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					                                                  NOTICE:
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(Department 53) by 4:00 p.m. the court day before this hearing and advise opposing counsel. If no call is
made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. Local Rule 3.04.

Judge McMaster discloses that attorneys appearing in cases on todays calendar may have donated to the
Committee for Judicial Independence which was formed to oppose the attempted recall of judge McMaster. A
list of donors and amounts donated is under the custody of court executive officer Jody Patel and can be
reviewed at room 611, sixth floor, courthouse, 720 Ninth Street.

                                              Department 53
                                        Superior Court of California
                                         800 Ninth Street, 3rd Floor
                                       LOREN E. MCMASTER, Judge
                                               T. West, Clerk
                                              V. Carroll, Bailiff

                                       Friday, May 12, 2006, 2:00 PM

Item 1      01AS03895         JERRY BLOCKER VS. PACIFIC SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO., ET AL
            Nature of Proceeding: Motion For An Order Disbursing $3520.91
            Filed By:   Finkelstein, David G.

                  Plaintiff's motion for an order disbursing $3,520.91 held by the sheriff and for
            issuance of a writ of execution is unopposed and granted.

                   The Court will sign the order submitted with the motion.

Item 2      03AS02580         MARY-ALICE COLEMAN VS. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL
            Nature of Proceeding: Notice of Motion for Attorney's Fees
            Filed By:   Austin, Nathan W.

            This matter is continued to 5/24/2006 at 02:00PM in this department.

Item 3      03AS06859         DON JONOUBEI VS. JAVAD ALEREZA, ET AL
            Nature of Proceeding: Motion For Protective Order
            Filed By:   Torngren, William P.

            This matter is dropped from calendar.

Item 4      03AS07107         RAFAEL E. AMAYA, ET AL VS. FORECAST HOMES, LP, ET AL
            Nature of Proceeding: Demurrer/Motion To Strike
            Filed By:   Henningsen, David S.

                   Defendants' demurrer to the ninth cause of action for fraudulent concealment is
            overruled.

                   In this cause of action plaintiffs list numerous construction defects. They allege
            the defects would not be visible to the buyer, defendants saw the defects and failed to
            remedy them, defendants knew that plaintiffs would be not discover them, and
         remedy them, defendants knew that plaintiffs would be not discover them, and
         defendants intended plaintiffs to purchase the homes without knowledge of the defects.
         They also allege that the defects were so obvious during construction that it would be
         impossible for a superintendent to not recognize them as serious defects that required
         repair before continuing with construction. This is sufficient to state a cause of action
         for fraudulent concealment. Barnhouse v City of Pinole (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 171.
         Felburg v Don Wilson Builders (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 383.

                 The motion to strike punitve damages is denied. If plaintiffs are successful on
         their claim for concealment, they may be able to claim punitive damages.

                This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.

Item 5   04AS00635         SHELLY BELL, ET AL VS. ADELBER MEDICAL GROUP ASSOC., ET AL
         Nature of Proceeding: Summary Judgment
         Filed By:   Bishop, Michael A.

               Defendants Adelberg Associates Medical Group (“AAMG”) and Miki Patenio’s
         Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication of
         Issues is granted.

                Plaintiff Shelley Bell’s Complaint alleges five causes of action: the 1st for gender
         discrimination, the 2nd for sexual harassment, the 3rd for breach of employment
         contract, the 4th for statutory sexual battery and the 5th for wrongful termination.
         Defendants move for summary adjudication of each cause of action, and on the claim
         for punitive damages.


         Plaintiff was employed by AAMG on November 6, 2000, as a records technician. (MF
         4.) Plaintiff signed an employment contract that expressly stated that she was an at-
         will employee. (MF 3-4.) Plaintiff was provided with an employee handbook with a
         sexual harassment policy which she read and acknowledged. (MF 6-7.)

               In October 2001, plaintiff had breast augmentation surgery, which she discussed
         openly in the office. (MF 13-14.) Plaintiff has alleged that defendant co-worker Mikki
         Patenio came up behind plaintiff and “juggled” her breasts, while plaintiff was
         discussing breasts with another co-worker. (MF 15.)

