The CAA Accident Prevention Leaflet 2/2004 issued June
PFA Rally- Kemble 9-11 July
The Popular Flying Association (PFA) is hosting its annual rally at Kemble between 9th and 11th July this year. As
is traditional for such an event, the airspace around Kemble and other local aerodromes will become extremely
crowded. Pilots intending to fly either to the rally itself, or anywhere in the area, are reminded that they MUST
comply with the restrictions and procedures notified in the AICs which have been issued. The procedures,
although apparently a little complex, are quite specific for the various categories of arrival and departure.
It should be noted that there were a number of incidents last year of pilots apparently totally ignoring the agreed
procedures, and several who actually infringed Controlled Airspace. We understand there were even some who
completely mis-identified other airfields as their intended destination.
Details of this AIC are available on the NATS website www.ais.org.uk. In addition, the Directorate of Airspace
Policy has included an online map and aerial photographs on the ‘ontrack’ section of the ‘aeronautical charts and
data’ section of the ‘airspace’ part of the CAA’s web site. The map and photographs may be read or downloaded
Airspace will become extremely crowded
PFA Rally ......................................................................... 1 The benefits of a UK IMC rating abroad .......................9 Fly-ins and showing off ................................................ 17
Attention foreign pilots ................................................... 2 Introduction of ‘Mode S’ in UK airspace ................10-11 Class and type ratings - keep them valid .................... 18
Attention British pilots .................................................... 2 Time to act? ....................................................................12 CAA charts - England South ....................................... 18
The cluttered pilot ........................................................... 2 Overheated MOGAS .....................................................12 Sinking air ...................................................................... 19
Aeroplanes bite the hand that feeds them ..................... 3 IFR cross-channel flights ............................................12 Don’t be shy! .................................................................. 19
Brakes suspect? .............................................................. 3 Don’t rely on the autopilot .............................................13 Word for all seasons ..................................................... 19
Safety in Spin Training ................................................4-5 Teamwork........................................................................14
Aerobatics ........................................................................ 6 Instrument approaches ..................................................14
Farnborough restricted airspace .................................. 6 Practising instrument procedures ...............................15
Lookout and avoid ............................................................ 7 GPS backup on instrument approaches ......................15
Loss of control in cloud .................................................. 8 What are these ? ....................................................16
GPS databases ................................................................ 8 Carburettor ice detection ..............................................16
Glider sites ...................................................................... 9 1
Suitable weather? ..........................................................17
Attention foreign pilots!
We know that pilots from overseas read GASIL, usually on the CAA web site. Mainly for their benefit, we would
like to publicise the guidance material for VFR flight in UK airspace which is published on the CAA web site at
www.caa.co.uk/dap through “aeronautical charts and data” and “VFR Guide”. The guide contains most of the
differences which foreign pilots may experience when flying VFR in UK airspace compared with their own. We
strongly recommend that any pilot flying to the UK should read at least the sections that he expects to apply to
his flights, well in advance.
Attention British pilots!
As explained above, the UK publishes guidance material for VFR flight in UK airspace. As recent articles,
including those in this issue, have highlighted, British pilots flying abroad will find as many differences in foreign
airspace as foreigners find here. Most countries provide similar information on web sites, usually provided by their
aeronautical information services such as SIA in France (details in issue 1 of 2004) and DFS in Germany. We
strongly recommend that any pilot flying abroad from the UK should search for, obtain and study whatever information
is published well in advance of his flight.
The cluttered pilot
We know that several aircraft owners and operators, especially those with relatively small aircraft, have invested
in equipment for use in the air, but prefer not to make modifications to their aircraft. Satellite navigation devices
spring to mind as the most common type of ‘hand-held’ equipment carried in the cockpit, but other pieces of
equipment are also to be found. With the requirement to carry secondary radar transponders in all aircraft and
the development of lightweight transponders to comply with that requirement, it is likely that even more ‘hand-
held’ equipment may be carried in aircraft. This however carries inherent dangers, and pilots must be aware of
Loose articles in a cockpit are possible sources of control restriction, and so many pilots attach the equipment
either to the aircraft structure or to themselves with
temporary fixings. Any such temporary fixings must
not only be secure in normal flight conditions but
Loose articles in a cockpit are
must also be capable of restraining the object possible sources of control restriction
(including any wiring) in the most extreme
manoeuvres which the aircraft is expected (permitted)
to fly. Pilots of aircraft with open (or non-existent) cockpits may find it convenient to carry equipment in the
pockets of their flying suits. Again, the pockets and attached wiring must be capable of restraining the objects
in all conditions of flight.
However, the flight conditions are only part of the problem. Pilots should consider the possible effects of the
equipment coming loose in the event of a forced landing onto a rough surface, and the possible consequences if
the aircraft comes to a sudden stop. It is unlikely that hand-held equipment will ever be able to be carried in
conditions as safe as those which approved modifications are intended to ensure, but a little serious thought
should be able to minimise the risk.
Editorial office: General Aviation Department (attn GASIL Editor), Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority,
Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Telephone (01293) 573225
Fax (01293) 573973 e-mail: email@example.com.
Distribution (non-subscribers): GAD Admin, address and fax as above. Telephone (01293) 573503.
Subscriptions: £16 per annum (credit cards accepted), contact GAD (Admin) address and fax as above.
Telephone (01293) 573503.
Photocopying and extracts: Photocopying this leaflet is permitted and short extracts can be published provided the source is
Content: CAA staff comment and deductions are based on available information. The authenticity of the
contents, or the absence of errors and omissions cannot be guaranteed. Nothing in GASIL
relieves any pilot, operator or engineer of his/her duty to ascertain and comply with ALL
applicable regulations and formal documents.
Aeroplanes bite the hand that feeds them
In an AAIB report in their bulletin 3 of 2004 we read of a crew member attempting to start an Aeronca Chief by hand
swinging the propeller, which in this aircraft was the normal procedure. On the previous day, the swinger had
apparently spent almost two hours attempting to start the engine but to no avail. The engine was cold, and not
fitted with an impulse magneto, which would be expected to produce a spark at the optimum point during the
On the second swing of the propeller this particular morning, however, the engine ‘coughed and kicked back’.
The swinger was caught off guard and hit by the trailing edge of the metal propeller blade, which caused a deep
laceration and fractured a bone.
The AAIB note that this is the fifth instance since February 2000 that a propeller being hand swung has caused
injury to the person carrying out a hand swing. On three of these occasions the engine was not expected to
start. We must always treat a propeller as live and liable to cause injury.
We read in an accident bulletin from the BEA (French AAIB) of the pilot who taxied a Robin DR400 up to the
refuelling pump behind another aircraft, and failed to stop until he collided with it. The report states that no
problem was obvious with the brakes during the post –accident investigation.
However, the report also indicates that a week or so earlier, a pilot had mentioned he had needed to ‘pump’ the
brakes of this aeroplane before they had full effect. This had however not been entered in the technical log,
although apparently an engineer had investigated the occurrence. In fact, after the accident damage had been
repaired, the brake fault manifested itself again and the master cylinders were replaced, as was the parking
brake valve. Since then there has been no recurrence of the fault.
It is possible that aircraft in this country may be in a similar situation. Sometimes it is difficult to cure an
intermittent problem, but a record of problems discovered and action taken must be available to future pilots, so
that they can at least exercise increased care.
Safety in Spin Training
We published this article from a CAA Flight Examiner two years ago. As a result of recent events, we are
repeating it here. While many pilots may have no intention of spinning their aeroplanes, or getting into an extreme
attitude, there are several who need, or wish to, and for them this should be required reading. For the rest of us,
the most important part is the first sentence in the paragraph on “spin recovery action”.
Each year there are a number of occurrences which involve spinning in some form; there are probably still more
incidents where pilots give themselves a good fright and put it down to experience, being too embarrassed to tell
anyone about it. This article is an attempt to give guidance to those involved in spin training or those who wish
to explore the envelope of their aeroplane.
What is spinning? The spin is a stalled condition of flight with the aeroplane rolling pitching and yawing all at the
same time. There are aerodynamic forces and gyroscopic forces (caused by the rotating mass of the aeroplane)
which may be either pro-spin or anti-spin. In a stable spin the aerodynamic and gyroscopic forces balance out
leaving the aeroplane rolling pitching and yawing at a constant rate.
So what? A control input may have aerodynamic and/or gyroscopic effects and consequently it can be difficult to
predict the effect that any pilot input may have on a spin. If you are going to spin (or fly aerobatics) it is important
to minimise the unpredictable elements. Firstly have you read the manufacturers recommendations in the AFM?
Is the aeroplane fully serviceable; would you spin or aero an aeroplane that exhibits odd stalling characteristics?
Some have and regretted it! Is the type cleared for spinning and are there any mass and balance considerations?
Have you got the right tool for the job? The Cessna 150/152 Aerobat is widely available but its spin characteristics
are unusual. For example it is reluctant to spin, usually needs a small amount of power to sustain it, and will
recover often before full spin recovery action is taken. This may be OK as an introduction but does it really
prepare a pilot to spin other light aeroplanes?
Using anything other than FULL pro-spin controls during the spin may well aggravate the spin:
• In many aeroplanes relaxing the rudder or elevator a little (or not continuing forward movement of the control
column sufficiently during recovery) will induce a high-rotational spin.
• Using power can have several effects; firstly the propeller is a gyroscope and at high rpm it produces
precessional forces, which may upset the gyroscopic balance of the spin, often flattening the spin attitude;
the propeller slipstream will change the effect of the rudder and elevator. (For these reasons the first recovery
action is usually to close the throttle).
• Using aileron may promote recovery or it may increase the rate of yaw.
Any of these unusual inputs may cause flat, high rotational, or oscillatory spins (or some combination of these).
It is important to realise that recovery from such spins may be considerably prolonged and lead to greater height
Spin training requires better weather than for other general handling work. You should have a good horizon and
visibility and good clearance from cloud both horizontally and vertically. You should not be over complete cloud
cover or a smooth featureless surface to minimise the possibility of disorientation.
Handover/takeover of control
When 2 pilots are in the cockpit the captain must brief how control will be taken over if the flying pilot has a
problem or intercom is lost. For flying instructors on early aerobatic or spinning exercises the chance of a
student freezing on the controls is quite high. One way for an instructor to get access to the controls in a side
by side set-up, is to move his left arm smartly across the chest of the student; this is usually enough to attract
the attention of the student and encourage him to release the controls.
Calculation of minimum spin entry altitude
Starting the spin from a safe height is imperative. Calculate the absolute minimum safe entry altitude from the
ground up in the following steps, then add an extra safety margin if at all possible:
• Minimum altitude to complete the manoeuvre. Logically if you use 3000ft above ground level (agl) for
stall recovery you should use not less than this for completing your spin e.g. Ground + 3000ft
• Minimum altitude to commence recovery. Add the height required to take recovery action and pull out of
the dive. For an erect spin this could be of the order of 1000ft to 1500 ft (but depends on type and could be
more) i.e. ground + 3000 +1500
• Minimum entry altitude. Add on height for each intended turn (typically about 200ft per turn for a light
piston aeroplane) i.e. ground + 3000 + 1500 + 800 (for 4 turns)
• If you intend to do aggravated spins of any kind make extra allowance. For example a high-rotational spin
could take an extra 4-6 turns in the recovery. (On early spin exercises wise instructors assume that the
student will aggravate the spin!)
• If you carry a parachute as a safety back-up, decide on a minimum abandonment height which allows time
to get out and height for the parachute to deploy fully. Below this height you cannot abandon so the
aeroplane must have recovered by this height. You must be familiar with the abandonment drill for your
aeroplane and how to use the parachute. It is a good idea to simulate these drills in a practice session on the
ground. If you have to use the parachute, quick and efficient abandonment with sufficient height is essential.
