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					A Strategic Planning
Framework

International Relations 550




San Francisco State University
19 December 2000
I. Elements of the Plan......................................... 1
A. The Identification of the Problem .......................................... 1

B. The Urgency of the Problem ............................................... 3

C. Goals and Objectives ....................................................... 4

D. The Background: Conditions, Events, and/or Actions Leading to the
Problem ........................................................................... 6

E. Lessons from a Past Analogous Case ................................. 10

F. Projection of Current Trends Without Resolution..................... 12

G. Threat Assessment........................................................ 15

H. Opportunity Assessment ................................................. 17

I. Positions and Interests of Contending Parties ......................... 18

II. Construction of Scenarios ........................... 20
A. Guiding Principles.......................................................... 20

B. Proposed Strategy and Tactics for Solving the Problem............ 21

C. Culture Constructs: The Leaders in Context .......................... 23

D. Strength and Weakness of Involved Parties .......................... 25

E. Obstacle Anticipation: Domestic and Foreign......................... 27

III. The Estimation of the Costs and Benefits
of the Scenarios ................................................... 30
IV. Bibliography .................................................... 32




                                        2
 I. Elements of the Plan
      This strategic planning framework for Libya addresses the

problem of U.S. sanctions against Libya. In order to develop the

strategy, we will first identify the dynamics of the U.S. sanctions, rate the

priority of the problem, and identify the objectives to meet the specific

goals. As a background, we will review the history of terrorism and

disinformation in U.S.-Libya relations, and for comparison, the case of

U.S. sanctions and relations with Sudan will be studied. We will also

take a look at current trends, particularly in Libya’s economy, in order to

predict future threats should the U.S. sanctions remain in place. Lastly,

we will assess the level of opportunity at this time to follow the proposed

course of action and the positions and interests of the parties involved.


 A. The Identification of the Problem

U.S. Sanctions, 1986 & 1996

      In reference to U.S.-Libyan relations, Geoff Simon states that “the

Libyan question is not an isolated event, but part of a broader picture in

which a powerful hegemonic state adumbrates to itself the right to define

                                                                            1
moral right and international law in its own perceived interests.1” In brief,

the problem for Libya is that the United States has placed unilateral

economic sanctions for the past 14 years and been the forerunner in

United Nations Security Council Resolutions for multilateral economic

sanctions against Libya for the past 8 years. Both sanctions have

political and security consequences, and both are based on moral

grounds set by the United States according to that country’s interests.


      The economic sanctions imposed on Libya by the U.S. Reagan

administration in January of 1986 came about due to the concern of the

U.S. government “about the murderous terrorist activities instigated by,

and carried out with, the help of Libya and its erratic, outlaw dictator,

Muammar Qaddafi.2” The sanctions prevented U.S. companies from

engaging in new contracts in oil-related economic activities and froze

Libyan assets in the U.S.3


      The sanctions also had political and military consequences as

well. Politically, they succeeded in isolating Libya in international

relations by labeling the country a “rogue” state and spreading


         1
             Simons, Geoff. “Libya: The Struggle for Survival” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 295.
         2
          United States. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sanctions Against Libya: Hearing and Markup before the
         Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. Washington:
         GPO, 1988. 3.


                                                                    2
disinformation about Libya and Qadhafi’s ties to terrorist organizations

and actions. Militarily, the sanctions left an open door to the use of force

by the U.S. who could claim that all other courses had been exhausted.

This U.S. exemplified this attitude in the April 1986 bomb raid of Libya.


 B. The Urgency of the Problem

Priority Rating: 7

      While the problem of U.S. sanctions levied against Libya is the

most important international problem that Libya is currently facing, it is

not the top priority at this time. Libya is working toward increasing her

international status and her economic prospects through improving

relations with other African countries and neighboring European

countries, respectively.


      Nevertheless, if Libya is to fully integrate into the international

political economic system, the sanctions against her must be lifted. The

sanctions are a threat to Libya economically, politically, and militarily as

has been mentioned earlier.


      The impact of the sanctions in practice have not had the effect of

crippling the Libyan economy due to their unilateral nature, although it

         3
             Rose, Gideon. “The United States and Libya.” Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe and Problem


                                                                 3
has benefited European and Asian companies over U.S. companies4.

They have isolated Libya politically, and leave an open door to military

action. This impact was much more severe in the late 1980’s,

particularly during the tense moments of military confrontation between

the U.S. and Libya, but has since been restrained by international

opposition to the hard-line stance of the U.S. Libya policy.