                 AAMG gave plaintiff her first annual review in November 2001, which noted that
         plaintiff was inefficient, used the telephone and internet inappropriately and engaged
         others in conversation with the other staff members were not on break. (MF 17-18.)
         On August 1, 2002, plaintiff was given a written reprimand for co-worker
         communications, work attire, time sheets, focusing on her work and yelling in the office.
         She was informed that she would be terminated if she did not improve. (MF 20-22.)

                On November 25, 2002, plaintiff left work early because of an incident with Ms.
         Patenio. Plaintiff went to Patenio’s work area, and Patenio turned around in her chair
         while on the phone, gestured towards plaintiff and made a squeaking noise. Plaintiff
         returned to her work space, wrote Patenio an e-mail complaining about references to
         her breasts, and left work. Their supervisor conducted an investigation. (MF 23-26.)

                On January 15, 2003, AAMG gave plaintiff an annual review counseling her
       On January 15, 2003, AAMG gave plaintiff an annual review counseling her
about time management, productivity and efficiency. (MF 27-28.)

      On Feb. 5, 2003, plaintiff asked Patenio about being a lesbian in front of another
co-worker in the lunchroom. (MF 29.) Patenio complained about the incident to their
supervisor, who counseled plaintiff about creating gossip about Patenio in the office.
(MF 29-30.)

       On Feb. 19, 2003, plaintiff accused Patenio of coming to her work space the
previous day and saying “oh, I’ll wait till your done lubing up” because plaintiff was
applying lip balm. Plaintiff stated in the e-mail that she would not interact with Patenio
unless she could limit her comments to work only. Plaintiff further stated that she
would no longer work with management, and would take matters into her own hands.
(MF 31-33.)

      On Feb. 21, 2003, AAMG terminated plaintiff because of her ongoing
productivity issues and her refusal to work with management. (MF 34.) Plaintiff filed a
complaint with DFEH.

      Summary adjudication of the 1st cause of action for gender discrimination is
granted.

       To prevail on a cause of action for discrimination, the plaintiff must provide
evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the
position he sought or was performing competently in the position she held, (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an
available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. Guz v.
Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.

        Here, there is no evidence that gender was the basis for plaintiff’s termination.
Plaintiff is a woman, worked with other women and was replaced by a woman. Plaintiff
even concedes that she was not performing at a satisfactory level, as material facts 45
and 46 are undisputed. The Court does not find that plaintiff has established a prima
facie case of discrimination based on gender.

        AAMG’s office manager, Debby Ortega, was responsible for both hiring and
firing of plaintiff, and plaintiff’s employment lasted only two and half years. (MF 37.)
Where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a
discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong
inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive. Horn v. Cushman &
Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 798, 809.

        Discrimination claims are analyzed under a three-step framework. First, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The
employer then must offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment decision. Finally, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the employer's
proffered reason was pretextual. Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236.


Defendants had legitimate, non discriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff. (MF 45,
46.) Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving the employer's proffered reason
was pretextual.
      Summary adjudication of the 2nd cause of action for sexual harassment is
granted.

        Plaintiff asserted in discovery that the discrimination claim was actually
harassment claim. (MF 48.) The elements of environmental sexual harassment are:
(1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment
complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment; and (5) respondeat superior. Fisher v.
San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 608.

       The factors that can be considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances
are: (1) the nature of the unwelcome sexual acts or works (generally, physical touching
is more offensive than unwelcome verbal abuse); (2) the frequency of the offensive
encounters; (3) the total number of days over which all of the offensive conduct occurs;
and (4) the context in which the sexually harassing conduct occurred. Id., at 610.

      Defendant AAMG has a written sexual harassment policy, and Bell received a
copy. (MF 50.)

       Here, plaintiff asserts a few incidents constituted harassment: the incident when
Patenio touched her breasts, when plaintiff was discussing breast augmentation, the
incident when Patenio made a gesture toward plaintiff’s breasts, the “lubing up”
comment, and in her opposition, plaintiff adds a gesture by Patenio which plaintiff
understood to refer to oral sex.

        Harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial; rather the
plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a
generalized nature. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 121, 131. A
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is not established where a coworker
simply uses crude or inappropriate language in front of employees or draws a vulgar
picture, without directing sexual innuendos or gender-related language toward a
plaintiff or toward women in general. Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions
 (2006) ___Cal.4th ___, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 4719.

