South Korean Electoral Politics and Seoul’s Position on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Daniel A. Pinkston, Ph.D.1 25 April 2003 During trilateral talks in Beijing 23-25 April 2003, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Li Gun (Lee Gŭn) reportedly told U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Li also reportedly said that Pyongyang is prepared to produce more weapons or export them, depending on U.S. actions. The Bush administration now faces an extremely difficult security problem that will require close coordination with key regional countries, particularly South Korea and China. As Washington moves forward with policies to deal with Pyongyang’s nuclear program, a clear understanding of South Korean government policies and domestic constraints will be necessary to maintain close cooperation with Seoul. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun (No Mu Hyŏn) has only been in office two months, so his approach to dealing with North Korea is still emerging as the nuclear crisis unfolds. The president has extensive foreign policy and national security powers within the South Korean system of government. Therefore, many were anxious to learn how the South Korean government’s position on the North Korean nuclear program might shift following the election of Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) candidate Roh on 19 December 2002.2 In particular, many were concerned that Roh’s election and antiAmerican sentiments expressed during the campaign might signal a coming rift in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The 2002 South Korean Presidential Campaign Political corruption3 was the dominant issue throughout the nomination process and subsequent campaign, but a naval clash with North Korea in June 20024 and new information about Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program increased the relevance of security issues prior to the election in December. Many in the Bush administration had believed that Lee Hoe Ch’ang of the Grand National Party (GNP) would win the election and support the Bush administration’s proposed policy of “tailored containment” that was peddled around the region in late 2002.5 In January 2002, Lee Hoe Ch’ang spent seven days in the United States meeting with senior Bush administration officials including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.6 However, Lee’s perceived closeness to the Bush administration probably harmed his electoral chances after two school girls died in a U.S. military training accident, which fueled anti-Americanism during the campaign.
On 13 June 2002, two 14-year old girls were killed on their way to a birthday party when they were run over by a U.S. armored vehicle. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard and Lt. Gen. Daniel R. Zanini, commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, both apologized for the incident, but the U.S. handling of the case did not satisfy those seeking a trial in a South Korean court and revisions in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the two countries.7 On 10 July, the Ministry of Justice asked U.S. Forces Korea to waive its right to prosecute the soldiers for being accused of committing crimes while on duty, but the request was denied.8 The two soldiers were later arraigned and tried in a U.S. court martial, but were acquitted of negligent homicide charges.9 The two soldiers left Korea for the United States on 27 November.10 While Lee Hoe Ch’ang was perceived to be close to the Bush administration, Roh Moo Hyun had never visited the United States.11 Roh declined to visit the United States during the campaign, insisting he had no specific reasons to go. Many U.S. government officials misunderstood Roh’s failure to visit the United States as a sign of “anti-Americanism,” but Korean voters interpreted Roh’s refusal to visit and stated desire to revise the SOFA as evidence of leadership qualities that could put the bilateral relationship on a more equal basis. During the campaign, Roh and Lee both embraced some form of détente or cooperation with Pyongyang. However, Lee Hoe Ch’ang and the GNP were very critical of Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy,” and the GNP demanded “strict reciprocity” from Pyongyang. In his acceptance speech after receiving the GNP nomination, Lee said he “would help North Korea on one hand and try to bring it out to a road to reform, opening, and peaceful coexistence.” Lee also said he “would demand that North Korea keep promises and that South Korean food [aid] go to the mouths of the North Korean people [and not the military].” Lee promised a “sharp increase in humanitarian aid.”12 Roh Moo Hyun was prepared to expand cooperation with North Korea even more than Kim Dae Jung. The South Korean president has almost exclusive authority for dealing with Pyongyang, but the president still faces constraints from the international system and from domestic political forces. Therefore, Roh and Lee’s approaches to Pyongyang would probably be closer than most people might expect, although Lee almost certainly would have taken a harder line. Regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, Roh believed that pressure alone could backfire, and that the problem could be resolved peacefully through dialogue and persuasion. Lee agreed that the nuclear issue had to be resolved peacefully through dialogue, but caused a stir during a televised debate in December when he declared that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons.13 U.S. intelligence officials had estimated that North Korea probably possessed one or two nuclear weapons, but Lee’s statement suggested that he was resolved to implement a hard-line containment strategy against North Korea even though he presented no compelling evidence to indicate that Pyongyang had become a nuclear power. Following his victory in a close election on 19 December 2002, Roh Moo Hyun began efforts to put concerns over the future of Seoul’s bilateral relationship with Washington
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to rest. The day after the election, Roh spoke with George W. Bush by telephone and met with U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.14 After these discussions, a spokesman for Roh stressed that the new president would strengthen the bilateral alliance with the United States.15 In January 2003, Roh visited General Leon J. LaPorte, U.S. Forces Korea commander, and other senior military officers at the U.S. Army Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Roh reiterated the importance of the bilateral security relationship and said he would never accept North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.16 He repeated the same message at the American Chamber of Commerce in Seoul and said there were misunderstandings over anti-Americanism in South Korea. Roh explained that most citizens were seeking a more mature bilateral relationship and a revision of the SOFA agreement.17 Roh’s Inauguration and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis Roh did not have the luxury of easing into his