IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § ABOLALA SOUDAVAR by pww35354

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									                         IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                                                 §
ABOLALA SOUDAVAR,                                §
                              Plaintiff          §
                                                 §
                   VS.                           §    CIVIL CAUSE NO. _________
                                                 §
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,                        §
BONYAD-E MOSTAZAFAN VA                           §
JANBAZAN, SABT-E AHVAL-E                         §
KOLL-E KESHVAR, and                              §
HOJJATOL-ISLAM NAYERRI                           §
                                                 §
                              Defendants



                            PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

        TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

        COMES NOW, ABOLALA SOUDAVAR, and files this Original Complaint:


                                              PARTIES
Plaintiff:

   Abolala Soudavar ("Soudavar" or "I") is a citizen of Iran, a legal alien and resident of Houston,

    Harris County, Texas since 1983.

Defendants:

   The Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran"), is a foreign sovereign

   Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan ("Bonyad") is a gigantic commercial organization built upon

    confiscated properties and privileged trade. It is officially structured as a non-profit organization,




                                                     -1-
    but its Board of Directors and President are appointed by the Supreme Leader Khamenei, and are

    answerable only to him; it should thus be considered as a government agency.

   Sabt-e Ahval-e koll-e Keshvar ("Sabt") is National Title Institution of Iran where all deeds are

    registered and an independent agency.

   Hojjatol-Islam Nayerri ("Nayyeri") is the chief judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts.


                                     Service of Process
       Service of Process on all Defendants is governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

(“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (a) (1) - (4), (b) (1)- (4), and Rule 4 (j)(1)F.R.C.P and will be effectuated

accordingly by certified mail return receipt requested through the court's clerk. To speed up the

process, a second set of documents shall be served through DHL international courier services. For

the Islamic Republic of Iran, service is to be effected on the Honorable Minister of Foreign affairs,

Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Tehran, Iran. Similarly, service for Bonyad shall be effected through the same

process on its Managing Director, Mr. Ali Forouzesh; for Sabt, on its Managing Director,

Mr. Mohammad-Reza Alizadeh; and for Nayerri at the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary

Courts; all located in Tehran, Iran.


                                          Introduction
       In the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, even though a new constitution was

promulgated to lay the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and an official government was

selected and/or elected to govern the country accordingly, certain individuals and revolutionary

splinter groups preferred to exert their power outside the realm of government, mainly for lucrative

purposes. Through Mafia-like operations, they control contraband and the traffic of many illegally

imported goods, and engage in extortion. Thugs and intimidating tactics are used to silence victims


                                                  -2-
as well as government officials, but most importantly, the income derived from their operations also

nourish the financial interests of many of the high placed officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

One of their most lucrative operations has been the taking of property, especially those of Iranians

residing outside the country who have limited means to combat their fraudulent tactics. In collusion

with a few judges who operate outside the regular judiciary system, and under the umbrella of

revolutionary courts, seemingly lawful orders are issued and properties are taken which are then

either sold or returned against ransom. The instant case arises out of one such operation.


                                  Facts of the case
                             th
1. On Nov. 15, 1993 the 6 section of the Revolutionary Islamic Court of Tehran rendered a

   judgment that certain properties of Soudavar and his family should be transferred for resale to

   Bonyad subject to the payment of the Fifth (khoms) of the appraised value to a special account

   no. 3466 of the Melli Bank - South Palestine street branch (appendix 1).

2. The stated causes for the judgment were as follows:

   a) that Soudavar and the rest of his family, including his father Samad and daughter “Soudabeh”

       had fled the country prior to the Islamic Revolution and had chosen to live in the “Land of

       the Infidels,”

   b) that they had abandoned their properties,

   c) and since it the management of thus abandoned property was difficult, as per the – “order” of

       the Supreme Leader, they should be appraised and, for resale purposes, their title should be

       transferred to the Bonyad

3. The enumerated properties in the judgment consisted of 10 real estate deeds and six group of

   company shares, the last one being shares of a public company, the Khawar Industrial Group


                                                -3-
   (“KIG”).

