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					                                             DRAFT
                           Discussion Paper on Command and Control:
                    Planning for a Third Party in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

                                            David Last1
                                  Royal Military College of Canada

                    Peacekeeping Workshop: Canadian and Israeli Perspectives
                             Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice and
                              the Truman Institute, 3-5 April 2006.

         This discussion paper starts with the assumption that some form of third party
intervention will be part of the continuing efforts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Building on the Truman Centre’s proposal for a Monitoring Apparatus for Regional Stabilization
(MARS), it considers precursors and models for command and control, a plausible structure for
the parts of a mission that seem necessary, and a coordination mechanism. It does not constitute
a full analysis of the requirements for command and control, nor an appreciation of the details of
implementation.
         The central issue in discussions of command and control is the degree to which the
mission is beholden to the parties, and particularly to Israel. Previous models for intervention
have minimised the autonomy of the mission, entirely excluding any independent action inside
Israel. Forces and observer missions like UNTSO, UNIFIL, UNDOF, and MFO have been
carefully managed by Israel yet all but the last have overstepped acceptable limits for Israeli
sovereignty and security.2 While this is what we would expect from a strong state in a difficult
neighbourhood (Canada would do no less), Israeli restrictions on third party mandates have
precluded nation building and security guarantees for a nascent Palestinian state, and this has
arguably undermined Israeli security. The results Israel demands of the PA cannot be achieved
without a stronger state apparatus, economic development, security sector reform and even
cultural revival to defeat the nihilism and despair of the current generation, which is feeding
terrorism. All of this requires a more robust and capable third party mission than Israel has
hitherto been prepared to accept.
         The challenge of developing a command and control model is to balance Israeli demands
for limited capacity with Palestinian needs for robust capacity and security guarantees against
harm from Israel and from their own militants. At the same time we have to acknowledging that
any third party force is unlikely to be able to provide security guarantees against random acts of
terror. This asymmetry threatens to leave Israel in the worst of worlds, with its own security not
enhanced, while the PA receives assistance that could make for a greater threat in the future and
militant spoilers are undeterred. Unless the command, control and liaison mechanisms guard
against this situation, a third party role may be out of the question.
         I think the answer lies in a four-part mission, with a single integrated security leg based
loosely on the MFO model (but with greater capacity), and a three-legged multinational mission
responsible for nation building in the nascent Palestinian state. This “stick and stool” model
might be sufficient to help Israel manage the conflict while the international community helps to
build a state that can be a partner for eventual resolution. Paralleling the stick and stool at the
operational level, three tiers of strategic oversight will permit essential vetoes by the parties,

1
  David Last is a Canadian officer with peacekeeping experience in Cyprus, Croatia, and Bosnia, who has
recently conducted field research and taught in the security sector in West Africa. He teaches political
science at the Royal Military College of Canada, where he also serves as Registrar.
2
  Interviews conducted by author, Israel, July 2002.


David Last                                        1/26                                       April 2006
                                              DRAFT
while permitting escalation on two lines – through three-party security-oriented sub-committees,
and through larger bodies that permit the deployment of alliances and resources to resolve
differences.
        I will discuss the MARS prescription, some precursors and models, and a command and
control model that might accommodate the stated preferences of the parties.
The MARS Prescription
         The MARS model assumes that multiple crises will recur in the course of attempting to
achieve security for Israel beside a mature Palestinian state. A third party will therefore be useful
to assist in identifying incipient crises, and preventing or managing them. The apparatus does not
presuppose a particular level of military or police force – it seems reasonable to expect the level
and form of third party force to fluctuate during the life of the mission, as it has in other cases of
third-party assistance to manage conflict. The apparatus must rest on a basic document, which
defines its mandate, mode of operation, and criteria for appraising success. It is expected that an
international coalition will contribute to the apparatus, but that careful selection and training will
offset the normal disadvantages of multinational coalitions, allowing it to define common aims,
improve internal cohesion, and operate as an integrated and coordinated mission, with a unique
“strategic culture”.3
         The MARS prescription might represent a radical departure from principles of
international peacekeeping or third party policing of a protracted conflict. If the apparatus
evolves as it is described in the Truman Centre discussion paper, then an international coalition
force, with a super-power guarantee, will essentially become contractor to the parties, with the
responsibility to resolve their security problems. I deduce this from the central principle:
“…crucial for the force’s success is accountability and complete loyalty to the two sides and the
mission through neutralizing – as far as possible – basic loyalty to the home nation of each
component.”4 Both Unarmed UN Military Observers, operating with diplomatic licence, and
armed UN peacekeepers operating within a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) wear a national
flag on one shoulder and a UN patch on the other. Interfering with their mandate or their well-
being defies both the international community, and the good faith of the troop-contributing
country. But for MARS, the primary loyalty must be to the mandate and the long-term interests
of the parties to the conflict. The hope is that this will prevent the politicization of the force by
outside actors. There is also a risk that it will internalize the issues that make the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict so intractable. It is, after all, asking a lot for a soldier or civil servant from a
third country to vest his or her primary loyalty in both Israeli and Palestinian interests, when this
is likely to result in being reviled by both parties.
         I deduce from this central principle that the command and control model should provide
for two structures. One component should be responsible for primary security functions,
including counter-terrorism and any security guarantees through separation of the parties. This
component will face the greatest challenge in maintaining the dual loyalty demanded by the
MARS prescription. A second component, responsible for political, economic and social aspects
of nation-building, will be concerned primarily with the nascent Palestinian state, and therefore
will have less difficulty with divided loyalties. The two components will have difficult
responsibilities to each other. While the Israeli focus is on the prevention of attacks against Israel
citizens, the security component will also have to prevent Israeli attacks from destroying the
infrastructure of the nascent state, which is being built up by the political-economic-social


3
  Kobi Michael, “International Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena: From an International Force to
a Monitoring Mechanism for Regional Stabilization” Unpublished discussion paper, June 2005, 6.
4
  Michael, 2005, 7


David Last                                        2/26                                        April 2006
                                           DRAFT
component of the mission. It will also have to prevent attacks by Palestinian militants against
Palestinians involved in building a state that may be less than the aspirations of many.
         The need for this two-component structure (security stick and development stool) is
under-scored by the five operating principals specified in the MARS prescription. The first
principle demands the highest standards of professionalism, particularly for the security
component. The second demands the capacity to view situations from multiple perspectives,
which acknowledges that the parties to which the mission is expected to be loyal adhere to very
different accounts of the conflict, and eventual transformation to a non-violent conflict requires
mutual accommodation of these accounts. The third principle demands that the sole source of
authority for the mission is the recognition and agreement of both sides. This is particularly
challenging for the security component, but one can imagine circumstances in which political,
economic and social legs of the nation-building stool might support action perceived by some to
be against Israel’s interests. The fourth principle demands capacity for independent operations
over time (perhaps even an intergenerational time-span, if the conflict so far is any guide), and the
fifth requires the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.5
        These five additional principles demand adjustments to the mission structures that have
worked in other transitional environments. UN missions typically work with renewable six-
month mandates, but the MARS prescription envisions (with good reason) a structure likely to
remain in place for years and possibly decades, preserving and building on a coherent body of
expertise under the guidance of two sophisticated parties to a conflict which is likely to remain
zero-sum at least with respect to control over territory and water, if not other aspects.
         The idea of a mission that operates “independently,” but is responsible to the parties also
poses dilemmas for a command and control system. It suggests a four-way veto – by each party
over the actions of either component. This seems more stringent than the normal requirement for
consent to the initial mandate and force composition, followed by a relatively free hand at the
operational level. UNTAG in Namibia and UNTAES in Croatia were examples of transitional
missions with considerable operational freedom, which still ran into obstacles from the parties.
To prevent this four-way veto from leading to stalemate, I infer from the principles that the
mission must include mechanisms for resolving disputes, and may even impose some solutions
on the parties, acting as arbitrator rather than just mediator. But when should it have these
powers, and how can they be reconciled with responsibility to the parties? Circumstances will
arise when taking action is deemed essential for the security of one party, but deemed inimical to
its security by the other.
         Differentiating between human security and national security helps to clarify the
responsibilities of the monitoring apparatus, and what the parties will have to do to make it work.
The first responsibility of MARS is for national security – the survival of the state and
preservation of the character of national institutions. In Israel’s case, these are comparatively
strong and unlikely to be shaken by even another generation of social turmoil. In the nascent
Palestinian state, on the other hand, they are weak or non-existent. The security component of the
monitoring apparatus has a relatively simple task on the Israeli side, but a complex and perhaps
impossible task on the Palestinian side. This is offset by the reverse situation for human security.
The Palestinians face such a huge deficit in human security that presiding over improvements
should be relatively easy. Liberating Israelis from fear of Palestinian suicide attacks, on the other
hand, is a task that seems beyond even the highly competent IDF, and is likely to elude a
multilateral coalition.



