Docstoc

SSR

Document Sample
SSR Powered By Docstoc
					          N
          A
          T
          I
          0
          N
          A
          L
          T
          R
          A
          N
          S
          P
          0
          R
          T
          A
          T
          I
          0
          N
          S
          A
          F
          .E
         .-
          T
          Y
Doc
N rst)    6
AAI(
 73A4
          0
c .2      A
          R
         ID
                                         FILE NO. 1-0022

   AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
            TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
              BOEING 707-331C, N15712
       SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
            SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
                SEPTEMBER 13,1972
AWPTED: MARCH 14, 1973




                         NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
                                Washington, 0. C. 20591

              /I.              REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-AAR-73-4
                                                               TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD TITLE PAGE
.   Report No.                            2.Government Accession No.    3.Recipient's Catalog No.
    NTSB-AAR-73-4
'                              A i r c r a f t Accident Report
    T i t l e and S u b t i t l e                                       -                5.Report Date
rans World A i r l i n e s , Inc., Boeing 707-331C, Nl57l2,                               Marrh 14. 1973
Light 604, San Francisco, C a l i f o r n i a                                            6.Performing Organization
zptember 13, 1972                                                                          Code
. Author(s).
         .                                                                               8.Performing Organization
                                                                                           Report No.

. Performing          Organization Name and Address                                      i0.Work U n i t No.
ureau of Aviation Safety                                                                                 1039
xtional Transportation Safety Board                                                      I l . C o n t r a c t o r Grant No.
sshington, D. C. 20591
                                                                                         13.Type o f Report and
                                                                                            Period Covered
2.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
                                                                                           A i r c r a f t Accident Renort




                                                                                 -I
        NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
        Washington, D. C. 20591                                                          1 .Sponsoring Agency Code

                                                                                     I
5.Supplementary Notes



&.Abstract

          O September 13, 1972, a Trans World A i r l i n e s , Inc., Boeing 707-331C, on a
           n
scheduled cargo f l i g h t from San Francisco, California, t o John F. Kennedy
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Airport, Jamaica, New York, crashed i n t o San Francisco Bay
following a r e j e c t e d t a k e o f f . There were no i n j u r i e s t o t h e t h r e e crewmembers,
t h e only occupants on board. The a i r c r a f t was s u b s t a n t i a l l y damaged.

      The National Transportation Safety Board determines t h a t t h e probable cause
of t h i s accident was t h e i n i t i a t i o n of r e j e c t e d takeoff procedures, beyond V
speed, w i t h i n s u f f i c i e n t runway remaining i n which t o s t o p t h e a i r c r a f t . Th;
crew a c t i o n was prompted by t h e f a i l u r e of t h e two r i g h t t r u c k r e a r t i r e s
which produced a noticeable a i r c r a f t v i b r a t i o n and a reduction i n a i r c r a f t
acceleration.




17.Key Words                                                                             1 8 . D i s t r i b u t i o n Statement

Rejected takeoff, takeoff reference speeds, _reverse                                       Released t o public
t h r u s t , p e r r u n , _bead bundles.                                                 D i s t r i b u t i o n unlimited



19.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n    20.Security C l a s s i f i c a t i o n       21.No.    of Pages        22.Price
   (of t h i s report)                        ( o f t h i s page)
         UNCLASSIFIED                           UNCLASSIFIED                                      12
UTSB Form 1765.2 (11/70)
                                                           ii
               T A S WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
                RN
                BOEING 707-331C, N15712
           SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
                SAN FRANCISCO, CALLFORNlA
                   SFMR 13, 1972
                    ET E


                               F
                        TABLE O CONTENPS




Synopsis  .....................
Investigation   ..................
Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations   .................
     Appendix A - Crew Information   .......
    Appendix B   -   A i r c r a f t Information   ......