4. The judgment had to be verified and approved by the chief Revolutionary judge Nayyeri who in

   his haste to pass on said properties to his allies, approved all stated facts and allegations as

   “correct” even though:

   a) Soudavar‟s father Samad had died in 1954 in Tehran and his daughter Sara (and not

       Soudabeh) was born in Los Angeles after the Revolution, and that Soudavar himself had left

       Iran some 7 months after the Revolution

   b) it listed a property belonging to Soudavar's mother, Ezzat-Malek Soudavar, who still resides

       in Iran

   c) the shares of KIG, which are now the subject of a parallel suit in this court (00CV01717),

       were nationalized prior to Soudavar's departure from Iran and were in the custody of a

       government agency, Sazman-e Gostaresh va Nowsazi Sanaye Iran; they were not abandoned

       and not in the custody of the Bonyad

   d) more generally, the other enumerated shares were from private or public companies with a

       functioning board of directors when Soudavar left the country, and that the departure of a

       registered shareholder could not be equated with an abandonment of shares

   e) the enumerated real estate was never abandoned but in the custody of a staff managed by

       Soudavar‟s mother who paid all relevant related taxes and duties, and most particularly, a

       construction project was under way for the Malek Caravansarai (item #2 of the judgment list)

       for which municipal approval had been obtained and more than $700'000 in permit fees had

       been paid, and that

   f) most of those real estates remained in the name and possession of Soudavar or his mother for


                                               -4-
           year‟s after the judgment, and some are still in their possession and therefore, never

           abandoned as claimed in said order.

5. Nayyeri's notations justify the sale as being conducted out of necessity and on behalf of the

      owners, that the proceeds (or what shall remain of it after deducting management charges and a

      Fifth) are to be kept in a temporary account and to be returned to owners upon their return subject

      to a new ruling from the Revolutionary Court (see appendix 1).

6. In a letter addressed to Nayyeri (appendix 2), Soudavar not only objected to the untrue facts but

      also to the applicability of the so-called order of the Supreme Leader that nobody had or has seen.

7. The matter was also addressed as a petition to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament (appendix3)

      raising concern about:

      a) the concept of the “Land of Infidels” and penalties for Iranians living abroad

      b) the jurisdictional reliance on a non-documented “order of the Supreme Leader” that is not

           revealed to anybody

      c) and the requisition of the Fifth of the capital value of real estate in disagreement with Iranian

           civil Law and Moslem jurisprudence1

      d) finally, the Speaker was requested to verify the above concepts, and to openly declare them as

           applicable law if they really should be considered as such!

8. Even though article 90 of the Iranian Constitution requires the Speaker to answer such petitions,


1
    According to the Koran (VIII:41) a Fifth of the spoils of the holy wars should be distributed among the relatives of
the prophet, the needy and the orphans. The majority of Moslems that is the Sunnis believe that the Fifth only applied
as the text reads, that is to spoils of war and not commercial activities. The Shiite majority on the other hand have
developed a jurisprudence that extend the Fifth to revenue but not to capital. Most importantly, even the Shiites
recognize that the Fifth cannot be extracted, but must only be paid on a voluntary basis, and to a religious leader
chosen by the devout person.
                                                           -5-
     and despite several reminders and requests to see or to get a copy of the Supreme Leaders

     "order", no answer was received. Follow-ups to the newly elected Speaker (this last summer)

     have remained unanswered. Nayyeri also refused to answer. Only copies of the above that were

     sent to President Rafsanjani and subsequently to President Khatami, were acknowledged as

     received with a promise of enquiry, but no further news ever developed from this end either.

9.   As the operations of the Nayyeri-Bonyad mafia is usually based on fraudulent assumptions, all

     orders and correspondence are conducted in absolute secrecy and victims are never notified about

     them. Thus, by the time that - by pure hazard - Soudavar finally obtained a copy of the 1993

     order (mentioned in fact 1), a few properties had already been taken by Bonyad. The letters

     mentioned in facts 6 and 7 put a temporary freeze on the activity of Bonyad. But with the

     approach of new elections and the growing power of the reformist faction in Iran, Bonyad

     attempted one more time to illegally grab as many properties as possible. In a letter addressed to

     the Sabt and dated June 20, 1998 (appendix 4), Bonyad claimed that the Soudavar family had

     been dispossessed by the 1993 order and demanded that further Soudavar family properties be

     titled to them. By intimidating the Soudavar-employed guardians of said properties to leave,

     Bonyad has in the past year been able to take possession of them and the Sabt has issued new

     titles. Through bribery and corruption Sabt even titled property 37/3231 that was not even listed

     in that correspondence, to Bonyad.

