Get documents about "Impacts of the Us Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran - DOC
Description
Impacts of the Us Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran document sample
Document Sample
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
1
Index
1NC Iran Adv (1/5) ................................................................................................................................................. 2
1NC Iran Adv (3/5) ................................................................................................................................................. 3
1NC Iran Adv (4/5) ................................................................................................................................................. 4
2NC Iran Ext 1 Plan Doesn‘t Solve Gas Coop ....................................................................................................... 6
2NC Ext 2 Relations Improving Now ..................................................................................................................... 7
2NC Ext 3 and 4 New gas deal ............................................................................................................................... 9
2NC Ext 6 Impacts non-u ..................................................................................................................................... 10
2NC Ext 7 Removing TNWs Hurts US Turkey Relations ................................................................................... 11
2NC Ext 9 Won‘t strike without the U.S. ............................................................................................................. 12
2NC Ext 9 Agreed not to strike............................................................................................................................. 13
Ext 2- Relations improving ................................................................................................................................... 14
Ext 2- Relations good............................................................................................................................................ 15
Ext 3- No Need for Iran‘s Gas .............................................................................................................................. 16
1NC Terrorism Frontline (1 / 3)............................................................................................................................ 17
1NC Terrorism Frontline (2 / 3)............................................................................................................................ 18
1NC Terrorism Frontline (3 / 3)............................................................................................................................ 19
2NC Ext Non-U ................................................................................................................................................... 20
2NC Ext 3 Turkey solves terrorism ...................................................................................................................... 21
2NC Ext 4 Terrorists can‘t do it ............................................................................................................................ 22
2NC Ext 5 Terrorist could get TNWs from Italy .................................................................................................. 23
Security CP 1NC (1/1) .......................................................................................................................................... 24
2NC Counter Plan Solvency Extension ................................................................................................................ 25
CP Solvency Extensions ....................................................................................................................................... 26
Allied/Turkish Prolif Links ................................................................................................................................... 27
1
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
2
1NC Iran Adv (1/5)
1) No Aff solvency- alt causalities to why gas cooperation fails
Elin Kinnander, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2010, ―The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship:Politically
Successful, Commercially Problematic‖ http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf
Natural gas cooperation between Iran and Turkey has, as described in this paper, been far from successful.
The contract has run into huge problems, with disputes over both deliveries and prices. Both sides find it hard to
compromise on either of these issues and, as a result, the finalization of the gas MoU continues to be delayed . Almost
every year since the start of deliveries in 2001, a disruption has occurred, either because of insufficient
Iranian supplies, or insufficient Turkish demand. Both countries have given different explanations for the fact that
deliveries have never reached the volume stipulated in the contract. However, this paper concludes that the most
common causes have been: Iran‘s lack of gas during the winter period; Turkey‘s lack of demand (or
oversupply from its other sources), but also problems with securing the pipelines from terrorist attacks.
In other words, Iran has not been a reliable exporter and Turkey has not been a reliable importer. Turkey has taken Iran to
arbitration over a price dispute; and Iran has threatened to take Turkey to arbitration due to failure to reach take-or-pay
levels. These are very hostile acts in gas trade between any two countries. The intriguing question that this leaves us with is
why both countries want to develop and expand the natural gas cooperation, given the relatively unsuccessful history and
the lack of mutual trust?
2) Squo solves, Turkey and Iran relations improving now
SABRINA TAVERNISE, an American journalist who is currently the Istanbul bureau chief of The New York Times,
6/15/10, ―Turkey and Iran: Strange Bedfellows?‖ http://www.indianexpress.com/news/turkey-and-iran-strange-
bedfellows/633786/0
Viewed from Washington, Turkey and Iran are strange bedfellows. One is a NATO member with a
Constitution that mandates secularism, and the other, an Islamic republic whose nuclear programme has been one of the
most vexing foreign policy problems for the US in recent years . So why have the two countries been locked in a
clumsy embrace, with Turkey openly defying the US last week by voting against imposing new sanctions on Iran?
Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates mused that Turkey was ―moving eastward,‖ a shift he attributed to the
European Union‘s tepid response to Turkey‘s application to join it. But many here do not see it that way.
Turkey simply disagrees with the US over how to approach the problems in the Middle East. The Obama administration
chooses sanctions, Turkey believes cooperation has more of a chance . ―I would be appalled if Turkey cut itself off from the
West and aligned with the Islamic world, but that‘s not what‘s happening,‖ said Halil Berktay, a historian at Sabanci
University. ―Turkey is saying, ‗You‘ve been talking about building bridges. This is the way to build
them‘.‖ For the United States, Iran is a rogue state intent on building a bomb and crazy enough to use it. Turkey agrees
that Iran is trying to develop the technology that would let it build a weapon, but says Iran‘s leaders
may be satisfied stopping at that. ―We believe that once we normalise relations with Iran, and it has
relationships with other actors, it won‘t go for the bomb,‖ said a Turkish official who works closely with Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Part of Turkey‘s motivation in reaching out to Iran is based in realpolitik. Iran is
Turkey‘s neighbour and also supplies the country with a fifth of its natural gas. The approach is also
part of a broader policy of economic and political integration in the region that Turkey, under Erdogan,
has pursued for nearly a decade. Iranians can travel to Turkey without a visa, as can Syrians, Iraqis, Russians and
Georgians. More than a million Iranians travel to Turkey on vacation every year. The recent nuclear talks were part of that
effort. They culminated in May in what Turkey, and its partner Brazil, said was a commitment by Iran to swap a portion of
its low-enriched uranium with other countries. Iran would ship out part of its stockpile in exchange for a form of uranium
less likely to be used for weapons.
