Military and Police Technology Strategy by yhk84668

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									Scholtz on hierarchies and
networks
     Institutions like the military, police and
      national security are hierarchic for the
      purpose of achieving collective effort.
     Institutional hierarchies inevitably develop
      pathologies.
     Intelligence doctrine (particularly the ‘cycle’)
      reinforces the pyramidal and centrist
      tendency.
     Modern information technology facilitates
      networks and multiple participation
     Hierarchic schemes serve the command;
      networks serve a web of users.
                                 DECISIONS & PLANS




       DOCTRINE                  STRATEGY & TACTICS      CONTEXT
                                      (Synergy)



       PRODUCTS                     INTELLIGENCE         PROCESSES
   Situational Appraisal;                             Collection; Research &
 Contextual Understanding;                             Analysis; Synthesis;
Capability; Capacity & Intent;                            Dissemination
           Review
Hierarchies and networks (2)
    Historically intelligence was an asset
     exclusively available to generals to aid
     strategy.
    Today its scope and reach exceed anything
     imaginable in former times
    Intelligence creation relies upon wide
     organizational participation.
    Intelligence can serve strategy, operations
     and tactics.
    Secure networks with controlled access can
     ‘socialize’ & distribute usage.
Decision making
   Intent within a context.
   A balance of evidence, predisposition and
    intuition.
   Limited by capability, capacity and the
    unknown.
   The calculation of risk (probability).
   Obduracy and the pursuit of folly.
Intelligence and decision
making
    Strategists, operational commanders and
     tacticians can and usually do rely on the
     existing agenda.
    Moving beyond the status quo usually
     involves obtaining the initiative - a shift from
     reaction to interdiction.
    Preconception and intuition uncertain guides
     to action; evidence usually incomplete;
     alternative is intelligent analysis.
    Initiative (and therefore intelligence) is
     needed at each level – strategic, operational
     and tactical.
Intelligence as a nervous
system
   Reactive systems for (policy or policing) imply
    an acceptable balance, they do not engage
    change or require intelligence.
   When the level of ‘conflict’ is unacceptable
    and the problem is beset with unknowns,
    change and intelligence are essential and
    essentially linked.
   Intelligence is a synthetic process distilling
    knowledge of the problem (target) and
    operational learning (tactics).
   If it is designed as a nervous system it can
    serve the brain (strategy) and the fingertips
    (tactics).
Richard Betts’ critique (1)
Conceptual approaches to intelligence
   failure:
. Invisible success and disproportionate
   significance of failure (scapegoats).
. Communications failures.
. Paradox of repair – new pathologies.
. The abilities of those above.
. Institutional motive.
Richard Betts’ critique (2)
Inherent barriers to analytical accuracy:
. Business hierarchy limits optimal use.
. In crisis, data and policy outstrip analysis.
. Ambiguity of evidence.
. Loss of influence when ambivalent.
. Atrophy of reform.
Richard Betts’ critique (3)
Elusiveness of solutions:
. Tribunals and reviews initiate expensive and
   counter-productive fail safe regimes
. Measure and counter measure – transience of
   methodologies.
. Consolidation as an answer to ‘silos’ generates
   bureaucracy.
. Devils advocate becomes ‘Cassandra’.
. Impracticality of ‘upgrading’ users.
James Sheptycki’s critique
   Digital divide – legacy systems.
   Linkage blindness – inf. Boundaries.
   Noise – non-consonant data.
   Overload – under capacity.
   Non reporting and inaccurate recording.
   Intelligence gaps – hoarding and silos.
   Institutional friction inter and intra agency.
   Defensive data concentration.
   Resistance of occupational subcultures.
Intelligence and strategy – thesis.
The strategic commander and policy maker, in
 time of conflict and confrontation, are beset by
 the practical requirements of decision making
 within finite time frames. The ‘intelligence
 community’ should operate as a corporate brain
 for the commander, providing an objective
 rationale for action in the immediate and longer
 term. The alternative is almost always the
 march of folly.
Intelligence and strategy –
engagement level.