10. The no. 3466 account of the Melli Bank is non-governmental account and its proceeds are not

     accounted in the government budget. It is used to line the pockets of the government officials

     who support the Bonyad mafia.




                                                  -6-
                                         Cause of action
           The fraudulent takeover and resale of Soudavar's properties has deprived him of assets

estimated at $20,000,000. Hence this lawsuit.


                                            JURISDICTION
           Jurisdiction is provided through 28 U.S.C. §1330(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. §§1601

et seq., FSIA,2 and the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the

United States of America and Iran, June, 16, 1957; 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93

(“Treaty of Amity”),3 and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.


2
    FSIA (in relevant parts)
§1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act
a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case-
    ....
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.


3
    The Treaty of Amity (in relevant parts)
The United States of America and Iran, desirous of emphasizing the friendly relations which have prevailed between
their peoples, of reaffirming the high principles in the regulation of human affairs to which they are committed, of
encouraging mutually beneficial trade and investments and closer economic intercourse generally between their
peoples, and of regulating consular relations, have resolved to conclude, on the basis of reciprocal equality of
treatment, a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, …


Article III. 2.     Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have their juridical status
                                                           -7-
           Since the lawsuit is against a foreign sovereign, jurisdiction is available if the case qualifies

as an exception to the FSIA. We shall claim that this case qualifies both, as a commercial exception

stipulated in FSIA 1605 (a), and as a treaty exception stated in FSIA 1604.4


                                   FSIA - Commercial exception
           The third clause of FSIA § 1605(a)(2):




recognized within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in defense
and pursuit of their rights, to the end that prompt and impartial justice be done. Such access shall be allowed, in any
event, upon terms no less favorable than those applicable to nationals and companies of such other High Contracting
Party or of any third country. It is understood that companies not engaged in activities within the country shall enjoy
of such access without any requirement of registration or domestication.


Article IV (in relevant parts): Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, including
interest in property, shall receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party, in no case less than required by international law. Such property shall not be taken except for a
public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be
in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision
shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination and payment thereof.


Article XI.4: No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations, associations, and government
agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial,
shipping or business activity within the territory of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself
or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgement or other liability to which privately
owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.


4
    Section 1330(a) provides "district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of any nonjury civil action against a
foreign state ... as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement." See
generally Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1967 n. 5, 76 L.Ed.2d 81
(1983).
                                                             -8-
        …[3] an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
        activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States,

is invoked here to establish that our case fits a commercial exception of the FSIA. For this exception,

the "act outside the territory" of the USA shall be the taking of Soudavar properties and the

"commercial activity of the foreign state" shall be their resale.


A- Commercial nature of the activity
      Weltover informs us that the “nature” of a transaction is controlling and not its “purpose” and

reiterates that a foreign state engaging in "commercial" activities "do[es] not exercise powers peculiar

to sovereigns"; rather, it "exercise[s] only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens"

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607; 112 S.Ct. 2160 (1992), at 614, 2166. In the instant

case not only the nature of the foreign state activity is a resale transaction of the kind that any private

citizen can engage in, but it's declared purpose also confirms its nature by stipulating in the 1993

judgment that the taking was for the purpose of resale (fact 1).

        One should note that the aura of sovereignty that the 1993 judgment projects on this foreign

activity cannot be considered as a deterrent for such interpretation of commerciality, since said

judgment was fraudulent and based on misrepresentation. Indeed:

   as explained in fact 4 above, none of the listed properties were abandoned nor could be

    interpreted as abandoned, and this undermines the legality of the judgment

   Article 167 of the Iranian Constitution stipulates that judiciary decisions should be based on

    existing laws or should the need arise, on recognized authoritative Islamic sources of

    jurisprudence or recognized authoritative fatwas (i.e. religious decree). Neither the Iranian

    Constitution nor any other Iranian law define the whereabouts of the Land of Infidels, or levy a



                                                   -9-
      penalty on Iranians living abroad or require the Fifth to be an obligatory contribution rather than

      voluntary. These questions are simply not addressed there and cannot be used as a legal basis.