                             iii
                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -E
                S P E C I A L N O T I C


     This report contains the essential items of informa-
tion relevant to the probable cause and safety message to
be derived from this accident/incident. However, for those
having a need for more detailed information, the original
factual report of the accident/incident is on file in the
Washington office of the National Transportation Safety
Board. Upon request, the report will be reproduced com-
mercially at an average cost of 15$ per page for printed
matter and 854 per page for photographs, plus postage.
(Minimum charge is $ 2 . 0 0 . )

     Copies of material ordered will be mailed from the
Washington, D. C. business firm which holds the current
contract for commercial reproduction of the Board's public
files. Billing is sent direct to the requester by that
firm and includes a $2.00 user service charge by the Safety
Board for special service. This charge is in addition to
the cost of reproduction. No payments should be made to
the National Transportation Safety Board.

     Requests for reproduction should be forwarded to the:

          National Transportation Safety Board
          Administrative Operations Division
          Accident Inquiries & Records Section
          Washington, D. C. 20591




                        V
                                                                         F i l e No. 1-0022


                        NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
                              W S I G O , D. C. 20591
                                      '
                                A HN L N
                              AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted:      March   14, 1973

                              RN
                             T A S WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
                              BOEING 707-331C, N15712
                         S4N FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
                              SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
                                 SEPTFNBER 13, 1972
                                            SYNOPSIS

       A Trans World A i r l i n e s , Inc., Boeing 707-33112, crashed i n t o
San Francisco Bay at approximately 2243 P a c i f i c daylight time,
September 13, 1972, following a r e j e c t e d takeoff f o Runway OlR at
                                                                    rm
t h e San Francisco I n t e r n a t i o n a l Airport, San Francisco, California.
Flight 604 was a r e g u l a r l y scheduled cargo f l i g h t from San Francisco,
California, t o t h e John F. Kennedy I n t e r n a t i o n a l Airport, Jamaica,
Nw York. There were no i n j u r i e s t o t h e t h r e e crewmembers, t h e only
  e
persons on board. The a i r c r a f t was s u b s t a n t i a l l y damaged.

         The i n v e s t i g a t i o n disclosed t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t f a i l e d t o s t o p on
t h e remaining runway following a r e j e c t e d takeoff i n i t i a t e d by t h e
captain. This a c t i o n was taken a f t e r t h e takeoff r o l l had t r a v e r s e d
approximately h a l f t h e 9,500-foot runway t o t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e i n t e r -
sections of Runway OlR with p a r a l l e l Runways 28L and 28R. The a c t i o n
was i n i t i a t e d when t h e crew detected a n a i r c r a f t v i b r a t i o n and a
reduction i n a i r c r a f t acceleration, a f t e r passing VI speed. Crew
a c t i o n included t h e use of wheel braking, s p o i l e r operation, and
reverse engine t h r u s t . However, t h e a i r c r a f t overran t h e departure
end of t h e runway and a breakwater and came t o r e s t i n San Francisco Bay,
approximately 50 f e e t from t h e shoreline.

        Following t h e accident, numerous pieces of t i r e t r e a d and shredded
t i r e casings from t h e d i s i n t e g r a t e d No. 3 and No. 4 r e a r t i r e s were
found along t h e runway. Dual wheel rim marks from t h e s e wheels were
a l s o evident.

      The National Transportation Safety Board determines t h a t t h e
probable cause of t h i s accident w s t h e i n i t i a t i o n of r e j e c t e d takeoff
                                                  a
procedures, beyond Vi speed, w i t h i n s u f f i c i e n t runway remaining i n
which t o s t o p t h e a i r c r a f t . The crew a c t i o n was prompted by t h e f a i l u r e
of t h e two r i g h t t r u c k r e a r t i r e s which produced a noticeable a i r c r a f t
vibration and a reduction i n a i r c r a f t a c c e l e r a t i o n .