      These incidents appear to be insufficient to constitute harassment. Plaintiff
never brought the touching incident to AAMG’s attention. Plaintiff never informed
AAMG that she had been subjected to sexual harassment.

        The touching was in the context of plaintiff’s own discussion of her breast
augmentation surgery. Courts have found that even unwelcome sexual touching is
insufficient to constitute severe or pervasive harassment when the incidents are
isolated and there is no violence or threat of violence. Herberg v. California Institute of
the Arts (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 142, 153.

       No evidence is submitted that the oral sex gesture was directed at plaintiff, and
the single "lubing up" comment is insufficient, especially since it is unclear that such
remark had any sexual connotation.

      The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct would have interfered with
a reasonable employee's work performance and would have seriously affected the
psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that she was actually offended. Fisher v. S
psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that she was actually offended. Fisher v. S

       Plaintiff did not miss any work, take a stress leave, file a worker’s compensation
claim, or see a mental health professional about the alleged “harassment”.

      No cause of action for retaliation has been alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.
The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on motion for summary
judgment or adjudication. Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.

      Summary adjudication of the 3rd cause of action for breach of employment
contract is granted.

       Plaintiff was an at will employee under an express written contract. Labor Code
section 2922. An at-will provision in an express written agreement, signed by the
employee, cannot be overcome by proof of an implied contrary understanding. Guz v.
Bechtel Nat., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 317, 340. AAMG exercised its right to terminate
an at-will employee.

       The Business and Professions Code section 17200 claims are not set forth as a
separate cause of action in the complaint. Assuming that such statutory theory was
properly pled, there are no facts to support such and no issues of material facts to be
resolved by a jury. Summary adjudication of the claims for a violation of Business &
Professions Code section 17200, et seq. is granted.

       Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants’ violation of the letter and spirit of
FEHA, the California Constitution and Civil Code sections, including sexual battery,
constitutes an unfair business practice.

        Plaintiff’s opposition asserts that because an arbitration clause in her
employment contract requires her to pay arbitration fees, therefore the contract is
unconscionable. However, there is no evidence that the employer here has sought to
enforce the arbitration clause. Plaintiff concedes that she has no claim for restitution
or damages. (UMF 85.) As there is no evidence of a reasonable probability of future
violations, there is no basis for injunctive relief. Plaintiff therefore has no remedy
under Business & Professions Code section 17200.

      Summary adjudication of the 4th cause of action for statutory sexual battery is
granted.

        Plaintiff sues under Civil Code section 1708.5(a). That section requires that the
defendant act with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate
part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly
result.

      Here, Patenio is accused of having touched plaintiff’s breasts in the course of a
conversation about plaintiff’s breast augmentation surgery. Plaintiff has not shown
evidence of Patenio’s intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact.

      Summary adjudication of the 5th cause of action for wrongful termination is
granted.

        While an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary or
irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose
         irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose
         that contravenes fundamental public policy. The policy must be supported by either
         constitutional or statutory provisions; the policy must be public in the sense that it
         inures to the benefit of the public rather than serving merely the interests of the
         individual; the policy must have been articulated at the time of the discharge; the
         policy must be fundamental and substantial. Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
         Scripps (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1111.

                Here, AAMG did not terminate plaintiff for refusing to violate a statute or for
         exercising any statutory right for the public benefit.

                Summary adjudication of the punitive damage claim is granted, as no cause of
         action to support it remains.

                Plaintiff has failed to show malice, fraud or oppression. Civil Code section 3294.

              As summary adjudication of each cause of action has been granted, summary
         judgment is also granted.

                The prevailing party defendants are directed to prepare an order and judgment
         of dismissal for the Court's signature pursuant to C.C.P. section 437c(g) and C.R.C.,
         Rule 391.




         0635203


Item 6   04AS03141         LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INS. CO. VS. LCL ADMINISTRATORS, INC.
         Nature of Proceeding: Motion For Reconsideration
         Filed By:   Mounier Jr., John F.

                Cross-complainant/defendant LcL's motion for reconsideration is denied.

                 LcL acknowledges there are no new facts or law. It argues there are changed
         circumstances and the Court should exercise its inherent authority to reconsider its
         ruling.

