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Sample of ADIT's Compliance Department "Anti-Corruption Report" newsletter.
Sample of ADIT's Compliance Department "Anti-Corruption Report" newsletter.
2 AD October 2010 8 In this issue… International Bribery Rules & Regulations OECD Working Group on Bribery 2009 report: What is in the pipeline for the coming months? 1 OECD Working Group on Bribery 2009 report: What is in the pipeline for the coming months? The OECD Working Group on Bribery has recently published its annual report for 2 Increasingly Accurate Guidance on 2009, which follows the new 2009 “Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery Compliance Programs from Authorities of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. It was an N opportunity for the Working Group to review several countries’ progress on TY O corruption and future deadlines in this matter. Conference Coverage SI R 3 London World Bribery and Compliance PE Forum: September 14 & 15, 2010 FU Countries’ implementation and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is monitored by the OECD Working Group on Bribery through a rigorous system of peer- review monitoring, or what Transparency International calls the ‘gold standard’ of O IF Country Focus monitoring. PR D Monitoring is subject to specific agreed upon Principles and is broken down into three 4 South Africa: Progress Noted, Efforts Required phases: D IT TE Phase 1 evaluates the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement the Convention. AD Best practices Phase 2 assesses whether a country is applying the legislation effectively. IC Phase 3 focuses on enforcement of the Convention, the 2009 Anti-Bribery 5 No ‘Tone At The Top’ without ‘Tone in the Middle’ Recommendation and outstanding Phase 2 recommendations. TR ES Trends PROGRESS REPORT ON COUNTRIES IN PHASE 1 OR 2 6 Authorities Tackling the Fine Line between 2009 monitoring focused on unsolved issues from the two first phases. The report R Lobbying and Corruption 7 The International Anti-Corruption provided insights into changing anti-bribery legislation in the signatory states of the Academy Convention and information on countries wishing to join the Working Group. The group also recalled the importance of strengthening cooperation with emerging 8 Barometer economies to stop foreign bribery. Poll of monetary penalties delivered by In its report, the Working Group provided a tailored assessment of each member the Department of Justice since 2009 country’s progress in 2009. 9 Agenda Issue n°8 2 October 2010 THE 2009 REPORT: MORE COUNTRIES WANT TO JOIN AND WORK WITH THE OECD Israel: the latest country to join the 38 OECD members has undergone both Phase 1 and Phase 2. Among the recommendations, the Group noted, inter alia, that Israel should be more proactive in detecting, investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases, and namely those involving the defense industry (viz., making it mandatory for the Military Censor to report suspicions of foreign bribery by Israeli companies to law enforcement authorities). Legislation on sanctions and the jurisdictional implementation of the foreign bribery offence has been introduced. Chile: The passage of Act no. 20393 of December 2009 satisfied Chile’s obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, with the introduction of the criminal liability of legal persons for the bribery of Chilean and foreign public officials. Chile’s Phase 3 evaluation is scheduled for March 2014. Turkey: The Group noted the record level of private sector participation during evaluations. Since June 2009, the country is now in compliance with Article 2, with the introduction of a new amendment on corporate liability, to its Code of Misdemeanors. Portugal: The Group recommended that Portugal raise public employees’ awareness on foreign bribery, take action to ensure better protection for whistleblowers in the private sector and address N its low number of prosecutions of foreign bribery cases. Portugal expressed a divergent opinion on TY several recommendations. O SI Slovenia: The Group recommended that Slovenia ensure whistleblower protection, raise awareness R on foreign bribery and promote internal company controls. This will be examined in further detail PE during Slovenia’s Phase 3 evaluation in 2013. FU Poland: drafted a new Bill, which has removed the prerequisite of convicting a natural person before O IF being able to prosecute a legal person. PR D United Kingdom: A new Bribery Act was introduced in June 2010. D Czech Republic: Legislation on corporate criminal liability has been postponed to June 2010. IT TE Slovak Republic: In December, the Working Group decided to issue a public statement about the AD situation, warning that further uncertainty about Slovak bribery law may require increased due diligence over Slovak companies by their commercial partners, or multilateral development banks. IC Luxembourg: the Working Group continued to urge Luxembourg to bring its legislation into line with TR Article 2 of the Convention by establishing legislation to hold companies liable for foreign bribery. ES WORKING WITH THE WORLD This is what the Group calls the Global Approach, which involves a greater engagement with R countries not yet members of the OECD, especially emerging countries. Call on countries not parties to the Convention to join: The OECD Working Group on Bribery plays an important part in the OECD’s efforts to expand its membership. In 2009, Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia continued work on their ‘accession roadmaps’ to possible future OECD membership. Russia officially requested to join the Convention in February 2009. A wider engagement with emerging countries: The Working Group is also actively involved with many of the countries that the OECD has identified for ‘enhanced engagement’, with a view to possible future membership. The countries include Working Group on Bribery members Brazil and South Africa, as well as China, India, and Indonesia. The Working Group also began engaging more closely with Thailand, another major emerging economy. 2 Issue n°8 3 October 2010 - In April 2009, China began addressing how to establish an offence of bribing a foreign public official, but was not yet at the stage of drafting legislation. - India: The CBI and the CVC have enquired about the required procedure and steps to join the Anti-Bribery Convention. India does not currently have an active domestic bribery offence. During a visit, the anti-corruption authorities recognized the need to focus on bribe-givers as well as bribe-takers and on the need to strengthen preventive anti- corruption mechanisms. The authorities also expressed interest in future cooperation with the OECD and the Working Group on Bribery, including attending further meetings of the Working Group as observers. - The Group agreed to invite Indonesia to attend all 2010 meetings as an observer. - In October 2009, Thailand proposed a legislative amendment to establish a foreign bribery offence. It also participated to the December 2009 meeting. PHASE 3 COUNTRY MONITORING OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: THE NEXT STEP Last December, the Working Group adopted a post-Phase 2-assessment mechanism, which acts as a permanent cycle of peer review, involving systematic on-site visits as a shorter, more tightly focused assessment mechanism than for Phase 2. The first cycle of review under this mechanism is known as N Phase 3. This next step in the monitoring process engaged by the Working Group started in June, TY O according to a timetable for evaluations. SI R OBJECTIVES OF PHASE 3: SHORTER AND TIGHTER FOCUS PE