5
    Michael, 2005, 7.


David Last                                      3/26                                    April 2006
                                              DRAFT
        The focus of the monitoring apparatus, then, on the Palestinian side is on sheltering the
growth of a state apparatus, which can provide for human security. On the Israeli side, it is on
reducing the risk of isolated acts of terror, no combination of which is likely to threaten the Israeli
state.6
        In contrast to the Truman Centre proposal, Israeli strategic thinking focuses on security.
Shlomo Brom of the Jaffee Centre, for example, lists four functions for international assistance to
disengagement: monitoring the security aspects of an agreement, assuming responsibility for
sensitive areas like border crossings that must be transferred to Palestinian control, guaranteeing
the security of a (necessarily) demilitarized Palestinian state, and deterring foreign elements from
penetrating Palestinian territory to use it as a base of operations against Israel. Brom also cites
former US Ambassador Martin Indyk’s proposal for an American “trusteeship” over the
Palestinian territory to build democratic institutions within the timeframe of the three-year
roadmap, but he admits that this seemed highly unlikely even at the time of writing in 2003.7
         The main challenge to the two parties is to operate under conditions of mistrust as a
Palestinian state evolves. The main challenge for the third party is to bridge that mistrust through
systematic confidence building measures. The command and control structure for the “stick and
stool” model must therefore permit clear and rapid communication between the parties and the
third party at the right level to resolve incidents. Sometimes this means escalating quickly to the
highest decision-making levels. Sometimes it means resolving issues a the lowest level and
dampening down the speed of communications in order to prevent an escalation to levels which
can act with more serious consequences.8 Indeed, when national authorities become involved they
may find it politically impossible to avoid an over reaction.
         The command and liaison structure needs to be different for security issues and for
political, economic and social questions, because the response time must be less and sensitivity to
failure will be greater for security issues. The problem here becomes drawing the boundary for
security issues. The pattern for international peacekeeping mission has been to separate military
forces and police forces, leaving the former to military alliances and the latter to the UN or to
organizations like the Commonwealth or the OSCE. This is an unsatisfactory division, described
by research on the “policing gap” in post-Cold War peacekeeping missions.9
         The policing gap is obvious when we focus on the limited capacity of military forces to
provide for community security, but there is another gap evident when we focus on the capacity
of police to protect institutions. Sociologist James Sheptycki writes of the distinction between
“low policing” which secures rights and interests of individuals within a community, and “high
policing” which secures institutions or the interests of a regime or state.10 States with weak
institutional safeguards are at great risk of having security apparatus (military or police)
developed for community purposes and hijacked to support the interests of a particular regime.

6
  These priorities accord with the challenges listed by Michael, pp. 8-10.
7
  Shlomo Brom, “International Forces in an Israeli-Palestinian Agreement,” Strategic Assessment, 5:4,
February 2003.
8
  Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1998)
9
  Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, “Bosnia and the International Police Task Force," in Robert B.
Oakely, Micahel J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, editors, Policing the New World Disorder: Peace
Operations and Public Security. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1998.
10
   Jean-Paul Brodeur 'High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities'
Social Problems, vol. 30 No. 5 (1983) pp. 507-20; and James Sheptycki, "Postmodern Power and
Transnational Policing: Democracy, the Constabulary Ethic and the Response to global (in)security"
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper Series – No. 19
(2002)


David Last                                        4/26                                        April 2006
                                            DRAFT
This is one interpretation of what went wrong with the Palestinian Authority’s multiple police and
intelligence organizations under Arafat. The command and liaison structure therefore needs to
discriminate between different organizations on the basis of the risk that they might pose for
undermining trust in the mutual security of the two parties. Functions related to state security
clearly belong to the “stick” but so too do some functions related to human security.
Table 1 Components of Human Security
     Component                                  Example11
Economic security          Employment and education – stable work places




                                                                                    Development
Food security              Confidence in continuation of safe and reliable
                           food and water supply meeting cultural needs
Health security            High quality health services universally available




                                                                                    “stool”
Environmental security     Decent living in an unpolluted environment
Personal security          Guaranteed human rights and freedoms
Community security         Life free from physical and psychological violence




                                                                                                  Security
Political security         Positive and optimistic expectations about the




                                                                                                  “stick”
                           future; active involvement of the individual in the
                           decision-making process
         The 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development identifies seven categories of human
security.12 Three of these are secured by the chain of security organizations that the command
and liaison structure of the monitoring apparatus must accommodate. Personal security and most
of community security are normally matters for “low policing”. When threats to the community
affect the political order (as they do when organized crime corrupts the police, for example) then
community security becomes a matter for high policing, similar to political security. Personal,
community, and political security can be seen as part of a continuum related to the functions of
police, gendarmes, and military forces, all three of which belong with the “stick” structure.
Policing therefore cannot be separated from the security component of the monitoring apparatus.
         The problem with this solution is that the other categories of human security also have
distinctly political aspects. Economic security, food security, health and environmental security
can be addressed by the political, economic and social “nation-building” component of a
stabilization mission, but not in a community which is victim to physical and psychological
violence, and engaged in an armed conflict. My deduction is that primacy must be given to the
control of physical violence even while we acknowledge that merely the absence of physical
violence does not constitute a sufficient condition for lasting inter-communal peace.
         A review of the MARS proposal suggests that security and nation-building functions
should be separately addressed by the command and liaison structure. Security includes both
national security and three of the seven categories of human security listed in the 1994 UNDP
Report on Human Development. As we move from “low policing” affecting individual and
communities towards “high policing” affecting the survival of regimes, then we are increasingly
likely to face vetoes by the parties, which will make compromise difficult. These are the
circumstances under which a third party may have to function as an arbitrator to keep the process
on track. In fact, it may be a vital interest of either or both parties to be able to blame the third
party in order to save face in difficult lose-lose situations.




11
   Adapted from Viorica Zorita, Human Security in Transition Societies. Burcharest: NATO Studies
Center, Strategic Issues Review, August, 2003, 54-56.
12
   United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report. New York: United Nations, 1994.


David Last                                      5/26                                          April 2006
                                            DRAFT
Precursors and Models for Command and Control
         The MFO serves as a generic command and control model. Since it is extolled as a
model by Israeli advocates, and criticized by some American analysts,13 it is worth reviewing in
some detail. Canadian historian Sean Maloney sees the flaw not with MFO, but in the policy
decisions of Canadian governments – a vote of confidence for the innovation involved in this new
structure.14
         The MFO operates under a Director General (DG) in a headquarters outside the theatre
(Rome). He communicates with a Force Commander (FC) in the theatre and liaison officers in
Tel Aviv and Cairo.15 The Force Commander presides over battalions (BN), logistics support,
aviation and coastal patrol units, which is fairly standard for peacekeeping missions. The majority
of the troops – three infantry battalions – are engaged in a buffer zone monitoring operation that
is similar to many static UN peacekeeping missions like UNFICYP in Cyprus (post 1974). More
innovative are the mobile observations and inspections by the Civilian Observation Unit (COU)
conducted across the length and breadth of the Sinai Peninsula. Periodic inspections and follow-
up on challenges raised by either party help to maintain confidence in the agreement. A support
contractor provides technical verification means to augment the Civilian Observation Unit. This
mobile element serves as a strategic asset, like divisional reconnaissance in a military context, or
military observers attached to a UN peacekeeping force.16
Figure 1: Organization of the MFO
        An American officer points out that “…the overall force behind the continuing peace in
the Sinai has been the political commitment by the party nations to fully comply with the treaty
terms.”17 He extrapolates from this to argue against expanding MFO into the Golan height,
because uncertain political commitment could undermine overall confidence in the MFO. Rather,
he suggests evolving the infantry battalions into an observer force. He even suggests that the
existing UNTSO monitoring function could be expanded into the Sinai, acknowledging that while
this probably would not be acceptable to Israel, the US should still explore it.
          Spoehr’s conclusions are implicitly supported by the annual reports of the MFO Director
General, and by the attitudes of the parties towards it.18 It performs its current functions well, but
offers little prospect of expansion or innovation. Israel’s neighbourhood is complex enough that
working arrangements should be left alone. Even arrangements that don’t always work well
(UNTSO, UNIFIL, and UNDOF, for example) may be better left alone than wiped away, lest
their removal upset a delicate balance.
         Aside from this inherent caution, there are other good reasons for ruling out an expansion
of MFO, a priori. First, it would introduce the complexity of three-party asymmetry to a
mechanism that is inherently designed for symmetrical two-party relations. This would be
particularly difficult on the Sinai-Gaza border, which has already generated friction. Second, its
structure, resources, standard operating procedures and experience are tailored to the empty