2
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
3
1NC Iran Adv (3/5)
3) Turkey and Europe no longer needs gas from Iran, new deal struck
Shahin Abbasov, is deputy editor-in-chief of the daily Echo, an independent newspaper based in Baku, Azerbaijan, 6/7/10,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61234
Natural gas sales and transit agreements signed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on June 7 appear to give a
long-awaited green light for Azerbaijani gas sales to Europe-bound pipeline projects. While energy
executives have welcomed the news, a source at Azerbaijan‘s state energy company SOCAR tells EurasiaNet.org that the
two sides failed to reach a comprehensive gas agreement. ―What was signed today is more of a memorandum of
understanding than a commercial contract,‖ said the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) senior
executive, who asked not to be named. The documents signed in Istanbul by Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev and Turkish President Abdullah Gül nevertheless allow the Azerbaijani government to open
negotiations with European companies about gas sales from the second, peak phase of gas production at its Shah
Deniz field, since Baku and Ankara have reached an ―agreement in principle,‖ the source said. Talks about ―commercial
details‖ for gas supplies and exports from this second phase, expected to kick in after 2016, will continue until the end of
this year, according to the SOCAR source. The source did not elaborate. Neither Turkish nor Azerbaijani officials gave a
reason for why some details remain outstanding after earlier assurances that a package agreement was a done deal. [For
background see EurasiaNet‘s archive]. Few details about the Istanbul agreements have been disclosed. Turkish Energy
Minister Taner Yildiz stated that the new price Turkey must pay for gas from Azerbaijan‘s Shah Deniz project is higher
than the previous price of $120 per 1,000 cubic meters (tcm). Still, Yildiz declined to provide an exact figure, Turkish
media reported. A SOCAR source told EurasiaNet.org earlier that the planned price would be $250/tcm. CNN-Turk,
however, has reported an agreed price of $300/tcm. The two energy partners also reportedly agreed on the
price and volume of Azerbaijani gas supplies to Turkey from Shah Deniz after 2016, when the second
phase of production is projected to reach 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Yildiz did not give a price,
but said that Turkey had secured the right to buy 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2016, 4 bcm in 2017 and 6 bcm in
2018. A third agreement allows Azerbaijan to set up a company in Turkey to handle issues related to
gas transit to Europe via Turkish territory. A separate accord between SOCAR and BOTAS, the Turkish state-run
energy transit company, established the conditions and mechanisms for gas sales and shipment. Details were not
immediately available. Despite the lack of a package deal, one key potential Azerbaijani gas client – the much-touted
Nabucco pipeline–expressed satisfaction with the progress made. In a June 7 statement, the Nabucco consortium‘s chief
executive officer, Reinhard Mitschek, called the documents ―a step in a positive direction.‖ Officials in both
Turkey and Azerbaijan similarly emphasized the positive. ―This opens the way for the securing of supplies for
European gas projects like Nabucco, ITGI (Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic
Pipeline),‖ declared Yildiz, the Turkish energy minister, Turkish media outlets reported. SOCAR
President Rovnag Abdullayev forecast that the agreements would pave the way for new large-scale
projects that could be compared with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines. Helping to boost
optimism, SOCAR announced on June 3 that it could start Phase 2 of Shah Deniz as early as 2014, the Trend news agency
reported. A package gas agreement was originally expected to be signed during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan‘s May 16-17 visit to Baku, but the deal was delayed at the last moment. Similar last-minute hiccups may have
characterized the Istanbul meeting. Just a few days before the signing of the agreements, SOCAR President Abdullayev
and Vice-President Elshad Nasirov, along with BP-Azerbaijan President Rashid Javanshir, made an urgent trip to Istanbul
to join discussions involving expert groups. The SOCAR source claimed that the trip took place after Turkey allegedly tried
to add terms to the transit agreement that would strengthen Ankara‘s position. The source did not specify the terms.
Turkey‘s NTV television channel reported that the Istanbul agreements were finalized only at a June 7
meeting between President Aliyev and Turkish President Gül. For all the question marks, Baku-based energy
expert Ilham Shaban said that Azerbaijan has achieved a key objective – holding talks directly with
European companies about gas supplies to Nabucco, ITGI and NAP. ―With about 6 bcm of gas from Stage 2
which will be supplied to Turkey, Baku still have about 10 bcm of gas to supply to European markets,‖ Shaban said.
3
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
4
1NC Iran Adv (4/5)
4) New gas line improves relations.
Anav Silverman, the international correspondent for the Sderot Media Center, 6/9/10 ―Turkey: Jihadi State Rising‖
http://www.aina.org/news/2010069141710.htm
Cedvet Yilmaz stated that
Back in February, the Turkish daily, Today's Zaman wrote that the Turkish State Minister ,
his government was committed to working on improving relations with its neighbor Iran. The driving
force behind this commitment, indicated Yilmaz, were the mutual gas transfer projects, which both Yilmaz and Iranian
Foreign Minister, Manoucheher Mottaki agreed will bring both countries to a "historical era." Turkey and Iran have
signed a number of deals to facilitate the flow of gas through Turkey to Europe, including agreements
to allocate some Iran's South Pars gas field to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, where Iranian gas
will be trasported across Turkey. The Turkey-Iran pipeline transfers natural gas worth around $2 billion every year.
"We believe that the projects for the tansfer of Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey will give a
momentum to relations between the two largest economies in the world," Yilmaz has stated. Another Turkish
government official, Zafer Caglayan, stated that bilateral trade with Iran has grown to $10 billion in the
past eight years
(only if they read the Isreal strike impact)
5) Both the Ross and Morning Star evidence give timeframes for their impact which have already
passed- both cards are non-unique
6) Iran is mad about recent sanctions -they are perceived as a threat and kills diplomacy- proves no
brink to their impact
VOA news 04/09/10 (Iranian Leaders Criticize New Threat of International
Sanctionshttp://www.payvand.com/news/10/apr /1073.htm l7/10/10)
Top Iranian leaders are again lashing out at Western nations over the threats of new sanctions. It was another
day of back-and-forth exchanges between Western leaders and Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. Iran
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad slammed remarks by U.S. President Barack Obama in Prague that Russia and
the United States are "working together at the U.N. Security Council to pass strong sanctions on
Iran."Ahmadinejad delivers a speech in the city of Oroumiyeh 540 miles northwest of Tehran, 07 Apr 2010
According to Iran's official IRNA news agency, Mr. Ahmadinejad said Iran does not welcome the idea or threat
of sanctions, but would never beg to reverse them.
4
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
5
1NC Iran Adv (5/5)
7) Pulling out TNWs would sever ties, and destroy our relationship with turkey, linking to their own
impacts
Bell and Loehrke, Benjamin, Bell is the project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow. Loehrke is a
research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 09 ―The status of
U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey‖, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey,
In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are
another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some
U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to
keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue that the weapons are "an essential political
and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense
Department's 2008 report on nuclear weapons management concurred : "As long as our allies value [the nuclear
weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear
weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a
demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack.
They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise
questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.
