EKONOMSKA ANALIZA EUROPSKOG PRAVA

Document Sample
EKONOMSKA ANALIZA EUROPSKOG PRAVA Powered By Docstoc
					EKONOMSKA ANALIZA PRAVA
   odnosi se na primjenjivanje ekonomskih
    metoda na pravne probleme i institucije.

   Istraživanja pokazuju da metode i analitički
    postupci, Pareto efikasnosti, teorije igara,
    analiza transakcijskih troškova, društvenih
    troškova, javnog izbora ekonometrijske i
    statističke metode i dr. primijenjeni na pravo
    mogu dati nove i interesantne spoznaje.
   razvija se u novu modernu znanstvenu i
    nastavnu disciplinu.
   Pravna područja primjene su ne samo oblast
    ekonomskog i trgovačkog prava već i javnog
    prava, kaznenog prava, obiteljskog prava i dr.

   Ekonomska analiza prava postaje sastavnica
    prestižnih sveučilišnih programa prava i
    ekonomije u SAD, a novije i u Europi.
   interdisciplinarni uspjeh dvaju velikih društvenih
    znanosti
   relativno novo polje istraživanja
   Ronald Coase “Problem of social cost” (1960.)
   Guido Calabresi „Some thoughts on risk
    distribution and the law of torts“ (1961.)

   Gary Becker, Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi,
    Trimarchi, Bentham, Williamson, Landes, Cooter,
    Shavell, Van den Bergh, Schäfer i dr.
   Ekonomska analiza prava kao moderna znanost i
    metoda u primjeni.
   Početci: uzak ezoteričan interdisciplinaran
    pravac istraživanja prava i ekonomije, koji je
    u samo nekoliko dekada prerastao u rašireno
    područje brojnih publikacija i institucija koje
    su doprinijele preispitivanju prava i pravnih
    metoda
   Ekonomija pruža znanstvenu teoriju za
    predviđanje utjecaja pravnih sankcija na
    ponašanje.

   Za ekonomiste, sankcije izgledaju kao cijene
    i, pretpostavlja se, ljudi reagiraju na te
    sankcije slično kao što reagiraju na cijene.
    Ljudi reagiraju na više cijene tako da troše
    manje skupljih dobara, pa se pretpostavlja da
    ljudi reagiraju na jače pravne sankcije tako da
    rade manje sankcioniranih aktivnosti.
   primjenjivanje ekonomskih metoda na pravne
    probleme i institucije
   polazište: kako se može od ograničenih resursa
    određenog društva ostvariti najveće moguće
    zadovoljenje društvenih potreba i očekivanja.
    Ako se taj cilj ostvari bez gubitka resursa u
    primjeni takvo gospodarstvo se smatra
    efikasnim.

   problem normativne ekonomije je predlaganje
    propisa i institucija koje vode prema efikasnoj
    uporabi resursa
   primjena mjerila i koncepta efikasnosti na
    propise, pravna pravila

   pretpostavka: da i pravna znanost i judikatura
    moraju ocjenjivati pravna pravila i propise
    uporabom kriterija o tome da li oni potiču ili
    sprečavaju efikasnu uporabu resursa

