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SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

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					   SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH
           EASTERN EUROPE


    NATIONAL ASSESSMENT FOR KOSOVO




Prepared by
Genc Krasniqi



                KIPRED
February, 2006




      2
                TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS……………………………………………………………………...               3
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………                    4
OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS ……………………………………    5
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY...………………………………………….   6
ECONOMIC SECURITY…………………………………………………………………...               10
ETHNIC COMMUNITY SECURITY………………………………………………………..            11
PERSONAL AND PUBLIC SECURITY……………………………………………………...         13
SECURITY INSTITUTIONS……………………………………………………………….              14
    KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE………………………………………………………              14
    THE FUTURE OF THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS…………………………..   16
    KOSOVO FORCE…………………………………………………………………                   18
    SHADOW INTELLIGENCE BODIES……………………………………………….           19
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………                     20
LITERATURE…………………………………………………………………………….                    21
ABOUT KIPRED………………………………………………………………………...                  25




                             3
                           LIST OF ACRONYM’S

AER (European Agency for Reconstruction)
CCK (Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija)
CDC (Centers for Disease Control)
CIVPOL (United Nations Civilian Police in Kosovo)
CCHF (Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever)
EWR (Early Warning Report)
EU (European Union)
FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
IDP (Internally Displaced Person)
IMF (International Monetary Fund)
KFOR (The Kosovo Force)
KPC (Kosovo Protection Corps)
KPS (Kosovo Police Service)
KPSSD (Security Services Division of KPS)
KCB (Kosovo Consolidated Budget)
LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo)
MFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy)
MP (Member of Parliament)
NGO (Nongovernmental Organisation)
POE (Publicly Owned Enterprise)
PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo)
PISG (Provisional Institutions of Self-Government)
SOE (Socially Owned Enterprise)
SME (Small and Medium Enterprise)
SEE (South Eastern Europe)
SMZ (Serbia and Montenegro)
SOK (Statistical Office of Kosovo)
SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General)
UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo)
UN (United Nations)
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)
UNSCR 1244 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244)
WB (World Bank)




                                        4
INTRODUCTION

The intention of this report is to draft the national assessment of Kosova in terms of
security and democracy, while at the same time illuminating the principal threats to
security in Kosovo as well as the environment from which these threats emerge. This
report also strives to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the security sector as it
currently exists in Kosovo. This report takes a holistic approach to security including a
wide range of issues which contribute towards perceptions of security in Kosovo. This
report takes into account a relatively large number of public opinion surveys that have
been conducted in Kosovo since 1999 and the subsequent trends that emerge from those.

Kosovo is experiencing a slow recovery from the war of 1998 and 1999, which resulted
in widespread suffering, murders and missing persons, destroyed property, destitution
and a wide spread desperation among the population. The people and institutions of
Kosovo are currently striving to put the destruction and conflict behind them. They are
endeavouring to create a society in which all individuals and communities can hope for
ordinary lives and a better future. The general security situation has improved
significantly and, as a result, the current situation is relatively stable, primarily due to the
presence of KFOR and UNMIK.
The interesting dichotomy of having at the same time an external presence ensuring a
stable environment and at the same time indigenous institutions such as KPC striving
towards a future Kosovo Army, clearly point out that both security and democracy must
be viewed through a wider prism while trying to encompass all relevant factors that
directly influence the public opinion of these issues.

There are a number of potential triggers of dissatisfaction that could generate significant
social upheaval. The growing problems of corruption and political cronyism within the
structures of government have also ensured a growth in public contempt for existing



                                               5
structures. A further issue of significant concern both in the long and short term seems to
be a general complacency of the institutions of government.


OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS

The legal framework of government in Kosovo by the international community is
outlined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, under the powers of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therein (UNSCR 1244) the international community is
identified as the authority that has law enforcement and the use of power prerogatives in
Kosovo.
As outlined by the UNSCR 1244, the major wielder of power in politics, security and
related issues is the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and, in
particular, the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).
Regardless of the undergoing process of transferring competencies to Kosovo’s
institutions, UNMIK remains the key decision-making entity and it is likely to maintain
this role until the end of the status process and for a short transitional period afterwards.1
Furthermore, it will continue to exercise an oversight role over Kosovo’s institutions
within the area of transferred responsibilities.
Similarly, KFOR is mandated with the role of peace enforcement and external security.
KFOR also has a law enforcement mandate, exercised jointly with the UNMIK Civilian
Police and, increasingly, with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). From the outset, KFOR
has responded to the General Headquarters of NATO and not to UNMIK. In addition, for
some matters, the national components of KFOR look to their respective national
Defence Ministries for direction.
The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) constitute the second major
governing structure in Kosovo. At the central and local levels, the PISG has been formed
as a result of four free and fair elections, between 2000 and 2004. However, the
establishment of democratic institutions in Kosovo is at an early stage and accountable
and responsible structures, at all levels, need time to mature. From the outset of the
democratic elected institutions in Kosovo, the PISG has been challenged by the lack of
appropriate capacities. Notwithstanding this the progress towards the implementation of
standards has proved that the Kosovo institutions have developed during the last five
years and do have a sense of commitment towards the population of Kosovo.
The political dynamics in Kosovo have seen significant changes following the
establishment of the PISG. Whereas the 2000 elections brought the first free and fairly
elected institutions, the general elections in 2004 created an opposition at the national
assembly level. The presence of an opposition has positively contributed to an increased
plurality among political parties.
With the intensification of final status talks, UNMIK is moving faster in transferring
further powers to the PISG. At the end of 2005, UNMIK allowed the PISG to establish
two new ministries, internal affairs and justice. This means that the Government of