FU The purpose of Phase 3 is to maintain an up-to-date assessment of the structures that Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have put in place to enforce the laws and rules implementing the Convention and 2009 Recommendations. O IF There are three pillars: PR D Progress made by Parties to the Convention on weaknesses identified in Phase 2. D IT Issues raised by changes in the domestic legislation, or institutional framework of the TE Parties. AD Enforcement efforts and results, and other key group-wide crosscutting issues. IC Similar to the first two Phases, the third Phase is based on vertical evaluations for each country. TR Phase 3 evaluation should be complete in 2014, according to the schedule established by the Working Group on Bribery. Every visit is based on the principle of member countries’ mutual ES evaluation. Two countries are always appointed to lead the evaluation and choose two local or national experts who take part in the on-site visit and draft the preliminary report. R HOW DOES IT WORK? Similar to the first two phases, various steps will mark the third stage. Questionnaire: Before evaluation, the country receives a questionnaire from the Working Group, which takes account of the evaluation results of Phase 2. The country has to answer different questions about the implementation of the Convention and 2009 Recommendations. On-site visit: Shorter than Phase 2 visits, they are scheduled to last up to three days. This is an opportunity to meet the authorities responsible for the enforcement of anti-corruption, such as magistrates and policemen, but also to discuss informally with key private sector representatives (especially on the issue of compliance). Following the visit, the two lead examiners jointly with the Secretariat of the Working Group draft a 3 Issue n°8 4 October 2010 preliminary report based on the questionnaire and collected data. Of course, the country under review is free to make comments. Note that France’s evaluation will start in June 2012. It is the only one that will take place entirely in French. The lead examiners will be Italy and Switzerland. Final report: The assessment is then sent to the Working Group on Bribery, which discusses difficult issues with the country and may form appropriate recommendations. All the discussions ultimately lead to the adoption of a final report listing the recommendations and any objections from the country. Follow-up reports: Similar to Phase 2, monitoring is implemented, which requires the country to make a written report within 24 months following the final report. Meanwhile, the Working Group may request an oral report, which is delivered within 12 months. A second report may be required if the first does not fully satisfy the Group’s recommendations. A KEY PHASE - CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT Because peer review is an inter-governmental process, business and civil society groups are not invited to participate in the formal evaluation process, in particular during the Working Group’s evaluation and follow-up. N TY O However, their views can be expressed and reflected in Phase 3 where enforcement in the private sector is also examined. Notably, businesses and civil society groups (such as trade unions or SI R nongovernmental organizations) very often take part in on-site visits. PE FU The OECD’s determination to integrate the private sector into its control program was illustrated by the adoption of a guide for companies and international organizations in February 2010. Since, the Working Group endorsed a new Initiative to Raise Global Awareness of Foreign Bribery at the end of O IF 2009. The guide is presented as, "the most comprehensive guidance ever provided to companies" by PR Chairman of the Working Group on Bribery Mark Pieth. D D He also said that raising awareness is necessary to the Convention’s future success and that the goal IT could not be achieved without targeting the private sector and the general public during the three- TE year Initiative. AD IC TR ES R 4 Issue n°8 5 October 2010 INCREASINGLY ACCURATE GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE ules & PROGRAMS FROM U.S. AUTHORITIES Amendments to chapter Eight of the U.S. Federal Guidelines Manual on the sentencing of egulations organizations, including proposed changes to §8B2.1 (Effective Compliance and Ethics Program) and §8D1.4 (Recommended Conditions of Probation — Organizations) were submitted to Congress on April 29, 2010. They will become effective on November 1, 2010, unless Congress decides otherwise. Compliance professionals’ attention should primarily focus on the proposed amendments GUIDELINES FOR UNIFORM SENTENCING HAVE BECOME LINES OF CONDUCT FOR POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS Congress created the Sentencing Commission in 1984 to establish uniform sentencing for federal defendants. The Commission enacted the Guidelines in 1985 for individual defendants and completed them in 1991 with provisions for organizations. The Guidelines' primary goal is to N achieve uniform sentencing and alleviate disparities. TY O For nearly 25 years, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been mandatory, meaning that the SI courts have been obliged to sentence defendants within the sentencing scope of the Guidelines, in R most cases. This changed after the United States v. Booker case, when the Supreme Court ruled PE FU that the Guidelines were merely advisory. The Courts are now allowed to tailor sentences according to other statutory concerns. The federal sentencing guidelines applicable to organizations provide companies with strong incentives for implementing compliance and ethics programs (if every O IF principle is respected, companies could reasonably expect sentencing leniency when criminal PR conduct has been disclosed) and with meaningful guidance on how to do so. D CHAPTER 8: FOR THE ATTENTION OF COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALS! D IT TE Chapter 8 “is designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken AD together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to IC maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.” According to the Guidelines, four factors may increase the ultimate punishment of a company: TR (1) The involvement in, or tolerance of criminal activity (2) The organization’s prior history ES (3) The violation of an order (4) The obstruction of justice R Chapter 8 provides two factors that mitigate a company’s ultimate punishment: (1) The existence of an effective corporate compliance and ethics program (2) Self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility by the organization §8B2.1 (Effective Compliance and Ethics Program): The proposed amendment to §8B2.1 alters one of the mitigating factors, i.e., a company’s rollout of an effective compliance and ethics program. One of the required items for an effective compliance and ethics program pursuant to 8B2.1 is committing to remediation efforts after a company has discovered criminal conduct. The 5 Issue n°8 6 October 2010 amendment clarifies the notion of ‘remediation efforts’: “After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent similar criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the organization’s compliance and ethics program.” Application notes provide guidance on what are ‘reasonable steps’: - The organization should take reasonable steps to make restitution and otherwise remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct. - The organization should self-report and cooperate with the authorities. - The organization should assess and, if necessary, modify its compliance program to ensure that the