Military schools have gradually increased their minima over the years such that they use figures considerably
higher than those suggested here for their light piston aeroplanes. This seems like a lot doesn’t it? Yes, but
there have been training accidents where pilots have chosen spin entry heights that guaranteed that they would
hit the ground before completing the recovery!
Spin recovery action
By far the best action is to initiate recovery before a spin develops; that is centralise the controls as soon as
control is lost. However, if we are deliberately spinning or carrying out extreme manoeuvres we must be
prepared for the case where we are too late for this to be effective i.e. a fully developed spin.
The spin recovery action may vary according to type; read the Flight Manual before flight. Typically for an erect
• Throttle: Closed.
• Aileron: Neutral.
• Rudder: Check the direction of yaw and use FULL anti-yaw rudder. A pause is often recommended between
moving the rudder and elevator, and this is important to ensure rudder effectiveness.
• Elevator: Move the control column centrally forward. As the aeroplane starts to recover the attitude will
steepen and the rate of rotation will increase; keep moving the column towards full deflection until the spin
• Centralise: Centralise all controls as soon as the spin stops or the aeroplane will flick in the opposite
• Climb: Roll towards the nearest horizon and pitch into a climb attitude applying power carefully.
Be confident that the correct recovery action will stop the spin. Do not go back to pro-spin control and start again
because you will certainly delay recovery. (In the very unlikely event that normal recovery action fails, in-spin
aileron may well help but this is a last resort action).
In determining the direction of yaw for an inadvertent spin the turn needle is always the best indication (not the
slip ball). Beware if you only have a turn co-ordinator; it measures yaw and roll. In an inverted spin yaw and roll
are in opposite directions so a turn co-ordinator is of no help to you here!
Before you fly aerobatics and especially if you teach, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of how to
recover from mishandled manoeuvres, and especially spinning. Competence in spinning will lend confidence and
enjoyment to your flying, but do it safely.
The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) has reviewed an incident involving a helicopter carrying out a filming task and an
aeroplane carrying out an aerobatic display. The UKAB report drew attention to the need to make the CAA
Airspace Utilisation Section aware of unusual aerial activity so that they could promulgate NOTAMs as required,
and the consequent need to study the NOTAMs that are published.
However, the report also mentioned that the aerobatic aeroplane was not transmitting the dedicated aerobatic
transponder code of 7004. While it had no bearing on that particular incident, transmitting that code gives
warning to radar controllers at Air Traffic Service units that the aircraft will change its position and altitude rapidly,
and suggests that they should instruct or advise other aircraft to keep well clear.
The full instructions for using this dedicated code are in the UK AIP, at ENR 1-6-2-1, and it does not just apply to
formal aerobatic displays. Unless he has been allocated a specific code by an ATC radar unit, the pilot of an
aircraft should select 7004, with Mode C if possible, 5 minutes before starting any aerobatic manoeuvres. It is
also advisable that the pilot should contact an ATC radar unit beforehand and inform them of the area within which
they intend operating.
Farnborough restricted airspace
During and around the Farnborough Air Show, between the 12th and 26th July 2004, Temporary Restricted Airspace
will be established around the area, encompassing not only the Farnborough MATZ as shown on current charts,
but surrounding airspace also. The times of activity of the different areas of Restricted Airspace, which will be
under the control of Farnborough Air Traffic Control, vary from day to day.
The map below indicates the areas concerned, but pilots flying in the area between the 12th and 26th of July should
refer to the relevant AIC, 31/2004 (Mauve 107) and NOTAMS for details, including the times of activity of the
different areas of Restricted Airspace.
Lookout and avoid
With the arrival of summer, General Aviation activity increases. The activity of course is not confined to aeroplanes
and helicopters – microlights, gliders, hang gliders, balloonists and parachutists all cram themselves into whatever
piece of sky has suitable weather. Collision risks increase, so lookout becomes even more important than in
Good lookout means not just a scanning of the sky ahead, of course. The technique is important, allowing our
eyes to stop for a second or so every 20 degrees of scan. The whole sky must be checked, but it is advisable to
concentrate on the directions from which a collision risk is most likely to come.
That does not just mean around the direct flight path of our aircraft. Where aircraft are ‘funnelled’ between
Controlled or Restricted Airspace the concentration of aircraft increases. Expect increased numbers in the
vicinity of navigation aids and obvious visual features, such as the Stokenchurch mast referred to elsewhere.
Along into-wind ridges and under cumulus clouds, gliders and hang-gliders will be found spending much of their
time climbing, and will then set off towards other sources of lift, usually (but not by any means uniquely) abandoning
their climb close to the base of the cloud.
Around parachute drop zones, fast climbing aeroplanes will be encountered climbing
and descending rapidly, in addition to the parachutists descending from them
even more rapidly in free fall! If we are approaching an aerodrome, we must
Route study before
expect aircraft to climb from that aerodrome towards us from below, and also to
descend towards it from above us. The extended centreline of the runway in use flight can give an
may be an area of particularly high risk. At winch-launching sites such as that early indication
illustrated, gliders and hang gliders will climb extremely rapidly from their launch
point. Route study before flight, and including the ground well in front of us as
part of our lookout scan, can give an early indication of increased collision hazards.
Of course, once we become aware of increased collision risks, we can reduce them. Each free fall parachute
drop zone has a nominated air traffic service unit listed on the charts which can advise if the drop zone is active
(always treat the zone as active unless officially informed otherwise!), and most aerodromes have at least an air-
ground communications service, to which pilots can pass information about their intended flight path and obtain
information about others’. In any case, planning a route to avoid high risk areas, or changing course in the air, is
likely to reduce not only the risk of collision, but also the pilot’s stress level.
Loss of control in cloud
The AAIB, in their bulletin 3 of 2004, report a fatal accident to a Cessna 182T, in which they conclude the most
probable cause of the accident to be pilot incapacitation. The aircraft is reported as having entered cloud shortly
after take-off, turned and climbed to a cruising altitude, and then fairly soon afterwards entered what appears to
have been a spiral dive from which it did not recover.
However, the report includes information on the surrounding circumstances of the accident, which causes us
considerable concern. We note from the report that the pilot took off into a cloudbase reported by the pilot of an
arriving aircraft to be “between two and three hundred feet”. The aerodrome in question has no published instrument
approach procedure, so we wonder how the arriving pilot had made his approach safely.
We also would wish to point out that (as advised in AIP AD 1-1-2 para 22.214.171.124) the pilot of a single engined
aeroplane ought not to take off unless the cloud base is sufficiently high to ensure a high probability of a safe
forced landing in the event of an engine failure after take-off (the same consideration, of course, should also be
applied during the cruise). Operations in such conditions are likely to lead to accidents which are unrelated to
pilot incapacitation, although it may be worth considering the extra stress of flight in marginal weather, and the
possibility for that extra stress to hasten a medical complication.
We frequently remind pilots of the dangers of relying on out-of-date databases in their satellite navigation equipment,
explained in our SafetySense leaflet 25 “Use of GPS”, available in LASORS and on the CAA web site www.caa.co.uk
through ‘publications’. Reports have come to our notice that even those commercially available databases, which
are sold as supposedly valid, may not be without error.
In addition to the omission of all Class A airspace, errors are reported to have been found in the vertical boundaries
of certain airspace, including those of a Danger Area and of a VFR corridor through Controlled Airspace. What
concerns the reporters is that, unlike errors on the CAA charts, which can be rapidly amended by NOTAM action
if safety is an issue, these database errors appear to have been reported some time ago but have still not been
We also know that the set up of GPS map displays can be altered by the user, perhaps without them realising
they have done so. That can make even information correctly contained in the database unusable or nearly so.
The picture below indicates the perils of setting the display to show the aerodrome name as the nearest ‘city’.
The aerodrome of Weston on the Green is marked as “Oxford”, as is Kidlington. Having the colours of danger
area boundaries set to ‘yellow’, makes Danger Area D129 around Weston on the Green extremely difficult to
identify in the air.
As we always remind our readers, mistakes can be easily made. For that reason, we emphasise that all flight
planning must be completed on an up-to-date chart as amended by NOTAM, and any database information that
the pilot may wish to refer to must also be checked against that chart.
In the previous article about anticipating and reducing collision risks where possible, we mentioned winch launching
glider sites as a potential hazard. Of course, the danger comes not only from the rapid rate of climb of a glider
being winch-launched, but also from the cable itself, as we have highlighted many times in the past. Modern
launch methods mean that a cable-launched glider will reach the published maximum launch height under
conditions which would have been unlikely in the past. While there is always
a launch controller on the ground whose duties include checking the airspace
into which the cable is to be launched is clear of approaching aircraft, the
higher the glider is to be launched, the longer it will spend attached to the
The collision risk is
cable after the clearance to launch is given. Powered aircraft approaching the high even outside the
launch site at even moderate speeds may be outside the launch controller’s launch procedure
view at the start of the launch, but in the danger zone by the time the glider
(whose pilot has a poor field of view during launch) reaches it.
However, the collision risk is high even outside the launch procedure. Tug and glider combinations climb relatively
slowly, but are less manoeuvrable than a single powered aircraft (and have priority!). Although many glider pilots
attempt to fly away from the launch site as quickly as possible, which might be thought to spread and therefore
reduce the collision risk, power pilots should be aware that inexperienced pilots are unlikely to have the skills (or
be qualified) to travel outside gliding range from their site. This means that the least experienced pilots will be
found closest to the launch site, and should provide an increased incentive to give such a site a wide berth
Pilots should also remember that a published glider site is by definition an aerodrome, even if it has no Aerodrome
Traffic Zone, so the pilot of any aircraft flying in its vicinity must comply with Rule 17 (5) of the Rules of the Air
Regulations1996. He must either conform with the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft intending to land, or
keep clear of it (which is probably the best option). He must also make all turns to the left unless ground signals
indicate otherwise, just as every aircraft must do.
The benefits of a UK IMC rating abroad
We regularly remind pilots that while an IMC rating is a very desirable qualification to hold, it is not valid outside
UK airspace. However, as some eagle-eyed pilots have pointed out after reading issue 1 of 2004, it does confer
one advantage in foreign airspace.
Schedule 8 to the Air Navigation Order 2000 lays down that the holder of a UK issued private pilots licence
without any additional ratings may not fly out of sight of the surface. This, as explained in the last issue, applies
wherever the pilot may be flying. However, if the pilot holds a valid IMC (or Instrument) rating, that restriction does
not apply. This means that in the airspace of a state which does not require PPL holders to remain in sight of the
surface (for example France), the holder of a UK issued PPL which contains a valid IMC rating may indeed fly out
of sight of the surface.
Introduction of ‘Mode S’ in UK Airspace
What is Mode S?
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Mode Select (Mode S) is a co-operative radar surveillance system using
ground based interrogators and airborne transponders. It enables the Air Traffic System to selectively interrogate
and receive data from your aircraft. An important benefit of Mode S is the increased safety afforded by the
presentation of additional data provided by your aircraft’s transponder to the Air Traffic Controller.
Why is it being introduced?
Mode S will provide the necessary improved surveillance capability required to overcome the limitations of existing
SSR (Mode A/C) and meet future traffic demands. The existing Mode A/C system is not selective, and interrogates
your aircraft many times during one scan of the ground interrogator. Ground and airborne Mode S installations
will be backwards compatible with aircraft equipped with Mode A and Mode A/C transponders. The Air Traffic
Controller will be presented with more information from Mode S transponder equipped aircraft, which will not only
allow improved monitoring, but also reduce voice transmissions, which in turn will reduce radio frequency (RF)
pollution, garbling, and false track indications.