      Another factor affecting the priority of the removal of U.S.

sanctions is that it is a long-term problem. The U.S. placed the initial

sanctions in 1986, 14 years ago. They were reinforced in 1996 with the

Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was particularly significant in its attempt

to place secondary sanctions against foreign companies who invested

more the $40 million in Libya’s oil sector. While on the one hand it is

urgent that Libya has the sanctions lifted to jumpstart the economy, on

the other hand Libya has learned how to work around the sanctions.


 C. Goals and Objectives

End U.S. Sanctions

      Libya’s overall goal is to improve her international relations in

order to improve her international and domestic political economy and


         Countries. Ed. Richard N. Haass. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999. 143.


                                                                4
bring credibility back to the Qadhafi regime that will soon be succeeded

by his son, Saadi Qadhafi5. This strategic planning formulation,

however, is based on the specific, tangible, and realistic goal of ending

the U.S. sanctions levied against Libya.


      The objectives, or means, of achieving this goal are three-fold.

First, Libya must pressure the U.S. Congress to repeal the sanctions.

The U.S. Congress is the body responsible for making the decision to or

not to end sanctions against Libya, and therefore that body is the focus

of the strategy. There are three effective lobbies that can pressure

Congress on behalf of Libya: European countries, U.S. oil companies,

and pro-African lobbies, such as the Nation of Islam. In addition, Libya

should appease those lobbies that would seek to pressure Congress not

to repeal the sanctions in order to soften their objections, such as

AIPAC, Israel, and the families of the Lockerbie victims.


      Second, Libya should meet the demands of the sanctions in the

legal aspects. Without meeting the demands, Libya and those lobbying

for Libya have no case to make for the ending of the sanctions. If the



         4
           Rose, Gideon. “The United States and Libya.” Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe and Problem
         Countries. Ed. Richard N. Haass. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999. 144.
         5
           Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Libya, 2000-2001. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000. 9.


                                                                5
demands are met, the argument can be made that there is no reason to

continue them.


      Last, Qadhafi can tone down the revolutionary and anti-West

rhetoric that he has been made famous for. This will serve to soften the

general U.S. population and the Congress in their attitude toward Libya,

and will make it easier for the U.S. media to present Qadhafi as a

changed man.


 D. The Background: Conditions, Events, and/or Actions
 Leading to the Problem

Terrorism or Disinformation?

      The causes of the problem of the U.S. sanctions against Libya

stems from the misperceptions of the U.S. about Libya’s interests and

intents and from the fear of the Reagan administration in particular of the

growing influence of the “Evil Empire” in the Middle East.


      With the rise of Qadhafi after the Libyan revolution in 1969, there

also arose his ideology of Libyan Islamic socialism. This was an

anathema to the U.S. version of a liberal democracy on two fronts. First

of all, the use of the Shari „a (Islamic law) in civil affairs sharply contrasts

with the concept of the separation of church and state that is so


                                            6
important in the U.S. system. Second, Qadhafi’s version of socialism

and consequent social and economic changes, such as the

nationalization of U.S. oil-companies, positioned him in alliance with the

U.S.S.R. in the perception of the U.S.


      Qadhafi’s relations with the U.S.S.R. did nothing to dispel U.S.

fears of losing ground in the Middle East. In 1972, Libya and the

U.S.S.R. signed cooperation agreements, and in 1974 they signed their

first major arms deal6. Between the closure of western bases and

nationalization of western oil companies, Qadhafi’s anti-imperialist

rhetoric and ideological conflict with the U.S., and on top of that the

seeking of agreements with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. viewed Libya as

tipping the international balance of power in favor of the Soviets,

particularly once Reagan and his black-and-white thinking came to

power.


      In order to combat this, the U.S. began a disinformation campaign

and a covert military strategy designed to destabilize Qadhafi’s regime

and isolate Libya in the world system7. The campaign included planted

evidence to convince Qadhafi that his life was in danger and implicating


         6
          Vandewalle, Dirk. “Chronology of a Revolution.” Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969-1994. Ed. Dirk Vandewalle. New York: St.
         Martin’s Press, 1995. xxv-xxvi.


                                                               7
Libya in terrorist activities whether or not the U.S. had sufficient

evidence to make those claims. Among them included the bombing of a

disco on 5 April 1986 in West Berlin frequented by U.S. servicemen.

Two soldiers were killed.