program is more affective. - If an organization decides to modify its compliance program, the company may take the additional step of retaining an independent monitor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of the modifications. - High level staff “should be aware of the organization’s document retention N policies and conform any such policy to meet the goals of an effective compliance TY O program under the guidelines and to reduce the risk of liability under the law.” - SI A company is required to “periodically assess the risk of criminal conduct [within R it] and…take reasonable steps to design, implement or modify” its compliance and PE - ethics program. FU As part of this assessment, a company is required “to monitor the nature and O IF operations of the organization with regard to particular ethics and compliance functions.” PR D §8D1.4- Recommended Conditions of Probation D IT An amendment has also been submitted to §8D1.4 (Recommended Conditions of Probation – TE Organizations) (Policy Statement) to simplify the recommended conditions of probation for AD organizations. The new section consolidates the list of conditions that are sufficient conditions for IC probation. TR The Guidelines currently make a distinction between conditions of probation that appropriately ensure that an organization can to pay an order of restitution, fine, or assessment, and conditions of probation that are appropriate for any other reason. The proposed amendment eliminates this ES distinction and gives the courts the flexibility to impose any of the available conditions of probation on a company. R The proposed amendments also clarify two of the current possible conditions of probation: -They allow the court to require an organization to submit to the examination of its books and records by an independent corporate monitor, instead of simply a probation officer. -They allow the court to require an organization to submit to a reasonable number of unannounced examinations of facilities subject to probation supervision. (Currently, the courts might only require organizations to submit to examinations of their books and records, as a condition of probation.) The Commission has also asked the public for comments on the proposed amendments and on “whether to encourage direct reporting to the board by responsible compliance personnel by allowing an organization with such a structure” to receive mitigation of its ultimate punishment “even if high- level personnel are involved in the criminal conduct.” 6 Issue n°8 7 October 2010 OECD MOVING THE SAME DIRECTION The OECD recently issued anti-bribery compliance recommendations by its working group representing 38 nations, called Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Similar to US guidelines, the Recommendation provides that “member countries should encourage . . . companies to develop and adopt adequate (…) *Compliance programs+ or measures for the purpose of preventing and detecting foreign bribery (…)” So far, the United States has been the only country with such principles. The OECD Recommendation goes even further than the U.S. Guidelines regarding the ‘why’ of Compliance programs, by specifying that countries should take account of some instances “in their decisions to grant public advantages, including public subsidies, licenses, public procurement contracts, contracts funded by official development assistance, and officially supported export credits.” The Recommendation also gives a few guidelines regarding the ‘how’ of anti-bribery compliance. This includes expectations about anti-bribery policies, training, internal controls, reporting N TY systems, discipline for violations, compliance incentives, accountability for program O management and program assessments. There is also considerable emphasis on third-party compliance measures. In many ways, the suggested measures are very similar to those in the SI R U.S. Guideline PE FU Finally, the proposed U.S. amendments provide helpful insights into how a company should design its compliance program if it wants to benefit from leniency in the event criminal O IF conduct is discovered. Although the Guidelines are considered as merely advisory, they clearly indicate what the Sentencing Commission considers as being the best practices in ethics and PR D compliance. Consequently, companies should bear the principles in mind when assessing or modifying their compliance programs. D IT TE AD IC TR ES R 7 Issue n°8 8 October 2010 LONDON WORLD BRIBERY AND COMPLIANCE FORUM: SEPTEMBER 14 & 15, 2010 onference The London World Bribery and Compliance Forum was held on September 14 & 15, 2010 and brought together 80 compliance professionals (government enforcement officials, in-house counsel, legal practitioners and others who deal with bribery and corruption topics on a daily basis) mainly from the UK. At the core of the summit stood the issue of the new UK bribery Bill, overage which should become effective in April 2011. Mike Koelher, a well-known U.S. law professor (Butler University) and publisher of the FCPA professor website, gave a compelling opening speech whose main lines are summed up in this article. Mike Koelher first highlighted the specific context of the summit: business interest and concern over bribery and corruption issues has never been higher. This is due to increased enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), expected implementation of the Bribery Act in the UK and increased interest and enforcement activity in other jurisdictions as well. He then chose to focus on a few specific topics, while painting a broad picture of the issue. N TY O “I fully understand that ENFORCEMENT TRENDS various “carrots” and “sticks’ SI R may motivate corporates to The enforcement of anti-bribery laws has clearly become internationalized. The FCPA is a law that voluntarily disclose conduct, impacts not only U.S. companies. Indeed many of the largest cases have involved foreign PE but I continue to believe that it is premature to encourage FU companies. In the same way, the Bribery Act is expected to impact not only U.K. companies, but also foreign organizations that conduct business in its jurisdiction. Moreover, a greater degree of O IF corporates to voluntarily cooperation between sovereign enforcement agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Justice disclose conduct when the (DOJ) and the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO), in enforcing bribery and corruption laws is clearly PR D contours of the law at issue growing. remain unsettled and in many D cases have never been Enforcement theories and procedures are becoming internationalized although each nation has IT subjected to judicial scrutiny.” unique attributes of local law and procedure. Mike Koelher highlighted the fact that in both the TE SFO’s memo titled “Approach of the Serious Fraud Office to Dealing with Overseas Corruption” and AD Mike Koelher, US Law in other public comments by SFO officials, it is clear that the SFO intends to adopt many U.S. style IC Professor enforcement procedures, such as encouraging voluntary disclosure and making use of negotiated settlements, such as non prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements. TR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE ES The FCPA professor highlighted that one curious component of FCPA enforcement and expected Bribery Act enforcement is the constant encouragement by government enforcement agencies that organizations voluntarily disclose conduct to the agencies that could potentially implicate the law, R rather than deal with the conduct at issue internally in an effective and responsible manner with the assistance