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					                       CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
                        FOURTH REVIEW PROCESS 2008

             RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
                    ON THE NATIONAL REPORT OF
                                         GERMANY

Seq. No                                     Article           Ref. in National Report



1                                            General            Page 3
Question/ It is stated that “The staffing situation at the regulatory body still needs to be improved
Comment considerably…” To what extent does Germany consider that the announced phase-out of
          nuclear power has contributed to the staffing difficulties the regulatory body faces?
Answer    The phase-out of nuclear energy does not have an impact on staffing.
2                                            General            Entire report
Question/ The report is well structured. It is a good practice to include at the end of each article a
Comment summary of ”progress and changes since 2004” and of “future activities”.
Answer    Thank you for your comment.
3                                            General            p. 3
Question/ In 2005 the Germany prioritized the following five measures to improve safety:
Comment 1) Reform of nuclear administration, 2) IRRT mission in 2006, 3) Completion of the rule
          updating project, 4) Obligation to react appropriately if safety is questionable for all plants,
          5) Safety management operative in all plants.

           Due to the fourth report it seems that none of these measures have been completed
           successfully so far. Some of these measures were already announced in earlier reports.
           What are the reasons behind these delays? Are these delays a consequence of the loss of
           competent staff? Are there comparable deficits regarding other important regulatory
           functions? What role plays the loss of competent staff?
           What actions have been taken or will be taken to improve the situation?
Answer     The actions for improving the situation in Germany with regard to the 5 issues mentioned
           are as follows:

           1.) There are no further considerations on a reform of nuclear administration, as stated for
           the 2005 Review Conference, by the Federal Government being in office since November
           2005. The Federal Government strives for improvements within the frame of existing
           structures of nuclear administration. In this respect, special consideration shall be given to
           the results of the IRRS mission 2008 in Germany, which relates both to an authority of a
           Land and to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
           Safety.

           2.) In the years 2005/2006, there were discussions between the Federal Government and the
           Länder to agree on kind and scope of the mission. The invitation to conduct the IRRS
           mission was issued on 17.04. 2007. The IRRS mission will be conducted in Germany from
           7 to 19 September 2008.

           3.) The delays in publishing the safety requirements for nuclear power plants are due to
           their discussion in the Federal and Länder committees. The consultation processes between
           the Federal Government and the Länder are very comprehensive and are still in progress.
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            4.) See National Report Art. 9, p. 53

            5.) Since 2001, the Federal Ministry for the Environment has been strongly committed to
            the introduction of state-of-the-art safety management systems. This commitment has
            already resulted in good achievements at several plants. However, it showed that the
            introduction of an ambitious system cannot be performed in the short term. The plant
            operators assured the Federal Ministry for the Environment to complete the introduction of
            the safety management systems until August 2008 at all German NPPs.

            Explanations on the maintenance of competence are given in the answers to the other
            questions related to Article 8.
4                                            General           p. 3
Question/   During the 2005 review meeting the German delegation raised serious concerns regarding
Comment     the German regulatory system: The challenge results from "maintenance of six fully
            equipped and competent nuclear regulatory authorities; wasteful luxury that at the same
            time represents an avoidable erosion of competence; some authorities with limited
            competence in specific safety-related fields; delegation of regulatory functions to external
            experts; need for a new law at federal level. Reform of the nuclear administration is an
            essential prerequisite for comprehensive and sustainable measures for ensuring an effective
            nuclear administration." What has changed since 2005? Has the situation improved?
Answer      There are no further considerations on a reform of nuclear administration, as stated for the
            2005 Review Conference, by the Federal Government being in office since November
            2005. The Federal Government strives for improvements within the frame of existing
            structures of nuclear administration. In this respect, special consideration shall be given to
            the results of the IRRS mission 2008 in Germany, which relates both to an authority of a
            Land and to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
            Safety.
            (Note: Due to the close connection to question No. 3, the same answer was given here.)
5                                            General           p. 3
Question/   A highlight discussed at the 2005 review meeting for Germany was "Significant loss of
Comment     competent manpower from the regulatory bodies resulting in lack of competence in some
            technical fields". What actions have been taken to prevent further degradation and to re-
            establish adequate competence of the regulatory body? How has the situation changed since
            then?
Answer      Detailed information on the organisation and staffing of the nuclear authorities of the
            Federation and Länder is contained in the National Report, Art. 8 p. 37-41.
            For the federal level the following additional information can be given. Since more than a
            decade the number of technical qualified staff working on the federal level on nuclear
            safety issues has basically remained stable. But during the same period the challenges have
            grown considerably. Therefore a larger workforce is now needed on the federal level than
            was necessary in former times.
            At present, a schedule has been developed at the federal level according to which the staff
            of Directorate RS I (see Fig. 8-4 in the National Report) and the corresponding section of
            the BfS (Office of radiation Protection) shall be increased by about 25 persons from
            different disciplines within 3 years. The decision on this issue will be taken for the first step
            by the Parliament in autumn 2008.
            Furthermore retiring staff members had to be replaced by younger ones. By this some
            experience has gone but at the same time the questioning attitude and the engagement of the
            staff has grown. Since 2005, the number of staff responsible for nuclear safety has not
            changed significantly since new qualified staff was recruited for staff leaving. The


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          necessary detailed technical knowledge is increased by a training programme.
6                                           General            p. 3
Question/ During the 2005 review meeting Germany highlighted safety culture with regard to
Comment licensee's response to safety findings especially for the case that such findings give rise to
          doubts about the ability to control a design basis accident. What actions has the German
          regulator taken to resolve this issue? Have respective actions been taken by all operators?
Answer    The applicable regulations in Germany require reporting of events by the plant operator
          according to the criteria actually to be fulfilled (Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting
          Ordinance - AtSMV). In case of doubts about the management and control of design basis
          accidents, the plant operator has no express obligations. Of course, doubts about the control
          of design basis accidents (= suspicion of danger) entitle the supervisory authority to order
          all adequate measures for cessation of operation;

           In 2005, two Länder ministries imposed – by order of the Federal Ministry for the
           Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety – an obligation on one plant
           operator each related to the handling of information about doubts regarding the control of
           design basis accidents. According to this, the plant operators were obliged
               • to immediately inform the competent supervisory authority about findings that the
                   verification of the ability to control a design basis accident could be put into
                   question,
               • to temporarily cease plant operation if the required ability to control a design basis
                   accident cannot be verified in the short term, and
               • to submit a work schedule for investigations and backfitting measures.

           Both plant operators instituted legal proceedings against it which have not been terminated
           yet.
           A joint statement on the position of all plant operators on the handling of information and
           findings is given in the National Report Art. 9, p. 53.

          Regarding the proceeding of the authorities in case of such doubts, see answer to question
          71.
7                                            General
Question/ The Netherlands compliments Germany with the well written report
Comment
Answer    Thank you for your comment.
8                                            General             General
Question/ A detailed and comprehensive report with clear identification of "Progress and changes
Comment since 2004" and "Future activities" stated after each article – at the end of each chapter.
Answer    Thank you for your comment.
9                                            General
Question/ In the light of the recent resolution of the European Parliament (of 4.10.2007), which
Comment stressed that the nuclear power is indispensable to mitigate global warming effect,
          considering that the construction of new nuclear power plants takes many years and the
          shutdown of German NPPs is not dictated by technical or safety considerations but by
          political decision, it is evident that in the interest of European Union would be to keep the
          German NPPs in operation. Will the German government consider the resolution of the
          European parliament in this matter?
Answer    According to our understanding, this energy policy question is not associated with the CNS
          process.


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10                                            General         page 168
Question/ According to Appendix 2-3 Research reactors Completely Dismantled there are 24 research
Comment reactors which have been completely dismantled.
          •What does it mean “completely”dismantled? Is it green field status, or just availability for
          a new industrial construction? What is the radiation dose rate considered acceptable in the
          site of a “completely dismantled” reactor?
          •Are there any cost data available or other technical data on the amount of work and
          material involved, radiation doses received by the personnel conducting dismantlement,
          timetable etc which could serve as a rough guidance for other countries planning
          dismantlement of their reactor facilities?
Answer    A nuclear facility ranks among “completely dismantled” when the materials, buildings and
          sites are released from nuclear regulatory control under the Atomic Energy Act [1A-3]. The
          final state after release from nuclear regulatory control is not necessarily “green field
          status”, but also ulterior utilisation.

           In Germany, quantitative requirements for the release of materials, buildings and sites from
           nuclear regulatory control were introduced into the Radiation Protection Ordinance [1A-8].
           The quantitative, radionuclide specific clearance levels are based on the internationally
           accepted 10 microsievert concept, which means that public exposures shall not be higher
           than about 10 microsievert per annum.

           Technical data from the decommissioning phase which have to be kept for longer periods
           of time cover a number of topics, such as operation, surveillance and radiation protection.
           Records and documentation must be deposited with the competent authority at the request
           of the latter. Although a recapitulatory final decommissioning report is not yet mandatory
           in Germany, for many finished decommissioning projects comparable documents have been
           prepared.

           Information about decommissioning costs can be found in several decommissioning
           documents and reports. In the case of decommissioning projects financed by the German
           Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und
           Forschung, BMBF), information about decommissioning costs can be obtained from semi-
           annual reports of the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe.

           Further information will be given in the national report for the next review meeting of the
           Joint Convention in 2009.
11                                         General
Question/ A report funded by the German government has found, according to German media, "Our
Comment study confirmed that in Germany a connection has been observed between the distance of a
          domicile to the nearest nuclear power plant ... and the risk of developing cancer, such as
          leukemia, before the fifth birthday," the daily Süddeutsche Zeitung quoted the report as
          saying. Government radiation specialists said they could not explain the finding, since there
          was no direct radiation from the 16 German plants, which are all scheduled for closure in
          the early 2020s. The study was paid for by the German Federal Radiation Protection
          Agency [BfS] the government's main adviser on nuclear health. It was conducted by the
          German Register of Child Cancer, an office in Mainz which is funded by the 16 German
          states and the federal Health Ministry. The study found that 37 children had come down
          with leukemia in the period between 1980 and 2003 while having home addresses within 5
          kilometers (3.1 miles) of nuclear power plants. The statistical average for Germany would
          have predicted just 17 cases in that group. Statistically, the 20 extra cases could be


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          associated with living close to the plants, but the BfS said more research was needed to
          discover if the presence of reactors was actually the cause of the cancers.
          The results of that study are used by the opponents of nuclear power to show that German
          NPPs cause leukaemia. The study was financed by German government, namely by the
          ministry of environment, which is against nuclear power. On the other hand, the German
          report to CNS claims that German NPPs are safe. Since German Environment Minister
          Sigmar Gabriel said the government radiation safety committee would analyze the findings
          and called for additional research to explain the increased number of cancer cases, could the
          German delegation explain this contradiction and provide some clarification of the real
          situation?
Answer    The study was commissioned by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection in 2003 and
          conducted by the German Childhood Cancer Registry, which is linked to the Institute for
          Medicinal Statistics, Epidemiology and Informatics (IMBEI) of the University of Mainz.
          The study covered 1,592 children who had developed a form of cancer and 4,735 healthy
          children under the age of 5. The healthy children are the so-called control group, with living
          conditions as similar as possible to those of the sick children. 41 counties in the vicinity of
          the 16 sites of Germany's 22 nuclear power plants were studied for the period 1980-2003,
          According to the study, the risk of developing a cancer or leukaemia increases by a
          statistically significant degree with proximity of the residence to a nuclear power plant.
          This finding is based primarily on leukaemia cases among the under-fives.
          To date, various studies - some conducted in Germany – have investigated incidence of
          illness at different distances from nuclear power plants – up to 5 kilometres, 5 to 10
          kilometres and 10 to 15 kilometres.
          For the current study a new scientific approach was chosen: the distance between the
          residence of a sick child and the nearest nuclear power plant was compared with the
          distance between residence and nuclear power plant of an average of 3 healthy children of
          the same age living in the same county. The study found that the shorter the distance
          between the child's home and the nuclear power plant, the higher the risk of him/her
          developing cancer.
          This study is only concerned with statistically comparing the proximity of the residence of
          sick children to the nuclear power plant with that of healthy children in a corresponding
          control group. The study does not give an opinion as to what might be the possible cause of
          cancer in children in the vicinity of German nuclear power plants.
          This study does not comment on the question of whether radiation from the nuclear power
          plants could be a possible cause for the cancer: according to current scientific knowledge,
          radiation exposure of the population resulting from the operation of nuclear power plants in
          Germany would have to be at least 1000 times higher in order to explain the observed
          increase in the risk of cancer. The statistical study and known causal connections between
          the risk of cancer and radiation are thus not compatible.
          Because of the importance of the study, Federal Environment Minister Gabriel has asked
          the Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK) to carry out a detailed analysis of the
          study's results, its concept, the data collected and the question of a possible causal
          connection. Once the findings of this analysis are available, a decision will be made on how
          to proceed. The analysis will be prepared until end of September 2008.
12                                           General           Introduction Page 3, paragraph 3
Question/ In the report, in this and other subsequent paragraphs, there are several references to
Comment “Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants”. As the report contains no specific
          references other than to German legislative requirements, could Germany clarify whether
          this is a German document, or a general reference to the IAEA requirements series NS-R-1,
          NS-R-2, etc? It would have been helpful if the national report had been clearer in providing



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            precise details for such references. The absence of section and paragraph numbers also
            complicates the task of cross-referencing any questions or comments on the report to the
            relevant point in the text.
Answer      “Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants” refers to a German document. The “Safety
            Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants“ are available under the link
            http://regelwerk.grs.de, also in an English translation.
            Thank you very much for your suggestion for editorial improvement which we will
            consider in the next report.
13                                            General             Introduction Page 3, final paragraph
Question/   The report says “It is intended to bring the BMU project “Safety Requirements for Nuclear
Comment     Power Plants” as well as the deliberations of the federal and Länder governments regarding
            a future ordinance or administrative procedure to an end.” Does this mean that the project
            and discussions will continue until they have been completed, or that they will be halted
            before being completed?
Answer      The statement in the report means that the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU)
            will continue the project and discussions. The BMU expects that the project and discussions
            will be completed successfully until summer 2008.
14                                            General
Question/   Prior reports identified the impending loss of experienced staff due to retirements as a
Comment     challenge area. In the current report, it is identified that budget constraints and other factors
            are limiting the capability of the BMU and Lander nuclear authorities to even study the
            current situation. Instead, significant reliance is placed upon knowledge transfer to more
            junior staff members. How effective are the current initiatives in assuring competent
            personnel remain at the BMU and Lander authorities? What are your plans for dealing with
            continued closure of nuclear plants? How will it impact the capability to attract and retain
            qualified staff?
Answer      Also see answer to question No. 5, para 1:
            At present, a schedule has been developed at the federal level according to which the staff
            of Directorate RS I (see Fig. 8-4 in the National Report) and the corresponding section of
            the BfS (Office of radiation Protection) shall be increased by about 25 persons from
            different disciplines within 3 years. The decision about this will be taken finally for the first
            step by the Parliament in autumn 2008.

            A training programme is provided for new staff.

          Further, decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities is monitored by the
          authority through licensing and supervisory measures until release from regulatory control.
15                                        General
Question/ With regard to plant modifications or changes in operations which may require a revision to
Comment the existing license, does the regulatory authority review all changes or does the licensee
          perform a screening review to make a determination? How do you determine when a
          modification or change represents a “greater than obviously insignificant” impact on safety
          level requiring prior approval by the regulatory authority? How is probabilistic safety
          assessment used in the licensing process?
Answer    See National Report, Art. 7(2ii), p. 25 on this issue.

            More details are given below:
            Major modifications are subject to licensing according to § 7 of the Atomic Energy Act.
            The Länder have introduced down-graded regulations below the licensing level.
            Not considered as major are those modifications which obviously may only have negligible


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           effects on the safety level of the plant, but which are subject to the accompanying control
           by the authorised experts consulted by the supervisory authority according to § 20 AtG to
           ensure the safe operation of the plant and which will have to be inspected prior to their
           implementation by the regulatory authority within the framework of supervision. As a rule,
           the following issues require approval by the authority:

           a) Modifications that affect the function or the design characteristics of safety-relevant or
              security-relevant installations or measures.
           b) Modifications whose implementation or inclusion in plant operation may affect the
              function or the design characteristics of safety-relevant or security-relevant installations
              or measures.
           c) Modifications of safety-relevant or security-relevant definitions in the safety
              specifications (e.g. design principles or design values and set limit values) and in similar
              safety-relevant or security-relevant written operational stipulations unless they are
              merely of an editorial nature.
           d) Structural measures not subject to licensing according to the regional building
              regulations which also affect safety-relevant or security-relevant installations (cf. Annex
              2) or which affect structural and fire-protection-related modifications and additions or
              also modifications of the escape and rescue routes.

           In the following cases, examination by the authorised expert will normally suffice.
           a) Minor safety-related modifications, especially the exchange or replacement of safety-
               relevant installations with installations that are equal or similar (slightly differing) and at
               least of the same effectiveness as far as they are qualified according to the specifications
               and other safety-relevant operational stipulations applicable in their case.
           b) Modifications and supplementations of documents of the safety documentation (cf.
               Annex 1 no. 8) that do not belong to the safety specifications as far as the consultation
               of authorised experts is required according to the stipulations laid down in this case.

          Probabilistic analyses may be considered in addition to deterministic safety requirements in
          order to verify that the safety precautions are well-balanced.
16                                          Article 6        Page 12, Para. 2, and Table 6-2
Question/ How were the required improvements by backfitting measures (described in Table 6-2)
Comment identified and prioritized?
Answer    Table 6-2 shows the unchanged status since the 1st Review Conference in 1999 (see also
          answer to Question 20).

           In the then German report (see The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
           Conservation and Nuclear Safety Nuclear Safety in Germany Report under the Convention
           on Nuclear Safety by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the First
           Review Meeting in April 1999, Bonn, September 1998), detailed information was provided
           in Art. 14 with respect to Table 14-3 on the different activities regarding the identification
           of the indicated improvement measures, such as risk analyses, safety reviews, the
           evaluation of events, and accident analyses and safety demonstrations within the framework
           of the licensing and supervisory procedure.

           In principle, prioritisation of plant improvements is done as following:

           Highest priority is attached to those plant improvements that are necessary to establish the
           "necessary precautions against damage according to the state of the art of science and
           technology". Without them, a NPP must not continue operation.


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          Optimisation of accident control beyond the establishment of the requisite precautions and
          improvements in the area of residual-risk minimisation are assessed and, if need be,
          implemented with consideration of
              - deterministic aspects,
              - probabilistic aspects,
              - evaluation of operating experience,
              - influences on the operation of the plant
              - cost/benefit ratio.
17                                       Article 6          Chapter 6 P12
Question/ What the content of PSR? What’s the attitude of regulatory body against the deviations
Comment found in PSR?
Answer    The PSR consists of a deterministic and a probabilistic part which both have to be
          performed according to regulatory guidelines referenced under [3-74]. More information is
          given in the National Report under Article 14, p. 77-79.

           The deterministic safety assessment of the nuclear power plants comprises of the following
           parts:
               - symptom-oriented review of the plant safety status
               - and
               - demonstration of the installations and measures for specific, very rare accidents as
                   well as the emergency protection concept,
               - demonstration of the operational management system and evaluation of operating
                   experience.
           The symptom-oriented review is to be based on accidents as compiled in Appendix 3 in the
           National Report. Appendix 3 also includes a spectrum of beyond-design-basis accidents for
           the demonstration of the installations and measures for very rare accidents.

           The methods and data applied for the probabilistic safety analysis are described and
           published in supplementary documents (“PSA Methods” and “PSA Data”) [4-7] to the
           regulatory guidelines. In view of the obligatory performance of PSAs with extended
           analysis scope within the framework of the PSR required by law, the PSA guideline was
           revised and republished in November 2005 [3-74.3]. According to this new guideline, a
           PSA of level 1 for power operation and low-power and shutdown states and a PSA of level
           2 for full power has to be performed. The scope of the PSA covers internal and external
           events.

           Regulatory experience with results of the PSRs is as follows:
           PSRs carried out so far have revealed no deficits that would require direct intervention by
           the nuclear supervisory authority according to § 19 AtG or § 17 AtG, i.e. intervention
           which would have forbidden further operation of the plant under review. The reviews took
           more recent safety-related findings/verification procedures and operating experience into
           account. In this context it had to be checked or decided whether e.g. backfittings in the
           sense of a continual improvement of plant safety were necessary or whether the function
           and integrity of systems, structures and components had to be newly demonstrated by
           means of improved verification methods. The PSR results have led to different modification
           measures and improved verification methods which have been of are yet to be implemented
           either on the order of the nuclear supervisory authority or voluntarily on the licensee's own
           initiative. These measures contribute to a continual improvement or optimisation of the
           level of safety of the plants reviewed.



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          The results of the probabilistic analyses which were carried out alongside the deterministic
          ones yielded core damage frequencies below the reference levels recommended by the
          IAEA for future plants, confirming well-balanced plant concepts.
18                                          Article 6       Chapter 6 P7
Question/ According to the report, most of the nuclear power plants have already been issued license
Comment permits to increase the initial enrichment of U-235 to values of up to 4.4 weight % and
          fissile plutonium in MOX fuel elements, how to balance and evaluate its impact on safety
          and economy?
Answer    The use of higher-enriched fuel elements reduces the number of reloaded fuel elements per
          cycle, which leads to an increase in discharge burn-up of the fuel elements and thus reduces
          fuel cost. An increase of the enrichment from 4w/o U-235 to 4.4 w/o U-235, for example,
          leads to a reduction in the reloading amount of about 10%.

           MOX fuel elements are used in Germany not for economic reasons but due to the legal
           obligation to recycle fuel. Due to the decision in favour of long-term interim storage, the
           amount of plutonium arising from reprocessing is limited. To avoid any negative effects
           from the use of MOX fuel, the plutonium content is calculated such that the MOX elements
           can reach discharge burn-up levels that are comparable to those of the uranium fuel
           elements used at the same time.

           The relevant safety-related aspects in connection with the use of higher-enriched uranium
           fuel elements and MOX fuels are the absorber effectiveness inside the reactor core (control
           rods and – in the case of PWRs – boric acid) and in storage.

           Inside the reactor core, an increased enrichment leads to the increase of the average core
           burn-up and therefore to an increased share of (bred) plutonium in the uranium fuel
           elements. This effect is, of course, clearly more marked with the direct use of plutonium-
           containing MOX reload fuel elements. The higher proportion of plutonium fission
           processes leads to a harder spectrum, which tends to reduce the effectiveness of absorbers.
           This also causes a change in the reactivity coefficients. It was therefore shown in licensing
           procedures that these changes are slight and that all observed transients and incidents
           remain under control. In some PWR plants, the boric acid dissolved in the coolant was
           enriched with the absorbing boron isotope B-10.