The first stage of the overall CAA Mode S strategy is to introduce Mode S Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance
in the high-density airspace surrounding the major UK airports and along the major UK air routes from 31 March
2005. The second stage would be to then introduce Mode S Elementary Surveillance, only, in the remaining
airspace from 2008. The first consultation process for the Mode S Enhanced Surveillance proposal, which mainly
affects commercial operators, was conducted last year, and a second consultation process, involving a wider
audience, has recently ended. The document may still be viewed on the CAA website under the ‘Consultation’
section at the following link: http://www.caa.co.uk/dap .
A separate consultation process will be conducted for the 2008 Mode S Elementary Surveillance proposal.
What is Elementary Surveillance?
This is the minimum surveillance functionality for aircraft equipped with a Mode S transponder. Information from
your aircraft’s Mode S transponder is provided in the form of ‘Downlink Aircraft Parameters (DAPs)’. For Mode S
Elementary Surveillance, the following information is supplied to the Air Traffic System on request:
a. Identity Code – sometimes referred to as the 4 digit ‘squawk code’.
b. Pressure altitude – now able to provide altitude to 25 ft precision where altimetry system allows.
c. Unique ICAO 24-bit Aircraft Address – allows identification of the airframe. This is ‘hardwired’ into your aircraft
or transponder and will stay with your aircraft whilst on the UK register.
d. Aircraft Identification (Aircraft ID) – In addition to the Identity code, an Aircraft ID is provided, consisting of a
set of letters and/or numbers entered via the transponder control panel. Typically you would enter your aircraft
registration (G-ABCD) or flight plan callsign if different. The Aircraft ID will appear on the controllers display.
e. Transponder Capability Report – indicates to the air traffic controller the ‘data link’ capability of your transponder.
This lets the ground interrogator know what information you can supply.
f. Flight Status – indicates whether the aircraft is airborne or on the ground. For aircraft without retractable
undercarriage, the flight status will be permanently set to ‘airborne’.
What is Enhanced Surveillance?
Mode S Enhanced Surveillance provides additional ‘Downlink Aircraft Parameters (DAPs)’ to those provided by
Elementary Surveillance. For Enhanced Surveillance, the following is supplied to the Air Traffic System on request:
1. Ground Speed 6. Magnetic Heading
2. Track Angle 7. Indicated Air Speed
3. Turn Rate 8. Mach No.
4. Roll Angle 9. Selected Altitude
5. Climb Rate
In addition to the above information, further data may be extracted from your transponder. For example, barometric
pressure setting maybe downlinked if available.
These parameters are taken from an aircraft’s onboard systems, such as the Air Data Computer, Inertial Reference
Unit, Flight Management System and Autopilot. Some aircraft subject to the proposed implementation will be
unable to supply every DAP mentioned above for technical reasons. For instance, some older aircraft without an
inertial reference unit will find it difficult to supply track angle and turn rate. Other aircraft without a digital
autopilot may find it difficult to supply selected altitude. An exemption policy is available for aircraft unable to
supply every DAP. It is expected, however, that all modern large aircraft will be able to fully comply with the
requirements of Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance.
Will it affect me?
Probably! Aircraft with a maximum takeoff mass (MTOM) of 5700kgs or above, or a maximum cruising True Air
Speed (TAS) of greater than 250kts operating as General Air Traffic (GAT) in designated UK Terminal and En
Route airspace from 31st March 2005 will need to equip with Mode S Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance. (If
your aircraft is less than 5700kgs and its maximum cruising TAS is less than 250 knots, you only need Mode S
It is also proposed to introduce a Mode S Elementary Surveillance, only, for most categories of flights in all other
airspace from 31st March 2008. This means that aircraft not required to fit a Mode S transponder by 31st March
2005 will probably have to fit one by 31st March 2008!
How much will it cost?
1. Mode S Elementary Surveillance:
The modification to support Mode S Elementary surveillance requires the existing Mode A/C transponder to be
removed and replaced with a Mode S transponder. Several avionic manufacturers supply Mode S transponders
which meet the Elementary Surveillance requirements, and should be contacted for current prices. It is important
to confirm with your supplier that the Mode S transponder complies with the requirements of Joint Aviation Authorities
(JAA) Temporary Guidance Leaflet (TGL) 13 revision 1; some early Mode S transponders may require updating.
For Elementary Surveillance, the modification will probably be classed as a ‘Minor Change’ and may be carried out
by your local maintenance organisation. The 24-bit Aircraft Address may be obtained, free of charge, from the
Applications and Certification Section of the CAA’s Safety Regulation Group, whose e-mail address is
firstname.lastname@example.org, telephone number 01293 768374.
2. Mode S Enhanced Surveillance:
This modification will give an aircraft both Mode S Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance capability. It requires
the existing Mode A/C transponder to be removed and replaced with a Mode S transponder which meets both
Elementary and Enhanced Surveillance requirements of Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Temporary Guidance
Leaflet (TGL) 18; again some early Mode S transponders may require updating. Manufacturers who offer the
equipment should be contacted for current prices. The Enhanced Surveillance modification will probably be
classed as a ‘Major Change’. This will require obtaining an EASA approved STC or Service Bulletin from your
aircraft manufacturer. An important document which must be supplied with the STC (or SB) is the Flight Manual
Supplement. This lists the DAPs which your aircraft can provide to the Air Traffic System, and may be used to
provide proof of that to a National Aviation Regulator.
Exemptions will be available for reasons such as technical infeasibility, infrequent use of the airspace, aircraft
with only a short length of remaining service, or transponder supply problems. For the 2005 Mode S Enhanced
Surveillance proposal, a central Mode S Exemption Co-ordination Cell within Eurocontrol will process exemption
requests on behalf of the national authorities. A full explanation of the draft UK exemption policy for the 2005
Mode S Enhanced Surveillance proposal is on the CAA web site (tip – use ‘search’ facility and type ‘Mode S
Exemption Policy’). An exemption policy to support the 2008 Elementary Surveillance proposal will also be
drafted as part of the forthcoming formal consultation process.
What should I being doing now?
i. Determine whether or not your aircraft is affected by the proposed introduction of Mode S into UK Airspace.
ii Determine whether you need both Elementary and Enhanced surveillance, or only Elementary surveillance.
iii. Consult your local CAA Approved maintenance or design organisation for details of the modification required.
iv. Ensure you will be compliant (i.e have the correct Mode S transponder system installed) by the proposed
Useful Websites for Further Information on Mode S:
http://www.caa.co.uk/dap (see under “Mode S”) and http://www.eurocontrol.int/mode_s
Time to act?
The UK Airprox Board have reported an incident at an aerodrome which brought a helicopter and a training
aeroplane piloted by a solo student into close proximity. The Board’s conclusions are unsurprising, but they
mention the fact that when the student pilot realised that the helicopter was coming close to his aeroplane, he
asked the aerodrome controller for permission to vary the published circuit procedure in an attempt to avoid the
While instructions from an air traffic controller must be followed inside the
aerodrome traffic zone under normal circumstances, it is important to
remember that the pilot is responsible for the safety of his aircraft and the pilot is responsible
occupants, and if danger seems to threaten the pilot should take whatever for the safety of his
action he or she considers best in the circumstances. The time spent in aircraft
asking and obtaining permission to do something non-standard may be
better spent in flying away from the dangerous situation.
Not that we wish to belittle the help that the controller can give the pilot. The controller may well have a different
viewpoint of the situation, perhaps on occasion better than the pilot; so if time permits by all means ask.
However, if time is pressing, it will probably be better to act, at the same time telling the controller and other traffic
what you are doing.
On occasion last summer the UK basked in temperatures which reached over 30 degrees Celsius. At the same
time, instances of misfiring and other engine problems rose.
Several of these engine problems were caused purely because the pilots concerned continued to use MOGAS in
their aircraft as the temperatures rose. While quite a few aircraft/engine combinations are approved for MOGAS
use, the limitations on that use must be adhered to. At fuel tank temperatures above 20 degrees, the likelihood
of vapour lock and pump cavitation becomes considerable, and MOGAS must not be used in these conditions.
Remember the limitations and refer to Airworthiness Notices (AN) 98 and 98A. We do not want to read AAIB fatal
accident reports which attribute the cause to using MOGAS outside its permitted conditions.
IFR cross-channel flights
A report from ATC at Lille and feedback from General Aviation pilots has highlighted problems concerning IFR
flights routeing beneath the Worthing CTA, in Class G airspace within the UK, destined to enter the Lille TMA
which is Class E airspace. For example, some IFR flights have entered the Lille TMA without obtaining an ATC
clearance. Some other IFR flights have not requested ATC clearance until already at the boundary of the TMA,
and there is occasional conflict between IFR flights in Class G airspace whilst en-route to the Lille TMA.
Pilots conducting such a flight should note the following:
1. All flights to and from the United Kingdom which will cross the UK FIR boundary must file a flight plan.
2. IFR flights require a clearance to enter Class E airspace, and it is the pilot’s responsibility to obtain that
3. A request for clearance to enter controlled airspace must be made in time to allow the clearance to be
issued before the aircraft reaches the controlled airspace boundary. Lille ATC have asked that pilots
request such a clearance at least 5 minutes before ETA at the Lille TMA boundary.
4. Class G airspace is uncontrolled, and pilots are responsible for providing separation between flights,
whatever flight rules they are following. Flight information is available from the London Flight Information
Service, whose Area Flight Information Service Officers (AFISOs) will where possible also assist with
passing an ETA to Lille and obtaining a clearance for a flight to enter the Lille TMA. However, pilots must
understand that AFISOs do not provide a control service and cannot provide separation between flights.
Flight in IFR outside UK airspace requires the pilot in command to hold a valid instrument (not IMC) rating,
regardless of prevailing meteorological conditions.
Don’t rely on the autopilot
The holder of a JAR PPL has demonstrated his ability to maintain level flight on instruments for a matter of a few
minutes while turning the aircraft through 180 degrees. As most of those who have experienced longer periods of
instrument flight will have discovered, the concentration level needed for even that safe level flight is difficult to
maintain for long periods. More complex manoeuvres (such as those which an IMC rated pilot is expected to
carry out) require even more concentration, and we may consider that a major part of the skill of instrument flying
is in fact that ability to concentrate.
Certainly, the concentration part of the skill is one which deteriorates rapidly if not practised. A pilot who has
held an instrument flight qualification in the past, but who has not practised instrument flight regularly, is almost
certainly no longer capable of maintaining safe instrument flight for as long as he used to. A pilot with even a
recently obtained or revalidated IMC rating would be well advised to limit his periods of instrument flight to less
than half an hour at a time, and if out of practice should reduce the time even more. A pilot who has obtained an
Instrument Rating has demonstrated that he has the capacity to not only maintain that concentration level, but
also carry out other quite complex tasks and calculations at the same time, for over two hours. Maintaining the
qualification (and of course regular practice) should ensure that his concentration level can be maintained at a
level sufficient for continuous instrument flight in normal conditions.
Many instrument qualified pilots have found that an autopilot can provide considerable assistance when
meteorological conditions preclude visual flight. Although the amount of assistance available depends on the
individual combination of aircraft and autopilot, even the ability to relax one’s grip on the flying controls and allow
the aircraft itself to carry out the boring but demanding task of maintaining its own flight attitude is a considerable
advantage. More sophisticated autopilots can carry out more complex tasks, and in some cases may give the
impression at times that the pilot is flying a computer.
In the past, we have highlighted the possible problems which autopilots may suffer. They (and their operators)
are far from infallible, and the pilot must always be ready to disconnect the autopilot and take control manually at
any stage of flight. Monitoring the autopilot while the aircraft’s attitude can be confirmed by reference to an
external horizon is not particularly taxing, and normally allows the pilot to keep an even better lookout than that
of a pilot flying manually. However, monitoring an autopilot with sole reference to the instruments takes
concentration; not as much as actually flying the aircraft on instruments, but still quite a lot, and certainly for the
same length of time.