13
   Thomas W. Spoehr, “This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the US Commitment to the MFO,”
Parameters Autumn, 2000, 109-125.
14
   Sean M. Maloney, “Reluctant Peacekeeper: Canada and the Multinational Force and Observers in the
Sinai, 1979-1982,” forthcoming, International Peacekeeping.
15
   Spoehr, 2000, 14
16
   David Last, “Cooperation between Units and Observers,” News From The Front! (The Centre for Army
Lessons Learned, September/October 1994), pp. 1-2,5,7. Also published in Peacekeeping and
International Relations, September-October 1994, p. 4.
17
   Spoehr, 2000, 115.
18
   Multinational Force and Observers, Annual Report of the Director General, Rome, February 2004.


David Last                                      6/26                                      April 2006
                                             DRAFT
spaces of the Sinai. It has not track record of working in crowded urban spaces and dealing with
intermingled populations. Third, MFO is strictly a military truce supervisory organization. It has
no capacity to address the human security tasks that the development stool of MARS must
support.
         The conclusion from this is that the elegant simplicity of the MFO may serve as a skeletal
model for MARS, but third party assistance to disengagement and long-term accommodation of
coexisting Israeli and Palestinian states will require a more multi-dimensional structure for
command and control. This brings us to examine some of the alternative command and control
models, which have been proposed recently for Israeli-Palestinian security problems. Most of
these models do not actually provide for command and control in a military sense, but illustrate
the structures that have enabled third party involvement, which is the necessary starting point.
Alternatives to the MFO
        Jarat Chopra’s 2003 article on third party monitoring provides the most succinct
summary of recent variations on political and security monitoring mechanisms. These are not the
same as command and control arrangements, but lay out a series of alternatives for the political
superstructure that is necessary for a third party role, therefore an essential part any command and
control arrangement. To permit easy comparison, each alternative has been reduced to a
schematic, which is inevitably a simplification.
          As Chopra writes, the “minimalist incrementalism” of the Quartet (US, EU, UN, and
Russia) and other independent efforts combine to support de facto intervention of more than a
thousand personnel, but there is no clear set of relations or workable proposals for these assets to
support conflict resolution.19 Following Chopra’s work, I will summarise the evolution of eight
different plans or proposals. Chopra groups these thematically but I present them chronologically
to illustrate the evolution, and to focus on the combination of security and development
structures.
         The Mitchell plan of May 2001 followed the Sharm el-Sheikh peace summit. President
Clinton sent Senator George Mitchell to determine causes and recommend solutions for the
Intefada. Mitchell issued a report in April 2001, which linked Israeli security to Palestinian
political interests.20 Egypt and Jordan prepared draft papers separately, and in May 2001
Palestinians proposed a two-tiered monitoring structure consisting of a multinational steering
committee and three subordinate sub-committees to address security, settlements, and economic
and civil affairs. The Steering Committee would have consisted of the participants at the Sharm
el-Sheikh summit: Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Turkey and Norway, plus
representatives of the US, the UN, and the EU. This structure was never implemented.
Figure 2: Mitchell Plan of May 2001
         The Tenet plan of June 2001 emerged after the 1 June 2001 suicide bombing at the
Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv. President Bush sent CIA Director George Tenet to force negotiations
on Sharon and Arafat. While the Mitchell report had explicitly linked Israeli security and
Palestinian political demands, Tenet focused only on security. Under the Tenet plan, both sides
accepted third party monitoring of their ceasefire obligations, beginning with the Security Sub-
Committee. The other sub-committees envisioned by Mitchell would be established later after
the parties (specifically the Palestinian authority) had demonstrated the will to abide by their

19
     Jarat Chopra, 2003, 36.
20
  Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, Full text of the report completed on April 30,
2001 and published on May 20, 2001, available at www.mofa.gov.ps.



David Last                                        7/26                                      April 2006
                                            DRAFT
obligations. The step forward here was to offer up CIA officers to chair the Security Sub-
Committee with Israeli and Palestinian counterparts who were also counter-terrorist experts. In
July, the G8 offered monitors, but Israel rejected them. I have found no record of the form in
which the other two sub-committees might eventually have been staffed.
Figure 3: Tenet plan of June 2001
         The Contact Group proposal of July 2001 represented an attempt by the Palestinian
authority to broaden representation in the Security Sub-Committee to permit non-American third
party representation, while still relying heavily on American counter-terrorism expertise. Chopra
feels that it followed the pattern established by the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG)
established in April 1996 after Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” operation in the Lebanon. ILMG was a
single tier forum to address violations of the ceasefire agreement. It included Israel, Lebanon,
and Syria, with the US and France as rotating chairs. The Palestinians consistently sought more
multinational representation on the technical team, while the Israelis preferred a small, entirely
American team. The contact group did not end up playing a larger role in 2001.
Figure 4: Contact Group Proposal of July 2001
         The Palestinian proposal of March 2002 entailed an International Montioring and
Verification Mission to implement the Tenet plan. An international steering group would include
the Quartet plus interested foreign parties. A senior trilateral security committee would consist of
just the US, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the US providing the Chair. The second tier
would consist of the same three Sub-Committees first proposed by Mitchell – security,
settlements, and economic and civil affairs. Here we see the first of the two-part solutions – a
larger body to satisfy the Palestinians, and a smaller body with a security focus to keep the
Israelis happy.
Figure 5: Palestinian proposal of March 2002
         The Zinni plan of April 2002 amended this two-tier structure to include four sub-
committees responsible for security (arrests, prisons, and weapons decommissioning),
geographical issues (Israeli redeployments and Palestinian complaints of territorial
encroachment), and incitements (addressing mainly Israeli complaints about Palestinian
transgressions). The fourth sub-committee was labelled “other”, for the remaining elements of
the Mitchell plan, including the freeze on settlements and economics and civil affairs. The thrust
of this initiative was to make the sub-committees align more closely with the issues about which
the most traffic was received. Zinni thought that the Israelis would be prepared to accept up to 60
monitors, and went as far as enquiring amongst other nations about potential monitors for a
multinational contribution.
Figure 6: Zinni Plan of April 2002
         The International Task Force for Reform of the Palestinian Authority followed President
Bush’s long awaited policy statement of June 2002. This statement envisioned a two-state
solution with new Palestinian leadership.21 The International Task Force for Reform of the
Palestinian Authority was an unwieldy structure comprising seven sub-committees to address
civil society, financial accountability, local government, development of a market economy,
conduct of elections, judicial reform, and administrative reform. These sub-committees evolved
rather haphazardly as donors provided either personnel or resources in other forms towards one
goal or another that suited their individual development assistance plans. Arafat’s loss of control

21
  Transcript: Bush, Sharon on Mideast Peace, Mitchell Recommendations (Bush calls for breaking "cycle
of violence"), US Embassy, Israel, 26 June 2001.