   primjena: korist odvjetnicima, sucima,
    zakonodavstvu, managerima i ostalim
    ekonomistima prigodom donošenja strateških
    odluka, investicijskih odluka, odluka o tome da li
    tužiti ili se nagoditi i dr.
   Zakonska obveza osiguranja klizišta uz ceste
    na snazi je u svim europskim zemljama
    naročito alpskim cestama Austrije, Švicarske,
    Njemačke. Veliki resursi eksploziva, željeznih
    mreža i 24 - satnog nadzora - rada službi su
    angažirani za tu svrhu. Ali smatra se
    opravdanim jer izbjegavanje klizanja
    zemljišta i mogućih žrtava i štete važnije su
    od uštede na resursima kojima se klizanja
    sprečavaju.
   Iste opasnosti postoje i na drugim planinskim
    putovima ponekad vrlo prometnim kao na
    primjer Khyber, prijelaz između Pakistana i
    Afganistana. Kada bi na tom putu zahtijevali isti
    stupanj sigurnosti i uporabe odgovarajućih
    resursa, ekonomska analiza daje potpuno
    drugačije rezultate. Ta investicija sa istom
    svrhom, ali na drugom mjestu potrošila bi možda
    ukupan proračun ili druga raspoloživa sredstva
    (zajmovi) tih ekonomski slabih zemalja. Resursi
    bi bili bolje (efikasnije) uporabljeni za druge
    hitnije namjene. Sanacija klizišta u Afganistanu i
    shodno tome zakonska obveza uprave o takvim
    zaštitama ne bi bila efikasna uporaba
    ograničenih resursa, a takvi propisi ne doprinose
    efikasnoj uporabi resursa.
   Zaključak: Propisi i pravna pravila nisu
    apsolutna: oni su blisko povezani sa
    dostupnim resursima i ekonomskim
    razvojem. Niti ekonomija nije neovisna od
    prava jer konačni učinci i posljedice
    ekonomskih mjera ovise od ponašanja ljudi i
    djelovanja institucija koje uređuju pravo.
   Ako živite u državi gdje je najteža kazna za
    kriminalce doživotni zatvor, netko predloži da pošto
    je oružana pljačka vrlo težak zločin, da bi oružani
    pljačkaši trebali dobiti doživotnu kaznu.
   Odvjetnik se pita da li je to u skladu sa zabranama na
    okrutne i neuobičajene kazne.
   Neki pravni filozof pita se je li to pravedno.
   Dok ekonomist ističe da ako bi kazne za oružanu
    pljačku i za oružanu pljačku sa ubojstvom bile iste,
    dodatna kazna za ubojstvo bila bi jednaka nuli i pita
    se da li stvarno želite da bude u interesu pljačkaša da
    počini ubojstvo.

   To je ono što ekonomiste povezuje sa pravom.
   Ekonomija, čiji osnovni predmet interesa nije novac ili
    gospodarstvo, već umiješanost racionalnog izbora
    /Rational choice theory/, koristi se kao osnovni alat za
    otkrivanje utjecaja zakona.

   Osnovna pretpostavka ekonomskog pristupa, i u pravu i u
    svemu drugome, jest da je čovjek racionalan.

   Koji zakoni će se donijeti, kako se oni tumače i provode,
    ovisi o tome kakvo je ponašanje u racionalnom interesu
    zakonodavnog tijela, sudaca i policije.

   Proučavanje prava uči ekonomiste da razmišljaju
    opreznije, točnije i preciznije u konceptima koje razvijaju i
    namjenjuju određenom prostoru i vremenu.
   Ekonomija pomaže razumjeti pravo na nov način,
    u realnom okruženju troškova, neracionalnosti
    ponašanja, osobnih interesa.

   Pravnici provode mnogo vremena rješavajući
    praktične probleme, te su tehnike pravne analize
    koje koriste tome i posvećene.
   Rezultat ili odluka nekog sudskog slučaja često
    mijenja definicije, odnosno način na koji se
    opisuju činjenice, prema njima se studenti prava
    mogu naučiti razlikovati osjetljive verbalne
    razlike. Te verbalne razlike, koje se ponekad
    nepravnicima čine istinitima, a zapravo nisu,
    temelje se na maloj, ali važnoj činjenici koju
    ekonomisti ignoriraju.
   Ekonomisti često upotrebljavaju izraz
    dobrovoljna razmjena, ali nemaju dovoljno
    znanja o tome što zapravo znači to
    dobrovoljno za razmjenu. Ugovor o prodaji,
    na primjer, ima kompleksnu i dobro
    objašnjenu teoriju volje. Kada bi ekonomisti
    vodili brigu o tome što bi ih pravo moglo
    naučiti, njihovi modeli bili bi realniji.
   bavi se područjima kao što su:
    ◦ predviđanje kakve će učinke pojedini zakoni
      prouzročiti na društvo / na gospodarstvo / na
      državu,
    ◦ daje pojašnjenje zašto se pojedini propisi donose
      sa stanovišta stvarnih motiva i realnih okolnosti
      (prevladavanje lobija, nepotpuna informacije, drugi
      interesi), daju se upute o tome kako bi se trebali
      primjenjivati i provoditi,
    ◦ pomaže u sudstvu kod donošenja presuda
      temeljem raznih ekonomskim analiza i drugo
   Glavni efekt ekonomske analize prava trebao
    bi biti mijenjanje argumenata, a zaključke
    prepustiti sudu.
   Ekonomija koristi matematički precizne
    teorije (Teorija cijena /Price theory/ i Teorija
    igara /Game theory/) i empirijski čvrste
    metode (statistika i ekonometrija) analiziranja
    utjecaja cijena na ponašanje