      In retaliation for the bombing, the Reagan administration ordered

the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986, killing between 40

and 100 civilians, and one soldier8. By then, U.S. sanctions against

Libya had already been place since January of that year, leaving the

door open for exactly this kind of situation. William Blum reviews the

questionable evidence of the U.S. in implicating Libya in the case of the

West Berlin disco, and comes to the conclusion that “Qaddafi’s principal

crime in Reagan’s eyes was not that he supported terrorist groups, but

that he supported the wrong terrorist groups; i.e., Qaddafi was not

supporting the same terrorists that Washington was . . .9”


      In addition to the disinformation campaign, the U.S. initiated an

economic campaign against Libya beginning 1985 with sanction on oil-

related activities for U.S. companies in Libya, and in 1986 with much

         7
           Blum, William. “Libya 1981-1989: Ronald Reagan meets his match”. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA
         Interventions since World War II. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995. 283.
         8
           Reagan Strikes Gadhafi – April, 14, 1986. “CNN’s John Donvan describes the attack”
         http://www.cnn.com/resources/video.almanac/1986/index2.html#libya
         9
           Blum, William. “Libya 1981-1989: Ronald Reagan meets his match”. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA
         Interventions since World War II. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995. 282.


                                                                8
broader sanctions. By 1992, the U.S. had succeeded in convincing the

international United Nations Security Council that multilateral sanctions

should be enforced against Libya with resolution 748, and in 1996 the

U.S. instituted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which added secondary

sanctions to foreign companies.


      There have been a few attempts to resolve this problem on the

part of Qadhafi. For example, in an attempt to preempt the further

deterioration of U.S.-Libyan relations, during 1978 and 1979, both the

U.S. and Libya sent delegations to each other’s countries for talks.

Another attempt of Libya was in 1999, when Libya finally met the three

demands of the UNSC sanctions to pay compensation to the family of

Yvonne Fletcher, the policewoman killed in the machine-gunning of anti-

Libyan demonstrators in London, to pay compensation to France for the

shooting down of a UTA plane over Chad, and to turn in the two Libyan

suspects of Pan Am flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland10.


      The success record of these attempts is a failure. The talks in

1978-1979 ending in no positive result, and the meeting of the UNSC

demands has only resulted in the suspension of sanctions, and not the

lifting of sanctions, due to the use of the U.S. veto power on ending the


                                        9
sanctions completely. And U.S. sanctions are still in place. Ambassador

Ronald Neumann emphasized that “as a practical matter, we will not be

able to assure ourselves that Libya is cooperating fully with the

[Lockerbie] trial until after it is substantially underway.11”


 E. Lessons from a Past Analogous Case

Sudan

      In order to have a greater understanding of the nature of the

problem between Libya and the U.S., we can look at a similar case

between the U.S. and Libya’s neighbor, Sudan. The differences

between the two countries could affect their ability to deal with the U.S.


      Like Libya, Sudan has been accused by the United States of

actively contributing to terrorism and of proliferating chemical weapons.

Sudan’s threat has been termed a “national emergency,12” paving the

way for economic sanctions which were set in place in 1997 by the U.S.

and soon after by the UN, and for military actions to follow.


      The U.S. plagued Sudan with a bomb raid just a few months after

the declaration of economic sanctions, in 1998. The bombing was of a


          10
            Deeb, Mary-Jane. “Qadhafi’s Changed Policy: Causes and Consequences.” Middle East Policy 7.2 (2000):146.
          11
            United States. Committee on International Relations. U.S.-Libya Relations: A New Era?: Hearing before the
          Subcommittee on Africa. Washington: GPO, 2000. 4.


                                                              10
pharmaceutical plant where the Sudanese were supposedly building

chemical weapons.


      What can we learn from the case of Sudan and U.S. sanctions?

The significance lies in the differences in the objective conditions of

Libya and Sudan. First of all, Sudan is one of the poorest countries in

Africa, while Libya is the richest.


      This disparity is due to the abundance of high quality crude oil that

Libya has and the world demands. As a result of this demand, Libya has

maintained European support both economically and politically,

particularly with Italy, Spain, and Germany. This fact puts Libya in a

better negotiating position than Sudan who has very little to trade.


      In addition, Libya is emerging as a leader in the African continent.

The Organization of African Unity recently convened in Tripoli and

Qadhafi has been actively involved in peace-making missions in Sierre

Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This leadership position

gives Qadhafi the backing of many African leaders and gives him and

Libya a higher status in the international system. As a result, Qadhafi is

in a better negotiating position.


         12
              United States. Executive Order. Sudan Sanctions. http://www.usis-


                                                                  11
 F. Projection of Current Trends Without Resolution

Libya’s Stifled Economy
      13
           Ironically, the consequences of the U.S. and UN sanctions have

not had the effect of crippling Libya’s economy, although growth has

been stifled. Instead, the U.S. has suffered both economically and

politically due to indirect effects of limitations on the ability of U.S. firms

to invest in Libya’s oil industry.