     A s a r e s u l t of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s accident, t h e Safety Board
recommends reconsideration of recommendations previously made t o t h e
Federal Aviation Administration.
                                                 - 2   -
                                           TWESTIGATION                                                At 2
                                                                                                       and
         Trans World Airlines, Inc., Boeing 707-331C, Nl57l2, a r r i v e d i n                        the
San Francisco a s n i g h t 667 a t 0655 P.d.t. 1 on September 13, 1972.
                                                        1                                              nois
During ground time i n preparation f o r d e p a r h r e as F l i g h t 604, the a i r -               runw
craft received layover service maintenance which included an inspection                                 k
                                                                                                        a
                                                                                                       mi
of t h e landing gear assembly, t h e t i r e s , and t h e engines. A s e c u r i t y
check was completed 18 minutes p r i o r t o ramp departure. The computed
takeoff reference speeds 2 / f o r a takeoff a t 308,844 pounds with a                                 aPPr
f l a p s e t t i n g were V1-125 h o t s ; VR-148 knots and v2-165 knots. These                       i n a'
c a l c u l a t i o n s were based on a wind from 290" a t 10 knots, and a temperature
of 55".
                                                                                                       the
         The crew boarded t h e a i r c r a f t and completed t h e necessary c h e c k l i s t s ,    feet
and the f l i g h t was cleared t o t a x i t o Runway 01R a t 2233. F l i g h t 604
departed from t h e cargo gate with 77,714 pounds of cargo and 98,000 pounds
of fuel. W i n g t h e t a x i operation t h e r e was conversation between t h e                      door
captain and t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r concerning heavy takeoffs and takeoff abort                  Guar
procedures. The captain s t a t e d , " I t ' s your takeoff."         e
                                                                      H l a t e r remarked,
" I f t h e r e ' s an abort, I'll do it Sandy." The a i r c r a f t was t a x i e d i n t o
takeoff p o s i t i o n by following t h e t a x i guideline t o t h e runway c e n t e r -            and
l i n e , This point was located 300 f e e t from t h e runway threshold. A t                          4,70
2241:49.5, t h e f l i g h t was cleared f o r takeoff.                                                28R,
                                                                                                       whee
          The takeoff was normal u n t i l approximately 3 seconds a f t e r t h e c a p t a i n       whi c
c a l l e d "v".        By t h i s time the a i r c r a f t had progressed approximately h a l f -
way down %he runway t o t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Runway 01R with
                                                                                                       whee
                                                                                                       the
Runways 28L and 28R. A t t h i s time, a v i b r a t i o n was noted. The v i b r a t i o n            APPr
i n t e n s i f i e d and continued throughout t h e remainder of t h e takeoff roll.                  righ
According t o t h e crew, the runway i s uneven throughout t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n
and some v i b r a t i o n i s expected.
                                                                                                       Flig
       The captain s t a t e d t h a t t h e noise and v i b r a t i o n were associated with          atur
t h e landing gear. There were s e v e r a l other loud "clunking" sounds during                       inch
the next s e v e r a l seconds and t h e a i r c r a f t ' s a c c e l e r a t i o n diminished. The
captain reported, "The runway markings a t t h e north end of t h e runway were
about t o pass under us ( t h e first painted runway surface marking i s located                       Fli@
approximately 2,000 f e e t from t h e north end of t h e runway). W had not y e t        e            trac
reached VR       - t h e speed was under 140 knots. I was convinced w were n o t           e           wit?
going t o c l e a r t h e runway and approach l i g h t s . I immediately i n i t i a t e d
abort procedures, using fill brakes, s p o i l e r s and reverse t h r u s t . "
                                                                                                       RLUlk
                                                                                                       be CE
-/
1    A l l times are P a c i f i c daylight time based on t h e 24-how clock.                          t rac
-
2/    ~1- - C r i t i c a l engine f a i l u r e speed.                                                attz
                                                                                                       take
      vR --Rotation speed.                                                                             secc
      v2 --Takeoff s a f e t y speed.
                                                          - 3 -
          A t 2242:46.7, t h e sound of engine noise decreased as t h e power was reduced,
          and t h e captain i n i t i a t e d a b o r t procedures. Approximately 2 seconds l a t e r ,
          t h e engineer s t a t e d , "Gotta blown t i r e . " A t 2242:49.4, t h e sound of engine
          noise increased as t h e captain applied reverse t h r u s t . A s t h e end of t h e
                    a
          runway w s nearing, t h e captain turned t h e a i r c r a f t t o t h e r i g h t t o avoid
1         making   contact with t h e approach l i g h t s .