          Regarding the storage of fuel elements in facilities for fresh and spent fuel elements,
          respectively – i.e. dry and wet storage facilities – it could also be demonstrated within the
          framework of these licensing procedures that the required subcriticality is ensured during
          normal operation as well as under accident conditions. Regarding the storage of fuel
          elements in a wet storage facility, it was taken into account that there is boron dissolved in
          the water.
19                                         Article 6          p. 14
Question/ The report states that safety assessments will continue including the mandatory safety
Comment reviews. Has BMU defined a regulatory policy and a guide for the regulatory assessment of
          integral safety re-views? What has been the experience of the regulator so far in applying
          periodic safety reviews for continuous safety improvements?
Answer    Safety reviews have been made mandatory by the Atomic Energy Act [1A-3]. They must be
          performed under consideration of the state of the art in science and technology.

           Within the framework of these reviews, non-compliances are shown and necessary
           measures are defined plant-specifically.


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          There are guidelines available [3-74] how to perform the deterministic and probabilistic
          safety assessments and what should be the content of these assessments. A more detailed
          description of the content of the safety assessments and the experience of the regulator in
          applying the PSR for continuous safety improvements is given in the answer to question 17.
20                                         Article 6        @p.13 Table6-2
Question/ Table 6-2 Major Backfitting Measures in Nuclear Power Plants According to Construction
Comment Line
          Can the improvement of facilities be considered under the structured phase-out policy?
          The examples of improved modifications are listed up in the Table 6.2. Does this table
          include the examples after the phase-out policy was established?
Answer    Table 6-2 shows measures performed in the nineties. The same table was already presented
          in the first National Report (Art. 14).

           The amended Atomic Energy Act (AtG) of 2002 [1A.3] did in no way reduce the safety
           requirements for nuclear power plants.

          The improvements of the safety of the nuclear power plants were and also will be continued
          to be performed.
21                                        Article 6         App. 1-2 (page162)
Question/ 19 nuclear power plants have been decommissioned. From these, 15 nuclear power plants
Comment are currently being dismantled, two nuclear power plants are in safe enclosure and two
          plants have already been completely dismantled.
          •Which NPPs have been completely dismantled?
          •What have been the costs?
          •What is the estimated difference in costs for immediate (short term) and delayed (60 years)
          dismantling?
Answer    Two NPPs (prototype reactors) have been completely dismantled in Germany:
           • Heißdampfreaktor HDR (superheated steam-cooled reactor, 25 MWe) in
               Großwelzheim (Bavaria), complete dismantling finished in 1998, costs about 49.6
               million EUR (source: news releases of FZK).
            •   Niederaichbach KKN (DRR/D2O-moderated, 106 MWe) in Niederaichbach (Bavaria),
                complete dismantling finished in 1995, costs about 143.2 million EUR (source: speech
                manuscript closing event KKN).
           It must be prefixed that the estimated differences in costs for immediate and delayed
           dismantling can vary amongst different facilities and depend on the specific situation.
           Insofar no general statement can be given to this question. The operators of NPPs in
           Germany have to prepare annual cost calculations in order to justify the amount of the
           respective reserves for decommissioning. Within the scope of these cost calculations, the
           costs for immediate and delayed dismantling (30 years) have been calculated for reference
           reactors (PWR and BWR). In these calculations, the delayed dismantling is about 7-8 %
           more expensive than immediate dismantling, caused by derivation and operation of safe
           enclosure.

          Further information will be given in the national report for the next review meeting of the
          Joint Convention in 2009.
22                                        Article 6          (page 13)
Question/ Over the past years, numerous improvements have been realised at all nuclear power plants
Comment in the course of their operating lives, in particular also by measures in the area of beyond


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           design basis accidents…
           Table 6.2 shows several areas of improvement, but the reviewer has not found the
           information on some important issues.
           •Hydrogen hazard. According to the guidance of German-French experts issued as the
           official recommendation of RSK in 1988 all PWRs should have been provided with passive
           recombiners. This process was under way in 2000 ? Has it been completed?
           •Are safety and pressure relief valves in BWRs qualified for steam water flow?
Answer     Presently, passive autocatalytic recombiners for the degradation of hydrogen forming as a
           result of event sequences involving core melting are installed in the containments of
           German pressurised water reactor plants, except for one plant.

          The safety and relief valves of the German boiling water reactors are qualified for loading
          with water in the low-pressure range. Loading with water in the high-pressure range is
          safely precluded by a highly reliable cut-off of the high-pressure injection systems.
23                                         Article 6         pages 12 & 14
Question/ Please provide more information on the criteria used by the licensees and by the regulators
Comment for the classification of PSR findings and for the prioritization of improvement measures
          and corrective actions. How it is the reasonable practicability of the
          improvements/corrective actions assessed?
Answer    See also answer to Question no. 16.

           The licensee identifies improvement measures with due consideration of deterministic
           aspects, probabilistic aspects, the evaluation of operating experience, influences on the
           operation of the plant, and the cost-benefit ratio.

           The authority takes all aspects relevant for the case in question into account to achieve an
           optimum of accident prevention or accident control, or even a further reduction of the risk.

           For this purpose, deterministic and probabilistic aspects as well as operating experience are
           considered. This means that the results of the safety status analysis, the PRA and the safety
           review part dealing with "operational management and evaluation of operating experience"
           are assessed by the authority and its authorised experts and weighed against each other.

          There is no defined scheme, nor are there any clear rules according to which the assessment
          is made.
24                                         Article 6          p. 12
Question/ Apart from the reportable events, reports about other abnormal occurrences and voluntary
Comment reports made by staff members are also recorded and investigated.
          Can you briefly explain criteria for reportable events system. How do you motivate
          operators for reporting?
Answer    The official procedure for the reporting of events is laid down by law for the operators of
          German nuclear installations holding an operating licence according to § 7 AtG in the
          Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting Ordinance – AtSMV [1A17]. There are three
          different categories for reporting incidents to the authority, each specifying its own
          reporting deadline (S – immediate reporting, E - urgent reporting, N – normal reporting).
          According to the AtSMV, only those events have to be reported that fulfil certain criteria
          that are mentioned in the appendices to the Ordinance.

           The reporting criteria are differentiated according to radiological aspects and aspects in
           view of systems design and are allocated to the three above-mentioned reporting categories.


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            The radiological reporting criteria cover discharges, releases, cases of contamination, and
            the carrying-off of radioactive substances. The reporting criteria in view of systems design
            cover deficiencies, operational disturbances or damage to safety-relevant systems as well as
            a range of concrete initiating events (criticality disturbances, auxiliary power supply losses,
            leakages from pipes, etc.). Rare events due to external impacts (aircraft crash, earthquake,
            blast pressure waves) or internal events (fires, flooding, explosions) are also covered by
            special reporting criteria. Concrete instructions on how to use the individual criteria are
            contained in separate notes, which have been published but are not part of the statutory
            ordinance.

            The Reporting Ordinance regulates the licensees' duties regarding the reporting of events. It
            also contains penalty regulations for any violations, e.g. if an event has only been reported
            incompletely or not at all.
25                                            Article 7.2.1     p. 23
Question/   What is the added value of federal supervision if the federal regulator has failed to update
Comment     regulatory safety requirements for decades?
Answer      The reason for not updating the safety requirements lies mainly within the federal structure
            of the atomic administration in Germany. On the other hand the atomic administration is
            legally obliged to base its decisions on the actual state of science and technology. This
            means that rules that do no more represent the state of the art must not be the base of
            regulatory decisions. Apart from this the federal regulator has far more tasks than to prepare
            new rules.
26                                            Article 7.2.1     p. 23
Question/   On page 23 reference is made to the "safety philosophy". Where is the German safety
Comment     philosophy laid down? What are main differences to international safety fundamentals and
            related basic requirements?
Answer      In Germany, the regulations corresponding to the international safety fundamentals and
            related basic requirements are stipulated at the level of the Atomic Energy Act, the nuclear
            non-mandatory guidance instruments (or the planned "Safety Requirements for Nuclear
            Power Plants", see National Report, p. 23) as well as the planned Nuclear Installations
            Safety Ordinance.
            The reference made to "safety philosophy" is given in the context of elements to be
            considered, drafting a new safety ordinance. "Safety philosophy" in this context is related to
            authorised concepts of the existing plants and the fulfilment of their authorisations.
27                                            Article 7.2.1     p. 24
Question/   In November 2006, the BMU submitted a first draft for a national action plan for the
Comment     implementation of the WENRA requirements. The plan will be further developed in
            agreement with the Länder authorities and after having heard the plant operators. This plan
            was published on the Internet. Completion was announced for 2007. What is the current
            status of the German action plan?
Answer      The first draft of the national action plan submitted by the Federal Ministry for the
            Environment (BMU) addresses the implementation of WENRA Reference levels into
            national regulations. The reference levels will be implemented by the “safety requirements”
            which are under discussion with the states authorities. Additionally some contents will be
            made legally binding by an ordinance being in preparation by a group of representatives of
            federal and states (Länder-) authorities.
28                                            Article 7.2.1     7 (2i), p.23
Question/   A part of the Licensees have certified "ISO" quality management system. Does the
Comment     Regulatory Body ("länder authorities") have similar certified quality management system?


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Answer    Administrative sequences and processes of the nuclear authorities of the Länder are
          governed by mandatory organisational sequences stipulated by the Länder governments.
          The establishment of QM systems or the recording and analysis of typical processes within
          the regulatory scopes of the Länder are therefore only of a supplementary character. No
          certifications have been performed, nor are they intended. Most Länder governments are
          currently preparing or implementing modern results- or performance-oriented
          administration control concepts. These are to allow the gauging and verification of whether
          targets have been reached or whether there have been deviations from the target, and
          performance figures are to provide the possibility of comparison within individual
          organisational units (use of modern controlling instruments – from reporting up to the
          balanced scorecard).
29                                            Article 7.2.1    page 23
Question/ 1)While the planned ordinance is legally binding, it is not clear what is the formal status of
Comment the “Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants”. Is BMU authorized to establish
          binding regulations for the enforcement of the Nuclear Law?
          2) How does this draft regulation reflect the state of the art in science and technology?
          What was the outcome of the discussions with the stakeholders on this draft?
Answer    1.)
          Following their adoption by the BMU, the "Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants"
          will reflect the state of the art in science and technology which from the point of view of
          the BMU will have to be standard for the assessment of the existing German plants.
          Discussions with the stakeholders have not yet been completed.

           According to the Constitution, the Federal Government (BMU) is entitled to supervise the
           administrative actions of the Länder. Following the eventual adoption of the "Safety
           Requirements for Nuclear Power plants", it will base its supervision on the contents of the
           latter. They will thus become mandatory by the individual decisions that will be taken (for
           details cf. p. 20 of the Report).

           2.)
           According to the Atomic Energy Act, a licence may only be granted if the necessary
           precautions against any damage resulting from the construction and operation of the facility
           have been taken in line with the state of the art in science and technology. The state of the
           art in science and technology is reflected in the nuclear regulations, which accordingly have
           to be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, adapted to the state of the art in science and
           technology.
           The nuclear non-mandatory guidance instruments in Germany are composed of the "Safety
           Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants", the "Accident Guidelines PWR", various notices,
           guidelines and general administrative procedures of BMI and BMU, the "RSK Guidelines
           for PWR", further RSK and SSK recommendations, and the Technical KTA Safety
           Standards.
           The safety standards of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) are subject to a
           continual review process, which ensures that they are up to date.

           The Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants describe the design and the operation of
           nuclear power plants according to the most advanced state in Germany, taking into account
           the international state of the art in science and technology. The Safety Requirements for
           Nuclear Power Plants consider among other things the latest versions of the rules of the
           International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the reference levels for the
           assessment of the safety of nuclear power plants defined by the Western European Nuclear
           Regulators' Association (WENRA) within the framework of a comparison of international


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            best practices.
            So far, stakeholders have submitted about 8,000 comments on the different drafts of the
            Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, all of which have been considered in the
            different reviews. This active participation means that practical experience in connection
            with the application of current rules and findings from the safety-related assessment of
            events as well as other operating experience will be reflected in the final version of the
            Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants. Furthermore, expert practices of the
            different expert organisation as well as regulatory procedures in connection with different
            safety-related matters are also considered this way.

          To all WENRA members an English version of the requirements (draft) has been given half
          a year ago. Until now we got no comments.
30                                           Article 7.2.1     page 24, first paragraph
Question/ How does the German legislation specify the nature and extent of the application of newly
Comment established requirements to existing facilities and current activities?
Answer    In Germany, a licence for a nuclear power plant may only be granted if the requisite
          precaution against damage has been taken according to the state of the art in science and
          technology. In this connection, the range of effects covered by the licence has to be taken
          into account in the considerations. The actual meaning of the vague legal term 'requisite
          precaution against damage according to the state of the art in science and technology' used
          by the legislator has to be determined by the authority separately for each case. Here, the
          latter has to take existing statutory ordinances and the non-mandatory guidance instruments
          - e.g. applying to the field of radiation protection – into account. Should the authority find
          that the requisite precaution against damage is no longer ensured for the plant in question, it
          may take supplementary measures by imposing further requirements or, initially, by
          carrying out supervisory measures. These measures are subject to the principle of
          commensurability.

            As far as corresponding regulations for the further development of the requirements for
            taking precautions are introduced by statutory ordinance, such a statutory ordinance may
            provide for a temporary arrangement to allow the implementation of the new requirements.

            In the case of a modification licence, the range of effects covered by the licence has to be
            taken into account in the considerations. This means that for this range of effects,
            requirements from new regulations principally have to be considered.
31                                            Article 7.2.1    page 24
Question/   Could you please provide more information on the outcome of the discussions with the
Comment     stakeholders regarding the action plan for the implementation of the WENRA Reference
            Levels into national regulations? How many resources are devoted by the regulator to the
            implementation of the action plan?
Answer      The legal implementation of the action plan is performed by an update of the German
            nuclear non-mandatory guidance instruments. The discussions with the stakeholders have
            not been completed yet. The work of the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) on
            this issue is performed by a division with four desk officers. For specific technical issues,
            the work may be supported by experts consulted. See also answer to question Nr. 27.
32                                            Article 7.2.1    Page 22, paragraph 3
Question/   In relation to KTA safety standards, the report says that “A safety standard requires a 5/6
Comment     majority to be passed.” It is clear from Figure 7.1 on page 17 that KTA safety standards are
            an important and, potentially, a legally binding tier of the legislative system. Yet, from
            reading page 22, paragraph 3, it would appear that the imposition of a new KTA safety


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          standard could be blocked by an alliance between the nuclear power utilities and the
          manufacturers. Might this be possible, and might it not become increasingly likely as the
          utilities seek to minimise operating costs during the limited remaining lifetimes of the
          plants? This possibility is of particular concern given the role of the KTA safety standards
          in relation to plant ageing management (see page 81, final paragraph).
Answer    Yes, the necessary 5/6 majority implies a “veto“possibility for each of the 5 groups of the
          KTA. This is intended and constitutes an essential part of the procedure – all specialists
          concerned must share a common opinion.
          In practice, this does not present a problem, because not only supervising authorities and
          experts but also manufacturers and operators are interested in the safe operation of their
          plants. Only in the context of the KTA procedures, the manufacturers and operators have
          the possibility to introduce their opinion (and their expertise) into the regulatory process.
          Furthermore, if manufacturers and utilities were to use their “veto power” within the KTA
          process in a way that could potentially compromise the safe operation of the plants, the
          authorities have the right to issue safety requirements, guidelines or recommendations of
          their own making. Therefore, an obstructive behaviour within the KTA would quickly lead
          to a situation where the regulatory authorities would be forced to develop and issue
          requirements, guidelines and recommendations without extensively seeking the expertise of
          the utilities and manufacturers.
          It should be noted that within the German regulatory system, the KTA does create legally
          binding rules. The purpose of the KTA standards is to provide a solid interpretation of the
          legally binding framework on a sophisticated technical level. However, exactly because the
          KTA standards are not legally binding in their own right, their usefulness within the
          German regulatory system, as well as their usefulness as an expert opinion in a pending
          lawsuit, is tightly bound to their high reliability and quality. It is the high quality of the
          KTA standards that is ensured by the 5/6 quorum. This quorum guarantees that no
          standards are issued that are opposed by a large fraction of the concerned experts.
          More information on the KTA, its procedures and its history can be obtained from the KTA
          website (http://www.kta-gs.de).
33                                          Article 7.2.2      Subsection 7 (2ii) (p. 25)
Question/ All operating NPPs in Germany have an operation license without time restriction. Also,
Comment according to information given in Subsection 7 (2ii), NPP safety assurance should be in line
          with the latest safety requirements.
          1) What mechanism ensures the implementation of modern technologies of safety assurance
          if the licenses are not limited in time?
          2) Under what procedure the licensed plants are reviewed for compliance with the modern
          requirements?
Answer    1.) See answer to Question 30.
          2.) According to § 7 para. 2 no. 3 of the Atomic Energy Act, the yardstick for the granting
          of a licence is whether the requisite precaution against damage has been taken according to
          the state of the art in science and technology. The competent authority has to check within
          the framework of its state supervisory function whether this requisite precaution against
          damage is still in place. Should the authority come to the conclusion that the requisite
          precaution against damage according to the state of the art in science and technology is no
          longer in place, it may impose additional licence requirements or order remedial action
          within the framework of its supervisory function.

           In addition to continual supervision, the AtG demands integral safety reviews at fixed
           intervals.




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34                                          Article 7.2.2     Subsection 7 (2ii) (pp. 26-28)
Question/ The licensing procedure provides for involvement of the public in this process. To this end,
Comment together with a standard Safety Analysis Report a special document (additional report) is
          produced, which allows the public to verify that their rights are not violated while
          performing the activities that are subject to licensing.
          1) Do the expert organizations invited by the licensor for safety documentation review need
          to have a license for the corresponding kind of activity?
          2) Who prepares the report for the public and who checks the conformance of this report to
          the Safety Analysis Report?
Answer     1. The supporting expert organisations consulted are not licensed. They are appointed by
               the regulatory authorities. When ordering advisory support, the following aspects are
               mainly taken into account. Training, professional knowledge and skills, reliability, and
               impartiality. The experts are not subject to any directives in their professional work,
               but framework guidelines have to be observed in the preparation of expert opinions in
               the nuclear administrative procedure. The authorities are not bound in their decisions
               to the results of the consulted experts' opinions.
               See National Report, Art. 8, p. 45 "Authorised Experts"
           2. The additional safety report is prepared by the applicant and will be reviewed by the
               competent authority with support of their experts in the course of the licensing
               procedure.
35                                          Article 7.2.2     Subsection 7 (2ii) (pp. 26-28)
Question/ Section 7 mentions the involvement of German specialists of different levels in the
Comment development of the IAEA standards and describes efforts to compare the IAEA standards
          with the national requirements.
          Can we say that there is conformance (on the whole) between IAEA standards and the
          German national requirements? Can we say that the recently developed document "NPP
          Safety Requirements" is in conformance with the IAEA requirements? Will the
          enforcement of this document require safety-significant upgrading efforts at existing
          German NPPs?
Answer    The "Fundamental Principles for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants – Safety Requirements
          According to the State of the Art in Science and Technology (Safety Requirements for
          Nuclear Power Plants)" were checked for consistency with the following Safety
          Requirements:
          − Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design Safety Requirements
               Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1
          − Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation Safety Requirements
               Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2
          − The Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Requirements
               Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3
          − Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations Safety Requirements
               Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3
          The safety requirements adopted in the "Fundamental Principles for the Safety of Nuclear
          Power Plants – Safety Requirements According to the State of the Art in Science and
          Technology (Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants)" are consistent with the safety
          requirements of the cited IAEA "Safety Requirements". The results of the corresponding
          checks are comprehensively documented.

           Concerning the requirement of safety-significant upgrading efforts, please see answer to
           question 30.



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36                                           Article 7.2.2      Subsection 7 (2ii) (pp. 26-28)
Question/ According to information stated in Section 7, the decision to issue the license is taken either
Comment on the basis of conclusion of independent (authorized) experts or on the basis of conclusion
          of the regulatory bodies' staff. The conclusion of an independent expert may be both taken
          into consideration or rejected. The above expert's conclusion has no legal (mandatory)
          force.
          Is there an administrative or any other responsibility of an independent expert for the
          conclusion prepared by him? Or this is a question of his moral and ethical responsibility, of
          his prestige of an expert?
Answer    In Germany, authorised experts are on principle required to show a high degree of
          professional qualification and be independent. If assessments or calculations are performed
          by an authorised experts which subsequently turn out to be erroneous, the experts is liable
          according to German civil law for any cost incurred or damage caused as a result. Here, the
          prerequisite is that the error can be demonstrated. Additional information on the system of
          expert assessment in Germany is contained in Chapter 8 (1) (page 45 f). There are two
          regulations pertaining to the work of authorised experts [3-8, 3-34].
37                                           Article 7.2.4      7 (2-iv), p. 29, 30
Question/ Criminal and administrative offences are defined in the Atomic Energy Act and sanctions
Comment are provided for persons committing such offences. However, the report sates that “as a
          result of the intense regulatory supervision, any inadmissible condition is usually detected
          at an early stage […] before administrative offence and criminal proceedings have to be
          taken”: does that means that no example exists of enforcement of those provisions?
Answer    In Germany, proceedings have already been instituted by nuclear supervisory authorities to
          prosecute administrative offences. Object of these proceedings was, e.g., allegation of
          delayed reporting according to the Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting Ordinance
          (AtSMV) or deficiencies in the plant organisation. Further, criminal proceedings were
          instituted by third parties (of citizens) or also at the instigation of the nuclear supervisory
          authorities.
38                                           Article 8.1
Question/ 1. With the consideration of the Agreement between the Federal Government and the power
Comment utilities of 14 June 2000, what measures are employed to assure both motivation and
          technical competence of the regulatory body personnel?
Answer    Regarding technical competence, see question No. 5:

          According to our knowledge, the decision to phase out nuclear energy has no impact on the
          motivation of the personnel since it does not have an impact on the job security of authority
          representatives.
39                                         Article 8.1
Question/ 2. What is the duration of the introductory phase for new employees without special nuclear
Comment knowledge? What kind of training and personal development activities will be provided
          during this period?
Answer    The licensing and supervisory authorities in Germany have no standardised system of
          training and further qualifying their own personnel. Training depends on future functions
          and already acquired skills. Possible courses comprise e.g. simulator training, courses in
          key qualifications, basic courses in reactor technology and radiation protection as well as
          the comprehensive introduction to the nuclear regulations. In addition, a number of
          technical seminars are offered to new members of staff. During the first years, training is
          monitored and supported by mentors.