1
  UNMIK is categorized as the primary actor due to the scope and depth of its mission and responsibilities
it has. For more information about the competencies of UNMIK, read UNSCR 1244 at:
(http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/N9917289.pdf, last visited: 11 January 2006)


                                                     6
Kosovo will assume responsibility for the rule of law and law enforcement for the first
time.2
Serbian political institutions are the last major actor within the Kosovo political process.
The Serbian political architecture includes political parties, parallel structures, NGOs and
the “Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija” (CCKM). These institutions have
complicated internal relationships and their dealings with UNMIK and the PISG are
ambiguous. The Coordination Centre is the major official institution in Serbia for dealing
with Kosovo and represents the government of the Republic of Serbia. However, the
main challenge for UNMIK and the PISG is the existence of parallel structures because
their presence is felt in security, courts, property rights, education, health care and civil
registration. Analysts and diplomats have argued that the lack of integration by the Serb
community is due primarily to the existence of these structures. However, it is also true
that the Serbs share a wide mistrust of the PISG.3 While the parallel institutions have
been a disruption to the rule of law, as well as an incentive not to integrate, they have
probably served in the role of a life-line for some segments of the Serb community.
Serbian political parties are active in Kosovo and, in recent years, a number of Kosovo
based Serb political parties have emerged winning significant votes in the local elections
in 2002 with one gaining a municipal majority in Strpce/Shterpcë.
UNMIK has continuously cooperated with the political structures of the Serbian
community. The main struggle continues to be focused on their integration into the
institutional life of Kosovo. There are various reasons for the lack of success, but it can
be argued that the existence of parallel structures is the main reason for this situation.
Whereas some analysts and officials link the existence of these structures to the mistrust
held by the Serb community towards Kosovo institutions; others argue that this is due to
the unresolved political status of Kosovo. Nevertheless, very it is clear that the existence
of these parallel structures has been the main obstacle for the integration of the Serbian
community.
As it stands with the departure of KFOR and UNMIK, with parallel structures operating
on the ground Kosovo and PISG, as the legal authority, unable to discharge its
responsibility in the entire territory, Kosovo would fit the description of a failing state.


POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY

Political security is seriously curtailed by the unclear mandate of international
administration stretched between the conflicting objectives of substantial autonomy as
provided by the UNSCR 1244 and state-building aspirations of the Kosovo’s elite and its
overwhelming majority. Kosovo is still being administered under the authority of Chapter
VII of the UN Charter in the name of pacifying a threat to international peace and
security and less in terms of a genuine state-building. Hence, immediate stabilization has
2
  For more information about the establishment of the two new ministries see:
http://www.unmikonline.org/dpi/pressrelease.nsf/0/B5D23DE799453CF8C12570DD005AADFB/$FILE/pr
1469.pdf, (last visited: 12 January 2005).
3
  It is worth noting that parallel structures are installed in all Serbian enclaves and provide various services
for the Serbian community. More about the existence of the parallel structures and their impact on the
overall situation in Kosovo read the OSCE report on Parallel Structures Kosovo,
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf (last visited: January 12, 2006).


                                                       7
superseded efforts of genuine institution-building and empowerment of the local
citizenry.
Kosovo also faces serious challenges in terms of its governance. Responsibilities are split
between indigenous and international institutions. The dichotomy in governance between
local and international elements inhibits a clear division of responsibilities and creates a
perplexing picture of the lines of accountability. The relatively poor performance of both
deepens their image in the eyes of the represented and inhibits accountability.
Currently, the executive branch of the PISG, the Government, is seen to be unstable. It
derives its power less from the majority of the citizens and more from the international
community. Approval of citizens for the government is based predominantly on
expectations about the final status outcome and less on institutional performance and its
capacity to deliver services. In addition to this the Kosovo Assembly rarely meets and
fails to provide a much needed venue for conducting regular and thorough debates. The
single district electoral system, with closed party lists, makes the Assembly less
representative of the population and more attentive to internal party pressures.
It is an established fact that weak governance are naturally prone to being contested by
the majority of the population. Poor service delivery (be it energy, social services,
utilities, safety) erodes peoples’ reliance on official structures for obtainment of essential
services. Moreover, some Kosovo Serbs continue to view Kosovo institutions with deep
suspicion, an incentive for them to relate to “parallel institutions” instead. While efforts
to bridge this gap are present and will continue, any significant effect may not be
achieved before the final status process is concluded.
The coordinating and monitoring capacity of the central government is weak4, leading to
the perception that the governing bodies are also weak. This is not surprising since the
public administration in Kosovo is fairly new and inexperienced.5 Yet, the need for the
enactment of new laws has been constantly emphasized by representatives of Kosovo
institutions and representatives of international administration in order to overcome the
existing gaps between the inherited Yugoslav legal system and the new, social, economic
and political realities.6 Further, with efforts concentrated in drafting and adopting laws
(due to standards requirements & related) insufficient attention has been paid to their
implementation7.
The legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions is limited to the predominant Kosovo Albanian
and non-Serb communities. Explicitly or implicitly, Kosovo Serbs have not granted
legitimacy to PISG/UNMIK, with many Kosovo Serbs generally operating within their
enclaves. The latter is perceived as a security threat for the majority of the population and
is seen as an extension of Belgrade’s regime. Kosovo Serbs, on the other hand, see the
enclaves as a form of protection and a means of providing essential services. Be it as it
may, the current situation nourishes the perception among both Albanians and Serbs, that
they are a threat to each other and the conflict as a zero-sum game where a gain for one
necessarily means a loss for the other.
4
  OSCE Official Site, DOCUMENT: Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws Report II,
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17515_en.pdf (last visited: 20 December 2005).
5
  UNDP, Assessment of Administrative Capacity. March 2005, p.8.
6
  OSCE Official Site, DOCUMENT: Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws Report II,
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17515_en.pdf (last visited: 20 December 2005). p.7
7
  OSCE Official Site, DOCUMENT: Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws Report II,
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17515_en.pdf (last visited: 20 December 2005). p.7