David Last                                      8/26                                      April 2006
                                             DRAFT
and the consequent loss of legitimacy by the political structures of the Palestinian Authority led to
a shift back to bilateral assistance as the coordination mechanisms collapsed and the humanitarian
situation worsened.22
Figure 7: International Task Force Proposal of June 2002
         The Wolf proposal stemmed from US Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf’s new
coordination and monitoring mission which began work in June of 2003. Wolf grouped the road-
map issues into seven new baskets – three each for issues of primary concern to the Palestinians
and the Israelis, and one shared basket. The Israeli issues were settlers and outposts, release of
Palestinian prisoners, and quality of life (a euphemism for freedom from fear of further attacks).
The issues of primary concern to the Palestinians were security, action against incitement, and
institution building and reform. The shared basket concerned security cooperation, including the
joint police patrols that had run under the Oslo process from 1997 to 2000.23 Wolf worked with
a matrix tracking the actions of the parties as a test of political will, and the idea was that
additional monitoring resources would be made available if there was evidence that they could be
well used. The parties, however, did not pass the test by Washington’s measures, and the
monitoring of progress in the seven baskets never got beyond about twelve American advisors
working directly with Wolf.
Figure 8: Wolf plan of June 2003
         The Zabecki plan of October 2003 was to have been the next step beyond the
International Task Force Proposal. Working for Wolf, General Zabecki planned to establish five
teams of two or three monitors each. Two would cover the West Bank, one the Gaza Strip, one
would roam to complete investigations, and the fifth would be held in reserve. The monitors
would be American, both military and civilian, and with competencies that would permit them to
address the issues listed in the seven baskets of the Wolf plan from the previous June. These
monitoring teams were never established.
Figure 9: Zabecki plan for Monitoring Teams, October 2003
         The overall pattern in the evolution of monitoring mechanisms has been one of resistance
by Israel to all but monitoring which might enhance its own security. Israel has consistently
obstructed any form of third party monitoring or assistance that might hasten or even
acknowledge the possibility of Palestinian statehood. Outside Israel it seems self-evident that the
choice must be between a two-state solution or Palestinian citizenship within a single state
including the occupied territories. Since the latter option would mean demographic submersion
of the Jewish state, only a two-state solution offers security. Yet within Israel there are large
constituencies that have not yet accepted this. This has resulted in prevarication over third party
arrangements, and regularly backing away from security-plus missions to security-only
missions.24
        Chopra concluded in 2003 that the degree of international intervention required for
confidence was already high, but also rising due to declining confidence of the parties with each

22
   Chopra, 2003, 37.
23
   Deborah Heifetz-Yahav, “Non-mediated peacekeeping as a cultural performance of masculinity,”
Challenge and Change for the Military: Social and Cultural Change edited by David Last, Franklin Pinch,
Douglas Bland, and Alan Okros (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 2004), 35-56.
24
   One question to address is whether repeated American reversion to “security only” formulae might
disqualify them as a politically impartial guarantor of a monitoring mechanism. On the other hand, the US
is probably still the only game in town. See Aluf Benn, “American Diplomat takes driver’s seat on road
map tour,” Haaretz, 20 Nov 2005.


David Last                                        9/26                                      April 2006
                                              DRAFT
failure. With McCallum, Attallah and Grinstein he reviewed planning considerations, reporting
on three-way Israeli-Palestinian-international planning talks in the Netherlands.25 Shlomo Brom
considers similar factors from a strictly Israeli point of view.26
         Four other existing frameworks for third party involvement are worth mentioning,
because any monitoring mechanism will have to function with them, or incorporate their efforts,
to be effective. The first is the World Bank’s Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) – an
independent structure composed of all major donors, previously responsible for development, but
playing a role in humanitarian assistance by 2003. The second is the Quartet, consisting of the
US, UN, EU, and Russia, which provides an overlapping hierarchy to oversee Palestinian reform,
with some personnel on the ground. Two other lesser structures do varying degrees of business
with the Quartet. The first is a “Security Committee” consisting of the US, Egypt and Jordan,
responsible for overseeing Palestinian Security Sector Reform, though its involvement has not
been comprehensive.27 Finally, the EU has some in-theatre conflict resolution teams dealing with
micro-security issues on the Palestinian side, which have had some success in negotiating local
ceasefires.28
         How will a new mission work with all these existing structures? Most observers have
noted that the ad hoc incrementalism of the last decade has not led to any improvements in the
conditions that create human insecurity for Palestinians and undermine the security of Israel. A
plausible structure for MARS will permit a security element to manage the risk of physical
violence, while a separate element will address structural violence. This division naturally
parallels the division between Security Council and the General Assembly and its specialised
agencies, The security elements include police, paramilitary and military structures, while the
other element must address governance and democratization (the political dimension), relief,
reconstruction and development (the economic dimension) and reconciliation and cultural revival
(the social-psychological dimension).
Plausible Structure for MARS and related missions
         A plausible command and control structure for MARS can be outlined in three parts.
First, I will consider the political superstructure, which would provide for international oversight
and authorize the mission. Second, I will discuss the organization of civil, military and police
components of the mission. Finally, I will discuss some factors in the geographical division of
the area of responsibility (AOR).
Political Superstructure
         The preceding review of third party assistance suggests that close political oversight by
large and unwieldy organizations, or even by the US alone, might not be in either party’s
interests. Israel is clearly reluctant to accept directive oversight in matters of security. It
generally prefers direct arrangements like those of the MFO or ILMG. Palestinians, on the other
hand, prefer arrangements that offer several potential allies an opportunity to influence the
powerful Israelis. The Palestinian proposal to implement the Tenet plan reflects this conflict
well, by providing for both an international steering group and a senior trilateral council.
However, there is also something to be said for a supervising conference amongst whose larger
membership both resources and allies might be found. The largest membership that might be
25
  Jarat Chopra and Jim McCallum With Amjad Atallah and Gidi Grinstein, “Planning Considerations for
International Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Discussion paper supporting proximity talks,
Economic Cooperation Foundation in Israel, 2003.
26
   Brom, op cit. 2003.
27
   Transcript: Bush, Sharon on Mideast Peace, Mitchell Recommendations (Bush calls for breaking "cycle
of violence"), US Embassy, Israel, 26 June 2001
28
   Avi Shlaim, “Europe and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Oxford Research Group, February 2005.


David Last                                        10/26                                        April 2006
                                                DRAFT
envisioned would probably be the Quartet plus interested parties. Germany, Japan, and
Switzerland, donors to the MFO, might be solicited. The May 2001 model of a steering
committee with two international organizations and eight states may be too unwieldy for political
oversight, let alone steering.29 Its advantage would like in having more potential allies for the
Palestinians, but they have no particular reason to expect useful support from the Arab states that
might participate.
         One way of limiting the damage that might be done by ineffective or inappropriate
political oversight, while making it available to remove roadblocks, is for it to meet only
intermittently with representatives at the Head of Government or Foreign Secretary level. This
eliminates the cost of permanent secretariat and implicates bureaucrats and policy-makers in
supporting countries. The conference, in session for only a few days in any given year, provides
direction to a permanent Steering Committee. This might consist of the Foreign Office desk
officers of key countries, who are available continuously though at a distance. Major donors and
troop-contributing countries would be represented on the Steering Committee, but its purpose is
not to provide daily guidance and direction; it would get involved only at the request of the
Implementing Council.
         Daily direction and operational control of the mission would be exercised by the Director
General, with terms of reference similar to those of the current MFO. The implementing council
of Palestinians and Israelis would keep him on track. In the Steering Committee, as in the
Oversight Conference, Israel and Palestine are minority voices. But in the Implementing Council
they are majority partners. This follows from the logic of the MARS proposal that the entire third
party structure must ultimately serve the interests of the parties if its work is to be durable and
coherent.
         When the interests of the parties appear to be incompatible, the DG and small
international staff may attempt to resolve the differences with the resources available to the
Implementing Council. Failing this, the Steering Committee and Oversight Conference provide
two levels of escalation with additional diplomatic and economic assets available at each level.
More importantly, the Security Sub-Committee (of the Steering Committee) and the Security
Committee (of the Oversight Committee) offer two more intimate forums to which sensitive
security questions can be escalated.
        The Oversight Conference could choose to meet in different locations on each occasion.
The Steering Committee might have a small permanent presence off shore (perhaps Cyprus), but
equally might consist only of virtual links between responsible desk officers. The Implementing
Council, on the other hand, needs a permanent presence, probably in Israel or the West Bank.
         The DG would head what amounts to a small theatre headquarters, bringing together a
small group of expert staff on security, democratization, development and psychological-social
dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. While minimizing the number of
military staff officers, the key cells would probably include coordinators for intelligence,
analysis, information operations and public relations, and support - perhaps about fifty people in
all. The DG’s staff would also provide the direct liaison with the EU Conflict Resolution Teams,
which might usefully continue to operate independently.
         Both the “stick” of police and military forces responsible for security and the “stool” for
political, economic, and social support would report to the implementing council. The DG
therefore has to have both powers of directive command and the confidence of the parties. It
must be clear that the Force Commander operates under the orders of the DG, and with the
confidence of the parties. But at the same time, the parties cannot arbitrarily withdraw their

29
     Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, Norway, US, UN, EU.