job as president. North Korea tested a surface-to-ship cruise missile the day before his inauguration, 18 and restarted its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun a day or two later.19 Roh responded quickly by asking his staff to confirm the status of the reactor, and by implementing a broad diplomatic initiative to deal with the crisis. While in Seoul for Roh’s inauguration on 25 February, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked Roh to support the U.S. position of dealing with Pyongyang multilaterally, and Roh reportedly told Powell, “I understand what you are saying regarding a multilateral approach. I agree.”20 Although Powell claimed he had gained Roh’s full support for the American multilateral strategy, the Roh government’s policy is more complex than simply falling behind the U.S. position. Roh has labeled his policy towards Pyongyang as “the policy for peace and prosperity,” based on the following principles: dialogue; trust and reciprocity; international cooperation based upon Korean initiatives; public participation; and supra-partisan cooperation.21 In regard to North Korea’s nuclear program, the Roh government has stressed that Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, but that the problem must be resolved through peaceful dialogue. The Roh government’s first step towards addressing the North Korean nuclear problem was to promote close trilateral cooperation with Tokyo and Washington.22 Roh also instructed his foreign policy advisors to draft a response, which became a so-called “roadmap” for resolving the problem.23 Although the details of this roadmap or comprehensive deal are still unclear, energy assistance and security assurances for Pyongyang have been mentioned.24 Foreign Minister Yun Yŏng Kwan presented the “roadmap” to the Bush administration during a visit to Washington in late March. Yun suggested that the United States should take a bold initiative towards North Korea like it did with China in the early 1970s. Secretary of State Powell said Yun’s proposal was interesting, but rejected any dramatic opening to North Korea at this time.25 In contrast, the South Korean proposal was well received in Tokyo.26
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Given Roh’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis, Prime Minister Ko Kŏn and Foreign Minister Yun Yŏng Kwan have expressed frustration with the intransigence of Washington and Pyongyang over the issue of bilateral vs. multilateral talks.27 President Roh’s position is that dialogue format is less important than achieving results,28 and South Korean government officials have said that U.S.-North Korean bilateral diplomacy and multilateral talks are both necessary to bring a verifiable end to the North Korean nuclear program. In an effort to gain U.S. support for the South Korean initiative to deal with the nuclear crisis, Roh decided to support the United States in the war with Iraq even though South Korean public opinion was strongly opposed to South Korean involvement. Facing strong opposition from legislators, Roh extended considerable political capital by going to the National Assembly on 2 April and delivering a speech to gain legislative approval for the dispatch of about 700 non-combatant troops to support the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.29 In return for support in Iraq, South Koreans expect the United States to consider Seoul’s concerns in dealing with the North Korean nuclear program. Trilateral Talks in Beijing Many South Koreans criticized President Roh when it was announced that delegations from the United States, China, and North Korea would meet in Beijing for trilateral talks on 23-25 April. Roh’s policy for peace and prosperity emphasizes Korean input, but Seoul was excluded from the Beijing talks. Initial reports out of Beijing indicate North Korean Deputy Foreign Minster Li Gun said that North Korea has nuclear weapons. If these reports are confirmed, it will be extremely difficult for the Roh government to maintain its policy of engaging North Korea, and the government will be under pressure from domestic and international sources. A spokesman for the opposition Grand National Party has already issued a statement declaring that North Korea’s announcement means a change in policy towards Pyongyang is required.30 South Korean hawks will now blame engagement policies for allowing North Korea to cross the nuclear threshold, and will demand a hardline approach. On the other hand, many Roh supporters are likely to blame the Bush administration’s refusal to extend negative security assurances to North Korea as the reason for Pyongyang’s choosing the nuclear option. Many probably believe that the Bush administration never intended to seek a negotiated settlement, leaving North Korea with no choice. Some may even believe that Roh was duped into supporting the coalition against Iraq, and that South Korea’s exclusion from the Beijing talks contributed to the collapse of the talks. Internationally, the Roh government will likely come under pressure from Bush administration hardliners who seek regime change in Pyongyang. However, most South Koreans are more concerned about the effects of the North Korean nuclear program on the South Korean economy, rather than the security implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea. The common South Korean view is that North Korea would never use
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nuclear weapons against fellow Koreans, and that the geographic proximity makes nuclear weapons impractical. In 1994, when it appeared the United States was moving towards a military strike against the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facilities, President Kim Yong Sam telephoned President Bill Clinton and warned that he would not accept a second Korean war during his tenure.31 On Roh’s inauguration day, Colin Powell reportedly assured Roh that the United States would seek South Korean approval before launching a military attack against North Korea.32 However, Seoul’s support for a preemptive military strike is very unlikely. The U.S. military does not need South Korean cooperation to execute a military strike against North Korea’s nuclear facilities, but failure to obtain Seoul’s approval would place the bilateral alliance at risk. Conclusion The Bush administration maintains that the North Korean nuclear issue is a regional and global problem that requires multilateral attention. If reports from the Beijing talks that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons are accurate, effective U.S. policy will require close coordination with South Korea and other countries. All countries in the region wish to avoid a catastrophic war on the Korean peninsula, but the security policies and policy preferences of the United States and South Korea diverge in some areas. South Korea wants to cooperate closely with the United States in resolving the crisis, but Seoul does not want its interests to be subordinated to those of the United States. This will complicate the task of forming and implementing a coordinated regional policy.
Senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The author would like to thank Phillip Saunders and Sarah Diehl for their helpful comments. 2 Paul Shin, “Former Human Rights Lawyer Roh Wins South Korean Presidential Election,” Associated Press, 19 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Yoichi Kosukegawa, “Focus: U.S.S. Korean Relations May Enter Difficult Era,” Japan Economic Newswire, 19 December 2002, in LexisNexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Andrew Ward, “Victory for Roh Will Create Tension with US,” Financial Times (London), 20 December 2002, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Jim Lobe, “Politics-U.S.: South Korea Marks Bush’s Third Election Defeat,” Inter Press Service, 19 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. For a report on U.S. government suspicions about Roh around the time of his nomination in April 2002, see Shindonga, 1 July 2002, pp. 126-136, in “US Government Said Collecting Information on ROK Presidential Candidate No Mu-hyon,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020628000056; 최영재, “주한 미국대사관의 대선 X 파일: 미 정보기관 노무현 뒤를 캐고 있다,” 신동아, 1 July 2002, http://shindonga.donga.com. 3 The last year of Kim Dae Jung’s presidency was rocked by a series of scandals that included two of his sons and the first lady’s nephew. The Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) suffered overwhelming defeats in local elections held on 13 June and in by-elections for vacant National Assembly seats on 8 August. The endemic scandals led to Kim Dae Jung’s resignation from the MDP, and to impeachment threats from the Grand National Party (GNP). See Jong-Heon Lee, “Opposition Sweeps S. Korea’s Elections,” United Press International, 13 June 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Hyung-jin, “Following Another Election Triumph, GNP Set to Flex Parliamentary Muscles,” Korea Herald, 10 August 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Shin Yong-bae, “Internal Strife Brewing in MDP Following Defeat in Elections,” Korea Herald, 16 June 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 9 August 2002, in “ROK MDP Leaders to Resign, Take Responsibility for ‘Crushing
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Defeat’ in By Elections,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020809000028; Yonhap News Agency, 9 August 2002, in “ROK’s Yonhap: MDP Likely to Follow in Predecessor’s Footsteps to Create New Party,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020809000057. 4 During the naval clash in June, North Korean naval forces sunk a South Korean vessel off the west coast, but the South Korean military called off the pursuit of North Korean boats when South Korean officials learned that North Korea was preparing to respond with missile fire from shore batteries. Afterwards, the GNP harshly criticized the defense minister and the joint chiefs of staff, and demanded that the Kim Dae Jung government reconsider its policy towards North Korea. See “The Naval Clash on the Yellow Sea on 29 June 2002 between South and North Korea: The Situation and ROK’s Position,” Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1 July 2002, http://www.mnd.go.kr; Ministry of National Defense, 7 July 2002, in “ROK Defense Ministry Announces Investigation Results of West Sea Clash—Graphics,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020707000007; Hwang Jang-jin, “N.K Readied Anti-Ship Missiles During Naval Exchange of Fire,” Korea Herald, 5 July 2002, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 4 July 2002, in “ROK DefMin (sic) Refutes Criticism, Says DPRK Was Preparing Missile launch in Sea Clash,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020704000034; Hwang Jang-jin, “S. Korea, U.S. Analyze Communications During West Sea Skirmish with N. Korea,” Korea Herald, 1 July 2002, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr; Hwang Jang-jin, “South, North Exchange Fire in West Sea,” Korea Herald, 30 June 2002, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr; Kim Hyung-jin, “GNP to Submit No-Confidence Motion on Defense Minister,” Korea Herald, 4 July 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 5 Although the policy was ambiguous, it was apparently designed to establish a multilateral coalition to concentrate economic and diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang, with the desired result of “regime collapse.” See Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Readies Plan to Raise Pressure on North Koreans,” New York Times, 29 December 2002, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Jonathan D. Salant, “Lacking