     The Supreme Leader Khamenei is the top ranked political authority of Iran but his religious

      knowledge is generally not considered at a level allowing him to issue religious proclamations.

      But even if Nayyeri implicitly recognizes him as a religious authority, the hidden, unrevealed

      (and perhaps non-existent) "order" of the Supreme Leader cannot constitute a basis for judgement

      because it is neither public nor documented; it is unrecognized and therefore lacks authority.

     If the illegal 1993 judgment was to be taken at face value, it could still not be read as a

      confiscation of all Soudavar properties for the simple reason that the basis of the 1993 order was

      a claim of abandonment of property. Therefore it only applied to those listed in said order. If

      further “abandoned” property were to be discovered by Defendants, a new judgment was required

      to confiscate them. But such has been the arrogance of Defendants that even a semblance of

      legality no matter how egregious the accusation (such as a flight to the Land of Infidels) is no

      longer observed and the taking of properties subsequent to the 1998 letter was without any

      pretense to legality.5

     Finally, Defendants' activities have much in common with certain Mafia operations in which

      judges are bribed, government officials are intimated and victims are robbed of their property

      under a veil of legality.

           The Iranian Constitution and laws define the sovereign state of Iran. If acts and activities of

certain government officials, organs or agencies fall outside the realm of said constitution and laws, it


5
    Defendants' activities much resembles the acts of piracy referred to in The Brig Malek Adhel , 43 U.S. (2 How.)
210, 232 (1844), where the Supreme Court observed that pirates were " hostis humani generis " (an enemy of all
mankind) in part because they acted "without . . . any pretense of public authority."
                                                          - 10 -
is by definition fraudulent and therefore cannot pretend to be sovereign. To recognize such acts and

activities as sovereign is tantamount to conferring sovereign status to the Mafia in the United States.


C- Direct effect
       In Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438 (C.A.D.C. 1990) at

451, a variety of "direct effect" cases are enumerated including non-payment of principal and interest

to US residents in Callejo v. Bancome S.A. 764 F2d at 1110 1112, and breach of contract or letter of

credit to a Texas corporation in Texas Milling Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d

300 (2d Circ. 1981) at 312-13. Since Soudavar has been a legal alien in the USA from 1983 onwards,

it is clear that the taking and resale of his properties has direct effects in the US as capital losses. An

obvious consequence of the capital losses in the instant case is that they are reportable to the IRS.

Whether the losses are deemed to occur by the IRS after the taking, or re-titling, or possession, or

resale of said properties, the timing of the direct effect is post 1983 and after Soudavar became a

legal resident.

        The third clause of FSIA 1605 a (2) is thus applicable here.


                                       Treaty of Amity
        When the FSIA is in direct conflict with an international agreement the 1604 exception is

applicable as per Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US 428. 109 S. Ct. 683,

692, 102 L. Ed 2d 818 (1989) (“This exception [to FSIA] applies when international agreements

„expressly conflic[t]‟ with the immunity provisions of the FSIA”). The Treaty of Amity is one such

treaty because it confers jurisdictional rights in excess of the FSIA. We shall argue applicability

along the lines developed in a parallel case (00cv01717) currently submitted to this court.




                                                   - 11 -
Jurisdiction through articles III and IV combined
       Articles III and IV of the treaty confer the following rights to an Iranian in the USA:

1. If a US citizen has the right to sue Iran through the Treaty of Amity or through any other vehicle,

      then nationals of Iran in the United States shall have equal rights and jurisdictional stature.

2. Since courts have confirmed the rights of US citizens to sue Iran for compensation of property

      taken by Iran, then as an Iranian in the US, Soudavar must have the same jurisdictional rights.

