Palestinian Elections

					Palestinian Elections

March 2006

By Adam Hanieh

H amas’s landslide victory in the January 25 elections for the 132-seat Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC) is an unprecedented turning point for politics in both Palestine and the broader Middle
East. Arguably for the first time since the establishment of Israel in 1948, an official administrative
power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has strong popular support and is not directly beholden to
Israeli or Western interests.

Pre-election polls had consistently forecast a tight race between Hamas and the ruling party Fatah.
Hamas was expected to win approximately one-third of the seats in the PLC, with 40 percent going to
Fatah. The Independent Palestine list of Mustafa Barghouti, a prominent NGO figure in the West
Bank, was predicted to emerge as the third largest party, significantly ahead of the secular left Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Smaller parties like Badil, a coalition of smaller Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) factions, and the Third Way, led by former Palestinian Authority (PA)
Finance Minister Salam Fayyad and Hanan Ashrawi, director of the Palestinian NGO Miftah, were
also expected to gain several seats each.

Defying predictions from both participants and observers alike, final results gave Hamas 74 seats
compared to 45 for Fatah. The PFLP managed three seats, with two seats each going to Independent
Palestine, Badil, and the Third Way. Independent candidates achieved four seats. The high voter
turnout of 78 percent can be considered a definitive mandate from the Palestinian electorate.

It is hard to overstate the significance of the shift that has taken place. The Palestinian Authority under
Fatah rule—with a few notable exceptions following the uprising that began in September 2000
—was generally marked by little more than verbal disputes with the Israeli government. PA security
forces coordinated with the Israeli military, arrested political opponents and activists, responded to
Israeli actions on the ground with little more than muted, rhetorical opposition, and routinely repeated
the mantra of the “violence on both sides.” This role facilitated the demobilization and confusion of
the Palestinian national movement. The real fear that the victory of Hamas brings to Israel, the U.S.,
and EU is this: Who will they call on to control the Palestinian population now that the old PA
—however ineffective and unreliable it was from their perspective—has crumbled?

Rejecting a Political Fiction
T he popular vote for Hamas is principally a rejection of the disastrous negotiations that followed
the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. Countless voices have criticized those accords as a fig-leaf
for the ongoing colonization of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, far removed from the avowed goal of
an independent Palestinian state. Under the cover of peace negotiations, Israel continued to encircle
and isolate Palestinian towns and villages with its network of settlements, bypass roads, and
checkpoints. The Israeli military controlled Palestinian transit with a complicated system of permits
and movement restrictions. These isolated population islands were given the trappings of autonomy,
but effective control remained in the hands of the Israeli state. Oslo (and subsequent agreements) was
aimed at having Palestinians police themselves while allowing Israel to deepen this system of
Hamas’s victory is a striking indictment of this so-called peace process. Promoted with the deliberate
deceit of Western governments and the corporate media, the myth of negotiations was fully shared by
the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, most particularly by individuals such as Palestinian
President Abu Mazen and Prime Minister Abu Ala. The PA leadership came to represent submission
and surrender under the banner of peaceful negotiations and empty condemnation of violence.
Indeed, immediately prior to the Legislative Council elections, Hamas leader, Khaled Mishaal,
pointed out that, “The experiment of 50 years taught us this road was futile and Hamas would not
continue to deceive the Palestinian people with this political fiction.”

Systemic Corruption

U nderstanding the nature of the Oslo process is central to explaining the Hamas victory. Most
commentary has pointed out that popular sympathy for Hamas is based on rejection of the corruption,
nepotism, and profiteering of the ruling party Fatah following the establishment of the PA in the mid-
1990s. While this is certainly true, it provides little explanation of the root causes of this corruption.
What usually goes unstated is that this systemic corruption was a direct and deliberate outcome of the
Oslo process.

Oslo established a system in which the Palestinian Authority became completely reliant on foreign
funds for its continued survival. Israel guaranteed the subservience of the Palestinian Authority
through control over border crossings and movement between cities, a campaign of massive land
confiscation that devastated Palestinian agriculture and severed the city of Jerusalem (which provided
40 percent of the Palestinian economy) from its West Bank hinterland.

