Docstoc

The Israeli-Palestinian Process and Regional Instability

Document Sample
The Israeli-Palestinian Process and Regional Instability Powered By Docstoc
					                   1 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability:
                        An Assessment

                                           By Goor Tsalalyachin


                                           Executive Summary

 •   Conflicting interests and policies in the Middle East might hinder Israel and the Palestinian
     Authority from concluding negotiations with a peace pact, despite this being their proclaimed
     interest.

 •   Not withstanding the importance of domestic politics, careful attention should be given to the
     broader regional context in which the current process is taking place.

 •   Iran continues to play a negative role also in relation to the peace process. Teheran rejects the
     renewal of the negotiations and might try to derail the process through one of its proxies,
     increasing the threat of tensions between Israel and Lebanon and the likelihood of hostile
     activities in and around the Gaza strip and the Sinai area.

 •   As a result, the threat of tensions between Israel and Lebanon as well as the likelihood of hostile
     activities in and around the Gaza strip and the Sinai area might have increased. A failure of the
     Israeli-Palestinian process may also increase instability in neighbouring countries such as Egypt
     and Jordan.

 •   A failure of the Israeli-Palestinian process might increase instability in neighboring countries as
     Egypt and Jordan.

 •   Turkey’s leaning towards Islamism strengthens radical Hamas at the expense of the more
     moderate Palestinian Authority.

 •   Potential changes in the regional balance of military power increase the potential of regional
     tension. Russian and Iranian arms increase regional instability, especially when considering such
     weapon systems that are perceived by Israel as posing a serious threat — thus raising the
     possibility of pre-emptive interception.

 •   Key international actors must play a constructive role in reducing regional friction, thus
     increasing the stability and the probability of a successful peace process between Israel and the
     Palestinians.


                                                                                                       October, 2010
                      2 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment




      The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability:
                              An Assessment


Preface

Perhaps the only thing that both the Palestinians and Israelis could easily agree on is the deep sense
of scepticism they share while embarking on the latest episode of the ever-stretching saga, known
as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the failure of too many previous attempts to resolve the
conflict, the vision laid out by President Obama is an ambitious one. ‘These negotiations are
intended to resolve all final status issues’, Barack Obama declared at the White House, shortly
before the opening of the peace talks. ‘The goal is a settlement, negotiated between the parties, that
ends the occupation which began in 1967 and results in the emergence of an independent,
democratic and viable Palestinian state, living side by side in peace and security with a Jewish state
of Israel and its other neighbors. That’s the vision we are pursuing.’ 1

The tension over the question of extending the temporary moratorium on Israeli settlement activities
in the West Bank presents more difficulties for the negotiating parties. Despite their proclaimed
intention to resume effective and direct negotiations, Israel and the Palestinians are both employed
in and argument over the issue of settlement freeze and not in substantial negotiations on the core
issues of the final status agreement.

This only underlines how high the stakes are for all parties involved, including a risk to President
Obama’s reputation as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who, perhaps stressfully, had already received
the prestigious peace-prize even before plunging into the tiresome peace-process. The stakes are
also high not only for the negotiating leaders but also for their people. A failure of the process is
only likely to ignite more violence, pushing any chance of resolving the conflict further away.

More violence between Israel and the Palestinians is also a potential risk for regional security, given
the fragility of some of the more moderate regimes in the Middle East — in contrast to the thriving
radical elements. It is therefore a particularly demanding challenge for the negotiating parties. But
it is also a demanding challenge for all other international actors who wish to see the process
succeed.

At the heart of the current diplomatic process lies a rather familiar paradox. However, too often it is
overlooked by many who employ a more simplistic prism, reflecting a narrower perception while
examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in almost complete disconnection from its regional
context.

1
  The White House, 1 September, 2010, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by the President in the Rose Garden
after Bilateral Meetings
                   3 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment




This paper does not offer a historical review of the Conflict, nor does it analyse the numerous
previous attempts to resolve it. The purpose of this work is to present the potential danger of the
paradox — as it will be described in the following pages. The aim is to place the current process
and the said paradox in a broad and regional context, hopefully invigorating broader thinking on a
specific problem.

The paper presented here is based on research and analysis of information obtained from open
sources. The responsibility for any inaccuracies or errors rests solely with the author of this
document.
                    4 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


1. Introducing the Paradox
The origins of the paradox, as presented below, derive from the complex geo-politics of the Middle
East, the conflicting interests and policies of regional and international actors. The sum of these
conflicting interests and policies might impose such conditions on the Israeli government and on the
Palestinian Authority, where they might resort to act against their own proclaimed interest of
concluding the negotiations with a peace pact. Yet, they will do so with great conviction and
decisiveness. The risk from the materialization of this paradox might be too high, first and
foremost for Israeli and Palestinian civilians, as well as for the regional and international security.

What is the Paradox? At the present time, not ignoring the variants and the obvious reservations, it
is fair to suggest that both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government strategically assess
that pursuing a political settlement is the preferable course of action — or at least present it as their
proclaimed interest. Be that the preferable way, it is surely not the easy way. For both the Israeli
Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority are maneuvering between several
pressuring forces. On the one hand, both leaders face an international demand to resume effective
negotiations that will produce a peace treaty. But, on the other hand, both leaders are subjected to
domestic political pressures, notably from those who oppose any political compromise and reject
the very concept of concessions — territorial and otherwise.

Domestic politics in both societies are fundamental to understanding the Process, the risks and the
prospects of success. However, internal politics and domestic opposition are not the only factor that
might hamper the diplomatic process; nor is it, as this paper argues, necessarily the most acute one.

Whilst the rather conventional approach to examining the conflict uses a narrow prism, almost in
complete disconnection with other critical factors, the reality is far more complex. Greater forces, in
the Middle East and beyond, pay a substantially negative contribution to the region’s fragile
stability. In the context of the renewed peace process, the affects of this negative influence might
generate such developments that will force either side to act and react in a manner that they see as
necessary — but will also be in a sharp contrast to their interests in securing a viable peace accord.
That is the disturbing paradox.

A narrow analysis, or even a lack of recognition in the existence of this paradox, will be particularly
unhelpful by whoever wishes to move the process forward towards the much-desired
comprehensive and lasting political settlement, bringing an end to this everlasting long conflict.
The objective of the following sections in the paper is to examine the key factors that jeopardize the
process and deteriorate the security and stability of the region. They are comprised of a combination
of scholarly analyses and information from a rather wide variety of other primary sources,
providing the grounds for assessing the developments and establishing an informed assessment.
Naturally, this assessment does not pretend to include all of the components shaping current
development, but rather point out some of the most important ones in the relevant setting.

First presented is an examination of the role of Iran in the context of the peace process. It is
followed by a review of additional key factors, yet not all, that shape the political climate and
                  5 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



security environment, emphasizing the importance of the cohesion of the region’s regimes and
potential changes in its balance of military power.
                       6 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


Iran with Hizballah and Hamas as its Proxies

Iran is now investing growing efforts to strengthen its regional influence. Consistent with its
familiar policy and revolutionary doctrine, the Iranian regime rejects the renewal of the
Israel-Palestinian negotiations. Utilizing its proxies, Iran might try to derail the process. A
likely result of such possible developments is a rising tension between Israel and Lebanon, as
well as the likelihood of hostile activities in and around the Gaza strip and the Sinai area
(potentially affecting Aqaba, Eilat and Sham El-Sheikh) - thus increasing the risk to the process’
integrity.

Iran’s role and its contribution to regional instability cannot be overestimated. Its regime has
already made its view on the recent negotiations publicly clear when shortly after the Israeli-
Palestinian peace talks commenced in Washington, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that
the ‘Palestine's issue cannot be resolved through talks with the enemies of the Palestinian nation.
Resisting is the only way to rescue the Palestinians’. 2 A further comment made by an Iranian
diplomat provides another insight into the regime’s line of thinking. Iran’s ambassador to the
Netherlands, Kazem Gharib-Abadi has said in an interview: ‘The so-called Middle East peace talks
cannot succeed because the Palestinian negotiation team is not really the official representative of
the Palestinian people’. 3 Similar messages were repeated during Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to
Lebanon - further discussed in this section.