of professional advisors. This aspect of enforcement remains controversial. It is widely acknowledged in the U.S. that the enforcement agencies are, with greater frequency, pushing the envelope in terms of enforcement theories, so much so that it is not clear if such theories would even prevail in court. Moreover, many of these enforcement theories have never been subjected to judicial scrutiny because the enforcement action is settled via a resolution vehicle that is itself subject to little or no judicial scrutiny. Mike Koelher concluded on this topic by saying: “I fully understand that various “carrots” and “sticks’ may motivate corporates to voluntarily disclose conduct, but I continue to believe that it is premature to encourage corporates to voluntarily disclose conduct when the contours of the law at issue remain unsettled and in many 8 Issue n°8 9 October 2010 cases have never been subjected to judicial scrutiny.” NON AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS Non and deferred prosecution agreements have a common point: they both remove - in whole or in part - an independent judicial system from a fundamental role in a transparent legal system based on the rule of law, ensuring that provable facts support each element of the alleged crime and that resolution specifics are in the public interest. In his recent Innospec sentencing remarks, Lord Justice Thomas cited The Risk of Abusing a Dominant Position, a paper that notes, among other things, that the newly enacted SFO guidance on “alternative methods to the disposal of criminal investigations by way of negotiated pleas or other resolutions by corporate defendants” may “introduce some unintended risks of abuse.” Mike Koelher shares this concern, “it is troubling when an area of law largely develops outside of the judicial system via privately negotiated agreements – agreements that corporates often feel compelled to enter into, regardless of facts or legal theories, mindful of the “sticks” the enforcement agencies posses. I support the study Transparency International (TI) has called for in its recent Progress Report on the OECD Convention. That report expresses a concern that negotiated settlements could be “questionable deals” between enforcement agencies and companies and it calls for procedures to make settlement terms subject to judicial approval independent from the prosecutor’s office.” N TY O HOW SHOULD FINES AND PENALTIES BE CALCULATED? “I do not know what the exact SI R answer should be, but I am Lord Justice Thomas also touched on the issue of fines calculation. He called for a uniform comfortable in my conclusion approach to financial penalties across multiple sovereigns, an increasingly important issue given PE that the best answer is not $703 million (USD) solely to FU the growing collaboration between foreign enforcement agencies. The TI report noted that in some cases fines and penalties are based on the amount of the bribe, while in other cases, fines O IF the U.S. Treasury because a and penalties are based on the amount of profit or gain from the transaction at issue. French, Dutch, and Italian PR D company allegedly bribed For Mike Koelher, the issue should be handled as follows: Nigerian officials – something “Fines and penalties should exceed the amount of profit from the wrongdoing, but with multiple D that actually happened over a enforcement agencies increasingly having jurisdiction over the same core conduct, greater IT 10-day period earlier this TE attention needs to be paid so that companies are not paying duplicative (and thus excessive) fines summer.” and penalties for the same conduct.” AD Mike Koelher, US Law IC Professor WHERE SHOULD THE MONEY GO? TR The U.S. and the U.K. have different approaches to the topic. In the U.S., all fines and penalties assessed in an FCPA enforcement action are collected into the U.S. Treasury. In the UK, as reflected in the Mabey & Johnson case, at least a portion of the assessed fines and penalties are repatriated ES to the countries affected by the bribery. Recognizing the fact that bribery is not a victimless crime, the U.K. approach seems to be the better of the two, although it poses several logistical obstacles R when it comes to ensuring that the money is indeed paid to the right persons or institutions. Mike Koelher made this compelling comment about the issue: “I do not know what the exact answer should be, but I am comfortable in my conclusion that the best answer is not $703 million (USD) solely to the U.S. Treasury because a French, Dutch, and Italian company allegedly bribed Nigerian officials – something that actually happened over a 10- day period earlier this summer.” He also remarked that that a former Assistant Director of the SEC Enforcement Division recently noted that one of the reasons “governments will keep pursuing corrupt business practices” is for “one simple reason – it’s lucrative.” Similarly, a former high-ranking DOJ FCPA official was recently quoted in connection with the increase in FCPA enforcement, “government sees a profitable 9 Issue n°8 10 October 2010 program, and it’s going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.” PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION? Mike Koelher closed his speech by asking one question, ‘Is government only enforcement the best and most efficient way to eliminate business bribery?’ As an answer, it appears that the most direct victim in bribery cases is the competitor who was denied an opportunity to bid, or lost a contract because it was unwilling to make the improper payments unlike its rival. For Mike Koelher, as TI notes in its recent report, and as reflected in certain recent events both in the U.S. and U.K., political interference in bribery investigations is an unfortunate result of government only enforcement. A private plaintiff would not be armed with the ‘sticks’ government enforcement agencies possess – meaning that defendants in such cases would likely mount a legal defense based on the facts and the law. Thus, the process would likely inject much-needed judicial scrutiny into bribery cases and result in useful judicial decisions. N TY O SI R PE FU O IF PR D D IT TE AD IC TR ES R 10 Issue n°8 11 October 2010 COUNTRY FOCUS SOUTH AFRICA: PROGRESS NOTED, EFFORTS REQUIRED The latest report by the Working Group on Bribery recommends that South Africa step up its efforts to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption in international business transactions. The Working Group on Bribery has just completed a review of South Africa’s implementation of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. OECD DIAGNOSIS Main recommendations by the OECD are as follows: • Increase awareness in the fight against bribery in the public and private sector N • Strengthen existing resources for law enforcement and training activities in the fight against TY O complex economic crimes, including bribery offences, and improve coordination between the police and prosecutors to fight bribery more effectively SI R • Ensure that the responsibility of companies engaged in acts of bribery committed either as PE appropriate FU • Ensure that Article 5 of the Convention, which prohibits considerations of national economic O IF interest, relations with another state, and the identity of individuals or companies when PR prosecuting foreign bribery, applies effectively to all investigative and prosecutorial decisions in D foreign bribery cases. D South Africa’s positive efforts to fight against foreign bribery are also highlighted in the report. A IT TE case in point is the recent undertaking of a robust legislative fight against bribery in connection with the Law on Prevention and Punishment of Corruption (Prevention and Combating of Corrupt AD Activities Act). As the Act makes it mandatory to report suspicions of bribery, it could be useful in IC uncovering cases of bribery. TR GREYER SITUATION ON THE GROUND Despite improvements, many companies are convinced that paying bribes directly, or via third ES parties, is still required to gain contracts in South Africa. Some companies have begun implementing anti-corruption policies, but actually local sources indicate that improper practices can still be found. Corruption acts are done in a less direct or visible way (via agents or with non- R financial remuneration), but are still common in the private as well as public sector. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION International Commitments South Africa is not an OECD member country, but it has signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Convention entered into force in South Africa on August 18, 2007. South Africa has also signed: - The Merida Convention in 2003 (UNCAC) 11 Issue n°8 12 October 2010 - The African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2004) - The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act The 2004 ‘Act’ also provides guidance for: • Investigative measures into corruption and related corrupt activities • The establishment and endorsement of a Register to place certain restrictions on persons and businesses convicted of corrupt activities for tenders and contracts • Holding persons in a position of authority accountable for reporting certain corrupt transactions • Extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities Statute of Limitations N TY Section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the right to institute prosecution for any O offence, lapsed after the expiration of a period of 20 years from the time when the offence was SI R committed. PE Responsibility of Legal Persons FU As a general rule, South African law is applicable to natural and legal persons alike. The definition [is O IF also appropriate for public entities, or state-controlled companies. PR D Responsibility of Business Leaders D A business owner or senior manager who is aware of an incident of corruption, fraud, or extortion IT involving more than R100,000 (approximately €9,500) and who fails to report it, is guilty of a crime TE under the South African law. AD Third Parties: IC The 2004 Act specifically criminalizes corruption acts involving agents as it indicates that corruption TR can be done directly or indirectly by accepting gratification “from any other person, whether for the benefit of him/herself or for the benefit of another person.” ES Facilitating Payments According to South African law, facilitating payments are illegal and a criminal offense. R Gifts and Hospitality Gifts and entertainment are traditionally part of the South African business environment. However, there is a growing awareness that said gratifications should not be excessive. With the increasing focus on good governance, many companies are revisiting their approach to gifts and entertainment. Some have even opted for a policy forbidding any gifts or entertainment. Different Codes of Conduct are applied to public officials, depending on their position. The codes comprise: - Prohibiting gifts and other favors (in return for a benefit, or for the purpose of influencing 12 Issue n°8 13 October 2010 the receiver) that would create a conflict of interest - Setting limitations to the value of gifts, ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 rands (approximately 95 to 140 euros). - Establishing guidelines for the disclosure of gifts to public officials (with requirements to disclose gifts exceeding 350 rands, or €33). Despite increasingly detailed regulations from the National Treasury over the years as well as additional codes of conduct for specific industry sectors (e.g., construction), most observers and the Public Service Commission (PSC) have reported low levels of compliance with reporting requirements. Public officials are also supposed to register their financial interest yearly, but recent reports have shown that some civil servants are still reluctant to do so. No remedial or disciplinary action has been taken against those refusing to disclose their financial interests, either. For some sources, the Public Service Codes of Conduct are ineffectual in preventing two related types of unethical and unlawful behavior by public servants, i.e., favors to friends or family and unauthorized outside remunerative work. N TY Every observer and our sources consider that, compared to the numerous cases of corruption O mentioned in both the public and the private sector, the number of cases that find their way into SI the courts and produce sentencing is very low. R PE FU The main factors explaining the low level of enforcement are: The lack of any political decisiveness in the matter (even if the latest O IF government announcements point to changes in this area) The lack of any real independent anti-corruption agency with PR D investigation & prosecution powers The inadequacy of the level of resources allocated to investigations. D IT TE AD IC TR ES R 13 Issue n°8 14 October 2010 NO ‘TONE AT THE TOP’ WITHOUT ‘TONE IN THE MIDDLE’ It is widely agreed that a clear message from the top is essential for the creation of a corporate ethical culture. Indeed, the US Sentencing Guidelines recommend that “High-level personnel and est substantial authority personnel of the organization shall be knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program … and shall promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.” ractices MID-LEVEL EXECUTIVES KEY FOR CORPORATE MESSAGE However, it has become increasingly obvious that middle managers’ role should not be underestimated. A lack of commitment by this level in the company pyramid may seriously jeopardize the dissemination of the corporate ethical culture. All levels of employees should believe that the organization wants to act ethically in everything it does, so that the culture can reach the core of the company. Nowadays, most top managers clearly realize they have a clear role to play in delivering a strong message about the company’s values and credo. Misconduct by senior managers in major cases, such as Enron or Worldcom, has made top managers aware of the importance of communicating from the top: they have to set the ‘tone’. N TY A tone set from the top, albeit crucial, provides no guarantee that middle managers whose role is O critical to day-to-day management, will make the tone from the top their line of conduct. Actually, SI the main problem is that lower level employees, who are in permanent contact with middle R managers rather than with top managers, will align on the former’s behavior and state of mind. PE FU According to Kirk Hanson, Executive Director of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics and University Professor of Organizations and Society, “The implementation of ethics in an organization O IF is as strong as its weakest link as it flows down into the organization. An organization’s ‘tone at the top’ must be translated into a tone ‘in the middle’ before they can reach the rest of the PR D organization.” D Consequently, ethics and compliance managers should focus on influencing middle managers’ IT specific behaviors rather than on top managers’ behaviors, as they have done over the past years. TE AD Impacting middle managers’ behavior is more complicated than influencing top managers’ conduct. IC Actually, middle managers are constrained by intractable financial, sales and cost control objectives. “The implementation of They usually