David Last                                         11/26                                 April 2006
                                            DRAFT
consent for operations, or the Force Commander will be put in impossible situations and troops
under his command will be placed in danger. This is a recipe for failure.
         We must now address the fundamental asymmetry of capacity and objectives between
Israel and the Palestinians. Israel is cohesive and powerful with no immediate threats to state
security, while the Palestinians are weak and divided and their territory enjoys neither the status
nor the security of a state. Under the Chairmanship of an impartial third party, the parties deal
with each other ostensibly as equals. Of course, Israel can always draw on the superior state
power including intelligence and close relations with a superpower. The Palestinians, on the
other hand, can resort to denying control over spoilers, which may often be true. They may also
choose to forsake the smaller security forums for larger the larger Committee and Conference in
which resources for nation-building may be offered up as incentives, but in which the Palestinians
may have greater leverage.
         The Security Subcommittee of the Steering Committee might work directly with the
informal “Security Committee” consisting of the US, Egypt and Jordan, engaged in overseeing
Palestinian Security Sector Reform. The plenary body of the Steering Committee and perhaps of
the Oversight Conference could deal directly with representatives of the World Bank and the
IMF, although it may more useful for the Peace Implementation Council at the operational level
to work with the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) of the World Bank, established to ensure
efficient use of development resources.30
        Figure 10: Simplified Structure of MARS about here
Components of the Mission
         Moving to the operational level, we would expect the security “stick” to operate as a
unified structure under an experienced force commander with an effective professional staff. The
key components would be a force, observers, and a civilian police element. A paramilitary force
like the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in Bosnia-Herzegovina might be attached either to
CIVPOL, as the polish riot police was in Eastern Slavonia, or to the Force, as the MSU was in
Sarajevo. However since both the military force and the Commissioner CIVPOL would be
expected to report to the Force Commander, it probably doesn’t matter much. It would also be
entirely appropriate for the monitoring and observation component under the Chief Military
Observer (CMO) to include civilians, and perhaps even to be headed by a civilian with the right
combination of security and intelligence experience. The Civilian Observation Unit of the MFO
and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) provide useful precedents here.
        The Deputy Force Commander, or an analogous position, would serve to keep the stick
and stool working together, in a sort of “chief of staff” capacity. With the Force Commander
occupying a strategic leadership role for three disparate sets of assets, a subordinate commander,
perhaps a Commander CJSOTF,31 would manage the operations of the Force. We assume that the
force would operate under rule of law, in a constabulary rather than a combat mode, and therefore
even in counter-terrorist operations would be responsible for limited and proportionate use of
force and preservation of evidence. The Counter Terrorist and Special Operations Forces models
combine to provide the best idea of what much of this force might look like.
         As we move down into the individual regions (discussed below) there might be a wide
variety of conventional and special troops, working in close coordination with police and
30
   Elena Peresso, “Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of the World Bank for the West Bank and Gaza (AHLC)”
Rome, December 10, 2003 – http://web.worldbank.org
31
   The American term Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) conveys the idea of
special operations and counter-terrorism assets deployed in a theatre, but it does not rule out the
employment of conventional units as well.


David Last                                     12/26                                     April 2006
                                           DRAFT
gendarme-type units. For example, we can image border control gendarme specialists on the
Gaza-Egypt frontier, an international police force with a specialized counter-terrorist back up in
Jerusalem, conventional monitoring and patrolling along much of the frontier, with investigation
and civilian observation playing a major role along the arterial routes through the Occupied
Territories and into Israel itself. Within each region we would expect to see not just variety, but
experimentation and continuous evaluation of operational effectiveness. For example, we might
find that a visible armed presence calms some areas, but exacerbates tensions in others.
Community police tactics might build effective relations in some regions, but fail to produce
results in others. Despite demanding high levels of cultural sensitivity, linguistic competence,
and professional expertise, we might not achieve these levels, and we have to acknowledge that
even with the best people and structures, the tactics must adapt to the situation.
        Figure 11: Detailed MARS Structure
        It is not immediately apparent how extensive the roles of third party security forces
should be. Experimentation implies that the rules of engagement, tactics, techniques and
procedures, will change by both time and location, to determine how effective different
approaches are.
         The credibility and effectiveness of this force, in all its elements, is contingent upon the
highest standards of professionalism. However, the force will have to rely on volunteer
contributions from the international community. There will inevitably be misfits, as there are in
any NATO or UN mission. Usually, multinational headquarters have to work with a certain
proportion of dysfunctional members. This is part of the friction that makes the simple things
hard. The label “placebo mission” on the organization chart suggests that there should be places
where these people can be collected without harm to the mission, in the organizational equivalent
of a biological appendix or mechanical lint trap. When the parties evince lack of confidence in
particular individuals, or when it is apparent that they are not up to their duties, they might be
temporarily (or terminally) assigned to the placebo mission. This can also be a useful device for
diverting external interference along harmless avenues. Placebo missions should be dispersed in
the organization and cunningly labelled to avoid detection by their inmates. There is also the risk
of “appendicitis” if an enthusiastic cell gets out of control, so this obviously takes some
leadership and organizational management skills.
         The Civilian Police mission must be an integral part of the security “stick” rather than
taking its usual place on the political side of the mission. This is both because the military is
operating in a largely constabulary role and because effective civilian policing is essential to the
level of security that will mark success of the mission. The CIVPOL will not have “original
jurisdiction” – powers of arrest and detention. This will remain with the parties. However, it may
be necessary to provide international “stiffening” to the Palestinian police, by employing foreign
police officials with unimpeachable credentials at key positions within the Palestinian police
structure, integrated into the emerging mechanisms of civilian oversight for the nascent
Palestinian state. This has been done successfully in Sierra Leone, where the Chief
Superintendent of Police, reporting directly to the Sierra Leonean Minister, was a British career
police officer on a five year contract, paid by the UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID) and responsible to DFID for mentoring and development as well as to the
Minister for operational matters. The work of a monitoring and training CIVPOL mission is
much simplified by having partners on the inside of the target police force. The common
language of English facilitated the Sierra Leonean case. Here again there is room for some