These two public comments mentioned above, by the President and by one of his diplomats posted
in a European capital, encapsulate two of several pillars in Iran’s foreign policy. First, a support and
cultivation of the so called “resistance”, a euphemism for militant Jihad, which is a fundamental and
a key feature of the Iranian revolutionary doctrine and a means in its quest for regional influence.
The second is the objective of undermining the authority and legitimacy of more moderate or
western oriented Arab/Palestinian leaderships. 4 In this context, Iran is consistent in its aspiration to
position itself as the ultimate defender of the Palestinian cause, to the degree of being ‘more
Palestinian than the Palestinians’. 5 Thus it makes the support, guidance and finance it offers to
radical elements a critical element of its foreign policy, while also serving as a unifying factor in
domestic Iranian politics: the ‘conservatives could demonstrate ‘success’ in confronting Israel and
reformists could display loyalty’. 6

In an unprecedented development, the Palestinian Authority has denounced Iran. In response to
Ahmadinejad’s said declaration, the spokesman of the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Nabil
Abu Rudeineh was sent to comment. ‘He who does not represent the Iranian people, who forged
elections and who suppresses the Iranian people and stole the authority, is not entitled to talk about
Palestine, or the President of Palestine,’ said Nabil Abu Rudeineh. His statement, circulated by the

2
  Reuters, 3 September 2010, ‘Iran's Ahmadinejad calls on Palestinians to fight on’ Parisa Hafezi, Teheran
3
  IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency, 5 September, 2010 ‘Mideast peace talks cannot succeed: Iranian diplomat’
4
  Bar, Shmuel (2009) p. 9-10 also see: IISS (2005) 'Iran's terrorist sponsorship', Strategic Comments, 11: 2, 1-2
5
  Menashri, David (2006) see relevant quotes of Abdollah Nuri and from Arzeshha
6
  ibid
                      7 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



Palestinian News Agency WAFA goes even further: ‘We have fought for Palestine and Jerusalem
and the Palestinian leadership has provided thousands of martyrs and tens of thousands wounded
and prisoners did not repress their people, as did the system of Iran led by Ahmadinejad.’ 7

Motivated by its strong ambition to achieve regional hegemony and in line with its concept of
exporting the Islamic revolution, Iran’s involvement with radical, violent militant groups is well
established. 8 Driven by a mixture of theology and revolutionary politics, Iranian views on the
illegitimacy of any political compromise with Israel, as well as on its very existence, positions itself
closer to Islamist movements such as Hizballah and Hamas than to the Arab nationalism of the
1960s and 1970s. 9 Adding to its continuing defiance in relation to its nuclear program 10 , Iran is a
source of tension, affecting any non-radical regime in the region and far beyond. 11

Against this backdrop, and in light of the recent and projected developments discussed below, it is
not unreasonable to assess that Iran might do its best to derail the peace process. It might do so by
utilizing one or several of the various instruments it has in its tool kit, most likely through its loyal
proxies. The affects may be felt both in the political theatre, and more dangerously in operational
terms, in which Iran has proven to be most capable of — particularly in its support in developing
and arming asymmetric warfare. Such involvement in indirect asymmetric warfare with Israel was
vividly exhibited during the Second Lebanon War of 2006. It has been revealed that Iran and Syria
transferred advanced weapon systems into the hands of Hizballah, which were later used in combat
with Israeli Forces. 12

In this context, distinct attention should be paid to the recent visit of the Iranian President to
Lebanon. In addition to his audience with the Lebanese President Michel Sleiman, Prime Minister
Saad Hariri and Hizballah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, President Ahmadinejad, as
planned, 13 had also visited Bint Jbail in southern Lebanon, just a few kilometres from the Israeli-
Lebanese border. 14

Ahmadinejad’s visit came at tense times, particularly following the August border incident - the
worst since 2006 - in which a force of the Lebanese army opened fire on Israeli soldiers while they
were cutting down a tree in the proximity of the Blue Line, located on the Israeli side of the
border. 15


7
  WAFA , 4 September, 2010 ‘Abu Rdeina: Who Forged Elections, Doesn't Represent Our Irani Friends’
8
  US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2009’, see:
Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism . Also: Kam, Ephraim (2007)
9
  Menashri (2006)
10
   IAEA, 6 September 2010, Report by the Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’. Particularly note p. 10-11
11
   For a recent example, see elaborated MEMRI report on Kuwait, 13 September, 2010
12
   Cordesman H. Anthony (2010) ‘The Arab-Israeli Military Balance’ p. 50
13
   AFP 9 September, 2010 ‘Iran's Ahmadinejad set to visit Lebanon in October’
14
   Al Manar 14, October, 2010 ‘Ahmadinejad from Bint Jbeil: Zionists Will Not Last Long!’
15
   UN News Centre 4 August 2010, ‘ UN steps in to defuse tensions on Israeli-Lebanese border’
                     8 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


Despite the peaceful end of the presidential visit, in contrast to the concerns expressed ahead of it,
the impressive footprints of Iranian influence in Ahmadinejad had left in Lebanon is anything but
peaceful. It was vividly exhibited in the warm welcome festivities in Beirut and beyond, seeing
Ahmadinejad’s portraits, Iranian flags, Hizballah banners and mass rallies in support of Iran. 16
Firstly, it bears an important symbolic significance, considering the fact that President Ahmadinejad
himself is not a frequent visitor to this part of the Middle East - in spite of his strong influence.
Since February 2010 Ahmadinejad has increased his personal presence in the area — holding talks
in Damascus and meeting with his brother in arms, Hizballah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
Still, the October visit to Lebanon was Ahmadinejad’s a first since 2005, and a first since the War
of 2006.

Second, this visit is important beyond the obvious symbolism of Ahmadinejad’s graceful smiles
seen at the massive rally in Bint Jbeil — a point of heavy fighting between IDF soldiers and
Hizballah guerrillas during the War 2006. There’s more in this visit, also beyond Ahmadinejad’s
repetition on the familiar messages on Israel’s destruction and against the United States, 17 and
beyond the perverse tribute he paid to the Lebanese, by declaring that ‘Lebanon is the school of
resistance... and is like a university for jihad’ (emphasis added). 18

Although no clear confirmation is available, careful attentions should be given to any possible
operational implications, as Ahmadinejad’s visit might have had more operational content. Some
evidence of this can be found in news reports and semi-official statements made ahead of the visit.
A Lebanese newspaper recently quoted a communiqué circulated by the Iranian news wire IRNA,
stating that the ‘Lebanese President Michel Sleiman asked Iranian officials to consider selling
advanced military equipment to the Lebanese Army.’ 19 The risk and the possible implications are
further discussed below, in the section on Potential Changes in the Balance of Military Power.
Ahmadinejad’s tête-à-tête with Nasrallah at the Irania Embassy in Beirut just before conclduing his
visit 20 might also bear operational content and, at the very least, should not be considred merely as
an evidence to the strong Hizballah-Iranian conntetion. Naturally, there is no available public
information to prove or refute such a proposition.

Second, the visit illustrate the intense efforts invested by Iran to establish a regional axis under it’s
leadership. References to that can be found in the reports on the refusal of Prime Minister Hariri to
join such an axis — due to the domestic “coexistence formula” that does not allow Lebanon to join
Iran. 21 Another reference can be found in the language and terminology used by PRESS TV, an
Iranian television propaganda arm in Britain, referring to the elements comprising this axis -



16
   BBC News Online ,13 October 2010, ‘Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 'backs united Lebanon’. Also see: PRESS TV,
15 October, 2010: live televiosn coverage of Ahmadinejad’s speech at Bint Jbeil
17
   Reuters 14 October, 2010 Ahmadinejad, near Israel border, says "Zionists mortal"
18
   Al Jazeera, 14 October, 2010 ‘Ahmadinejad visits south Lebanon
19
   Daily Star, 25 August 2010, ‘Ahmadinejad to visit Lebanon on September 11-12 — reports’
20
   Reuters, ibid
21
   Ynet, 15 October, 2010 ‘ Hariri to Ahmadinejad: Lebanon won't join axis’
                       9 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



combining Iran, Syria, Turkey and Iraq. 22 Further indications are found in the recent repoartge
emerging from the Gulf and from Iraq — on increasing Iranina intervensions in the Iraqi political
system and concerns from Therenan’s ambitions. 23

Iran is already in the position where it may pick and choose from a wide verity of proxies operating
under its patronage — not necessarily through the obvious and identifiable ones. As it had already
done in the past, Iran may use several operational platforms it holds in its sophisticated tool kit. It is
comprised of several organisations and operational frameworks including Hizballah in Lebanon, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades, Hamas, and also al-Moqtada Sadr in Iraq. In addition, several other organisations serve as
“virtual” platforms, or front line names, for more institutional and clandestine activity of the Iranian
security and intelligence apparatus, operating in the broader Middle East, and surely not limited to
the Israeli-Palestinian theatre. 24

One of the Iranian proxies could be utilized for initiating violence as a means of distracting
international public opinion from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Any developments in the
inquest of the murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri might provide further incentive for
violence to erupt, thus increasing concerns of the Iran-Hizballah-Syria alliance, which is a constant
source of insecurity. 25

