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					Jacque v. Steinberg Homes: Plaintiff refused to let mobile home company cross his field to make delivery; right of exclusion without explanation is crucial to ownership. Plaintiff recovers even though there was no real damage to his land.

State v. Shack: Farm owner refused access to government agents, assigned to bring legal and medical aid to farm workers; for reason of necessity, private or public, trespassing onto land of another may be required.

Pierson v. Post 1805: On wild territory, Post chases fox with hounds in sight of Pierson; Pierson shoots fox and carries it off. Rule: Mere pursuit without mortal wounding animal or depriving it of its liberty is not possession or occupancy. Pierson wins, against fox hunting culture, which would have awarded the fox to the first pursuer. POLICY: To promote certainty.

Ghen v. Rich 1881: Ghen killed whale with bomb-lance that contained his identifying mark; three days later another found whale ashore and sold its oil to Rich. Rule: In line with whaling custom, the person who kills first with the bomb-lance gets the whale. POLICY: To promote certainty and the killing of whales. Keeble v. Hickeringill 1707: Defendant comes near Plaintiff’s resort/duck pond and fired several rifle shots to scare ducks away. Keeble owns ducks because he owns land under them. For Plaintiff.

O’Keiffe v. Snyder 1980: Plaintiff had three paintings stolen in 1946, did not report stolen paintings until 1972. Four years later she demanded recovery of paintings from man who had bought the paintings in good faith.

Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990: Museums must return Native American artifacts to direct lineal descendant of original owner unless they can show such owner or owner’s tribe voluntarily ceded right to item to museum. No AP b/c AP cannot begin with voluntary transfer. White v. Brown 1977: Decedent left will leaving home to plaintiff “to live in and not to be sold.” Question, does plaintiff have FSA or life estate. Rule: a will shall convey all interest testator had, unless contrary intent is expressed in word/context. Assent: “no sale”—illegal restriction on alienation of FSA. Dissent: “no sale”—legal restriction available only on life estate with reversion implied to grantor or heirs intestacy.

Baker v. Weedon 1972: Weedon brought claim to chancery court for immediate sale of property, a farm which had greatly increased in value because interstate bypass was being built on land. Remaindermen oppose sale because of continuing potential for increase. Rule: Court will order sale if deterioration/waste and whether sale is “necessary for best interest of all parties.” H: Sale of whole not justified.

Falls City v. RR: City conveys land to RR, as long as site used for RR divisional headquarters. When HQ moves, city wants land back. Rule: reverter provision invalid as restraint on alienation

Mountain Brow Lodge v. Toscano 1968: Gift deed gives Plaintiff property “for use and benefit of second party, only” with possibility of reverter to grantor if property used or transferred to another party. Rule: Clause “in event of sale” is absolute restraint against alienation and void. Because restriction on use was condition limiting land use and not covenant restraining alienability of fee simple, it is valid. POLICY: Majority—alienability will be restricted if for good purpose.

Ink v. City of Canton 1965: Grantor conveys tract of land to city for use and purpose of public park only. Gov. takes most of land to build freeway. Rule: Because probability of reverter was so small (Who wants to buy land restricted for use as park?), amount if any, by which value of land for any use exceeds its value for specific use, should got to grantor. City must use money gained from sale for parks. City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve: When condemnor owns present possessory interest in land, the action of condemnation itself is imminent violation. Restatement rule on dividing property in case of eminent domain applies only when a paramount authority, not grantee, interrupts use.

Riddle v. Harmon 1980: Before her death, wife granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in property, terminating joint tenancy, and prepared will disposing of interest. Rule: Minority—no straw needed; legal ritual should not be maintained, for sake of efficiency.

Harms v. Sprague 1984: Joint tenant cosigned note with Defendant on his interest in JT, unbeknownst to fellow tenant. Cosigner dies and leaves all property to Defendant before mortgage is recorded. Rule: By lien theory, mortgage did not sever JT; so at death of cosigner, his interest and lien vanished. Divestment by will had no effect on property in joint tenancy, because it ceased to exist.