David Last                                     13/26                                     April 2006
                                            DRAFT
experimentation in the Palestinian case. The Palestinian Diaspora may be a source of recruits,
either trained or waiting to be trained, but with a degree of international commitment.32
         The political, economic and social legs of the development “stool” do not necessarily
correspond to specific organizations, and this has been a source of difficulties in other missions.
The problem of assigning a particular organization to the role is that the organizations and their
prior cultures take over the function and do what they are accustomed to doing, whether that is
what the mission really calls for or not. For example, the UN Relief, Refugees and Works
Agency (UNRRWA) would probably not be a good candidate to take over the combination of
political and social work that needs to be done, because it has vested interests in particular
outcomes, employees who have been identified with Hamas, and a long track record of inertia
and dissatisfaction on both sides. Listing the alphabet soup of international and non-
governmental organizations provides a wide array of organizations to choose from, but each of
these should be seen as contractors rather than a framework. The model of the Office of the High
Representative in Sarajevo should probably be followed to provide a framework. But to get the
balance right, the Ramallah equivalent (perhaps a consul general?) should have sufficient
resources to contract and direct international organizations. While we should generally be
circumspect about eliminating organizations, on the grounds that most of them do some good
some of the time, a case might be made here for consolidation of resources.
         The political component of the mission entails political capacity building and human
rights monitoring. For capacity building at the national level (the nascent Palestinian government
in Ramallah), we need mechanisms to build the capacity of the executive, legislative, judicial, and
administrative functions of government. Each of these might be an office of the Head of Political
Affairs, with links to external resources. Multinational assistance is a double-edged sword here,
because the parts have to work together; it may not be functional to have the French develop
courts and judges, while the British provide training for lawyers and police. Language is critical,
and will have a big impact on the character of the institutions. If Arabic is the official language
of the state, it will constrain the quality and quantity of political capacity building, and shape
through materials available the education of the crucial next generations. If the Palestinians are
clever, they might select English as a second official language. If they are very clever, they might
choose Hebrew; this might be one of the most dangerous things that they could do for the long-
term security of Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, and would call for a major effort on Israel’s
part to contribute to social and political capacity building.
         Human rights monitoring is a function that should be included with political capacity
building, with potential Palestinian spoilers as its primary target. Israeli abuses of Palestinian
human rights are widespread, well documented, and the targets of well-organized lobbies within
Israel and abroad such as Peace Now and Machsom Watch. The Human Rights monitoring
function for Israeli-on-Palestinian abuse can be nominal or in the form of liaison with human
rights groups, and the Israeli government can be held to account to bring it to heel. Much more
difficult is the problem of Palestinian-on-Palestinian abuse, which will stunt political
development in more serious and lasting ways than can Israeli abuse. Building self-sustaining
mechanisms to check the long-standing violence of militants against their own population will be
the central challenge of the human rights monitoring function. This can only be done from the
ground up, community by community, and with international assistance. It will require close
integration with the resources available for social assistance.



32
  Roy Thomas, “Does tapping the Diasporas for Recruits Provide an Advantage in Policing? The
Experience of the Canadian Trained Haitians (CTH)” forthcoming in Police and Society, 2006. There are
reservations about tapping Diasporas, but Haiti and Palestine may prove to be different.


David Last                                      14/26                                     April 2006
                                            DRAFT
          The psychological and social component of post-conflict reconstruction is the most
frequently omitted or under-resourced yet is probably the single most important determinant of
whether peace lasts. Free media, mass communications, popular culture, sport, and recreation are
all essential elements of the cultural and social regeneration that must accompany nation building.
The dilemma here is that simply providing these things as packages from an outside source is
both unaffordable, and fails to meet the real need. Only home grown institutions work. So what
role is there for international assistance? A community based approach might start with
neighbourhood facilitators. The concept of neighbourhood facilitators was tested in a field
experiment in Bosnia in 1997-1998 to develop a structure for “peace building platoons”.33 Local
candidates from a community are screened, selected, trained, and deployed in mixed
international-local teams to work out of a community centre, solving problems and mobilizing
international resources to support the needs of the community. They can serve as grass-roots
conflict-resolvers when two communities (such as settlers and Palestinians) clash. Community
centres (perhaps one per 100 thousand) with about five teams per centre provide a framework for
social regeneration. As with other aspects of the command and control structure, there is scope
for experimentation here. Leadership is likely the key, and a sufficient budget to hire the right
people and give them resources to serve the community can undermine the support base for
militants. The extent to which the neighbourhood facilitation network is secular rather than
Islamic will vary by region, in order to compete effectively with its more radical alternatives.
Community centres established under the Head of Social Affairs could become the tactical-level
“foot on the ground” for local capacity building, human rights information, employment
generation and other activities within the development sphere. Under some circumstances, they
could be useful points of contact for the third party security forces, although there will be times
and places at which it will be essential to keep them completely separate for the security of the
civilians working there.
         While community-based initiatives are indispensable, social reconstruction will require
state-level and international initiatives as well. Support for public and private broadcasting, and
for national news media representing international events will help media institutions move
beyond representations of victimhood, but will need national equivalents of bodies like the
Canadian Radio and Television Council (CRTC) to provide guidelines. Rather than such bodies
falling under the Head of Social Affairs directly, we might envision a small liaison and technical
assistance staff to work with the Palestinian authorities, and a secondment arrangement similar to
that described above for police. If the politically neutral and reliable local talent cannot be found,
it might be hired internationally and integrated in the Palestinian context with a mentoring role.
         Popular culture, sport, and recreation are probably the easiest programmes to instigate,
given some international resources. Here, the objective should be to foster athletic and
recreational groups as civil society organizations, rather than supplicants to a ministry of sport.
Since the more diverse the sources of funds the better, the liaison cell for this function might have
primarily a fund-raising function. There is some experience from the various post-1975 Helsinki
Forum initiatives in the use of sport and culture for people-to-people confidence building, and
this could be built into the structure by providing embedded links with appropriate NGOs from
Israel and other Arab states. In view of the potential for such internationalisation to be exploited
by spoilers, there might be pressure for a covert intelligence element. Considering the risk that
this could completely discredit the program, transparency would be preferred.



33
  Gary Shapiro of the Vermont-based NGO Conflict Resolution Catalysts developed the concept that was
tested. Reported in David Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Theory, Cases, Experiments and
Solutions” Royal Military College of Canada, working paper 99/01, 1999.


David Last                                      15/26                                     April 2006
                                             DRAFT
       If existing UN commitments to UNRRWA are redirected (for example, by abolishing
UNRRWA) then the UNHCR might become the prime contractor for short-term relief and
humanitarian assistance with an end-date, and a connection to the development efforts of the
Economic Mission.
         The Economic Mission to support reconstruction and development might follow the
prescriptions of World Bank advisors Gerson and Colletta, following a free market model.34
They advocate a “Peace Implementation Council” that brings together members of the
international organization, profit and non-profit communities, with representatives of the affected
country. The Peace Implementation Council provides a framework of rules and permissions that
satisfy the minimum requirements for direct foreign investment. Government-sponsored NGOs
provide relief (perhaps as implementing partners for international organizations like ECHO) and
privately backed development initiatives with political guarantees take on major employment
projects.35 The PIC might be chaired by the Head of Economic Affairs for semi-weekly or more
frequent meetings, but would have access to escalation to resolve problems or seek additional
enabling resources. Like political and social affairs, it would be more likely to escalate through
the larger multinational bodies, than through the smaller security bodies. The PIC would probably
be the main point of contact and source of information for the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of the
World Bank. Loan guarantees for major infrastructure development projects, and possibly
currency stabilization will be an important part of economic revitalization. The PIC will work
with the IMF, World Bank, and donors to set the right climate.
         While the main role of the PIC is to craft political guarantees, congruent with the interests
of the parties, which will foster economic revitalization, it has a secondary role as cheerleader and
salesman to drum up foreign interest and investment. A subsidiary body consisting primarily of
locals – the Business Development Council - aids it in this. The Business development council
attempts to identify and remove obstacles to local development. The more international
connections it keeps open, the more resources it is likely to be able to deploy to assist its
members to overcome obstacles, including developing markets and export strategies, finding new
sources of supply, and shutting down restrictive practices that limit opportunity. The Business
Development Community would work with local chambers of commerce. Where there are none,
it would assist to establish them. Community centres established by the Head of Social Affairs
could act as a locus for employment generation projects, with UNDP micro financing, guided by
local chambers of commerce.
         Efforts to include business in development strategies have not been without controversy.
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2004 the UN announced a
series of partnerships including one between UNICEF and McDonald’s on children’s vaccination,
and another between the UNDP and Monsanto. Although the initiatives had the support of the
governments of the US and the UK, the UK’s own advisor on sustainable development, Sir
Jonathan Porritt, criticized them as “naïve”. There are numerous specific objections related to
conflict of interest, but the central problem concerns the extent to which large multinational
companies operate for their own interests rather than for the public good. Even strong states have
difficulty regulating them; weak states have no hope of doing so.36 This suggests an additional
role for the PIC and Head of Economic Affairs. They must guard against possible exploitation
that could lead to disenchantment with modernity and markets, reinforcing Islamist tendencies.