                            Libyan Economic Trends ($m )

                                   External Debt                         GDP
                                   FDI                                   Oil Exports

       25,000

       20,000

       15,000

       10,000

        5,000

                  0
                      2

                               3

                                        4

                                                  5

                                                            6

                                                                     7

                                                                               8
                   9

                             9

                                      9

                                                9

                                                          9

                                                                    9

                                                                             9
                 9

                           9

                                     9

                                              9

                                                        9

                                                                  9

                                                                           9
               1

                         1

                                   1

                                            1

                                                      1

                                                                1

                                                                         1




            israel.org.il/publish/econews/1997/november/eco1104e.html
            13
               Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Libya, 2000-2001. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000. 9.


                                                                    12
      As we can see from the above chart, Libya’s economy has not

been greatly affected by the sanctions. The only major drop was in

revenue from oil exports, but the overall drop in world oil prices was

probably the main factor. In addition, we can see that Libya’s external

debt actually has gone down during sanctions, positively affecting the

economy.


      On the other hand, we also see that foreign direct investment and

gross national product have been stifled, and this has adversely affected

Libya’s economic growth. Yet, considering the sanctions and low world

oil prices, Libya was able to maintain a stable economy and even

improve due to trade with European markets.


      For the U.S., the consequences of not resolving the issue are also

disheartening. U.S. oil companies are at a disadvantage against their

European and Asian counterparts. Especially with the suspension of UN

sanctions and the subsequent pursuit of Libyan contracts by several

foreign oil companies, U.S. firms are starting to wonder who is being

punished by the sanctions.


      The U.S. government is feeling the pinch also. In a report given by

U.S. President Clinton updating the Committee on International


                                        13
Relations on the sanctions, he stated that in the January – July 1999 six

month period “the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control] has collected

7 civil monetary penalties totaling $38,000” and that expenses directly

related to “the declaration of the Libyan national emergency are

estimated at approximately $4.4 million.14”


      As if the economic consequences for the U.S. were not enough,

politically the U.S. policy is creating greater and greater tensions with

European Union. In fact, the E.U. has threatened to bring the U.S. to

court in the W.T.O. based on unfair secondary sanctions from the Iran-

Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 that punishes non-U.S. firms from investing

more that $40 million in Libya’s oil industry and thereby hinders trade15.


      The consequences for the rest of the world in general are the

continuing international and regional instability caused by the U.S.

sanctions on Libya in particular. The stifled Libyan economy has caused

domestic unrest within Libya that has effects on Libya’s regional

relations, especially in terms of foreign workers who are currently being

forced out of Libya to make room for Libyan workers. Internationally,



         14
            United States. Committee on International Relations. A Report on Developments Concerning Executive Order
         12543. Washington: GOP, 1999. 2.
         15
            Rose, Gideon. “The United States and Libya.” Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe and Problem
         Countries. Ed. Richard N. Haass. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999. 153.


                                                              14
while U.S. – E.U. tensions affect those two parties the most, they also

have a significant affect on the world system.


 G. Threat Assessment

U.S. Disadvantaged

      From our previous discussion of the current trends without

resolution, we can predict possible threats should the U.S. sanctions

against Libya persist.


      For Libya, it is clear that the persistence of the sanctions would

continue to be an obstacle to economic development. If the sanctions

continue, Libya will be even more dependent on the European markets

as the basis for her economic well-being, and this will not suffice to

develop and grow economically.


      As we have mentioned earlier, as long as the sanctions are in

place, the U.S. is only one step away from using military intervention.

This creates an unstable political environment that discourages long-

term foreign investment, especially in infrastructure.


      However, the threat to the U.S. of persistence of the sanctions is

also great. If the sanctions persist, the U.S. will continue to throw away


                                         15
money to enforce sanctions that are not having their desired affect while

at the same time prohibiting U.S. companies from benefiting from trade

with Libya. Increasing tensions with E.U. would be equally damaging to

U.S. interests, and to the U.S. pocketbook should the case against the

U.S. in the W.T.O go through.


      In addition, the U.S. attitude toward countries like Libya could

contribute to a reformation of Cold War alliances as Russia tries to come

back as a world leader, and this could have adverse consequences to

the U.S. and the world as a whole.


      For the European Union, the persistence of ILSA would increase

hostilities with the U.S. due to sovereignty infringement from the

secondary sanctions. It would also be costly to the Europeans whether

they submitted to the conditions of ILSA and didn’t invest in Libya, or

whether they ignored ILSA and suffered the consequences of U.S.

sanctions, should they be enforced.


      While it is the goal of this strategy to end the U.S. sanctions, we

should take a moment to examine the threats of doing so.