2.1 The wider context
The Iranian Presidential visit to Lebanon and the potential arms deal complemented by
Ahmadinejad’s previous rounds of talks earlier this year are clear steps, openly taken by Iran to
implement its ambition to expand its power in the region. However, this too should also be
examined in a wider political context — not necessarily implying an operational-military-
coordination between the parties in the immediate timeframe, but rather a reflection of the battle
between Washington and Teheran for regional influence in the Middle East. Thus, Ahmadinejad’s
more frequent visits should be weighted against other developments — as with the French and the
American attempts to reach out to Syria and Lebanon. 26

A good example is the recent development surrounding the visit of the US envoy Senator George
Mitchell to Damascus and Beirut in which he declared that ‘without Lebanon there will not be


22
   PRESS TV 14 October, 2010 ‘Update On Ahmadinejad Visit to Bint Jbeil, South Lebanon’, live telelvision report by
Ali Rizk
23
   The Guardian 18 October, 2010 ‘Iran backs Maliki for second term as Iraqi PM’. Also see: MEMRI,15 October
2010: ‘Saudi news papers: Lebanon is on the verge of explosion’, multiple references to Iran’s and Hizballah’s
aspirations (Hebrew)
24
   Bar, p.15
25
   Xinhua 17, September, 2010 ‘Hezbollah MP calls for abolishing Hariri's tribunal’ cf: Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(Leidschendam) 24 August, 2010: ‘The Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon requests additional
information and evidence held by the Secretary General of Hezbollah’
26
   Al Manar 10 September, ‘France to Push Israel-Syria Talks’
                      10 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


comprehensive peace in this region.’ 27 From the Iranian perspective, Senator Mitchell’s remarks in
Beirut and those made in Jerusalem are particularly loathed. ‘A part of our objective has been to
encourage discussions between Israel and Syria, just as we have done so with respect to Israel and
the Palestinians’, said Mitchell. ‘We do not believe that proceeding on both tracks is mutually
exclusive; to the contrary, we believe that they can be complementary and mutually beneficial if we
can proceed toward comprehensive peace on more than one track.’ 28 In view of such a high profile
effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian track, there is no wonder that Ahmadinejad has deployed a
counter effort, hurriedly travelling to Damascus for an audience with the Syrian President: ‘We
have to be ready and in harmony’, Ahmadinejad explained at the time. 29

In short, Iran has increased its effort to expand its influence in the region by cultivating relations
and establishing an axis of proxies and allies. It rejects the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority
(PA) and denies any political settlement with Israel. For various reasons and concurrent with its
Islamist revolutionary doctrine, it has the capacity and the motivation to damage the process. Iran
possesses all the necessary components: the ideological-theological-political context, as well as the
operational means to support it.




27
   Daily Star, 18 September 2010, ‘Mitchell: No peace deal without Lebanon’
28
   US Department of State, September 15, 2010 ‘Special Envoy George Mitchell on Middle East Talks in Jerusalem’
29
   Haaretz, 18 September, 2010 ‘Ahmadinejad in Syria: Mideast states will foil U.S. plan to alter region's politics’
                      11 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment




Regimes’ Cohesion

A failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process may increase instability in neighbouring
countries.

Any analysis of this nature must take into account the stability and the cohesion of moderate
regimes in the Middle East, particularly Egypt and Jordan with which Israel have signed peace
treaties that remain valid and stable. These regimes are particularly sensitive to violent eruptions in
the region, not limited to the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as they might also inflame
domestic public opinion in Arab countries — generating radical activity by activists of the Muslim
Brotherhood and/or such elements affiliated to global Jihad. This might pose a risk to the regimes’
cohesion, which is clearly beyond the shared interests of the United Kingdom and the European
community, the US and Israel.

Concerns from the possibility of failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and a sense of
urgency to secure an agreement were well reflected in the speeches made by the two worried best-
men attending the re-launching ceremony of the peace talks. Standing at the White House next to
President Obama, King Abdullah II turned to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Abbas and
warned: ‘If hopes are disappointed again, the price of failure will be too high for all’. 30 Jordan is
particularly sensitive to any developments surrounding the Palestinian question, both for issues
related to internal security - inter-linked with possible demographic changes. The large Palestinian
population already residing in Jordan and the fear from a new wave of Palestinian refugees moving
into the country in the event of an extremely dramatic escalation, shapes the Hashemites thinking
regarding these issues. 31 Jordan's monarchy requires stability.

Egypt is in no better condition. The home country of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt is now
experiencing some level of political uncertainty. The health of the Egyptian President is by now a
source of concern for many in the West who value the moderate role played in the region by
President Hosni Mubarak. In an extraordinary step, Mubarak was accompanied to the opening
ceremony of the Israeli-Palestinian talks at the White House by his son Gamal. 32 In Egypt and
beyond, this unusual move was perceived as an indication of a more advanced apprenticeship for
the Egyptian successor. 33 Similarly to the Jordanian King, the Egyptian President had also
expressed a sense of urgency, warped by somewhat historic flair, which, in due course, may be
referred to as his acclaimed gallant legacy. ‘I have gone through wars and hostilities, and have
participated in the quest for peace since the first day of my administration’, Mubarak said in




30
   The White House, 1 September, 2010 ‘Remarks by President Obama, Four Mideast Leaders’
31
   IISS (1999) 'Jordan after King Hussein', Strategic Comments, 5: 2, 1-2
32
   Financial Times 2 September, 2010 'Mubarak trip fuels succession talk’
33
   Haaretz, 31 August, 2010, ‘Mubarak signals Egypt succession by taking son to Washington’ cf: ‘Diplomatic Sources:
Mubarak discuss with Obama power transition’-A MEMRI extract from an Egyptian source, 1 September, 2010
                     12 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


Washington. ‘I have never spared an effort to push it forward, and I still look forward to its success
and completion’. 34

Even if the process is indeed successfully completed within the specified timeframe, there is no
certainty that Mubarak — or his son to that effect — will be in power to see it. For the Egyptian
political system is already in turmoil, not only because of Mubarak’s illness. The authority and the
legitimacy of the Mubarak’s regime are being publicly questioned. A recent display of political
insolence was made by none other than presidential candidate Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, former head
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Dr ElBaradei
challenged Mubarak, called his regime a ‘decaying temple’ and called for the unification of the
opposition to boycott the forthcoming upcoming parliamentary elections. 35 ElBaradei’s call for
boycott was well received in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and beyond. For example, the
Muslim Brotherhood’s European spokesman and former chairman Kamal al-Helbawy commented
that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood needs to convince the various political parties to boycott these
elections and to stand behind ElBaradei in his call for a boycott as a prelude to civil
disobedience.’ 36 Recent reports indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood will indeed run independent
candidates for the Egyptian parliament as it does to bypass the ban imposed on it — as it is not
officially recognised. 37
At this stage it is difficult to assess with confidence what the final outcome of the internal Egyptian
processes would be and how domestic stability will be secured. However, suffice to say that it
indicates the existence of political disquiet in the current process, with more elements challenging
the authority of the regime in Egypt. Support in such conclusion can be seen in the reports on
heavily toughening regulations imposed by the regime on live television coverage ahead of the
forthcoming elections. 38

In the context of the peace process and potential risks for regional stability, Egypt and Jordan are
particularly important for two reasons. A) Any new wave of bloody Israeli-Palestinian violence
might inflame public opinion in Arab countries, aggravating radical activity that affects domestic
security and the stability of these regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood and radical elements
associated with global Jihad, which operate in these countries, despise pro-Western moderate Arab
leaders no less than they despise America and Israel together. B) Such conditions of instability, if
not faced with effective response, might provide more leverage for radical militant elements and
terrorists to operate against domestic targets, as well as against Israeli ones. Terrorist operatives are
already threatening sensitive spots in Southern Israel, in Aqaba and the Sinai desert. 39 Further



34
   The White House, ibid
35
   The Guardian 7 September, 2010 ‘Egyptian dissident Mohamed ElBaradei urges election boycott’. Also see: Al
Masry Al Youm online 7 September, 2010, ‘Wednesday’s papers: Health Minister's healthcare bills and ElBaradei
rallying the troops’
36
   Al Masry Al Youm, 21 September, 2010 ‘Brotherhood meets with NAC to discuss elections’
37
   Reuters 9 October, 2010 ‘Egypt main opposition group to contest election’
38
   Reuters: 14 October, 2010 ‘Egypt tightens TV broadcast rules before election’
39
   Fore examples of security concerns in Jordan, see recent security alerts issued by the US State Department:
                      13 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



ideological and theo-political guidance was recently released in London and Egypt in a publication
of the Muslim Brotherhood, glorifying terrorism, advocating for Jihad and inciting also against
moderate Arab regimes. 40




15, September 2010 ‘Warden Message - Possible Imminent Threat in Aqaba’. Also see previous security alerts: general
warnings from 19 and 30 of August, 2010. Also: ‘Security Incident’ 2, September 2010. Reports on Egyptian security
alert in the Sinai desert: Ma’an, 19 September, 2010 ‘Group tries to strike Israel from Sinai’
40
   Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, Report from 18 October, 2010 (Hebrew)
                      14 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


Potential Changes in the Balance of Military Power

Potential changes in the regional balance of military power increase the potential of regional
tension. Such changes may not automatically or necessarily place Israel in an absolutely
inferior position. Nonetheless, they might still be perceived as posing a serious threat — thus
raising the possibility of permeative interception and the potential for regional tension.