have the feeling that top management is broadcasting the message to focus on TR ethics in an organization is quantifiable business objectives rather than on the ‘softer’ targets, i.e., ethics. Possibly also, they as strong as its weakest link perceive that top management does not realize that they cannot achieve real performance without as it flows down into the ‘stretching’ the corporate ethical standards. ES organization. An organization’s ‘tone at the SEVERAL TECHNIQUES FOR PERSUADING MIDDLE MANAGERS top’ must be translated into R a tone ‘in the middle’ before Several techniques can help to disseminate the company’s ethical commitment and convince middle they can reach the rest of managers that the company is serious about its objectives. the organization.” Kirk Hanson recommends the following incentive actions for middle managers: Kirk Hanson, Executive Director of the 1. Top executives must themselves exhibit all the ‘tone at the top’ behaviors, including Markkula Center for acting ethically, talking frequently about the organization's values and ethics, and Applied Ethics supporting the organization’s and individual employee's adherence to the values 2. Top executives must explicitly ask middle managers what dilemmas arise in implementing the ethical commitments of the organization in the work of that group 3. Top executives must give general guidance about how values apply to those specific 14 Issue n°8 15 October 2010 dilemmas 4. Top executives must explicitly delegate resolution of those dilemmas to the middle managers 5. Top executives must make it clear to middle managers that their ethical performance is being watched as closely as their financial performance 6. Top executives must make ethical competence and commitment of middle managers a part of their performance evaluation 7. The organization must provide opportunities for middle managers to work with peers on resolving the hard cases. 8. Top executives must be available to the middle managers to discuss/coach/resolve the hardest cases. N TY O SI R PE FU O IF PR D D IT TE AD IC TR ES R 15 Issue n°8 16 October 2010 AUTHORITIES TACKLING THE FINE LINE BETWEEN LOBBYING AND CORRUPTION Lobbying, the channel used by civil society to influence public decision-making, has grown rends considerably. Business, labor and nongovernmental organizations resort to lobbying in different ways. Some 15,000 lobbyists are registered in Washington DC and 5,000 in Ottawa. Nearly 3,000 lobbyists are registered with the European Commission in Brussels and over 4,500 with the European Parliament. Nevertheless, when large businesses and interests become involved, the fragile balance between legitimate and illegitimate lobbying activities is jeopardized. THE FUZZY LINE BETWEEN LOBBYING AND CORRUPTION Transparency International’s ‘Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide’ defines lobbying as follows: “Any activity carried out to influence a government or institution’s policies and decisions in favor N of a specific cause or outcome. Even when allowed by law, these acts can become distortive if TY O disproportionate levels of influence exist — by companies, associations, organizations and individuals.” SI R But when does lobbying become corruption? Transparency International’s Global Corruption PE FU Report 2009: Corruption and the Private Sector tries to answer this question. The report explains how businesses with huge funds for backing their lobbying activities and close O IF relationships with lawmakers can achieve disproportionate access to the policy-making process in ways that are not accessible to common citizens. When safeguards for transparency and PR D accountability are limited, illegal, undue and unfair influence in a country’s policies and politics become a real danger. D IT On the other hand, interest groups, an inescapable reality in modern democracies, will always TE strive to influence government decision-making. Lobbying can yield valuable information and AD data for more transparent and informed decision-making. IC AN URGENT NEED TO REGULATE LOBBYING TR The current economic crisis has drawn attention to lobbying, with loud calls to improve governance both in private sector boardroom practices and public sector management. ES A December 2009 IMF paper establishes a relation between intensive lobbying and high-risk R lending practices. The paper concludes that, “the prevention of future crises might require weakening political influence of the financial industry or closer monitoring of lobbying activities to understand the incentives behind better.” Some countries have started implementing legislation and government regulations, viz., Australia, Canada, France, Hungary, Poland, the UK and USA. Recently, both houses of the French parliament issued codes of conduct for lobbyists and established registers. The European Commission has also recently reinforced its lobbying regulations. Israel, an OECD accession candidate country, has also recently amended its legislation, while Slovenia is discussing changes. Several OECD countries are reviewing Bills, or taking action in parliament, including the Czech Republic, South Korea, Italy, Mexico, Norway and the Slovak Republic. 16 Issue n°8 17 October 2010 THE OECD DEALING WITH THE ISSUE To tackle the burning issue, the OECD has recently adopted a recommendation with a set of 10 principles as guidance for decision-makers on how to foster good lobbying governance. Especially during the current crisis, at a time when countries are reshuffling regulations for entire sectors, the principles will help rebuild trust, promote a level playing field for business and avoid potential hijacking by powerful interest groups. The OECD lobbying principles provide guidance for decision-makers at all levels of government, at both national and sub-national levels. They principles support the commitment of the private sector and civil society. This underscores an essential aim of the new OECD principles, which is to encourage policymakers to level the playing field by dealing fairly with all relevant stakeholders and not just those with funds, in the democratic lawmaking process. New OECD principles are in no way an anti-lobbying tool. For instance, several countries have improved transparency; yet in spite of these efforts, the have not been able to reduce lobbying visibly. The goal is to improve lobbying practices as part of the drive to foster open N governance and restore public trust in markets and democracy. The OECD principles are a vital TY component of the effort to make the world economy stronger, cleaner and fairer. O SI R 1. Countries should provide a level playing field by granting all stakeholders fair and equitable access to the development and implementation of public policies. PE FU 2. Rules and guidelines on lobbying should address the governance concerns related to O lobbying practices and respect the socio-political and administrative contexts. IF PR D 3. Rules and guidelines on lobbying should be consistent with wider policy and regulatory frameworks. D IT 4. Countries should clearly define the terms 'lobbying' and 'lobbyist' when they consider or TE develop lobbying rules and guidelines. AD IC 5. Countries should provide an adequate degree of transparency to ensure that public officials, citizens and businesses can obtain sufficient information on lobbying activities. TR 6. Countries should enable stakeholders – including civil society organizations, businesses, the media and the general public – to scrutinize lobbying activities. ES 7. Countries should foster a culture of integrity in public organizations and decision-making by providing clear rules and guidelines of conduct for public officials. R 8. Lobbyists should comply with standards of professionalism and transparency; they share responsibility for fostering a culture of transparency and integrity in lobbying. 