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					Mission Command
  ‘Match of the Day’
  Sqn Ldr Rhys Cowsill
                 SCOPE
•   Origins.
•   Use and Development: 1806 to Cold War.
•   Introduction to British Military Doctrine.
•   ‘Mechanics.’
•   Culture.
•   Threats and Opportunities.
MATCH OF THE DAY
    14th October 1806

          PRUSSIA
(Professionals and hot favourites)
               vs
          FRANCE
(Upstart peasants – New Manager)

     At Jena and Auerstadt
         Kick-off 3.00pm
NAPOLEON
SCHARNHORST
SCHARNHORST

     ‘We fought bravely
       enough, but not
       cleverly enough.’
  CARL von CLAUSEWITZ

           ‘On War’
(published posthumously 1832)
     CLAUSEWITZ’ LEGACY

• The Fog of War.
• The Friction of War.
• The importance of speed of decision
  making.
      Findings of Scharnhorst’s
          ‘Board of Inquiry’
• The Prussian Army was run as a machine,
  with iron discipline, because the morale of the
  troops was low.
• Officers tried to counter chaos of battle by
  using mathematical principles.
• Nobody took action without orders.
• Highly centralised and process-dominated.
• It used ‘Befehltaktik’ – i.e. based on Orders.
     Findings of Scharnhorst’s
         ‘Board of Inquiry’
• Napoleon was able to communicate
  very rapidly with his Marshals.
• He explained his intentions, as well as
  what he wanted them to do.
• He expected them to use their initiative.
• They did!
• The result was a very high tempo – a
  very fast ‘OODA loop.’
     The OODA Loop

         Observation

Action              Orientation

         Decision
Reforms to the Prussian Army
• The need for speed of decision making was
  recognised.
• Officers were trained and authorised to make
  real-time decisions at low level.
• Philosophy that it was better to act now with
  good intentions than to wait for the ‘right’
  order.
• Doing nothing was a greater sin than making
  the wrong decision.
• Orders from above could not possibly give
  the officer on the ground all the guidance he
  would need.
Field Marshal Von Moltke
Field Marshal Von Moltke
            • Father of
              ‘Auftragstaktik.’

            • “Obedience is a
              principle, but the
              man stands above
              the principle.”
           Auftragstaktik
• Senior commanders should not order
  more than was absolutely necessary but
  should ensure the goal was clear.
• In case of doubt, subordinate
  commanders should seize the initiative.
MATCH OF THE DAY 2
 Franco Prussian War 1870
    Return (grudge) Match

         FRANCE
           vs
         PRUSSIA

       Kick-off 3.00pm
MATCH OF THE DAY 3
  The Great War 1914

      GERMANY
       (ex Prussia)
            vs
  COMBINED SERVICES
      (France/BEF)
          Match Report
• Owing to muddy conditions and
  outstanding new goalkeeping device
  (machine guns), match stagnates and
  goes into extra time.
• OODA Loop goes from ‘observation’ to
  ‘action’ and back again.
     The OODA Loop

         Observation

Action              Orientation

         Decision
          Match Report
• Owing to muddy conditions and
  outstanding new goalkeeping device
  (machine guns), match stagnates and
  goes into extra time.
• OODA Loop goes from ‘observation’ to
  ‘action’ and back again.
• Auftragstaktik comes on as late
  substitute and almost wins the game.
         Between the Wars
• Germany develops ‘an Army of 100,000
  officers.’
• Training centred on ‘thinking obedience.’
• Trust becomes central to military doctrine.
• Everyone expected to learn, and be able to
  do, the job 2 levels up.
• Proves very effective in coping with and using
  the chaos of the battlefield.
    British Army (the Victors!)
• Reverts to ‘huntin’ shootin’ an’ fishin.’
• Prefers to try to control the chaos of the
  battlefield.
• Designs a ‘Master plan.’
• Master plan specifies in great detail precisely
  what everyone has to do.
• Yet, orders are not considered absolute.
• Result is a lot of debating and delay
  – very slow OODA Loop.
     The OODA Loop

         Observation

Action              Orientation

         Decision
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force
          Royal Air Force
• Unusually, prepares to fight the NEXT
  war.
• Dowding designs ‘integrated defence
  system’ for Battle of Britain (NEC?).
• Delegates responsibility for the fighting
  to Group Commanders.
• Allows for a very fast OODA Loop.
     The OODA Loop

         Observation

Action              Orientation

         Decision
          Royal Air Force
• Unusually, prepares to fight the NEXT war.
• Dowding designs ‘integrated defence system’
  for Battle of Britain (NEC?).
• Delegates responsibility for the fighting to
  Group Commanders.
• Allows for a very fast OODA Loop.
• This is the main reason for the defeat of the
  Luftwaffe.
MATCH OF THE DAY 4

 Second World War 1939

   ‘OLD FIRM’ GAME

    Venue – Various

     Kick-off 3.00pm
            Match Report
• Germany has outstanding first half using
  Auftragstaktik from the ‘off.’
• Big wins away in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
  Holland, Belgium France etc. etc.
• Manager substitutes Befehltaktik for
  Auftragstaktik just after half time.
• Germany loses away in Russia (Stalingrad
  City).
• Loses to new Combined Services (US/UK).
• Loses at home trying to play 2 games at
  once.
             Cold War
• Static posturing.
• Everyone told what they had to do
  (Befehltaktik?).
• Not ‘manoeuvre warfare.’
• Little need for Auftragstaktik.
• But!! BAOR is seriously out-numbered
  and so…
Field Marshal Bagnall KCB GCB
           CVO MC*
• 1986 – Introduces principles of
  Auftragstaktik to UK Military doctrine
  and influences NATO doctrine.
• Doctrine becomes known as ‘Mission
  Command.’
• Great idea!
• ……but nobody knows about it.
        Mission Command
• Is designed to facilitate effective action
  under chaotic and confusing conditions.
• Is based on trust.
• Is intended to unify autonomy and
  alignment.
• The ‘mechanics’ are as follows:
       Mission Command
• The Commander:
  – Briefs his intent to 2 levels down.
  – Explains the limitations, e.g. time,
    boundaries, must do, mustn’t do.
  – Allocates resources.
  – States WHAT is to be achieved, not HOW
    it is to be achieved.
  – Gives decision-making criteria.
        Mission Command
• The Subordinate Commander:
  – Understands ‘my role in his plan’ 2 levels
    up.
  – Devises his own plan to play his part in
    achieving the commander’s intent.
  – Asks for more resources if needed, but
    offers back resources not needed.
  – Briefs his subordinates 2 levels down.
  and so forth…
    The Culture Required for
   Effective Mission Command
• The Commander retains ultimate
  responsibility for decisions but:
   – He must genuinely empower his people.
   – He must trust his subordinates.
• Everyone must act as a leader.
• A decision to act now in accordance with
  commander’s intent, rather than to wait for
  orders, is imperative.
   Threats and Opportunities
• The greatest threat to the successful
  implementation of Mission Command is
  a belief that technology will allow
  command to be supplanted by control.
• The greatest challenge is to use Mission
  Command, not just in war, but in every-
  day episodes of leadership at all levels
  and to become proficient in its use.

				
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