                 First, the motion must be denied since it fails to meet the requirements of Code
         of Civil Procedure section 1008. Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094.; See also New York

               The fact that LcL received reports from its expert after the hearing on the
         motion to strike is not a changed circumstance that will support a motion for
         reconsideration. LcL blames Liberty for not producing documents for LcL's expert to
         examine until December 14, 2005. However, it appears that LcL has repeatedly
         ignored Liberty's communications that documents and files were available for LcL to
         inspect.

                It is LcL's repeated failure to respond to discovery that resulted in the Court
         granting Liberty's motion to strike LcL's cross-complaint and answer. As the Court
         granting Liberty's motion to strike LcL's cross-complaint and answer. As the Court
         observed in its ruling, "The interrogatories at issue were so basic that if the defendant
         had a good faith basis for its affirmative defenses and its cross-complaint it would had
         little difficulty answering them." To contend 18 months later that it could not answer
         them until its expert had reviewed documents from Liberty is an argument without
         merit.

               There is no basis for the Court to reconsider, sua sponte, its earlier ruling since
         the Court is convinced its ruling was correct.

                This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.


Item 7   04AS03533         LANIS CLARK, ET AL VS. M.J. CARSON HOMES, INC., ET AL
         Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Withdraw Atty of Rec
         Filed By:   Wise, Michael J.

                Dropped. No order has been lodged with the court. CRC 376(e).

Item 8   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
         Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Compel Free Responses (Keith Olsen)
         Filed By:   Buckman, Mark F.

               Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Keith Olsen to respond to request for
         production is unopposed and granted. Compliance without objections shall be by May
         22, 2006.

                Sanctions are denied because the motion was not opposed. Although CRC 341
         purports to authorize sanctions if a motion is unopposed, the Court declines to do so,
         as the specific statute governing this discovery (CCP 2031.300(c)) authorizes
         sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
         sanctions under the CRC must conform to the conditions of one or more of the statutes
         authorizing sanctions. Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v Firmater Inc. (1997)
         60 Cal.App.4th 352, 355. However, repeated conduct of failing to comply with
         discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an abuse of the discovery process and
         award sanctions on that basis.

                This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.



Item 9   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
         Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Compel Free Responses (Jeffrey Olsen)
         Filed By:   Buckman, Mark F.

                Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Jeffrey Olsen to answer interrogatories is
         denied. Discovery was deadlines were specifically and implicitly extended pending
         settlement negotiations. On March 22, 2006, plaintiff indicated the negotiations had
         failed and there would be no more extensions ("the agreement will not be furthered
         negotiated."). Defendant then served verified responses on March 28, 2006.
         Nonetheless, plaintff filed this motion on April 20, 2006.
          Nonetheless, plaintff filed this motion on April 20, 2006.

                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.



Item 10   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel
          Filed By:   Jeffrey Olsen

                 Defendant's motion to compel is moot. Plaintiff has filed verified responses prior
          to the agreed upon deadline.

Item 11   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Compel "objection free" Responses (Keith Olsen)
          Filed By:   Buckman, Mark F.

                 Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Keith Olsen to respond to interrogatories
          is unopposed and granted. Compliance without objections shall be by May 22, 2006.

                 Sanctions are denied because the motion was not opposed. Although CRC 341
          purports to authorize sanctions if a motion is unopposed, the Court declines to do so,
          as the specific statute governing this discovery (CCP 2030.290(c)) authorizes
          sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
          sanctions under the CRC must conform to the conditions of one or more of the statutes
          authorizing sanctions. Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v Firmater Inc. (1997)
          60 Cal.App.4th 352, 355. However, repeated conduct of failing to comply with
          discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an abuse of the discovery process and
          award sanctions on that basis.

                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.



Item 12   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Compel Responses to Request For Production of Documents/Special I
          Filed By:   Tzikas, Aristides

                 This matter is dropped from calendar. Plaintiff's request for sanctions is denied.

Item 13   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
          Nature of Proceeding: Application For Appointment of Discovery Referee
          Filed By:   Tzikas, Aristides G.

                 Defendants' application for appointment of a discovery referee is denied.

                 Defendants filed an ex parte application and the Court set the matter for
          hearing. Defendants have not filed any points and authorities in support of the
          application and none accompanied the ex parte application.
                 Plaintiff, as shareholder, has the right to inspect the corporate books. However,
          the demand to inspect must be at a "reasonable time during usual business hours."
          Corporations Code Section 1601(a). Plaintiff's demand with less than two hours notice
          wa not reasonable. The Court expects counsel to meet and confer upon reasonble
          notice and agree upon a date and time for such inspection. Defendants have not
          shown a need for a discovery referee to supervise such an inspection. The motions to
          compel, also set on this calendar, do not reveal discovery disputes that require a
          referee.

