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					                               World Politics -- 2520


1. TA Office Hours:
    Tuesday         13h00-14h00 Navid             <nv794791@dal.ca>
    Wednesday       15h00-16h00 Matilka           <matilkakrow@gmail.com>
    Thursday        13h00-14h00 Mike              <mc208718@dal.ca>

                   Political Science Lounge -- 3rd Floor Henry Hicks



2. Final Exam -- Friday, December 17 -- 8:30 am

3. Guest Speaker -- Thursday, November 18
                    Colonel Simon Hetherington
                    Commander, Task Force Kandahar
                            Section 5
      Rational vs. Non-rationality Models of Foreign Policy
*. Readings 5.1 -- General Overview
        - rational vs. psychological (cognitive) models

*. Readings 5.2-5.3 -- Application to Coercive Diplomacy
        - Paul Huth and Bruce Russett
        - Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein

*. Deterrence and Compellence in Crises Situations
        - threat to core interests
        - high probability of military hostilities
        - finite time for response

*. Bosnia 1993-1995

*. Kosovo 1998

*. Reading 5.4 -- Michael Ignatieff – Virtual War
                        Janice Stein (reading 5.1)
Reviews Rational & Psychological Models of Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Rational Decision-makers
   - the approach assumes most people are logical and orderly in their thinking
   - preferences are usually ranked and transitive
          *. if I prefer A to B, and B to C, then I prefer A to C
   - generally open to new information
   - able to assess the value of information even if inconsistent w/ expectations/beliefs
   - open to conflicting arguments and contradictory evidence
   - able to adjust strategies accordingly
   - able to learn correct lessons from history
   - can chose options that give greatest expected utility
   - assumes leaders are "instrumentally" rational (not substantively rational)
          *. based on information at the time – not based perfect decision making
   - rational choice is an assumption -- not an accurate description of process

   - problems:     *. mounting evidence decision-makers rarely meet these standards
                   *. especially difficult in times of crisis
                   *. very hard to meet demands in situations where expecations high
Non-Rational Decision-makers (field of Political Psychology)
   - cognitive revolution – insights into the mind and decision making patterns
   - rejects complex models of rational choice
   - humans have a preference for simplicity, order and cognitive consistency
   - people usually misunderstand the essence and meaning of "probability"
          *. we tend to overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high probs.
   - we tend to use inappropriate or inaccurate lessons (analogies) from history
   - we tend to discount or reject information that challenges our beliefs/perceptions
   - we tend to defend (bolster) the choices/alternatives we select
          *. not because they are rational choices but because bolstering is comforting
   - possibility of making an error produces defensive cognitions (to deal with stress)
          *. bigger errors produce more active defences
          *. conflict, debate tension produces higher stress
          *. Creating consensus (even if wrong) is comforting – relieves stress
          *. Group Think (Irving Janis) – e.g., intelligence consensus on WMD
   - once formed, cognitions/beliefs are very difficult to change
          *. requires abundance of information to change beliefs or shift course
          *. explains why deeply rooted hatreds are difficult to alter, despite costs
           Coercive Diplomacy in World Politics
              Rational Deterrence and Compellence

(A) Clearly define and communicate to opponents the specific
    behaviour deemed to be unacceptable;
(B) Convey/illustrate/emphasise to challengers a commitment to
    punish violations;
(C) Possess the capability to defend the commitment and to
    follow through with the threat -- i.e., the capacity to deny
    challengers any gains they receive through aggression;
(D) Demonstrate the resolve to carry out the retaliatory actions if
    the challenger fails to comply.
Typology of Deterrence (Compellence) Encounters
  1. Immediate Deterrence
        - crisis situation (e.g., Cuban Missile Crisis)
  2. General Deterrence
        - non-crisis situation (e.g., Cold War; MAD)
  3. Direct (mutual) Deterrence
        - two actors/states
  4. Extended Deterrence (at least three actors)
        - attacker – client state (protégé) -- defender

Deterrence versus Compellence
  *. Deterrence is about preventing a state from doing something (stop an attack)
  *. Compellence is about forcing a state to do something (retreat)

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett 1984 study
  *.    54 cases of extended-immediate deterrence
  *.    questions:         How does deterrence work?
                           What conditions explain succeed and failure?
                           Is behaviour consistent with theory?
   Hyp -- Defender will be more likely to fight to the degree that defender's overall
    existing military capabilities exceeds attacker's.

   Hyp -- Defender will be more likely to fight to the degree that defender's
    existing local military capabilities exceed attacker'
   Hyp -- Attacker will be more likely to fight to the degree that attacker's overall
    existing military forces exceed those of defender.

   Hyp -- Attacker will be more likely to fight to the degree that attacker's existing
    local military capabilities exceed those of defender.

                          ========================

FINDINGS --        1. Rational Deterrence Works!
                   2. Credibility & deterrence success related to:
                            a. military ties b/w defender and client state;
                            b. economic ties b/w defender and client state;
                            c. history and reputation
                                      - i.e., did defender retaliated in the past?
Richard Lebow and Janice Stein study (critique of Huth and Russett)
*. Rejected 78% (38 of the 54 cases rejected) -- problems?
         - Huth & Russett cases confused deterrence/compellence;
         - some cases were not really deterrence encounters;
         - attacker and defender incorrectly coded;
         - successes and failures incorrectly coded;
         - L and S completely agreed with only 9% of H and R cases.