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            New staff members are involved from the start in dealing with current problems and are
            step by step given more responsibility.
40                                            Article 8.1        Page 40, Paragraphs 3 and 4
Question/   The report states that the “competence loss analysis” was not completed due to data
Comment     protection. Furthermore, the report indicates that the “personnel development concept …
            could not be established due to budgetary boundary conditions”. What follow-up actions
            are being carried out on these two outstanding staffing initiatives, despite difficulties
            encountered regarding data protection and lack of funding?
Answer      The competence loss analysis stated in the report was discontinued. Regarding the present
            personnel development concept see answer to question 5.
41                                            Article 8.1        Chapter 8(1) P44
Question/   For the development of management systems at Lander authorities, it is written in the report
Comment     that: further developed approaches to these management systems that are specific to nuclear
            regulation are employed where applicable.’Please provide a more detailed description on
            what kind of approaches have been applied.
Answer      Beyond the sequences and processes of the nuclear authorities that are regulated by the
            usual organisational procedures for Länder ministries, specifically developed nuclear
            regulatory procedures are established for specific nuclear regulatory processes.
            These include regulations for complex, regularly recurring sequences and processes
            developing in a co-ordinated manner at both Länder and federal authorities as well as
            routine processes of the nuclear licensing and supervisory procedures at the Länder
            authorities.
            Among the individually regulated processes developing in a co-ordinated manner at both
            Länder and federal authorities are for example the official reporting procedure for the
            reporting of accidents, incidents or other events in nuclear power plants that are relevant to
            nuclear safety (→ Article 19 (vi)) and the related evaluation of operating experience by the
            supervisory authorities (→ Article 19 (vii)).
            Among the individually regulated processes developing at the Länder authorities are the
            periodic safety assessments and safety reviews within the framework of state supervision
            (→ Article 14 (i, ii)). This also includes in particular the safety assessments to be performed
            according to the licence requirements on the basis of mandatory in-service inspections,
            within the framework of preventive maintenance, and in the case of power plant
            modifications and overall maintenance inspections as well as on the basis of reports on the
            operation of the plants (→ Article 14 (i, ii)).
42                                            Article 8.1        Chapter 8(1) P44
Question/   For the BfS staffing issues, it is written in the report that expert opinions on how the BfS
Comment     may be modernized are available. How to implement to improve the staffing situation?
Answer      The modernisation process covers organisational and scientific aspects and is not primarily
            dedicated to improving the staffing situation. For the latter, see answer to question 53.
43                                            Article 8.1
Question/   Do you have currently in your regulatory staff, or in a technical support organization (TSO)
Comment     working for the regulatory body, an adequate number of technical experts (e.g., in the areas
            of reactor physics, thermo-hydraulics, and materials engineering) who can conduct an in-
            depth safety assessment of nuclear power plant, as would be needed for evaluation of
            operating events, large power upgrade, lifetime extension, or new build? Do these experts
            have tools and ability to conduct independent safety analysis, including both deterministic
            analysis and PRA? What is the number of such experts in various technical areas within the
            regulatory body and within the TSO? What is the outlook concerning the number of experts
            in a few years ahead?


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Answer      The supervisory authorities and the commissioned TSOs dispose of sufficient numbers of
            technical experts to be able to deal with the respective topic areas of current interest.
            Technical experts for the assessment of nuclear safety are mainly concentrated at GRS and
            at the different TÜVs. While GRS is mainly working for the BMU and performing a lot of
            research and developing assessment tools, the TÜVs are mainly working as a TSO for the
            Länder, performing reviews of safety assessments and supporting the regulatory body in the
            supervision of the local NPPs. In particular, GRS is able to perform in-depth safety
            assessments on different topics, taking advantage of the research activities and knowledge
            of the operational behaviour of the plants.
            As in most companies and institutes working in nuclear safety, a considerable loss of
            experienced staff is taking place due to retirements. It is the policy of TSOs to keep a sound
            number of experts in the different areas. To achieve the necessary knowledge in nuclear
            matters, a training programme has been established at the TSOs.
44                                           Article 8.1
Question/   What kind of systematic training and development programmes you have for your new
Comment     regulatory staff members? How do you ensure that they are ready to conduct their duties as
            regulatory staff members in the tasks assigned to them?
Answer      See answer to question 39.
45                                           Article 8.1        p. 38
Question/   The current staffing of the Federal Regulator is reported on page 38. Why are there
Comment     relatively many legal experts and only few technical staff? Which staff resources are
            devoted to the main regulatory functions as specified in Art. 7?
Answer      Federal supervision oversees the legal compliance and appropriateness of the execution by
            the respective competent authorities of the Länder. The related tasks require both legal as
            well as technical experts. For detailed technical issues, the BMU involves suitable experts,
            especially GRS.
46                                           Article 8.1        p. 43
Question/   What are the strategic aims of the Directorate-General RS and the key political strategies of
Comment     the BMU. Has a strategic plan been established and published?
Answer      Regarding the scope of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the federal authority has a
            strategic plan. The plan is not published. Parts of the plan are for example:

            -    There shall be reports on the introduction of a safety management system for all NPPs
                 by the 1st quarter of 2009.
            -    The Safety Requirements for NPPs shall be in such an advanced state of development
                 by the summer of 2008 that they can be published.
            -    The review of the emergency power supply systems of the German NPPs shall be
                 concluded.
            -    Successful performance of the IRRS Mission

          The strategic aims of the BMU have been notified to all staff and form the basis for the
          current activities.
47                                        Article 8.1      8 (1), p. 32
Question/ The Länder are responsible for the licensing and supervision of nuclear installations while
Comment the BMU supervises the lawfulness and expediency of the actions of the Länder; the Länder
          Committee for nuclear energy has a coordination role: can Germany explain how, in
          practice, an adequate treatment is applied to NPPs in different Länder so that a similar
          safety level is achieved?
Answer    There exists a common basis due to the safety requirements in the nuclear regulations that


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          have been accepted by all Länder. Differing opinions in their interpretation and application
          as well as in regulatory procedures are discussed under Federal Government leadership in
          the Federal States Committee for Nuclear Energy and its Technical Committees and
          Working Groups. The structure and function of the Federal States Committee is described
          on page 36 of the National Report.
48                                         Article 8.1       p. 32 to 48
Question/ Can Germany explain how public information on incidents occurring in NPPs is organized,
Comment especially regarding the implementation of INES? What actions are taken by operators? By
          Länder authorities? By the BMU? Especially, in connection with the above question, how
          does BMU ensures that INES is consistently applied in all Länder?
Answer    All event reports are centrally recorded, evaluated and checked for possible applicability to
          other German plants by GRS and BfS. The results are summarised in a report and made
          available to Parliament, the Länder, the licensees, the expert organisations, and the general
          public.

           The BMU has delegated the position of the INES Officer to GRS since beginning of INES.
           The flow of information regarding INES is the following: The operating organisations of
           nuclear power plants have the obligation to rate each reportable event. The nuclear safety
           officer of each plant is responsible for the correctness of the INES level. The Länder
           authorities and the local TÜV may check the correctness. The INES officer checks all event
           reports with respect to the correct INES level. Thus, consistent reporting of all plants can be
           achieved. If there are different opinions about the correct INES level, the operating
           organisation and the authorities as well as the INES officer discuss the correct level.
           The final decision on the classification is taken by the BMU and the INES Officer.

           In some federal states, the authorities also publish the reportable events on their internet
           pages.

          The communication departments of the licensees' companies inform the general public in a
          timely manner by issuing a press release, which is also put on the company website. The
          content of the press release has been previously agreed with the technical departments and
          the power plant site management.
49                                         Article 8.1        p.49
Question/ Article 8: Progress and Changes since 2004, 2nd Para.
Comment It is described in the report that the staffing situation at the regulatory body still needs to be
          improved. But, we suppose, that it is not only the staffing problem in the regulatory body
          but also the morale of the employee in the operators, that matters in the phasing-out
          situation in Germany. It can be considered that the decrease of the morale of employees
          might cause to jeopardize safety of NPP. What kind of measures are taken for preventing
          the decrease of employee morale?
Answer    So far, no negative influences on staff morale and therefore no negative influences on the
          safety of the NPPs that could be attributed to the nuclear phase-out have been observed.

           The high level of safety culture that has been achieved regarding the basic attitude and
           disposition of the employees towards safety-relevant tasks and activities and the priority of
           safety in the case of conflicting aims is maintained by means of various measures applied
           by the licensee, even during the transitory period between the operation and the
           decommissioning of a plant. These include e.g. timely communication, transparency with
           respects to planning and working programmes, and long-term planning of employment
           programmes.


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50                                        Article 8.1     8(1), Table 8.2. and text, p.35
Question/ Table 8.2 and text on co-operation between the authorities of the regulatory body- Länder
Comment Committee for Nuclear Energy:

           It is assumed that the federal governments have a more generic/general task whereas the
           Länder governments have more plant specific tasks. Given that the technical committees
           and permanent working groups of the Länder Committee for Nuclear Energy only convene
           twice a year (at least), how is avoided that too much overlap is created in the daily work, or
           worse, gaps arise because a party thinks that a certain task/problem belongs to the ball park
           of some other party?
Answer     The Länder authorities are responsible for the licensing and supervision of nuclear power
           plants. They are the authorities that deal directly with the licensees. The BMU oversees the
           legal compliance and appropriateness of the work of the Länder authorities and can - if
           necessary - issue directives to the Länder in individual cases. Therefore there is no overlap
           for the area of licensing and supervision, but there are no gaps either since the Länder
           authorities have prime responsibility.
           Furthermore, it is a task of the BMU to set standard federal procedures (e.g. in the form of
           administrative regulations and bodies of technical rules) for the actions by the authority and
           to deal with generic issues. In this area there may be an overlap which, however, can be
           eliminated by directives issued by the BMU. In the same way it cannot be generally
           excluded that there are any gaps in cases where the federal supervisor does not dispose of
           the information necessary to see the need for action regarding standard federal procedures
           or generic issues.

          Apart from the direct information between federal regulator and Länder authorities, the
          work of the Federal States Committee and its Technical Committees is therefore an
          essential instrument for the exchange on generic issues.
51                                          Article 8.1       8(1), p.40
Question/ Competence of the “regulatory body” staff :
Comment
          Ageing of regulatory body staff associated with a sudden generation change is also a
          problem of the Dutch Nuclear Regulatory Body. Therefore, we are very interested in the
          German experiences and strategies for finding the solution to the problem.
          Although the “competence loss analysis” couldn’t be brought to an end, were there any
          preliminary results that can serve as attention points for hiring and/or training of new
          regulatory body staff?
Answer    See answer to question 5.
52                                          Article 8.1       8(1), pp.42 -44
Question/ Management systems of the regulatory body:
Comment In the ISO 9001/2000 system, performance indicators are used as a feedback mechanism. Is
          that also the case in the management system of the Directorate-General RS? If that is the
          case, can you give some examples?
Answer    Managerial personnel and the staff in general are to ensure a high degree of process quality
          by complying with and continually developing process descriptions and working
          instructions. For the evaluation of the processes affecting them, the process descriptions are
          attributed so-called indicators, reflecting the expected values (e.g. meeting of certain
          deadlines) on which the results of the respective processes are measured.
53                                          Article 8.1       8(2), p.49
Question/ What is the percentage of vacancies and temporary personnel at BMU and BfS? Are there


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Comment tasks that are currently not or insufficiently carried out, and if so which tasks require
        attention?
Answer  At the BMU there are no vacant established positions. Approx. 15% of the staff have a
        contract limited to 2 years.
        Due to the fact that the number of established positions is too low, it is not possible to fulfil
        all regulatory functions with the degree of detail they demand, so that TSOs have to be
        consulted frequently for these tasks. This applies in particular to the detailed analysis of
        events in domestic plants, OEF for foreign plants, and strategic safety issues.

          The staff of the BfS Department of Nuclear Safety consists only of permanent personnel.
          See also answer to question 5.
54                                       Article 8.1      p.49
Question/ What is meant by “the Regulatory Body (RB) is in some areas increasingly reliant on the
Comment support by TSOs”. Which areas do this concern? Does it mean that in those areas the
          professional competence inside the RB has disappeared or is limited due to capacity/budget
          policies?

           What is the current situation at GRS and Technical Inspection Agencies with respect to
           vacancies? Since the industry has also to replace many retiring people in the future and all
           organizations need the same level of expertise, can there be explained what is the
           effectiveness of all the different organizations in attracting staff?

           The report states that the staffing situation will be improved. Effectiveness will be
           improved based on “existing competences in BMU and Länder.” On the other hand there
           will be no structural change of the distribution of functions between Bund and Länder
           during the current legislation. Could you please explain how the improvements will be
           achieved ?

           Has the request for 7 more staff at BMU level been successful?

           Will IAEA be asked to make an advice about the German structure of regulatory body
           during the IRRS mission?
Answer     See also answers to questions 5, 53 and 61.

           The work of the German supervisory authorities is traditionally underpinned to a large
           extent by the TSOs. This concerns in particular the safety-related assessments of
           installations.

           The number of staff in the Directorate General RS of the BMU has effectively remained
           unchanged over a longer period.

           GRS and the TÜVs are constantly hiring new staff and experienced experts also as a
           resource for the regulatory authorities. The training of the new staff follows a common
           approach of all TÜVs and GRS. The different organisations have in addition a limited
           amount of special courses to meet their specific needs. The maintenance of the competence
           level is a major challenge for the future. Modern knowledge management tools are in use
           and will be further developed. In the current situation with a “booming” market esp. for
           engineers, many organisations have difficulties to hire sufficient numbers of excellent
           young people. GRS and the TÜVs are no exception. Nevertheless, the tasks of a TÜV are
           well known to students. Hiring is e. g. performed via ads in the newspapers, on the internet,
           and by direct contact to universities.


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          The IRRS Mission in Germany in 2008 is about a review of the functions of nuclear
          administration in Germany, not about structural issues of the organisation of the nuclear
          authorities.
55                                         Article 8.1        Article 8, Page 42
Question/ Management System as described in Article 8 Page 42— Does it follow the European
Comment Model or the IAEA GS R3. Integrated Management System Model?
Answer
          The RS Management System in the narrower sense only covers part of the IAEA Safety
          Requirements GS-R-3. It is a pure process management system which is to be optimised by
          procedures. What is described are the processes that are necessary to achieve all targets of
          the Directorate General RS or perform the corresponding planning. These descriptions are a
          major part of the electronic QM Manual; it contains no instructions as regards content.
          During the first quarter of 2007, a first interim assessment was made of the use of the QM
          Manual. This revealed that the QM Manual is still used at rather different levels of
          intensity. The usefulness of the QM Manual is seen above all in its function as a work aid
          for new staff, in connection with the allocation of new responsibilities, and for deputy
          arrangements.
*                                          Article 8.1        Section 8, Page 49
Question/ Under the heading Progress and Changes Since 2004, it is mentioned that the staffing
Comment situation at the regulatory body still needs to be improved. Please provide details about the
          actions undertaken to improve the situation
Answer    See answer to question 5.
56                                         Article 8.1        page 40
Question/ The report acknowledges the difficulties and the fact that older, experienced personnel are
Comment replaced by university graduates without experience, just having a university degree. It is a
          negative selection process, which can result in lowering the overall technical competence of
          regulatory body personnel. What is more, the same process will be observed in industry,
          although the report does not mention it. Evidently, talented people will not go to the
          profession which is scheduled to be discarded.
          Are there any negative effects observable which are could be to the loss of highly qualified
          personnel leaving the profession in view of the perspective of shutting down nuclear power
          plants in Germany?
Answer    Such negative effects could not have been observed.
57                                         Article 8.1        pages 42-43
Question/ Please give more information on the experience so far with the implementation of the
Comment Quality Management System for the regulatory body. Does it take account of relevant
          IAEA GS-R-3 requirements? Has an overall performance of regulatory activities improved
          as a result of the implementation of this process based management system? What
          indicators are used to monitor the effectiveness of the processes and which are the areas of
          activity that benefited the most from this new system?
Answer    The RS Management System in the narrower sense only covers part of the IAEA Safety
          Requirements GS-R-3. It is a pure process management system which is to be optimised by
          procedures. What is described are the processes that are necessary to achieve all targets of
          the Directorate General RS or perform the corresponding planning. These descriptions are a
          major part of the electronic QM Manual; it contains no instructions as regards content.
          During the first quarter of 2007, a first interim assessment was made of the use of the QM
          Manual. This revealed that the QM Manual is still used at rather different levels of
          intensity. The usefulness of the QM Manual is seen above all in its function as a work aid
          for new staff, in connection with the allocation of new responsibilities, and for deputy


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           arrangements.
58                                          Article 8.1        page 34
Question/ It is stated that “During the review period, deliberations continued on a possible reform of
Comment the nuclear administration structure in Germany. There are no plans to change the existing
          basic
          structure of nuclear administration - i.e. the distribution of functions among federal and
          Länder governments - in Germany.” Recalling that the aim of the possible reform had been
          stated to be the centralisation of the regulatory responsibilities to ensure that there are no
          undue interferences into the regulation of safety matters, how have these concerns been
          solved?
Answer    The deliberations on a reform of nuclear administration as they were presented at the 2005
          Review Conference are no longer pursued by the Federal Government that has been in
          office since November 2005. The Federal Government is striving for achieving
          improvements within the existing structures of nuclear administration. In this context,
          especially the results of the 2008 IRRS Mission to Germany – which will review one
          Länder authority as well as the BMU – are to be taken into account.
59                                          Article 8.1
Question/ On page 3 of the German Report it was stated that “the staffing situation at the regulatory
Comment body still needs to be improved considerably in view of the high and still increasing
          requirements to be met. This applies in particular to the federal nuclear authority and the
          subordinate Federal Office for Radiation Protection”.
          What legal and governmental mechanisms are in place that can be used to ensure that the
          Regulatory Body has adequate staffing and financial resources to discharge its assigned
          responsibilities?
          What measures are planned by Germany to ensure long term sufficiency of qualified
          personnel for the performance of all nuclear regulatory activities?
Answer    Owing to the right of Parliament to adopt the budget and control its execution by the
          government, the equipment and staffing of the RB requires approval by the Treasury.
          Regarding the federal nuclear regulatory authority and the Federal Office for Radiation
          Protection, staffing levels were increased within the framework of the 2008 federal budget.
          For the financial years to come, BMU and BfS will demand a further step-wise increase of
          staffing levels as part of a graduated scheme. Here, reference will be made – as was already
          done in the case of the 2008 budget – to the importance of the provision of adequate levels
          of qualified staff for ensuring an operable system of nuclear administration.

          See also answers to Questions 5 and 53.
60                                         Article 8.1
Question/ How does the Regulatory Body define policies on its regulatory actions? How are
Comment stakeholders informed about the objectives and the results of the work of the regulatory
          body in Germany? Are there regular reports made available to the public to inform on
          regulators’ activities?
Answer    The global targets of the BMU/Directorate General RS and the strategic annual planning
          building on them are guided by the risks of the installations and activities within the scope
          of responsibility of the Directorate General RS. The flexible communication and decision
          structures ensure adequate safety-oriented actions for events as they occur. The depth of
          evaluation by the federal regulator is guided especially by the safety-related or the generic
          relevance of the individual event in question. Here, the federal regulator's activities are
          based i.a. on the Information Notices prepared by GRS – being the authorised expert
          organisation advising the BMU – on all reportable events in German nuclear power plants.
          These Information Notices contain in-depth analyses of theses events and are also


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            forwarded to the licensees and the nuclear licensing and supervisory authorities of the
            Länder.

            The BMU as part of the executive is obliged to render account to Parliament, the
            administrative courts and the general public. This may be done with respect to individual
            occurrences but also in general form. One example are the BMU's annual and quarterly
            reports to the German Bundestag on reportable events in German nuclear power plants. In
            addition, the BMU provides comments – some of them in extensive form – on certain
            activities and issues to answer parliamentary enquiries. Apart from that, there is a general
            right according to the Environmental Information Act to access environmental information
            which can be gained by giving information, granting access to records, or by other means
            (§3 of the Environmental Information Act). The press releases of the BMU are to be found
            under the Internet address
            http://www.bmu.de/english/current_press_releases/doc/38285.php
61                                            Article 8.1        page 38
Question/   Figure 8-4 shows current staffing of the Directorate RS I "Safety of Nuclear Installations".
Comment     How has this structure been designed and reviewed to ensure that it is adequate for the
            extent and nature of facilities and activities the authority has to regulate?
Answer      The structure is guided by the technical requirements. A few years ago a task review was
            carried out. The results were implemented. The structure shown in the report is subject to
            continual adaptation to the needs. In this year, the structure will be reviewed within the
            framework of the IRRS Mission.
62                                            Article 8.1        Subsection 8 (1)
Question/   Two important problems have been identified regarding the issue of maintaining the
Comment     competence of regulatory bodies' staff: 1) inviting young specialists and 2) preservation of
            accumulated information and knowledge. The second problem is being partially dealt with
            by systematization and storing all the available information in electronic form. The first
            problem, as shown by the data given in the Report, basically remains unresolved. Only
            financial problems are mentioned as the reason for this situation. However, there exists
            another aspect of this problem. With the existing Atomic Energy Act, it is hard to believe
            that this problem will be resolved.
            How can one attract young and promising specialists to the industry, the development of
            which has been precluded by the legislation?
Answer      The main problem with winning permanent junior authority staff in the past was that some
            posts of staff who had left were cut or only temporarily refilled. It is generally no problem
            to win young promising staff at the required (low) numbers for the existing permanent posts
            at the authority. However, it is necessary to provide further job-specific training of the
            junior personnel over a longer period of time, which is done by way of corresponding
            programmes. At present there are no unfilled permanent positions at the BMU. At present, a
            schedule has been developed at the federal level according to which the staff of Directorate
            RS I (see Fig. 8-4 in the National Report) and the corresponding section of the BfS (Office
            of radiation Protection) shall be increased by about 25 persons from different disciplines
            within 3 years. The decision about this will be taken finally for the first step by the
            Parliament in autumn 2008.
63                                            Article 8.1        Section 8.1
Question/   It is mentioned that deliberations have been going on during the reporting period on a
Comment     possible reform of the nuclear administration structure. The effectiveness of the regulatory
            body is to be developed and optimized. What ideas have been discussed so far to that aim?
Answer      The deliberations on a reform of nuclear administration as they were presented at the 2005
            Review Conference are no longer pursued by the Federal Government that has been in


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            office since November 2005. The Federal Government is striving for achieving
            improvements within the existing structures of nuclear administration. In this context,
            especially the results of the 2008 IRRS Mission to Germany – which will review one
            Länder authority as well as the BMU – are to be taken into account.
64                                            Article 8.1        pages 40 - 41
Question/   Young professionals with a nuclear curriculum are rare, as education in nuclear science and
Comment     technology almost disappeared from universities in Europe. In some countries, this situation
            is about to change as nuclear power is being reconsidered as an option for future energy
            needs, whereas Germany's phase-out decision gives a clear signal to students that there will
            be no professional future in this field. As more and more experts are retired and successors
            with the required skills are missing, the federal government and Länder authorities strive to
            improve the staffing situation with human resource development and knowledge
            management measures. Which additional measures will maintain the nuclear safety
            competences at the regulatory body on the long term?
Answer      Also see answer to question 5
            Personnel development and knowledge management are central elements for maintaining
            nuclear safety competence. Additional supporting elements are advanced training and
            organisational measures (e.g. job rotation).
65                                            Article 8.1        Para. 8 (1), page 42
Question/   It is mentioned in the National Report: “For a construction and operating license of a
Comment     nuclear power plant, altogether 2 tenths of a percent of the construction costs have to be
            paid. A modification subject to licensing costs between € 500 and € 500,000”.
            Does it mean that, license could cost between 500 euro and 500,000 euro? Please clarify the
            phrase.
Answer      The cost framework is regulated in the Cost Ordinance under the Atomic Energy Act
            (AtKostV) [1A-21]. The level of fees is generally guided by the respective authority's effort
            needed to grant the licence. In addition, the level of the fee depends on the importance of
            the licence project to the applicant and has to observe the principle of commensurability.
            The cost framework mentioned in the question exclusively refers to modifications that are
            subject to licensing.
66                                            Article 8.1        Page 40, paragraph 4 (see also page 49,
Question/   The report states that “A personnel development concept to ensure personnel levels could
Comment     not be established due to the budgetary boundary conditions.” It goes on “As a first step to
            improve the situation, the BMU has applied for seven new positions within the nuclear
            safety administration for the 2008 federal budget.” It would appear from these statements
            that there are significant financial strains, leading to staff shortages, and yet page 42,
            paragraph 1, says that “There is no refinancing of the activities of the federal nuclear
            authority.” Would it not be advantageous, and consistent with the practice in many other
            Member States, for there to be a mechanism whereby the full costs of the staff of the
            federal nuclear authority could be recovered from the licensees?
Answer      The federal nuclear authority does not supervise the plant operators directly. This task falls
            within the competence of the Länder authorities which are under the supervision of the
            Federation with regard to the lawfulness and expediency of their actions (see National
            Report, p. 14). According to the principles of the German law on fees, no fees can be
            charged to the operators of nuclear installations for this supervision of the federal nuclear
            authority towards the Länder authorities.
67                                            Article 8.2        Page 46, Paragraph 2
Question/   Under “Authorised experts”, the report states that “For the federal supervisory activities,
Comment     the BMU will equally consult national and international experts if necessary. The work of


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          the experts is financed by the plant operators via reimbursement, in some cases directly to
          ease administration.” Based on this statement, please indicate how (actual or perceived)
          conflict of interest would be avoided for federal supervisory activities?
Answer    A conflict of interest for the authorised experts cannot arise by the financing arrangements
          described. The scope of activities of the experts is determined by the competent authority.
          Thus, the competent authority takes its own decision on the costs involved. Therefore, the
          statement that these costs are refinanced by the plant operator and in some cases the work
          of the experts is financed directly to ease administration only applies to the procedure of
          reimbursement but not to the scope of expert consultation.
68                                          Article 8.2       Section 8
Question/ Conformance to the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention is assured in Germany by
Comment independence of regulatory bodies from license holders. The activity of the above license
          holders is managed by different Ministries. However, according to Atomic Energy Act's
          provisions, it is the operating organization that covers all the expenses associated with
          regulation and licensing.
          Can this situation be a source (cause) of insufficient independence of the regulatory body?