                The a i r c r a f t continued past t h e overrun, t o t h e r i g h t of t h e Runway l 9 L
          approach l i g h t s t r u c t u r e , and over t h e breakwater. The a i r c r a f t came t o r e s t
          i n about 10 f e e t of water, approximately 50 f e e t offshore.
ture
                  The a i r c r a f t fuselage broke around i t s e n t i r e circumference, forward of
          t h e wings. The nose gear assembly, t h e No. 2 engine, and approximately 6
3ts,
          f e e t of t h e l e f t wing t i p separated from t h e a i r c r a f t .

unds           The crew launched a l i f e r a f t and boarded it through t h e main cabin
          door. They were subsequently picked up and brought ashore by a U. S. Coast
ort       Guard rescue h e l i c o p t e r . There were no i n j u r i e s t o t h e crewmembers.
ed,
                   A examination of Runway OIR revealed numerous pieces of t i r e casing
                    n
          and t r e a d of varying s i z e s strewn along t h e runway, s t a r t i n g a t a point
          4,700 f e e t from t h e threshold, through t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n s of Runways 28L and
          28R, t o a point 6,800 f e e t down t h e runway. Evidence of right landing gear
          wheel r i m imprints were found 6,450 f e e t down t h e runway. These marks,
.ptain    which were l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d as having been made by t h e No. 3 and No. 4 r e a r
lalf -    wheels, along with t h e scuff marks of t h e s i x remaining t i r e s , continued t o
with      t h e San Francisco Bay shoreline, which i s 316 f e e t beyond t h e runway end.
;ion      Approximately 300 f e e t short of t h e runway end, a l l t r a c k s veered t o t h e
..
ion
          r i g h t half of t h e runway.

                   The San Francisco hourly weather r e p o r t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e crew of
          Flight 604 at b r i e f i n g time was c l e a r s k i e s , v i s i b i l i t y 12 miles, temper-
Jith      a t u r e 55" F., dew point 52' F., wind 300" a t 12 knots, a l t i m e t e r 30.02
?in@;     inches Hg.      The runway was reported t o be dry.
 The
 were              The a i r c r a f t was equipped with a Lockheed A i r Service Model 109-C
xated     F l i g h t Data Recorder (FDR), S e r i a l No. 759. h a m i n a t i o n of t h e recorded
o t yet   t r a c e s disclosed that a l l parameters had been recorded i n a normal manner
 not      with no evidence of recorder malfunction or recording abnormalities.
sd
                    The FDR readout showed t h a t coincident with t h e final t u r n onto
          Runway OIR, t h e airspeed t r a c e began t o move upward from zero as t h e heading
          became s t a b i l i z e d at about 009". A t approximately 134 knots, t h e airspeed
          t r a c e showed a reduction i n a i r c r a f t acceleration. The maximum speed
          a t t a i n e d was 142 knots which was reached 49 seconds a f t e r t h e start of t h e
          takeoff. From t h i s point, t h e speed decreased t o 27 knots within 11.5
          seconds.
                                              - 4 -
         The extensively damaged a i r c r a f t was removed from San Francisco Bay.
Examination of t h e main landing gear wheels and t i r e s disclosed t h a t a l l
t i r e s were properly i n f l a t e d , except Nos. 3 and 4 which exhibited only t h e
t i r e bead bundles. The f u s e plugs on these wheels were i n t a c t and had not
melted. There was no evidence of m i l l i n g of t h e wheel rims.

          The two f a i l e d t i r e s were No. 3 and No. 4 r e a r . Both t i r e s were in-
s t a l l e d at John F. Kennedy I n t e r n a t i o n a l Airport, N w York, on September 5,
                                                                       e
1972, and each had been subjected t o 26 landings p r i o r t o t h e accident.
No. 3 r e a r t i r e , General T i r e S/N 92520279N3, had been recapped t h r e e times,
whereas, t h e No. 4 r e a r t i r e , Firestone I n t e r n a t i o n a l S/N 11R040234, had
been recapped four times. Both t i r e s had been recapped by t h e Mchwell
T i r e Co., Kansas City, Missouri. An examination of t h e records of Mchwell's
f a c i l i t y showed t h a t it met o r exceeded t h e minimum standards e s t a b l i s h e d by
t h e Federal Aviation Administration f o r recapping a i r c r a f t t i r e s .