The requirement to monitor, and perhaps immediately take control from, the autopilot means that it is essential
to maintain one’s own instrument flying skills. If you do not practise these skills, you cannot rely on them.
However, because you are not using (and not needing to use) them normally, it is easy to forget that you are
losing your ability to maintain the necessary concentration level to get yourself out of trouble. Keep in practice!
However, it has been suggested that there may be some pilots who use their autopilot to fly the aircraft in
conditions requiring flight by sole reference to instruments, even though they are not themselves in current
instrument flying practice. This is not a good idea, even if the pilot’s instrument flight qualification is still legally
It has been further suggested that there are pilots who do not actually possess a valid instrument flight qualification,
but who rely on their autopilot to control their aircraft in conditions that are outside the privileges of their current
licence. This of course is highly dangerous as well as totally illegal. Apart from the purely criminal aspects, any
pilot conducting such a flight ought to consider whether an insurance company would believe its blatant illegality
to be valid grounds for refusing to pay out on any relevant policies, whether hull, third party, or life insurance.
Finally, although a pilot may be prepared himself to deliberately accept such risks, it is doubtful whether any
passengers being carried in such conditions would have the necessary knowledge to make their own risk
assessment on the matter. It is probable that most other pilots would consider any such passengers to be at
Last February, a Cessna 152 was flying from Southend to Norwich on a night training flight. While in radio
contact with Wattisham Radar, the engine started running roughly, and the instructor declared a state of Urgency
(“PAN PAN”) and announced his intention to return to Southend. The radar controller passed him radar vectors
towards Southend and alerted the Distress and Diversion cell.
Passing Colchester, the instructor realised he was unable to maintain height. He was however able to see a lit
area on which it seemed possible to make a forced landing, which he considered to be his safest option. The
duty aircrew officer from the army helicopter unit at Wattisham was leaving the control tower after his tour of duty,
but remained to offer assistance. He used a map and the pilot’s description to identify the lit area as a particular
car park at a Ministry of Defence establishment in Colchester.
The police operations controller at the barracks dispatched a team to assist and inspect the car park. Fortunately,
one of the police team was a pilot himself, and was able to confirm that the site was unobstructed and of
sufficient length for a Cessna 152 to land. The vehicle crew positioned the vehicle beside a point which seemed
suitable as a runway threshold, in order to give the pilot an aiming mark, and the instructor was able to make a
successful night forced landing on the car park.
At the 2003 CAA General Aviation Safety Awards on 11 th May in London, Lord Glenarthur, Chairman of the British
Helicopter Advisory Board, presented the first prize to the whole team involved in ensuring the aircraft was able to
land safely. The picture shows PC Yates of the Essex constabulary holding the trophy, together with the duty
aircrew officer, Staff Sergeant Steven Anthony, and MOD Police Sergeant Sam Shields and Constables Jim Ririe,
Brian Britton and James Clift with their certificates. Unfortunately, the air traffic controller, Mr Martin Grogan,
whose calm voice as he gave regular updates and reassurance to the aircraft crew was considered by the
instructor to be a major factor in the safe outcome, was unable to be present.
It is not only accidents which are caused by a series of events like links in a chain. Sometimes, as in this
case another chain, this time of people working together, may be necessary to prevent an accident occurring.
In this issue we again remind pilots of the importance of complying with appropriate regulations when flying
abroad. In the last issue we included a reminder about IMC ratings not being valid in other countries’ airspace.
We also stated that when following a published instrument approach procedure, the pilot is flying under instrument
flight rules (IFR).
Several readers have pointed out that it is possible to obtain permission from air traffic control units to make
instrument approaches without complying fully with the instrument flight rules. They mistakenly believe they are
flying under visual flight rules (VFR), because invariably they are required to maintain at least the appropriate
visual meteorological conditions (VMC – also known as the VFR minima). In fact, they are still under IFR, it is
just that the controller has permitted them on that particular occasion to use the facility without complying fully
with the instrument flight rules laid down.
Practising instrument procedures
We have in the past reminded pilots of their responsibilities when practising instrument procedures. We have
recently received an incident report which suggests that we need to repeat our advice.
If a pilot wishes to make use of any radio navigation aid, according to Rule 40 of the Rules of the Air Regulations
1996 he must comply with such restrictions and appropriate procedures as may be notified in relation to that aid,
unless an air traffic control unit authorises him to do otherwise. If he
wishes to practise an instrument approach procedure, or part of such
a procedure, he is required by Rule 7 to inform the appropriate air inform the appropriate air
traffic control unit of his intentions beforehand. The ‘appropriate unit’
traffic control unit
in the case of an instrument to an aerodrome would normally be the
air traffic control unit of the aerodrome itself.
A holding pattern over a non-directional beacon (NDB), which forms part of an aerodrome’s approach pattern, is
part of that approach procedure. Even if, as in the incident reported, the pilot is flying in visual meteorological
conditions in class G airspace, that legal requirement exists, for the simple reason that other aircraft can be
expected to be making their approaches through exactly the same part of the sky!
GPS backup on instrument approaches
GPS owners should be aware that SafetySense leaflet 25, published in LASORS and available for free downloading
from the CAA’s website www.caa.co.uk, following “publications” and “general aviation”, gives our guidance for the
use of GPS equipment in general aviation aircraft.
The main thrust of our advice is that GPS is an AID to navigation and not a navigation system in itself. The
information it provides should therefore always be used with care, and never used on its own in safety-critical
situations. However, if it can be cross-checked with another navigation aid, its accuracy can be of considerable
assistance to pilots.
GPS equipment is not approved for “home made” instrument approaches, and these should never be attempted.
However, instrument pilots are aware that any navigation aid can only be used in safety-critical situations such as
instrument approach procedures if there is some form of back-up available to indicate its continued serviceability,
such as the coding of a VOR or ILS station. We also very strongly recommend that even with such back-up,
approach aids should be cross-checked with others, such as DME range to confirm range versus height on the
glideslope. In the event that DME information is not available to back up the primary instrument information, a
pilot may wish to use the range obtained from his GPS as a confirmation of his position.
GPS must not be used as a substitute
Most ILS procedures and many VOR or NDB procedures require the use of DME as part of the procedure; on
these procedures GPS must not be used as a substitute for normal DME equipment. Most procedures that rely
on DME information have a back-up procedure for use when the DME is unserviceable; this may require radar
range checks from ATC or the use of timing. Where timing is used to define distances on an approach, GPS
information can be used to increase situational awareness; however, timing still remains the primary method to
calculate base turn points, descent points etc, and the correct approach procedure and minima WITHOUT DME
must be adhered to.
If GPS is used as a back-up then be sure of at least the following:
a. The GPS waypoint you have selected will give relevant range indications, either from the appropriate beacon
or from the runway threshold or touchdown point. The approach plate will indicate where distances are
b. Your GPS is continuing to provide at least a 3 dimensional fix.
c. The indicated GPS position has been recently checked against another positive position fix from other aids,
such as VDF, an NDB or VOR beacon.
What are these ?
Readers who consult their latest charts for the south of England may have noticed a new red marking “ Laser
site unlim”. This marking indicates the position of these sites where visible and infrared lasers of varying powers
may be activated. It is similar to the marking for a gas venting station.
These Laser Hazard Areas have been published for some time in the AIP at ENR 5-3-11, and were mentioned in
a GASIL article a few years ago. Although an accidental release of laser beams from these sites is extremely
unlikely and would only result from total failure of all safety systems, the consequences if it should happen could
be extremely hazardous. High power laser beams such as those on test, unlike those low-powered ones used
for decorative purposes, can cause permanent eye damage. It has therefore been decided to mark the sites
where this potential hazard might exist on the charts, and advise pilots to avoid overflying them.
Carburettor ice detection
Our recent emphasis on carburettor icing has drawn a few comments from readers. One pilot has included his
method of detecting the onset of carburettor icing using an exhaust gas temperature gauge, which may be of use
to other pilots.
Over many years I have found that while flying in the UK a carburettor air temperature gauge nearly always
indicates in the warning zone. A carb. air temperature gauge also does not show that carburettor ice is present,
just that its formation is likely. By the time carb. ice is detected by a reduction in engine note or reducing rpm
a considerable amount of ice can have accumulated.
In contrast, when the engine has been correctly leaned using an EGT gauge, even slight carb. ice accretion will
be quickly indicated by a drop in exhaust gas temperature caused by the richer mixture. When the ice has been
melted using hot air the E.G.T. indication rises to its previous position. I believe therefore that an EGT gauge
offers far more useable information than a carburettor air temperature gauge.
Using the temperature indicated on an EGT gauge is a method suggested in
some Flight Manuals to produce the most economic fuel consumption in cruising
flight. The technique usually involves finding the mixture which produces the We should all be
maximum indicated temperature, and then enriching the mixture to give an making full
indication of for example 50 degrees lower than maximum. However, most carburettor ice
instructors and training organisations teach the method of leaning the mixture checks
until the engine sounds slightly rough, then enriching the mixture until it runs
Either method will produce an indication on an EGT gauge if one is fitted (if the mixture is fully rich there may be
no indication). If pilots note the EGT reading during cruise, and include the gauge in their regular engine instrument
scan, any decrease in reading may, as our reader suggests, provide an early warning of possible carburettor
icing. Trials in the US in the 1980s suggested that such EGT drops usually did indicate the presence of
carburettor icing, although it is not completely clear whether the drop was due to mixture enrichment or power
reduction. The same trials did find that “false alarms” were common, but these were regarded as quite acceptable.
However, many of us have no EGT gauge, and whether we do or not we should all be making full carburettor ice
checks regularly, as described in SafetySense leaflet 14, Piston Engine Icing, available on the CAA web site
www.caa.co.uk through “publications” and “general aviation”, and in LASORS 2004.
In GASIL and during CAA Safety Evenings, we emphasise the importance of pilots sending information about
incidents to the CAA. Frequently the reports cause us concern, and often those causing most concern are
passed to us in confidence, so individual follow-up action is not possible.
Recently we have received several reports on the same subject from different parts of the country. This magazine
goes to all instructors, so hopefully those most able to remove our concerns will act accordingly. We are talking
about supervision of student pilots under training, and the duty of care owed to their students by the instructors
who are tasked with providing that supervision.
During their course of training for licence issue, students are required to learn not only the skills required to
handle their aircraft, but also the airmanship required to make safe decisions about their future flights. They in
turn will have a duty of care towards others, particularly their own passengers. They need to learn how to
interpret weather forecasts, the need to check that the weather is actually following the forecast pattern, and the
importance of having safety options in the event of the weather turning out worse than forecast. However, they
also need to learn that flight into a poor forecast is a risk which should not be taken, and it is this aspect which
is causing concern.
The reports invariably involve a student pilot carrying out a qualifying
solo cross-country flight in forecast conditions which would tax an
experienced qualified pilot. These reported conditions have been It is not the pilot’s fault that he
low cloud, poor visibility, or high winds including crosswinds above
is showing unsatisfactory
the aircraft’s demonstrated crosswind. Sometimes not only the
forecast, but the actual conditions, have been unacceptable, and airmanship
in cases actually illegal, in that it was impossible for the pilot to
comply with the Rules of the Air in the conditions.
The reports usually come from the aerodromes being visited, where a person has been asked to complete a
satisfactory qualifying cross-country certificate during the pilot’s rushed visit to a control tower or flying club. The
person being asked has to consider what to do. If the certificate is not signed, the pilot has spent a lot of time
and money for nothing, and it is not the pilot’s fault that he is showing unsatisfactory airmanship – it is his
supervising instructor. Most human beings use that argument to sign, and then worry for a long time afterwards
whether the chap got home safely, and whether he is going to become an accident statistic in the near future.