8) Israel won‘t strike Iran without U.S. support-they don‘t have the tactical abilities and don‘t want
to sever relations
World Tribune 7/9 (―Obama expects 'no surprises': Israel won't strike Iran without U.S. permission‖
World Tribune – July 9, 2010 http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=13017)
President Barack Obama expects Israel to seek U.S. approval before attacking Iran's nuclear weapons
facilities. Obama said he was confident that Israel would not attack Iran without U.S. permission. In a July 8
interview on Israeli television, Obama did not disclose whether he discussed a proposed Israeli attack
on Teheran during his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the previous day. The president
was interviewed by Israel's Channel 2 after the 90-minute session with the prime minister, which marked the first time Obama met the Israeli media since
The president, who has pursued a reconciliation policy with Teheran, said the strategic
he entered office.
relationship between Israel and the United States would not allow for a unilateral Israeli strike. "I
think the relationship between Israel and the U.S. is sufficiently strong that neither of us try to surprise
each other," Obama said. In 2010, the Obama administration, including Vice President Joseph Biden, warned Israel not to attack Iran. Netanyahu,
who has urged the international community to intensify sanctions, has repeatedly assured that Israel was not planning an imminent strike on Iran. Since
2007,officials said, the United States has withheld military systems that could facilitate an Israeli air
strike on Iran. The banned systems were said to have included air refueling, advanced reconnaissance
and buster-bunker bombs, long requested by Israel.
9) Israeli president has publicly stated they will not strike Iran
Rianovosti 09 (―Israel won‘t strike Iran-Russia‘s Medvedev‖ http://en.rian.ru/world/20090920/1561 95202.html 7/7/10)
Israel will not strike Iran, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said. Medvedev said
MOSCOW, September 20 (RIA Novosti) -
in an interview with CNN aired Sunday that Israeli President Shimon Peres, when on a visit to the Russian Black Sea
resort of Sochi in August to discuss Russia's arms deals with Iran, told him: "Israel is not going to
make any strikes on Iran, we are a peaceful country." Medvedev said Russia supplies purely defensive armaments to Iran. "Our
task is not to strengthen Iran and weaken Israel or vice versa, but [to establish] a normal, quiet situation in the Middle East," he said. Asked what could
happen should Israel nevertheless make a strike, Medvedev said: "This is the worst thing that could be imagined... This would be the most unwise
development of events. But my Israeli colleagues told me they are not going to act like this, and I trust them."
5
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
6
2NC Iran Ext 1—Plan Doesn‘t Solve Gas Coop
Extend 1NC 1. Aff doesn‘t solve. Multiple warrants
1. No Turkish demand—supplies from other sources means it doesn‘t need Iranian gas.
2. Iranian gas shortage—during winter, Iran can‘t produce enough gas
3. Terrorist sabotage—attacks on pipelines means gas won‘t make it to Turkey, EVEN IF a deal is
struck.
4. Evidence also indicates pipe lines have been disrupted for the past 9 years, we should have seen
the affs impacts
That‘s our Kinnander evidence
6
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
7
2NC Ext 2 Relations Improving Now
1nc 2-. Iran-Turkey relations are improving now. That‘s Tavernise
1. Turkey is ―Moving eastward‖ because of its recent rejection from the EU
2. They intent to improve relations to stop a possible WMD by Iran
3. Turkey will continue to deal with Iran EVEN after sanctions
4. Relations are high enough now, that gas trade will continue even after recent sanction which
proves how resilient the gas trade is
2) Even in light of the new sanctions turkey continues dealing with Iran
UPI, 7/2/10, ―Energy ties with Iran stable, Turkey says‖ http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-
Wars/2010/07/02/Energy-ties-with-Iran-stable-Turkey-says/UPI-16271278079811/
Ankara plans to continue activity in the Iranian energy sector because it is not restricted by U.N.
sanctions, the Turkish energy minister said. The Security Council voted June 9 to place new sanctions on Iran that
allow for searches of banned goods in cargo to or from Iran and increase the number of individuals and companies subject
to travel bans and an asset freeze. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz told Iran's state-funded broadcaster
Press TV that his country would continue doing business with Iran in light of the Security Council
measure. "Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any
specific restriction on energy deals," he said. Yildiz added that his country was waiting for the results of technical
studies to wrap up in the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf. "After we receive the result of this study we will decide
how to move forward," Yildiz said According to Press TV, Iran exports more than 880 million cubic feet of
natural gas to Turkey every day.
2) Iran and Turkey are ―Friends and Brothers‖, strait from the President
TEHRAN TIMES, 10/27/07, ―Destiny of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq intertwined: Ahmadinejad‖
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=155964
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad said here on Sunday that the nations of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq are
―friends and brothers.‖ ―The destiny of all of us is intertwined,‖ Ahmadinejad told the visiting Turkish
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. Ahmadinejad said the enemies are planning to dominate all countries through a long-
term plan and ―do not want the regional countries including Iran, Turkey, and Iraq to be powerful and live
in peace.‖
3) Turkey sticking to its vows, increasing its soft power with Iran, plus Nuclear deal passing
The Reuter, 5/22/10 ―Iran to go ahead with Turkey atom fuel swap—report‖
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKMOS23296620100522
Iran intends to go ahead with a deal reached with Turkey and Brazil for a nuclear fuel swap despite a
new sanctions resolution against Tehran pending at the United Nations, an Iranian parliamentarian said on
Saturday. "Iran is committed to the vows that it made and wants to make them operational and will
submit its letter to International Atomic Energy Agency," Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of parliament's Foreign
Affairs and National Security Committee, was quoted as saying by semi-official news agency ISNA. "The Americans'
propaganda will not have any effect on Iran's decision ... We advise those countries who want to issue this
resolution against Iran not to be manipulated by America." Iran's official news agency IRNA said on Friday Iran will hand
an official letter to the IAEA's chief on Monday with details of the fuel swap agreement with Brazil and Turkey. The IAEA
brokered the basis of the deal last October in talks involving Iran, France, Russia and the United States, but it soon
7
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
8
Turkish and Brazilian representatives at the IAEA will
unravelled amid Iranian demands for amendments.
accompany Iran's envoy during the meeting with the IAEA chief on Monday, a communique from Iran's
Supreme National Security Council published on Saturday in the daily Hambastegi said. Leaders of the three countries
announced the agreement last Monday under which Iran will send 1,200 kg of its enriched uranium stocks --
reducing its supply of potential atomic bomb material -- to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods for a Tehran
medical research reactor. But the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, after months of negotiations,
brushed off the deal with a draft resolution on a new set of sanctions against Iran that Washington handed to the Security
Council on Tuesday. A prominent Iranian lawmaker, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, had suggested on Thursday Iran could scuttle the deal if the
sanctions resolution is approved. Western powers fear that Iran is secretly trying to produce nuclear weapons, but Tehran denies this and says it is
Under last week's surprise agreement, the first batch of
enriching uranium only to produce fuel for nuclear power stations.