In addition to Iranian arms deliveries, Russia too is playing an important role in exporting advanced
weapon systems to the region. Motivated primarily by its ambitions to strengthen its position on the
international stage, Moscow plays a growing role in the Middle East through arms deals. A most
recent and comprehensive review of Russian sales in the Middle East clearly illustrates the extent of
this involvement. A complete examination of these arms deals accedes the boundaries of this paper,
however the information considered is sufficient to delineate the process of continuing Russian
arms supplies to various countries in region, including Iran, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, the Gulf states,
Algeria and Libya. 41

Russian arms deals with Iran and Syria have remained a matter of high priority for Israel’s most
senior decision makers through several administrations. Deep concerns and strong objections were
made by Israel, both publicly and in private, expressing fears of any arms sales that would change
the delicate regional balance of military power, undermining the Israeli Qualitative Military Edge
(QME). 42 The fact that Israel is not shy of expressing similar strong objections to its strategic
sponsor and patron, the United States, 43 is a reflection of Israel’s particular sensitivity to such
developments. As a result, the maintenance of its relative QME is fixed as a fundamental pillar in
its defence doctrine which necessitates reliance on better equipment and training to compensate for
a manpower deficit. 44

Sales of sophisticated missiles are repeatedly objected to by Israel, especially in light of their later
appearance in theater used against both civilian and Israeli targets, as happened during the Second
Lebanon War of 2006.

The most recent developments provide two opposite examples that are both essential to
understanding the Russian arms exports policy, as well as the importance of international
engagement with the Russian government over the issue.

The first example is of the Russian arms deal with Syria to supply sophisticated missiles. Russia
announced that it rejects the American-Israeli reservations about their intention to equip Syria with
advanced cruise missiles that would potentially be transferred from Syria to Hizballah, raising the


41
   Magen, Zvi, Shapir, Yiftah and Bagno-Moldavsky, Olena (2010) p. 80-81
42
   Ynet, 5 October, 2008, ‘Barak: Russia is breaking the balance in the Middle East’ (Hebrew) cf: Haaretz, 20 April,
2005, ‘Sharon: Russian missiles being sold to Syria do threaten Israel’
43
   New York Times ‘Israeli concerns delay U.S. arms sales to Sunni Arab states’ 5 April 2007
44
   Sharp M. Jeremy (2009) ‘US Foreign Aid to Israel’, US Congressional Research Service
                      15 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



risk to Israeli marine vessels. 45 The Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov publicly rejected
the American-Israeli request and denied its rationale. While visiting Washington, Mr Serdyukov – a
Russian Defence Minister in the Pentagon since 2005 – delivered Russia’s decision: ‘The US and
Israel ask us not to supply Syria with Yakhont. But we do not see the concerns expressed by them
that these arms will fall into the hands of terrorists’. 46 Similar concerns were publicly expressed by
the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, who accused Syria and Iran of supplying weapons of
‘ever-increasing capability’ to Hizballah in Lebanon. ‘We're at a point now, where Hizballah has far
more rockets and missiles than most governments in the world, and this is obviously destabilising
for the whole region’, Secretary Gates commented. His Israeli counterpart warned on the same
occasion that ‘Syria was arming Hizballah with weapons systems that can turn or disrupt the very
delicate balance in Lebanon.’ 47

The second example is of the Russian arms deal with Iran to supply S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, 48
which are said to have the potential of improving the Iranian aerial defence in such a way that will
hinder any possible air campaign against its nuclear facilities. Unlike the previous example
mentioned of the deal with Syria, in this case Russia responded to the international pressure and
recently announced that the deal with Iran will not materialize, inviting criticism from Teheran that
‘the Russians are being humiliated by America and the Zionist regime.’ 49

Russia’s position should be carefully noted, also due to the context in which the latest
announcement was made: a statement of enhanced relations with both the Pentagon and the Israeli
Ministry of Defence. The Russian arms deals with Iran and Syria were the subject of discussions
between the Russian leadership and the Israeli Minister of Defence, Ehud Barak in Moscow. During
this first-ever visit of an Israeli Defence Minister to Russia, a special defence and military
agreement was signed between the two countries – a first of its kind. 50 The improved relations with
Israel combined with American pressure may have helped to prevent the deal with Iran, but was
futile in relation to the deal with Syria.

Furthermore, the comment made by the Israeli Prime Minister during a meeting with some of his
Cabinet ministers, a comment subsequently leaked to the press, should not go unnoticed: ‘To our
regret, the deal is now proceeding in stages and that is problematic for us’, Netanyahu said. ‘We are
dealing with a new arsenal of missiles and rockets and there has to be a military response to that’. 51

The past year saw several secret arms deals at various stages, with some even successfully
interrupted. A good example is the interception in Thailand of the North Korean shipment of 40


45
   Haaretz, 27 August, 2010, ‘Israel working to thwart Russia arms deal with Syria’
46
   AFP 17 September, 2010 ‘Russia to supply Syria with cruise missiles’
47
   BBC News online: 28 April 2010 ‘Hezbollah armed with improved missiles - US’
48
   Haaretz, 9 September, 2010 ‘Defense minister lobbies Moscow to stop arms sales’
49
   Reuters 23 September, 2010 ‘Iran criticises Russia for banning missile delivery’
50
   Reuters, 6 September, 2010 ‘Russia, Israel sign military cooperation deal’
51
   Haaretz 19 September, 2010 ‘Netanyahu: We tried and failed to stop Russian missile sale to Syria’
                      16 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


tonnes of heavy weapons on board an Ilyushin-76 cargo plane on December 2009. 52 The mystery
around the destination of the weapons delivery was cleared up just a few months after by the Israeli
Foreign Minister, who officially and publicly stated that the North Korean cargo was sent ‘with the
intention to smuggle these weapons to Hamas and Hizballah’. 53

Arms supplied by the US to Saudi Arabia have traditionally sparked great irritation in the Israeli
defence establishment. 54 New reports on an expected deal worth $60 billion made the Israeli
Defence Minister pay another visit to the Pentagon in order to make the case for maintaining the
Israeli QME. 55 In the meantime, the US State Department tried to place the forthcoming deal in a
broader context, commenting that the US provides ‘…security assistance to a range of allies from
Israel to Saudi Arabia. It is in our national interest to do so to maintain both security and stability in
the region’. 56 Unlike in Moscow, Washington is far more receptive to Israeli reservations. Not less
important is the fact that both the Saudis and the Israelis now share similar concerns from the
Iranian threat, positioning the two countries in a rare crossroad of mutual security needs.

As exhibited above, Israel and the United States remain deeply concerned about the flow of arms
from a variety of sources that might change the balance of military power in the region. Israel’s
strategic tolerance for such break-even weapons systems is not particularly high, unless it is
confident of its ability to neutralize such a risk. In any event that containment and diplomatic
prevention will be perceived as futile, Israel might resort to the use of force in order to prevent the
threat from materializing.

In the context of this analysis, two risk factors should therefore be noted, for they might generate
the following possible scenarios. A) An escalation as a result of a possible forceful interception of
any weapon system or operational platform, even before its actual use in theatre; and/or B) an
escalation as a result of a need to use extra firepower to overcome an adversary's relative advantage
gained through such operational capabilities when their appearance in theater was not prevented.

The possible scenarios are numerous, yet they may all derive from a similar set of developments:
critical changes in the balance of military power that necessitate a use of force might lead to
regional tension, also hampering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Such developments will fall
exactly into the paradox model presented above. In spite of its public commitment and the personal
prestige of its Prime Minister already put to test, Israel might still regard the risk of new weapons
systems as too high — and will be forced to act.

Should the containment of any responses and possible retributions not succeed, tension is likely to
rise in the region, with possible projection also onto the West Bank and Gaza strip. This might also
place the PA in an extremely difficult position to continue with negotiations as “business as usual”.