      First of all, in the U.S. there are several groups who would feel

threatened by the lifting of sanctions. The families of the Lockerbie

                                        16
bombing victims would feel threatened because of their fear that Qadhafi

could strike again in terrorist activities and not be held accountable. The

American-Israel Public Affairs Committee would be threatened because

of the possible consequences to Israel. A real security threat to the U.S.

would be Libya’s chemical weapons capabilities and precedent in using

them. Second, Israel would be threatened if the sanctions were lifted

due to Libyan hostility toward Israel and the chemical weapons security

threat especially considering that Libya is on the verge of acquiring

ballistic missiles with the ability to reach Israeli cities16.


 H. Opportunity Assessment

Opportune Timing

      Now is an opportune time for Libya to pursue the lifting of U.S.

sanctions because of the domestic and international situations of both

the U.S. and Libya.


      The domestic situation of the U.S. makes now the opportune time

because Libya has conformed to UN demands and turned in the two

Libyan suspects of the Lockerbie bombing, thereby bringing some sense

of movement to the families of the victims. In addition, oil companies are

          16
             Sinai, Joshua. “Qadhafi Quest” Near East Report. AIPAC, 20 March 2000.
          http://www.aipac.org/result.cfm?tableName=ner&id=269


                                                               17
eager to get into the Libyan market. Internationally, the U.S. is isolated in

her Libya policy and therefore is finding that the policy of economic

sanctions is ineffective without multilateral support.


      For Libya, naturally there is domestic support for ending the

sanctions. Internationally, Libya is improving her international status

through warming ties with Europe and a leadership role in Africa.


      The domestic and international situations of the U.S. and Libya

makes this an opportune time because both countries have interests in

seeing the sanctions lifted for economic reasons, the argument of the

U.S. for the sanctions is weaker with the compliance of Libya with UN

sanctions, and the support for Libya is stronger with her improving

international status.


 I. Positions and Interests of Contending Parties

Conflicts and Convergence

      The positions and interests of the parties involved in the problem

are important to examine in detail in order to find points of conflict of

interests and points of convergence of interests and the reasons why. In

this way, we can locate the foci of possible solutions to the problem.



                                          18
      The positions of the parties, in brief, are that Libya and the

European Union would like to see the sanctions lifted, while the U.S.

would like to keep them in place.


      All three parties have interests in oil, with Libya wanting to export

and the E.U. and the U.S. needing to import. But this is where the

convergence of interests ends.


      Libya is interested in integrating back into the international political

economy and normalizing relations with other countries.


      The E.U. is interested in engaging Libya in order to bring her back

into the world system and to take advantage of her oil reserves, which

converges with Libyan interests. In addition, in terms of secondary

sanctions, the E.U. is concerned about her pride, economic interests,

the principle that secondary sanctions hinder trade, and the political

instability if Qadhafi is removed from power17. This conflicts with U.S.

interests.


      The U.S. however, is interested in her security and therefore

wants to isolate Libya in the world system, regardless of the economic

consequences. This conflicts with both Libyan and E.U. interests.



                                          19
 II. Construction of Scenarios
      Now that we have taken a close look at the various aspects of the

problem of the U.S. sanctions against Libya, we will move on to a

detailed plan for solving the problem. We will begin with the guiding

principles of using diplomacy, and then give an overview of the strategy

of pressuring the U.S. Congress to lift the sanctions. We cover the

culture constructs of the countries and their leaders, and make an

assessment of their relative economic, political, and military strengths

and weaknesses, and finally we offer ways to combat possible obstacles

that will arise in public opinion, both foreign and domestic.


 A. Guiding Principles

Diplomacy

      There are four guiding principles that Libya should follow in its

pursuit of lifting the U.S. sanctions. First, Libya should not use or

threaten the use of terrorism. Second, she also should not use or

threaten the use of biological or chemical weapons. Third, she should

have a preference for diplomatic initiatives as opposed to economic or

         17
              Rose, Gideon. “The United States and Libya.” Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe and Problem


                                                                 20
military courses of action. Fourth, her actions should be determined by

international law and written agreements, especially concerning the legal

aspects of the sanctions and of the Lockerbie trial.


 B. Proposed Strategy and Tactics for Solving the Problem

U.S. Congress

      The U.S. Congress is the key to having U.S. sanctions against

Libya lifted and therefore the proposed strategy is to place internal and

external diplomatic pressure on the U.S. Congress to repeal sanctions.


      The tactics for achieving this strategy are to appease the

opposition to soften their objections, to launch a media campaign to gain

sympathy, to use U.S. lobbies as advocates in Congress, and to

pressure U.S. international allies to lobby for Libya.


      The opposition, that is, those groups who have no interest in

seeing the sanctions against Libya lifted and would oppose because of

their own reasons, can have their objections softened through

appeasement. These groups include the families of the Lockerbie

bombing, AIPAC, and Israel.



         Countries. Ed. Richard N. Haass. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999. 153.