                                                  8
The issue of enclaves becomes even more dangerous due to two diametrically opposite
strategies. On one hand, there has been an attempt by the PISG to integrate them into the
legal and social framework of Kosovo, and on the other hand we have witnessed
Belgrade’s policies being driven by the desire to cement the partition of Kosovo. Even
within a legitimate society, there are always latent problems; but when it comes to
legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions popular support is decreasing. Trends show an
underlying dissatisfaction which could fuel serious unrest.
Aside from polling-related data, other data confirms the above trend. Lack of clear and
identifiable accountability feeds the feeling of alienation from the system by a growing
number of citizens. This increases the possibility of negative forms of expression of
dissatisfaction rather than constructive participation. Statistics show a ratio of 4 times
more destructive participation, such as public protest, for each positive form of
participation such as membership in a trade union or implementation of an NGO project.8
The post-war enthusiasm for citizen participation set far too high a bar (primarily
elections and related forms of political participation) and the serious decline in
participation, ever since the first days of fledgling democracy, demonstrates a high risk
scenario. The current system has outlived itself and there seem to be more incentives for
avoiding and fighting the system rather than using it constructively to address one’s
needs or to realize opportunities through active participation in the political life.9 In short,
a sense of public ownership is lacking. The current electoral system falls short of
faithfully representing citizens’ trust in electing national and local representatives, or to
provide the sustained incentive for accountability back to the voters once in power.
Whereas elected representatives are elected proportionally, their accountability to those
who have elected them remains, at best, limited. Moreover, the current electoral system
has negative effects, such as impeding representative-represented relations, increasing
chances for weak government, hampering accountability and discouraging voter turn-out,
to mention just a few.10 Any expectations for democratic accountability must essentially
include changes to the electoral system as a major step towards stimulating more
responsible leadership at all levels, democratically run parties, faithful representation of
diverse interests, MPs who bring legitimacy to the institutions as well as stable and
responsive government. The goal should be replacing destructive “dialogue” on the
streets with constructive dialogue in institutions.11
Voting trends indicate that the legitimacy gap is a widening. In only four years, voter
turn-out has fallen from almost 90% to less than 50%. Non-voters nowadays make a
larger “constituency” than the collective number of votes gained by three biggest
parties.12




8
  UNDP Kosovo. 2004. Human Development Report Kosovo2004 The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and
Choices. Prishtina: UNDP Kosovo.
9
  KIPRED, Reforming the Elector System of Kosovo, 2005;
KIPRED Electoral Trends and Voting Behavior in Kosovo (Forthcoming)
10
   KIPRED, Reforming the Electoral System of Kosovo, 2005.
11
   KIPRED, Voting Trends and Electoral Behavior in Kosovo 2000-2004 (Forthcoming), p.2.
12
   KIPRED, Voting Trends and Electoral Behavior in Kosovo 2000-2004. (Forthcoming), p.5.


                                                9
Rule of law13 is perceived as poor. Kosovo police and judiciary are understandably
fragile institutions.14 There is a wide public support for both KFOR and KPS as the main
institutions in charge for security, in spite of the fact that the rule of law as such is
perceived as poor. A high number of unresolved criminal cases, a serious backlog of
cases waiting for adjudication nurture mistrust in the courts and legal system as a whole.
15
   Almost half of Kosovo Albanians (46%) admit a lack of trust in the justice system.16
What has seriously curtailed the potential for strengthening the rule of law is the poor
example set by international administration. Academics and practitioners have made it
clear that it is critical to have clear codes of behaviour for the international administrators
or advisors and mechanisms to hold them accountable.17 UNMIK, for example, has been
quite reluctant to accept the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsperson to the
detriment, not only of the Office but also for offering a role model to ordinary Kosovars.
The situation is worsened by the fact that KFOR - the predominantly NATO military
presence in Kosovo - falls outside the Ombudsperson’s jurisdiction.
The creation of institutions, governed by the rule of law, will doubtlessly continue to
remain at the top of the list of burning issues. Meanwhile there are gross violations of
basic rules, e.g. in terms of property rights (ownership, possession, occupancy),
competition, intellectual property rights, environmental protection and related issues,
when perpetrators remain at large, a sense of impunity prevails18.
Cultural legacy plays a negative role in consolidating trust in the system of the rules in
force. There is generally little confidence in the legal system, which is mainly due to the
legacy of the Communist regime, from where the lack of confidence in the legal systems
stems.. Enactment of discriminatory rules throughout the 1990’s and use of judicial and
law enforcement mechanisms against the majority of Kosovars further undermined
confidence in the system. Judged by its subsidiary legislation, the government also pays
insufficient attention to implementing legislation enacted by the Assembly.19 The
tendency to sweep away rules of procedure illustrates the low regard given to the
application of the law.




13
   In general terms meant to include effective police, courts prisons / dealing with human rights violations
and crimes committed.
14
   Ambassador Kai Eide. The Situation in Kosovo Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Oct. 2005. Report, p.5
15
   “Another general conclusion that cuts across all areas is that the overall legal system, built in parallel
from a variety of sources lacks coherence and consistency. There is a growing risk that the system will
become increasingly fragmented, contradictory, and unwieldy, unless there is a major effort to codify it,
and unless foreign experts move out of drafting legislation and into purely advisory roles. This risk should
not be underestimated. Inconsistencies in the legal system tend to grow over time, and can threaten the rule
of law and the administration of justice. The longer the process is allowed to continue, the more difficult it
becomes to untangle as time passes.” UNDP, Assessing Adm. Cap. p.9
16
   KosovaLive, CDRSEE and Medijski Centar Beta “Kosovo-Kosova, Coming to Terms with the Problem
of Kosovo: The Peoples’ Views from Kosovo and Serbia”. 2005, p.10
17
   You, the People: Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations. p. 9.
18
   Ambassador Kai Eide. The Situation in Kosovo Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Oct. 2005. Report, p.5.
19
   OSCE Official Site, DOCUMENT: Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws Report II,
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17515_en.pdf (last visited: 20 December 2005). p.6.