52
   ‘Times Online, 13 December 2010, ‘Thai police seize North Korean aircraft carrying 40 tons of heavy weapons’
53
   Haaretz, 12 May, 2010 ‘Lieberman: Iran, Syria and North Korea are new axis of evil'
54
   New York Times ‘Israeli concerns delay U.S. arms sales to Sunni Arab states’ 5 April 2007
55
   Ynet 19 September, 2010 ‘Israel fear: arms deal with Saudi Arabia might damage the military advantage’
56
   US Department of State, 16 September 2010, Daily Press Briefing, Assistant Secretary Philip J. Crowley
17 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment
                      18 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


4. Turkey
Turkey’s increasing tendency toward Islamism and cooperation with radical elements
strengthens radical Hamas at the expense of the more moderate PA.

Turkey’s growing inclination to partner with radical elements, specifically with Iran, raises serious
concerns given its geo-political importance and unique character as a secular country with a Muslim
majority. The combination of its influence in the Muslim world and increasing involvement in
international institutions — in addition to its membership to NATO — and with its geographic
position being vital for energy security, Turkey is a critical element in regional stability and
international security.

The latest example of Turkish conflicting interests can be seen in its position over the negotiations
to deploy a NATO anti-missile system against possible threats from Iran and Syria. The
straightening times ties between Turkey and these two countries, as further discussed in this section,
induced Ankara to oppose the definition of Iran and Syria as a threat to NATO allies. The case of
the NATO anti-missile system sharpens the different routs Turkey is following, of expending
relations with radical elements on one hand, while maintaining relations with the West on the other
hand. 57

Concerns of domestic radicalization taking place in Turkey are only amplified by the latest
significant political developments such as the recent approval of constitutional amendments through
a national referendum. Despite the agreement on some progressive amendments proposed, the
Turkish opposition voiced concerns over such amendments that might change the balance of power
between the government and the judicial system — even referring to Prime Minster Erdogan as a
‘modern-day sultan’. 58 The approval of the constitutional amendments also generated disquiet from
the possibility of further changes to the secular character of Turkey, and from growing influence of
the ruling Islamists, represented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). 59

Whilst the recent domestic developments are of great importance, the focus here is maintained on
the changes in the Turkish foreign policy, which are, in effect, a continuum of the domestic
processes.

Inspired by its declared policy of ‘zero problems towards neighbours’, Turkey’s relations with
radical elements in the region are now above par, at the expense of some of its good connections
with more moderate regional actors. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister
explained: ‘[it]…has been successfully implemented for the past seven years. Turkey's relations
with its neighbours now follow a more co-operative track. There is a developing economic
interdependence between Turkey and its neighbouring countries.’ 60 A good example for the
implementation of this approach is the Turkish-Iranian relations. Once considered by Ankara as a

57
   Reuters 18 October, 2010 ‘Turkey says anti-missile should not single out Iran’
58
   CNN 12 September, 2010 ‘Turkey's Erdogan hails constitutional referendum win’
59
   The Washington Post, 19 September, 2010 ‘Is Turkey becoming more democratic, or less so?’
60
   Foriegn Policy, 20, May 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy’
                     19 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



security risk, Iran now enjoys even more significant and major trade relations with Turkey than ever
before. 61

Expansion of trade is indeed an important incentive for both Turkey and Iran to strengthen their
relations, 62 as described by Erdogan: ‘Just as we are Iran's gate into Europe, Iran is our most
important gate into Asia’. 63 Thus, Iran is now more able to project defiance against the West, in
spite of the economic pressure stemming from the advanced UN and EU sanctions — best
described by the Iranian propaganda website PRESS-TV: ‘Turkey-Iran trade up despite US will’. 64

The Turkish position on the Iranian nuclear enterprise is publicly resonated by the following three
principles, as vividly described by its Foreign Minister: A) ‘Nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes is a right of all nations’. B) ‘The Middle East must be a nuclear-free zone’; and, C)
‘Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy, more efficient diplomacy. Not military tension, not economic
sanctions, which will affect Turkey as a neighbouring country.’ 65

The strengthening of relations between Turkey, Iran and Syria are now a significant part of the
regional existence 66 , generating some disconcertion also in Washington primarily in-light of the
Turkish position on Iran’s nuclear programme. Reports on President Obama’s phone conversation
with Prime Minister Erdogan reflect the American concern with Ankara’s support for Iran against
the imposed sanctions. 67

Recent developments and subsequent reports raise more questions on the Turkish connection with
Iran. One such report, which is strongly denied by Turkey, involves an alleged large-scale
transaction between the regime in Teheran and the governing party of Turkey. A British broadsheet
claimed that Iran donated the sum of $25 million to the AKP, 68 who reject the charge and reportedly
‘pledged to take legal action’ against the newspaper. 69

Even in the event that this news report is proven to be unfounded, the glorification of Tayyip
Erdogan by Iranian propaganda is still rather telling. The response of PRESS-TV to the results of
the latest Turkish referendum is in fact an homage to Erdogan. Extracts are brought here only in
brief, suffice to illustrate the perception of Erdogan as a pan-Islamist hero, as well as reflecting the
irony with which the totalitarian theocracy of Iran pays tribute to the Turkish democracy:


61
   Financial Times, 17 September, 2010, Turkey seeks to treble trade with Iran cf: AFP 23, August 2010 ‘Turkey to
remove Iran from enemies watch list’
62
   PRESSTV, 19 September, 2010 ‘Turkey interested in Iran auto industry’
63
   PRESSTV: 17 September, 2010 ‘Turkey: Iran entitled to have N-energy’
64
   PRESSTV, 31 August, 2010 ‘Turkey-Iran trade up despite US will’
65
   Council on Foreign Relations, 14 April, 2010 ‘A Conversation with Ahmet Davutoglu’
66
   Al-Manar, 10 June, 2010, ‘Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria to Set Up Free Trade Zone’
67
   BBC News online 20 May, 2010, ‘Obama to pursue UN sanctions despite Iran nuclear deal’
68
   Telegraph, 14 September, 2010 Iran donates $25 million to Turkey's ruling party.
69
   Today’s Zaman 17, September, 2010 ‘AK Party takes legal action against Iran donation story’
                     20 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


                   ‘Practically no Arab leader in the region congratulated Ankara over its victory
                   in securing a strong vote of confidence -- perhaps because Arab states not only
                   shun referendums, but lack a democratic process for holding free elections that
                   reflect the wishes of the majority.

                   However, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has become steadily
                   popular in the Arab world in recent years. His stance concerning Palestinians,
                   the blockade of Gaza, and the Israeli attack on a Gaza-bound aid convoy has
                   increased his popularity to the point of forcing some Arab leaders to reach out
                   to this old regional colonialist power and seek better economic ties.

                   It is impossible to believe that any Arab nation will stay unmoved by the
                   referendum and Erdogan's victory; especially since his Justice and Development
                   Party (AKP) has an Islamic stance and is supported by faithful Muslims who
                   were forced to hide even their personal religious aspirations since the
                   foundation of secular Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk…

                   … Turkish series are now offering Ankara a new window into Arab homes.
                   Even Syria -- which has made several very popular anti-Ottoman historical
                   series in recent years -- is now considering portraying the area from a more
                   positive point of view.’ 70

In addition to the factors already stated above in shaping the said Turkish policy, and in addition to
the important role played by the now Foreign Minister Professor Davutoglu - who previously
served as a senior adviser to the Prime Minister — some pay particular attention to another actor
who also paid an important contribution. It is argued that the warming of relations with Iran is
promoted by Dr Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s newly appointed chief of the Central Intelligence Agency
MIT. The available open sources of information may indicate the thinking of Dr Hakan and
Turkey’s position on Iran, mainly rejecting the Western demand from Teheran to abandon its
nuclear ambitions. This approach was domestically assessed by some in Turkey as another
illustration of its ‘self-assumed role of acting as an interlocutor between Iran and the West.’ 71
However, outside of Turkey, particularly in Israel, this approach is judged rather differently. For
example, the very appointment of Dr Hakan to head the Turkish intelligence sparked dismay in
defence circles, well reflected in the extraordinary comment made by the Israeli Minister of
Defence. In a radio interview Barak expressed fears that given the new appointee’s close relations
with Iran, Israeli state secrets — previously shared with Turkey as a military ally — will be
compromised. 72

Some of the shifts in the Turkish policy are clear, vividly expressed in the tough language used by
its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in connection to Israel on various occasions in the past
two years. 73 Other examples are not necessarily always made voluntarily public, for example in the