Electricity, water, and communications remained firmly in Israeli hands. This control was codified in
agreements such as the 1994 Paris Economic Protocol, which restricted what goods Palestinians were
permitted to export and import.

Foreign inflows, principally from the U.S. and EU, became the sole means of liquidity for the
Palestinian Authority. These funds, however, came with a political price and were designed to buy
compliance with ongoing colonization. Patronage and corruption were the obvious and logical
consequences of such a system. With little opportunity of sustaining a livelihood, individual survival
became dependent on the disbursements and personal contacts in the PA or Fatah. Around half a
million Pales- tinians are reliant on the PA for their livelihood.
Moreover, prominent figures in the Palestinian Authority held control over the large Palestinian
monopolies that directly conducted business with Israeli and foreign companies. Their profiteering
monopolies that directly conducted business with Israeli and foreign companies. Their profiteering
depended on the continued status quo. Perhaps the most notorious example of this was the cement
companies owned by the Palestinian prime minister, Abu Ala, later found to be directly involved in
building the apartheid wall.
An increasingly wide gap between the majority of the population and the wealthy elite in and around
the Palestinian Authority turned into a vast chasm following the onset of the Palestinian uprising in
September 2000. Poverty levels reached 70 percent in areas such as the Gaza Strip while the
conspicuous consumption of an increasingly small elite reminded the general population that the brunt
of Israeli attacks against Palestinian society was not being borne equally. In contrast, Hamas activists
are now seen as honest, reliable, and committed to the interests of the poor.

The elections were conducted with two votes: one for a West Bank/Gaza Strip-wide party list (66
seats) and one for individual candidates running on the district level (66 seats). Confirmation of how
Hamas candidates were perceived by the communities closest to them was shown by the district level
vote where Hamas took 45 out of the available 66 seats.

What Next?

T he election heralds an enormous shift if a Hamas-led PA fulfills its promise to act in accordance
with popular interests. To take one very concrete example: currently, around 100 Palestinians are held
as political prisoners in Jericho prisons by the Palestinian Authority. These activists are drawn from
all political factions. Perhaps the most notable are leaders of the PFLP who are being held for the
assassination of the far right, Israeli tourism minister, Rehavam Ze’evi, in response to the killing of the
PFLP leader Abu Ali Mustafa. Their imprisonment was ordered by the Israeli, U.S., and British
governments and was hugely unpopular across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, Ahmed
Saadat, the general secretary of the PFLP, won a seat to the legislative council at the head of the
PFLP list while being detained in Jericho. It appears highly unlikely that Hamas will continue to
comply with measures such as these and, indeed, one of their first announcements following their
victory was that they would release Saadat.

If Hamas makes good on its promise not to sustain these structures of occupation then this will be a
huge setback for Israeli and U.S. interests in the region. The situation, however, defies simplicity due
to the network of factions and interests located throughout the PA apparatus. The legislative council is
a weak body and considerable power remains in the hands of Abu Mazen and the presidential office.
The security forces—in particular the Preventative Security branch —remain a Fatah-led body under
the nominal control of Abu Mazen while Hamas, particularly in the Gaza Strip, maintains a strong
network of armed cadre.

A number of commentators have raised the fear that the election results could herald a repeat of the
1991 Algerian experience where the election victory of the Islamic party FIS was overthrown by a
military coup and led to prolonged civil war. Any repeat experience in the Palestinian context would
undoubtedly involve the Israeli military and security apparatus in both provoking and maintaining
internal armed strife. There is no doubt that Hamas is aware of this threat and they have repeatedly
stated that Hamas supports a government of national unity and have so far refused to be drawn into
armed clashes with other Palestinian factions. Nevertheless, covert Israeli support for such an
eventuality is a real possibility.
The push to keep Palestinian security forces under Abu Mazen’s control could lay the groundwork
for such a scenario. U.S. support for key PA security chiefs, such as Mohammed Dahlan and Jibril
Rajoub, is an open fact and both have been prominent in the post-election armed demonstrations by
Fatah supporters. These demonstrations have condemned the Hamas victory and called for the
resignation of Abu Mazen and the Fatah central committee. Nevertheless, in a statement released on
January 28, Fatah’s armed wing, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, described these demonstrations as a
populist grab for power by particular Fatah leaders. In a none-too- oblique reference to Mohammed
Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub, the AMB sharply criticized the organizers of the demonstrations as “ones
who spread corruption and greatly contributed to the humiliating Fatah defeat.”
The key question will be how Hamas manages the contradiction between its commitment to the
national struggle and maintaining the structures of the PA. The economic dependency of the PA will
not disappear with the Hamas victory although the political character of this relationship has been
made strikingly obvious with threats by the U.S. and EU to cut funding. It remains to be seen whether
Hamas can find alternate sources of support and whether they will attempt to implement some form of
wealth re-distribution or, instead, become more acceptable to the West.