                                                     10
Judicial performance remains unsatisfactory and is not likely improve in the near future.
Courts are still considerably understaffed with judges and prosecutors. There are also
serious inconsistencies in substantive terms such as in the delivery of documents,
verdicts, untimely delivery of court orders to release or detain and a lack of security
arrangements for local members of judiciary. Efficiency is poor and the length of
procedures remains a serious problem. All these defects play a role in undermining
citizens’ confidence in the rule of law, perceiving it as rather selective, unfair and prone
to kinship ties and political correctness rather than impartial and decisive decision-
making. Corruption, connections, lack of professional standards as well as inadequate
education also have a negative impact in the performance of judiciary.
Parallel structures, including courts and other outlets of the Belgrade government, which
operate in Kosovo without hindrance, drastically undermine both the identification of
citizens with the rule of law and their trust in the system. This counts particularly for the
Serb community, which relies on such outlets for delivery of basic services. There has
been a continuous political commitment on the side of international administration to
resolve the issue of parallel structures. However, in spite of such commitments the reality
on the ground proves the contrary20. “Northern Mitrovica and the three northern-most
Serb-dominated municipalities have been and continue to be bastions of Belgrade-
supported parallel administration ever since KFOR consolidated the defensive line drawn
by stressed Kosovo Serbs along the River Ibar in summer 1999”.21
The persistence of parallel structures is generally seen as a political demonstration of
Serbia’s presence in Kosovo as well as a reflection of mistrust between the two largest
ethnic communities, which seriously undermines the implementation of the rule of law in
the entire territory of Kosovo.22


ECONOMIC SECURITY

Kosovo inherited a damaged economy which has come from a period of poor or no
economic policies and war devastation. Since 1999 there was a shift toward more liberal
market policies. The macro economic policies of Kosovo should be seen the light of the
fact that the macro economy signifies levels of investment, output, exports and
employment.
Although considerable economic progress has been made in Kosovo during the last six
years, much remains to be done. According to independent and international assessments,
Kosovo is economically sustainable based on its natural resources.23 Yet, situation in
Kosovo is such that one of the poorest economies in Europe. The economy of Kosovo
currently accounts for approximately 90% current account deficit. This deficit in return is

20
   OSCE Official Site, DOCUMENT: Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws Report II,
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17515_en.pdf (last visited: 20 December 2005). p.8.
21
   International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo. 22 April 2004. Available:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/155_collapse_in_kosovo_revised.pdf (last
visited: 15 February 2006). p.12.
22
   Ambassador Kai Eide. The Situation in Kosovo Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Oct. 2005. Report, p.12.
23
   According to Martii Ahtisaari. Aliu, Fatmir. 2005. Qymyri I Kosoves, sipas Ahtisaarit, Faktor Percaktues
i Statusit te Kosoves ,Koha Ditore, December 22.


                                                    11
financed by Diaspora remittances, as well as spending of the international community
directly and indirectly.
Kosovo has attained substantial achievements in the fiscal and monetary policies
recording budgetary stability and low inflation. This remarkable achievement is
accomplished basically for two reasons: (1) the increase in revenues and the low
expansion of expenditures; and (2) use of Euro imposing monetary discipline. Fiscal as
well as monetary stability can be a prelude for policy action for growth and poverty
reduction but not a substitute for such a policy. The use of the euro in Kosovo had a
significant impact on the monetary stability and financial discipline in Kosovo. In the
early years of Euro the inflation was double digit24 due to the massive international aid
and private inflows. This inflation recessed in 2002 and onwards. Currently Kosovo
records below average Euro-Zone inflation. It also brought a monetary stability as well
due to the fact that neither BPK (who acts as a fiscal agent) nor the economy of Kosovo
at large, do not face exchange risks.
Growth in Kosovo remains highly dependant on donor assistance. However, assistance
by foreign donors is declining, but still contributed 23% of GDP in 2004, compared to
36% in 2002 and 28% in 200325.
Employment is the most pressing challenge faced by the Kosovo policymakers, which
has been a persistent problem throughout Kosovo’s recent years. Having a large available
working age population (i.e. 15-64) and continual population growth, Kosovo is faced
with a growing unemployment which will be extremely difficult to curb. According to the
Ministry of Work and Social Welfare (MWSW), unemployment stands at 42.3%.26 This
level of unemployment has remained constant for some years. The large donations that
were injected in Kosovo’s economy have produced a soothing, but limited and short-term
effect on this statistic. The continuous and controversial privatization of Socially Owned
Enterprises and Public Enterprises which started in 2002 has laid the ground for privately
led employment. Consequently employment in the private sector has experienced a slight
increase which compared to the public sector which according to the MEF is
overstretched. For the time being, government remains the main generator of
employment, without reasonable chances for a change in the near future.
The budgetary implications directly affect sustainability and efficiency of security
institutions.
Both the KPS and the KPC take a considerable share of the KCB, accounting for
approximately 10% of the entire budget or € 70 million of the KCB. The KPS budget is
more than €52 million per annum and, budget projections for 2005/627 there will be an
increase of approximately 10% to pay for the restructuring the KPS.28 The KPC had a
budget of €15 million in 2005 and an additional €400 thousand was donated from the

24
   Source BPK Official Site, http://www.bpk-kos.org/English/Press%20Release.htm (last visited 8 January
2006).
25
   Kosovo 2005 Progress Report, European Commission, 2005.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2005/ (last visited: 25 November 2005) p. 29.
26
   Data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare
27
   MEF has published all the budgetary projections for, and under these projections KPS as well as KPC
will have an increase in their respective budgets for approximately 10%.
28
   KPS will have to undergo changes in order to upgrade its efficiency, also under the
UNMIK/REG/2005/54 KPS is a prerogative of SRSG but it, slowly, will be transferred to the PISG
Ministry of Interior. Therefore this move will interlock KPS in changes.