34
   Allan Gerson and Nat J. Colletta. 2002. Privatizing Peace: From Conflict to Security. (Ardsley, NY:
Transnational Publishers).
35
   Gerson and Colletta, 2002, chapter 13.
36
   Simon Zadek, “Looking Back on Johannesburg,” Green Money Journal, Summer 2005, 13:4, Number
55, pp. 1-2.


David Last                                       16/26                                      April 2006
                                               DRAFT
In this, they will need close cooperation with the Social Mission, particularly from the
Community Centres.
         The UN Development Program could play a major role within the Economic Mission, or
loosely in parallel with it. The latter has been more characteristic of its role in other missions.
Providing micro loans to encourage local employment, and particularly to provide livelihoods for
demobilizing fighters, is an established UNDP role. In the Palestinian case, the entire male
population has been affected by the conflict, even if they have not all been fighters; it is difficult
to distinguish target groups, and the simplest solution might be to include them all, as has been
the practice in some other conflicts. Larger funds are available for sector development. Here
there is need for some strategic thinking. Agriculture might be the logical sector to develop, but
that means water, and water is a source of conflict. Any agricultural development plan will
require a water plan, and a plan to manage future decisions about water.37 Diaspora tourism could
be very valuable (both for the tourist dollars, and for support in the larger international
community), and would have to be tied to Israeli guarantees of laissez-passer. Construction,
transport, and light industry are other sectors awaiting development. Iraq could yet be an engine
for regional change, by providing economic opportunity, and if it is likely to become one, then
liaison with Coalition and Iraqi authorities might be a useful part of the PIC responsibilities.
Geographical Division of the Area of Operations
          Like the details of the mission components, the geographical boundaries will have to be
assessed by a more comprehensive estimate than can be provided in this discussion paper. Some
of the factors that should be considered in such an estimate have been raised by Israeli and
Palestinian representatives in Track II discussions.38 Some factors influencing the placement of
boundaries include demographic realities including settlements and arterial routes, Palestinian
leadership and the territorial divisions of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli security fence, and
the status and security of borders with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. The sensitivity of
airspace and the economic importance of coastlines must also feature in calculations of
boundaries. Span of control suggests at least three regions – north, central, and southern – with
some division of additional responsibilities between them. This division leaves the central region
with the overwhelming majority of operational problems, and suggests a very asymmetrical
division of assets. One way to lighten the load might be to treat Jerusalem as a separate region,
but it is not clear that it is readily divisible from the surrounding area. Figure 13 suggests a
division of tasks between three regions.
         Figure12: Suggested Areas of Responsibility


Coordination Mechanisms
         The basic structure proposed for multi-level coordination is the tripartite special tribunal
or joint commission. The model for this is the Joint Military Commission or Joint Civil
Commission typical of transitional missions under the UN, NATO, and OSCE. The concept
follows from the starting assumption of the Truman Centre proposal – that the monitoring
apparatus must be responsive and accountable to the parties. We would not expect routine
agreement between the parties; therefore the third party in each case must have resources at its
disposal and mechanisms for escalation in order to break deadlocks.


37
   It might require a regional body bringing in Turkey, which might have other strategic interests in the
conflict.
38
   Chopra et al, 2003



David Last                                         17/26                                        April 2006
                                             DRAFT
        Figure 13: Coordination Structure
         Figure 14 illustrates a coordination structure controlled by the DG that would be
superimposed on the other components of the mission. Consisting of not many more than 30
experienced diplomats or senior officers, it would have a trouble-shooting or problem-solving
function for all aspects of the mission. The key to success would be consistent and effective
interlocutors on both sides. To achieve this, some investment must be made in preparation and
training of key Israeli and Palestinian officials.
         The coordination structure would augment rather than supplanting the normal day-to-day
interactions of a force, observers, and nation building mission, who daily work would involve the
parties. How would this work in practice? Starting on the development side, consider a
community centre in a Palestinian town near the Security Fence. The community experiences
about 50 percent unemployment,39 restricted water supply, isolation from essential services,
contested land transfers (disputed legality of ownership),40 alienation from the Palestinian
Authority and factional disputes that render local government dysfunctional.41 There is an
underground economy, high drug use among youth, and some intimidation to recruit for extremist
factions. A heavy Israeli security presence restricts even local movement, and reprisals for attacks
have resulted in destruction of houses resulting in repeated confrontations with rock-throwing
youths.
        In this scenario, a civilian organizer from the Social Mission might arrive in the town to
begin selection and training of neighbourhood facilitators. If she is making any progress, she
might expect threats to herself or her recruits. She would report these threats immediately on the
daily secure electronic submission. The daily coordinating conference of the regional
headquarters (consisting of a nucleus of perhaps three or four people Central Region – the West
Bank) would flag this as urgent because of risk to staff, and pass the information immediately by
secure electronic means to security coordinator for the West Bank (under the Force Commander’s
authority). Local police would be asked to investigate, but there would be little confidence that
this would resolve the issue. Intelligence would assess the threat – if deemed serious or
imminent, a SOF or CT team might be assigned to the town to stake out potential culprits. At the
same time, police monitors might be dispatched to spur the local police to effective action.
Should they shirk their responsibilities, powers of removal might be invoked (as they have been
by the Office of the High representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Thus the incident is used to
smoke out spoilers and bolster local police, while protecting the advancement of the Social
Mission.
         Having established a community centre, three to five teams of two or three locally
engaged neighbourhood facilitators would assist with problem solving and development
activities. The network of local facilitators is a leadership framework, and can be compared to
the cell structure of an insurgency, but with more openness, and a reversal of the security-
development priorities typical in an insurgency. Like the cells of an insurgency, it seizes on
issues of popular concern, mobilizes people and matches them to available resources, serves as a

39
   International Labour Organization, “Situation of Palestinian workers continues to deteriorate” Arab
Media Internet Network, 27 May 2005 “One in three young persons aged 15-24 years and over half of
those aged 25-29 years are in forced idleness, that is neither studying nor in employment…”
40
   Hadas Ziv, The Bureaucracy of Occupation: the District Civil Liaison Offices. Joint report of
MachsomWatch and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, Translation and editing by Susan Weingarten.
Jerusalem, 2004.
41
   Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information, “The New Palestinian Challenge – Effective
Governance -Toward the Creation of a New and Independent Palestinian Strategy,” Arab Media Internet
Network, 14 June 2005.


David Last                                       18/26                                      April 2006
                                                DRAFT
network for collecting “soft” intelligence, and enables the deployment and employment of other
resources. Employment has been identified as central in this town, so several of the teams will
focus on it. One might work with UNDP to put groups together to qualify for mutually
guaranteed micro financing. Another might work with the Chamber of Commerce (establishing
one, if necessary) to develop business opportunities. Facing obstacles in getting materials or
products across the Jordanian border, the community centre might escalate through the regional
council to the Economic Committee of the Implementation Council. The liaison officer in Jordan
might take it on, helping to remove obstacles. There is scope to escalate to the Steering
Committee and the Oversight Conference if the obstacles prove intractable.
          The scenario might continue with signs of economic progress and social regeneration
bringing renewed opposition. Some might come from anti-modern, anti-market forces and some
might come from Israeli elements opposed to the development of a Palestinian state. One can
imagine these sources of opposition reinforcing each other – Islamist unrest on the Palestinian
side provides an excuse to shut down the traffic through the security fence, eliminating a market
and employment opportunities. The issue would be escalated to the Central Region Council,
where the Palestinian representative would wish to treat it as an economic issue, while the Israeli
representative would claim that it is a security issue. Israel might choose to play the linkage
game, refusing to deal on the security fence closure until another issue was addressed, such as
illegal Palestinians in East Jerusalem.42 The linkage issue could be derailed by passing it up to
the Implementing Council or higher, while using press releases or other less public
announcements to indicate the international mission’s position. The Force might agree to
temporarily take control of the security fence checkpoint as a face saving measure (allowing
Israeli leaders to blame the internationals – of course this could backfire if a breach occurred on
the Force’s watch). After a short period of international control, it might be turned back to the
Israelis under international monitoring to ensure that there is no further unwarranted restriction of
movement. The security committee, or a local tribunal, might be involved in refining the security
instructions or developing written protocols to prevent repeated escalation.
Conclusion
         Like any third party intervention, it can only work with the cooperation and assistance of
the parties to the conflict. The Truman Centre proposal for a Monitoring Apparatus for Regional
Security (MARS) suggests one way in which the asymmetry of the parties might be overcome,
and this paper has suggested some of the structures that might give form to MARS. The two
linked structures outlined here provide for a security “stick” to meet Israeli objectives, and a
development “stool” with political, social, and economic legs, to meet Palestinian objectives.
Each structure has a series of steps for escalation. The security ladder consists only of
Palestinians, Israelis, and a single powerful guarantor. The development ladder consists of larger
bodies within which the Palestinians should be able to mobilize allies and seek resources.
         The scenarios above illustrate how a command and control structure might work in
practice. It is more complex and considerably larger and more expensive than the other
alternatives to the MFO considered in the first part of the paper. In common with many of them,
it combines the security function sought by Israel with the development function essential for a
Palestinian state. If Israel is not serious about permitting the growth of a separate Palestinian
state, then it will not work. If Palestinians are not serious about coexisting with the state of Israel,
then it will not work. But given good faith on both sides, adequate resources, good luck, and
patience, a command and control structure similar to the one outlined here might make a useful
contribution to disengagement and coexistence.