9. Countries should involve key actors in implementing a coherent spectrum of strategies and practices to achieve compliance. 10. Countries should review the functioning of their lobbying rules and guidelines on a periodic basis and make the necessary adjustments in light of experience. 17 Issue n°8 18 October 2010 THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ACADEMY (IACA) rends The International Anti-Corruption Academy, based in Laxenburg 15km south of Vienna, Austria is starting operations this autumn. By 2011, IACA will operate globally as a full-fledged international organization, with regional offices planned for the mid-term. The academy describes itself as “An International Centre of Excellence for a New and Holistic Approach to Fighting Corruption.” More than 1,000 participants from over 120 UN Member States and over 25 organizations and institutions from the private business sector, civil society, academia and the media attended the IACA inaugural session during a two-day conference on September 2 & 3, 2010, in Vienna. THIRTY-SIX FOUNDING MEMBERS TO DATE Thirty-five UN Member States (see the list at the end of the article) and the European Public Law Organization signed the Agreement for the Establishment of IACA as an International N Organization. The first round of signatures will be open until December 31, 2010. The first TY O signatories will be considered IACA Founding Members. SI IACA PARTNERS R PE FU IACA is a joint initiative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Republic of Austria, supported by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and major stakeholders such as the OECD, the European Network of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EPAC), the International O IF Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA), the World Bank, Transparency International PR and - last but not least - Interpol. D Interpol announced that it “will offer its law enforcement expertise to help define the Academy’s D curriculum and to provide course work support regarding law enforcement’s role in anti- IT TE corruption training” and that it “agreed to work cooperatively with the Academy, linking the training done in Austria to its worldwide contacts in law enforcement and among international AD institutions, universities and police academies.” IC To demonstrate its support for the project, INTERPOL also pledged USD 250,000 towards the TR activities of the new anti-corruption body from a donation INTERPOL received from the Motorola Foundation, the first company to support such an initiative globally. ES IACA MAIN OBJECTIVES The Academy’s main stated goal is to educate a new generation of specialists and experts to tackle corruption related issues. R The Academy describes itself as “A future global centre of excellence” that “will pursue the objective of creating a holistic and inter-disciplinary approach to professionalizing anti-corruption training, education and research.” It also promotes partnerships with public and private sector institutions, including academia, civil society and NGOs from all regions. 18 Issue n°8 19 October 2010 Academy education and training are largely based on the 2005 UNCAC Convention. The Academy is also taking a closer look at assisting States in turning the provisions of the Convention into reality. Main IACA goals are to: Address the phenomenon of corruption holistically, comprehensively and in an inter- disciplinary approach Professionalize anti-corruption work to meet the most modern and exacting standards Foster direct dialogue, collaboration, exchange and synergies between relevant stakeholders Improve substantially the effectiveness of institutions, organizations or individuals engaged in preventing and combating corruption Conduct research on effective and efficient anti-corruption strategies and activities Build partnerships with all the relevant stakeholders IACA ACTIVITIES The Academy will cover a vast spectrum of lectures, seminars, special events, conferences and other training activities including (academic) degree programs and offer a broad range of tailored courses. N The Academy will also be providing distance learning and web-based tools. TY O Students will come from various entities such as governmental agencies, international organizations, SI anticorruption agencies, law enforcement entities, the judiciary, NGOs, civil society actors and R business. PE FU The Academy will establish and maintain a global network of like-minded alumni and professionals. Special courses will be delivered by high level academics, practitioners and other experts while O IF permanent as well as part-time faculty members will teach ‘module’ and skills courses and present PR case studies combined with long term anti-corruption and ethics issues. D The first September 2010 activity was an expert meeting with non-state actors on "Non-State Actors in the Asset Recovery Processes” organized jointly by IACA and the Basel Institute of Governance. D IT TE IACA GOVERNANCE AD The International Steering Committee IC The International Anti-Corruption Academy is governed by an International Steering Committee TR (SC), which brings together senior representatives of IACA’s main Partners and meets once a month. The Steering Committee’s main responsibility is to adopt the Academy policies, handle ES management, the transitional work program and budget. It also has to review the progress of Academy activities and evaluate its initiatives. The Committee also approves the appointment of members to the two others governance bodies: R the International Senior Advisory Board and the International Academic Advisory Board. The first members of the Steering Committee are: The Chair: Martin KREUTNER, Special Advisor to the Minister for Anti-Corruption Affairs, Austria 3 members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austria 2 members of the European Anti-Fraud Office’s (OLAF) 3 members of UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime) The Commissioner General of the National Centre for Human Rights in Jordan All representatives to the SC work in an honorary capacity. 19 Issue n°8 20 October 2010 The IACA International Senior Advisory Board The International Senior Advisory Board (ISAB) comprises a group of Anti-corruption experts and is set out to advise IACA in matters of strategic direction. It decided, inter alia, to focus on support for fundraising, increase international recognition by acting as IACA Ambassadors and facilitate wider networking. The Senior Advisory Board is chaired by Michael Hershman, Co-founder of Transparency International and current President of the Fairfax Group The other members of the Senior Advisory Board are: Barry O’Keefe, Chair of the Law Advisory Board, Notre Dame School of Law, Sydney Australia Mark Pieth, Chairman of the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Eddie R. Ouko, Auditor General of the African Development Bank Timothy Tong, Commissioner of the Independent Commission against Corruption in Hong Kong N Huguette Labelle, Chair of Transparency International TY Roberto de Michele, Principal Policy Adviser, Inter-American Development Bank O Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, former South African Cabinet Minister and currently Director at SI R the United Nations Development Program PE The International Academic Advisory Board FU O IF The International Academic Advisory Board (IAAB) consists of nine academics specializing in anti- corruption matters. PR