70
   PRESSTV 17 September, 2010, Mohioddin Sajedi ‘Turkey's referendum vs. the Middle East’
71
   Today’s Zaman 6 April, 2010 ‘Hakan Fidan: The strongest candidate for head of MİT’
72
   Haaretz, 2 August, 2010 Amos Harel (Hebrew)
73
   BBC News online, April 7 2010 ‘Turkish PM Erdogan says Israel is 'threat to peace’
                      21 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



context of cultivating the relations of the governing party (AKP) with Hamas. When asked to
explain the cloak of secrecy surrounding a recent visit of a Hamas delegation for talks in Ankara,
Erdogan embraced Hamas and explained: “We were never going to beat the drums in advance of
their arrival. For security reasons, we had to keep things secretive. This is why we did not tell you.
We did our brotherly duty, and now the rest is up to them.” 74

Even the more positive and moderate role played by Turkey through its mediation between Israel
and Syria 75 — which is still considered as the preferred route by President Assad 76 and still pursued
by Turkey 77 — was recently shaded by the language used by the Turkish President in connection to
Israel, ahead of the United Nations General Assembly. Initial reports of a possible sideline meeting
between President Abdullah Gul of Turkey and President Shimon Peres of Israel in New York, the
first at such a high level following the Flotilla incident, were soon proven premature. President Gul
saw fit to explain before the gathering that ‘Foreign ministers can meet with others from the enemy
country even in the battlefield.’ Although the Turkish newspaper which published Gul’s remarks
elaborated that he‘...had been referring to a meeting between Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
and Israeli Industry, Trade and Labour Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer in Brussels in the aftermath
of the flotilla attack’ 78 — the suggestive reference to Israel as an enemy state of Turkey and not as a
strategic ally remains. A meeting between the two presidents also failed to occur during the Clinton
‘Global Initiative’ to which they were both invited. 79 Although President Gul had explained at some
point that ‘time did not allow’ for a meeting with President Peres, he still found the time to meet
with President Ahmadinejad of Iran. 80

As presented above, a combination of several factors are at the core of the Turkish dynamic. Both
domestic issues and regional-international issues are key to forming an understanding of the
problem, such as the changing character of the Turkish electorate, 81 trade and economics as referred
to above, as well as its ongoing affair with the EU membership process. 82 They all play their part,
naturally in tandem with the Islamist views and the line of thinking of the ruling party and its
leadership.

Yet, even a careful analysis, which includes a willingness to accommodate the argument of
domestic politics and internal delicacies as the shaping factor of Turkey’s foreign policy – not
74
   Hürriyet 2010, ‘Erdogan on Hamas: We do not need permission from anybody’
75
   Council on Foriegn Relations, ibid. See Ahmet Davutoglu account on his envoy, describing his admiration to the
negotiating parties and why did the process collapse
76
   Haaretz, 13 September, 2010 ‘Assad: Turkey vital to Israel-Syria peace talks
77
   Hürriyet, 15 September, 2010 ‘Turkey committed to Israel-Syria peace, says FM’
78
   Today’s Zaman, 20 September, 2010 ‘Gul, Peres to have surprise meeting in New York’
79
   Today’s Zaman, 22 September, 2010 ‘Ankara insists no request from Gül to meet with Peres’ cf: Ynet: 20
September, 2010 ‘Gul can't find time to meet Peres’ and Ynet 20 September, 2010, ‘Peres: Turkey still our friend’
80
   New York Times 22 September, 2010 ‘At the U.N., Turkey Asserts Itself in Prominent Ways’
81
   Foreign Policy, 20, May 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu. Interestingly Misiter Davutoglu himself had referred to these
domestic changes and their affect on Foreign Policy. Also see: Cagaptay, Soner (2009) ‘Is Turkey Leaving the West?’
82
   BBC News online 17 September, 2010 ‘Keeping Turkey focused on EU challenge’ and 27 July, 2010, ‘Cameron
'anger' at slow pace of Turkish EU negotiations’
                      22 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


ignoring the merits of the so called “zero-problems-with-neighbours” – will have to recognize the
difficulties in harmonizing the surfacing contradictions. It was eloquently summarized by Soner
Cagaptay: ‘TAKP's foreign policy has not promoted sympathy toward all Muslim states. Rather, the
party has promoted solidarity with Islamist, anti-Western regimes (Qatar and Sudan, for example)
while dismissing secular, pro-Western Muslim governments (Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia).’ 83

In conclusion, this section explored the key and most recent displays of the Turkish tendency to
lean towards Islamism - while it maintains its relations with key Western actors.

Turkey perceives itself as more than “just” an important regional actor; it has an appetite for
participation in, and influence of, various international frameworks, expanding its power through
soft means, serving its diplomatic and economic objectives.
Against this background, implications for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should not be
considered lightly. A more Islamist Turkey, co-operating with Iran and supporting the Hamas
government in the Gaza strip, serve as a negative factor, undermining the international efforts to
strengthen the moderate Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Despite its increasing leaning towards more radical elements, it is still in its political and economic
interest to maintain good relations with the United States and the European Union, thus still
enabling more room for engagement. In order to induce Turkey to change the less desirable
elements of its current policy it is imperative that Turkey is presented with sufficient incentives and
disincentives to achieve this.




83
     Cagaptay, ibid
                   23 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment




                                                  Assessment


This document reviews just a few of the most prominent factors that shape the current regional
reality in the Middle East, and that might hamper the renewed negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority. The document does not include an analysis of the internal Palestinian
divisions between Hamas and Fatah. In the same way, this work does not include an analysis of the
Israeli domestic politics and the fierce opposition, for example over the question of the moratorium
on building in the settlements on the West Banks. Without ignoring the high importance of these
rivalries and their critically divisive impact, the document maintains a focus on other important
factors: Iran and its proxies, potential changes in the balance of military power, the cohesion of the
regimes in Jordan and in Egypt, as well as on the growing Islamist inclination of Turkey.


Presented below is an assessment in summary of current and potential trends:


* Against the fragility of the moderate Arab regimes of Jordan and Egypt (in various degrees) Iran
is strengthening its relations with Lebanon, Turkey and Syria. This tendency is not expected to
diminish, and it is most relevant to the strength and efficiency of the sanctions imposed on
Teheran in connection to its nuclear enterprise.

* Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon is of great importance, both for its symbolic significance as
well the potential for any operational aspects. Ahmadinejad’s dramatic show of force in southern
Lebanon for the first time since the War of 2006, may be examined through different prisms. At the
best, the rather unusual intensity of Ahmadinejad’s visits to this part of the Middle East is a
reflection of the battle between Washington and Teheran for influence in the area, and another
indication of the growing political co-ordination at the highest levels between Iran and its allies.
At worst, it might be proven to be an indication for more substantial co-ordination, with
particularly dangerous implications for regional stability.

* The rejection of the renewed Israeli-Palestinian talks by Iran and the political backing and
legitimacy that Hamas receives from Turkey constitute negative factors, damaging the
position of the Palestinian Authority and its more moderate leadership. An unanswered and not
refuted delegitimization of the PA might have its effect on Palestinian constituencies, with some
risk in the longer term of leading to an erosion of the authority of the PA and its Chairman,
and/or placing them under pressure. This could then lead to a toughening of the PA positions
during negotiations, as if to prove its credentials.

* In addition to the familiar (and to some degree even expected) security alerts — the threat of
terrorism in Israel and the West Bank has clearly increased, already manifested in two deadly
                   24 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


attacks. A substantial analysis of potential terror attacks requires the kind of information that is
beyond the remits of this paper, and even beyond its prime objective. Yet, it is possible and

important to point out that the intent of radical militant elements to execute terror remains. The
actual materialization of such an attack, or attacks, is therefore only a function of the available
operational capability of potential predators and the level of efficiency of the counter-terrorism
efforts (now at a higher degree of co-operation between Israeli security services and the PA security
apparatus).


* In the context of this assessment, it is possible to conclude that the risk from possible violent
developments that will fall into the model of the paradox described above is a high one — given the
uncontrolled variables of the Israeli-Palestinian security equation, as well as of the Iranian influence
and guidance to its proxies. In such events, as has been seen in numerous occasions in the past,
there is a tendency for the tactical to become strategic. Even a tragic event that is rather limited in
scale might come to bear much greater significance, with the potential it has to jeopardize the
process.


* The political risk as a function of the terrorism threat, as described above, is likely to
remain also in the longer period, primarily subjected - although not limited - to the decisions of the
Hamas political-military leadership.


* The risk for the Israeli armed forces, especially to its vessels operating in the
Mediterranean, is expected to grow once the Russian-Syrian missile arms deal is executed.
Israeli high-level diplomacy failed to persuade Russia to prevent the deal from happening. At this
stage, it is unclear what type and scale of ‘military response’ the Israeli Prime Minister
referred to. The leakage to the press of his remarks could be interpreted as both a public sign of
warning, as well as a reflection of Israel’s willingness, if not intent, to take action to intercept the
said weapon system before its deployment — primarily if there is an intent to transfer it from Syria
to Hizballah.


