Hill v Edmonds
Relevant Facts: Df, Edmonds, the driver of a delivery truck owned by Bagoli, parked the truck, in the street, with the lights out, on a stormy night. The Pl claimed to have seen the truck some four car lengths ahead of her, and either swerved or hit it directly. Pl could not remember which b/c she was rendered unconscious. Legal Issue(s): Whether a complaint can be dismissed when separate acts of negligence combine to produce a single injury? Court’s Holding: No each is responsible, and the jury determine to what extent. Procedure: Trial Ct dismissed complaint at the close of jury trial. The complaint is reinstated and remanded for new trial. Law or Rule(s): 1) Duty, 2) Breach of Duty 3) causation, and 4) damages. The causation element requires proof of both cause in fact and proximate cause. Court Rationale: Even if the driver of the vehicle in motion, PL, were negligent, she would not be sole responsible for the accident. The driver, DF, of the truck allowed his unlighted vehicle to stand in the middle of the street and without which the accident would not have happened. Plaintiff’s Argument: The truck owner negligently left the vehicle in the middle of the street without lights on a stormy night, which caused the accident. Defendant’s Argument: The driver of the car failed to exercise caution on a stormy night and she caused the accident by her breach. Anderson v Minneapolis
Relevant Facts: Def R.R. Company set fire to a bog which swept over a large area and connected with another fire already in existence. The combined fires burned over the Pl’s property. Legal Issue(s): Whether the jury should have been instructed that if the original fire combined with another fire, superior in strength, but of unknown origin the Df was not liable? Court’s Holding: Yes Procedure: Verdict for Pl. Df appealed order denying NOV or M. for new trial. Affirmed.
Law or Rule(s): 1) Duty, 2) Breach of Duty 3) causation, and 4) damages. The causation element requires proof of both cause in fact and proximate cause. Court Rationale: If a fire is negligently started and it is the material element causing the injury whosoever started that fire is liable. When a fire joins with another and then causes the damage to the property, if either would have destroyed the property, . The fire set by the engine was negligence, the Pl’s property was destroyed as a result. If another fire was started by another company’s engine there would be joint liability, no evidence was presented. The material element was the negligent ignition by the engine, not the conjunction of two independent fires. The jury was adequately instructed on either side of the causation, whether to find for the Pl or Df and the jury chose the Pl based on the evidence presented. Plaintiff’s Argument: The material element causing the injury was the fire which was started negligently by the DF. Defendant’s Argument: When a fire joins with another and then causes the damage to the property, if either would have destroyed the property, the Df is not liable.
Summers v. Tice, et al., 33 Cal.2d 80 199 P.2d 1 [1948] FACTS: On November 20, 1945, plaintiff Summers and the two defendants [consolidated] Tice and Simonson, were hunting quail on an open range. Both defendants were using a 12 gauge shotgun, with 7-1/2 size shot. Prior to hunting, plaintiff discussed the hunting procedures with the defendants, saying they should all “stay in line” and also ensured they knew to exercise care while hunting. While out on the range, plaintiff went up a hill, rather than “stay in line,” placing all three hunters in a triangle. However, both defendants were able to see plaintiff with an unobstructed view and they knew his location. A quail rose and flew between plaintiff and defendants, who were approximately 75 yards apart. Both defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff’s direction. Plaintiff was struck in the eye and upper lip. It was found by the court that the shots which struck plaintiff were shot by the defendants at about the same time or one immediately after the other. It was also found that both defendants were negligent and that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. HISTORY: The trial court found for the plaintiff. Defendants appealed. ISSUE: Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, and should the judgment against both defendants stand, since they were not acting in concert?
RULING: Yes to both. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court’s judgment. RULE/ANALYSIS: Defendant Simonson stated that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence because, as a hunter, he assumed the risks involved in hunting. Although plaintiff suggested they “stay in line” and he instead went uphill, it was apparent that both defendants were aware of plaintiff’s position and were able to see him. Therefore, it was held that the trial court was justified in finding that plaintiff did not assume the risk or act other than as a reasonable person under the circumstances. Defendant Tice argued that there was evidence to show that the shot which struck plaintiff was from Simonson’s gun, due to admissions made by Simonson to third parties. However, there was no evidence to prove that the shots came from Simonson’s gun and the court was not able to find which defendant was at fault. Therefore, it was found that both defendants were jointly and severally liable for plaintiff’s injuries. SUMMARY: The general rule is that when two or more defendants are negligent and it cannot be determined as to who caused the injury, it would be unfair to exonerate either from liability. Each defendant has the burden of proving the other was the sole cause of harm. Since neither defendant in this case was able to do so, the court had no choice but to uphold the judgment. Sindell v Abbott Laboratories Relevant Facts: While the PL’s mother was pregnant with her, she was given a synthetic estrogen, DES, to prevent miscarriage. Pl alleges that she developed cancer as a result of this action, and named five manufacturers of DES as co-defendants. There are 195 other manufacturers of DES [diethylstilbestrol]. Legal Issue(s): Whether the named dfs represent a substantial share of manufacturers of DES, and thereby the parties which caused the harm? Court’s Holding: Yes Procedure: Trial Ct. dismissed the action. Reversed. Law or Rule(s): 1) Duty, 2) Breach of Duty 3) causation, and 4) damages. The causation element requires proof of both cause in fact and proximate cause. Court Rationale: If all the dfs jointly controlled the risk of harm, and the pl could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the product was manufactured by one defendant, the burden of proof as to causation would shift to all dfs, so long as it only applies to a small unit of producers. Where in this case there are some 200 manufacturers this doctrine does not apply.
In determining causation, measure the likelihood that any of the dfs supplied the product, by the percentage of DES sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. PL asserts that 5 or 6 companies produces 90 % of the DES marketed. Each manufacturer’s liability for an injury would be approximately equivalent to the damages caused by the DES it manufactured. Plaintiff’s Argument: Pl was injured by a drug that was manufactured where 5 or 6 companies produce 90 % of the DES marketed Defendant’s Argument: It is impossible to determine which company produced the DES which caused the injury to PL, and PL failed to name all possible dfs.