Answer    In Germany, the licensee and the plant operator are private companies and are not run by
          ministries.
          The supervisory and licensing authorities work independently and are not subject to any
          influence by the licensee/plant operators, in particular with regard to safety-relevant issues.
          The authorities charge fees for services requested by citizens, organisations or companies.
          In general, the amount of fees depends on the efforts and expenses of the authority
          including expenses for expert opinions. A conflict of interest cannot arise by these
          financing arrangements.
69                                         Article 8.2        Section 8
Question/ Regulatory bodies continue to remain dependent on such technical expert organizations as
Comment GRS or Technical Inspection Agencies. These expert organizations have long-term, proven
          programs for maintaining the required number of staff, experts and their competence. This
          information stated in Section 8 is in no way evaluated.
          Is this growing dependence of the regulatory bodies on independent experts support
          considered to be a significant deficiency?
Answer    There is a large number of experts available to the supervisory authorities coming from
          different expert organisations. The experts are not bound by instructions when performing
          their work. They are only subject to the expert guidelines and the respective contractual
          conditions. The advantage here is the multitude of experts available for specific questions
          and tasks from a large range of disciplines. The supervisory authorities pay attention to the
          independence of the experts and experts organisations commissioned. They are not obliged
          to actually use the expert opinions or to follow the recommendations.
          Should the independence of the authorised expert be questionable or should the expert cross
          the threshold from the technical assessment to the legal judgement, the authority may
          commission other experts at any time. In so far, the dependence on external experts cannot
          generally be regarded as deficiency.
          However, it is a deficiency that, in some cases, the nuclear supervisory authorities do not
          have sufficient technical/scientific personnel staff to assess the expert opinion, which only
          may serve as evidence for determining the actual situation with regard to safety, and to
          draw the conclusions. In these cases, a preponderance of the expert organisations, which do
          not have the democratic legitimation of federal supervision, may result such that they not
          only determine how safe the NPP is, but also decide on whether it is safe enough. A



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          preponderance of expert organisations exists for all German authorities, both for the
          supervisory and licensing authorities of the Länder and for federal supervision.
          Also see answer to question 54.
70                                         Article 9          Chapter 9 P51
Question/ It is written that:’A special German feature is the co-operation of the plant operation in the
Comment VGB PowerTech e. V. (VGB) under whose umbrella research and development work is
          jointly promoted. What is the cooperation mode between VGB and the plant to ensure the
          long standing relationship?
Answer    The German nuclear power plant operators (like all operators of fossil-fired electricity-
          generating plants in Germany, too) are members of VGB PowerTech e.V., the
          technical/rule-making association of the electricity-generating industry in Germany. Under
          its umbrella, the four companies that operate nuclear power plants in Germany have
          imposed on themselves in the special committee on "Plant Technology" the statutory task
          of discussing and adopting nuclear R&D projects with generic objectives. VGB will then
          look after the formal execution of these projects on behalf of these four companies.

            This membership of the nuclear power plant operators in VGB PowerTech e.V. and on the
            special committee on "Plant Technology" and the fact that the above-mentioned targets are
            laid down in the statutes ensures long-lasting co-operation.

            The operators are committed by their own responsibility for the safe operation of the NPPs
            to carry out an exchange of experience at all levels. The co-operation of all operators within
            VGB is a major contribution in this respect.
71                                            Article 9          Chapter 9 P53
Question/   For the proceeding of the plant operators in case of doubts about the management and
Comment     control of design basis accidents, the approaches and deliberations of the plant operators
            were reported. How does the supervisory authority deal with the findings or issues in the
            management and control of a design basis accident?
Answer      The nuclear licensing and supervisory authority
            - examines at short notice and by consulting authorised experts whether the programme
                 of work intended by the licensee for the clarification of the safety issues and for the
                 design of possible remedial measures is sufficient,
            - orders additional measures according to § 19 AtG for a clarification of the facts or for
                 the remediation of the condition or any protective measures to be taken if necessary (→
                 Article 7 (2iv)),
            - decides on the need for ordering any restrictions on operation up to the shutdown of the
                 plant according to § 19 AtG (→ Article 7 (2iv)),
            - checks the prerequisites or needs for modifying or revoking the licence according to §
                 17 AtG to guarantee safety (→ Article 7 (2iv)) and
            - informs the federal nuclear regulatory authority and the nuclear authorities of the other
                 Länder so that they can initiate, if necessary, any suitable measures within their
                 responsibilities to ensure safety.
            Further details on this issue can be found in the answer to Question 6.
72                                            Article 9          p.52
Question/   The report describes among others, how a radiation protection officer and his supervisor
Comment     should communicate in writing about their possible disagreements.
            How often has the competent authority been informed about such disagreements?
Answer      Neither the German competent authorities nor the licensees are aware of any case where
            this final means of a radiation protection officer had to be applied. It is common
            understanding in the sense of a developed safety culture to follow the proposals of the


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          radiation protection officer.
73                                   Article 9         p.53, 54
Question/ regulatory review:
Comment What determines a major change of plant personnel organization?

          Handling of doubt about the management and control of design basis accidents:
          There seems to be disagreement between regulator and licensees about the handling of such
          matters. At least it is quite interesting to know on what criteria the licensee will base its
          decision on to shut down the plant.
Answer    1.)
          According to § 7 para. 1 of the Atomic Energy Act, any major modification of the operation
          of a nuclear installation is subject to licensing. This also applies to any major modifications
          of the organisation of personnel. For example, organisational changes due to the merger of
          companies and the related changes with regard to the person holding the licence also fall
          regularly under the licensing requirement.


          2.)
          If there is any doubt regarding the capability of accident control, the licensee carries out an
          engineering assessment of the information, with consideration of operating experience and
          the known plant behaviour. If there is any doubt regarding the control of design basis
          accidents, the licensee will at short notice
           - order a working programme for the further clarification of the issue and, if necessary,
               for devising remedial measures,
           - inform the supervisory authority about it, and
           - decide whether the plant has to be shut down.

          When deciding upon whether to shut the plant down, the licensee will be guided by his
          supreme company principle, namely that safety of the nuclear power plants is the highest
          priority. He will therefore only refrain from shutting the plant down in such situations if the
          information and the knowledge available allow plant operation to continue without this
          company principle being violated.

          The nuclear licensing and supervisory authority
          - examines at short notice and by consulting authorised experts whether the programme
             of work intended by the licensee for the clarification of the safety issues and for the
             design of possible remedial measures is sufficient,
          - orders additional measures according to § 19 AtG for a clarification of the facts or for
             the remediation of the condition or any protective measures to be taken if necessary (→
             Article 7 (2iv)),
          - decides on the need for ordering any restrictions on operation up to the shutdown of the
             plant according to § 19 AtG (→ Article 7 (2iv)),
          - checks the prerequisites or needs for modifying or revoking the licence according to §
             17 AtG to guarantee safety (→ Article 7 (2iv)) and
          - informs the federal nuclear regulatory authority and the nuclear authorities of the other
             Länder so that they can initiate, if necessary, any suitable measures within their
             responsibilities to ensure safety.

          The authority bases all its decisions on the safety principle according to which safety must
          have priority over all other considerations.



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74                                           Article 9        p.55
Question/ Progress and changes since 2004, Future activities:
Comment In which way is the safety management system self learning? Is this aspect of self learning
          an automated feature?
Answer    The management system works in accordance with ISO 9000 on the basis of a PDCA cycle
          (plan, do, check, act). All other processes work also on this basis -"automatical" feedbacks
          are produced for improvements (self learning process; continuously improved process).
          Examples for the self learning of processes are the structured application of audits, reviews,
          indicators or experience feedback.
75                                           Article 9        page 55
Question/ The report states that
Comment “A concept was presented which provides that
          − the operators with power plant activities at the international group level accelerate
          the internal flow of information on events with safety relevance. Information potentially
          relevant for German plants shall be provided directly to other German plant operators.
          − by means of the international reporting system NEWS of the IAEA all nuclear
          power plants are informed by own initiative about safety-relevant events within 48 hours
          without waiting for an assessment by the regulatory authority. The information shall
          generally be accompanied with a qualified report to serve as a basis for an in-depth plant
          specific review for applicability to other plants or, if necessary, for initiation and
          performance of first measures.
          Assessment and forwarding functions of this new international reporting system of the plant
          operators shall be performed centrally at the nuclear reactor manufacturer AREVA.
          According to a preliminary assessment by the BMU, these new reporting structures of the
          plant operators present a qualitative enhancement which may substantially improve the
          reaction of the plant operators to safety-relevant events.”
          •Is the principle of classifying events by their radiological consequences right for the
          purpose of further accident prevention? This approach results in giving very low ranking to
          those events which could be precursors of large accidents and were just stopped short of
          accident due to lucky circumstances. Should we not change the approach to the ranking of
          information meant to be exchanged among operators?
Answer    Germany follows the INES approach. The assessment of actual or potential radiological
          consequences has been demonstrated to be a valid method to decide upon the fast
          distribution on information about the related event to other organisations and the public.
          But the radiological consequences are not the only aspect to assess the safety significance
          of an event. Furthermore, an in-depth evaluation of events and the entire operating
          experience has to be performed. The results of these in-depth studies will also be distributed
          to the respective organisations. In most cases these studies are not published since their
          content is very technical and may include restricted information.
76                                           Article 9        page 55
Question/ The report presents correct principles of reporting nuclear incidents. However, in practice
Comment they are not always implemented. For example in the case of a fire in Krummel NPP in
          June 2007 the press published very unfavourable reports on the reports of the nuclear
          industry.
          In case of a fire at Vattenfall's Kruemmel site June 28 2007 “the plant operator's claim that
          a fire in the transformer had no effect on the reactor itself proved to be a lie” (Spiegel) On
          Wednesday, the chief executive of Vattenfall Europe AG stepped down. Klaus Rauscher
          was the second manager to depart this week amid mounting criticism for the utility's
          handling of a fire at a nuclear plant in northern Germany, reports the AP. "When it comes
          to security at nuclear power plants, I can only say, that when it comes to the information


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          policy, this really has not been acceptable and therefore my sympathy for the industry is
          limited," Chancellor Angela Merkel said. Merkel, a physicist by training, normally favors
          nuclear power, but the June 28 fire at the Kruemmel plant, near Hamburg, has put the
          industry in a bad light. (Spiegel on line )
          •Could you clarify for us the real impact of the fire and the reasons why the press believed
          that the public was misinformed?
Answer    The featured article mentioned above reports about the progress in connection with the
          introduction of a reporting system run by the operators themselves that is to ensure that
          there is a fast flow of information in case of any international events in nuclear installations
          with relevance to the safety of German plants. This reporting system was not relevant in
          connection with the transformer fire at the Kruemmel NPP in June 2007.

          Apart from that, the operator's statement to the general public quoted in your question,
          which said that the transformer fire had had no effect on the reactor, did in fact turn out to
          be wrong afterwards. For example, during the event, reactor scram was triggered, the RPV
          level dropped due to the loss of operational feedwater supply - which actuated steam line
          isolation – and fumes entered the control room, which was caused by the erroneous
          activation of the ventilation system. Furthermore, the inadvertent manual opening of two
          safety and relief valves caused a rapid pressure drop inside the reactor from 70 to 20 bar
          within 4 minutes.

          The Vattenfall utility, which operates the plant, was criticised by the competent supervisory
          authority as well by representatives of the other German nuclear power plant operators for
          its information behaviour towards the general public in this event. Vattenfall itself admitted
          that mistakes had been made and presented among other things a catalogue of more than 50
          individual measures for improvements in the areas of technology, organisation,
          administration and staff training as well as information of the general public.

          Short description of the event sequence:
          On 28/06/2007 at 15:02 h, a short circuit in one of the two generator transformers of the
          Kruemmel BWR led to a fire. The electrical protection systems isolated the short circuit
          and actuated a switch-over to the reserve grid, which resulted in a reactor scram.
          The reserve grid ensured the power supply of the plant so that no emergency diesel
          generator had to start. After the switch to the reserve grid, a failure in the automatic
          program to re-establish operational feedwater led to a loss of operational feedwater supply.
          Because of the decrease of the coolant level in the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor
          protection system actuated steam line isolation as well as the start-up of the first high-
          pressure reactor core cooling system at about 10 min after the beginning of the event.
          About 14 min after the beginning of the event, two safety and relief valves were opened
          manually for about 4 min due to a communication problem among shift personnel. The
          pressure in the reactor decreased to about 20 bar. As a result the coolant level in the reactor
          pressure vessel decreased further until the reactor protection system started up the second
          high-pressure reactor core cooling system. Subsequently, the coolant level in the reactor
          pressure vessel rose to 14.07 m within 6 min. One of the high-pressure core cooling
          systems was then automatically switched off, and the other one was automatically
          switched-over to minimum flow operation.
          The plant was afterwards brought into the status cold shutdown.
          The fire fighting was done by on-site and external fire brigades. The fire was under control
          at about 17:00 h. At 22:00 h, the fire fighting operations ended, but the complete
          suppression of the fire inside the transformer took several days.
          No safety systems had been affected by the fire, but fumes reached the control room


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            because gases were transported via the ventilation system. No critical concentration of
            CO2/CO was reached.
            The event was rated as level 0 in the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
            Although all safety systems worked as designed, there are several actions that will be taken
            by the operator of the NPP. The control of the ventilation system for the main control room
            as well as the restart of the operational feedwater after a switch-over to the reserve grid will
            be improved. Other measures of the plant operator are intended to improve the
            communication among shift personnel during an event. An improvement of the operating
            manual is also intended.
77                                            Article 9        page 51
Question/   Could you please provide more information on the jointly commissioned development of a
Comment     system for integral event analysis under consideration of human errors and possibilities for
            organisational optimisation.
Answer      Learning from operational experience is an essential element of nuclear safety.
            Occurrences, incidents and near misses are an important starting point to optimise safe
            operation. In order to make this improvement potential accessible, VGB has in co-operation
            with the Research Center for System Safety at the Technical University Berlin developed
            the methodology SOL (Safety through Organizational Learning). SOL enables the
            systematic analysis of safety relevant events in order to facilitate comprehensive learning
            from operational experience. SOL systematically identifies weaknesses in the main
            organisational sub-systems technology, individual, teams, organisation and organisational
            environment as well as in the interfaces between these sub-systems. The opportunities for
            "learning from events" are effectively increased through SOL. SOL has been tested in
            different industries over many years with great success in preventing losses and to optimise
            economic outputs. SOL continues to be successfully applied internationally in nuclear
            power plants. SOL is available as software. The operating organisations use this software as
            standard application for the analysis of events in all German nuclear power plants.
78                                            Article 9        Section 9 (p. 55)
Question/   The Section mentions that the plant operators informed about conceptual deliberations on
Comment     how they intend to react in case of doubts about the management and control of design
            basis accidents.
            Does that mean that currently the operators have no guidance as to how they should act if
            they have doubts regarding the adopted practice of design basis accident management?
Answer      See national report, Article 9, p. 53 and the answers to questions 6 and 71.
79                                            Article 10       Chapter 10 P57
Question/   According to the report, German nuclear power plants have developed a safety management
Comment     system based on the process control to quantify safety in various domains by the practice of
            self-assessment, audits, management review and the application of IAEA indicators. What
            specific areas do you quantify? How do you implement the measures for continuous
            improvement?
Answer      See answers to Questions 74 and 83.

            For example, one German operator has introduced about 180 indicators for the total of
            approx. 70 processes of his safety management system. These measure the results of the
            processes as well as the way how they are performed. Some of these indicators were
            prescribed by the competent Länder authority. These are mainly indicators relating to the
            overall safety performance of the power plants (e.g. "number of reactor scrams", "number
            of reportable events", "number of unplanned unavailabilities of safety systems") as well as
            indicators relating to documentation (number and duration of "red entries") and experience
            feedback (duration of dealing with Information Notices, reportable events...). The operator


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            is aiming for a sensible reduction of the number of indicators as some of them have only
            little validity and others can only be determined with much manual effort.
80                                            Article 10        p.57
Question/   The Licensees use the indicator systems based on IAEA TECDOC-1141. Does the
Comment     Regulatory Body ("länder authorities") use any kind of indicators for assessing the safety
            performance of Licensees? If yes, is this regulatory indicator system comparable or
            identical with the Licensees'?
Answer      The Länder authorities are at present gathering first experience with the use of safety
            performance indicators. The indicators used are partly indicators that are collected by the
            licensee and reported to the authority. Others are indicators collected by the authority itself.
            For example, the nuclear authority of the state of Baden-Württemberg applies approx. 70
            indicators. Of these, approx. 40 are communicated to the authority by the licensee. The
            remaining 30 or so indicators are obtained by the authority from the official evaluation of
            events, from inspections, and from operators' reports. The evaluation of the indicators is
            aimed at the early detection of changes. The causes of such changes cannot usually be
            derived from the indicator itself; the indicator merely 'indicates' possible changes. If there is
            such an indication, the cause is established in talks with the operator or by means of in-
            depth analysis.
81                                            Article 10        p.59
Question/   Progress and Changes Since 2004
Comment     It is mentioned about process description and general indicators in page 59.
            Please tell us more in detail about “process description”, “general indicators” in German
            Safety management system. How is “general indicator” different from “performance
            indicator”?
Answer      When management systems were introduced at the German nuclear power plants, the first
            phase included the establishment of safety performance indicators that were adopted from
            IAEA TECDOC 1141 or had already been used for exchanging experiences among
            WANO. In the time that followed, the nuclear power plants organised their working
            sequences in processes in the sense of a process approach according to DIN EN ISO
            9001:2000. The process descriptions regulate e.g. what starts the process, what input
            parameters are used, and what output is generated by the process. The individual steps are
            defined in a graphical process representation. Special decision criteria are listed for
            decision-making. The processes are monitored by process supervisors. One important
            monitoring instrument are process indicators. They are used to monitor individual
            subprocesses or whether the process result has been achieved. As these process indicators
            are more sensitive to changes and give early indications, the nuclear power plants use such
            process indicators increasingly for monitoring safety performance and the effectiveness of
            the management system. This is meant by the passage in the CNS report which says that
            general indicators (from IAEA TECDOC 1141 and WANO) have been developed plant-
            specifically (by using process indicators).
82                                            Article 10        p.58
Question/   VGB-SBS:
Comment     What can be said about the performance and main results of the VGB-SBS?
Answer      See also answer to question 86.
            Confidentiality is an essential prerequisite of the effectiveness of VGB-SBS. The results of
            these evaluations are therefore not accessible to the public. This is in accordance with a
            demand of the work councils of the NPPs.
83                                            Article 10        Article 10, Page 57
Question/   The process-based safety management at the nuclear power plants uses safety indicators


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Comment based on IAEA TECDOC-1141 as an additional internal management instrument. To what
          extent performance indicators are used, by the BMU or the Lander supervisory authorities,
          to assess the safety performance of a licensed reactor? What indicators are used? Do they
          influence inspection program?
Answer    The nuclear supervisory authorities of the Länder are informed by the licensees about the
          relevant results of safety culture assessments. To assess the safety culture of the nuclear
          power plants under supervision, the Länder supervisory authorities also make use of the
          safety indicators applied by the licensees. These include in particular indicators regarding
          the smooth or careful operation of the plant, such as various criteria for the recording of
          forced load reductions and standstills, for the recording of system and component
          conditions and especially incident-induced and ageing-related deviations and events, and
          for the recording of events, such as reportable events and significant disturbances.
          Furthermore, they also include indicators relating to operation at low risk. Here, indicators
          are important that can provide information about the number and trend of safety system
          challenges as well as those that concern the ability to control events, such as for the
          recording of safety system performance, personnel skills and emergency preparedness, and
          finally those concerning risk. The third major group of indicators is to cover the necessary
          positive safety attitude of the operation. It is about questions of attitude towards safety and
          the striving for improvement. The results of the assessment of safety culture also have an
          influence on the supervision programme. Any deficiencies and potential improvements
          identified are paid special attention in this programme.
          See also answer to Question 80.
84                                            Article 10       page 57
Question/ Could you please provide examples of positive results/trends observed following the
Comment implementation of process based safety management systems by the licensees? Are all
          licensees systematically using the safety indicators based on IAEA TECDOC-1141?
Answer    (1) The systematic process-based management system enhances transparency of interaction
          of organisational units. It allows an early detection of irregularities.
          (2) All NPPs are using safety indicators based on IAEA TECDOC-1141 systematically.
          Systematically using means that the whole set of indicator areas of TECDOC-1141 is
          considered. However, the individual indicators are partially modified and/or redefined in
          order to use them in an effective manner and to avoid misinterpretations.
85                                            Article 10
Question/ If the regulatory bodies find that financial investments in safety assurance measures are
Comment insufficient, they can issue an appropriate directive requiring to increase funding.
          If, due to certain circumstances, the operating organization is unable to provide the required
          investments in safety assurance, then in what way can the Regulator influence such a
          situation besides issuing directives?
Answer    According to §7 para. 2 no. 3 AtG, a licence for a nuclear installation may only be granted
          if the necessary precaution against damage has been taken in line with the state of the art in
          science and technology. This also requires that the licensees have to provide sufficient
          financial resources over the period of operation of the installations to guarantee their safety.
          If this prerequisite is not fulfilled, the competent authority can revoke the operating licence.
86                                            Article 10       Section 10.1
Question/ Information is given about the work on safety culture performed by the licensees. Are there
Comment any dedicated safety culture programs at the plants aiming at building and developing the
          safety culture? Are any safety culture indicators being used? Please explain.
Answer    (1) The safety culture evaluation system (VGB-SBS) is an element of the safety culture
          program. Each application of this system is accompanied by information meetings and
          follow-up workshops.