We can only recommend that if the visiting pilot’s airmanship is demonstrated to be poor as a result of obvious
poor supervision, that the certificate reflects that fact. Of course, if the person asked to sign the report considers
conditions are unsafe for the return flight, the student and his supervising instructor at his base should be advised
accordingly. If the flight takes place despite that advice, it may be appropriate to make a formal report to the
Fly-ins and showing off
The summer brings its share of air displays and fly-ins. It also unfortunately brings its share of accidents. An
actual air display is carried out by pilots whose flying and planned display has been assessed by display
authorisers, and although occasionally accidents occur during these displays, there are controls in place to
minimise the risk to others.
However, it seems to be part of the human make-up that when an audience is present, the human starts to
figuratively ‘grow horns’ and a desire to impress that audience flows into the brain. That desire can be so strong
that it displaces the common sense which should normally be present, and the pilot does things he knows, or at
least did know before the adrenaline set in, to be less than safe.
The results are too often damage to aircraft and injury to persons. It needs strict self-discipline to resist temptation,
but resist it we must!
A desire to impress
Class and type ratings – keep them valid
We have become aware that there are pilots who hold professional licences who are under the mistaken belief
that revalidating type ratings on these licences automatically also revalidates their single or multi engine piston
ratings. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. To exercise any licence privileges on any type or class of aircraft, such as a
single engine piston aeroplane, the appropriate rating must be individually revalidated or renewed as appropriate.
If the rating has lapsed, any flying you do will be illegal!
We know of others who have completed all the requirements to revalidate a single engine piston rating, but have
not had the actual revalidation signed up in their licence rating page by an examiner. Although the National PPL
allows the pilot himself to maintain a ‘running’ currency in his logbook, the ratings page of a UK or JAA PPL must
be signed by an examiner before the previous rating expires – if the signature is too late then the rating must be
renewed by a licensing skills test!
Information on the methods of revalidating and renewing ratings are contained in LASORS, available from Documedia
Solutions at a price of £8.50. LASORS is also available for free download from the publications section of the
CAA’s web site www.caa.co.uk
CAA charts – England South
Sharp eyed readers, especially those living near the western edge of the London TMA, will have noticed that a
particular prominent navigation feature, previously marked on the charts as an obstruction, seems to have been
removed from the latest edition of the 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 charts. The feature, at position 513954N 0005522W,
lies just beside the M40 on the edge of the Chiltern Hills, and is known in the area as the ‘Stokenchurch mast’.
Because of a technical error, an amendment to the obstruction database used by the map producers seems to
have been incorrectly completed, and the obstruction was removed from the database. However, it is still there,
as NOTAMs have reminded us all, and still stretches upwards to an elevation of 1184 feet above sea level, a
height of 393 feet above ground. It is however, now regarded as ‘unlit’.
The incident does highlight an important point. The CAA’s maps and charts web page www.caa.co.uk/dap “chart
updates” included the removal of the mast some time previously, but no-one seems to have noticed that. While,
for safety purposes, additions on the updates page are probably more important than removals, had any of the
local pilots noticed the removal and used the feedback facility on the same web site, the error would have been
corrected before the charts were published. Pilots are encouraged to check charts, and the updates, and send
feedback when mistakes are noticed.
We have heard of several pilots who claim to have been caught out by ‘sinking air’ on the final approach, and
thereby become involved in an accident. The air does indeed move vertically as well as horizontally, and in
certain cases severe downdrafts can be experienced. AIC 72/2001 (Pink 72) “The effect of thunderstorms and
associated turbulence on aircraft operations” highlights these dangers and is shortly to be reissued. AIC 19 of
2002 “Low altitude windshear” warns and gives details of that specific phenomenon. Another cause of downdrafts
may be air sinking in the lee of a hill (see AIC 6 of 2003 (Pink 48) “Flight over and in the vicinity of high ground”)
or wake turbulence (see AIC 17 of 1999 “Wake turbulence”).
However, in more usual meteorological conditions, unexpected excessive downdrafts are unlikely. What is most
likely to be experienced is normal convective flow. Thermal upcurrents, which may or may not be capped by
cumulus clouds, are popular with glider pilots, but are invariably surrounded by sinking air. If a pilot is making his
approach close to one of these thermals, he may well find himself sinking faster than he expected. A similar
effect may occur at low height if he encounters the horizontal gust flowing as a headwind into the bottom of a
thermal, just after he has passed through the thermal itself (the thermal will probably have encouraged him to
reduce power more than usual).
The cure for high rates of descent caused by meteorological phenomena
is a powerful and responsive engine. However, many GA aircraft do not
have a particularly powerful engine, nor one that responds rapidly to If the pilot has difficulty
throttle lever movement. In fact, experienced pilots flying the diesel he should apply full
engined aeroplanes which are becoming popular seem to feel that these power and go around
produce the intended increase in power rather slower than they are
used to. However, this merely emphasises the need for prevention
rather than attempting a cure once the problem has occurred.
If the pilot uses full flap early on the normal approach path, he will require more power than normal. The higher
the power being produced by the engine, in general the more rapidly the engine will respond to the pilots power
lever input. This might be very important if the aircraft has a variable pitch propeller, which produces little extra
drag as the power reduces
The best prevention is a combination of anticipation and practice. On a day when the aircraft is being pushed up
and down by thermal currents, a pilot should be expecting to find considerable vertical air movement as he
makes his approach. Making a steeper approach than normal gives more scope for absorbing the possible sink,
but an updraft may prevent the pilot landing at the threshold. The important point is to prevent the aircraft
descending below the ideal glidepath. Recognising the onset of any descent takes practice, but in any case, if
the pilot has difficulty maintaining the correct approach path, he should apply full power and go around as soon
as he identifies that fact. The most difficult task in aviation is making a good landing from a bad approach!
Don’t be shy!
Further to our article on pilots lacking confidence in making radio calls, we have received this from a flight
instructor. While the content may be light-hearted, the problem is easily recognised.
The Hovering Finger. A student knows that it is the right time to make a radio call, they know what to say, the
airwaves are quiet but nothing happens. The finger moves over to the ‘press to transmit’ switch (PTT), then
hovers and twitches for many, many seconds. Some students will remove the finger and carry on flying without
actually having made the call, obviously feeling that they have done more than enough. Others, after much finger
twitching will shoot an anguished glance over to me. I have never worked out how to respond to that, other than
to nod encouragingly back.
It is known that many pilots, even some with considerable experience, feel uncertain when required to make radio
calls. The best way to gain confidence is to practise. If practising in flight is inappropriate or inconvenient,
perhaps a ground training session with an R/T instructor or examiner might give that confidence? A visit to a
local Air Traffic Control Unit might also be useful.
Word for all seasons
“Always remember – you fly an aircraft with your head, not your hands!”
Bad weather - wirestrike
In their bulletin 3 of 2004, the AAIB include a report on an accident to a helicopter which was returning to its base
in conditions of lowering cloudbase. The pilot attempted to continue in sight of the ground for the final mile or so
of the flight, believing he was clear of all possible obstructions, but encountered pylon cables. While climbing in
an attempt to avoid them, his tail struck the wires, detaching the tail rotor/fin assembly. The aircraft was further
damaged in the subsequent heavy forced landing, but fortunately the three occupants escaped with minor injuries.
It is so terribly tempting to continue in marginal weather, especially when one’s destination is very close. However,
the dangers of continuing are considerable. Making a safe landing in a suitable field, and either sitting out the
weather or calling a taxi, is preferable to risking ones life by continuing into the unknown, especially if one has
passengers on board.
Bad Weather - wirestrike .............................................. 20 Incorrect fuel reading ...................................................22
Built up areas ................................................................ 21 Rotorcraft Airworthiness Directives ............................23
Secure your protection ................................................. 21 Rotorcraft Letters to Owners/Operators .....................23
Withdrawal of certain Restricted areas ...................... 21 FAA Bi-Weekly Lists - rotorcraft ..................................23
Small helicopter safety seminar .................................. 22 FAA Maintenance Alerts - rotorcraft ...........................23
Bell 206 engine mounting pins .................................... 22
Built up areas
In one of their reports, the UK Airprox Board draw attention to a group of helicopter pilots who apparently were
seen flying over the centre of a large built up area at about 700 feet above the ground. These helicopters were
single engined, and had one of them sustained an engine problem, it was extremely unlikely that the pilot would
have been able to make a landing without causing damage, or even injury to persons, on the ground below.
Rule 5 (1) (b) of the Rules of the Air regulations 1996 requires a helicopter to be able to alight without danger to
persons or property in the event of the failure of a power unit. A pilot of a single engined helicopter attempting to
comply with that rule while flying at a low height would have to devote considerable attention to that compliance,
to the detriment of lookout and other essential tasks, so Rule 5 (1) (c) requires it to maintain at least 1500 feet
above the congested area of a city town or settlement to give the pilot a chance to find such a safe area in the
event of an engine failure. The rules are there for a purpose, and ignorance of the law is no excuse!
Secure your protection
The August bulletin from the BEA (French AAIB) includes a report on an accident which occurred to a home built
autogyro. A student pilot was undertaking solo flights under the supervision of an instructor. After his first circuit,
he landed for debriefing, then took off again for a further circuit.
Apparently he had removed his protective helmet for the consultation with his instructor,
but had failed to fasten it again properly before take-off. During the initial climb, he was failed to
aware of the helmet starting to slip off his head, but was unable to stop it falling off completely
and hitting the blades of the propeller behind him. The engine failed, and the pilot set up a
descent maintaining the rotor rpm. Unfortunately the subsequent forced landing was again
complicated by electric wires across the intended landing area. The pilot’s round-out was
too high, and the aircraft was damaged in the heavy landing.
While we hope those pilots who wear protective helmets (hopefully those of at least every open-cockpit
aircraft) will have been reminded to check the fastening of their helmets during pre-take-off checks (perhaps
as part of the ‘harnesses’ check), there is another very important point which we wish to bring out.
The aircraft was unfortunately damaged in the accident because the landing was heavy. However, had the
pilot allowed himself to be distracted by the slipping helmet and lost control of his aircraft during the climb,
the consequences would almost certainly have been much more serious. Concentrate on flying the aircraft,
as this pilot did, and you reduce the risk of the initial event turning into a serious, or even fatal, accident.
Withdrawal of certain Restricted areas
With effect from 2300 hours (UTC) on 7 July 2004 the following Restricted Areas will be withdrawn:
EG R318 Altcourse
EG R152 Bristol
EG R320 Doncaster
EG R151 High Down
These prisons will be added to the list at para 3 of AIC 5/2002 (Yellow 68)(which is in process of re-issue);
helicopter pilots are urged to familiarize themselves with the contents of this Circular.
Small helicopter safety seminar
As reported in the last issue, the CAA and AAIB intend to host a further day’s seminar for small helicopter pilots
at Farnborough in November this year. The date will almost certainly NOT be as stated in the last issue, but most
likely will actually be the 9th November.
The day will take a similar format as the previous two, and will be aimed primarily at qualified private pilots who
have perhaps been away from the training system for some time. However, as always, it will be open to others.
Last year’s seminar was considerably oversubscribed, so we advise any pilot who has missed the last two and
who has an interest in attending this next one to register that interest early with the CAA’s General Aviation
Department on 01293 573227. Invitations will be sent when details of the venue and timings have been finalised.
Bell 206 engine mounting pins
According to a Transport Canada report in their Feedback magazine, during a special inspection of the engine
mount legs in a Bell 206L, the lower pins, part number 100-048-5-12, were found severely corroded. One of them
was completely rotted through. The report notes that modern pins are manufactured from stainless steel, but
suggests that disassembly might be required for proper inspection of the older pins.