   ekonomija pruža teoriju ponašanja da bi
    predvidjela kako ljudi reagiraju na promjene
    u pravu
   ova teorija nadmašuje intuiciju, isto kao što
    znanost nadmašuje zdrav razum
◦ mikroekonomski koncepti kao što su maksimizacija,
  ravnoteža i efikasnost /maximization, equilibrium,
  efficiency/,
◦ krivulje ponude i potražnje, krivulje proizvodnje,
  krivulje korisnosti, krivulje troškova, krivulja
  indiferencije i dr.,
◦ teorija izbora i korisnosti (granična korisnost i zakon
  opadajuće granične korisnosti), ravnoteža potrošača,
◦ cjenovna elastičnost ponude i potražnje,
◦ teorija proizvodnje i graničnih proizvoda, kratki i dugi
  rok,
◦ tržišna ravnoteža, teorija igara, teorija cijena,
◦ Pareto efikasnost ili Kaldor-Hicks efikasnost,
◦ analiza troškova i koristi /cost – benefit analysis/ i dr.
   nov pristup izučavanju prava
   uključuje primjenu neoklasične ekonomije (ekonomska sredstva
    reagiraju na cijene i druge poticaje maksimizirajući svoje ciljeve)
   dva pristupa: pozitivna i normativna ekonomska analiza prava.

   Prvo je pozitivno pitanje: koji su utjecaju na društvo uvođenjem novog
    zakona?
   Drugo je normativno pitanje: koji bi zakoni bili najbolji za društvo?

   pozitivna ekonomija analizira pravo, predviđa njegove utjecaje, te
    ukazuje na one zakone koji bi bili uspješni. Rezultati pozitivne analize
    mogu se koristiti za normativnu analizu, kao recept kako doći do
    djelotvornog zakona
   pozitivna ekonomska analiza prava koristi ekonomske analize i metode
    da bi predvidjela utjecaje raznih zakona, pravila, propisa i sl.

   normativna ekonomska analiza prava donosi prijedloge zakona, pravila,
    propisa i sl. temeljem ekonomskih posljedica na već donesene zakone.
   Glavni koncept normativne ekonomske analize prava jest efikasnost
    /efficency/, jer se najčešće ono što se smatra pravednim izjednačava sa
    efikasnošću.
   SAD: duga i ponosna tradicija, čvrsto ukorjenjena
    u njezin pravni sustav, zahvaljujući pionirskim
    znanstvenicima Američki pokret za pravo i
    ekonomiju djeluje gotovo u svakoj pravnoj grani
    u SAD-u
   Europa: interes raste, no ta disciplina još nije u
    toj mjeri inkorporirana u europski pravni i
    ekonomski sustav; utjecaj na europsko
    zakonodavstvo i sudske odluke još uvijek je
    zanemariv, te iako izgleda kao da je pokret prava
    i ekonomije u Europi podcijenjen očekuje se
    procvat u budućnosti
   Relativno manji uspjeh u Europi:
    ◦ karakteristike europske kulture i pravnog sustava
      koji su više tradicionalni, te se oslanjaju na povijest
    ◦ odnos sudaca, odvjetnika i znanstvenika kako
      pravnika tako i ekonomista u Europi pokazuje
      nedostatak suradnje
   1995. godine, u članku „Economic analysis of law
    and market legislation“.
   2004. godine je organizirana prva konferencija
    na tu temu. Međunarodna konferencija Europske
    udruge za pravo i ekonomiju (European
    Association of Law and Economics - EALE),
    održala se u Zagrebu.