This contradiction is not of Hamas’s making. A conscious aim of Oslo was to narrow the Palestinian
struggle to a dispute over land percentages in the West Bank and to sever any link between
Palestinians in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, those who remained in 1948 historic Palestine as Israeli
citizens, and those exiled outside of their homeland. Key to this was the destruction of the PLO as a
national liberation movement and its replacement by the Palestinian Authority state building project.

The formation of the PLO in the 1960s was a critical step forward for the Palestinian struggle as it
unified the dispersed Palestinian nation across many generations and countries. The bedrock demand
of this struggle was insistence that Palestinians had the right to return to their homes and lands from
which they had been exiled. A key feature of all negotiations since Oslo has been an attempt to
undermine this demand, reducing it to the symbolic return of a few thousand Palestinians to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Despite the willingness of individuals such as Abu Mazen to acquiesce to such
attempts, Palestinians across the globe remain united behind a full return to historic Palestine.

In a show of tragic irony following the Hamas victory, Abu Mazen claimed that he would continue
negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the PLO rather than the PA. Although this has
technically always been the case, the neutering of PLO structures post-Oslo meant that the direction
of negotiations was far removed from democratic or popular control.
Both Hamas and the PFLP campaigned around the importance of renewing Palestinian structures
outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PFLP included in its program that the Legislative
Council elections should form the mandate for the West Bank/Gaza Strip representation for the
Palestinian National Council (PNC). As the Palestinian parliament in exile, the PNC is the highest
leadership body of the PLO and supposedly represents all Palestinians in exile. It has, however, been
moribund in recent decades. The PFLP has called for elections across the world to elect the rest of the
PNC and to re-establish it as the primary force for Palestinian decision making.
In an encouraging sign Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal clearly identified this as an important strategic
orientation of Hamas. In an editorial published in the Guardian on January 31, Mishaal stated, “Our
message to the Palestinians is this: Our people are not only those who live under siege in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip but also the millions languishing in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and
Syria and the millions spread around the world unable to return home. We promise you that nothing
in the world will deter us from pursuing our goal of liberation and return. We shall spare no effort to
work with all factions and institutions in order to put our Palestinian house in order. Having won the
parliamentary elections, our medium-term objective is to reform the PLO in order to revive its role as
a true representative of all the Palestinian people, without excep- tion or discrimination.”
In this context, the Palestinian solidarity movement is faced with important challenges. Given the
disarray that Hamas’s unexpected victory has caused for Israeli and U.S. plans, we should fully
expect a sustained ideological offensive against them in the mainstream media. This campaign has
already begun with the predictable stories of the impending “Talibanization” of Palestinian society.
Such claims, however, must be treated with suspicion. Hamas’s victory expressed a political
sentiment and desire for a real alternative to the Oslo straitjacket. The Hamas leadership clearly
recognizes this and has shown little inclination to imple- ment far-reaching social changes along
religious lines.
The Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has overwhelmingly stated that these
negotiations have been a cover for the deepening of Israeli apartheid. The clear message of Hamas
representatives in the weeks following the election is that the peace process—as understood by Israeli
and Western powers and dutifully regurgitated by the mainstream press—has nothing to do with a
genuine, just peace. It remains to be seen whether the rest of the world will heed this message.

Adam Hanieh is part of the Al-Awda Right of Return Coalition and co-author of Stolen Youth: The Politics of
Israel’s Detention of Palestinian Children (2004).

From: Z Net - The Spirit Of Resistance Lives