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            (2) Indicators are based on IAEA TECDOC-1141 safety indicators. TECDOC-1141 defines
            so-called "safety attributes". One of these attributes describes the safety culture (operate
            with a positive safety attitude). This attributes are assigned to specific indicators for
            example "percentage of events due to a human error".
87                                             Article 11.1       Chapter 11(1) P61
Question/   The German operators make extensive investments to maintain and further enhance the
Comment     safety level of nuclear power plants over the past years. How can the operators get enough
            financial expense for these investments?
Answer      The refinancing of past investments is ensured by the returns from the sale of the electricity
            produced in the German nuclear power plants.
88                                             Article 11.1       p.61
Question/   "Review by the authority":
Comment     What determines a legal form change to be essential? Has this been written in the law?
Answer      The term "essential modification" was introduced into the Atomic Energy Act as a vague
            legal term and was only put in concrete terms through jurisdiction as follows.
            The modification of a licensed installation according to § 7 AtG or the modification of its
            licensed operation is deemed essential and therefore subject to licensing if the intended
            modification according to its kind and/or extent appears to have the potential of affecting
            the safety aspects mentioned in the licensing requirements of § 7 para. 2 AtG and thus, "as
            it were, of raising the licensing issue anew." Here it does not play any role whether the
            individual modification will improve or downgrade the safety level of the plant. It is not the
            results (positive/negative) of the evaluation but its cause that is decisive.
89                                             Article 11.1       Para. 11 (2), page 61
Question/   Ukraine has faced in practice with the set of problems in ensuring the necessary level of
Comment     nuclear safety at the Chernobyl NPP after adoption of the political decision about its shut
            down. Those problems have both technical (reasonability to fulfil the safety upgrade
            measures) and human (motivation of work for the administration and the staff of the NPP)
            nature.
            In some sense the situation in Germany looks like similar taking into account the strategic
            political decision to get rid of utilization of the nuclear energy.

          What is the policy and due to which measures the Germany’s Government solves the
          problems connected with the motivation of personnel and its attraction to the work in
          nuclear energy sector?
Answer    German NPPs are operated by large private entities, which are well known as attractive
          employers. NPPs have, up to now, no problems to attract capable people to work in their
          companies.
90                                         Article 11.2       page 63
Question/ It seems that the age distribution of personnel with technical know how at the German
Comment NPPs shows a particular important drop for the age group between 25 and 35 years. What
          are the reasons for having such a small representation of this age group? Would Germany
          not consider it important for future safety considerations and know how management to
          reinforce this age group?
Answer    The chart with age distribution reflects the situation at the Biblis NPP. One must keep in
          mind that German engineers leave university at an age of 30. Having the choice as very
          attractive employers, NPPs often prefer to engage experienced personnel of suppliers or
          contractors, what also explains the comparable low number of staff aged 25 to 35.
91                                         Article 11.2       p.62
Question/ Sufficiency of staff:


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Comment Most text is in this section is about the qualification of staff, sufficiency of staff gets less
          attention. The report states that during the licensing phase and major staff reductions, the
          sufficiency of staff is reviewed.
          Is the sufficiency of staff also reviewed and reported during the ‘normal’ operation phase?
          If so which form and frequency does this review have?
Answer    In German nuclear power plants, the organisational charts as well as the responsible
          persons and their area of responsibility are documented in the personnel operational
          organisation (PBO). The PBO is a licensing document and part of the safety specifications.
          Changes in the organisational charts or the responsible persons are communicated to the
          regulator. A substantial change of the PBO requires regulatory approval.
92                                           Article 11.2     p.61
Question/ “Implementation and measure of the plant operators (according to their own statement)”
Comment The NPPs in operation in Germany are run by private companies.
          Are there any requirements applicable for the owners of NPPs, for instance requirements
          regarding commitments to principles like "priority to safety"?
Answer    All German utilities committed themselves to giving absolute priority to safety, for instance
          in high level management documents (see also Art. 9).
93                                           Article 11.2
Question/ KTA 3501 safety standard requires that any personnel actions for manual management of
Comment an emergency situation should be initiated not earlier than 30 minutes after its occurrence.
          Does that mean that the operator cannot activate reactor emergency protection (scram)
          system earlier even if the initiating event has been identified?
Answer    The concept of the reactor protection system design includes the automatic control of
          design basis accidents for a period of at least 30 minutes (see also KTA 3501) without the
          need of any manual action. In the case of abnormal operation or design basis accidents, the
          aim of this concept is to ensure efficient time to diagnose the situation and take appropriate
          actions. Of course, the reactor trip button can be actuated by the operator at any time, if
          needed, as well as any other measures to control the accident.
94                                           Article 12
Question/ 1. Do the German NPPs plan to modernize/digitalize their control rooms?
Comment
Answer    A comprehensive and stepwise modernisation programme of the whole instrumentation and
          control systems (I&C system) of the German NPPs was initiated and is currently underway.
          The applied state of the art of inserted I&C systems are digital software-based systems (e.g.
          modern process computers) with screen-based and menu-driven handling. In a second step,
          the necessity of modernisation of the control room will be evaluated.
95                                           Article 12
Question/ 2. Is the integral human performance assessment programme developed for all NPP sites?
Comment How many persons are assigned to that activity at each NPP?
Answer    (1)The human performance assessment programme started in the middle of the 90s and is
          applied in all NPPs.
          (2) In each NPP, several employees are occasionally involved in holistic event analyses and
          human factor methods.
96                                           Article 12
Question/ 3. What percentage of operational events at NPPs is caused by human errors? Who
Comment undertakes the detailed analyses of events caused by human errors?
Answer    (1) The percentage of human errors of the reportable events of the last 10 years amounts to
          approximately 20 %.
          (2) In each NPP, several employees are involved in detailed events analyses.


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            For special events of particular importance, external experts were consulted for analyses.
97                                            Article 12
Question/   How does your regulatory body assess organizational changes with regard to human
Comment     factors?
Answer      Changes in the organisation are subject to examination by the nuclear licensing and
            supervisory authority as part of the nuclear licensing procedure according to § 7 AtG in the
            case of essential changes (→ Article 7 (2ii)) or as part of the nuclear supervisory procedure
            in the case of non-essential changes (→ Article 7 (2iii)). These examinations also extend to
            human factors to ensure that the possibilities and limits of human acting are sufficiently
            taken into account in the changing of the organisation. In the examinations, special
            attention is paid to whether function and authorisation are matched correctly.
98                                            Article 12        p.67
Question/   Does the Regulatory Body ("länder authorities") have requirements of methodology for
Comment     examination/assessment of events with human or management errors?
Answer      The nuclear supervisory authorities are held to apply generally accepted procedures and
            methods for the examination of safety-relevant issues or to demand their use from the
            nuclear power plant operators in verification procedures and from the authorised experts
            consulted in nuclear assessment procedures. In line with the state of the art in science and
            technology, reviews of the socio-technical overall Man-Technology-Organisation system
            are carried out if faults have occurred to which human error or mistakes by management
            may have contributed (→ Chapter 18 (iii)). To do this, generally accepted methods from
            work science are applied, such as the "SOL – safety through organisational learning"
            method, which is based on developments of the Institute of Psychology and Work Science –
            Work, Engineering and Organisational Psychology – at the Berlin Institute of Technology.
            See also answer to Question 77.
99                                            Article 12        page 69
Question/   Regarding regulatory activites in the HF field, emphasis is put particularly on event
Comment     analysis. What kind of oversight activities are performed concerning the operators' Human
            Factors Engineering activities and programmes for plant modifications/modernisations and
            design and implementation of new systems?
Answer      As already described in connection with Article 12, the regulatory reviews within the
            framework of the nuclear licensing and supervisory procedures for construction and
            modification of the plant or its operation, as far as this is in the scope of the modification,
            and for the verification of safety (see Article 14), of course also extend to the
            implementation of and compliance with the requirements on the man-machine interface and
            human factors engineering. Moreover, further requirements on concepts of an integrated
            design of the socio-technical overall system man-technology-organisation (MTO) are
            imposed in the nuclear licensing and supervisory procedures and in the course of safety
            verifications (see Article 18 (iii)).
100                                           Article 13        Page 72, Paragraph 2
Question/   Under “Implementation/measures”, the report states that “Any detected gaps and
Comment     deficiencies [in quality assurance] are communicated immediately.” What are the areas that
            have experienced gaps and deficiencies in the past reporting period and what were the
            corresponding remedial actions initiated?
Answer      Aim of communication of gaps and deficiencies is the optimisation of the quality
            management system of the contractor. Operators and contractors (together) try to find
            solutions to improve the product of the contractor - training courses, sensitisation for safety
            of NPPs and efficient operational sequences.




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101                                         Article 13       Chapter 13
Question/ How is the effectiveness of the internal audits assured in the nuclear power plants ? Could
Comment you please give some examples of previous audit findings to demonstrate the effectiveness
          of the audits performed by some staff units.
Answer    An audit is a systematic, independent review aiming at determination of facts and their
          objective evaluation. Persons executing may not have direct responsibility for the issue of
          the audit (independence). The effectiveness of internal audits is assured by comprehensive
          staff qualification for auditing, performing of audits by staff across-the-sites of the utility
          and detailed audit reports covering derived measures. The reports have to be submitted to
          the top management and the realisation of measures is based on and monitored by
          corrective action programmes.

            Audits are applied typically on the management system, on processes or on products,
            including services.

            Examples of previous audit findings:
            - Optimisation of check list for fuel element handling,
            - improved effectiveness check of training course measures,
            - optimised supplier report system,
            - improved collection of reliability data of components.
102                                          Article 13          Chapter 13
Question/   From which aspects does the supervisory authority assess internal audits’ results from each
Comment     nuclear power plant ?
Answer      As explained in the CNS Report, the licensees regularly review the effectiveness of their
            QA systems by internal audits within their responsibility for the safe operation of the
            nuclear power plants in Germany.
            Within the framework of their overseeing function, the supervisory authorities are informed
            by the licensees about the results of these plant-specific internal audits which monitor
            compliance with the requirements of KTA 1401 and ISO 9001:2000. In particular, the audit
            results or necessary improvements established in this connection are communicated. Any
            necessary improvements or anomalies to be eliminated that were uncovered during the
            internal audit are defined in an action plan that is subject to monitoring of the dates. The
            effectiveness of the measures has to be demonstrated and is checked. To this end, the
            supervisory authority, within the framework of its overseeing function, demands report on
            the progress of executing the action plan, on the keeping of the planned realisation
            deadlines, and on the effectiveness of the measures. For this purpose, the supervisory
            authority may carry out its own examinations during on-site inspections.
103                                          Article 13
Question/   Are the licensees taking any action to implement integrated management systems in line
Comment     with IAEA GS-R-3 requirements?
Answer      A further optimised standard for safety management is developed for German NPPs in the
            framework of the VGB. The IAEA standard GS-R-3 is one of the international documents
            that VGB has considered.
104                                          Article 13          page 72
Question/   Does the safety authority take any credit of the existence of an ISO-9001 certificate in its
Comment     supervisory activities?
Answer      In this respect, no general statement can be made. Basically, however, aspects for which
            management systems are available are subjected to random reviews. Thus, effectiveness is
            reviewed and potential deficiencies are identified.


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105                                         Article 14.1
Question/ § 14 (i) describes in the subparagraph on “Safety review” the status with regard to Periodic
Comment Safety Review (explaining that the term “Periodic” is no longer applicable in view of the
          limited lifetime of the plants). From the description of the Safety Review (page 78) it might
          be deduced that the analyses are mainly focusing on accident analysis and accident
          management measures. However, international guidance, in particular the IAEA Safety
          Guide NS-G-2.10, foresees a much wider scope of topics to be considered for the (Periodic)
          Safety Review. Are the Safety Reviews presently performed for the German NPPs still in
          line with, for instance, this IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.10?
Answer    In Germany, safety reviews are performed on the basis of the periodic safety review
          guidelines (see Art. 14 (1), p. 78). The relevant internationally published recommendations,
          among them also those of the IAEA, have been considered adequately in the PSR
          guidelines regarding the objectives and scope of the analysis and review areas. See also
          answer to question 106.
106                                         Article 14.1      p. 77
Question/ Would you please provide more detailed information with regard to the national standard
Comment criteria used in the performance of periodic safety review (developed in the 90ies or new)?
          Please provide reference to a document if existing.
Answer    See also answer to question 17.
          The detailed requirements of the PSR documents are to be found under the Internet address
          http://www.bfs.de/de/bfs/recht/rsh/englisch.html/#2 under reference number 08/97 and
          08/05.
107                                         Article 14.1      p. 80
Question/ What is the weight factor of the reviews and assessments carried out by the authorized by
Comment the regulator external experts in the course of decision making and how is their expertise
          (opinion) integrated in the final statement of the regulator?
Answer    The supervisory authority always consults experts with a high degree of expertise, ensures
          that the analyses and expert opinions are of high quality and gives them due consideration
          in its decisions.
108                                         Article 14.1      Page 79, last paragraph
Question/ Under “Probabilistic safety analyses”, the report states that “the removal of deficiencies and
Comment improvements of the balance of the precautionary measures led to an increase in safety …”
          How was this increase in safety measured, and what criteria have been used?
Answer    After development of measures on the basis of the PSA, a reduction in the frequency of
          hazard and core damage states due to reassessment could be identified in several cases.
109                                         Article 14.1      Section 14-(i). p. 78
Question/ (Article 14-1, Section 14-(i). p. 78)
Comment 1) Please provide the detailed deterministic safety assessments based on a spectrum of
          accident management measures to cope with beyond-design basis conditions.
          2) For the management of the accident which is beyond design basis conditions
          - What kinds of countermeasures do you have?
          - How do you apply these countermeasures to existing NPPs in operation?
Answer    1.)
          Deterministic safety assessments of representative sequences of beyond design basis
          accidents have been performed within the regulatory research activities on behalf of the
          Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) by GRS. They already started in the early
          80s. The early analyses have been a part of the German Risk Study Phase B. Examples of
          preventive measures developed are bleed and feed in PWRs (backfitting of pressuriser
          safety and relief valves including I&C), and pressure limitation measures in BWRs


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           (installation of additional diverse pressure limitation valves) were analysed. An example of
           a mitigative measure developed is the passive autocatalytic recombiner concept to limit
           hydrogen concentration inside the containment during beyond design basis accidents. All
           measures had been recommended by the German Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) and
           were implemented in the German NPPs on a voluntary basis.
           The German accident management concept and countermeasures applied in German NPPs
           are described in the German National Report of 2004, chapter 18 (i) “Safety Concept”.

           2.)
           For the following main emergency situations, technical emergency measures have been
           developed to supplement the accident management manual:
           - Ensuring core cooling in PWR plants (e.g. secondary- and primary-side bleed and
               feed),
           - ensuring core cooling and RPV integrity in BWR plants (e.g. independent injection
               system, diversitary pressure limitation, additional possibility for injection and fill-up of
               the RPV),
           - ensuring integrity of the containment vessel and activity retention for PWR and BWR
               plants (e.g. assured containment isolation, filtered depressurisation of the containment
               vessel, limitation of hydrogen concentration in the containment or inertisation with
               nitrogen, supply-air filtering for the main control room, sampling system for
               containment vessel),
           - ensuring emergency power supply for PWR and BWR plants (e.g. connection to
               neighbouring plant unit, increased capacity of batteries, restoration of grid supply,
               additional mains supply via underground cable).
           Moreover, a number of further measures have been introduced on the basis of plant- or
           type-specific boundary conditions that support the achievement of the protection goals in
           emergency situations.
           Until today, nearly all measures have been installed.

          In emergency situation, i.e. if the design-basis condition of the plant is exceeded due to the
          event sequence and the provisions of the operating manual are not applicable, transition to
          the accident management manual takes place via an interface. The accident management
          manual includes the specifications on the application of the emergency measures.
110                                         Article 14.1     Section 14(i), p. 79
Question/ (Article 14-1, Section 14(i), p. 79)
Comment 1) Provide the plant risk levels of the level-1, low power and shutdown, and fire PSA for
          the operating NPPs.
          2) It is mentioned that PSAs in Germany have led to technical and procedural
          improvements at the plants.
          - Does the Germany have the acceptable criteria(like risk safety goal) limiting the risk level
          of each NPP?
          - What kinds of action could be taken if the risk level does not meet the suggested
          acceptable level?
Answer    1.)
          Compared with the IAEA recommendation, the PSA results for power operation from the
          PSRs that were carried out generally show values that are lower by approx. one order of
          magnitude, e.g. with regard to the cumulated frequency of core damage states.

           The PSA results for low-power and shutdown operation as well as for fire events are of
           about the same order of magnitude as for power operation, or they are even lower.



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            2.)
            - Regarding the frequency of damage states that are determined as results from a PSA for
                 low-power and shutdown operation, there are no probabilistic acceptance criteria laid
                 down in the German regulations.
                 The German operators are guided by the international recommendations for
                 probabilistic safety criteria formulated by the IAEA (see Safety Guide NS-G-1.2,
                 IAEA, 2001) with the aim to stay clearly below the recommended values of the
                 probabilistic safety criteria.
            - Any deficiencies detected in the past have led to improvement measures, especially
                 also with regard to fire events in older-type BWR plants.
111                                             Article 14.1    p.79
Question/   Probabilistic safety assessment:
Comment     Given that the PSAs are part of the PSRs , did the outcomes play any role in the large
            investments for safety in German plants? (see article 11, page 61; e.g. 45% of € 940
            millions for optimization of safety of Biblis)
Answer      German regulation allows the use of PSA results for the assessment of necessity and
            urgency of measures to address PSR findings. Basically, PSAs have identified many
            necessary safety improvements which, in general, have been implemented. So the outcomes
            of PSA played, if any, a secondary role in the investments for safety.
            The quoted investments have been performed not in direct consequence of PSAs.
*                                               Article 14.1    Section 14, Page 74
Question/   Germany may like to provide some more detail about the safety assessment during
Comment     Operation. Kindly provide information about the documents which are used as a basis for
            the safety assessments and how the findings/ observations of the inspections are classified?
Answer      Safety assessment is described on p. 76-77 “Safety assessments in the supervisory
            procedure“ of the National Report.
112                                             Article 14.1    (page 74)
Question/   In order to prevent impairment of water suction from the containment sump, measures were
Comment     performed to optimise sump suction under the condition that the sump water contains
            insulation material. After experimental verification that the penetration of insulation
            material through sump strainers with smaller mesh size is significantly less, new strainers
            were installed at German PWR plants. An additional measure was the use of optimised
            insulations material, in particular avoidance of the use of both particulate and fibrous
            insulation material.
            With regard to loss-of-coolant accidents with release of insulation material, the issue of
            attachment of microparticles to the fibrous insulation material at sump strainers and the
            resulting increase of flow resistance and pressure losses is currently of importance.
            Analyses on this issue are performed in response to the RSK statement of July 2004.
            … To this end, it is planned to switch off the emergency core cooling and residual heat
            removal pumps for a short period and to perform a backflushing of the strainers to remove
            the depositions.
            It is not clear, why the issue of sump strainer clogging was identified for German PWRs as
            late as July 2004, although it had been known to be a serious safety issue in WWER 213
            and WWER 1000 units already in the beginning of 90-ies, as shown in the IAEA “WWER
            safety issue books”. Moreover, German –French technical support organisation Riskaudit,
            which is a joint company of French IRSN and German GRS, has been supporting Russian
            and Ukrainian NPPs in their efforts to solve the sump clogging problems within TACIS
            program over the last decade. For example, the TACIS project OSA Project R1.01/96C,
            entitled ”Supply and Installation of Filtration Equipment for Inlet of Pumps in Emergency
            Core Cooling Systems for 4 Units (VVER 1000)”, was concerned with the modernisation


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          of the ECCS pump suction filtering devices of Balakovo NPP, Units 1, 2, 3 and 4. It was
          proposed in 1996. The corresponding licensing related assessment was then performed in
          the frame of the Tacis Project No RF/TS/31 by SEC NRS (Russian TSO) and by Riskaudit.
          The project was then implemented and completed. Similar projects have been realised in
          several other NPPs in Russia and Ukraine. So Riskaudit was dealing with the issue already
          in the past century. Why the decision to deal with it in Germany was taken so late?
Answer    The information given on p.85 in the National Report relates to major backfitting measures
          in German NPPs since 2003. Concerning the sump clogging issue, an outline of the
          ongoing activities is given there. The RSK statement of July 2004 is mentioned in this
          context as a basis for the topical investigations in this field. Earlier RSK statements and
          backfitting activities are not part of this Convention report.
          The international experience on sump performance was thoroughly checked in Germany
          starting from the US Safety Issue (1979) and particularly after the Barseback event 1992.
          Germany participated actively in the preparation of the “Knowledge Base Report” by NEA
          and the follow-up works.
          National investigations on the sump clogging issue are performed since 1993 for German
          BWRs with large scale experiments and first backfits. Intensified investigations for PWRs
          started in 1997.
          A first comprehensive RSK statement on the problem was already issued in 1998.
113                                          Article 14.1     Section 14.i page 77
Question/ In this paragraph, it is said that the ‘Atomic Energy Act’ specifies those design
Comment modifications which require a previous approval and those which are just notified.
          It would be desirable counting on a more detailed explanation or example/s, for the better
          understanding of this paragraph.
Answer    Major modifications are subject to licensing according to § 7 of the Atomic Energy Act.
          The Länder have introduced graduated regulations below the licensing level.
          Not considered as major are those modifications which obviously may only have negligible
          effects on the safety level of the plant, but which are subject to the accompanying control
          by the authorised experts consulted by the supervisory authority according to § 20 AtG to
          ensure the safe operation of the plant and which will have to be inspected prior to their
          implementation by the regulatory authority within the framework of supervision. As a rule,
          the following issues require approval by the authority:
          a) Modifications that affect the function or the design characteristics of safety-relevant or
              security-relevant installations or measures.
          b) Modifications whose implementation or inclusion in plant operation may affect the
              function or the design characteristics of safety-relevant or security-relevant installations
              or measures.
          c) Modifications of safety-relevant or security-relevant definitions in the safety
              specifications (e.g. design principles or design values and set limit values) and in similar
              safety-relevant or security-relevant written operational stipulations unless they are
              merely of an editorial nature.
          d) Structural measures not subject to licensing according to the regional building
              regulations which also affect safety-relevant or security-relevant installations (cf. Annex
              2) or which affect structural and fire-protection-related modifications and additions or
              also modifications of the escape and rescue routes.