42
     Paul Findley, “Ethnic Cleansing in Jerusalem, Israeli Style” Arab Media Internet Network, 12 Jul 2005.


David Last                                          19/26                                       April 2006
                                             DRAFT
      Figure 1: Organization of MFO



                                        Figure 1: Organization of MFO


                                                     DG

                                   LO Tel Aviv               LO Cairo


                         Force                   Observers              Support


                          Infantry BN             Civilian                  Aviation
                              US              Observation Unity             France
                                                  (COU)

                          Infantry BN                                    Coastal Patrol
                              Fiji                                           Italy


                          Infantry BN                                         MP
                           Columbia                                         Hungary


                                                                            Transport
                                                                            Uruguay


                                                                            Logistics
                                                                              US




      Fig 2: Mitchell




                                        Figure 2: Mitchell Plan, May 2001


                                               Steering Committee


                                 Security          Settlements      Economic and
                                                                     Civil Affairs




David Last                                        20/26                                   April 2006
                                            DRAFT
      Fig 3: Tenet




                                    Figure 3: Tenet Plan of June 2001


                                             Political Steering
                                               Committee


                     Security                 Settlements             Economic and Civil Affairs
                 Sub-Committee               Sub-Committee                Sub-Committee
                 (Israel-CIA-PA)




      Fig 4: Contact group




                              Figure 4: Contact Group Proposal, July 2001


                                              International
                                             Contact Group

                                   Israeli                  Palestinian
                               Security experts           Security experts


                                         US Counter-terrorism
                                          technical experts




David Last                                        21/26                                            April 2006
                                                       DRAFT
      Fig 5: Palestinian




                                    Figure 5: Palestinian Proposal, March 2002


                                              International Steering Group
                                                      (Quartet plus)


                                        Senior Trilateral Security Committee
                                                   (US, Israel, PA)


              Security Sub-Committe           Settlements Sub-Committee                       Economics & Civil Affairs
                                                                                                  Sub-Committee




      Fig 6: Zinni




                                                Figure 6: Zinni Plan of April 2002


                                              Senior Trilateral Security Committee
                                                         (Israel, US, PA)


                                       Security                                 Geographical
                            (arrests, prisons, weapons)             (redeployment, response, investigations)

                                   Incitement                                       "Others"
                             (addressing complaints)                 settlements, economic, and civil affairs




David Last                                                  22/26                                                         April 2006
                                                       DRAFT
      Fig 7: State Dept




                                            Figure 7: State Department Plan, June 2002


                                                            Quartet Principals


                                                             Quartet Envoys


                                                          Quartet Committee
                                          (International Task Force on Palestinian Reform)


               Civil Society               Local government           Financial Accountability        Administrative reform

              Market economy                    Elections                  Judicial reform




      Fig 8: Wolf




                                                Figure 8: Wolf Proposal, June 2003


                                                             Wolf and Staff


                Israeli "baskets"                        Shared "baskets"                    Palestinian "baskets"


                 settlements and outposts              security cooperation                              security

                      prisoner release                                                                anti-incitement

                        quality of life                                                       institution-building and reform




David Last                                                      23/26                                                           April 2006
                                             DRAFT
      Fig 9: Zabecki




                                    Figure 9: Zabecki Plan, October 2003


                                                  Zabecki
                                                  and staff


              Team 1           Team 2             Team 3                  Team 4           Team 5
             West Bank        West Bank          Gaza Strip           Rapid Response       Reserve




      Fig 10: Simplified MARS




                                   Figure 10: Simplified MARS structure


                                            Oversight Conference


                                            Steering Committee


                                            Implementing Council
                                                   DG


                          Force Commander                              Consul General


                  Force      Observers      CivPol        Political        Social       Economic
                                                          mission          mission       Mission




David Last                                        24/26                                              April 2006
                                                                          DRAFT
      Fig 11 : Detailed MARS (reproduce full page)

                                                                               Figure 11: Proposed MARS Structure


                                                                                    Oversight Conference
                                                                                     (Quartet plus, HoG)

                                                                   Security Committee



                                                                                     Steering Committee
                                                                                    (Quartet plus, ForMin)

                                                                  Securty Sub-Committee



                                                                                    Implementing Council
                                                                                         (DG chairs)

                                                                         DG Staff


                                         Force Commander                                                                                    Consul General

                                    HQ                      DFC                                                                   Staff



                       COS                    CMO                     Comm CivPol                        political mission                    Social Mission                      Economic Mission
                                                                                                      Head of Political Affairs            Head of Social Affairs              Head of Economic Affairs


                             SOF                  Liaison                     Liaison                                  HR                                 HCR                     Peace implementation council
                                                                                                                                                    short term relief                 govt, profit, non-profit

                         CT Elms                  Reserve                    SSR & Trg                               Liaison                            Liaison                              Liaison


                         Region 1                Region 1                    Region 1                               Region 1                           Region 1                             Region 1


                         Region 2                Region 2                    Region 2                               Region 2                           Region 2                             Region 2


                         Region 3                Region 3                    Region 3                               Region 3                           Region 3                             Region 3


                         Support                                             PM-"MSU"                               Capacity                      Social regeneration            Business Development Council
                                                                                                                    Building                                                        Chambers of Commerce

                                                                                                                                                                                            UNDP
                                                                                                              Exectuive development               mass communication
                                                                                                                                                                                     Employment Generation
                                                                                                              Legislative development             free media
                                                                                                              Administrative development          popular culture
                                                                                                              Judicial development                sport and recreation                 micro-finance
                                                                                                                                                  neighbourhood facilitation           sectoral development
                                                                                                                                                                                       loan guarantees
                                                                                                                                                                                       currency stabilization




      Fig 12: suggested areas of responsibility

                                              Figure 12: Suggested Areas of Responsibility


             Lebanon
             Syria
                                         North
             Golan
             Coast

                                                                                                                                                                                         Jordan

         Egypt                                                                                                                             Central                                       West Bank

         Gaza                            South                                                                                                                                           Jerusalem

         G-WB corridor                                                                                                                                                                   Airspace




David Last                                                                              25/26                                                                                                                    April 2006
                                                               DRAFT
      Figure 13: Coordination Structure




                                                                 Figure 13: Coordination Structure


                                                                     Implementation Council
                                                                              (4)

                                                              LO Beirut                    LO Amman


                                                              LO Cairo                   LO Damascus


                                                       LO Washington                      LO New York


                                                         LO Brussels                           OIC LO



                         security committee         governance committee                social committee            economic committee
                                  (2)                        (2)                                (2)                         (2)



                                   Southern Region Council            Central Region Council         Northern Region Council
                                             (7)                                (7)                            (7)


                                        Sinai/Egypt                       Jordan                         Syria
                                        Gaza                              North WB                       Lebanon
                                        Interior (corridor)               Central WB                     Golan
                                        Coast (Gulf)                      Southern WB                    Coast, Mediterranean
                                                                          Air space




David Last                                                                26/26                                                          April 2006