           The didactic right evoked in the first point above stems from Article III of the treaty which

confers juridical rights to Iranians in the US “in all degrees of jurisdiction” and “upon terms no less

favorable than those applicable to nationals” of the United States “or of any third country.” The same

didactic reasoning has been used by other courts to determine for instance that citizens of each

signatory state must receive “national treatment with respect to … access to the courts of justice,”

whether in consideration of the Treaty of Amity when an Iranian national was suing a US corporation

(Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1978)), or in consideration of a

similar treaty of friendship when an Irish company was suing another Irish entity (Irish Nationals, at

91-92). Although the preceding opinions were expressed in consideration of forum non conveniens

matters and not jurisdictional ones, the applicable principle is the same as in here.6

           As for the second point above, American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980) established the jurisdictional rights of American citizens to sue Iran

in a U.S. court in order to obtain full compensation for properties taken by Iran. This was further



6
    Similarly, in Song v. Kim, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17713 (D.N.J. 1993), the circuit court reasoned that a similar
“national treatment” clause included in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea, 7th November 1957 “elevat[es] a [foreign] judgement to the status of a
sister state judgement” and allows a Korean national to enforce it in New Jersey.
                                                           - 12 -
reaffirmed in Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist

Ethiopia, 729 F.2n 422 (6th Cir. 1984), at 426. The rights of Iranian nationals can be no less.

           Several points need to be emphasized here:

a) The American International Group case was referred to The Hague court where it was awarded

      compensation on the basis of rights conferred by the Treaty of Amity.7 A good portion of the

      claims and awards at The Hague were ultimately based on the Treaty of Amity.8 Had it not been

      for the Algiers accords, the numerous lawsuits against Iran that were channeled to the

      International court of The Hague would have certainly been filed in US courts with the same type

      of arguments.

b) The Treaty of Amity is often labeled, and perceived, as a treaty only concerned with the rights of

      US nationals versus Iran, and vice versa. Such label or perception perhaps creates a prejudice for

      the acceptance of a didactic right that allows Iranians in the US to sue Iran for compensation of

      taken properties. However, nothing in the language of the treaty precludes such a conclusion. To

      the contrary, since the treaty proclaims at its very beginning the intent of “reaffirming the high

      principles in the regulation of human affairs,”9 (before and on par with two other goals: 1-

      “encouraging mutually beneficial trade and investments and closer economic intercourse

      generally between their peoples,” 2- “regulating consular relations”) one can only conclude that

      the treaty was meant to protect the rights of nationals of both countries in the broadest terms.

      Thus, our conclusion conforms to such intent.


7
    See American International Group, Inc. et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 93-2-3 (19 Dec. 1983),
reprinted in 4 Iran-US C.T.R. 96.
8
    See for instance G.H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, pp. 218-26.
9
    Treaty of Amity, at 901

                                                          - 13 -
c) Moreover, to maintain that such didactic reasoning is incompatible with the intent of the Treaty is

      to accept that the US signed a treaty of friendship with a country that did not share the same

      values or principles, especially in regards to fundamental issues such as property rights. One may

      do business with an unprincipled partner but one does not call him a friend! Secretary of State,

      John foster Dulles, under whose tenure the Treaty of Amity was concluded was precisely such a

      man: he participated in the 1955 Bandung Conference but refused to shake hand with the Chinese

      Premier, Chouenlai, and acknowledge him as a friend.10

d) Should either of the High Contracting Parties feel that these are unforeseen or unwanted

      outcomes, they have the prerogative to abrogate the treaty and limit their exposure.11 Debasing

      the sanctity of a bilateral treaty and watering down the meaning of its articles should not be a

      substitute for abrogation.

e) In Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F2d 438, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the

      D.C. Circuit Court extended the Supreme Court‟s Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess decision

      to Article IV of the Treaty of Amity. But in doing so it emphasized:

           “We do not decide here in what contexts, if any, the Treaty of Amity might constitute a
           waiver of immunity. We conclude only that the treaty has not effected a waiver in the instant
           case” (emphasis added), Foremeost at 347.