D One of the IACA Board’s main responsibilities is to give advice on: D IT Strategies and policy frameworks for the educational and training programs TE The operational organization of the courses AD The establishing of partnerships with universities or other academic institutions IC An IACA academic research program including specific research aims and objectives TR Signatory countries for the Establishment of the IACA as an International Organization 01 Albania 02 Argentina ES 03 Austria 04 Benin 05 Bolivia 06 Bulgaria 07 Cape Verde 08 Chile R 09 Cyprus 10 Hungary 11 Indonesia 12 Jordan 13 Kenya 14 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 15 Liechtenstein 16 Luxembourg 17 Malaysia 18 Mali 19 Mexico 20 Montenegro 21 Panama 22 Peru 23 Philippines 24 Portugal 25 Romania 26 Senegal 27 Serbia 28 Slovenia 29 Syria 30 Republic of Macedonia 31 Togo 32 Uganda 33 United Kingdom and Northern Ireland 34 Yemen 35 Zambia 36 European Public Law Organization 20 Issue n°8 21 October 2010 POLL OF MONETARY PENALTIES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SINCE 2009 The review of fines issued by the DOJ against companies between 2009 and 2010 may help understand and anticipate its decisions. (Fines amounts from DOJ and SEC official releases) Minimum Maximum Percentage of Fine agreed Company Name Date Fine range Fine range (million USD) minimum (million USD) (million USD) Fine range 2009 Kellogg Brown & 1 02/06/09 376,80 753,60 402,00 107% Root LLC 2 Latin Node, Inc. 03/23/09 4,20 8,40 2,00 48% Control 3 07/22/09 27,90 55,80 18,20 65% Components, Inc. Average Values: 136,30 272,60 140,73 73% N Maximum Values: 376,80 753,60 402,00 107% TY Minimum Values: 4,20 8,40 2,00 48% O 2010 SI R 4 BAE Systems plc 02/04/10 360,00 400,00 200,00 56% PE Innospec Inc. Daimler AG 03/17/10 03/22/10 101,50 116,00 FU 203,00 232,00 40,20 93,60 40% 81% 5 O IF DaimlerChrysler PR D Automotive Russia 03/22/10 34,20 68,40 27,36 80% SAO Daimler Export and D Trade Finance 03/22/10 36,40 72,80 29,12 80% IT TE GmbH AD DaimlerChrysler 03/22/10 6,30 12,60 5,04 80% China Ltd. IC Technip S.A. 06/28/10 318,40 636,80 240,00 75% TR Snamprogetti 07/07/10 300,00 600,00 240,00 80% Netherlands B.V. Alliance One ES 08/06/10 4,20 8,40 4,20 100% Tobacco Osh, LLC Alliance One 6 08/06/10 4,20 8,40 5,25 125% R International AG Universal Leaf 08/06/10 6,30 12,60 4,40 70% Tabacos Ltda. Average Values: 117,05 205,00 80,83 79% Maximum Values: 360,00 636,80 240,00 125% Minimum Values: 4,20 8,40 4,20 40% 21 Issue n°8 22 October 2010 Some values are outside the average; they can be explained by the circumstances of the case: 1. United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC: The fine (approximately $25,000,000 above the bottom of the advisory sentencing guideline range) reflected the egregiousness and long duration of the criminal conduct, KBR's leadership role in that conduct and the fact that KBR's use of international sales agents for the corrupt payments to foreign government officials did not appear to be limited to a single project. 2. United States v. Latin Node, Inc.: Defendant Latin Node was dissolved from an operational perspective. It currently exists only as a corporate entity for purposes of entering into this Agreement. This Agreement was also a result of the voluntary disclosure made by Latin Node and its parent corporation eLandia International, Inc., through their counsel, to the Department beginning in November 2007, and the disclosure of non-privileged evidence and information obtained as a result of the investigation by their attorneys. The disclosure and cooperation by eLandia International, Inc., Latin Node's parent, was timely, thorough and exemplary. During the course of several months, it disclosed thousands of non-privileged records and other information and promptly responded to the Department's requests for additional information. N TY 3. United States v. Control Components, Inc.: The Department took the following factors into O consideration: the appropriate consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines; Defendant’s recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct; Defendant’s SI R voluntary disclosure of evidence obtained as a result of its extensive internal investigation PE FU and its substantial cooperation in the Department’s investigation and prosecution; and Defendant’s substantial compliance and remediation efforts. O IF 4. United States v. BAE Systems plc: Fine initially set at $240 million, eventually lowered because PR of 40 million that were not covered by the FCPA (funds used to secure defense projects, D which did not require permission from the Department of State). D 5. United States v. Innospec Inc.: The agreed fine is low because Innospec represented that, IT TE were the company to pay more than the amount agreed, the continued viability of the AD company would be threatened (e.g., would exceed limits of credit facilities, cause a deficit of 85 million dollars, force the company to close facilities around the world) IC 6. United States v. Alliance One International AG: The fine is above the minimum of the range TR partly to account for the fact that two subsidiaries (DIAG and Standard Brazil) participated in the commission of the offense, along with a third unrelated company, although they were ES subsidiaries of different parent corporations at the time. Further, because DIAG, Standard Brazil and Company A collaborated to fix prices and pay bribes to the Thai officials, the conduct was not limited to a few employees or confined to a single business unit. R DOJ imposed fines in 2010 seem more balanced than in 2009. However the percentage of fines compared to the minimum fine range in 2009 appears lower. Overall, there is an average value of fines ranging between 70 and 80 percent of the minimum fine range. The fines higher than the minimum fine range can be explained by the extent and duration of corruption and how the convicted company cooperated with the DOJ. 22 Issue n°8 23 October 2010 THE AGENDA OCTOBER 2010 SE P T E M B R E 2 0 0 9 L M M J V S D L M M J V S D 9th European Forum on Anti-Corruption, October 20-21, 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 Paris, C5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 The European Anti-Corruption Summit 2010, November 2-3, London, 15 C5 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 14th International Anti Corruption 25 Conference, November 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 22 23 24 26 27 10-13, Bangkok, Thailand, IAAC 28 29 30 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 24th National Conference on the FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, November 16-17, NYC or Washington DC, OCTOBRE 2009 American Institute of conference L M M J V S D NOVEMBER 2010 Anti-corruption China Summit, November 30-December 2, Beijing, Ethical Beacon 1 2 3 4 N L M M J V S D TY O 5 Dhabi Summit7on Anti-Corruption, December 13-14, Abu 6 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Abu Dhabi, C5 SI R 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 PE 26 LATER 20 19 21 22 Anti-Corruption, Frankfurt Edition, January 25-26, Frankfurt, 27 28 29 30 23 24 31 25 15 22 FU 16 23 17 24 18 25 19 26 20 27 21 28 O IF C5 NOVEMBRE 2009 29 30 PR D L M M J V S D DECEMBER 2010 D 1 IT L M M J V S D TE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 AD 1 2 3 4 5 IC 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 TR 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ES 27 28 29 30 31 R ADIT email@example.com 62, rue Miromesnil 75008 Paris Tél. : +33 (0)1 56 77 06 30 Fax : +33 (0)1 56 77 06 31 23
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