                                                  12
Friends of KPC. The budget of 2006 sees an increase of approximately €3 million from
the KCB.
Donations have been a large part of KPC financing; among the donors the US
government has been the most active. The fact that there is considerably reliance on
donations for security institutions is worrying as it mitigates against their long-term
sustainability and proper development.


ETHNIC COMMUNITY SECURITY

Ethnic communities present one of the most serious conditions to the long-term stability
of Kosovo. The Serbian community is in a difficult position due to the differing visions
for the status of Kosovo. The Roma community faces long-term xenophobic exclusion
related to allegations of atrocities committed alongside Serb forces during the war. Other
communities have been much more successful in their integration with the Albanian
community, including several communities that were previously not distinguished from
the Roma. As a result, there is no violence towards the Bosniaks, Turks, Ashkalis,
Egyptians, Goranis. This more inclusive attitude may be influenced by a shared religion,
although it should be noted that religion does not rank highly as a dividing factor in
Kosovo.
These disadvantaged communities have sort to relieve their situation by creating cultural
entities. As young Albanians from Macedonia who used to come to Prishtina for
education and cultural events in the seventies and eighties, Bosniak youngsters now
increasingly migrate to Sarajevo with young Serbs going to Belgrade and young Turks to
Istanbul.
All communities have the right to education in their own language. However, the
problem arises with the lack of textbooks, which is also afflicts the majority population.
Insufficient attention has been paid by officials to this issue. Higher education is only
available to Albanians and Serbs. Bosniaks are split between going to Prishtina, with the
problem of the language or going to Mitrovica with exclusion problems that they face
with the radicalized Serb leadership there and especially with the notorious leadership of
the university, Mr. Papovic.


Population
Total Population     1 900 000 est.2002
Population density 175 p/sq. km
Ethnic groups
Kosovo Albanians 88%
Kosovo Serbs         7%
Other ethnic groups 5%
Age distribution, total
0-14 years           33%
15-64 years          61%


                                           13
65 and older       6%
Figure.1 Source: Kosovo and its population, (Statistical Office of Kosovo)

The end of the conflict in 1999 brought a complete change in the social, political and
economical structure of Kosovo. The Kosovo Serbs found themselves in a new reality
which they found difficult to grasp. The newly established UNMIK administration was
not initially recognized by the Serbs. After 1999 the situation for the Serb minority
deteriorated resulting in the creation of enclaves as safe havens, a general feeling of
insecurity and lack of freedom of movement.
For the last six years security concerns have made it difficult for Kosovo Serbs and other
minorities to travel outside their enclaves. Those living in the predominantly Kosovo
Serb municipalities in the north, Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zvečan/Zveçan, Zubin Potok and
the northern part of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality, rarely traveled through the rest of
Kosovo. In these enclaves the Serbian administration; courts, schools, hospitals, etc,
directly answering to Belgrade. Although UNMIK has never officially accepted these
Serbian-controlled structures, it has not made to much effort to stop them functioning.
These parallel institutions could be viewed as the main reason for the low level of
integration of the Serb community in the post conflict Kosovo society.
The main areas in which there are parallel structures could be grouped in three main
groups: administrative structures, schools and healthcare institutions and security
structures. Although the presence of parallel security is a potential destabilizing factor,
the two main factors that hinder the Serb population’s integration in to Kosovo society
are Education and Healthcare. A general lack of knowledge and common misperceptions
along with reluctance of the PISG to overcome these obstacles resulted in the further
isolation of the Serb community.
The situation with other minorities is somewhat different since none of them live in
concentrated areas but rather in mixed settlements with Albanian community. Thus, some
of the misconceptions were cleared through experience.

Lack of security continues to be a major factor in the Kosovo Serbian community’s
contention that they cannot foresee integrated schools in the near future. Serious security
incidents against members of the Kosovo Serb population and other minority
communities have diminished over the last year. The events of March 2004, however,
have showed that the underlying animosity persists.

Despite the fact that minority protection is often stated by the international community as
a prerequisite to the final political settlement, neither MEST nor educational authorities
in the municipalities have vocalized a comprehensive plan which would provide for the
integration of members of minority communities in general, or members of the Kosovo
Serb community in particular, into the MEST educational system. At the same time
issues as the right to study certain subjects in one’s mother tongue and the teaching of
history are subjects which have not yet been approached by Kosovo Serb and Kosovo
Albanian educators at all levels of education.