Incorrect fuel reading
The New Zealand CAA’s magazine ‘Vector’ contains a report about a helicopter, a Kawasaki - Hughes 369, on a
test flight. The pilot had failed to notice that his fuel indicator had stuck and continued to indicate about 150
pounds of fuel, despite continued flight time. The aircraft engine failed and the subsequent forced landing was
heavy, causing substantial damage. The fuel quantity transmitter arm appears to have been damaged during a
recent unscheduled maintenance operation.
However, the report draws attention, as we do, to the importance of knowing how
much fuel one has in ones tanks before take-off, and calculating how long one can Stuck and
safely remain airborne with that amount of fuel. Light aeroplanes have a reputation for continued to
inaccurate fuel gauges, we should all treat our own as equally suspect.
Rotorcraft Airworthiness Directives
The following have been issued since the last edition of GASIL. They will be published in the next amendment to
the respective publications, which are all available on the CAA Web Site: www.caa.co.uk/publications/search.asp.
Following the formation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), these next amendments to CAPs 473
and 474 will list all those additional airworthiness directives (AADs) which continue to be required for UK registered
aircraft under article 10 of EC regulation 1592/2002. Note that any modifications or replacement equipment
required under previously issued AADs must not be removed without reference to the amended relevant publications.
CAP 474 FOREIGN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES VOLUME III
AD Number Applicability Description
DGAC AD F-2004-046 Various SE & SA series Equipment and furnishings – Hoist hooks
RAI AD 2004-099 Agusta A109 Transmission support fittings – bolts P/N NAS625-14
TC AD CF-2004-05 Bell 206 Tail rotor blade trailing edge skin cracks
Rotorcraft Letters to Owners/Operators
The following Letter to Owners/Operators (LTOs) has recently been issued by the CAA. An LTO does not in itself
contain any mandatory requirements, but is intended to pass information. It may contain, for example, an item
of significant airworthiness information received from a foreign Aviation Authority. They are listed with Airworthiness
Directives and available through the CAA website www.caa.co.uk/srg/airworthiness.
LTO 2513 Robinson R22 Clarification of contents of FAA Emergency AD 2004-06-52
FAA Bi-Weekly Lists - rotorcraft
Since the last publication date, the following have appeared in the FAA Bi-weekly listings of Airworthiness Directives.
For those with access to the worldwide web, FAA ADs, including the Bi-weekly listings, are available on the
internet through http://av-info.faa.gov. Under “Aircraft information” select “Airworthiness Directives”.
Biweekly AD Aircraft/equipment type Item
2004-06 2004-06-51 Boeing 234 Aft rotor shaft extension
2004-06 2004-06-52 Robinson R22 series Main rotor blades p/n A016-1 or -2
2004-07 2004-06-04 Sikorsky S-76A, B, C Inverter wiring for autopilot
FAA Maintenance Alerts - rotorcraft
Aircraft/equipment type Item
Kaman HH-43B/F Confusion in RPM compensator control box fitment instructions
Rotorway Exec 90 & 162F Progressive cracking of secondary shaft assembly
The following have been issued since the last edition of GASIL. They will be published in the next amendment to
the respective publications, which are all available on the CAA Web Site: http://www.caa.co.uk/publications/
search.asp. Following the formation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), these next amendments
to CAPs 473 and 474 will list all those additional airworthiness directives (AADs) which continue to be required
for UK registered aircraft under article 10 of EC regulation 1592/2002. Note that any modifications or replacement
equipment required under previously issued AADs must not be removed without reference to the amended relevant
CAP 474 FOREIGN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES VOLUME III
AD Number Applicability Description
AC AD A-2004-002 Diamond DA40D Flight Manual revision & FADEC wire harness inspection
LBA AD D-2004-084 Schemp-Hirth DuoDiscus sailplanes Wings – possible spar cap to web bonding failures
Letters to Owners/Operators
The following Letters to Owners/Operators (LTOs) have recently been issued by the CAA. An LTO does not in
itself contain any mandatory requirements, but is intended to pass information. It may contain, for example, an
item of significant airworthiness information received from a foreign Aviation Authority. They are listed with
Airworthiness Directives on the CAA website www.caa.co.uk/srg/airworthiness.
LTO 2497 Rolls Royce historic engines Multiple engine maintenance
LTO 2501 Rolls-Royce Merlin & Griffon series engines Exhaust stub failure
LTO 2502 CFM Streak Shadow, Star Streak & Starstreak Undercarriage
LTO 2510 Turbine engined aeroplanes over 5700kg & pisten ANO Schedule 4 Scale P -
engined aeroplanes over 27,000 kg MTWA Flight Data Recorders
LTO 2512 Textron Lycoming direct drive piston engines with Transition to FAAAD 98-02-08 -
hollow forward crankshaft cancellation of CAA AD 006-07-94
Airworthiness Directives .............................................. 24 PA-34 Main Landing Gear Trunnion Attach Fittings .26
Letters to Owners/Operators ....................................... 24 A New Publication - CAP 747 ......................................27
Fuel line corroded ......................................................... 25 EASA impact on flight under current UK ‘A’ conds.... 27
Safety restraints ............................................................ 25 Mandatory Permit Directives ........................................28
FAA Bi-Weekly Lists ..................................................... 25 FAA Maintenance Alerts ..............................................28
Cables ............................................................................ 26
Fuel line corroded
We read in Transport Canada’s ‘Feedback’ magazine of a Cessna 152 fuel line that was noticed on a routine
maintenance inspection to have become severely pitted with corrosion. The corrosion occurred where the line
emerged through the cockpit floor on the right side of the centre console.
The engineer concluded that the corrosion was likely to have originated from dampness and other contaminants
brought into the cockpit by the occupant of the right hand seat (instructor) on his left shoe, which rested in that
area. It was there retained by the carpeting which as in the file photograph below was tucked under the console
for neatness and therefore in contact with the pipe.
In the “bad weather – wirestrike” accident reported by the AAIB and referred to in the helicopter section, the pilot
suffered injuries which the investigation considered he should not have. It appears that the stitching on the pilot’s
upper torso harness failed, even though the impact forces were well within the capability which an approved
harness should have been able to sustain.
The harness had apparently been replaced by a specialist company with belts manufactured by a small company
of aircraft furnishers. Although the belts were reported to have been supplied with documentation to the effect
they had been manufactured in accordance with applicable FAA standards, no relevant documents were traceable
after the accident, and the manufacturers are no longer trading.
It is vital that occupant restraint systems carried in or supplied for any aircraft comply with the relevant airworthiness
requirements. Lives may depend on them.
FAA Bi-Weekly Lists
Since the last publication date, the following have appeared in the FAA Bi-weekly listings of Airworthiness Directives.
FAA ADs, including the Bi-weekly listings, are available on the internet through http://av-info.faa.gov. Under
“Aircraft information” select “Airworthiness Directives”.
Biweekly AD Aircraft/equipment type Item
2004-04 2004-03-08 Learjet 31, 31A, 35, 35A, 36, 36A Forward engine beam shear webs
2004-04 2004-03-32 New Piper PA-46-500TP Circuit breaker assemblies and remote modules
2004-05 2001-13-18R1 Raytheon Beech 45, A45, D45 Wing spar assemblies
2004-06 2004-05-24 Lycoming - 540 series Certain crankshaft gear retaining bolts
2004-07 2004-06-09 Lancair LC40-550FG, LC42-550FG Fuel pressure transducer
2004-09 2004-08-10 Teledyne Continental 520 & 550 series ECi cylinder head
2004-09 2004-08-15 Goodrich TAWS8000 Connections to baro set potentiometer
2004-09 2004-08-16 NARCO AT150 transponder Upgrade
2004-09 2004-08-17 Cessna 208 & 208B Wing strut attach fitting nuts & cotter pins
2004-09 2004-09-05 Cessna 500, 501, 550, 551 BFGoodrich brake assemblies
2004-10 2004-08-17R Cessna 208 & 208B Wing strut attach fitting nuts & cotter pins
2004-10 2004-09-07 Raytheon Beech 1900, 1900C, 1900D Canted bulkhead
2004-10 2004-09-29 Honeywell TPE331 series engines First stage turbine disk
2004-10 2004-09-30 Raytheon Beech 1900C Landing gear electrical power current limiter
We read in a Service Difficulty Advisory from Transport Canada, that a technician who was conducting a flight
control cable inspection in the wing of a Cessna 650 found this particular cable severely damaged. There was
apparently a small amount of dirt around the pulley area, but no evidence of FOD, which would account for the
Transport Canada notes that the damage was not visible with the pulley installed. They also noted that the
manufacturer laid down no specific requirement for the removal of the cable at only 330 hours since the last major
inspection. The engineer had decided to remove the cable for inspection because he was unable to make a
proper inspection without doing so. The operator and certainly the pilot should be very grateful that he did so!
Piper Seneca (PA-34) Main Landing Gear Trunnion Attach Fittings
CAA received notification of an incident of cracked trunnion fittings in 1995 - GASIL 6/95 item E8 brought this
event to the attention of Licensed Aircraft Engineers at that time.
More recently CAA has become aware of a number of more serious incidents involving cracking and failure of both
the forward and rear trunnion fittings, (P/N 67042-12, and 67040-2,-3), of the main landing gear on Piper Seneca
aircraft. Failure of these trunnion fittings has resulted in main undercarriage collapse during ground operations
and has led to consequential airframe damage, emergency evacuation etc, .
Piper has raised a Service Bulletin SB 956 dated March 3, 1992, “Main Landing Gear Trunnion Attach Fittings”,
for which Piper considers compliance mandatory. The text of this SB notes that after prolonged service the bolts
attaching the main landing gear trunnion attach fittings to the wing spars may lose their torque. As a result of
loose bolts, damage to the fittings and wing spar can follow, leading to failure of the landing gear.
Part 1 of the Piper SB 956 requires 100 hour repetitive inspection of the trunnion fitting to wing spars attachment
bolts for correct torque - dependant on the results of the torque check, and the precise Seneca model involved,
bolt re-torque plus trunnion fitting dye-penetrant inspection or replacement is required as a consequence.
Part 2 of the Piper SB 956 provides instructions to replace the trunnion fitting and includes instructions to install
larger diameter trunnion fitting attach hardware which will strengthen the installation and relieve the repetitive
inspections of Part 1 of the SB.
CAA commends the contents of the Piper SB 956 to those maintaining Piper Senecas and has informed Austro-
Control (ACG) of the issue so that ACG can pursue this matter further on behalf of EASA with Piper/FAA as part
of the ACG continued airworthiness review of Piper types.
In addition CAA notes that aircraft being used for training, operated from grass strips, or that have suffered firm
landings would appear to be at higher risk of trunnion fitting cracking and damage to supporting structure. For
such aircraft CAA would recommend more frequent checks for correct fastener torque and inspections for cracking
of forward and aft trunnion attach fittings, with rectification to be carried out as per the manufacturer’s instructions
of SB 956.
CAA also notes that should discrepancies be found at one trunnion fitting (forward or aft), that a particularly
careful examination of the other trunnion fitting/spar joint is warranted. Should there be any doubt over the
condition of the other trunnion fitting, replacement of both fore and aft fittings and attachment hardware should be
considered a prudent precautionary measure.
A NEW PUBLICATION - CAP 747
UK Airworthiness Requirements in Accordance with EC Regulation 1592/2002
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) came into being on 28th September 2003 and became responsible
for regulating the airworthiness of the majority of the civil aircraft registered in the European Union States. As a
consequence, most aircraft with UK Certificates of Airworthiness must now comply with all of the following
mandatory airworthiness requirements:
1. Airworthiness Directives and mandatory actions issued by the State where the aircraft was designed. (e.g..
FAA ADs for products designed in the US, CAP 476 Mandatory Aircraft Modifications and Inspection Summary
for UK products, etc)
2. Airworthiness Directives approved by EASA. These may apply to non-EU products as well as EU products.
EASA ADs are listed on the EASA website at www.easa.eu.int/aw_dir_en.html . Particular ADs can be
obtained from the National Aviation Authorities that produced them on EASA’s behalf.