Iran's uranium would arrive in Turkey within a month, in return for fuel rods to keep a Tehran medical
research reactor running. Turkey and Brazil -- both currently non-permanent members of the Security Council -- and Iran have urged a halt to
talk of further sanctions because of the deal, but Western powers suspect it is an Iranian tactic to avert or delay sanctions. The new, extended sanctions
would target Iranian banks and call for inspection of vessels suspected of carrying cargo related to Iran's nuclear or missile programmes.
8
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
9
2NC Ext 3 and 4 - New gas deal
1nc 4: New deal makes Iran‘s gas um-important
1) Their evidence is significantly older, and does not take this into account
2) Although both Iran and Turkey are part of this deal, Iran is not the main exporter, so if they
pull out there is no impact
3) New gas deal improves relations
4) Our evidence quotes the prime minister on his intent to improve relations
5) They both have strong economical ties to this new line, and being rational actors, will try
and keep it up and running
2) Turkey, Azerbijan gas deal finalized, new gas network set up.
TODAY‘S ZAMAN, 6/7/10 ―Turkey, Azerbaijan sign Shah Deniz gas agreement‖ http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/news-212385-105-turkey-azerbaijan-sign-shah-deniz-gas-agreement.html
Turkey and Azerbaijan have signed a long-awaited memorandum of understanding for the shipment of
11 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijani's Shah Deniz field to Turkey. The deal was
signed by Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız and Azerbaijani Industry and
Energy Minister Natiq Aliyev on Monday during the third summit of the Conference on Interaction
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Speaking at the signing ceremony, Yıldız noted that the
two sides had ―reached an agreement over the price and quantity of gas to be exported from the Shah
Deniz II project, which will go online in 2017, to Turkey.‖ The minister declined to give figures immediately on
the price of the gas or on the percentage of gas for domestic consumption and for export to European countries. An
agreement was also reached over the price of natural gas Turkey exports from Azerbaijan, he said. Turkey will retroactively
pay for the gas it has purchased since April 15, 2008 at new prices. Turkey currently receives some 6 billion
cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan and pumps some of that amount to Greece.
3) New deal signed, Europe and turkey no longer depended on gas from Iran or Russia
World Bulletin, 6/17/10, ―Turkey, Italy, Greece to sign natural gas deal‖,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087
Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Italy's EDISON, and Greece's DEPA will sign a
memorandum of understanding for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline that will carry natural
gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The signature ceremony will take place in Ankara's Rixos Grand Hotel .
Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, President of the Executive Board and Director General of
BOTAS Fazil Senel, Vice-President of Italian Electric and Natural Gas Company EDISON Roberto Poti and President of
the Executive Board of Greek State Natural Gas Company Herry Sachinis will participate in the signature ceremony. The
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) Project is considered to be one of the EU's most crucial
projects. The natural gas pipeline will be 804 kilometers long and will go into service in 2015. ITGI
pipeline begins in Azerbaijan and ends in Italy. Once completed, the pipeline will carry around 10
billion cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Italy per year. Bulgaria was the last country that
joined the ITGI Project. Experts say that Serbia and Romania may join the project either directly or
indirectly.
9
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
10
2NC Ext 6-impacts non-u
Iran officials have already spoke out against U.S. sanctions as being another western attack on Iran,
tanking U.S. Irani relations which should have triggered their impacts
Recent sanctions non-unique their Mornings Star impact—even their evidence says sanctions are
considered an attack which would trigger the impact
Aljazeera, 6/25/10, ―Iran faces fresh US sanctions‖
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062545934360999
The US congress has approved new unilateral energy and financial sanctions against Iran , in a further
effort to pressure it into curbing its nuclear programme, which the US suspects is aimed at making a bomb. The House
of Representatives passed the bill 408-8 on Thursday, sending it to Barack Obama, the US president, for signing
into law. The senate earlier approved the sanctions 99-0. The new measures, which come on the back of
the latest UN security council and European sanctions, aim to cut off off Iran's access to imports of
refined petroleum products like gasoline and jet fuel and curb its access to the international banking system. "The UN
sanctions [passed on June 9], though a good first step, are quite tepid. And they are tepid because there are other members
of the security council who want to keep doing business with Iran ... the US ... has to pass these unilateral sanctions,"
Barbara Mikulski, a Democratic senator, said. The bill would effectively deprive foreign banks of access to
the US financial system if they do business with key Iranian banks or the Revolutionary Guards.
10
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
11
2NC Ext 7—Removing TNWs Hurts US Turkey Relations
1NC 7: TNWs are Key to US-Turkey Relations
1) Turkey sees the TNWs as a sign of US commitment
2) They allow for a cohesive relationship, and removing them would completely undermine this
2) Nukes key to credibility
Johan Bergenäs, Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Miles Pomper,
Senior Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, Dr. William Potter, Director, James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, et al, April 2010 ―Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons in
Europe: Moving Forward?‖ http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf accessed 7/2/10
Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the Baltic States, have historically been reluctant to
support the removal of U.S. NSNW. These states generally perceive these weapons as a means of
providing a highly visible deterrent to Russia and see their location and visibility as essential to assuring them of the
U.S. defense commitment to Europe and of the value of NATO. To this end, Bruno Tertrais, a prominent
European scholar, has stated that ―a U.S. nuclear withdrawal could be perceived as a lessening of
transatlantic security ties by countries which are particularly keen to shelter behind U.S. protection,
such as Poland, the Baltic States and Turkey.‖ 46 Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn writing in March 2010 cite an
unidentified ambassador from a new NATO member: Nuclear deterrence by the US and through NATO and
with the American presence of American warheads in Europe is the ultimate test of NATO‘s
credibility. If that fails, you will see a different NATO – more will follow the Poles in seeking bilateral guarantees. It is
the essence of NATO membership.47 Absent the nuclear link, experts fret that the new members will see little
benefit from NATO as they will perceive a lack of concern for their security from Germany and other Western
European NATO members. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently called for
Germany to reassure ―NATO‘s easternmost members that their security interests will be robustly protected.‖ 48
Discounting the possibility of a Russian attack worthy of a nuclear response, Perkovich calls on Germany to ―seek
collective policies to obviate the range of conventional and non-military threats such as cyber warfare and energy coercion
that can lead to escalatory crises.‖
11
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
12
2NC Ext 9 -won‘t strike without the U.S.
