Hodges v. Carter Relevant Facts: In 1948 pl’s drug store was destroyed by fire and at the time pl had four insurance policies with four different insurance companies against this type of loss. All four declined t opay any part. Dfs were attorneys hired to represent pl. In 1949,Dfs filed complaint and summons, but mailed copies to the State Insurance Commissioner as service of process custom dictated. The trial ct determined the custom was valid and entered judgment, the insurance companies appealed and won at the S. Ct. of N. C. In 1952, pl’s brought action against the df’s claiming dfs were negligent in prosecuting pl’s actions against the insurance companys by using an improper service of process, and failure to issue alias summons at the time initial action was pending. Legal Issue(s): Whether the dfs breached a standard of care to act as a reasonably and prudent person, exercising the same or similar degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by others of his profession similarly situated ? Court’s Holding: No. Procedure: Trial ct dismissed, affirmed. Law or Rule(s): An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is not answerable for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law which has not been settled by the court of last resort. Court Rationale: An atty must possess the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to practice in his profession, and which others similarly situated possess; and that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him, and he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill. Pl has not produce any evidence to show dfs breached any duty the law imposed upon them when they accepted employment to prosecute pl’s actions or that they did not possess the requisite learning, skill or ability required of an atty. Dfs mailed the process to the commissioner in following a custom which had prevailed in this State for over two decades. The right of the Commissioner to accept such had not been tested in the courts until the case arising this action. Plaintiff’s Argument: The dfs failed to adhere to a standard of care to act as a reasonably and prudent person, exercising the degree of learning, skill, and ability of an attorney. Defendant’s Argument: The dfs acted with good faith and exercised their best judgment as custom dictated in mailing the summons and complaint to the Insurance commissioner as any other attorney would have done.
Boyce v. Brown Procedural History: Plaintiff’s, Berlie Boyce and wife, Nannie Boyce brought suit against the defendant, Dr. Edgar Brown, to recover damages for alleged malpractice by the D upon the person of Nannie Boyce. The case was tried and the court granted a motion for an instructed verdict in favor of the defendant, finding that D was not guilt of any acts to charge him with malpractice. Judgment was rendered on the verdict, and, after the usual motion for new trial was overruled, this appeal was taken. Facts: In September 1927, one of the plaintiffs (Nanny Boyce) had a fractured ankle, and went to the defendant, a practicing physician and surgeon for many years, for treatment. The D operated, making an incision at the point of fracture, bringing the broken fragments of bone into apposition, and permanently fixing them in place by means of a metal screw placed in the bone. D attended P for 3 or 4 weeks following the operation, until a complete union of the bone had been established, and his services terminated. No services by D for P were needed for seven years until P consulted D again, complaining that her ankle was giving her pain. D examined the ankle, wrapped it with tape, and put it in an arch. A week later, D removed the bandage, but P’s ankle did not improve, and was growing more painful for P. Two years later, P returned to D, who examined her ankle. A few days later P went to another doctor, Dr. Kent, who noticed some discoloration and swelling, and made an X-ray of the ankle. The X-ray showed there had been some necrosis of the bone around the screw. Dr. Kent operated upon P, removed the screw, and realized the ankle was practically normal. Issue: Whether the examination and treatment given by defendant departed from the established standard for cases like that of the plaintiff. Rule: Negligence on the part of a physician or surgeon, by reason of his departure from the proper standard of practice, must be established by expert medical testimony, unless the negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty in recognizing it.
Analysis: Most laymen know that the X-ray usually offers the best method of diagnosing physical changes of the interior organs of the body, and particularly of the skeleton, short of an actual opening of the body for ocular examination, but laymen cannot say that in all cases where there is some trouble with the internal organs that it is a departure from standard medical practice to fail to take an X-ray. Such things are costly and do not always give a satisfactory diagnosis, or even as good a one as other types of examination may give. In may cases the taking of an X-ray might be of no value and put the patient to unnecessary expense, and, in view of the testimony in the present case as to the arthritis which the P had, and which Dr. Kent testified would have been his first thought as to the cause of the P’s pain, the court found that it is going too far to say that the failure to take
an X-ray of the P’s ankle at that time was so far a departure from ordinary medical standards that even laymen would know it to be gross negligence. Holding: Since, therefore, there was insufficient evidence to show that D was guilty of malpractice, the court properly instructed a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Scott v. Bradford
Relevant Facts: Mrs. Scott, pl, sought treatment from dr. Bradford. She was diagnosed with several fibroid tumors on her uterus. She signed a routine consent to surgery form prior to the hysterectomy. Afterward she was experiencing problems with incontinence [lack of self control], and she visited another doctor. She was found to have a condition which allowed urine to leak from her bladder into her vagina. She underwent three additional surgeries to correct her problem. Legal Issue(s): Whether the doctor breached a duty to disclose material risks to the pl prior to performance of the surgery? Court’s Holding: No Procedure: Jury found for df and pl appealed. No basis for reversal; Affirmed. Law or Rule(s): Full disclosure of all material risks incident to treatment must be made. A risk is material if it would be likely to affect a patient’s decision. Court Rationale: The duty to disclose is the first element. Then proof that patient would have chosen no treatment or a different course of treatment had the alternatives and risks been made known, thus establishing a causation. If the patient would have elected to proceed the element of causation is missing, and so to negligence. A causal connection between the patient’s injury and the doctor’s breach of a duty to disclose exists only when the disclosure of material risks would have resulted in a decision against it. The final element is that of an injury. The risk must have actually materialized, AND pl must have been injured as a result of submitting to the treatment. Plaintiff’s Argument: The df did not disclose material risks incident to the treatment prior to obtaining the consent of the pl. Defendant’s Argument: The df disclosed material risks surrounding a hysterectomy surgery and pl’s alternative sufficiently. Exception to the Duty to disclose: There is no need to disclose risks that either ought to be known by everyone or are already known to the patient; or if the disclosure would
alarm an emotionally upset patient; or where there is an emergency and the patient is in no condition to determine for himself whether the treatment should be administered.