                 Plaintiff's request for sanctions is denied.

                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.

Item 14   05AS03203         GARY OLSEN VS. SYLVIA COMPTON, ETAL
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion For Protective Order
          Filed By:   Tzikas, Aristides G.

                Defendant's motion for a protective order excluding plaintiff's wife from the
          deposition of defendant Jeffrey Olsen is granted. There has been a showing of good
          cause to exclude this non party. CCP 2025.420 (b) (12).

                 Plaintiff's wife is a non party witness who will also be deposed in this action.
          There appears to be no reason for her to attend other than to get a gauge on the
          questions being asked and the answers being given so she can take such into account
          when she testifies. See Lowy Dev. Corp. v Superior Court of Los Angeles County
          (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 317, 321. A deposition is not a public proceeding which anyone
          can attend.

                  Having read several motions and accompanying declarations in ths case, the
          Court takes judicial notice that this a family dispute where feelings run strong in all
          directions. Given such facts and given that the moving party is entitled to this person's
          deposition answers unadorned and not influenced by what she heard or saw at the
          deposition of another, and given the potential for disruption due to the presence of this
          nonparty because of the strong feelings of all of the participants, there has been a
          sufficient showing of unwarranted annoyance and oppression to the moving party
          should this future witness be allowed to remain during the deposition. See Lowy Dev.
          Corp. v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 317, 321

                  Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the moving party has filed a "meet and confer"
          declaration. The Tzikas declaration filed with the moving papers set forth that the at
          the deposition itself, moving party requested that plaintiff's wife be excluded and
          plaintiff's counsel refused and instructed the reporter to swear the witness. Plaitiff does
          not set forth what further efforts to meet and confer should have been made under
          these circumstances. By his actions, plaintiff's counsel made it very clear that further
          discussion of the issue would be pointless. The issue was discussed and the parties
          clearly set forrth their positions and both parties failed to yield. Under the
          circumstances of this case there has been a sufficient showiing of an attempt to meet
          and confer to resolve the motion short of filing this motion and that those efforts failed.

                 Plaintiff's request for sanctions is denied
                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.



Item 15   05AS04655         LUCINA J. ESTRADA VS. SEVERINO PAGUYO PAESTE, ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Default Hearing
          Filed By:   Swett, Thomas M.

                 Dropped for failure to demonstrate jurisdictional service.

                  Although the proof of service indicates that both the summons and the complaint
          were posted on the property, the attached photographs show only the summons. This
          matter may not proceed until compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 763.020
          is clearly demonstrated.



Item 16   05AS04789         JOYCE LEROY VS. ROBERT LEROY ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Demurrer
          Filed By:   Arnold, Cecilia

                Cross defendant's demurrer to the first amended cross-complaint for elder
          abuse is sustained.

                   Although not alleged in the cross-complaint, in her opposition Betty Leroy states
          she is the mother of Robert Leroy and Joyce Leroy was his girl friend, although she
          held herself out as his wife. Joyce no longer lives with Robert and filed a complaint for
          partition of the property.

                    Betty alleges that Joyce promised Betty she could live in one half of the duplex
          for life and Joyce would pay one half of Robert's expenses. Betty alleges that in
          reliance on these representations she made the down payment on the duplex and
          continues to pay one half of the expenses. The grant deed shows the parties each
          own one third of the property. Betty alleges elder abuse by Joyce in taking and
          appropriating property of an elder.

                  The alleged representations and the purchase of the property occurred in 1987.
          The Court is troubled by the status of Betty. It appears she believes she has an elder
          abuse claim based on the fact that she was 65 years or older when the complaint for
          partition was filed. However, the wrongful acts occurred years before. Is Betty
          contending that filing a complaint for partition is elder abuse?

                  Assuming Betty has standing under Welfare & Institutions Code section
          15610.30, she has not suffered any damages. Betty is contending that if Joyce is
          successful in the parition action she, Betty, will have to surrender her interest and
          move. This is speculative. A partition action simply determines the rights of the
          parties. Joyce is seeking a determination of her rights, not to divest Betty of hers. If
          Joyce obtained a right to the real property by misrepresentations, Betty can raise that
          in the partition action to show that Joyce has no rights.