Israel can‘t strike without U.S. support-the U.S. has withheld military systems needed to strike including
air refueling, they also doesn‘t want to sever relations-that‘s our world tribune evidence
Israel won‘t strike independently
Harel, 09 (Amos, Israeli media expert on military and defense issues ―Israel can‘t launch strike against Iran on its
own‖30.12.09http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-can-t-launch-strike-against-iran-on-its-own-1.11017/7/10)
This date with destiny has caused some Israeli leaders to adopt a messianic tone. Some even see a tempting opportunity to
change the wider strategic reality in the region. Yet opinions are divided: Air force pilots, as they have stated on several
occasions, are confident in their own abilities should the order to strike be given, but senior defense officials are describing
their primary mission as preventing any foolish acts in the coming year. The IDF General Staff, as it did during the Gaza
offensive, is likely to behave as an operational subcontractor, content merely to present the government with various
military scenarios and their possible implications. It must be stated plainly: Israel does not have independent
strike capability against Iran - not in the broad sense of the term. The air force is capable of delivering a
certain amount of explosives to a given target and bringing most of its aircraft back home intact. But it is doubtful
whether Israel can allow itself to act against the wishes of the United States - to stand alone against an
Iranian response and begin an open-ended operation against a nation of 70 million people.
12
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
13
2NC Ext 9-Agreed not to strike
Israeli president has meet with leaders of many nations including Medyedey insuring that they will not
strike Iran, and they want to resolve all conflict peacefully- that‘s our Rianovisti evidence
Russian President has assured the international community he will not strike Iran
Humphries 09( Conor, September 20th ―Kremlin says Israel promised not to strike Iran‖ Reuters
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58J0NQ20090920)
"But my Israeli colleagues told me that they were not planning to act in this way and I trust them."
During a meeting in the Russian resort of Sochi in August, Israeli President Shimon Peres said Israel
would not attack Iran, Medvedev said. After the meeting, Peres told journalists Medvedev had promised to
reconsider a contract to sell S-300s to Iran. "When he visited me in Sochi, Israeli President Peres said
something important for us all: 'Israel does not plan to launch any strikes on Iran, we are a peaceful
country and we will not do this'," Medvedev said. Asked about the possible delivery of S-300s, Medvedev said
Russia had the right to sell defensive weapons to Iran.
13
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
14
Ext 2- Relations improving
Relations fine, Turkey gas trade continues with Iran, even after new sanctions
TEHRAN TIMES, 7/3/10, ―Iran-Turkey energy cooperation to grow‖
http://news.google.com/news/url?sa=t&ct2=us%2F0_0_s_5_0_t&usg=AFQjCNHtAfN763qUTrym8FrnScKRwo5_-
g&cid=0&ei=moAuTJjLDonslQeh9a6sAQ&rt=SEARCH&vm=STANDARD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tehrantimes.com%2Finde
x_View.asp%3Fcode%3D222437
The Turkish energy minister says the new UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran will
not affect the current energy deals between the two countries. ―Turkey will continue to cooperate with
Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals ,‖ Turkey‘s Energy and
Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz said in an interview with Press TV. ―Energy is not part of the UN
sanctions,‖ he added. Turkey is currently carrying out technical studies in Iran‘s south pars gas field
which could potentially yield prosperous investment for both countries. ―After we receive the result of this
study we will decide how to move forward,‖ Yildiz said. Iran exports 25 million cubic meters of natural gas to
turkey per day and the figure could increase to 30 in the near future
Turley stands up for Iran, deepening ties
Tulay Karadeniz, reporter for the Reuter, 6/10/10 ―Turkey says Iran sanctions "mistake"; deepens Arab ties‖
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49194320100610
Turkey called the imposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran a "mistake" on Thursday and said that it and
Brazil would continue to seek a diplomatic solution to remove concerns over Iran's nuclear
programme. In a speech to an Arab and Turkish ministerial forum, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan also announced plans
to form a regional free trade zone with three Arab states -- Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The moves will add to concerns,
voiced on Wednesday by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that the pivotal Western ally is in danger of swinging
eastward because of resistance in Europe to its bid for membership of the European Union . Turkey and Brazil, both
non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, were the only members of the 15-strong
council to vote on Wednesday against the imposition of new sanctions against Iran . Lebanon abstained.
"We would not want to participate in such a mistake because history will not forgive us," Erdogan told
a meeting attended by ministers from 22 members of the Arab League. He said Turkey intended, with Brazil, to
continue engaging Tehran, having secured a nuclear fuel swap deal last month that they had hoped
would head off sanctions. Western countries along with Russia and China viewed that deal as too little too late and
pressed on with a fourth round of sanctions, as Iran continued uranium enrichment that world powers fear could be used for
nuclear weapons. Turkey believes that sanctions are ineffective and that there are dangers in pushing the
Islamic republic into a corner. "Isolation is not the solution to Iran's problems," Erdogan said. EAST
OR WEST. Though not an Arab, Erdogan has become a hero to many in the Arab world for
championing the cause of Gaza's Palestinians and putting their plight near the top of the world agenda
after an Israeli commando raid on a Turkish aid ship.
14
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
15
Ext 2 – Relations good
Iran is shipping its uranium to Turkey, this improves relations and robs Iran of Nuclear capabilities
Associated Press, 4/17/10, ―Russia: Iran's deal with Turkey may not be enough‖
,http://www.salon.com/wires/world/2010/05/17/D9FOMAMG0_iran_nuclear/
Iran agreed Monday to ship most of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in a surprise nuclear fuel swap
deal that could ease the international standoff over the country's disputed atomic program and deflate a
U.S.-led push for tougher sanctions. The deal, which was reached in talks with Brazil and Turkey, was similar to a
U.N.-drafted plan that Washington and its allies have been pressing Tehran for the past six months to accept in order to
deprive Iran -- at least temporarily -- of enough stocks of enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon . Iran, which
claims its nuclear program is peaceful, dropped several key demands that had previously blocked
agreement. In return for agreeing to ship most of its uranium stockpile abroad, it would receive fuel rods of
medium-enriched uranium to use in a Tehran medical research reactor that produces isotopes for cancer treatment. It was
not immediately clear what would happen to the stockpile once the fuel rods were received.