                                                               21
      The media campaign would be designed mainly to create

sympathy among the general U.S. population by projecting Libya as a

victim of U.S. economic sanctions, which is hurting not the government,

but rather the regular innocent civilians who do not have access to basic

necessities due to the sanctions.


      The main U.S. lobbies that Libya should contact to gain support

would be the oil companies and the pro-African lobbies. Both of these

groups have vested interests in the lifting of the sanctions. The oil

companies would obviously benefit from such an action. Pro-African

lobbies, such as the National of Islam, would also benefit by creating

greater Africa-Diaspora ties and relations, especially considering

Qadhafi’s rise in reputation in the African continent.


      Lastly, Libya can pressure U.S. European and Asian allies who

have oil interests in Libya, namely the E.U. and Japan. The U.K., Italy,

and several other European countries have already warmed relations

since the suspension of UN sanctions, and Libya should use their

connections with the U.S. to further isolate the U.S. in her policy toward

Libya and pressure her to lift the sanctions.




                                          22
 C. Culture Constructs: The Leaders in Context

Libya

      While the U.S. and Libya have very different systems of

government, their leaders both have a great amount of power in their

foreign relations. We now examine how the culture constructs of Libya

and Qadhafi interact with those of the U.S. and our future president,

whether he is George W. Bush or Al Gore.


      Libyan leader Col. Muammar al-Qadhafi, while being a military

dictator, does reflect the culture constructs of Libyan society. The long

history of foreign rule in Libya has given Qadhafi an anti-imperialist

attitude.   The current events of Libyan international relations have

proven the value of media warfare in shaping public opinion. His

ideology is that of Islamic socialism. Libya’s national goals include a

Pan-African policy to achieve greater independence. Libya’s values and

norms stem from Libya’s tradition tribal culture of regionalism and

pastoralism. The longing for independence is his greatest emotion.


      These culture constructs differ greatly from those of the U.S. in

significant ways. Since we do not yet know who is officially the next U.S.




                                        23
president, we will look at the culture constructs of the U.S. and

Bush/Gore as a whole.


      First of all, the history of the U.S. has influenced the country

culturally by creating a missionary or philanthropic character, the

opposite of Qadhafi’s anti-imperialism. Current events have also taught

us about media warfare, particularly in the use of information and

disinformation to influence decision-making of actors. The ideology of

the U.S. is a liberal democracy. The paramount national goal of the U.S.

is to maintain the power that she currently enjoys. U.S. values are based

in the Christian religion, which contrasts with that of Libya’s Islamic

tradition. The strongest emotion of Bush/Gore is the feeling of superiority

over other countries.


      There are some differences between the Bush and Gore ideology

considering that one is a republican and the other a democrat. The EIU

Country Report for December 2000 foresees that U.S. oil firms will

advocate for the lifting of sanctions and says that the ILSA sanctions

may not be renewed in August 200118.




         18
              Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Libya, December 2000. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000.



                                                                 24
 D. Strength and Weakness of Involved Parties

Political, Economic, and Military Assessment

      Now that we have looked at the culture constructs of Libya and the

U.S., we will look at the overall strengths and weaknesses of the two

countries in terms of political, economic, and military capabilities.


      Libya’s strengths are predominantly political, while economically

she poses strengths and weaknesses, and military she has no strengths

at all in dealing with the U.S.


      Politically, Libya is integrating into the international system by

improving relations with European countries and taking a leadership

position in Africa. This rise in status strengthens Libya’s credibility and

ability to put pressure on the U.S.


      Economically, Libya has the benefit of comparative advantage in

the oil market with 95% of her production being the highest quality crude

oil and her low transportation costs due to the proximity to Europe. This

proximity is the main reason for another strength of Libya’s strong

European trade relations. On the other hand, Libya is also economically

weak due to extremely poor economic capabilities and low quality of

labor, technology, and industrial capabilities.

                                          25
      Libya is weakest in her military assessment. She has a weak

conventional     military    burdened      by     deteriorating   equipment,

approximately 60% of which is in storage. Libya spends 5% of her GDP

on military expenditures. In order to compensate for her military

weakness, Libya has built a chemical weapons program. This has

actually worked against Libya in the case of the U.S. though, since the

use of chemical weapons against the U.S. would only serve to bring

strong and swift military retaliation to Libya.


      The U.S. is obviously stronger in terms of economic and military

capabilities, but in terms of political capabilities the U.S. has both

strengths and weaknesses.


      The U.S. clearly has a strong and steady economy, even though it

is currently experiencing a slowdown. Her economic capabilities and

conditions are healthy and well managed. In addition, the U.S. can

afford the costs of the sanctions. Militarily, the U.S. does have the power

to use force against Libya if it so chooses.