                 There is no grant deed attached to the complaint. Plaintif is ordered to provide a
                There is no grant deed attached to the complaint. Plaintif is ordered to provide a
          copy of the deed to Department 53 before the time of the hearing.

                 As there is nothing in the opposition or the pleading itself to suggest that
          cross-complainant has a cause of action for elder abuse, the demurrer is sustained
          without leave to amend.

                 Cross-defendant shall submit a formal order and judgment of dismissal.

Item 17   05AS05126         THE TASKOPOULOS FAMILY ET AL VS. ESQUIRE PARTNERS
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Compel
          Filed By:   Riegels, David A.

          This matter is dropped from calendar.

Item 18   05AS05643         BRADY REID STRAW VS LISA G. STRAW, ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Demurrer
          Filed By:   Weinstein-Hamilton, Rebecca

                Defendant Raymond Straw’s demurrer to the amended complaint is sustained
          without leave to amend.

                The central fact underlying the entire complaint is that plaintiff and Lisa Straw
          never signed the Gain Participation Agreement, a condition for the sale of the real
          property.

                 In the verified original complaint plaintiff alleged an oral agreement in August
          2003 whereby defendant would sell an unimproved parcel of real property to plaintiff
          and his then wife Lisa. In the unverified amended compliant he alleges an oral
          agreement in 2001 that was rescinded by defendant and Lisa. However, plaintiff
          alleges he heard of it seven days later and then he and Lisa agreed to pay defendant
          $40,000 for the property. Neither plaintiff nor Lisa signed the Gain Participation
          Agreement as required by defendant before he would transfer the property.

                 Essentially plaintiff is attempting to avoid the fact that an oral agreement for the
          sale of real property is not enforceable.

                  Promissory estoppel (first cause of action) requires a promise to reduce the
          contract to writing. Defendant offered a written agreement and plaintiff refused it.
          Plaintiff has not changed his position in reliance on a promise. Paying $99.00 in
          property taxes is not part performance. Sutton v Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415,
          422. An alleged loss of opportunity to purchase other land does not amount to a
          change of position. Fallon v American Trust Co. (1950) 176 Cal.App.2d 381.

                 Plaintiff has not stated a claim for constructive trust (second cause of action)
          because he has not alleged sufficient grounds on which it can be imposed. Plaintiff
          has shown the existence of a res but the allegations do not show his right to that res or
          wrongful acquisition of it by defendant. The allegations do not show that defendant did
          anything wrongful. Communist Party v 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980,
          990-991.

                 The cause of action for partition fails because the allegations of the complaint
                 The cause of action for partition fails because the allegations of the complaint
          are insufficient to support any right of plaintiff to the property.

                 The causes of action for fraud are based on an alleged secret intent not to
          perform the oral agreement (fourth cause of action) and secretly rescinding the initial
          agreement (fifth cause of action). Neither cause of action is supported by facts to show
          a misrepresentation. Stansfield v Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 74. Plaintiff’s
          argument that he has pled other torts in the fifth cause of action makes no sense.

                  Plaintiff has requested judicial notice of evidence that is not properly the subject
          of judicial notice. If the plaintiff wants the Court to consider defendant’s declaration
          submitted in opposition to plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, the Court will
          do so as it supports defendant’s position.

                 The amended complaint and plaintiff’s opposition do not show that plaintiff can
          state any cause of action against defendant. Hence the demurrer is sustained without
          leave to amend.

                 Defendant shall submit a formal order and judgment of dismissal.



Item 19   05AS05643         BRADY REID STRAW VS LISA G. STRAW, ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Strike
          Filed By:   Weinstein-Hamilton, Rebecca

               The motion to strike is moot as the demurrer is sustained without leave to
          amend.

Item 20   06AS01029         NATOMAS CROSSING FUND ET AL VS. THE ORIGINAL PIZZA PUCKS
                            ETA
          Nature of Proceeding: Writ Of Attachment
          Filed By:   Hotchkiss, Nancy

                 Plaintiff's application for a writ of attachment is unopposed and granted on
          condition proof of service of the summons and complaint are filed in Department 53
          before the time of the hearing.