3. The requirements defined in CAP 747
Certain categories of aircraft are not regulated by EASA and must continue to comply with UK requirements. For
further information on the effects of EASA on UK-registered aircraft, see the CAA website’s EASA page
EASA’s process for managing mandatory airworthiness information is still evolving. Within the CAA the need for
a rationalisation of the relevant UK publications has been recognised. When available, further information will be
provided through the EASA page on the CAA website and through CAA Airworthiness Notices (CAP 455)
EASA impact on flight under current UK ‘A’ conditions
The changes in the regulations that result following the introduction of EASA will be phased in over several years,
and the initial issue of requirements focus on aircraft certification, maintenance and engineer licensing and training.
The EASA regulations do not completely supersede existing UK requirements and it is important that owners and
operators keep abreast of the developments that may impact upon them.
From 28 September 2004 the EASA requirements will result in the issue of EASA Airworthiness Certificates (Ref.
Note 2) for aircraft subject to EASA type certification. From that date, it will no longer be possible for approved
maintenance organisations or type rated licensed aircraft engineers to release an EASA aircraft (Ref. Note 1) as
being fit to fly under “A” Conditions, as currently specified in Article 8(2)(d) and Schedule 3 of the Air Navigation
Order. European Commission Regulation (EC) 1702/2003, Part 21 Subpart H, establishes the procedures for
issuing airworthiness certificates under EASA and enters into force on the 28 September 2004.
The EASA regulations do not provide for an equivalent ‘A’ conditions process and it is not possible to apply UK
requirements to the EASA Regulation. Therefore, an EASA Permit to Fly (Form 20) will need to be issued for an
aircraft to perform a flight without a valid EASA Certificate of Airworthiness (Ref. Note 3) being in force. A formal
application, requesting and justifying such flights, will need to be made directly to the CAA by appropriately
approved maintenance organisations or type rated licensed aircraft engineers. It is anticipated that applications
for such flights within the United Kingdom will be made to the local CAA Regional Office who, when satisfied, will
be able to issue an EASA Permit to Fly.
Appropriately approved maintenance organisations or type rated licensed aircraft engineers will remain responsible
for issuing a Fitness for Flight Certificate when satisfied with the airworthiness and maintenance standard of the
aircraft. The Fitness for Flight Certificate will validate the EASA Permit to Fly.
More detailed information, including the necessary application forms and certificates will be published by CAA in
Note 1: An “EASA aircraft” means an aircraft which is required to comply with Regulation EC No. 1592/2002, as
specified in Article 4, i.e. one for which an EASA type certification standard has been deemed to exist.
Note 2: An ‘‘EASA airworthiness certificate’’ means a certificate required by Article 2 of Regulation EC No. 1702/
2003 and defined in Part 21 Subpart H as a Certificate of Airworthiness, Restricted Certificate of Airworthiness or
a Permit to Fly.
Note 3: A valid Certificate of Airworthiness in the Transport, Aerial Work or Private Category, previously issued by
the CAA to an EASA qualifying aircraft prior to the 28 September 2004, shall be deemed to be an EASA Certificate
of Airworthiness. The CAA intends to replace such certificates with EASA documents to reflect the transition at
the next renewal.
Mandatory Permit Directives
The following Mandatory Permit Directives (MPDs) have recently been issued by the CAA, and will be published
in the next amendment to CAP 661. Compliance is mandatory for applicable aircraft operating on a UK CAA
Permit to Fly. MPDs are listed with Airworthiness Directives on the CAA website www.caa.co.uk/srg/airworthiness
1998-017R5 Yakovlev / Aerostar SA / Intreprinderea De Av Bacau Yak 52 Airframe & overhaul life
2002-009R1 Yakovlev Yak 50 Airframe & overhaul life
2004-004 Strojirny Prvni Petilesky / Let Narodni Podnik Kunovice Yak C.11 Series
Strojirny Prvni Petilesky Yak C.18A Pneumatic system
Yakovlev Tak 50 reservoirs
Yakovlev / Aerostar SA / Intreprinderea De Av Bacau Yak 52
Yakovlev Tak 55 and Yak 55M
Sukhoi SU-26M, SU-26M2, SU-26MX
Nanchang Aircraft NAMC CJ-6A
2004-005R1 Fly Buy Ultralights Ikarus C42 variants FB UK, FB 80, Replacement of elevator
FB 100 & FB 100VLA microlights horn assembly
2004-006 Yakovlev Yak 52 Barriers in rear fuselage
2004-007R1 CFM Streak Shadow, Star Streak & home built ShadowD series Main undercarriage
2004-008R1 CFM Streak Shadow, Star Streak & home built ShadowD series Nose undercarriage
2004-009 Mainair Quik Control frame top rivets
FAA Maintenance Alerts
Since the last issue, the following maintenance alerts have been published by the FAA. The full text of each is
available on the internet through http://av-info.faa.gov and under “Aircraft information” select “General Aviation
Airworthiness Alerts” , which are divided into monthly bulletins. Those without access to the internet can have
a copy of the item which interests them by sending a stamped, self-addressed, envelope to: General Aviation
Department, Admin Section, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex RH6 0YR.
Aircraft/equipment type Item
Beech 1900C Short circuit in aft pressure bulkhead - trim servo always powered
Beech 1900D Airliner Loose vertical stabilizer forward spar attach bolts
Beech A36 Bulges found in heater muffler assembly
Beech B100 Horizontal stabilizer attach bolt corroded, head detatched
Beech C90 King Air Cracked magnesium rudder pedal arm assembly
Cessna 172R Skyhawk Lower firewall cracked
Cessna 172S Incorrect heater duct routing melted glovebox
Cessna 208 Caravan I Nose landing gear strut internal failure
Cessna 402B Cracked wingtip fuel tanks aft bulkhead suport assembly
Cessna 402C II Businessliner Water froze in main gear up-lock actuator
Cessna T-210J Centurion II Worn alternate air door hinge pin - turbocharger damaged
Cessna T-303 Crusader Inboard lower engine mount leg cracked
Diamond DA20-C1 Freezing moisture causing stall warning system to fail
Piper PA-28R, -32R, -34, -44 PA-44 wing rib cracks under main gear side brace attach fittings
Piper PA-28R-201 Arrow III Main gear downlock spring attach bracket broken
Piper PA-28R-201 Arrow IV Nose gear actuator rod-end sheared on retraction
Piper PA-46-500T Malibu Meridian Improperly secured nose gear door hinge pin
Precision Carburettor HA-6 Fuel entered carburettor float
Raytheon HS 125-700A Chafing on aft lower dorsal fin fuel tank skin
Teledyne Continental TSIO-520 Additional cylinder base seal installed - studs worked loose
Temporary restriction of flying regulations
Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations for the following events will be promulgated by Mauve
AIC and NOTAM (this list is correct at publication submission deadline)
Brands Hatch 1 August 2002
Chailey 7/8 August 2004
Eastbourne 12-15 August 2004
Weston Park, Staffs 20-23 August 2004
Duxford 4/5 September 2004
RAF Leuchars 10/11 September
Southport 11/12 September 2004
RNAS Yeovilton 17/18 September 2004
Biggin Hill 18/19 September 2004
Brighton 24 September – 1 October 2004
Duxford 10 October 2004
Pilots are reminded that Restrictions for displays by Jet Formation Display Teams (Red Arrows etc)
will be published whenever possible by AIC and NOTAM, and the first AIC (23/2004 [Mauve 104]) has
already been published. Details of the timings of such displays will be notified by NOTAM. Details of
Restricted Airspace feature in the daily AIS Information Line message (0500-354802) and will be
included on the Pre-flight Information Bulletins (PIB) through the AIS Web site at http://www.ais.org.uk .
Information for overseas
We have been informed by DFS, the German Aeronautical Information Service, that they have produced a new
set of ICAO charts for flight over Germany. They have drawn attention to changes affecting several areas of
Classes C, D and E airspace, and also to airspace in which the carriage of a serviceable transponder is required.
Pilots intending to fly in the airspace over the UK, Germany or any other country airspace would be ill-advised to
use any but the most up-to-date charts available. Most commercial aviation shops stock such up-to-date charts,
and pilots may also find they are available through the aeronautical information services of the individual country,
perhaps on the relevant websites.
Temporary restriction of flying regulations ................ 29 Visual Reference Points ...............................................31
Information for overseas ............................................... 29 Aeronautical Information Circulars .............................31
On track airspace infringement survey ....................... 30 CAA Safety Evenings - Winter 2004-5 ........................32
Instructor Refresher Seminars 2004-6 ....................... 30 Military Civil Air Safety Day ..........................................32
CAA VFR Charts .......................................................... 30 External Safety Events ...................................................32
On Track airspace infringement survey
The task of addressing, where possible, the recommendations made in the ‘On Track’ report on General Aviation
airspace infringements (available on the CAA website at http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAPAP2003_5.pdf) now
lies with the CAA’s Airspace infringements Working Group (AIWG). The AIWG is made up of representatives
from the CAA’s Air Traffic Standards, General Aviation and Personnel Licensing Departments, plus the Directorate
of Airspace Policy. The GA and air traffic control communities plus the Ministry of Defence are also represented.
The AIWG’s first priority is the safe operation of aircraft and this will be the overriding principle in its decisions.
Details of the recommendations made by the On Track team and the progress of the AIWG will eventually be
made through the On Track website at www.flyontrack.co.uk. The site, managed on the CAA’s behalf by GASCo,
will be updated as AIWG work progresses and will continue to provide a forum for infringement-related issues to
be discussed by the aviation community as a whole.
Instructor Refresher Seminars 2004-6
The following seminars are planned for flight instructors to revalidate their instructor ratings.
Date Venue Provider
13/14 Jul 2004 London, City University AOPA
13/14 Sep 2004 Cranfield ETA
4/5 Oct 2004 Sywell, Northampton On-Track Aviation
4/5 Nov 2004 Wrightington ETA
7/8 Dec 2004 London, City University AOPA
22/23 Jan 2005 Bournemouth ETA
19/20 Feb 2005 Glenrothes, Scotland On-Track Aviation
22/23 Mar 2005 Bristol AOPA
11/12 Apr 2005 Northampton On-Track Aviation
12/13 Jul 2005 London AOPA
3/4 Oct 2005 Northampton On-Track Aviation
6/7 Dec 2005 London AOPA
21/22 Mar 2006 Bristol AOPA
Tel: 020 7834 5631 Fax: 020 7834 8623 Email: email@example.com Web: www.aopa.co.uk
Tel: 01202 572953 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Web: www.flightexaminers.com
Tel/Fax: 01993 844262 Email: email@example.com Web: www.ontrackaviation.com
CAA VFR Charts
The following charts have been published recently, or will be in the near future.
ICAO 1:500,000 scale
Northern England & Northern Ireland Edition 27 13th May 2004
ICAO 1:250,000 scale
Sheet 6 England East Edition 5 10th June 2004
Sheet 7 West & South Wales Edition 4 8th July 2004
The VFR charts “updates” page on www.caa.co.uk/dap contains the latest amendments to each CAA chart since
its publication date, and is updated every 28 days, coinciding with the AIRAC cycle. Pilots are encouraged to
check charts and also the updates; if any errors are noticed there is a feedback form on the web site, which can
be used to inform the Aeronautical Charts and Data section.
Visual Reference Points
The Aeronautical Information Circular describing the UK’s policy on Visual Reference Points (VRPs) has been
replaced. AIC 18/2004 (Yellow 129) was published on 1 April 2004 and provides guidance on the selection,
purpose, use and promulgation of VRPs. The AIC seeks pilots to report any difficulty in identifying the location
of a VRP, or where changing physical surroundings render the use of a feature as a VRP inappropriate (for
example, as result of landscape and/or land use change, demolition, or urban development), to the controlling
authority of the airspace concerned.