           In the following cases, examination by the authorised expert will normally suffice.
           a) Minor safety-related modifications, especially the exchange or replacement of safety-
               relevant installations with installations that are equal or similar (slightly differing) and at
               least of the same effectiveness as far as they are qualified according to the specifications
               and other safety-relevant operational stipulations applicable in their case.


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            b) Modifications and supplementations of documents of the safety documentation (cf.
                Annex 1 no. 8) that do not belong to the safety specifications as far as the consultation
                of authorised experts is required according to the stipulations laid down in this case.
114                                          Article 14.1       Chapter 9, p.53
Question/   Under article 9 it is mentioned that the plant operator informs the authority about changes
Comment     in the organizational chart of responsible persons. A major modification of the organization
            requires the approval or license by the competent authority. What analyses and internal
            safety reviews are normally performed by the licensees in cases of organizational changes
            such as outsourcing of safety related activities, downsizing, merging of production units
            etc. before submitting the case to the regulatory body?
Answer      The plant operator has to submit documents verifying that the safety-relevant tasks can also
            be performed to the required extent after modifications.
115                                          Article 14.1       Section 14.1
Question/   Information is given about the (periodic) Safety Review (SR) program. What safety
Comment     management aspects are covered in these reviews? How are current safety standards and
            practices accounted for? How does the regulatory body act on the results? Have the results
            led to any improvement measures, except for the mentioned results of the PSA studies?
            What is the current status with regard to the PSA level 2 studies?
Answer      The safety review contains an explanation of operational management and an evaluation of
            operating experience. According to the guidelines for safety reviews [3-74], the explanation
            of operational management has to comprise the areas plant organisation, plant operation,
            technical qualification, maintenance, radiation protection, information feedback, and
            emergency preparedness planning. The evaluation of operating experience is to comprise
            in-service inspections, load cases and fatigue analyses as well as reportable events. The
            principles of the management system as well as the organisational structure and the
            equipment with personnel are to be shown and assessed under the topic "plant
            organisation".

            The assessment of the results of the safety review by the authority is based on §§ 17 and 19
            AtG. No deficits have been identified in the safety reviews which would demand additional
            requirements (according to §17 AtG) or supervisory directives (according to § 19 AtG).
            Notwithstanding these results, the licensees have derived measures from these reviews to
            further improve safety.

          The revised version of the PSA guideline [3-74.3] in August 2005 made a level 2 PSA
          mandatory. All safety reviews presented after this date have had to include a level 2 PSA
          (cf. Tab. 14-1).
116                                          Article 14.2
Question/ What are the expectations for the completion of Level 2 PSA for all NPP sites in Germany?
Comment
Answer    The safety reviews (SR) (Article 14 (i)) which were started following the publication of the
          new PSA guideline (Article 14 (i) – reference list of nuclear regulations [3-74.3]) in
          November 2005 also comprise a level 2 PSA. The deadlines for submitting these SRs with
          level 2 PSAs are indicated in Article 14 (i), Table 14-1. Without wanting to anticipate the
          results, it is expected that the level 2 PSA analyses will verify the effectiveness of the
          emergency measures (Article 18 (i)) and the procedures to cope with emergencies (Article
          19 (iv)) put into effect in Germany.
117                                          Article 14.2     Page 3, Paragraph 5
Question/ Under “Progress and Changes Since 2004”, the report states that "After intense discussions


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Comment with the Federal Ministry for the Environment, the plant operators have put their concept to
        implement measures resulting from safety-relevant findings in concrete terms, especially
        for the case that such findings give rise to doubts about the ability to control a design basis
        accident." Please provide examples of the findings and compensatory actions that have
        been implemented in this regard.
Answer  The additional requirement with respect to how doubts about the ability to control accidents
        was caused by two concrete events:
             • In 1992, an event in the Swedish Barsebäck nuclear power plant revealed the
                 problem of a possible clogging of sump strainers in the event of a leak in the
                 reactor coolant system. At the end of 2002, analyses carried out by the
                 manufacturer on the order of the licensee of one plant showed that under the
                 postulated conservative assumptions, the clogging of sump strainers would lead to
                 high pressure differentials, thus indicating that the sump strainers would have failed
                 in an accident. If, however, one assumed a "realistic" leak of 0.003 A, there would
                 be no inadmissible pressure differential. The licensee did not inform the
                 supervisory authority in this case. As a demonstration of accident control would
                 have been difficult for the postulated conservative assumption of an 0.1 A leak, the
                 licensee decided in January 2003 to modify the sump strainers. During a walk-
                 down in April 2003 the licensee found that the sump strainers were actually even
                 smaller than had been assumed as a basis for the analyses carried out so far. It was
                 only then that the licensee informed the supervisory authority and decided to
                 refrain from restarting the plant for the time being.
                 The licensee subsequently modified the size of the sum strainers and also
                 considered further measures at the plant.
             • On 14 January 2005, a Länder supervisory authority informed the Federal Ministry
                 for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) that owing to
                 a gap in the safety demonstration it could not be excluded for one of the plants
                 within its responsibility that the LOCA "Leakage in the reactor coolant line in the
                 area directly connecting to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and in the RPV itself"
                 could not be controlled as the possible loss of coolant inside the clearance volume
                 of the biological shield had not been taken in to account in the safety
                 demonstration. The licensee had for that reason taken immediate action on 13
                 January 2005 to re-establish the plant's accident resistance. Initially, he singled out
                 4 June 2004 as the latest date when he should have demonstrably known about the
                 safety demonstration problem. However, according to the licensee's own statement,
                 a senior member of staff was already informed by the manufacturer on 11
                 December 2001 about the water possibly remaining in the reactor cavity in the
                 event of a loss-of-coolant accident. However, there were no further analyses and
                 calculations until an authorised expert consulted by the state prosecutor wrote a
                 letter instigating further investigations in November 2003. In the opinion of the
                 Länder supervisory authority and the BMU, the justified doubts about the sufficient
                 ability to control the design basis accident should have lead to corresponding
                 measures and to the information of the Länder supervisory authority at an earlier
                 stage.
                 The Länder supervisory authorities have in the meantime assured themselves of the
                 demonstration of accident control.

           Regarding the countermeasures taken by the Länder supervisory authorities, see answer to
           Question 4.




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118                                         Article 14.2         Article 14 (ii), Page 82
Question/ Reference 2nd last Para, Would Germany like to give any example of events due to ageing
Comment phenomena at German plants.
Answer    Examples of events due to ageing phenomena at German plants are:
          (1) Thermal fatigue caused two events with non-isolable leaks in older PWR plants in 1986
          and 1995, respectively.
          (2) In the early 1990s, intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) occurred in BWR
          plants in the weld region of piping of larger diameter manufactured from stabilised
          austenitic steel.
          (3) Chloride-induced transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) affected inner and
          outer surfaces of pressurised components made of austenitic stainless steels in several
          plants during the last decade.
          (4) Microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) degraded several components of service
          water systems in some plants during the last years.
          (5) Ageing of capacitors has led to isolated failures of I&C equipment in several plants over
          the years.
119                                         Article 14.2         Subsection 14 (ii)
Question/ Subsection "Impairment of water suction from containment sump" (pp. 84-85) mentions the
Comment development of new strategies and procedures for accident management in case of sump
          filters clogging. It is proposed to trip for a short time ECCS pumps and to perform filter
          backflushing.
          Are there any computational or experimental justifications demonstrating the success of
          such procedures?
Answer    The measures for backflushing of the strainers implemented in Germany are required for
          the control of design basis accidents. Computerised analyses to verify the effectiveness of
          the measures provided on backflushing are not available. The effectiveness of the
          backflushing measures to remove deposits and unclog strainers was demonstrated in 2007
          by experiments. The analyses on the influence of a new entry of insulation material into the
          reactor core after backflushing (resuspension) have not been finalised yet.
120                                         Article 14.2         Section 14.ii, page 84
Question/ In this paragraph it is mentioned a system for remote surveillance, which allows the online
Comment surveillance of a number of important operating parameters. The values transmitted are
          conveniently updated and stored for their later reviewing, if necessary.
          Which is the scope/range of such parameters?
          Does this system count on any emergency operational mode?
          Do these parameters have any resemblance with those described in the USNRC Generic
          Letter GL 89-15 “Emergency Response Data System”?
Answer    The remote monitoring system for nuclear reactors (KFÜ) is described in the National
          Report, Article 15, p. 100.

           The supervisory authorities of the Länder have realised different systems. In the following,
           an example is given by describing the system in the Land of Baden-Württemberg.
           The data entered into the NPP remote monitoring system of Baden-Württemberg are both
           element of supervision and of emergency preparedness.
           Numerous parameters are recorded which mainly correspond to the parameters of Generic
           Letter GL 89-15 of the U.S. NRC or are comparable to them. Regarding the small number
           of missing parameters, there are considerations to adopt them. However, there are also
           measuring points for several other parameters. So, e.g., data are transferred on the voltage
           of house load and emergency power supply busbars and the position of the generator circuit
           breaker. Moreover, the systems include numerous additional radiological measuring points


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          and operational information. Unit 2 of the Neckarwestheim nuclear power plant (GKN-2),
          the last nuclear power plant commissioned in Germany, has about 80 measuring points that
          are connected with the remote monitoring system. Thus, the system is an important element
          of supervision.
          For the purpose of emergency preparedness, the current weather forecast of Germany’s
          National Meteorological Service and other significant meteorological data, such as on
          precipitation, are included in the system. Due to the comprehensive weather information
          and the possibility, among others, to integrate data of the mobile measuring teams
          (helicopters, trucks) into the maps, the system can be used for dispersion calculations on the
          basis of which recommendations on the radiological situation can be given to the disaster
          control authorities.
121                                          Article 14.2     Section 14.ii page 83
Question/ In this paragraph it is said that ‘authorised experts’ may accompany during the inspections
Comment in order to assess the level of fulfilment with the license conditions. This includes the
          independent inspections carried out by the manufacturer or the supplier.
          How someone gets to be considered an ‘authorised expert’? If it is made through a specific
          license, how is it get and maintained by its holder?. How can be guaranteed the
          independence of these experts with the supplier or manufacturer?
Answer    In performing its licensing and supervisory activities the regulatory body may engage
          expert organisations or individual experts. These are engaged with regard to almost all
          technical issues related to the assessment of the safety of the installations and their
          operation (§ 20 of the Atomic Energy Act). When taking decisions on the question which
          experts should be engaged, aspects as vocational training, professional knowledge and
          skills, trustworthiness and independence are taken into account. To avoid a conflict of
          interests, the expert organisations should not work under contract of the licensee.

            More information can be found in the National Report, Art. 8.1, p. 45. Detailed
            requirements are specified in the regulatory guidelines [3-8] and [3-34].

            See also answers to questions 69 and 54.
122                                           Article 14.2     page 83
Question/   When the decision is made to shut down a NPP at a given time, will there be special
Comment     regulatory inspections to assess the impact of this decision on the staff? Keywords:
            Frustration, carelessness, disinterest in safety
Answer      The decision to phase out nuclear energy is a national decision, taken by the German
            parliament. An assessment as asked for could not put into question the decision of the
            parliament.
            If a decrease of safety – culture would be noticed that would put into question the safety of
            the plant, for whatever reason, the plant would not be allowed to continue operation.
123                                           Article 15
Question/   1. What is the new methodology used for dose calculation (as mentioned in the National
Comment     Report)?
Answer      The new methodology used for calculation of internal doses is described in a new guideline
            on physical radiation protection control for the determination of the body dose;
            incorporation control (Richtlinie für die physikalische Strahlenschutzkontrolle zur
            Ermittlung der Körperdosis, Teil 2: Ermittlung der Körperdosis bei innerer
            Strahlenexposition). It is based on ICRP recommmendations No. 68 und 78 as well on the
            issues of the German radiation protection ordinance. The need to set up a monitoring
            procedure is given if the potential annual dose (sum of internal and external doses) exceeds
            1 mSv [3-42.1].


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124                                         Article 15
Question/ 2. Is the same methodology for dose calculation used by authorities in all Länder? If not,
Comment how could the doses be compared?
Answer    The methodology addressed is part of a guideline on physical radiation protection control
          for the determination of the body dose; incorporation control (Richtlinie für die
          physikalische Strahlenschutzkontrolle zur Ermittlung der Körperdosis, Teil 2: Ermittlung
          der Körperdosis bei innerer Strahlenexposition (Inkorporationsüberwachung), [3-42.1])
          and is applied by all German Länder on a voluntary basis.
          Regarding the application by all German Länder, the same applies to the guideline for the
          measurement of external radiation (Richtlinie für die Physikalische Strahlenschutzkontrolle
          zur Ermittlung der Körperdosen, Teil 1: Ermittlung der Körperdosis bei äußerer
          Strahlenexposition [3-42]) (see also answer to question 123).
125                                         Article 15        Chapter 15 P89
Question/ The Table 15-1 states that regarding measures for removal of pending danger to persons it
Comment is to be achieved that an effective dose of more than 100mSv only occurs once per calendar
          year and an effective dose of more than 250mSv only once in a lifetime. The IAEA Safety
          Series 115 (Basic standards for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of
          radiation sources) has given more strict requirements concerning the issue; will Germany
          adopt the requirements of IAEA in the future?
Answer    The German regulation fulfils the requirements of EU Basic Safety Standards [1F-18]
          which consider IAEA Safety Series 115 (SS 115).
          From the German point of view, the postulates in Table 15-1 are basically in line with the
          detailed requirements in V.27 of SS 115.
          For special interventions and in single cases, the competent authority may agree on
          exceeding these dose limits to perform special tasks. In this case, a dose limit of 100 mSv/y
          has to be met, the reason may be compared to SS 115, issues b) or c).
          For issue a) of SS 115 (life-saving actions), higher doses than 100 mSv may occur. As
          guidance, the German Radiation Protection Ordinance distinguishes the doses with respect
          to the theoretical frequency. If doses are above 100 mSv, they may be applied only once per
          year. In the case of an even higher level of 250 mSv in Germany, which is below the IAEA
          guidance (ten times the maximum single year dose limit of SS 115)), this dose is allowed
          only once per life time. It has, however, to be kept in mind, that the dose of 250 mSv is not
          a limit. The doses may be higher, if necessary, but there is a recommendation that doses
          should be below thresholds of early deterministic effects, which might interfere with the
          fulfilment of the mission.
126                                         Article 15        p.89 Table15-1 Sec.55
Question/ Dose limit of foetus for occupationally exposed persons is 1mSv.
Comment Could you tell us how we should deal with foetus when the foetus had exposed more than
          1mSv?
Answer    The limit of 1 mSv is set for the foetus to protect it precautionally.
          If the dose to the foetus, from informing of pregnancy, is identified to be higher than
          1 mSv, actions will be taken on a case-by-case basis. There are no obligatory medical
          measures prescribed.
          From a preventive point of view the reasons of the overexposure will be investigated and
          actions will be taken to assure that this event will not happen again. If necessary,
          information and guidance is given to other operators to transfer the experience also to other
          facilities.
127                                         Article 15
Question/ (Article 15)


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Comment In relation to Emission monitoring, it is stated that the plant operators are obliged to
          participate in round-robin test.
          - What are the procedure and the criteria of round-robin test?
Answer    Round-robin tests are required according to the Guideline on the Verification of the
          Licensee's Monitoring of Radioactive Effluents from Nuclear Power Plants [3-44]) to
          assure the reliability and quality of the measurements of the operators of nuclear power
          plants. The Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS) is responsible for organising the
          round-robin tests, for evaluating the reported values and for reporting the results to the
          operators and the relevant authorities.
          Particulate filter and water samples spiked with known activities of relevant radionuclides,
          traceable to national standards, are sent to the operators who have no knowledge of the
          contained radionuclides and their activities. The operators perform measurements on these
          samples and report the measured values to the BfS. The BfS evaluates the measured values
          by statistical methods and reports the results to the operators as well as to the competent
          authorities.
128                                         Article 15        p.90
Question/ How many occupationally exposed persons in Germany have to end their “professional
Comment radiation work” due to the life time dose of 400 mSv?
Answer    In Germany, no member of the occupationally exposed personnel had to finish his/her
          professional career due to exceeding the 400 mSv lifetime dose.
          According to the German Radiation Protection Ordinance, occupationally exposed
          personnel is not necessarily obliged to end his/her professional career if he/she has reached
          a life time dose of 400 mSv. If the occupationally exposed person agrees, the competent
          authority in consultation with a physician can allow a further occupational exposure below
          10 mSv per year.
129                                         Article 15        p.90
Question/ Does German regulations allow the plant operators to perform the “independent official
Comment dosimetry” of the personnel in stead of having the official dosimetry services designated by
          the component authority perform this task?
Answer    The independent official dosimetry on external exposure only can be performed by services
          designated by the competent authorities and having an official status.
          German regulation actually does not allow plant operators to perform this kind of
          dosimetry.
130                                         Article 15        p.96
Question/ Does German regulations allow the plant operators to perform the “independent official
Comment dosimetry” of the personnel in stead of having the official dosimetry services designated by
          the component authority perform this task?
Answer    See answer 129, identical question
131                                         Article 15        p.99
Question/ The “independent measuring institutions” mentioned in the report, in various ways act on
Comment behalf of the authorities. Are these institutions allowed to render services to plant operators
          as well?
          How is independency of these institutions from the industry guaranteed?
Answer    Separate routine and emergency environmental monitoring programmes are defined for the
          licensee and the independent measuring institution in the guide REI for different nuclear
          installations. The number of environmental measurements is about the same for the
          operators and the independent measuring institutions. Some measurements are overlapping
          to control the licensee. Most measurements supply each other. The independent measuring
          institution is commissioned by the competent authority.


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132                                         Article 15        Page 94 of the national Report
Question/ In page 94 it is said “Section 6 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance stipulates that
Comment discharges of radioactive material shall be kept as low as possible taking due account of the
          state of the art and paying attention to the merits of each individual case, even where the
          values are below the limits of the operating”.
          How can it be verified that the technology used is adapted with the state of the art?.
Answer    Guidance to the technology to measure discharges of radioactive material is laid down e.g.
          in the KTA documents (KTA 1503.1 - 1503.3, KTA 1504, KTA 1505). These documents
          are periodically reviewed to be adapted to the state of the art.
133                                                           Page 96 of the national Report
                                            Article 15
Question/ In page 96 it is said “a maximum effective dose of 0.3 mSv per calendar year is applicable
Comment to radiation exposures of members of the public resulting from discharges of radioactive
          material with exhaust air or with waste water each”. Is the 0.3 mSv value applicable
          considering jointly or separately the discharges in the case of liquid and gaseous effluents?
Answer    It is applicable separately with 0.3 mSv/a for exhaust air and 0.3 mSv/a for liquid effluents.
134                                         Article 15
Question/ The European Commission published on 18th December 2003 a recommendation
Comment concerning the normalized information about gaseous and liquid effluents of the nuclear
          power plants and reprocessing facilities in normal operation.
          Are the German NPPs applying this recommendation in the quantification of their
          discharges? If so, has it been detected any repercussion in the amount of discharged activity
          and reported isotopes?
Answer    For the revision of the Guideline on Emission and Immission Monitoring (Richtlinie zur
          Emissions- und Immissionsüberwachung kerntechnischer Anlagen, REI) and of KTA safety
          standards 1503.1 and 1504, the Commission recommendation on standardised information
          on radioactive airborne and liquid discharges into the environment from nuclear power
          reactors and reprocessing plants in normal operation (L 2/36, of 6 January 2004) shall be
          taken into consideration.

          When considering the recommendation, there will be no major modifications, since the
          current regulations hardly differ from the issues regulated in the recommendation of the
          Commission.
135                                        Article 15
Question/ Regarding the determination of tritium and C14 in the radioactive effluents of the NPPs, is
Comment the physical-chemical form in which these isotopes are discharged to the environment
          identified?. Which are the techniques used for the sampling and measurement of the
          activity of such isotopes?
Answer    According to the nuclear safety standard KTA 1503.1, the emission of tritium with exhaust
          air as water vapour is to be determined. The discharge of C14 is to be balanced in the
          radiologically relevant chemical compound of the carbon dioxide.
          This is done by ducting exhaust air through a molecular sieve cartridge in a bypass flow.
          The cartridge is exchanged and evaluated once a month. For this purpose, the molecular
          sieve is removed and heated in an oven. During the heating process, tritium and C14 are
          reabsorbed from the molecular sieve. The air released by heating is first ducted into water
          where the tritium is dissolved. The air is then led into sodium hydroxide where the C14 is
          dissolved.
          The waste water is directly analysed for tritium.