Relations good enough to halt sanctions
Julian Borger, diplomatic editor, 5/17/10 ―Iran-Turkey nuclear swap deal 'means new sanctions are unnecessary'‖
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-turkey
Turkey‘s prime minister said today that there was no need for fresh UN sanctions against Iran
following an agreement under which Tehran would ship more than a tonne of its enriched uranium to
Turkey as part an exchange deal. Iran agreed to ship 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey in return for
nuclear fuel rods for a medical research reactor. The deal is intended to defuse the crisis over Iran's nuclear
aspirations at a time when a new round of sanctions is being discussed in the UN security council and
Israel is contemplating military action. The details of the deal, mediated by Brazil, have yet to be finalised and
would have to win the backing of other nuclear powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before it is
implemented. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey, which sits on the UN security
council, said the deal obviated the need for new sanctions. But British officials said Iran still had to do more to
prove that its nuclear ambitions were not threatening. "Iran has an obligation to assure the international
community of its peaceful intentions," junior foreign minister Alistair Burt said . "The IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency] has said it is unable to verify this. That is why we have been working with our partners on a
sanctions resolution in the security council. Until Iran takes concrete actions to meet those obligations, that work must
continue," he said.
Squo solves, Iran and turkey are improving relations now
Elin Kinnander, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2010, ―The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship:Politically
Successful, Commercially Problematic‖ http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf
This paper has presented the main features and factors influencing Turkish-Iranian natural gas relations and their current
outcomes. This was done by first examining the historical evolution of Turkish-Iranian relations, the preconditions for
today‘s gas contract, and a detailed presentation and discussion of Turkey‘s and Iran‘s natural gas cooperation over the past
decade. The main conclusion reached in this paper is that there exists a clear distinction, in terms of
success, between the Turkish-Iranian political relational and the commercial natural gas relationship.
The political relationship is strengthening and diplomatic ties are growing stronger. Even Turkish-
Iranian trade in commodities other than gas is growing rapidly, but the gas cooperation continues to be
delayed and to face problems. However, both countries portray their gas cooperation as developing and
growing, and of high priority. The logic behind both Turkey‘s but also Iran‘s desire to expand this cooperation can be
found within the framework of the countries´ foreign policy.
15
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
16
Ext 3 -No Need for Iran‘s Gas
New deal signed, Europe and turkey no longer depended on gas from Iran or Russia
World Bulletin, 6/17/10, ―Turkey, Italy, Greece to sign natural gas deal‖,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087
Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Italy's EDISON, and Greece's DEPA will sign a
memorandum of understanding for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline that will carry natural
gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The signature ceremony will take place in Ankara's Rixos Grand Hotel.
Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, President of the Executive Board and Director General of
BOTAS Fazil Senel, Vice-President of Italian Electric and Natural Gas Company EDISON Roberto Poti and President of
the Executive Board of Greek State Natural Gas Company Herry Sachinis will participate in the signature ceremony. The
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) Project is considered to be one of the EU's most crucial
projects. The natural gas pipeline will be 804 kilometers long and will go into service in 2015. ITGI
pipeline begins in Azerbaijan and ends in Italy. Once completed, the pipeline will carry around 10
billion cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Italy per year. Bulgaria was the last country that
joined the ITGI Project. Experts say that Serbia and Romania may join the project either directly or
indirectly.
16
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
17
1NC Terrorism Frontline (1 / 3)
1. Nuclear Terrorism is non-Unique
Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 ―The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,‖
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10
Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled
out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons . A layperson may figure it's
only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism,"
concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all
thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a
second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck
bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being
plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood
that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small."
2. Nuclear Weapons are safe from terrorists
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 200 9, ―The Atomic Terrorist?‖ International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed
7/2/10
There has also been great worry about ―loose nukes,‖ especially in post-Communist Russia—weapons, ―suitcase
bombs‖ in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on
the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have
bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991,are difficult to maintain
and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become ―radioactive scrap metal.‖ Similarly, a careful
assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these
devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-
existent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance. Even some of those most alarmed
by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded that ―It is probably true that there are no ‗loose nukes‘,
transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some
way.‖10 It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to
be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a
vicious on-and-off war for well over a decade. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by
terrorists, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. Notes Stephen
Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ―regardless of
what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.‖
Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a
worldwide pursuit launched. And most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a
great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by sensors in the hands of pursuers.12 Moreover,
as technology has developed, finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that will trigger a non-
nuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security
techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high security vaults, and
things can be organized so that two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb, but to
store, to maintain, and to deploy it.
17
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
18
1NC Terrorism Frontline (2 / 3)
Card Continues—No Text Removed
If the terrorists seek to enlist(or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb,
they would find, as Younger stresses, that ―only few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an
unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.‖ Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the
multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained only in a limited set of
functions.13There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray—Pakistan is
frequently brought up in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, e ven under those conditions, nuclear weapons
would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end
up going off in their own territory, would still have locks (and, in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled), and
could probably be followed, located, and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The worst
case scenario in this instance requires not only a failed state, but a considerable series of additional permissive conditions
including consistent (and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that
click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood script writers than to people experienced with reality.
3. SQ solves-Turkey government has begun to take anti-terrorist measures
Ankara 6/25 (ERCAN YAVUZ ANKARA ―Turkey walks fine line in fight against terror, stakes high‖ Today‘s Zaman
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214158-turkey-walks-fine-line-in-fight-against-terror-stakes-high.html)
The National Security Council (MGK), bringing together the president, the prime minister and some
members of the Cabinet with top military brass, convened yesterday to talk about new measures to take
against the increase in terrorist attacks of the outlawed PKK. The meeting started in the afternoon under the
chairmanship of President Abdullah Gül at the War Academies Command in İstanbul. The outcome of the meeting has not
yet been made public officially, but the generals and the government were expected to talk about a number of
possible measures including assigning special roles to police special operations teams in the fight
against terrorism and perhaps a change in Turkey's southeastern border with Iraq to allow better
control of the areas infested by the PKK. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, force commanders and Gül
arrived at the War Academies Command yesterday hours before the start of the MGK meeting to attend a conference to be
delivered by Gül. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also started his preparations early, arriving at the Prime
Ministerial Office inside Dolmbahçe Palace in İstanbul with those ministers who are members of the MGK. State Ministers
and Deputy Prime Ministers Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek and Ali Babacan, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül and Public Order and Safety
Undersecretary Muammer Güler met with the prime minister here. Turkey may suggest changes to the country's
existing borders with Iraq in order to more effectively fight terrorists hiding out in the mountains that
line the border. Government officials and top commanders brought up the possibility in a key security
and anti-terrorism meeting yesterday As they talked, Gül was giving a conference at the War Academy. During
his speech, Gül said terrorism is Turkey's foremost issue. ―There have been deep-rooted changes in our country, from
politics and the economy to commerce and the system of law. The real target of this transformation is to keep up with the
times, not lag behind the necessities of the age,‖ he said.