   Ekonomski fakultet u Zagrebu odabran je kao
    organizator 21. konferencije EALE. Time se ta
    konferencija po prvi put održala u jednoj od
    tranzicijskih zemalja, a Zagreb je bio domaćin
    znanstvenicima s područja prava i ekonomije
    najuglednijih europskih i američkih fakulteta.
   imovinsko pravo
   ugovorno pravo
   tržišno natjecanje
   pravo društava
   kazneno pravo
   obiteljsko pravo
   pravo intelektualnog vlasništva
   Rezultati se najviše koriste u SAD-u, najčešće
    u sudskoj praksi, a manje u Europi, osim u EU
    gdje se eksperti Ekonomske analize prava
    očituju o svakom novom projektu legislative.
   American Law and Economics Review
   Erasmus Law and Economics Review
   European Journal of Law and Economics
   International Review of Law and Economics
   Journal of Law and Economics
   Review of Law and Economics
   Supreme Court Economic Review i drugi.
   najvažniji intelektualni izazov u pravnom
    učenju unazad par desetljeća
   ekonomski koncepti primjenjuju se kako bi se
    pojasnila i objasnila neka pravna pitanja, ne
    samo u tržišnom natjecanju i ekonomskom
    pravu, već i u raznim netržišnim
    aktivnostima, od odgovornosti do obiteljskih
    pitanja i kriminala, ratnih zločina ulazeći u
    sferu javnog prava, harmonizacije europskog
    prava, ustavnog prava i dr.
   utjecaj je na zakonodavstvo i sudsku praksu
   mnogi znanstveni časopisi objavljuju članke
    iz ovog polja
   iako pravo i ekonomija postaju integralni dio
    pravnog i ekonomskog obrazovanja na
    najprestižnijim fakultetima predstoji još dug
    put do ostvarivanja svrhe i ciljeva ove
    discipline
   What is the defendant’s share of the market?
   Will price controls on automobile insurance
    reduce its availability?
   Who really bears the burden of the capital tax
    gain?
   How much future income did the children
    lose because of their mother’s death?
   Will private ownership of the electromagnetic
    spectrum encourage its efficient use?
   What remedy for breach of contract will cause
    efficient formation of and reliance on promises?
   Do businesses take too much or too little
    precaution then the law holds them strictly liable
    for injuries to consumers?
   Will harsher punishments deter violent crime?
   Does dividing the legislature into two houses
    increase or decrease the discretionary power of
    courts?
   Market economies maximize welfare (under
    certain institutional assumptions).
   Free exchange underlies the welfare gains of
    market economies.
   But exchange will be stifled without secure
    property rights and contract enforcement.
   So, a functioning market economy is
    unattainable without solid legal institutions to
    support it.
   Laws make arms-length transactions
    possible.
   For example, would a buyer advance money
    to a seller on eBay without the implicit
    backing of the courts?
   Likewise, would a seller send the item before
    receiving payment?
   Laws lubricate financial markets.
   For example, would a saver entrust money to
    a mutual fund company if there were not
    strict laws governing disclosure of the fund’s
    investment activities and its past
    performance?
   Without professional investors, would
    companies find it as easy to acquire capital?
   Laws make information more perfect.

   For example, how willing would homebuyers
    be to use realtors if there were no laws
    enforcing disclosure of dual agency?
   Laws facilitate market entry.

   For example, incumbent firms cannot price
    below cost to drive new entrants out of
    business. And incumbents cannot collude to
    raise price.
   Laws encourage innovation.

   For example, intellectual property rights
    (patents, copyrights, trademarks).
   Laws reduce transaction costs.

   For example, federal regulations require
    disclosure of nutrition facts on food labels;
    require certification of organic products;
    reduce inefficiencies of disputes by
    encouraging private bargaining; discourage
    overinvestment by compensating for only
    prudent reliance.
   rules of the game – i.e. the law

   given the costs and benefits of different
    opportunities – which are in part shaped by
    the legal system – here’s how individuals will
    maximize welfare
   Implicitly, economics gives us a criterion for
    picking between one set of laws and another.

   The criterion is efficiency.

   Can think of it this way:
    ◦ laws         incentives        optimization, given
      incentives        outcome (efficient?)
   Using economics to predict how individuals
    will react, we can rank laws based on the
    efficiency of the outcomes they engender.

   For example, does banning odd-numbered
    licensed plates on even numbered days
    reduce traffic, or cause individuals to
    purchase two cars instead of one? The latter
    is inefficient. There’s probably a better way to
    reduce smog.
   For example, does empowering a bureaucrat
    to allocate logging rights put the rights into
    the hands of his friends?
   What guarantees that the bureaucrat’s friends
    value these rights more than other loggers?

   An open auction would be more efficient.
    Rights would go to the party that values them
    the most. The law determines how property
    rights are allocated.
   For example, does instituting a rent ceiling
    actually allocate more apartments to lower
    income tenants?