       A l l landing gear wheel brakes, except those on t h e two r i g h t landing
gear r e a r wheels, showed evidence of high stopping energies. The No. 3
and No. 4 r e a r wheel brakes displayed only normal braking wear. None of
t h e brakes leaked during t e s t i n g .

     The a n t i s k i d system valves, wheel transducers, and t h e e l e c t r o n i c
control s h i e l d were subjected t o t e s t s and found t o be within allowable
tolerances and capable of normal operation.

         The engines, and t h e t h r u s t reversing system operated normally u n t i l t h e
a i r c r a f t entered San Francisco Bay.
                                                                                                       i
         The crewmembers were employed by Trans World A i r l i n e s , Inc., were c e r t i f -
i c a t e d f o r t h e type e q u i p e n t and operation involved, and were q u a l i f i e d
i n accordance with e x i s t i n g company and Federal regulations. (See Appendix A                   i
for d e t a i l e d informat ion. )                                                                   I
                                                                                                       f
       Estimated takeoff performance was prepared f o r Flight 604, based on t h e                    t
gross weight of t h e a i r c r a f t , t h e takeoff runway conditions, weather, and                 E
t h e use of four-engine reverse t h r u s t t o zero velocity. An approximation of                   f
t h e runway length used i n each segment of t h e takeoff was t h e n derived from                   a
t h e b e i n g Company performance data and t h e Flight Data Recorder as follows:                   C
                                                                                                      1
                              Condition                            Distance

             Normal Acceleration (0-120 knots)                  3,790 f e e t                         0
                                                                                                      s:
             Degradation of a c c e l e r a t i o n due t o     2,550 f e e t                         1
                                                                                                      a
              blown t i r e s (120-142 knots)                                                         CI
                                                                                                      c
                                                                                                      t
             Deceleration (142-0 knots)                         3 740 f e e t
                       Total distance t r a v e l e d           i$ K
                                                               li E T
                                                                                                      el
                                                            - 5 -

                                             ANALYSIS AEE CONCLUSIONS

            The a i r c r a f t performance c a p a b i l i t y and t h e physical dimensions of
       Runway OlR were adequate for t h e operation involved.

                Examination and t e s t i n g of t h e wheel brakes and t h e a n t i s k i d system
       and examination of t i r e scuff marks on t h e runway disclosed t h a t t h e air-
       c r a f t braking system was i n operational condition and had operated normally
>,     throughout t h e takeoff roll and t h e subsequent r e j e c t e d takeoff r o l l o u t .

                 A l l rubber debris from t h e f a i l e d t i r e s was found i n t h e general
.Is    v i c i n i t y of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n s of Runway OlR with Runways 28L and 28R,
)Y     i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t i r e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n took place i n t h i s a r e a . The t i r e
       remains were examined and portions were t e s t e d . The No. 4 r e a r t i r e showed
       s e c t i o n s of t i r e t r e a d rubber attached t o sidewall m a t e r i a l , which i s indica-
       t i v e of sidewall f a i l u r e . Remains of t h e No. 3 r e a r t i r e exhibited evidence
       of rubber reversion and rough t e x t u r i n g . This phenomenon i s t y p i c a l of t i r e s
       f a i l e d i n overload. It i s concluded that t h e No. 4 r e a r t i r e blew out first,
       due t o sidewall f a i l u r e , and t h a t t h e No. 3 r e a r t i r e then blew out as a
       r e s u l t of overload.