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136                                         Article 15
Question/ Which is the dose limit applicable to the workers in the control room during design basis
Comment accidents?
Answer    For design basis accidents, there are no special dose limits defined for personnel in the
          control room, this means that the limit of 20 mSv/a has to be observed in this case for the
          control room staff.
137                                         Article 15         page 91, last paragraph of Regulatory
                                                               re
Question/ Radiation protection is considered in the planning of all activities at a very early stage.
Comment Which measure ensures the participation of radiation protection experts during the planning
          phase of a new job or project?
Answer    According to the revised version of the IWRS II (Guideline on radiation protection
          measures during operation of a nuclear facility: Part II), radiation protection experts are to
          be engaged in the planning phase of new jobs or projects.
138                                         Article 15
Question/ Does Germany have the intention to reduce the effective dose limit for occupationally
Comment exposed persons? If yes, on which scientific basis?
Answer    It is currently being checked if, on the basis of ICRP recommendation No. 103, the dose
          limits have to be reduced.
139                                         Article 15
Question/ Does Germany have the intention to introduce radiation protection of non human species in
Comment its legislation?
Answer    The German Commission on Radiological Protection is currently preparing a
          recommendation on a conceptual framework, respective regulations.
          On the basis of this recommendation, a decision will be made on the legal implementation.
140                                         Article 15         Page 91 paragraph 3
Question/ The report states that “...the dose reference levels above which a very detailed radiation
Comment protection planning must be made were reduced, i.e. from 50 mSv to 20 mSv for the
          collective dose…..” Assuming that the units for collective dose are
          milliSieverts, and not man-Sieverts, does this mean the collective dose for all employees for
          the operation of a nuclear power plant for one year, or the collective dose to a particular
          group of employees during some specific task? Please clarify both the units and the
          definition of collective dose in this context.
Answer    These doses are in man.mSv and hold for the collective dose of the staff involved in one
          specific task (contributing to the work of the outage) and combining all work contributing
          to reach the certain goal of that task, as e.g. changing fuel, replacing a certain pump or
          testing certain piping by non destructive tests.
141                                         Article 16.1       Chapter 16(1) P104
Question/ For an Operator to inform emergency to competent authorities, which include Regional
Comment Administration, Land Government and Federal Government? About… without any undue
          delay, is there any specified time?
Answer    Considering an emergency, there are alerting criteria (e.g. plant internal technical criteria)
          laid down in a document (“Kriterien für die Alarmierung der Katastrophenschutzbehörde
          durch die Betreiber kerntechnischer Einrichtungen” [4-2]) and adapted in the operation
          manual of the plant. If one of these criteria is met, the operator immediately has to
          inform/alert the authorities in charge of emergency preparedness.
142                                         Article 16.1       Chapter 16(1) P108-P109
Question/ Which source term is considered or postulated when the emergency planning zone is being


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Comment extended from 25 km to 100 km?
Answer    It has to be stressed that the emergency planning zone is extended from 25 km - 100 km
          ONLY for the measure “iodine blocking of the thyroid for children < 18 years and pregnant
          women”. The zone was defined, as calculations with an accident consequence code using a
          high source term due to core melt and leak to the atmosphere showed that reduced
          intervention levels of 50 mSv (valid for children) could be reached up to that distance.
143                                         Article 16.1       p.103, General
Question/ Article 16 : Emergency Preparedness(general)
Comment The emergency preparedness and technical responses are provided in every country, but
          there are few countries in which some counter measures are provided to prevent the
          damages caused by harmful rumors or misinformation about a nuclear accident. If there are
          some measures to prevent those kind of damages in Germany, please tell us about it.
Answer    Germany is convinced that an open information policy and immediate reaction in an
          emergency will help to avoid rumours and misinformation to a certain level. In addition,
          early information of the public well in advance of any emergency – as prescribed by EU
          regulation – will support in this field. In Germany, an information concept has been worked
          out to give guidance to authorities and to the utilities how to act, co-operate and re-act in
          emergency situations and to propose and recommend measures and tools to support
          information of the public. In addition, regularly updated information leaflets are sent to the
          public living in the regions close to a nuclear power plant to inform on operation same as
          on the behaviour during an accident situation. The activities mentioned are supported by
          research projects to identify modern information techniques and practices.
144                                         Article 16.1       p.108, last para
Question/ It is said in the report (page 108, the last paragraph) that a special disaster control is
Comment performed.
          Please explain about “a special disaster control”.
          What kind of steps do you take when any NPP in the neighboring country causes a
          radiological accident and it may affect or affects your country? For example, protective
          actions, radiation monitoring, public information provision and so on.
          How is the response structure set-up in your country for such situation?
Answer    In Germany, disaster control is separated. On one hand, for all the country a general
          disaster control exists for all possible cases of hazard as e.g. big fires, flooding due to heavy
          rain and storms.
          On the other hand, due to the emergency laws of the Länder, special emergency plans have
          to be prepared for all (conventional or nuclear) facilities, which pose a certain higher
          danger to the public. This part of emergency preparedness is called “special disaster
          control” due to the necessity of special detailed plans for a certain area where short term
          measures are to be implemented with undue delay on the basis of pre-planned documents.
          In the case of an emergency in a neighbouring country, the same protection is aimed at as
          for an emergency in the own country. To reach this goal, there is a close co-operation
          between the neighbouring regions and countermeasures are intended to be harmonised over
          borders. The basis for this co-operation is laid down in agreements between the
          neighbouring countries.
145                                         Article 16.1       page 115
Question/ The report refers to an extensive integrated emergency exercise covering several Länder in
Comment 2005 performed for the NPP Krümmel.
          1. Could Germany provide some information on the scope and the involved actors of this
          exercise?
          2. What were the lessons learned with regard to communication between the authorities of
          the Länder?


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            3. How do the lessons learned affect emergency preparedness in Germany?
Answer      1. Four Länder (Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Western
            Pomerania) were involved in the emergency exercise “Krümmel 2005“ performed on 25
            November 2005 with 800 persons, among them representatives of the Länder authorities,
            task forces from the Länder and staff of the Krümmel NPP. Representatives of the Federal
            Ministry for the Environment (BMU), the supervisory authorities of the Länder and experts
            from the relevant authorities in Denmark participated as observers. The exercise was
            targeted at testing the disaster control data management system, the use of uniformly
            designed joint measurement centres for the four Länder and review of the plans for the
            establishment of emergency care centres.

            2. It was asserted that the newly established data management systems which, among
            others, provide the regular dissemination of situation information to all authorities involved,
            considerably improved communication between the competent authorities of the Länder.

            3. The lessons learned from the exercise have been incorporated into the Basic
            Recommendations for Emergency Preparedness.
146                                           Article 16.1     Article 16(2), Page 116
Question/   The Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU), is the national competent authority for
Comment     cross-border emergency management (Page 116), however, it is mentioned at 16(2) Page
            116 second last line “-- the competent authorities inform the potentially affected public
            without any delay—“ Who is the competent authority to inform the General Public in case
            of a radiation emergency?
Answer      The BMU is in charge of cross-border contacts according to international agreements.
            In addition, the BMU will inform the general German public about the actual situation,
            especially, if more than one State/Land is affected.
            On the regional level, the competent authorities of this level will inform the affected and
            potentially affected public without any delay.
*                                             Article 16.1     Section 16, Page 114
Question/   Kindly indicate if surprise drills ever been performed or planned? If yes what was the
Comment     outcome?
Answer      It is common practice in Germany to perform surprise drills.
            Positive experiences regarding the alerting phase have been made.
147                                           Article 16.1     Para. 16.1, page 115
Question/   Are the simulated data transferred in the course of integrated emergency training with NPP
Comment     in frames of remote NPP monitoring system?
Answer      Simulated data can be transferred via remote NPP monitoring systems to the radiological
            situation center.
148                                           Article 16.1     Para. 16(1), pages 107-118
Question/   Is the Emergency Preparedness Plan shall be activated immediately in case if the
Comment     information about the assault on the NPP has been received?
Answer      This issue is considered in the emergency preparedness, but is out of the scope of the
            Convention on Nuclear Safety.
149                                           Article 17.1     (page 121)
Question/   Background - Design against earthquake:
Comment     Since 1990, the design against earthquakes is based on a design basis earthquake (formerly
            called safe shut-down earthquake) in accordance with safety standard [KTA 2201.1]. The
            so-called operating basis earthquake, formerly considered additionally, was replaced by an
            inspection earthquake where only the plant condition has to be checked.


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          The design basis earthquake has the largest intensity that, under consideration of scientific
          findings, could occur in a wider vicinity of the site (up to a radius of about 200 km). What
          does it mean “largest intensity that, under consideration of scientific findings, could
          occur”? Depending on the geological period, the largest intensity can be smaller or larger.
          What period is assumed in Germany, 10 000 years, 100 000 years or another?
Answer    The version of KTA 2201.1 in effect at present stipulates a purely deterministic approach.
          Therefore, no recurrence frequency is given for the design basis earthquake. This means
          that the seismologists performing the seismic hazard analysis had to decide what the highest
          intensity at the site could be due to the tectonic and geological conditions. However, these
          considerations typically aimed for recurrence frequencies of 10-4 to 10-5 per year. At the
          moment, KTA 2201.1 is under revision. In addition to the deterministic approach, the
          amended version will also include probabilistic methods for the determination of the design
          basis earthquake. According to the current state of the discussions, the corresponding
          recurrence frequency will be 10-5 per year.
150                                         Article 17.1        page 121
Question/ The earthquake in Japan on 16 July 2007 showed that the NPP Kashiwazaki had been
Comment designed for a lower seismic intensity than actually occurred. The magnitude of Niigata
          Chuetsu-Oki earthquake was 6.8 on Richter scale, and it occurred with epicentre only 16
          km from Tepco's Kashiwazaki Kariwa 7965 MWe nuclear power plant. The plant's
          seismometers measured PGA of 0.27 to 0.68g, the S1 design bases for different units being
          0.17 to 0.27g and the S2 figure about 0.45g. The peak ground acceleration thus exceeded
          the S1 design values in all units - hence the need to shut down, and the S2 values in units 1,
          2 and 4. The NPP Kashiwazaki went through the earthquake very well. While there were
          many incidents on site due to the earthquake, none threatened safety and the main reactor
          and turbine units were structurally unaffected. Analysis of primary cooling water confirmed
          that there was no damage to the fuel in reactor cores. The effects of that major earthquake
          were limited to a small spillage of slightly radioactive substances. However, the point is
          that the earthquake level was actually higher than the plant's rated capacity. The fault that
          caused the earthquake had not been considered a threat when the plant was being designed.
          •Have German specialists analyzed lessons learned from that event regarding determination
          of seismic parameters for which the NPP should be designed?
          •Specifically, can it be confirmed that the errors which had been done in choosing
          earthquake intensity level for Kashiwazaki are excluded in the seismicity studies performed
          for NPPs in Germany?
Answer    Japan will host an IAEA international workshop, as soon as the analyses of the experts with
          respect to the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki earthquake are completely finished. A final evaluation
          whether the experience with this earthquake has consequences for the seismic hazard
          analysis in Germany will be performed, as soon as all relevant information is available. For
          the present, major consequences are not expected, because the seismic situation in Germany
          is very different from that in Japan: Whereas in Japan the relevant earthquakes concentrate
          on major (subduction) faults, the seismic activity in Central Europe has a more diffuse
          characteristic (less concentration on dominant faults). Therefore, the knowledge about the
          exact location and extent of faults is less important for the estimation of the site specific
          seismic hazard. In addition, any earthquake considered for the determination of the design
          basis earthquake according to KTA 2201.1 (deterministic approach) has to be shifted into
          the immediate vicinity of the site (if it occurred in the same tectonic region) or to the border
          of its tectonic region nearest to the site (if it occurred in a different tectonic region). This
          approach largely avoids the problems encountered in Japan.
151                                         Article 17.1        page 122
Question/ The report states that “For the newer nuclear installations, the design against aircraft crash


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Comment also covered aside from the reactor building further civil structures containing systems
        required for the control of this external event (e.g. the emergency feed-water building in
        newer PWRs). Furthermore, protective measures were taken to account for pressure waves
        from aircraft crash, e.g. by uncoupling the ceilings and inner walls from the outer wall or by
        a special design, so that no vibrations would be induced in components and internals.”
        •After all these improvements, are the German NPPs protected against aircraft crash?
        •Germany is the co-author of EPR design. Is this design sufficiently robust to protect the
        plant in case of a suicide aircrash attack? Up to what airplane size is it resistant?
Answer  The overall design of the German nuclear power plants is based on design loads to provide
        general protection against various external impacts, among them the accidental crash of a
        military aircraft (3 have no such protection, 4 are protected against the "Starfighter" load
        case, 10 are protected against the "Phantom" load case). In all German plants, specially
        safeguarded emergency systems for the particular protection against external impacts were
        provided in the design already or backfitted at a later stage. There is therefore a certain
        potential ability to control further-reaching scenarios, such as the deliberate terrorist crash
        of an airliner, on the basis of existing design margins, backfittings and diverse preventive
        measures.
        Although German branches of the AREVA company were involved in the development of
        the EPR and various institutions participated in the assessment of its design, the German
        regulatory authorities were not involved. They therefore also do not dispose of any detailed
        information on the design layout regarding the plant that is being erected in Finland.

            The actual design of the EPRs under construction in Finland and France depends on the
            regulatory requirements in the corresponding countries.
152                                           Article 17.1      Subsection 17 (i) (p. 121)
Question/   Subsection "Design against earthquake" mentions that KTA 2201.1 safety standard is
Comment     currently being revised to adapt it to the modern techniques of safe shutdown earthquake
            calculation including seismic impacts on reactor structures components and systems.
            In view of the fact that Germany has no plans to commission new nuclear plants, what is
            the main goal of improving this standard?
Answer      Even though the KTA safety standards describe design requirements, they are also used as a
            basis for deterministic safety reviews and for licensing procedures in case of major plant
            modifications. Therefore, it is necessary to keep them up to date with respect to the current
            state of the art in science and technology. The amendment of KTA 2201.1 focuses mainly
            on the methods for the seismic hazard assessment. According to the new revision,
            probabilistic methods have to be applied in addition to the deterministic method.
153                                           Article 17.3      page 124, Earthquake
Question/   Do the safety reviews also include a re-evaluation of the site-specific seismic hazard and, if
Comment     yes, is a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) part of the re-evaluation?
Answer      The safety reviews (to be carried out on a 10-year basis) for German nuclear power plants
            consist of a deterministic and a probabilistic part. Since the 2005 revision of the PSA
            guideline [3-74.3], the probabilistic part includes a seismic safety assessment, i.e. a seismic
            PSA (SPSA). Therefore, a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment has to be performed.
            For most sites a PSHA has been performed as part of the licensing process of the interim
            storage facilities (which had to be built at the NPP sites).
154                                           Article 18.1      Subsection 18 (i)
Question/   At German NPPs the defense-in-depth concept was strengthened in two aspects. On the one
Comment     hand, the measures taken referred to accident prevention and accident control, and on the
            other hand, also to measures for beyond design basis scenarios. Among these measures the
            following were mentioned: leak before break concept, use of improved design SGs


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           (preventive measures), using additional measures for beyond design basis accident
           management.
           Are the recently developed measures obligatory for implementation at "older" nuclear
           plants?
Answer     The measures mentioned in the report, specially those for beyond design basis accidents,
           are implemented in all NPPs. Table 6-2 gives an overview regarding the measures realised
           in different construction lines. The implementation of plant-internal accident management
           measures for the control of beyond design basis events (primarily: preventive measures:
           primary- and secondary-side bleed and feed and mitigative measures: filtered venting and
           hydrogen limitation (recombiners)) were recommended by the Reactor Safety Commission
           (RSK) in 1988 for risk minimisation. The plant-internal accident management measures
           were implemented in the course of corresponding modification measures or, in particular
           cases, their implementation is being prepared.

           The current status of implementation of the measures is presented in the answer support
           document.

          The LBB concept shall also be applied at older plants; in this respect, reassessments were
          or are performed for existing components or components replaced by those of
          corresponding quality.
155                                        Article 18.1      p. 129
Question/ ... measures to reduce the probability of occurrence of severe accidents (preventive accident
Comment management measures) or measures to mitigate the
          consequences of severe accidents with core damage (mitigative accident management
          measures) have been included in the design or performed as backfitting measures at
          existing plants at the German nuclear power plants since the eighties ( ¨ Table 6-2).
          In the table 6-2 there are only generally stated improvements of technical equipment for
          core damage prevention and mitigation.

          Can you list and briefly describe main improvements?
Answer    See answer to question 109 and answer support document for question 154.
156                                       Article 18.2
Question/ Have you met specific problems to find spare parts or replace-ment components properly
Comment qualified to a high safety class, as needed for plant lifetime management? If yes, how have
          you addressed the problem?
Answer    In some cases, there are problems to find appropriate spare parts. In the past, problems
          came up when components like electronic cards or switches were replaced. These new
          components did not have all the safety-relevant properties of the old ones even though the
          specified safety-relevant values were checked before. Several German Information Notices
          have been issued that describe events related to the spare part issue. These are WLN
          1997/07, 1998/09, 1998/10, 1999/02, 2000/08, 2000/13, 2001/03, 2002/07, 2005/04, and
          2006/05.

          Spare parts, e.g. in the area of I&C for older hard-wired systems, become increasingly
          undeliverable. A means of remedy is offered by the introduction of Teleperm XS. On this
          issue, intensive discussions are currently being held between plant operators, expert
          organisations and authorities.
157                                         Article 18.2     Subsection 18 (ii) (p. 131)
Question/ Subsection "Proof of incorporated technologies".
Comment How do they verify the computer codes used for plant design? Can the regulatory body


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           demand to present a code validation report?
Answer     The prerequisite of the use of computer codes is a validation of the results.

          The qualification of computer codes used for plant design and safety analysis is subject to
          proof. The regulatory body or authorised experts may require the documentation of
          validation of those computer codes used for the analysis for review. Validation
          requirements can be found, e.g., in Section 6.3 of the KTA safety standard 3101.2 “Design
          of Reactor Cores of Pressurized Water and Boiling Water Reactors”.
158                                           Article 19.1      Page 137 paragraph 2
Question/ The report states “Construction, commissioning and commercial initial trial operation of the
Comment nuclear power plants are usually performed by a general contractor who will be the licensee
          together with the future plant operator. After a successful initial operation, the turnkey plant
          is turned over to the plant operator by the general contractor. The responsibility for the
          safety of the plant stays with the general contractor until his official handover to the plant
          operator.” Does this mean that during the construction, commissioning and commercial
          initial trial operation phases, there are two organisations which are the licence holders, i.e.
          the general contractor and the future plant operator? If so, how are the responsibilities under
          the nuclear licence apportioned between these two organisations, and which of the two
          organisations is in charge of the site? If not, do the responsibilities of the general contractor
          under the nuclear site licence cease when the plant is turned over to the future plant
          operator, or at some other point in time? What would happen if, for some reason, the plant
          was never handed over to the future operator, for example due to a commercial dispute or a
          political decision not to allow the plant to go into full operation? Would the general
          contractor remain responsible for the costs of any nuclear accident during commissioning
          or initial trial operation, or for the decommissioning of the plant? Is the general contractor
          required to carry insurance against the costs of any nuclear accident during the
          commissioning phase? Please clarify the legal positions and responsibilities of both the
          general contractor and the future plant operator during each phase of construction,
          commissioning, initial commercial operation, and full commercial operation.
Answer         • Does this mean that during the construction, commissioning and commercial initial
                     trial operation phases, there are two organisations which are the licence holders,
                     i.e. the general contractor and the future plant operator?
                     In licences under the Atomic Energy Act, there can be more than one licence
                     holder. This supposes, however, that responsibilities of each of the licence holders
                     are clearly defined. The apportionment of responsibilities is stipulated by contract
                     and fixed in the nuclear licence.
               • If so, how are the responsibilities under the nuclear licence apportioned between
                     these two organisations, and which of the two organisations is in charge of the site?
                     Until the turnkey plant is turned over to the plant operator by the contractor, the
                     contractor has the main responsibility. Any legally relevant order, injunction etc.
                     issued by the relevant nuclear regulatory authority (example: shutdown order)
                     would be directed in practice to the contractor but formally it would be addressed
                     to all licence holders. The apportionment of responsibilities is stipulated by
                     contract and fixed in the nuclear licence.
               • If not, do the responsibilities of the general contractor under the nuclear site licence
                     cease when the plant is turned over to the future plant operator, or at some other
                     point in time?
                     After the contractor has turned over the plant to the operator, he returns his licence
                     to the nuclear regulatory authority. The operator assumes all responsibilities of
                     nuclear law.



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                •  What would happen if, for some reason, the plant was never handed over to the
                   future operator, for example due to a commercial dispute or a political decision not
                   to allow the plant to go into full operation?
                   This is a very theoretical question. Normally, the contract would entail an
                   obligation of the future operator to take over the plant and the full responsibility
                   after commissioning. Also, the nuclear regulatory authority would insist on the
                   future operator taking over the plant because the contractor would not fulfil the
                   regulatory requirements for long-term operation or decommissioning of the plant.
                   Therefore, it is not thinkable that the plant would remain with the contractor.
                   The release from licence ownership will be declared by the authority after review
                   of the prerequisites. Until then, the responsibility will remain with the licensee.
               • Would the general contractor remain responsible for the costs of any nuclear
                   accident during commissioning or initial trial operation, or for the
                   decommissioning of the plant?
                   The general contractor remains responsible for such costs if the contractor is also a
                   designated licence holder during the respective plant phases.
               • Is the general contractor required to carry insurance against the costs of any
                   nuclear accident during the commissioning phase?
                   If the general contractor is designated or recognised in the licence by the
                   competent authority as a licence holder, then he is a so called “operator of the
                   installation” according to the “Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
                   Nuclear Energy - Paris Convention”. In this respect, the contractor is also involved
                   in liability matters (see previous answer).
                   It is regulated between the contracting parties, respectively the other licence holder
                   or holders, to which extent the general contractor is committed to carry insurance
                   against the costs of any accident during the commissioning phase.
159                                         Article 19.3
Question/ What criteria are used to determine the lifetime of the plant.
Comment
Answer    In the German regulatory system, there are no criteria for a definite lifetime of a NPP.
          Nevertheless, operation licences are granted without time limit. On the other hand, the
          permissible cumulative usage factors of the individual components limit the lifetime, as far
          as they are not replaced. The component and system behaviour is checked at regular
          intervals and supplemented by fatigue analyses.

          In the German Atomic Energy Act, a maximum power production is laid down that is
          oriented to a power production of about 32 years.
160                                      Article 19.3
Question/ Do you have long term operation strategy or plans to operate the NPPs beyond design
Comment lifetime.
Answer    The lifetime of the German NPPs is limited by law. For each NPP, the maximum power
          production is fixed by law.

          The plant operators have strategies to continuously keep their plants in line with the state of
          the art. Replacement strategies are being prepared for individual components reaching their
          fatigue limit.
161                                       Article 19.3
Question/ Do you have a re-qualification program for components to be used beyond their design
Comment lifetime.



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Answer      Safety-relevant systems, equipment and plant components required for the safety functions
            are designed, partly with considerable wear allowances, for the technologically projected
            plant life of 40 years. They are subject to surveillance to ensure full operability at any time.
            See also answer to question 159.
*                                             Article 19.3      Section 19, Page 142
Question/   Please provide detailed information about diesel generators surveillance testing (test types
Comment     and test frequencies) in German NPPs.
Answer      The surveillance of the diesel generators for emergency power supplies is performed within
            the framework of in-service inspections by functional tests.
            For complete testing of functional readiness of emergency power supply by diesel
            generators, each component of the functional chain is subjected to various tests with
            specified test frequencies. For example, testing of signal transmitting (“on” signal) and trial
            runs are performed every month. Tests on fuel quality or electrical components and module
            testing are performed at larger intervals.
            Moreover, there is a multi-level maintenance programme up to complete revision with
            complete disassembly of the diesel generators every 8 years.
162                                           Article 19.3      Subsection 19 (iii) (p. 144)
Question/   The Report says that in recent years probabilistic assessment methods have been widely
Comment     used. In certain cases probabilistic techniques were employed to verify and update e.g.
            scope and frequency of primary circuit components testing specified in KTA 3201.4 safety
            standard.
            What is the current status of probabilistic safety assessments - recommendative (voluntary)
            or obligatory?
Answer      The preparation of a plant PSA is only mandatory within the framework of a safety review
            (SR) pursuant to 19a of the Atomic Energy Act (AtG). These comprehensive safety reviews
            of NPPs at a time interval of ten years have been mandatory in Germany since April 2002
            (see [3-74.1]). Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is part of such a comprehensive safety
            review. The details can be found in the German PSA Guide issued in 2005 [3-74.3] and
            described in the corresponding technical documents on PSA methods and PSA data [4-7].
            Concerning the development of PSA methodology, see also answer to question 17.