PERSONAL AND PUBLIC SECURITY


                                            14
In Kosovo, the human security issues were always prevalent in the everyday life of the
people. The perception of the Albanian population was that the Serbian state did not
ensure the security but it was the source of insecurity, repression and violence. Since
1999, Kosovo Serbs consider that there is no unconditional support for Albanian political
leadership to improve their security.29
After the war the ethnic dimension of public and personal security has changed
dramatically as regards perception of different communities in Kosovo. Public and
personal security is the main problem faced by the Serb community.30 In this respect
84,2% of Serbs feel unsafe, whereas just 25,8% of Albanians share the same feeling.31
While Albanians have confidence in KFOR, KPS and UNMIK Police (ranging from
roughly 60% to more than 90%), Serb confidence is lower, ranging from 5% to 25%.32

Human rights issues remain a problem in Kosovo. Clashing views as to the human rights
guaranteed result, at least partially, by insufficient information regarding what is
permitted and what not, misconceptions about the applicable law. Tainted by politics and
ethnic division, human rights remain a negative security issue. Whilst governmental
institutions are not tainted by serious, systemic tendencies to infringe human rights, they
are unable, or sometimes even unwilling, to protect universal human rights.
Hence, human rights violations are still not properly dealt with. Although the level of
crime remains at the relatively low level33, there are frequently unreported cases of low-
level, interethnic violence and incidents.34
Even though a relatively well structured system is in place (with the institution of the
Office of the Ombudsperson, community committees, etc.) recommendations of some of
these bodies (particularly the Ombudsperson) are still not taken seriously. A number of
changes, including the gradual transfer of power to PISG, had a considerable
psychological impact on Kosovo Serbs.35 They view these institutions with suspicion and
have chosen to stay outside of them, maintaining thus parallel structures.36




SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE
29
   “KosovaLive, CDRSEE and Medijski Centar Beta “Kosovo-Kosova, Coming to Terms with the Problem
of Kosovo: The Peoples’ Views from Kosovo and Serbia”. 2005. p.36.
30
   Early Warning Report #11, July-September 2005,
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/ews11/ewr11_engl.pdf (last visted 20 December 2005) p.35.
31
   Ibid, p.38.
32
   Ibid.
33
   Ambassador Kai Eide. The Situation in Kosovo Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Oct. 2005. Report, p.5
34
   Ibid. p.5
35
   Ambassador Kai Eide. The Situation in Kosovo Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Oct. 2005. Report, p.9.
36
   Ambassador Kai Eide. The Situation in Kosovo Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Oct. 2005. Report, p.4.


                                                  15
No matter the final status of Kosovo, it cannot be governed without law and order and all
the adequate institutions necessary maintaining internal security. Therefore the future of
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is guaranteed.
The KPS, until recently, was an organization which operated beyond an identifiable and
clear legal basis. UNSCR 1244 instructs the UNMIK to work in establishing Provisional
Institutions and to work in maintaining security, law and order.
Under article 8.1 of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional self-Government the
SRSG has exclusive authority over all law enforcement institutions including their local
staff. In 1999 UNMIK created the KPS, with the first tranche of KPS personnel joining
the UNMIK CIVPOL. Even with the promulgation of the regulation, the KPS is part of
the UNMIK Pillar I, which deals with Police and Justice and is headed by the Civilian
Police Commissioner (an UNMIK appointee) who is responsible to the Deputy of the
SRSG or the Head of Pillar I. The KPS is a police force with all the relevant police
competences, but the authority of the KPS is superseded by the International Police
personnel.
The current UNMIK Regulation 2005/54 gives the much needed legal basis to KPS.
Although it still leaves the KPS under the authority of UNMIK, the regulation reflects the
possibility of transferring competence to the Ministry of Interior.
The UNMIK Police is defined by two goals of UNMIK. Firstly, to guarantee law and
order and second to development of a credible, professional and impartial KPS. UNMIK
Police in cooperation with OSCE have trained 8.830 personnel for the KPS37. As of the
end of 2004, there was a total of 7,021 personnel in the KPS with approximately 15% of
minority personnel, including 8% of Serbs officers, and 15% of women. This personnel is
deployed as follow: 1,224 in Prishtina, 1,007 in Gjilan, 859 in Prizren, 813 in Pejë, 780 in
Mitrovica, 639 at the main headquarters, 83 in the Kosovo Police Service School, 120
Police Field Training Officers and 955 in the Border Police38.
Of all these personnel employed by the KPS are divided in two main units: The Police
Services (KPS) and the Security Services Division (KPSSD). The former performs
general law enforcement and public safety tasks while KPSSD is tasked with internal
security of government buildings. While KPS officers are full service police vested with
all competences to arrest, detain and perform their duties while under arms, the KPSSD is
trained generally to secure the buildings of national importance. They are not armed and
do not posses the right to arrest, detain, but they do this in cooperation and under
supervision of KPS.
KPS is structured in a manner of a prestigious police force. This was done to ensure that
the development of the KPS organization is proportionate with the responsibilities it
carries and growing responsibilities which is expected to undertake. To enable this
development, ranks have been designated and promotions carried out based on
competitive examinations. This development of KPS has resulted in the force being
capable to undertake responsibilities from UNMIK CIVPOL and perform duties along

37
   The training of the first class of KPS officers started on September 1999 at the Kosovo Police Service
School in Vushtrri.
38
   Based on the 29 December 2004 daily situation report of the Civilian Police Component of UNMIK,
quoted at: UNDP Interim Report, “Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo” (accessed only upon
request and by permission of the UNDP Officials)


                                                   16
side the UNMIK CIVPOL. Growing responsibilities and tasks that KPS can perform are
as follow:
        Beat Patrols;
        Station management;
        Traffic Services;
        Community Policing;
        Close Protection Units;
        Security Services;
        Special Armed police units;
        Intelligence;
        Special investigation and enforcement units in narcotics, prostitution and human
        trafficking, money laundering and other forms of organized crimes;
        Forensics and crime scene investigation capacities;
        Border policing;
        Police administration and training;

Based on the duties they perform described above, the KPS is engaged in all the
specialized duties, though much training needs to be done for these some specialized
functions and the grading system.
The KPS budget of €53 million has allowed the acquisition of the state of the art
equipment necessary for its enhanced operations. The KPS is the best equipped police
force in the region, however with growing numbers of KPS and the transfer or inclusion
in the new competences formerly reserved for UNMIK CIVPOL the KPS has to upgrade
its equipment.

