Office of Railroad, Pipeline &
Hazardous Materials Investigations
NTSB Team
• Ted Turpin IIC/Report Writer
• Bob Campbell Operations, Track, Signal,
and Mechanical
• Tom Lasseigne Hazardous Materials
• Crystal Thomas Hazardous Materials
• Margaret Athey Editor
• Doug Brazy Video
Parties
• Federal Railroad Administration
• Union Pacific Railroad
• United Transportation Union
• City of Texarkana
Point of Collision
N
Punctured Tank Car
Fatality
Train MPGHB
Railroad
Bridge
Police Cruiser
Car #16
Car #17
Car # 19
Standing Train
Collision
• The crew knew of the preceding train
• The crew understood that they had to control
their train at restricted speed
• The engineer had made brake and throttle
adjustments a mile before the collision
• The engineer had blown the whistle 1/3 mile
before the collision
Collision
• The rear car of the stopped train was
observable for more than 3,200 feet
• Stopping distance was about 1,500 feet
• The crew did not see the train until about
50 feet before impact
Union Pacific’s Response
• Upgraded Texarkana to signaled territory
removing the yard limits
• Eliminated 28 other yard limit locations
• Improved the quality of the testing of
employees while operating at restricted
speed
Office of Railroad, Pipeline &
Hazardous Materials Investigations
Hazardous Materials
Texarkana, Arkansas
October 15, 2005
Initial Notifications
• 4:56 a.m. – first train crew notified
yardmaster
• 5 a.m. – second train crew advised
yardmaster 2 cars derailed
• 4:56 a.m. to 4:59 a.m. – 911 dispatch
received calls about chemical odors
Initial Response Activities
• Fire and police responded immediately
• Yardmaster attempted to assess the
condition of the two trains
• Darkness and restricted visibility
hampered efforts to assess the scene
Propylene Release
• Not discussed until 5:04 a.m.
• 8 minutes after the accident
• 4 minutes before the explosion
Assessment Time
UP and Texarkana emergency responders
did not have sufficient time to assess the
scope of the accident before the explosion.
Overview of Emergency
Response
• Emergency concluded 19 hours after the
accident
• Positive results
• Problems with notification, communication,
and coordination
Deficient UP Actions
• Yardmaster failed to notify the city
• Yardmaster failed to provide a complete
list of cars containing hazardous
materials
Deficient UP Actions (Cont’d.)
• No UP employee assigned to command
post
• Unnecessary duplication of damage
assessment
Resulting Delays
• Completion of threat assessment
• Implementation of an effective response
UP Emergency Plans
• Comprehensive
• Not executed by yard or train personnel
Emergency Planning and
Preparedness
• City had outdated copy of UP plan
• UP had no copy of city’s plan
• Joint drills and exercises not conducted
Emergency Planning
The lack of emergency planning resulted
in inadequate notification, communication,
and coordination between the UP and the
emergency responders during the early
hours of the emergency.