Delfino v. Vealencis 1980: D and V own property as tenants in common; V lives on property and runs garbage business on lot; D seeks to partition by sale so property can be used as residential development. V seeks partition in kind to protect home and business. Rule: court orders partition in kind because because partition by sale would not serve “homestead” interests of V.

Johnson v. Hendrickson 1946:

children of grantor bring action for partition by sale against step-dad who lived on property with 1/3 interest; step-dad asked for partition in kind because he lived on homestead there. Court orders sale of property, because the required partition (into more than four sections) would seriously devalue property. No weight given to homestead interest.

Spiller v. Mackereth 1976: S and M—tenants in common; S entered building and began using it as warehouse, M writes letter demanding S to either vacate ½ of building or pay ½ rental fee of occupied property. Rule: no ouster, because letter demanding rent did not indicate S had denied access to M. Sawada v. Endo 1977: Plaintiff injured in car collision at fault of Defendant; before complaint filed, Defendant, who did not have insurance, and his wife conveyed property which they held by tenancy in entirety to sons. Rule: Group III and MWPA—Because neither spouse can convey interest, neither interest can be subject to claims of individual creditors during their joint lives—so conveyance was not in fraud of judgment.

Swartzbaugh v. Sampson 1936: Defendant sought lease of fraction of land for boxing pavilion held by Plaintiff and her husband as joint tenants; Husband agreed, plaintiff disagreed; wife sues to have lease terminated. Rule: leases executed by husband were valid and not voidable by Plaintiff. Remedies available to wife, beyond evicting lessee: a. Partition—partition entire 60 acres; husband and wife split land with no guarantee that boxing pavilion will end up on husband’s land, so lessee may lose lease if ends up on wife’s land, b. Ouster—try to enter on lessee; if lessee resisted, then wife could recover ½ of the fair market value of rent for property, or c. Accounting—affirms lease and sues husband for ½ rents or income from property. Though, she cannot bring actions in both ouster and accounting. Garner v. Gerrish 1984: Decedent rented house to Defendant set to run until the date of Gerrish’s choice. Estate argues that the tenancy ended with the death of the landlord. Rule: Contract law—the lease expressly granted the Defendant the sole right of termination, so Gerrish can stay.

Crechale and Polles, Inc. v. Smith 1974 : Near end of five year lease, Defendant sought a month to month extension while his new home was being completed. Landlord denied any oral agreement about a holdover extension, but accepted a check for the additional month. Rule: Once a landlord elects to treat a tenant as a trespasser but fails to eject him and accepts a check—he agrees to a month to month tenancy.

Soules v. HUD 1992: Single mom brings action against landlord who she claimed denied her rental of apartment in discrimination on basis of familial status. Rule: FHA 3604. H: For landlord. Although Plaintiff was within a protected group, qualified for the housing and was denied, the landlord was motivated by permissible considerations—she did not like the Plaintiff’s attitude and she had not intent to discriminate against her class (offered to rent to other single moms).

Reste Realty v. Cooper 1969: Commercial property floods due to defect in driveway (common area); L argues that tenant did not leave in reasonable time and defect was not permanent; Rule: condition of road was permanent defect, and tenant left within 10 days of worst flooding. Berg v. Wiley 1978: Tenant violated lease by remodeling restaurant without permission of landlord. Lease contained a provision allowing the landlord to retake the premises if the lessee were to fail to meet its conditions. Tenant closed restaurant for remodeling and sent away her employees. Landlord changed locks denying tenant access. Rule: Court held that premises had not been abandoned and that the landlord’s re-entry was not accomplished in a peaceable manner. (The only reason there was not a fight when he changed the locks, was because the Plaintiff was not around.)

Hilder v. St. Peter 1984: Defendant failed to repair apartment despite repeated requests; sewage in basement, window broken, plaster falling in back room. Rule: violation of IWH, tenant stayed and paid rent, court refunded all rent paid as damages—estimated Fair Market Value to be zero.


				
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