           Since the circuit court restricted its decision to the Foremost case alone, exploration of the

applicability of the treaty exception through a different angle is permissible here. In the Argentine


10
     As for Dulles' reaction towards countries with nationalizing policies, perhaps it would be helpful to remember that
because of a vested interest in United Fruit whose possessions in Guatemala had been partially nationalized by the
government of Jacopo Arbenz, he organized, together with his brother, the then head of the CIA Allen Dulles, a little
coup in 1954 to do away with nationalization (see "Whew! That War's Over. Ready for Another?" by L. Rohter,
New York Times, January 5, 1997).
11
     As per Article XXIII (3), the termination of the treaty requires one year advance notice.
                                                           - 14 -
Republic v. Amerada Hess decision, the Supreme Court first addressed maritime conventions such as

the Geneva Convention of the High Seas and the Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention, and

stated:

           “these conventions, however, only set forth substantive rules of conduct and state that
           compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs.FN10. They do not create private rights of
           action for foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in the United
           States‟‟; Argentine v. Amerada Hess at 692.

           Contrary to the maritime conventions, Article III of the Treaty of Amity establishes private

rights of action for nationals of Iran in U.S. courts.12 Therefore, said portion of Argentine Republic v.

Amerada Hess is inapplicable to the Treaty of Amity when Articles III and IV are considered in

tandem.

f) The Supreme Court then dealt with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Aug. 8,

      1938, United States-Liberia, separately and untangled from its remarks regarding maritime

      conventions. It rejected the treaty's relevance to issues of immunity waiver, not because it

      considered said treaty as mere rules of conduct (as for the maritime conventions) but because the

      rights conferred therein were subject to conformity to “local laws,” and the FSIA was considered

      one such law; Argentine v. Amerada Hess, at 693. Such language does not appear in the Treaty of

      Amity. The loophole that allowed a drop back into the FSIA from the Liberian treaty, does not

      exist in the treaty with Iran.

The Treaty of Amity can therefore be invoked as an exception to the FSIA. It provides jurisdiction

for this case.


12
     Also, none of the two maritime conventions considered in Argentine v. Amerada Hess rise in stature to the level
of Treaty of Amity. The Treaty of Amity is a bilateral and self-executing treaty, approved by a 2/3 majority of the
U.S Senate and ratified by the President of the United States as per Art. II of the U.S Constitution. Art. VI of the U.S.
Constitution dictates that such treaty is the “supreme Law of the Land.”
                                                         - 15 -
                             Jurisdiction as per the Alien Tort Act
           The Alien Tort Act provides: the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil

action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the

United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). As reiterated in Kadic v. Karadzic 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Circ.

1995), at 238, this statute confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the following three

conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) clearly violating the law of nations or a

treaty of the United States. The first and second conditions are obviously met in the instant case.

What needs to be demonstrated is the third condition.

           The Alien Tort Act provides jurisdiction against all Defendants, perhaps with the

exception of Iran itself (since the FSIA may override it as it comes "later in date").13 Its

applicability to the rest of Defendants stems not only from the fact that the fraudulent takeovers

and resale of properties are in violation of the law of nations but also in violation of the Treaty of

Amity. Indeed, the 1993 judgment is based on the notion that the United States is the "Land of

Infidels." It is derogatory and belligerent against the US, for it is a reminder of the religious duty

of Iranian Moslems (i.e. some 95% of the population) to combat "infidels" and therefore a clear

violation of the Treaty of Amity.14


                                                Remedy
           Plaintiff begs the Court to uphold his entitlement to compensation in an amount no less
than the sums pled above, and prays that upon final trial hereof, it shall have judgements against

13
     Kadic v. Karadzic notes "We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its
reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by
those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals"; at 239, and "However, as in Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 889, we doubt that the acts of even a state official, taken in violation of a nation's fundamental law and
wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an act of state."
14
     See footnote 3 supra
                                                          - 16 -
Defendants as follows:
1. For actual, direct, indirect, special and consequential damages, both present and future,
   against Defendants for loss and damage.
2. For punitive damages against Bonyad and Defendants other than Iran as provided by law.
3. For pre-judgement interest as allowed by law.
4. For post-judgement interest as allowed by law.
5. Costs of courts.
6. For all other relief for which Plaintiff might show himself to be justly entitled.




Respectfully submitted this 18th      day of October, 2000.


                                                              _____________________
                                                              Abolala Soudavar (pro se)
                                                              8403 Westglen dr.
                                                              Houston, TX 77063
                                                              tel: 713 784-1400
                                                              fax: 713 784-1916




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