    Assessment of capability, capacity and
     intent (friend and foe).
    Situational awareness and operational
     assessment.
    Criticality – what losses would
     catastrophic?
    Appraisal of tactical effectiveness and
     the technical utility of means.
Intelligence and strategy –
contextual level.
   Comprehending mindsets (making the implicit
    explicit) – cultural expectations and motivations.
   Interpreting the social nature of contending
    communications and command systems.
   Interpreting social and economic consequence.
   Unmasking enemies in false colours.
   Assessing conflict in the context of market,
    strategic or ideological confrontation.
Intelligence and strategy –
evolutionary level.

    Strategic and tactical comparison – the
     search of asymmetric advantage.
    Obtaining information dominance – in
     acquisition and distribution.
    Promoting a learning culture.
    Engineering the ‘Clausewitzian trilogy’ –
     consonance of political will, popular
     support and operational means.
As a methodology.
   Target centric – constantly rebuilding the target
    model and countermeasures.
   Network centric – extending reach, utility,
    spontaneity and opportunity.
   Pan centric – comprehensive assessment at
    apex level.
   Establishing a learning culture.
   Visible leadership – coordinating, establishing
    intent and interventionist (incorporating staff
    principles).
General Sir Rupert Smith ‘Utility
of Force’.
   Paradigm shift from armies with comparable
    resources doing battle on a battlefield – to
    strategic confrontation between a range of
    combatants, not all of which are armies, using
    different weapons, often improvised.
   Politicians fail to distinguish between the
    deployment and the employment of force.
   Lack of clarity and coherence in aim (political);
    deployment to achieve aim (strategy); battle
    plan (operations) and movement and fire
    (tactics).
General Bailey’s critique
   History of incorrigible reluctance to make
    accurate assessments of likely length, meaning
    and outcome of military deployments.
   Folly of the contention that deployments can be
    short, cheap and decisive.
   If the new ‘imperialism’ is missions based on
    ‘human rights violations’ and ‘international law’
    – requirement is for the long haul (‘nation
    building’, counter insurgency, holding the ring
    until the context changes).
Scholtz on hierarchies and
networks
     Institutions like the military, police and
      national security are hierarchic for the
      purpose of achieving collective effort.
     Institutional hierarchies inevitably develop
      pathologies.
     Intelligence doctrine (particularly the ‘cycle’)
      reinforces the pyramidal and centrist
      tendency.
     Modern information technology facilitates
      networks and multiple participation
     Hierarchic schemes serve the command;
      networks serve a web of users.
             CYCLES OF IMPLEMENTATION


Invention      Equipment    Technical Change           Tactics


Innovation     Procedures   Operational Change         Operations


Adaptation     Context      Technological ChangeStrategy
The Intelligence Cycle

         Problem Redefinition
                                   Collection
          Problem Definition




Review                                           Analysis




                                             Products
  Operations                              (Predictions &
                                          Opportunities)


                       Dissemination
             Operational Staff
                                                                                Target Teams
         (targets of opportunity
                                                                             (target ops / plans)
           in normal business)




                                           TARGET MODELS
                                                   RECOGNITION
                                   C
                                   O                                                                Other Intel
     TCG                           R                                             S                   Sources
                                   E   NETWORK CHARTS                            Y
                                         CRITICAL BUSINESS LINKS                 N
                                   E                                             T
                                   N       CRIMINAL METHODOLOGIES                H
                                   T                                             E
                                   I                 LINKS TO EVENTS             S
                                   T                            OTHER            I
                                   I                                             S
                                   E
                                   S
Specialist Collectors                                                                         Trusted 3rd
(humint, sigint, imint)                                                                         Parties
                                                      ALERTS




                                       Analysis & Researchers
                                                                Plan Owner
Target Centric Model
           Plans




     •Information
     •Target Modeling
     •Analysis




         Execution
                                 DECISIONS & PLANS




       DOCTRINE                  STRATEGY & TACTICS      CONTEXT
                                      (Synergy)



       PRODUCTS                     INTELLIGENCE         PROCESSES
   Situational Appraisal;                             Collection; Research &
 Contextual Understanding;                             Analysis; Synthesis;
Capability; Capacity & Intent;                            Dissemination
           Review

								
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