   Or, does it discourage landlords from
    maintaining properties?

   Do landlords and tenants subvert the intent
    of the law with “finder’s fees”?
   economics is concerned with efficiency, i.e., rational
    allocation of resources with least cost and maximum
    satisfaction
   law is concerned with justice only and not about its
    cost
   in case there is a conflict between efficiency and
    justice, economic analysis can be used to provide
    information on the costs of justice. There is another
    angle to justice here, i.e., the resources if not utilized
    properly or are being misused or wasted, it is
    considered as immoral and good law can prevent this
    to achieve efficiency and justice
   economics, in itself, may not be able to give precise
    answers, but it can draw attention to some important
    questions
   in many countries, the cost-benefit analysis is been
    used by law reform bodies and Governments to help
    in the development of more cost.-effective laws
   When a productive activity is undertaken, the total
    cost involved in it is constituted of both private and
    social cost.

   Private cost is that part of total cost which is borne by
    the individuals.
   Social cost is the cost which the society bears on
    account of the productive activity being undertaken.

   For example, the basic costs like cost of inputs, i.e.
    raw materials; wages, rent etc. are met by the
    manufacturer and are a part of private cost. But when
    productive activity is undertaken, the society will also
    bear its cost in the form of pollution to the
    environment and this cost is called social cost. All
    this creates an inefficient production pattern.
   legal economists are concerned with social
    costs and transaction costs as these divert
    the resources to unproductive purposes
   the unnecessary costs resulting thereof also
    imply denial of justice to certain sections of
    the society
   we can say that “justice is not independent of
    its cost”
   for instance, if civil law remedies are to be
    effective, it has to be cheap, otherwise
    transaction costs, i.e., the costs of retaining
    legal advisors, cost of bargaining etc. maybe
    very high
   A commission has been appointed to
    consider some reforms of the criminal law.
    The commission has identified certain white-
    collar crimes (such as embezzling money
    form one’s employer) that are typically
    committed after rational computation of the
    potential gain and the risk of getting caught
    and punished. Currently, those convicted of
    committing these crimes are sentenced to a
    term in prison.
   After taking extensive testimony, much of it
    from economists, the commission decides
    that a monetary fine, rather than
    incarceration, is the appropriate punishment
    for these offenses.

   The commission ranks each offense by
    seriousness and determines that the fine
    should increase with the seriousness of the
    offense, but by how much?
   The economists who testified before the
    commission persuaded the members that
    certain white-collar crimes occur only if the
    expected gain to the criminal exceeds the
    expected cost.
   The expected cost depends upon two factors:
    the probability of being caught and convicted
    and the magnitude of the punishment.
   We can define the expected cost of crime to
    the criminal as the product of the probability
    and the magnitude of the punishment.
   When a decrease in the probability of punishment
    offsets an increase in the magnitude of punishment,
    then the expected cost of crime remains roughly the
    same for criminals. But the cost of crime to criminal
    justice system may change.

   The probability of being caught and convicted
    depends in large part on the resources devoted to
    apprehending and prosecuting white-collar criminals,
    for example-on the number and quality of auditors,
    tax and bank examiners, police, prosecuting
    attorneys, and the like. These resources are costly, by
    contrast administering fines is relatively cheap.
   These facts imply a prescription for holding
    white-collar crime down to any specified level
    at least cost to the state: invest little in
    apprehending and prosecuting offenders, and
    fine severely those who are apprehended.
   Most serious offense should be punished by
    the maximum monetary fine that the offender
    can bear.
   Incarcerating any criminal – not just white-
    collar criminals – is inefficient unless the
    ability to pay fines has been completely
    exhausted.
   Eddie’s Electric Company emits smoke, which dirties the wash
    hanging at nearby Lucille’s Laundry. Eddie’s can abate the
    pollution by installing scrubbers on its stack, and Lucille’s
    can reduce the damage by installing filters on its ventilation
    system. The installation of scrubbers by Eddie’s or filters by
    Lucille’s would completely eliminate pollution or the damage
    from it. Installing filters is cheaper than installing scrubbers.
    No one else is affected by this pollution because Eddie’s and
    Lucille’s are near to each other and far from anyone else.
    Lucille’s initiates court proceedings to have Eddie’s declared
    to be a “nuisance”. If the action succeeds, the court will order
    Eddie’s to abate its pollution. Otherwise, the court will not
    intervene in the dispute. What is the appropriate resolution of
    this dispute?
   Assume that Eddie’s and Lucille’s cannot
    bargain or cooperate.