Details of visual reference points established at individual aerodromes are published in the UK AIP AD2 at section
AD 2-22 (Flight Procedures), and in some instances in Terminal Controlled Airspace charts at ENR 6. In addition,
they are depicted on the CAA’s 1:250000 and 1:500000 VFR charts by a blue box surrounding the name which
is linked to the location identified by a cross within a circle.
Aerial photographs of a limited number of VRPs can be found under ‘On Track’ in the ‘Aeronautical Charts’
element of the ‘Airspace’ section of the CAA website at <http://www.caa.co.uk/dap/dapcharts/ontrack/
document.asp?groupid=302>. Please note that the charts accompanying these photographs are not to be used
for navigation, but are meant as an aid to primary VFR navigation. The legal requirement under the Air Navigation
Order to carry a current approved chart remains in force.
Aeronautical Information Circulars
Recent AICs of interest to General Aviation pilots are listed below.
AIC 29/2004 Pink 64 Engine malfunction caused by lightning strikes (turbine engines)
AIC 22/2004 White 96 UK AIS publications – charges 2004
AIC 26/2004 White 97 Air Traffic Services – Qualification requirements in the UK
AIC 11/2004 Green 49 Aeronautical charts for civil aviation
AIC 13/2004 Yellow 127 Shuttleworth Old Warden special events
AIC 18/2004 Yellow 129 The establishment and use of visual reference points
AIC 21/2004 Yellow 130 Restriction of flying regulations – Southern North Sea 17 May – 14 Sep 2004
AIC 32/2004 Yellow 131 Gliding, hang-gliding and paragliding sites within the Luton CTR/CTA
AIC 35/2004 Yellow 132 Permanent airspace changes below FL100 – October 2003 - March 2004
AIC 45/2004 Yellow 133 PFA Rally Kemble 9-11 July 2004
AIC/20/2004 Mauve 103 Restriction of flying regulations – Southern North Sea 17 May – 14 Sep 2004
AIC/23/2004 Mauve 104 Restriction of flying regulations - Jet formation display sites
AIC 25/2004 Mauve 106 Restriction of flying regulations- Duxford various dates
AIC 31/2004 Mauve 107 Restriction of flying regulations – Farnborough 12-26 July 2004
AIC 36/2004 Mauve 108 Restriction of flying regulations – Pershore 12 June – 30 July 2004
AIC 37/2004 Mauve 109 Restriction of flying regulations – Kemble classic jets airshow 20 June 2004
AIC 38/2004 Mauve 110 Restriction of flying regulations – Stonehenge 20-21 June 2004
AIC 39/2004 Mauve 111 Restriction of flying regulations – Glastonbury 23-28 June 2004
AIC 40/2004 Mauve 112 Restriction of flying regulations – RAF Waddington 24-27 June 2004
AIC 41/2004 Mauve 113 Restriction of flying regulations – Silverstone & Turweston 9-11 July 2004
AIC 42/2004 Mauve 114 Restriction of flying regulations – RNAS Culdrose 13/14 July 2004
AIC 43/2004 Mauve 115 Restriction of flying regulations – RAF Fairford (RIAT 04) 14-19 July 2004
AIC 44/2004 Mauve 116 Restriction of flying regulations – PFA Rally Kemble 9-11 July 2004
CAA Safety Evenings – Winter 2004-5
The first confirmed venues for CAA Safety Evenings next winter season are listed below. There are only a limited
number every year, so each is effectively a ‘regional’ evening. Every GA pilot, flight instructor, engineer, or indeed
anyone associated with GA operations, in the area is invited and indeed strongly encouraged to attend. Although
the emphasis of the evening will be slanted towards the host organisation, the evenings are relevant to all forms
of general aviation.
Any aviation organisation which would like to host one of these evenings in the future should contact David
Cockburn, either by e-mail at firstname.lastname@example.org or by letter to him at General Aviation Department,
Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex RH6 0YR.
Most events are free, although a small charge is sometimes necessary at the door to cover the cost of hiring the
venue or providing refreshments. In addition, everyone has the opportunity to win prizes donated by generous
sponsors. It is usually appreciated if those attending let the organiser know of their intention to attend, to give an
idea of probable numbers.
The events start at 7.30 pm unless otherwise advertised, to last approximately 2¾ hours including a short break.
The main speaker from the General Aviation Department is normally accompanied by a guest, often from another
CAA department, and discussion and questions are encouraged.
The programme is also available on the GAD web site at www.caa.co.uk/srg/general_aviation, and any changes
or added events will appear there as they are arranged.
Date Area/airfield Location Organiser Telephone
11/10/2004 Liverpool Primo Lonzardi 01514 866161 ops
12/10/2004 Blackpool Departure Gate 3 Simon Menzies 01253 472527
22/10/2004 Aberdeen Alan Peace 01224 725333
28/10/2004 Coventry Coventry Aerroplane Club Wes Simpson 02476 301428
21/11/2004 Cumbernauld Ted Veitch 01236 452525
22/11/2004 Compton Abbas Clubhouse Clive Hughes 01747811767
24/11/2004 Kemble BCT Aviation Andrea Woodhead 01285 771015
25/11/2004 Derby Martin Jones 01283 733803
29/11/2004 Southampton Mark Gibb 023 8062 7376
10/01/2005 Lydd Restaurant Roy Panniers 01797 320734
11/01/2005 Stapleford Restaurant Penny Hodges 01708 688380
13/01/2005 Fenland Restaurant Lee Haunch 01406 540461
18/01/2005 Belfast Civil Service Club, stormont Ken Crompton 02891 813327
27/01/2005 Netherthorpe Restaurant Bruce Evans 01909 532413
02/03/2005 Perth College? Roger Young 01738 553357
Military Civil Air Safety Day
Regular readers will have been wondering whether the Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC) are intending to
organise a Military Civil Air Safety Day (MCASD) with the CAA this year. We are glad to announce that a MCASD
will be held at an RAF aerodrome in Lincolnshire on 30th September this year. Application forms should be
available from 30th June and may be submitted on-line through the DASC web site www.dasc.mod.uk , where
further information will be available, as it will on the CAA web site www.caa.co.uk/srg through “general aviation”
then “information”. Those without web access may write to SO2 Ops Sp (MCASD), Defence Aviation Safety
Centre, PO Box 333, RAF Bentley Priory, STANMORE, Middlesex HA7 3YN.
External Safety Events
We know that safety evenings and other events are held by not only the CAA, but by other organisations. For
example, the General Aviation Safety Council holds them, and flying clubs, PFA struts and type clubs do the
same. Many of these have facilities for only limited attendance; however, if an organiser wishes to make such an
event open to everyone else, we should be happy to list those events and organisers’ contact details in a similar
fashion to our own CAA safety evenings.
The Popular Flying Association (PFA) are holding several events at their headquarters at Turweston on Fridays
throughout the summer, involving engineering ‘open-house’ and speakers on various subjects.
2 of 2004 Information supplied by
Refer to NOTAM, Bulletins
or AIP etc. for full
FREQUENCY & AIRSPACE
AIS website -
Temporary changes not listed below may be deleted from those at GASIL 1 of 2004
Aerodrome Availability & Communications
AERODROME SERVICE FREQUENCY REMARKS
Alderney AD Til 01 Dec, Restriction on some Lithuanian and Russian reg acft. (C1613/03)
• Blackbushe AD Til 31 Aug, Rwy 08/26 slippery when wet (L12644/03).
Bristol Filton AD 110.55/CH42Y Perm. Rwy 09 DME may unlock inside 4 DME fm touchdown (L0041/04).
• Carlisle AD Til 31 Jul EST, AD strictly PPR (L1563/04).
• Compton Abbas AD 349.5 Til 30 Jun EST, NDB ‘COM’ u/s (L1572/04).
• Dunkeswell AD Til 31 Dec, Jet A1 (AVTUR) not avbl (L1559/04).
• Duxford AD Til 31 May, Asphalt Rwy 06/24 closed (L01404/04).
• Fife - Glenrothes AD Til 1 Sept, rwy lights u/s (L1458/04).
• Gloucestershire AD Til 14 Jun EST, twy H east of twy J not avbl to traffic due WIP (L0786/04)
Hucknall AD Perm. Tel nos. changed 0115-9630113, 0115-9642269 (L0284/04).
• Humberside AD 123.150 Til 30 Jun, RADAR freq change postponed, remains 123.150 (C1720/04)
• Isle of Man AD Perm. Changed dists for Rwy 03/21, details on request (C1111/04).
• Jersey AD 329.000 Til 31 Aug, Locator JW u/s (C0764/04).
Kirkwall AD Perm. Rwy 06/24 completely withdrawn (L0153/04).
Little Gransden AD Til 10 Jan EST AD unlicensed on Mondays & Tuesdays (L0101/04).
• Lossiemouth AD Til 31 Aug, AD cannot accept/handle visiting acft due wip (U0759/04).
• Manchester Barton AD Til 30 Jun EST rwys 02/20 & 14/32 closed due WIP (L1527- 8/04).
• Manchester Woodford AD 130.050 Til 01 Jul EST, Woodford RADAR u/s. Twr/Apch 120.7 (L1542/04).
Northampton/Sywell AD 378.500 Til 30 Jun EST, NDB ‘NN’ not avbl (L3105/03).
• Northampton/Sywell AD Til 31 Aug EST, Rwy 07/25 clsd due WIP on apron (L1582/04).
• Odiham AD Perm. Replacement PAR (RPAR) avbl VFR Ops only (U0715/04).
Oxford Kidlington AD 121.950 `Til 31 May, Gnd freq will not be avbl for a trial period (L0462/04).
Plymouth AD Til 08 Aug, de-fuel facilities not avbl (C1435/03).
• St Mawgan AD 128.725 Perm. Initial contact freq changed from 126.500 (U585/04).
• Scilly Isles/St Mary’s AD 123.820 Perm. TWR/APP freq 123.150 replaced (L0719/04).
• Shoreham AD Til 30 Sep EST, WIP Rwy 07 undershoot (C1159/04).
Southampton AD Til 01 Nov, Strictly PPR to all GA, Mil and non-sched (C1450/03).
• Stornoway AD Til 31 Oct EST, ABN u/s (L0980/04).
Sumburgh AD Til 22 Aug, Primary RADAR not avbl (A1018/03).
• Swansea AD Perm. Rwy 10/28 Reduced declared distances, details on request (L1395/04).
Swansea AD Perm. Rwy 15/33 closed (L0390/04).
• Tatenhill (AD) Til 26 Jun EST, AD not avbl for acft requiring a licenced AD (L1562/04)
Airspace & RADAR Services
• Barkston Heath, Lincs 525744N 0003342W Perm. Permanent Glider winch launch site (B0488/04).
• Fairford MATZ Til 27 Aug, MATZ active (B0063/04).
• Heathrow RADAR 119.900 Til 7Jul, 119.900 (Special VFR) not in use. Use 125.620 (B0574/04).
• Langford, Devon 5049N 00322W Til 12 Aug, kite /birds of prey flying 1nm radius (H2995/04).
• Lutton 5228N 00022W Til 31 Jul, kite /birds of prey flying 1nm radius (H2663/04).
• Muckamore, nr Antrim 5441N 00611W Til 26 Jul, captive helium balloon (H2559/04).
• Old Warden ATZ Til 27 Jun, temp ATZ established, 2NM RAD. Details on req (B0672/04).
• Swansea ATZ Til 30 Oct, ATZ active Wed-Mon 0800-1630 (B0838/04).
• Washingley 5229N 00020W Til 31 Jul, kite /birds of prey flying 1nm radius (H2659/04).