18
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
19
1NC Terrorism Frontline (3 / 3)
4. Terrorists wouldn‘t be able to acquire, develop, and deliver the nuclear weapon
Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 ―The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,‖
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10
The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get
a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have
already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not
scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists
were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other
safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to
an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue
individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes
Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably
while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with
spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment --
plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could
make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way
to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.
Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible
exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of
people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.
Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only
have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to
carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong.
That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of
seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should
stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications
and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one
that will never happen.
5. Terrorists could just as easily steal from Italy, Aff evidence not specific
Claudine Lamond, Research Intern at British American Security Information Council, 20 09 http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm
Italy hosts two nuclear bases. With the shift of attention to southern and eastern Europe, Italy features in NATO plans for
expansion. The United States may wish to close a base in Germany and move four infantry battalions
to Vicenza, making it Europe's largest US base, and include a possible increase of TNWs stationed in Italy. Public
discontent with these proposals was vividly shown in 2007 when there was a demonstration of over 100,000 people against the Vicenza military base and
the proposed expansion.[14] The presence of nuclear weapons on Italian soil at another US base, Aviano, is also deeply unpopular. As a consequence, the
Italian Berlosconi Government has voiced its own hesitation over nuclear sharing.[15] Italy has taken delivery of 121 dual-capable
Typhoon aircraft since early 2006.[16] It was also planning to purchase the dual-capable Joint Strike Fighter, but under budgetary
pressures, the government announced its decision to op-out from the JSF program in October 2008. It is unclear whether the Typhoon
will be modified to carry B-61s.
19
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
20
2NC Ext – Non-U
1nc 1: Terroists cant attack-They would have attacked by now or even tried to if they can actually steal a
bomb
1) Terrorists wont attack
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, ―The Atomic Terrorist?‖ International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed
7/2/10
Alarm about the possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons have been repeatedly raised at least
since 1946 when atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer contended that if three or four men could smuggle in
units for an atomic bomb, they could ―destroy New York.‖ Thirty years later, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor
proclaimed the problem to be ―immediate,‖ and explained at length ―how comparatively easy it would be to
steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.‖ At the time he thought it variously already too late to
―prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,‖ or ―in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too
late.‖3 Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their ―easy‖ task. In the wake
of 9/11, concerns about the atomic terrorist surged even though the attacks of that day used no special weapons.
By 2003, UN Ambassador John Negroponte judged there to be a ―a high probability‖ that within two years al-
Qaeda would attempt an attack using a nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction. And it is in this spirit that
Graham Allison in 2004 produced a thoughtful, influential, and well-argued book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate
Preventable Catastrophe, relaying his ―considered judgment‖ that ―on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack
on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.‖ He had presumably relied on the same inspirational mechanism in
1995 to predict that ―In the absence of a determined program of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear
terrorism against American targets before this decade is out.‖4 He has quite a bit of company in his perpetually alarming
conclusions. However, thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress
in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have
discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.
20
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
21
2NC Ext 3-Turkey solves terrorism
1NC 3: National Security Council brought together all key Turkey leaders to address recent threats
of terrorist attacks and have taken measures and assigned special operations to fight terrorist in their
country-that‘s our Ankara evidence
Recent terrorist threats continue to fuel Turkey
Today‘s Zaman 7/8( ―Diplomacy top priority for government in fight against PKK‖ http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-
215357-103-diplomacy-top-priority-for-government -in-fight-against-pkk.html 7/10/2010)
As the death toll rises due to a recent increase in terrorist attacks on Turkish military targets by the terrorist
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), with about 50 soldiers killed during the past month, Turkey has stepped up its military
operations in both the east and southeast of the country, as well as in the north of Iraq, where the PKK is based.
However, recent statements by state officials indicate that the government would like to try a diplomatic solution first, particularly
talks with northern Iraqi leaders. A total of 246 terrorists have been killed in the past 45 days, but it is not yet clear whether Turkey
will be carrying out a full-scale military campaign into northern Iraq to eradicate PKK bases. Recent statements suggest that the
government is likely to opt for a diplomatic route before taking any drastic military measures.
21
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
22
2NC Ext 4- Terrorists can‘t do it
1NC 4: Terrorists can‘t get or set off a TNW, multiple warrants
1) If it was easy to steal a bomb it would have happened already
2) If not maintained then they ―expire‖ and are useless
3) They would be easy to follow because of the radiation emitted from the bomb
4) They don‘t have the technicians to operate it
5) THEY ONLY HAVE TO MESS UP ONCE, it would be more complex than a Hollywood
movie heist
2) Terrorists can‘t USE the nukes even if they get them
Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 20 04 ―Old weapons, new terror worries‖
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10
Many Russian experts argue, though, that even if a terror group seized a nuclear weapon, they would not be
able to use it. American and most Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles have various safeguards that can
permanently disable a weapon if it is tampered with, or require an actual missile launch to arm the
warhead. "We can't exclude terrorists seizing a missile, but that will be the end of this terrorist act, because
they will not be capable of launching it - never," says Dvorkin, who also discounts chances of an inside job. "There is
not a single worker next to a nuclear weapon who is capable of giving this information, because the
codes are only known to the highest command."
3) no of inside job low; security solves
Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 ―Old weapons, new terror worries‖
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10
Tentative first signs of such collusion are already raising red flags, though making the link hasn't been easy, says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at
connection between the guy in a position to steal, and Al Qaeda, is
Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom. "The
a pretty difficult step," says Mr. Bunn. "It's not like you can walk in wearing a white turban waving a million dollars around,
and expect to get anywhere." Last year, however, a Russian businessman was found to have offered
$750,000 for weapons-grade plutonium, and contacted scientists at a key Russian institute, Bunn says.
They deceived him by selling him a canister of mercury. The days of the "desperate insider" of the
1990s - when guards at nuclear sites left their posts to forage for food, or electricity to alarms and weapons systems was cut because bills had gone
unpaid - are now giving way to the "greedy insider," Bunn adds.
22
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
23
2NC Ext 5 – Terrorist could get TNWs from Italy
1nc 4: TNWs in Italy are being increase
1) The aff‘s Kibaroğlu evidence is not specific to turkey, it merely uses turkey as an example, but is
talking about all TNW holding countries. Italy is right around the corner from turkey, and will
soon hold significantly more TNWs than it. There is no reason that the terrorists wont steal from
Italy where they have a better chance.