                The No. 4 r e a r t i r e f a i l u r e occurred a t 4 7 0 f e e t , which i s 600 f e e t
                                                                           ,0
       short of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of p a r a l l e l Runways 28L and 2 8 ~ . During t h e
       d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h i s t i r e , t h e adjacent No. 3 r e a r t i r e f a i l e d , a n d dis-
the    i n t e g r a t i o n of both t i r e s continued as t h e a i r c r a f t passed through t h e i n t e r -
       section. The runway surface i n t h i s 1,000-foot long i n t e r s e c t i o n i s uneven
       and passage through it i s normally accompanied by roughness.
tif-
                A s a r e s u l t , t h e v i b r a t i o n caused by t h e blown t i r e s was masked as t h e
,xA    a i r c r a f t traversed t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , and t h e v i b r a t i o n was not considered a
       problem u n t i l t h e a i r c r a f t passed beyond t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . A t t h i s point, a
       slowdown i n aircraft a c c e l e r a t i o n was a l s o detected. Considering t h e
;he    diminished acceleration, t h e increasing v i b r a t i o n , and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
       a i r c r a f t was about t o pass over t h e painted runway surface markers (2,000
of     f e e t from t h e end of t h e runway), t h e captain was convinced t h a t t h e heavy
)m     a i r c r a f t would not reach V speed ( 4 knots) and become airborne within t h e
                                                               18
       confines of t h e remaining R              runway, even though t h e airspeed was approaching
       140 knots.
              The Trans World A i r l i n e s f l i g h t manual s t a t e s t h a t t h e takeoff w i l l be
       continued if an engine f a i l u r e or other abnormal condition occurs a f t e r V
       speed; however, t h e captain exercised h i s prerogative of emergency authority                    1
       and r e j e c t e d t h e takeoff. I n view of t h e combination of f a c t o r s which
       confronted t h e p i l o t during t h e c r i t i c a l phase of t h e takeoff, h i s decision
       t o r e j e c t t h e takeoff i s understandable.

            The takeoff was made i n darkness, and t h e r e were fewer v i s u a l cues t o
       enable t h e captain t o judge a c c u r a t e l y e i t h e r t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n of t h e a i r c r a f t
                                               -   6-
o r t h e amount of remaining runway. Evidence of clean wheel r i m imprints
on t h e runway surface s t a r t i n g a t a point 6,450 f e e t down t h e runway, t h e
absence of t i r e d e b r i s beyond t h i s point, and t h e i n t a c t condition of t h e
s i x remaining t i r e s show t h a t t h e r e was no abnormal drag during t h e takeoff
r o l l . There seems no doubt t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t would have accelerated t h e
a d d i t i o n a l 8 knots t o V speed i n t h e remaining runway had t h e captain
continued t h e takeoff. RHowever, it i s equally t r u e t h a t if he had conserved
p a r t of t h e 300 f e e t of runway used i n maneuvering t h e a i r c r a f t i n t o take-
off p o s i t i o n and had not l o s t 25 percent of h i s brake effectiveness, he
would have been a b l e t o s t o p t h e a i r c r a f t within t h e confines of t h e air-
port. This would have undoubtedly minimized any a i r c r a f t damage.

                                                  AS
                                        PROBABLE C U E

         The National Transportation Safety Board determines t h a t t h e probable
cause of t h i s accident was t h e i n i t i a t i o n of r e j e c t e d takeoff procedures,
beyond V1 speed, with i n s u f f i c i e n t runway remaining i n which t o s t o p t h e
a i r c r a f t . The crew a c t i o n was prompted by t h e f a i l u r e of t h e two r i g h t
t r u c k r e a r t i r e s which produced a noticeable a i r c r a f t v i b r a t i o n and a
reduction i n a i r c r a f t a c c e l e r a t i o n .

                                         EO MN AI N
                                        R C M E D TO S

         Subsequent t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of an accident a t Anchorage, Alaska,
November 27, 1970, involving t h e takeoff of a Capitol I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Airways, Inc., DC-8-63F (NTSEAAR-72-12), t h e Safety Board recommended t o
t h e Federal Aviation Administration t h e implementation of takeoff procedures
which would provide flightcrews with time o r distance reference t o a s s o c i a t e
w i t h a c c e l e r a t i o n t o V speed. This recommendation was a g a i n made 8 months
                                     1
l a t e r as t h e r e s u l t of a Pan American World Airways, Inc., Boeing 747 acci-
dent a t San Francisco, California, on J u l y 30, 1971 (NPSBAAR-72-17). I n
                                                                                             A
t h e preceding i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t h e Board a l s o recomnended t h a t t h e F A
require t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of runway distance markers a t a l l c i v i l a i r p o r t s
where air c a r r i e r a i r c r a f t a r e authorized t o operate. These recommendations
apply equally i n t h i s case. Therefore, t h e Board recommends that t h e F A                A
reconsider i t s p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o t h e s e recommendations.
                                                      -   7-

                             BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
'f

                                                               /S/         .
                                                                     JOHN H REED
red                                                                  Chairmar.