   Since installing filters is the cheaper of the
    two ways to eliminate the damage from
    pollution, it is efficient for Lucille’s to lose the
    action.
   If Eddie’s and Lucille’s can bargain together and
    cooperate, their joint profits will be higher if they
    choose the cheaper means of eliminating the harm
    from pollution.
   When their joint profits are higher, they can divide
    the gain between them in order to make both of
    them better off.
   The cheaper means is also the efficient means.
   As a result, efficiency is achieved in this example
    then Lucille’s and Eddie’s bargain together and
    cooperate, regardless of the rule of law.
   An oil company signs a contract to deliver oil by a
    certain date from the Middle East to a European
    manufacturer. Before the oil is delivered, war breaks
    out in the exporting country, so that the oil company
    cannot perform the contract as promised. The lack of
    oil causes the European manufacturer to reduce
    production and lose profits. The manufacturer brings
    an action (that is, files a lawsuit) against the oil
    company for breach of contract and asks the court to
    award it a sum of money, called “damages”, that is
    equal to the amount of profits the manufacturer
    would have realized if the oil had been delivered as
    promised.
   The oil company contend that it should be excused
    from performance or granted more lenient terms
    for performing because the war that has frustrated
    its desire to perform the contract was not
    anticipated by either of the contracting parties.
    Unfortunately, the contract is silent about the risk
    of non-performance in the event of war, so that the
    court cannot simply read the contract and resolve
    the dispute on the contract’s own terms. In
    resolving the suit, the court must decide whether
    to excuse the oil company from performance on
    the ground that the war made the performance
    “impossible” or to find the oil company in breach of
    contract and to require the oil company to
    compensate the manufacturer for lost profits.
   For an economist analyzing this case, the crucial
    point is that the parties failed to allocatete
    between themselves the risk of a contingency – in
    this instance, war – that has arisen to frustrate
    performance of the contract.
   It is important to recognize that how the court
    apportions the loss between the two parties
    simultaneously accomplishes two things – first, it
    resolves the dispute between those litigants, and
    second, it guides future parties who are in similar
    circumstances about how courts might resolve
    their dispute.
   From the standpoint of economic efficiency,
    the court should assign the loss from non –
    delivery so as to make future contractual
    behavior more efficient. A rule for doing this
    assigns the losses to the party that could
    have borne the risk at less cost. One way to
    make risk more bearable is to take precaution
    against it.
   Assuming that the oil company is better to
    able to bear risk of war (in a better position
    to assess the risk of war in that region),
    economic efficiency requires the court to hold
    the oil company liable for breach of contract
    and, therefore, make it responsible for paying
    for the European manufacturer’s lost profits
    due to non-performance.
   In an economy where agents always lived up
    to contracts, revealed all private information,
    never attempted to infringe on others’
    property rights, could costlessly bargain with
    one another, and had limitless cognitive
    capabilities, markets would function perfectly
    without laws.
   But this is not the world we live in.

   Laws do affect economic efficiency.

   And economics can inform lawmaking.

   Studying the intersection of these disciplines
    can help shape better public policy.
   a law is an obligation backed by a state sanction
   economics provide a scientific theory to predict
    the effects of legal sanctions on behavior
   to economists, sanctions look like prices, and
    presumably, people respond to these sanctions
    much as they respond to prices
   people respond to higher prices by consuming
    less of the more expensive goods, so
    presumably, people respond to heavier legal
    sanctions by doing less of the sanctioned activity
   evaluate laws’ effects on important social values
   economics predicts the effects on policies on
    efficiency
   better to achieve any given policy at lower cost
    than at higher cost
   besides efficiency, economics predicts the effects
    of policies on another important value:
    distribution
   laws – incentives for changing behavior (implicit
    prices) and as instruments for policy objectives
    (efficiency and distribution)
   TRANSACTION COSTS
   RISKS
   INCENTIVES
   EFFICIENCY
   EFFECTIVNES

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Stats:
views:38
posted:4/15/2011
language:Croatian
pages:61