Maintenance of law and order is of fundamental importance for all the people of Kosovo
and the KPS contributes significantly to achieving this objective through its supporting
role in crime prevention and public protection and safety.
With the support of the international community, the capacity of the KPS in crime
prevention, criminal information gathering, criminal investigation and fighting against
criminality is being enhanced but much remains to be done.
This is a positive precedent in maximizing its abilities to gradually assume additional
responsibilities. However, the KPS has faced some shortcomings which have contributed
significantly to reducing its prestige in the eyes of the people.
Kosovo and its people in historically had a negative perception of the Police structures.
No tradition of democratic or community policing ever existed in Kosovo until recently.
The Serbian Police structure, during the 1990’s, contributed to repression and extensive
human rights abuses. This legacy has contributed to the KPS being viewed with cautious
optimism. During the past six years, people’s trust of the KPS has grown substantially
and this is a mark of credit for the KPS’ professional work.

THE FUTURE OF THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS

The future role of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) will be of a great importance due
to the aspirations of its members but also of the Kosovar Albanian people who see the




                                           17
KPC as the nucleus of their future army. In this context it is worthy to explain basic
elements of this organization in order to understand its implication in the security sector.
To understand the roots of the KPC one should look back the origins of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (UCK)39, which fought against Serbian security forces in the end of
nineties. After the end of conflict, the international community required the
demilitarization of the UCK. This process was very difficult and it happened only after
some concessions were made to the Kosovars. One such vague concession was the
promise that in future there would be an ‘army on the lines of the US National Guard’ for
Kosovo in the future.40 This allowed the UCK to disarm and transform itself to KPC. The
KPC was established under UNMIK Regulation 1999/8, defining KPC as “a civilian
emergency service agency, the tasks of which shall be to: provide disaster response
services; perform search and rescue; provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in
isolated areas; assist in demining; contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and
communities. The Constitutional Framework also tasks the KPC with the same
competencies.41
Even though the mandate of KPC is clear, misunderstandings have occurred and the KPC
has often been seen as a kind of paramilitary organization. This perception originates the
military genesis of the KPC and also because KPC members wear military-style
uniforms, with a certain number of them are allowed to carry weapons. Furthermore, it is
now obvious that KPC will be an important issue to be discussed within the framework of
the talks on the final status.
The KPC leadership has revealed its vision of the future of the organization. According to
this vision, the KPC should become the future army of Kosovo in order to ‘play a major
role in helping the emerging state develop. In addition to contributing to the security
operation, it will help lead the nation through the difficult times of transition by setting an
example for unity, integration, cooperation for others to follow’.42
This proposal argues that “Kosovo’s army is an important expression of sovereignty and
independence…it provides the ways and means that will contribute to the peace and
integrity of a democratic state, support foreign policy and security goals, and provide a
pledge to the international community of Kosovo’s contribution to wider partnerships.43
The proposal places emphasis on the current fragile security environment and suggests
that the establishment of the Kosovo’s army will contribute to the overall improvement of
the security situation within Kosovo.
The proposal reviews a series of threats to the security of Kosovo. In reviewing the
internal security threat the paper suggests that the political structures of Kosovo remain
39
   UCK is the Albanian abbreviation used in this paper instead of the English language version Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA)
40
   More details on the whole process can be found also in a recent report of the Centre for European
Security Studies, The Kosovo Protection Corps in Search of a Future, http://www.iss-eu.org (last visited:
20 December 2005)
41
   Chapter 7 of the Constitutional Framework states that The Kosovo Protection Corps is a civilian
emergency organization, established under the law, which carries out in Kosovo rapid disaster response
tasks for public safety in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance. United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) Official Site, Constitutional Framework of Kosovo,
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm (last visited: 29 December 2005).
42
   More on the prospects about the future of KPC read the KPC document “The Kosovo Army”, (accessed
only upon request and by permission of the KPC officials).
43
   Ibid.


                                                   18
weak and are vulnerable to aggressive actions from political extremists and terrorists.
These structures still need to be nurtured in a safe and secure environment. The Kosovo
economy is also struggling and it will be many years will be required in order to achieve
a stable and sustainable economy. A possible collapse of the economy would destabilize
the region and undermine Kosovo’s viability as a sovereign state. Kosovo has a
continuous internal security threat posed by armed gangs, organized crime and
smugglers, all of which are exacerbated by the possession of large quantities of illegal
arms. These will have to be controlled, if necessary using force, if they are not to
undermine the stability and economy of a fledgling democratic state.44

The current mandate of the KPC is seen to have run its course by Kosovo’s political
leadership. Hence, the vision of the KPC leadership is in concert with the views and with
the aspirations of the most Kosovar Albanians.




44
   All these information are elaborated in more details in the project proposal plan of KPC for the future
transformation of the KPC into a new army. This plan is called ‘The Kosovo Army’.


                                                     19
KOSOVO FORCE

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international force responsible for
establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo. This peace-enforcement force entered
Kosovo on 12 June 1999 under a United Nations mandate, two days after the adoption of
UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In accordance with UNSCR 1244, the mission of
KFOR is to:

     •   Establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety
         and order.
     •   Monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the conditions of
         the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK Undertaking
     •   Provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil
         functions until they are transferred to UNMIK.45

It is obvious that the primary task of KFOR is to maintain security, however the scope of
its engagements is broader. Examples of KFOR involvement can be found in a variety of
sectors such as public works and utilities, construction, transportation, railway operations,
mine clearance, border security, fire services, protection of international workers, food
distribution, removal of unexploded ordnance, mine-awareness education, medical
services, etc. Yet, KFOR has gradually ceded much of this role to other agencies. While
in June 1999 there were approximately 50,000 soldiers within KFOR, as conditions have
changed this number has decreased considerably to around 17,000 personnel from 2003
onwards as conditions on the ground have changed.