                                                               /s/   LOUIS M. THAYER
                                                                     Member


                                                               /S/   IA E A. BURGESS
                                                                     S BL
                                                                     Member
e
                                                               /s/   WILLIAM R. HALEY
                                                                     Member

        Francis H. McAdams, Member, d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e .

        March   14, 1973.


)

Ires
iat e
ths
31-
n
S
ions
A
                                                  -8.
                                                                                    APPENDIX A

                                          CREW INFORMATION

          Captain Richard C. Bogatko, aged 46, held A i r l i n e Transport P i l o t
C e r t i f i c a t e No. 1161694, multiengine land. Captain Bogatko held t y p e
r a t i n g s f o r t h e Lockheed Constellation, Martin 202/404, and t h e Boeings
707/720/727.            H i s f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e , dated June 19, 1972,
l i s t e d no l i m i t a t i o n s . He was employed by Trans World A i r l i n e s , Inc., on
October 27, 1952, and was upgraded t o Boeing 707 c a p t a i n on J u l y 28, 1958.
A s of September 13, 1972, he had accumulated a t o t a l of 14,591:28 hours,
of which 3,400:30 hours were flown i n t h e Boeing 707 aircraft; h i s last
proficiency f l i g h t check was completed on March 7, 1972; t h e date of h i s
last l i n e check was June 14, 1972; and September 5, 1972, was t h e d a t e of
h i s last emergency procedure r e f r e s h e r t r a i n i n g .

          F i r s t Officer Taylor H. Sanford, aged 38, held Commercial p i l o t
C e r t i f i c a t e No. 1466998, w i t h a i r p l a n e multiengine land and instrument
                         e a
p r i v i l e g e s . H w s type r a t e d i n t h e Lockheed Constellation a i r c r a f t .
H i s f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e dated May 5, 1972, l i s t e d no limita-
t i o n s . H was employed by Trans World Airlines, Inc., on December 7, 1964,
                  e
and was upgraded t o Boeing 707 first o f f i c e r on June 5, 1965. A of                  s
September 13, 1972, h i s t o t a l f l y i n g time was 7,349:OO hours, of which
32O:OO hours had been accumulated i n t h e Boeing 707 a i r c r a f t ; h i s last
proficiency f l i g h t check was completed on June 3, 1972; t h e date of his
last l i n e check was J u l y 5, 1972; and h i s last emergency procedure
refresher t r a i n i n g was on June 1, 1972.

          Flight Engineer Stephen L. P h i l l i p s , aged 30, held F l i g h t Engineer
C e r t i f i c a t e No. 1778626, with a t u r b o j e t powered r a t i n g . His second-
c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e , dated December 11, 1971, l i s t e d no l i m i t a t i o n s .
H w s employed by Trans World Airlines, Inc., on February 17,. 1967, and
  e a
was assigned as a f l i g h t engineer on August 29, 1967. Flight Engineer
P h i l l i p s possessed a t o t a l of 1,050:oo f l y i n g hours as a m i l i t a r y p i l o t a s
of t h e date of h i r e . O September 13, 1972, h i s t o t a l f l y i n g time as a
                                    n
                           a
f l i g h t engineer w s 2,820:oo hours of which 2,666:W hours had been accu-
mulated i n t h e Boeing 707 a i r c r a f t ; h i s last proficiency f l i g h t check was
completed on March 18, 1972. The date of h i s last l i n e check was March 8,
1971; and his last emergency procedure r e f r e s h e r t r a i n i n g was on March 13,
1972*
                                   - 9 -
                                                       APPENDIX B

                           AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

     The aircraft was a Boeing 707-331C, S/N 20068, N15712, owned and
operated by Trans World Airlines, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York,
New York 1 0 6 It had operated a total of 9,424:43 hours, including
          01.
659:52 hours since the last major check and 1 6 0 hours since the last
                                             5:1
station service check. The aircraft was maintained in accordance with
applicable Federal Aviation Regulations and the Trans World Airlines-
approved maintenance manual.

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Stats:
views:23
posted:3/7/2011
language:English
pages:14