      Politically, the U.S. is one of the most powerful countries in the

world, especially considering its standing as a permanent member of the

UN Security Council with veto power. However, in terms of her policies


                                           26
toward “rogue” nations, and her Libya policy in particular, the U.S. is

isolated due to the preference of European countries of engagement

and their distaste for U.S. extraterritorial policy-making in reference to

secondary sanctions.


 E. Obstacle Anticipation: Domestic and Foreign

Public Opinion

      The greatest obstacle to the strategy of pressuring the U.S.

Congress to lift the sanctions against Libya is from public opinion and

the possible lack of support for this course of action. This obstacle can

be overcome, however, through media campaigns and appeasement on

the part of Libya.


      Domestically, almost all Libyans would look upon the lifting of U.S.

sanctions favorably. However, some Libyans might perceive Qadhafi’s

actions as giving in to U.S. hegemony or giving up on the Palestinian

cause – both are issues that Qadhafi has taken pride in advocating

about. Qadhafi can combat this through a media campaign designed to

shape public opinion about his actions to show that it is not Qadhafi

bowing down to the U.S., but rather the U.S. bowing to Qadhafi.




                                        27
      Shaping foreign opinion may not be as simple though. Qadhafi

has to deal with the opinion of the general world population, lobbies

such as AIPAC, Israel, the families of the Lockerbie victims, and the

U.S. Congress itself. To influence general world opinion, Libya can use

both a media campaign portraying Libya as a victim suffering from U.S.

sanctions, and an appeasement strategy.


      In the case of AIPAC and Israel, Libya should stop supporting

Palestinian or other groups against Israel, and should give support to the

Palestinian Authority. He does not have to make these actions public in

order to have the desired effect, since public knowledge of these actions

could undermine his domestic credibility as an advocate for the

Palestinian cause. Simply stopping economic and military aid to these

groups and giving it instead to the P.A. would be enough, since AIPAC

and Israel would most likely be tracking such transactions. This would

not eliminate AIPAC and Israel as obstacles, but it would soften their

objections.


      In the case of the families of the Lockerbie victims, they have

already had some of their wishes met with the turning over of the two

Libyan suspects for trial in the Netherlands under Scottish law and


                                        28
judges. Most of them are probably unsure as to whether or not the two

suspects were actually involved, and ultimately, if the suspects are

found not guilty, the families would no longer be an obstacle. Until then

though, Qadhafi’s continued cooperation with the trial would lessen their

objection to the lifting of sanctions.


      The U.S. Congress itself poses an obstacle to this strategy

because many of them are hard-liners against the “rogue” states. With

the nearly even division between republicans and democrats, it may be

difficult for anything to be passed, especially a controversial subject such

as the lifting of sanctions against Libya. However, Libya should pressure

U.S. oil companies to pressure republicans by explaining how much

they are losing to their European and Asian competitors, and by making

promises of special deals should sanctions be lifted. At the same time,

Libya should make contacts with pro-African lobbies, such as the Nation

of Islam, and promote Africa-Diaspora relations by encouraging cultural

exchange between U.S. citizens of African descent and Africans.

Qadhafi can also give “charity” to certain pro-African lobbies to pressure

democrats to lift the sanctions.




                                         29
 III. The Estimation of the Costs and
 Benefits of the Scenarios
      Now that we have fully examined the problem of U.S. sanctions

against Libya and reviewed the strategy for solving the problem, we will

conclude with a summary of the costs and benefits of this strategy.


      We can see that there are economic, political, and psychological

benefits of the strategy of using diplomatic pressure to convince the U.S.

Congress to lift sanctions against Libya.


      The economic benefits would be that Libya would have access to

the U.S. oil market, which is a necessity for Libya’s economic

development. The strategy would also help Libya politically improve her

foreign relations with Europe and on the African continent, and would

increase Libya’s domestic and regional stability. Psychologically,

Qadhafi and Libya’s pride would remain intact because he would not

have to directly confront U.S. leaders and succumb to their demands,

and Libya would achieve greater sovereignty with the lessening of U.S.

intervention.




                                            30
      The costs to Libya are far outweighed by the benefits, but should

still be taken into consideration. Contributions to U.S. lobbies and to the

P.A. would have an economic impact on Libya, but certainly would not

cripple the economy. Politically, Qadhafi may lose his credibility as a

“revolutionary,” but this would only be negative to less powerful militias

looking toward Libya for support. The majority of nations would look at

the loss of revolutionary status as a positive. Psychologically, Qadhafi

would be breaking away from his Third Universal Theory, but in reality

he never followed it anyways.