                 Plaintiff shall submit a formal order pursuant to CRC rule 391.

Item 21   05AM06629         CREDIT MEDIATORS, INC. VS. MATTHEW WILLIAM KENNEDY, ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Order Compelling Responses to Contention Interrogatories
          Filed By:   Hamilton, Carol R.

                Plaintiff's motion to compel responses to requests for production is unopposed
          and granted. Compliance without objections shall be by May 22, 2006.

                 Sanctions are denied because the motion was not opposed. Although CRC 341
          purports to authorize sanctions if a motion is unopposed, the Court declines to do so,
          as the specific statute governing this discovery (CCP 2031.300(c)) authorizes
          sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
          sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
          sanctions under the CRC must conform to the conditions of one or more of the statutes
          authorizing sanctions. Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v Firmater Inc. (1997)
          60 Cal.App.4th 352, 355. However, repeated conduct of failing to comply with
          discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an abuse of the discovery process and
          award sanctions on that basis.

                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.




Item 22   05AM06629         CREDIT MEDIATORS, INC. VS. MATTHEW WILLIAM KENNEDY, ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Order Compelling Responses to Request for Production
          Filed By:   Hamilton, Carol R.

                Plaintiff's motion to compel answers to interrogatories is unopposed and
          granted. Compliance without objections shall be by May 22, 2006.

                 Sanctions are denied because the motion was not opposed. Although CRC 341
          purports to authorize sanctions if a motion is unopposed, the Court declines to do so,
          as the specific statute governing this discovery (CCP 2030.290(c), authorizes
          sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
          sanctions under the CRC must conform to the conditions of one or more of the statutes
          authorizing sanctions. Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v Firmater Inc. (1997)
          60 Cal.App.4th 352, 355. However, repeated conduct of failing to comply with
          discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an abuse of the discovery process and
          award sanctions on that basis.

                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required.



Item 23   06CS00533         IN RE: JESSICA PORTS
          Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Approval for Tranfer of Structured Settlement
          Filed By:   Ahtirski, Eugene A.

                 The petition for Approval of Transfer of Structured Settlement is denied.

                Transferor is the recipient of a structured settlement as a result of the wrongful
          death of her mother. She has received two lump sum payments of $13,000 each in
          January 2005 and 2006. She will receive two more payments in January 2007 and
          2008. She will also receive a $25,000 payment in November 2011.


          Transferor proposes to transfer the January 2007 and 2008 payments, a total of
          $26,000 with a discounted value of $24,230.95, for $20,850.00. The equivalent
          interest rate is 24%.

                 Transferor is 19 years old, unemployed, and in a drug rehabilitation program.
          She intends to use $2,400 to pay up to six months rent to her father and to use $5,000
          She intends to use $2,400 to pay up to six months rent to her father and to use $5,000
          to purchase a car and the remainder into savings.


          The Court finds the transfer it not in the best interest of the transferor because (1) the
          equivalent interest rate is too high, (2) transferor is unemployed, and there is no
          indication of any favorable prospects for employment, (3) transferor is in a drug
          rehabilitation program, (4) there appears to be no reason to accept a heavily
          discounted future payment to place funds in a savings account and prepay rent to her
          father, and (5) it appears that Petitioner has no present income and uncertain
          prospects for future income and needs the payment schedule to remain as it is.
          Providing a 19 year old with an admitted drug problem with a significant amount of
          cash that represents her earnings for two years in the future would be irresponsible.
          The Court cannot find on these facts that the proposed transfer is in the best interests
          of the tranferor.

                 This minute order is effective immediately and no formal order is required

Item 24   06AM01645         PAUL YANG VS. FAI YEE XIONG ET AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Motion To Quash Service Summon
          Filed By:   Raba, Jaime Vincent

                Defendants' motion to quash service is unopposed and granted. Plaintiff must
          comply with all the requriements of CCP 415.30.

Item 25   06CM00069         NATIONAL CREDIT ACCEPTANCE, INC VS. MARAGARET THOMAS ET
                            AL
          Nature of Proceeding: Petition To Confirm Arb Award
          Filed By:   Pugh, John J.

                 Petitioner's petition to confirm the arbitration award is unopposed and granted.
          Petitioner shall submit a formal order pursuant to CRC rule 391.

				
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