*. Political Psychology critique of rational deterrence theory.
         - leaders misread and misinterpret signals (communications fail);
         - misunderstand intentions of opponent;
         - often underestimate/overestimate capabilities or resolve of opponent;
         - remain insensitive to warnings;
         - rely on past experiences and use inappropriate historical cases;
         - process information in a way that confirms preexisting beliefs;
         - psychological / defensive mechanisms (procrastinate);
                   - exaggerate the benefits of your policy (bolster)
                   - exaggerate the nature of the threats
         - Reassurance is a better crisis management strategy than deterrence.
How do we reconcile two competing studies/conclusions about rational
deterrence?

     - both are right;
     - historical data/interpretations are essentially correct;
     - problem -- each study focused on different periods in the crisis;

              Cuban Missile Crisis
              (-) start of crisis -- weak deterrence created the crisis;
              (-) crisis management -- strong deterrence prevented escalation;
              (-) end of crisis -- reassurance (missiles in Turkey) resolved crisis.

Every crisis (data point) can be explored for more historical detail relevant to
testing deterrence.

Protracted crisis approach avoids selection bias when interpreting history
                           Protracted Crisis in Bosnia 1993-1995
   Prerequisites       1    2a/b   3a/b     4       5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13a/b   14(a)   14(b)


  undesired action     Y    Y/Y    Y/Y      Y       Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
 defined and threat
   communicated




 threat potentially    Y    Y/N    Y/N      Y       Y   N   Y   N   Y   N    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
costly to challenger




 capability to deny    Y    Y/N    Y/Y        N     Y   Y   Y   N   Y   Y    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
gains from challenge                       (light
                                          option)




 resolve (consensus)   Y    Y/N    Y/N      N       Y   N   Y   N   N   N    N    N    N/Y      Y       Y
   demonstrated




      Success?         Y    Y/N    Y/N      N       Y   N   Y   N   N   N    N    N    N/Y      N       Y
Radovan Karadzic – Bosnian Serb political leader
                          - currently on trial in The Hague Netherlands
                          - ICC and ICTY
                          - charged with two counts of genocide and war crimes

General Ratco Mladic -- Bosnian Serb military leader
                            - indicted on war crimes

Slobodan Milosevic -- President of Serbia
                             - indicted on 66 counts of genocide and war crimes
                             - died in his cell in The Hague, Netherlands in 2006
Warren Christopher   -- U.S. Secretary of State
Richard Holbrooke    -- Chief U.S. Negotiator



Cyrus Vance (US)
David Owen (UK       -- Vance-Owen peace plan
                           Protracted Crisis in Bosnia 1993-1995
   Prerequisites       1    2a/b   3a/b     4       5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13a/b   14(a)   14(b)


  undesired action     Y    Y/Y    Y/Y      Y       Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
 defined and threat
   communicated




 threat potentially    Y    Y/N    Y/N      Y       Y   N   Y   N   Y   N    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
costly to challenger




 capability to deny    Y    Y/N    Y/Y        N     Y   Y   Y   N   Y   Y    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
gains from challenge                       (light
                                          option)




 resolve (consensus)   Y    Y/N    Y/N      N       Y   N   Y   N   N   N    N    N    N/Y      Y       Y
   demonstrated




      Success?         Y    Y/N    Y/N      N       Y   N   Y   N   N   N    N    N    N/Y      N       Y
Deterrence/Compellence (Exchange 2a/b)

(*) April 1993
(*) UNSC Resolutions -- 713, 757, 787, 819, 820
(*) among the most sweeping economic sanctions in history
(*) economic embargo "Operation Sharp Guard"
       - ban shipment of any good through Yugoslavia
       - strict control of ships through Danube
       - ban all ships entering Yugoslavian territorial waters (12 mile exclusion zone)
       - impound all trucks, aircraft trains in other countries
       - freeze all Yugoslavian financial assets.
    Deterrence/Compellence Success and Failure (Exchange 2a/b)

1. Threat of sanction directed at Serbia (Slobodan Milosevic);
       - only indirect pressure on Karadzic/Mladic

2. List of economic sanctions limited by Russian UNSC veto threat;
        - Boris Yeltsin facing power sharing referendum

3. US refused to "unambiguously endorse" Vance-Open accord.

OUTCOMES:
  Successful compellence vis-a-vis Serbia (YYYY Y) -- (2a)
  Failed deterrence vis-a-vis Bosnian Serb attacks (YNNN N) -- (2b)
                           Protracted Crisis in Bosnia 1993-1995
   Prerequisites       1    2a/b   3a/b     4       5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13a/b   14(a)   14(b)


  undesired action     Y    Y/Y    Y/Y      Y       Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
 defined and threat
   communicated




 threat potentially    Y    Y/N    Y/N      Y       Y   N   Y   N   Y   N    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
costly to challenger




 capability to deny    Y    Y/N    Y/Y        N     Y   Y   Y   N   Y   Y    Y    Y    Y/Y      Y       Y
gains from challenge                       (light
                                          option)




 resolve (consensus)   Y    Y/N    Y/N      N       Y   N   Y   N   N   N    N    N    N/Y      Y       Y
   demonstrated




      Success?         Y    Y/N    Y/N      N       Y   N   Y   N   N   N    N    N    N/Y      N       Y
             Lessons From Bosnia 1993-1995

1. lessons about approach to studying coercive diplomacy
        (-) protracted crisis explains inconsistency in literature
                *. resolves Huth and Russtt vs. Lebow and Stein debate
        (-) multiple exchanges vs. single data points
                *. multiple exchange reveal support for rational deterrence


2. lessons about deterrence and compellence
        (-) satisfy conditions = deterrence works
        (-) fail to satisfy one or more = deterrence fails
        (-) weak threats provoke escalation in fighting
        (-) US, UK and NATO learn from two years of experience

				
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