      Obviously, this strategy has greater benefits than costs in all

aspects, economic, political, and psychological. Therefore, Libya should

pursue a strategy of pressuring lobbies and allies of the U.S. Congress

to   advocate     for   the     lifting   of    sanctions   against   Libya.




                                           31
 IV. Bibliography

      Scholarly Books

Blum, William. “Libya 1981-1989: Ronald Reagan meets his match”.
     Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War
     II. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995.
     Mr. Blum covers the covert military actions and disinformation
     campaign launched by the Reagan administration against
     Qadhafi. It brings to light the possibility that the U.S. may have
     made up many of the terrorist activities that Libya was accused of
     being involved in and the process by which the CIA “leaks”
     information to the media in order to shape public opinion.

Simons, Geoff. “Libya: The Struggle for Survival” New York: St. Martin’s
     Press, 1993.
     Mr. Simons covers the international history of Libya, briefly
     covering ancient times, and thoroughly investigating relations
     between Libya and the West over Lockerbie, the effects of oil, the
     1969 revolution, recent international ambitions (1970s – present),
     and relations with the U.S. He particularly focuses on the U.S.
     overt and covert campaigns to remove Qadhafi from power.

      Scholarly Articles

Deeb, Mary-Jane. “Qadhafi’s Changed Policy: Causes and
     Consequences.” Middle East Policy 7.2 (2000)
     Ms. Deeb comments specifically on the changing policies of
     Qadhafi toward the west in light of the meeting of the demands of
     the UN resolutions. She concludes that it is too early to tell
     whether the changes only for the immediate goal of revamping the
     economy to bolster support for Qadhafi and his son, or if they are
     fundamental changes in Libyan attitudes toward the west.



                                        32
Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Libya, 2000-2001. London:
     Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000.
     Detailed profile of the current economic situation in Libya with
     political, historical, and environmental background information.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Libya, December 2000.
     London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000.
     The article discusses the most current political and economic
     trends in Libya, emphasizing the possible effects on the status of
     the sanctions should Bush become president of the U.S.

Rose, Gideon. “The United States and Libya.” Transatlantic Tensions:
     The United States, Europe and Problem Countries. Ed. Richard
     N. Haass. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999. 140-
     162.
     The article emphasizes the tensions between the U.S. and Europe
     over the Libya “problem.” It gives background information on the
     history of U.S.-European-Libyan relations, consequences of
     actions, interests of the parties, costs and benefits of the
     sanctions, and offers solutions on the part of the U.S.

Sinai, Joshua. “Qadhafi Quest” Near East Report. AIPAC, 20 March
       2000. http://www.aipac.org/result.cfm?tableName=ner&id=269
       Mr. Sinai discusses U.S. Libya policy in light of current events,
       emphasizing the Libyan acquisition of chemical weapons and
       long-range delivery systems.

Vandewalle, Dirk. Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969-1994. Ed. Dirk Vandewalle.
     New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
     Mr. Vandewalle gives a detailed chronology of domestic and
     foreign highlights in Libya‟s history. The selection of articles
     emphasize Libya‟s domestic political system.

      Government Documents

United States. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sanctions Against Libya:
      Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
      its Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade.
      Washington: GPO, 1988.


                                         33
      Reiterates original sanctions in 1986 emphasizing Libya‟s and
      Qadhafi‟s support of international terrorism as the reason for U.S.
      economic sanctions.

United States. Committee on International Relations. U.S.-Libya
      Relations: A New Era?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
      Africa. Washington: GPO, 2000.
      Most recent hearing on U.S.-Libyan relations. Wide variety of
      testimonies with varying opinions from Ambassadors to scholars
      to former Libyan diplomat Mansour el-Kikhia. Many of the
      testimonies were from people cited in this and the FPO paper.

United States. Committee on International Relations. A Report on
      Developments Concerning Executive Order 12543. Washington:
      GOP, 1999.
      A report by President Clinton updating the original 1986 sanctions,
      emphasizing the cost to the U.S. government of enforcing them,
      and vowing to persist in the sanctions as long as Libya is a
      national emergency. He does not specify what constitutes a
      national emergency.

United States. Executive Order. Sudan Sanctions. http://www.usis-
      israel.org.il/publish/econews/1997/november/eco1104e.html
      An order similar to that of the 1986 sanctions on Libya calling for
      implementing sanctions against Sudan for terrorist activities and
      chemical weapon proliferation.

      Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Reagan Strikes Gadhafi – April, 14, 1986. “CNN’s John Donvan
    describes the attack”
    http://www.cnn.com/resources/video.almanac/1986/index2.html#li
    bya
    The news report covers the 1986 bombing of Tripoli and
    Benghazi, emphasizing that all targets were civilian. Original video
    news report.




                                         34

				
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