          Moreover, probabilistic analyses are performed in Germany on a voluntary basis in
          individual cases to show the effects of modification measures on the safety level of the
          plant and to verify measures of preventive maintenance during plant operation. In addition,
          probabilistic methods are applied to assess the urgency and importance of safety
          improvements in terms of a ranking.
163                                        Article 19.4      page 172
Question/ Dealing with severe accidents. The report says in page 172 in section 4.2 about one of the
Comment scenarios considered for BDBAs Double-ended rupture of a steam generator tube and
          increasing main steam pressure, with a trend to open the main steam safety valves.
          •Are the safety valves qualified for steam water flow?
          •In WWERs the secondary side safety valves are being exchanged for modified ones,
          qualified for steam water follows. Riskaudit is aware of it, because within TACIS program
          it makes assessments of these modifications.
Answer    There is a highly reliable protection against steam generator (SG) overfilling (e.g. two-
          channel signals) to prevent consequential damages in the event of accidents. In case of
          danger of SG overfilling, the main measures are stop of feedwater supply and shut-off of
          the feedwater pumps by the reactor protection system. In case of an SG tube leakage,
          overflooding of the defective SG is also prevented reliably for very unlikely event
          sequences by reliable detection and adequate measures.


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            Therefore, SG overfilling is so improbable that it has not to be postulated in the design.

            In addition, analyses showed that even in case of beyond design basis plant conditions with
            overfilling of the defective SG and intrusion of water into the main steam lines, the
            associated loads can be transferred, the main steam valves can discharge a two-phase flow
            and no consequential damages with impairment of safety functions would occur.
164                                           Article 19.4      page 172
Question/   The next scenario listed in section 4-2 is “Loss of three-phase current supply - unless
Comment     backed by batteries - for up to 2 hours. “
            •We have seen recently large blackouts in the US and in Europe, lasting longer than 2
            hours. Is it taken into account in the safety analyses of German NPPs? What would be the
            effects?
            •In Russia the NPPs are upgraded – in cooperation with Riskaudit - to provide reliable ac
            current e.g. from the hydro-plants nearby. What are the measures in place or being taken in
            Germany?
Answer      This scenario deals with hypothetical emergency situations on level 4 of the defence in
            depth concept and it therefore assumes that all prior safety provisions have failed. It has to
            be demonstrated that battery power is available at least for 2 hours and that measures are
            installed to come back to emergency power supply by diesel generators or by an
            independent grid connection. In all plants in Germany, at least three independent grid
            connections are available (see Appendix 4, Table 5 “Electric Power Supply”, page 184 and
            185).
165                                           Article 19.4      Subsection 19 (iv)
Question/   The data given in Subsection "Design basis accidents" show that in case of occurrence of
Comment     design basis accidents the plants use operating instructions which combine symptom-based
            and event-based approaches.
            Is the safety assurance approach for design basis accidents unified (standardized) for all
            NPPs or the approach is first of all defined by plant specific features?
Answer      The proceeding for design basis accidents is only uniform regarding the main procedure
            elements described. In particular, the protection goal oriented procedure (symptom-based)
            is plant specific.
166                                           Article 19.4      Subsection 19 (iv)
Question/   Subsection "Emergencies".
Comment     Is the emergency response team intended to act in emergencies (beyond design basis
            accidents) a permanently acting body which must undergo continuous training, drilling
            etc.?
Answer      Within the framework of emergency organisation, the functions of the emergency response
            team that cover the necessary areas (e.g. plant operation, radiation protection, mechanical
            and electrical engineering, communication) are defined. The persons at the plant fulfilling
            these functions and tasks are specified in the operation manual and are alerted according to
            alert lists. Within the framework of exercises performed at regular intervals, emergency
            scenarios and organisation as well as tasks and actions of the emergency response team are
            exercised. In addition to the members of the emergency response team, deputies and further
            task personnel is involved in the exercises.
167                                           Article 19.4
Question/   In response the Slovakia’s question in 2005 on the application of SAMG´s it was stated
Comment     “There is an ongoing discussion within the German Federal Ministry BMU as well as its
            advisory body Reactor Safety Commission (RSKK) on the necessity of an extension of the
            German Accident Management Concept towards the development and implementation of


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            SAMG”.
            Could Germany summarise the development since 2005?
Answer      In Germany, the technical measures and accident management measures provided for
            emergencies are specified in the accident management manual (see Article19 (iv)). With the
            draft "Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" (http://regelwerk.grs.de) published in
            September 2006, the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) expressed its view on
            the scope and application of SAMG strategies in Germany. On this issue, consultations are
            currently being held between the Federal Government and the Länder. In this respect, also
            see answer to question 3.
168                                           Article 19.4      page 145, Emergencies
Question/   Are there backup rooms for the emergency response team protected against the impacts
Comment     from e.g. plane crash or large releases of radioactivity? Is the dislocation to - respectively
            the use of - the backup rooms as meeting point covered by the procedures?
Answer      Besides the main control room, the German plants have a protected emergency control
            room for the immediate control of an incident or accident. Manning this emergency control
            room, which is protected against external impacts, will only be necessary after approx. 10
            hours due to the automatically running measures of the emergency system in the initial
            phase of the incident or accident (A different solution is in place at the Biblis twin-unit
            plant. Here, monitoring and control is done from the neighbouring unit.).
            To cope with emergencies, the German NPP operators provide an emergency task force
            additional to the control room shift team. The rooms used for this purpose are set up
            physically separate from the control room and the specially protected emergency control
            room.
            The layout of these emergency task force rooms differ from plant to plant.
            These emergency task force rooms do not normally have any special protection against
            external impacts and large releases of radioactivity, but internal withdrawal rooms or
            external withdrawal options exist. The emergency task force's structural and procedural
            organisation and its tasks are laid down in the operating manual and the accident
            management manual.
169                                           Article 19.6      page 147
Question/   The plant operators also inform the competent nuclear supervisory authority, to some extent
Comment     irrespective of their obligation to report (&#8594; Article 19 (vi)), about findings from their
            plants below the reporting threshold and about findings outside their plants that may be of
            relevance for safety-related issues.
            The nuclear supervisory authority evaluates these experiences principally with the methods
            also applied for reportable events with the objective to achieve, where possible, measures
            against recurrence of negative operating experiences in the plants of their jurisdiction. As
            far as these operating experiences or other findings made by the experts may also be of
            interest for the supervisory authorities in other Länder, appropriate information is made
            available. First, information is generally forwarded within the authorised expert
            organisation. The expert organisations informed this way, then check the findings for
            applicability to the plants for which they are competent as authorised expert and inform,
            where necessary, the respective nuclear authority by means of recommendations.
            •Is the level of competence of the supervisory authorities in Länder satisfactory? In view of
            the perspective of withdrawal from nuclear energy, are there people in Germany still
            willing to start working in the nuclear field?
            •What is the level at which events are reported inside Germany – outside to WANO – and
            outside to INES?
            •INES is criticised because it is based on radiation exposure. Thus the events which do not
            involve actual exposure are classified very low, and tend not to be discussed at the


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           international level. Is the system evaluated by German side as sufficiently effective?
Answer      • The Länder have highly competent personnel. The recruitment of junior personnel
                does not pose any problem.
            • The threshold of reporting events from nuclear power plants and research reactors is
                laid down in the Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting Ordinance (AtSMV). Reporting
                is performed with different time frames depending on the severity of the events. Main
                focus of the event reporting is to ensure that the authorities have sufficient time to act
                (up to evacuation of the local residents). All events are reviewed by the Länder
                authorities and their respective technical inspection organisation (TÜV),by the Federal
                Office for Radiation Protection (BFS) and GRS on behalf of the federal regulatory
                body, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor
                Safety (BMU). The threshold of reporting is low within the international context.
                Events with INES level 2 or above and events with increased public interest are
                reported to INES. Further, reporting is done to the Incident Reporting System (IRS),
                which is run jointly by IAEA and NEA. These event reports are restricted and thus not
                public. Germany reports these events which meet the threshold described in the IRS
                manual.
            • In Germany, the above described ordinance is applicable to reporting and assessment
                of events. Here, safety assessments are performed for events which, according to the
                view taken in Germany, are of high safety significance and that are not performed to
                this degree of differentiation by INES.

               Reporting to NEWS-INES is based on the actual and potential radiological
               consequences. Thus, also so-called “near misses” may be reported up to INES level 3
               (defence-in-depth aspect). INES is designed to quickly inform the public about
               significant nuclear events. A technically detailed discussion is not foreseen. These
               discussions mainly take place e.g. within the IRS on the authority side and within
               WANO on the utility side. IRS exists for nearly 30 years and has been proven a very
               good tool to exchange in-depth technical information about events. Nevertheless,
               Germany participates in the international efforts to further increase the efficiency and
               the effectiveness of international operating experience feedback.
170                                          Article 19.6      Subsection 19 (vi)
Question/ Is the detection of a crack (in piping or components) a reportable event?
Comment
Answer    Cracks with leakages are to be reported as events of category E (quick report, reporting
          deadline: within 24 hours) if they require plant shutdown in the short term for safety
          reasons and if the following plant systems are concerned:
           - Reactor coolant system and the directly connected systems including those areas under
              reactor coolant pressure,
           - main steam system up to the turbine and by-pass stop valves and all pipe sections that
              cannot be isolated from this pressure zone,
           - feedwater system and all pipe sections that cannot be isolated from this pressure zone.
          Cracks with or without leakage in the area of safety system installations, other activity-
          retaining systems and the boundaries of the main steam and feedwater systems are to be
          reported as event of the “N” reporting category (normal report, reporting deadline: within 5
          days) at the latest in the case of insufficient specified wall thicknesses, or if:
           - there are indications to a systematic fault, or
           - manufacturing or design deficiencies are identified, or
           - there are indications that loads have not been taken into account or measures of
              operational monitoring are insufficient.



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            Not reportable are:
             - seal and flange leakages outside the pressure boundary,
             - drop leakages at seals and flanges or valve seal leakages within the design basis of the
                 of the valve seal suction pipe within the pressure boundary,
             - leakages at measurement, drainage or vent lines in the turbine area.
171                                            Article 19.7      Page 151, Table 19-1
Question/   In Table 19-1, twelve “E” reporting category events were reported for 2004-2006. Please
Comment     explain whether these events pointed to a specific shortcoming or highlighted a trend.
Answer      The “E” reporting category is the second of the three German reporting categories. These
            reporting categories are based on the information needs of the regulatory body. The 12
            events of the “E” reporting category (quick report) occured in different NPPs and
            concerned various system areas and were due to various causes.
            The number of events of the “E” reporting category was small compared to the total
            number of events per year (1.5 to 5 %). A specific trend or a systematic deficiency in the
            systems affected could not be identified for category E events.
            Two of the category E events were rated at INES level 1 (anomaly), all others at INES level
            0 (no or hardly any safety significance). One category E event of INES level 1 was due to
            ageing of high-voltage cables. For dissemination of this operating experience, all other NPP
            operators were informed by way of an Information Notice. Regarding the second “E” event
            of INES level 1, a variable limit value had been exceeded due to faulty balancing of the
            tritium discharge with the wastewater. The total discharge of tritium was well below the
            permissible annual limit.
172                                            Article 19.7      Page 55, para. 1-6, and pages 153-154
Question/   Under “Progress and Changes since 2004”, page 55, paragraphs 1 to 6, the reporting
Comment     process of capturing international events is introduced; and, is further described under
            “Evaluation of operating experience on behalf of the BMU” (pages 153-154). Is there a
            regulatory document that describes the requirements related to event reporting and the
            ensuing OPEX?
Answer      The main regulatory document regarding OPEX is the AtSMV “Nuclear Safety Officer and
            Reporting Ordinance” [1A-17]. The paragraphs describe the progress made regarding the
            utility wide information exchange which was triggered by the authorities after respective
            events. These efforts by the utilities are not legally forced by the authorities, but the
            implementation of the utility’s own approach is followed and reviewed by the respective
            Länder authorities and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and
            Nuclear Safety (BMU).
173                                            Article 19.7
Question/   Please explain the principles or criteria applied by the regulator and operator for screening
Comment     other experience than incidents (e.g., management issues, unexpected degradation, design
            weaknesses, external hazards not considered earlier), for the purpose of ensuring adequate
            sharing of important experience with international interested parties (regulatory bodies,
            operators, designers, international bodies). Identify the relevant guide documents, if any,
            used for the screening.
Answer      Regarding the proceeding of the operator, reference is made to Article 19.
            As stated on Article 19, the evaluation of international operating experience and the
            information of the international community about German operating experience could well
            be improved. The regulatory body will, as also stated on Article 19, as future activity
            actively participate in the further development of the reporting and evaluation systems for
            operating experience at international organisations.
            Further to this clarification, the question is answered as follows:
            The Nuclear Safety Commissioner and Reporting Ordinance establishes the detailed basis


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            for the obligation of the operator to report accidents, incidents or other events relevant to
            nuclear safety (reportable events) to the competent supervisory authority. The reporting
            criteria stipulated in this ordinance do not only comprise events in the narrower sense.
            Rather, they comprise unexpected reductions of safety provisions, e.g. by functional
            disturbances in the safety system or in other safety-relevant systems and components.
            Further, indications to systematic failures and deficiencies in these areas and deviations
            from specified conditions – due to technical aspects as well as to design deficiencies – are
            documented in the same way as deficiencies in the management and in the integrated
            overall system man-technology-organisation (MTO). External events are also recorded. As
            already described on Article 19, these reports of the operators, the industry and the
            authorities are intensively evaluated at several levels. The findings of the authorities on the
            reportable events also being of interest for the safety of nuclear power plants abroad
            according to the INES and IRS manuals are made available to the international authorities
            via the Incident Reporting System (IRS) of IAEA and OECD/NEA by GRS on behalf of the
            BMU.
174                                           Article 19.7
Question/   Please explain how the regulatory body ensures or verifies that the operators are informed
Comment     and properly analyse the operating experiences reported through the well established
            international channels (e.g., WANO, IRS), and that they address the lessons learned by
            taking proper actions.
Answer      There is a comprehensive safety management system at the plants that is subject to
            permanent optimisation. This system also regulates processes and sequences of handling
            and implementation of external safety-relevant information in a detailed manner. The
            supervisory authority controls the proper functioning of this system at regular intervals.
175                                           Article 19.7
Question/   Please explain your national policy and practice of sending feedback reports to the
Comment     international interested parties on actions that have been taken in your country as response
            to significant events reported through international channels (e.g., WANO, IRS).
Answer      The IRS manual clearly describes the expectations to internationally share information on
            reported events. Germany follows this approach.
176                                           Article 19.7      page 149
Question/   The report states that
Comment     “This system has been improved over more than 30 years. The resulting feedback of
            operating experience has been a major contributing factor to the further development of
            safety in nuclear installations.
            In addition to targeted studies and analyses, reportable events and indications that are below
            the reporting threshold are the main source of experience feedback. Etc. ….
            Reportable events are evaluated by the industry and by the authorities at several levels, i.e.
            by the operator of the nuclear installation concerned and by the operators of other
            installations, by the Länder authorities and their expert organisations at a national level, and
            at a federal level by BfS and GRS (by order of the BMU). These multiple-level and
            independent analyses ensure that each reportable event is evaluated in detail and regarding
            all aspects.”
            The system is logically very good. However, there are indications that the accident in
            Forsmark occurred in spite of the fact that the weakness of the system was already known
            in Germany. Is it true? If yes, why the German experience had not been used in Forsmark?
Answer      The incident in Forsmark was partly related to equipment that is also installed in German
            plants. This equipment had also few malfunctions. Germany reported a related event to the
            IRS system years ago. But an event scenario like the Forsmark event did not occur in
            Germany before.


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177                                         Article 19.7      page 151
Question/ The BfS performs an initial evaluation of the reported events every month and informs all
Comment nuclear authorities of the Länder, the expert organisations, the manufacturers and the
          operators of nuclear power plants. The database of the reportable events at the BfS is
          accessible to the nuclear supervisory authorities of the Länder, the BMU and GRS.
          What about other countries, e.g. those with similar or even the same type of reactors, or
          equipment (Forsmark again)?
Answer    On behalf of the Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU), the Federal Office for
          Radiation Protection (BfS) prepares two reports on reportable events at nuclear power
          plants in Germany every three months, i.e. a detailed quarterly report and an overview
          report. These overview reports are submitted to the nuclear supervisory authorities of
          several states (at present 26 addressees). The states having installed German reactors also
          receive the detailed quarterly reports in addition.
          Events that meet the respective reporting thresholds are publicly reported to the IAEA for
          the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). Technically safety relevant events are
          internationally reported to the Incident Reporting System (IRS), respectively. The criteria to
          share event information via IRS are described in the IRS manual. An important aspect is the
          potential applicability of lessons learned to other plants. In addition, Germany has bilateral
          contracts with most of its neighbouring countries and respective commissions that treat
          safety relevant events in detail. Thus, a sufficient information flow is assured. For
          additional information needs, direct contacts to the respective authorities and organisations
          are established.
178                                         Article 19.7      page 154
Question/ Special events at German nuclear power plants that are, according to INES and IRS
Comment manual, also of interest for the safety of nuclear power plants in other countries, are
          reported to the IAEA by GRS in co-ordination with the BMU, the competent Land
          authority and plant operator. This applies, in particular, to all events classified INES Level
          2.
          Does it mean, that level 2 are always reported, and level 1 or 0 are not?
Answer    There exists an international agreement that events with INES level 2 and higher have to be
          internationally reported quickly (target: within 24 hours) to NEWS. Germany strictly
          follows this agreement. Reports of events with an INES level less than 2 should be
          communicated if the events attract international public interest. Germany has already
          reported several events of this type.
179                                         Article 19.7
Question/ Could you please provide more information on the measures taken by the licensees to
Comment increase the reporting of low level events, including near-misses, to allow for their trending
          and analysis? How many such low level events are reported within licensee’s organisations
          on average, in one year?
Answer    The established comprehensive reporting criteria for recording and categorising occurred
          events cover a wide range of failure modes. The number of events characterised as low
          level events or near misses is very low per plant and year and varies regarding the failure
          mode. Obvious trends have not been recognised until now.

          Most of the events that do not meet the reporting thresholds are more relevant for plant
          availability and cost effectiveness.
          Furthermore, the licensees promote the internal reporting of any deviance by the staff.
180                                        Article 19.7     pages 149 - 154
Question/ Does the authority check the quality of the event analysing process of the licencees and


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Comment how? Does the authority carry out it's own event examinations? If yes, in which cases?
Answer    In case of a reportable event, every assessment performed by the plant operator within the
          framework of reporting pursuant to the Nuclear Safety Officer and Reporting Ordinance
          (AtSMV) [1A-17] is subject to review by the authority. Further, the reports are subjected to
          generic and independent evaluations by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS)
          and GRS. Through the independent review by different parties, the safety assessment is
          verified with a high reliability. As far as the assessment of the events gives rise to questions
          with general or generic significance, GRS prepares an Information Notice with
          recommendations that are to be checked for significance to all other German NPPs.
          Deviations with minor significance, thus not being reportable, are recorded within the
          framework of plant inspections.
181                                         Article 19.8       page 156
Question/ Report on the activities on radioactive waste management in Germany was last given within
Comment the framework of the Review Meeting under Joint Convention in May 2006.
          •The decisions concerning high level waste storage facility are reported and discussed
          within the framework of Joint Convention, but they have also influence on the safety of
          nuclear power plants. The interim storage facilities have licenses for 40 years of fuel
          storage. After that time the fuel should be transported to permanent high level storage
          facilities. What is the actual position of German government on further development of
          high level storage facilities in Goerleben?
Answer    It was demonstrated and confirmed in the licensing procedure for all interim storage
          facilities in Germany that the transport and storage containers are suitable and safe for at
          least 40 years of storage. The licences limit the storage period respectively for the on-site
          interim storage facilities and the central interim storage facilities in Ahaus and Gorleben. It
          is planned to begin operations date for the availability of a disposal site for high active
          waste and spent fuel around 2035. Therefore, at the end of the storage period spent fuel and
          high active waste containers can directly be shipped from the interim storage facilities to
          the selected and approved disposal site.
          The moratorium period for the Gorleben salt dome was commenced on 1 October 2000. It
          will be maintained for a period of up to ten years, with a legal provision, the so-called
          Gorleben-Development Freeze Ordinance (Gorleben-Veränderungssperren-Verordnung),
          ensuring that the site is preserved and made safe in its current state. The Federal
          Government used this interruption period to clarify safety-relevant and conceptual issues
          concerning disposal of high active waste and spent fuel. Further decisions, a new site
          selection procedure for a disposal site for high level radioactive waste and spent fuel or
          further investigations of the Gorleben salt dome is still an issue for a political discussion
          within the Federal Government.
          Further information will be given in the national report for the next review meeting of the
          Joint Convention in 2009.




                                                      65
                                        Convention on Nuclear Safety:
                     Responses to the Questions and Comments Posted to Germany in 2008



Additional information related to Question 154



                    Implementation of Accident Management Measures at PWRs

                                                                                                                 3/2008




                                         KWB A



                                                         KWB B
                                                 GKN 1




                                                                                                                 GKN 2
                                                                                     KKP 2




                                                                                                   KKI 2
                             KWO




                                                                             KWG
                                                                       KKG
                                                                 KKU




                                                                                             KBR
                                   KKS




                                                                                                           KKE
Measure


Emergency
management manual
Secondary side bleed
Secondary side feed
Primary side bleed
Primary side feed
Assured containment
isolation
Filtered containment
venting
Catalytic recombiners to
limit hydrogen formation
Supply-air filtering for
the control room
Emergency power
supply from
neighbouring plant
Sufficient capacity of the
batteries
Restoration of off-site
power supply
Additional off-site power
supply (underground
cable)
Sampling system in the
containment

  design             realised through backfitting measures             applied for             not applicable




                                                           66
                                          Convention on Nuclear Safety:
                       Responses to the Questions and Comments Posted to Germany in 2008




                     Implementation of Accident Management Measures at BWRs

                                                                                                              3/2008




                                                                                                   KRB B



                                                                                                              KRB C
                                                                                KKP1
                                                                 KKI 1
                                                       KKB




                                                                                       KKK
Measure


Emergency management manual
Independent injection system
Additional injection and refilling of the reactor
pressure vessel
Assured containment isolation
Diverse pressure limitation for the reactor
pressure vessel
Filtered containment venting
                                                                                                       *          *
Containment inertisation
Supply-air filtering for the control room
Emergency power supply from neighbouring
plant
Increased capacity of batteries
Restoration of off-site power supply
Additional off-site power supply (underground
cable)
Sampling system in the containment

* wetwell inerted, drywell equipped with catalytic recombiners

   design             realised through backfitting measures              applied for         not applicable




                                                       67

				
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