* Whilst the information available is insufficient to draw a more substantial assessment sregarding
the final outcome of this specific missiles delivery, it adds to the Israeli-American concerns over
the growing stockpile of missiles Hizballah now possess. In the event that advanced and
sophisticated weapons systems reach the hands of Hizballah, IDF is likely to resort to the use of
firepower, in such volume and accuracy, so as to compensate for the perceived relative advantage of
their adversary. Given the experience of the War of 2006, such violent eruption will bear
significant political consequences — not excluding the peace process.
                   25 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



* The regimes of Jordan and Egypt remain concerned about a failure of the Israeli-
Palestinian process. The Muslim brotherhood and radical elements associated with global Jihad
which operate in these countries pose a threat to the internal security and to the stability of their
regimes. If the process fails, and the result is more Israeli-Palestinain violence, it is likely to
inflame Arab public opinion and to aggravate domestic radical activity.


* The domestic political developments in Egypt should be monitored carefully, for they bear a
wider significance. Even if the ruling party remains in power, its legitimacy and authority are
already fiercely challenged by the Muslim Brotherhood that appears to be lining up with Dr
ElBaradei, challenging the current Egyptian leadership. The high public support for the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, along with potential violence in the Palestinian territories, might at some
point lead to wide scale rallies and protests on the streets of Cairo - which will pose a further
challenge to the regime. Based on previous experience, it is possible to foresee a potential for a
tough response from the local security apparatus, increasing the probability for domestic political
and security unrest that might undermine the legitimacy of the regime further.
                   26 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



                                                  Final Note
Considering the analysis and assessment presented above, further development of possible policies
should be pursued by decision makers and those who provide counsel to them.

It will be useful to recognize the existence of the potential for escalation and regional instability —
which might jeopardize the integrity of the peace process and its potential success. What will
happen in such circumstances? Will the Israelis and Palestinians be left to their own destiny?
Alternatively, one must wonder, what can responsible countries do now to prevent radical elements
from derailing the process?

For example, Russia should be pressured to adhere to its responsibilities as a member of the
International Quartet, and in particular be pressured not to take any measure that will only
destabilize the regional security and hamper the peace process. The Russian arms sales to Syria and
to other radical elements does not correspond to the leading international role it seeks to play.

More firm action should be taken towards Iran, increasing political pressure on Teheran and
constructing a solid international consensus against its sponsorship, guidance and finance of
terrorism; its use of Hizballah and Hamas as its proxies and of course its nuclear ambitions. Most
importantly, in light of the continuing failure of the policies taken vis-à-vis Iran thus far, the time
has come to revisit the propositions and prevailing trends in Western thinking regarding this regime,
and perhaps develop a new strategy of deterrence.

There is also more to be done with regards to Lebanon and Syria, including strengthening the
authority, the political support and the operational capacities of UNIFIL, which is trusted with
the implementation of UN Security Council 1701. An international demand for the dismantling of
Hizballah is rarely voiced.

Meanwhile, Turkey should also be engaged in a clear and more coherent manner. It should be
presented with more incentives and disincentives, in order to induce Ankara to refrain from its
current course of foreign policy and leaning towards radical elements.

The EU countries, separately and collectively, together with the United States can play an
important part in working to achieve better conditions that would increase the likelihood of the
peace process to succeed.

Handling opposition and domestic public opinion will remain a critical challenge, first and foremost
to Netanyahu and Abu-Mazen. While key international actors might try to influence domestic
politics, they can be even more useful and helpful in affecting the regional theatre — where
difficulties remain immense.
                    27 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


Goor Tsalalyachin is the Legacy Heritage Senior Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society
20 October, 2010


                                                  Bibliography

AFP, 9 September 2010, ‘Iran's Ahmadinejad set to visit Lebanon in October’ (Beirut)
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hVKmUwi7RGWQZDhKE668RM3zsy-w

AFP 17 September, 2010 ‘Russia to supply Syria with cruise missiles’ (Moscow)
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hmuPn-0WgMggP0gWx2ibAsuQTz_Q

Al Jazeera, 14 October, 2010 ‘Ahmadinejad visits south Lebanon
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/10/201010144486491890.html

Al-Manar, 10 June, 2010, ‘Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria to Set Up Free Trade Zone’
http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=141600&language=en

Al Manar 10 September, ‘France to Push Israel-Syria Talks’
http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=153586&language=en

Al Masry Al Youm online 7 September, 2010, ‘Wednesday’s papers: Health Minister's healthcare bills and
ElBaradei rallying the troops’
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/wednesday%E2%80%99s-papers-health-ministers-healthcare-bills-
and-elbaradei-rallying-troops

Al Masry Al Youm online 21 September, 2010 ‘Brotherhood meets with NAC to discuss elections’
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/brotherhood-meets-nac-discuss-elections

Bar, Shmuel (2009) Iranian Terrorist Policy and “Export of Revolution”, Working Paper presented to the
10th Annual Herzliya Conference, The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya Lauder School of
Government, Diplomacy and Strategy Institute for Policy and Strategy

BBC News online: 28 April 2010 ‘Hezbollah armed with improved missiles - US’
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8647909.stm

BBC News online, 20 May, 2010, ‘Obama to pursue UN sanctions despite Iran nuclear deal’
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10129674

BBC News online, 27 July, 2010 , ‘Cameron 'anger' at slow pace of Turkish EU
negotiations’http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10767768

BBC News online, 17 September, 2010 ‘Keeping Turkey focused on EU challenge’
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11326425

BBC News Online ,13 October 2010, ‘Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 'backs united Lebanon’
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11526143
                    28 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment




Cagaptay, Soner (2009) ‘Is Turkey Leaving the West?’ Foreign Affairs, 26 October, 2009
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65661/soner-cagaptay/is-turkey-leaving-the-west

Cordesman H. Anthony (2010) ‘The Arab-Israeli Military Balance’ CSIS Center for Strategic International
Studies

Council on Foriegn Relations, 14 April, 2010 ‘A Conversation with Ahmet Davutoglu’
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21916/conversation_with_ahmet_davutoglu.html

CNN 12 September, 2010 ‘Turkey's Erdogan hails constitutional referendum win’
http://edition.cnn.hu/2010/WORLD/europe/09/12/turkey.referendum/index.html?iref=mpstoryview

Daily Star, 25 August 2010, ‘Ahmadinejad to visit Lebanon on September 11-12 - reports’
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=118589#axzz0zK9767IY

Daily Star, 18 September 2010, ‘Mitchell: No peace deal without Lebanon’
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=119423#axzz10V7dh4Hs

Financial Times, 2 September, 2010 ‘Mubarak trip fuels succession talk’
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76c7c08e-b6bc-11df-b3dd-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss

Financial Times, 17 September, 2010, Turkey seeks to treble trade with Iran
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/73eaa744-c1ef-11df-9d90-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss

Foriegn Policy, 20, May 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,0

The Guardian 7 September 2010 ‘Egyptian dissident Mohamed ElBaradei urges election boycott’ Jack
Shenker, reporting from Cairo http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/07/egypt-mohamed-elbaradei

The Guardian 18 October, 2010 ‘Iran backs Maliki for second term as Iraqi PM’.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/18/iran-iraq-maliki-ahmadinejad-sadr
Haaretz, 20 April, 2005, Amos Harel, Haaretz Service and Aluf Ben, ‘Sharon: Russian missiles being sold to
Syria do threaten Israel’
http://www.haaretz.com/news/sharon-russian-missiles-being-sold-to-syria-do-threaten-israel-1.156491

Haaretz, 12 May, 2010 ‘Lieberman: Iran, Syria and North Korea are new 'axis of evil'
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/lieberman-iran-syria-and-north-korea-are-new-axis-of-
evil-1.289866

Haaretz, 2 August, 2010 Amos Harel, ‘Ehud Barak warns of close relations between chief of Turkish
intelligence to Iran’ (Hebrew)
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1182625.html

Haaretz, 27 August, 2010, Barak Ravid, ‘Israel working to thwart Russia arms deal with Syria’
                    29 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment


http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-working-to-thwart-russia-arms-deal-with-syria-1.310443

Haaretz, 31 August, 2010 Avi Issacharoff, ‘Mubarak signals Egypt succession by taking son to Washington’
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/mubarak-signals-egypt-succession-by-taking-son-to-
washington-1.311264