Today, KFOR has three main tasks: a) external defense, b) protection of enclaves and
religious sites, and c) assisting the police services in the event that the latter are unable to
adequately respond to internal security challenges.

 This latter task (known as ‘Military Assistance to the Civil Power’) is arguably KFOR’s
most important role. It is telling however that there is no legislation stipulating how this
extremely important, yet potentially problematic, assistance should be carried out. KFOR
is not overseen by UNMIK, let alone by Kosovars. In fact, the military segment of the
international administration in Kosovo receives military and political guidance from
NATO and the respective Ministries of Defense of its contributing nations.46 In addition,
KFOR and UNMIK have different approaches to security and to their respective
responsibilities to ensure it.47 Recent events in Kosovo confirm the alarming persistence
of flashpoints of ethnic tensions across Kosovo despite KFOR presence. These

45
   Kosovo Force, Official Web Site of the Kosovo Force, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm, (last
visited: 11 January 2006)
46
   The lack of appropriate legislation which regulates these specific tasks and objectives has been addressed
recently in a paper published by KIPRED and Safer World, Enhancing civilian management and oversight
of the security sector in Kosovo. http://kipred.net/UserFiles/File/SecSectorManagement.pdf (last visited: 11
January 2006)
47
   Antonio Donini et al Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the perceptions of local
communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies: Feinstein International Famine Center
June 2005. p.25


                                                     20
flashpoints require a constant level of alert in order to be contained and to avoid
dangerous spillover effects. Over the last five years KFOR has actively contributed to the
maintenance of a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, and it is imperative for all
processes that KFOR maintain its presence for a longer period of time due to the fragile
security situation and uncertainty about the future status of Kosovo.

SHADOW INTELLIGENCE BODIES

In addition to the aforementioned institutions in Kosovo a number of shadow intelligence
services also operate. Their existence has been tolerated at best, and encouraged at worst,
by the international administration with Kosovo’s authorities unwilling or unable to
tackle this sensitive issue. A recent report described existence of shadow intelligence
agencies as one of several problems that is being “swept under the carpet rather than
addressed.”48 This attitude is consistent for the entire period of international
administration’s involvement in Kosovo, in spite of sporadic rhetoric against such
services.49 Yet, while delaying decisions on the future of party intelligence structures
until now have appeared to be the preferred tactic of UNMIK and Kosovo government,
with “talks due to get underway soon on Kosovo’s political future, it will become
increasingly difficult to ignore such fundamental issues.”50 The international community
will have to choose between tolerance, pronouncing them illegal or incorporating them.




48
   International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo after Haradinaj’, Executive Summary. Available:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf
(last visited 20 December 2005)
49
   UNMIK Department of Public Information, UNMIK Press briefing 30 November 2005, UNMIK Press
briefing 22 December 2005.
50
   Jeta Xharra, “Kosovo’s Intelligence Services Come In From The Cold”. BIRN. Available:
http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_15_6_eng.php (last visited: 27 December 2005)


                                              21
Conclusion
This report has outlined a number of both short and long term threats to the security of
Kosovo and highlighted the fact that in many ways the current internal security
architecture is not capable of dealing with these threats. The institutions that are expected
to provide security (with the notable exception of the judiciary) are however among the
most successful Kosovo institutions and this provides one optimistic element to this
report. However, wider governmental issues and the threat to the rule of law serve to
potentially undermine the strength of these institutions.

In the long term perhaps the greatest threat to Kosovo is caused by the lack of economic
development combined with demographics which indicate some of the most rapid
population growth in Europe.
There are a number of potential triggers of dissatisfaction that could generate significant
social upheaval. The inability of the state to provide for the basic needs of the population
is one such trigger. Other basic needs that are not adequately addressed include access to
adequate justice system. Public respect for the intuitions of government is already very
low and also more tellingly in the significant drop in voter turn out at the last Assembly
election in 2004.

There already exists in Kosovo an atmosphere of impunity and a lack of respect for the
rule of law. The inadequacy of the judiciary in fulfilling its role further significantly
emasculates the rest of the security sector and encourages a lack of respect for the
institutions of government and more specifically the security sector. The growing
problems of corruption and political cronyism within the structures of government have
also ensured a growth in public contempt for existing structures. A further issue of
significant concern both in the long and short term is the inability of the institutions of
government to respond to complex emergencies. This lack of coordination is in large part
because of the fragmentation in the powers of government in Kosovo between UNMIK
and the PISG which has created a potentially disastrous separation of powers in the
territory of Kosovo. The significant communal rioting in 2004 and more recently
problems related to flooding and landslides in Kosovo demonstrate that there is an
inability of the various branches of government to communicate or coordinate with each
other. Therefore if and when there is a major environmental disaster, such as the current
fear of avian flue, or social disturbances such as those seen in 2004 the government’s
inability to respond could be disastrous both for Kosovo itself but also the rest of Europe
as well.




                                             22
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       World Bank Kosovo.




ABOUT KIPRED


The Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development aims to support and promote
democratic values in Kosovo through training and independent policy research. The
training pillar is focused on the development of political parties through the Internet
Academy for Democracy, which was developed in cooperation with the Olof Palme
International Center. The research pillar focuses on producing independent policy
analysis on issues such as good governance, administration, political party development,
regional cooperation, political economy, local government and security.




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KIPRED
Kodra e Diellit, Rr. III, Ll. 39
Prishtinë, Kosovë
Tel/Fax: +381 (0) 38 555 887
Info: info@kipred.net
www.kipred.net




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