2) The aff‘s Tümer evidence is not talking about terrorist trying to attack the specific base in turkey.
It implies that IRAN might send a MISSLE to hit the base, not that the PKK will try and steal a
TNW. There is no reason that pulling out of turkey would help, only increase the chance of
terrorism in Italy where we CANT get involved.
23
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
24
Security CP 1NC (1/1)
Increase Security of TNW Counterplan
Text: The United States federal government increase and provide all necessary security support for the
B61 gravity bombs located in Turkey and increase Turkey border control.
Contention One: Competition
It leaves the nuclear weapons in Turkey and avoids the disads.
Contention Two: Solvency
Increased Security solves PKK attacks
Sadik, 08 (Giray ―Turkey Reorganizes Security Structure to Combat Terrorism‖ Terrorism Focus Volume: 5 Issue: 38November 5,
2008 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34088&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=246&no_ca
che=1)
The new Interior Ministry agencies will also address the domestic social concerns that exacerbate terrorism. To this end,
developing projects to prevent terrorist recruitment and providing public outreach will be among the main tasks of these
agencies. The reorganization also sets high standards in terms of the future conduct of security operations. Oversight,
accountability and responsiveness to public concerns are the new themes for counterterrorism actitivities (Aksam Gazetesi,
October 23). After the PKK attack on the Turkish military outpost in Aktutun in early October, border
security has sparked a public debate on the need for increased precautions. Since PKK militants have
been coming from the Iraqi side of the border, securing the frontier to prevent terrorist infiltration has
become an important concern for Turkish counter-terrorism efforts. To this end, the reorganization will
include the establishment of a new undersecretary for border security (Zaman, October) The MGK also
warned Iraq about preventing the use of its soil as a safe haven for terrorists. In light of repeated Turkish demands for
Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to deny safe havens to the PKK, the MGK has decided to closely
monitor Iraq‘s progress in this area (Bugun Gazetesi, October 21).
24
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
25
2NC Counter Plan Solvency Extension
Increased security precautions on borders and around B61 gravity bombs located in Turkey solve any
risk that the PKK will be able to access weapons and use Turkey‘s borders as a terrorist safe haven
ensuring terrorist threats
Increased security resolves any residual risk of terrorism.
Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 ―The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,‖
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10
The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb
or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone
missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as
those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani
bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized
use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100
pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to
jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country
over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb.
It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and
advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-
Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no
way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure,
drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or
extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know
what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish
Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be
lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to
go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks
on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably
won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles,
monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it
appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen
25
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
26
CP Solvency Extensions
Terrorism isn‘t probable but enhanced security resolves the risk.
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, ―The Atomic Terrorist?‖ International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed
7/2/10
At some point, however, probabilities, become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it begins to make
sense to ignore, or at least to back-burner, them: the risk becomes ―acceptable.‖ Consider the odds that a wheel on a
speeding automobile will suddenly shear off. That horror is surely ―not impossible,‖ yet legions of motorists
effectively find it so improbable that they are routinely willing to risk their lives that it will not happen —it
is, in short, an acceptable risk. The British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched
missiles and kill millions of Americans—far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet,
the risk that this potential (and fully possible)calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it
is ―accepted.‖ Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States enjoys a rather strained relationship, could
at any time do vastly more damage still with its nuclear weapons, a fully-imaginable calamity that goes
substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls ―a case for fear,‖ Cass Sunstein notes that if there is a yearly probability of one in 100,000 that
terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to one in 10,000 over ten years and to one in 5,000 over twenty.
These odds, he suggests, are ―not the most comforting.‖53Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would
probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just
perhaps it is at some of the levels suggested here: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt . The same consideration
holds for Vice President Dick Cheney‘s ―one percent doctrine.‖ A top CIA analyst late in 2001 told him that al-Qaeda probably did not have a nuclear
there‘s a one percent chance that they do,
weapon, but that he couldn‘t ―assure you that they don‘t.‖ To this, Cheney replied, ― If
you have to pursue it as if it were true.‖54 Cheney‘s observation is a somewhat confused, but effective, way of saying that
one should take low probability events that could have an exceedingly high impact very seriously
indeed. And a one percent chance of a terrorist atomic attack would clearly fit into that category. It‘s just
that the chances, while perhaps not zero, do not seem to be anywhere remotely near one percent. It‘s not that they are necessarily one in 3.5 billion, but
aren‘t anything like one in 10, one in a hundred, or one in a thousand. Perhaps, in fact, they are
they
comparable to, or even lower than, those for a thermonuclear attack from Russia.
Need security premised on the fact that Al Qaeda can do it later to solve
Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 ―Old weapons, new terror worries‖
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10
the amount of foresight Al Qaeda displayed in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks deepens fears of nuclear terror.
Still,
"It's more complicated than slapping on an alarm clock and running a couple of wires, like James Bond," says Jon Wolfstahl, a nuclear
nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. "But we believe it's within the capability
of more sophisticated, well-financed groups, especially if they can get their hands on scientists or engineers with
knowledge of these systems." Al Qaeda tops that short list. "[Al Qaeda cells] are not very capable, technically, but they're
learning more and more, and this isn't going to go away in one or two years," says David Albright, a physicist who
heads the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. Searching for clues about the level of Al Qaeda nuclear expertise, he has
make a lot of mistakes, [but]
examined troves of documents and videos uncovered in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. " They
they're becoming more capable over time," says Mr. Albright. Recruiting nuclear and computer experts could make
the dangers surge. "People have that capability, they may turn sympathetic to Al Qaeda, or be
blackmailed by Al Qaeda," Albright says. "You can't build a defense on the premise that Al Qaeda can't do it."
26
Turkey TNW Neg-2.0 DDW 2010
27
Allied/Turkish Prolif Links
US TNWs stop Turkish proliferation
Malcolm Chalmers, is Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security
Studies, 3/10, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf
Finally, critics of a NATO ‗zero option‘ point to the critical role that NATO extended nuclear
deterrence has played in preventing proliferation within NATO. Today, the development of
independent German and Italian nuclear weapons is not a serious possibility. Given current trends in
Iran, however, the risk of Turkey moving in this direction cannot be dismissed so easily. At the very
least, any steps towards revising the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine must take the Turkish
dimension into account.
27
Related docs
Other docs by gpl12798
