Western religious traditions because, as I will argue, classical theists should not believe in violations of the laws of
nature. In place of the rejected Humean accounts, this paper seeks to develop and defend a Leibnizian conception of miracles on which an event is said to be miraculous just in
case we can discover its final cause but not its efficient cause.

Michael Tiboris, UC San Diego, "Risk, Heartedness, and Punishing Lucky Chancy Attempters"
Commentator: John Davis, Cal State Fullerton
ABSTRACT: Could we justify a policy of treating criminal attempts and successes the same, instead of punishing all attempts less than successes? The difference between criminal
attempt and success is sometimes just a matter of luck. But, I argue, the prevalence of luck is normatively insignificant for punishment. A policy of punishing attempts and successes
the same would have to be based on the rationale for punishing attempts in the first place. I consider two potential rationales: heartedness rationales and risk-rationales. The risk-
rationale seems initially more attractive for its concreteness. So I consider two tactics for privileging it over the heartedness-rationale. I argue that, for all its difficulties and
vagueness, the heartedness-rationale cannot be ignored; it is an independently important element of proportionality in punishment. I conclude by suggesting a way to balance
heartedness and risk in applying punishment and its impact on the revisionist policy of treating attempts and successes the same.

David Adams
Michael Cholbi
Peter Ross
Ericka Tucker
Dale Turner