Haaretz, 9 September, 2010 ’ Anshel Pfeffer, ‘Defense minister lobbies Moscow to stop arms sales
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/defense-minister-lobbies-moscow-to-stop-arms-sales-1.312616

Haaretz, 13 September, 2010 ‘Assad: Turkey vital to Israel-Syria peace talks
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/assad-turkey-vital-to-israel-syria-peace-talks-1.313591

Haaretz, 18 September, 2010 ‘Ahmadinejad in Syria: Mideast states will foil U.S. plan to alter region's
politics’
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/ahmadinejad-in-syria-mideast-states-will-foil-u-s-plan-to-alter-
region-s-politics-1.314443

Hürriyet 2010, ‘Erdogan on Hamas: We do not need permission from anybody’, by Ana sayfa
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/3970962.asp?gid=74

Haaretz 19 September, 2010, Barak Ravid, ‘Netanyahu: We tried and failed to stop Russian missile sale to
Syria’ http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-we-tried-and-failed-to-stop-russian-
missile-sale-to-syria-1.314624


Hürriyet, 15 September, 2010 ‘Turkey committed to Israel-Syria peace, says FM’
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-committed-to-israel-syria-peace-says-fm-2010-09-15

IAEA 6 September 2010, Report by the Director General ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’. The report
Document derestricted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on 15 September 2010. Marked as
Marked: GOV/2010/46 and available online:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-46.pdf

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, Report from 18 October, 2010 (Hebrew)
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/ipc_134.htm

IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency. 5 September, 2010 ‘Mideast peace talks cannot succeed: Iranian
diplomat’ (English, reporting from Berlin)
http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=259041

Kam, Ephraim (2007) Changes in Iran's Strategic Posture, Strategic Asssessment,Vol. 9, No. 4
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=25&incat=0&read=37

Ma’an, 19 September, 2010 ‘Group tries to strike Israel from Sinai’ (Gaza city)
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=316035
                     30 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



Magen, Zvi, Shapir, Yiftah and Bagno-Moldavsky, Olena (2010) ‘Russian Arms Exports to the Middle East:
A Means or an End?’, inside: Startegic Assessment, vol 13 No 2, August 2010 INSS Tel-Aviv University
(English and Hebrew).

MEMRI: Diplomatic Sources: Mubarak discuss with Obama power transition’ - (extract translated into
Hebrew) 1 September 2010 (Extract in Hebrew) http://www.memri.org.il/cgi-
webaxy/sal/sal.pl?ID=107345_memri&lang=he&act=show2&dbid=articles&dataid=2510

MEMRI: ‘Fears in Kuwait from the Iranian threat over the Gulf countries’, 13 September 2010 (Hebrew,
analysis based on multiple open sources from the Gulf) http://www.memri.org.il/cgi-
webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=2517

MEMRI,15 October 2010: ‘Saudi news papers: Lebanon is on the verge of explosion’, multiple references to
Iran’s and Hizballah’s aspirations (Hebrew) http://www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl

Menashri, David (2006) 'Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict ', Israel Affairs, 12:1, 107-122
New York Times, 5 April 2007 ‘Israeli concerns delay U.S. arms sales to Sunni Arab states’
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/world/africa/05iht-
arms.4.5162312.html?scp=3&sq=QME%20Israel&st=cse

New York Times 22 September, 2010 ‘At the U.N., Turkey Asserts Itself in Prominent Ways’
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/world/europe/23diplo.html

PRESSTV: 17 September, 2010 ‘Turkey: Iran entitled to have N-energy’
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/142805.html

PRESSTV, 19 September, 2010 ‘Turkey interested in Iran auto industry’
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/143147.html

PRESSTV, 31 August, 2010 ‘Turkey-Iran trade up despite US will’
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/140691.html

PRESS TV 14 October, 2010 ‘Update On Ahmadinejad Visit to Bint Jbeil, South Lebanon’, live telelvision
report by Ali Rizk http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NXICE3DBIRE

PRESS TV, 14 October, 2010: Sepcial coverage of Ahmadinejad’s speech at Bint Jbeil - available on
Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-3u77NrKXY

‘Quartet Statement’, London, 30 January 2006
http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/middle_east/quartet-30jan2006.htm

Reuters, 3 September 2010, ‘Iran's Ahmadinejad calls on Palestinians to fight on’, Parisa Hafezi, reporting
from Teheran. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6821EX20100903

Reuters, 6 September, 2010 ‘Russia, Israel sign military cooperation deal’(Moscow)
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE6850YY20100906
                    31 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



Reuters 23 September, 2010 Iran criticises Russia for banning missile delivery (Teheran)
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFHOS36665420100923

Reuters 9 October, 2010 ‘Egypt main opposition group to contest election’ (Cairo)
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE69806A20101009

Reuters: 14 October, 2010 ‘Egypt tightens TV broadcast rules before election’ (Cairo)
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE69D23P20101014?pageNumber=1

Reuters 14 October, 2010 Ahmadinejad, near Israel border, says "Zionists mortal" (Bint Jbeil)
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69D2LW20101014?pageNumber=2

Reuters 18 October, 2010 ‘Turkey says anti-missile should not single out Iran’ (Ankara)
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69H3BX20101018?pageNumber=1

Sharp M. Jeremy (2009) ‘US Foreign Aid to Israel’ Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress,
December 4, 2009

Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Leidschendam) 24 August, 2010: ‘The Office of the Prosecutor of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon requests additional information and evidence held by the Secretary General of
Hezbollah’ http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/196

‘Times Online, 13 December 2010, Richard Lloyd Parry, ‘Thai police seize North Korean aircraft carrying
40 tons of heavy weapons’ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6954868.ece

Todays Zaman, Emre Uszlu, 6 April, 2010 ‘Hakan Fidan: The strongest candidate for head of MİT’
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-206487-109-centerhakan-fidan-the-strongest-candidate-for-head-
of-mitbr-i-by-i-bremre-uslucenter.html

Today’s Zaman 17, September, 2010 ‘AK Party takes legal action against Iran donation story’
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-221891-101-ak-party-takes-legal-action-against-iran-donation-
story.html

Today’s Zaman, 20 September, 2010 Gül, Peres to have surprise meeting in New York
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-221876-gul-peres-to-have-surprise-meeting-in-new-york.html

Today’s Zaman, 22 September, 2010 ‘Ankara insists no request from Gül to meet with Peres’
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-222322-ankara-insists-no-request-from-gul-to-meet-with-
peres.html

UN News Centre, 4 August 2010, ‘ UN steps in to defuse tensions on Israeli-Lebanese border’
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35532&Cr=Leban&Cr1

US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism
2009’, see: Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm
                    32 | The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Regional Instability: An Assessment



US Department of State, September 15, 2010 ‘Special Envoy George Mitchell on Middle East Talks in
Jerusalem’ http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/September/20100916101954su0.9556783.html#ixzz10VDRHaDb

US Department of State: 15, September 2010 ‘Warden Message - Possible Imminent Threat in Aqaba’;
Security alerts of August 2010 and 30 August 2010; 2, September 2010, ‘Warden Message - Security
Incident’. Full thread of alerts available at: http://jordan.usembassy.gov/acs_warden_messages.html

US Department of State, 16 September 2010, Daily Press Briefing, Assistant Secretary Philip J. Crowley
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/09/147268.htm

WAFA , 4 September, 2010 ‘Abu Rdeina: Who Forged Elections, Doesn't Represent Our Irani Friends’,
Ramallah, time: 21:27 http://english.wafa.ps/?action=detail&id=14734

The White House, 1 September, 2010, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by the President in the Rose
Garden after Bilateral Meetings
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/01/remarks-president-rose-garden-after-bilateral-
meetings

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary: ‘Remarks by President Obama, Four Mideast Leaders’.
Washington DC, 1 September, 2010. Official transcript available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/September/20100901215349su0.9199488.html?CP.rss=true#ixzz0yOQKDBzW

Xinhua 17, September, 2010 ‘Hezbollah MP calls for abolishing Hariri's tribunal’
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-09/17/c_13515967.htm

Ynet 5 October, 2008, ‘Barak: Russia is breaking the balance in the Middle East’ (Hebrew)
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3605469,00.html

Ynet 19 September, 2010 ‘Israel fear: arms deal with Saudi Arabia might damage the military advantage’
(Hebrew)
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3955883,00.html

Ynet 20 September, 2010 ‘Gul can't find time to meet Peres’
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3957067,00.html

Ynet 20 September, 2010, ‘Peres: Turkey still our friend’
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3957793,00.html

Ynet: 15 October, 2010 ‘ Hariri to Ahmadinejad: Lebanon won't join axis’
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3969992,00.html




                                                          ***

				
DOCUMENT INFO