Many Options, Bush Administration Seeks to Increase Economic Pressure on North Korea,” Associated Press, 28 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 6 Yonhap News Agency, 28 January 2002, in “ROK's Yonhap: Lee Hoi-chang Returns From 7-Day U.S. Trip,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020128000093; Hwang Jang-jin, “GNP Leader Supports American Forces in South Korea, Wraps up Visit to U.S.,” Korea Herald, 28 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 24 January 2002, in “ROK's Yonhap: Lee Hoi-chang Meets Dick Cheney on Korea's Int'l Situation,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020124000085; Yonhap News Agency, 24 January 2002, in “ROK Opposition Leader's Meetings With US Officials Detailed,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020124000019. 7 “US Armored Vehicle Kills Two Middle School GirlsA (sic) Top U.S. Military Leader Expressed Regret over an Accident Thursday Morning in which Two Korean Teenage Girls Were Run over and Killed by a U.S. Armored Vehicle,” Korea Times, 15 June 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 8 Kim Ji-ho, “U.S. Military Refuses to Relinquish Jurisdiction over American Soldiers,” Korea Herald, 8 August 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; “USFK Rejects Request for Transfer of Jurisdiction Over Soldiers,” Korea Times, 8 August 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 9 Jun Kwanwoo, “Court Clears Second US Soldier in South Korea Schoolgirl Deaths,” Agence France Presse, 22 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; “Court Clears US Soldier of School Girl Deaths,” Agence France Presse, 22 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com; Kim Ji-ho, “Court-Martial on U.S. Soldiers Begins,” Korea Herald, 19 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Sang-Hun Choe, “Testimony Enters Second Day in Court Martial of U.S. Soldier Accused of Negligent Homicide in South Korea,” Associated Press, 18 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 10 Yonhap News Agency, “US Soldiers Cleared of Schoolgirls’ Deaths Leave South Korea,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 27 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 11 Roh is scheduled to visit Washington in May 2003. 12 Digital Hannara, 10 May 2002, in “Acceptance Speech of ROK Opposition Party Presidential Candidate Yi Hoe-Ch’ang,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020510000043. 13 Hankyroreh Shinmun, 4 December 2002, in “ROK Daily on ROK Presidential Candidates' Stand on DPRK Nuclear Issue, SOFA Revision,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021204000050; “Lee’s Remark on N. Korean Nukes Sparks Dispute,” Korea Herald, 5 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com; 신승근, “이후보 ‘북한 핵 보유’ 발언 파문 / 정치권 ‘근거없는 주장에 국민불안’ 반박,” 한
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겨 레, 4 December 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr; 이동국 및정녹용, “李 ‘北, 核보유’ 단정 논란 가열,” 한국일보, 5 December 2002, p. 4, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr. 14 Barbara Demick, “Incoming S. Korean Leader to Visit U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 21 December 2002, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Kwak Young-sup, “U.S. Envoy Calls on Chief-to-Be,” Korea Herald, 21 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 15 “Roh to Visit Washington Shortly after Inauguration,” Agence France Presse, 21 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Andrew Ward, “South Korean Victor Moves to Ease US Fears,” Financial Times (London), 21 December 2002, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 16 T.D. Flack, “U.S. Alliance Needed, Says S. Korean President-Elect Roh Moo-hyun,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 17 January 2003, http://www.estripes.com. 17 T.D. Flack, “President-Elect Roh Urges Diplomacy, Better Ties at Meeting,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 19 January 2003, http://www.estripes.com. 18 A North Korean official attending a Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Kuala Lumpur said the missile was tested for “safety reasons.” See Mainichi Daily News, 25 February 2003, in “Japan: DPRK Official at NAM Meeting Says Missile Launched for 'Safety Reasons',” FBIS Document ID: JPP20030225000082. 19 Jiji Press, 27 February 2003, in “U.S. Informs Japan of Yongbyon N-Reactor Restart,” FBIS Document ID: JPP20030227000031. 20 Nicholas Kralev, “Powell Sees Support on Talks with N. Korea,” Washington Times, 26 February 2003, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 21 “Roh Adopts ‘Peace, Prosperity’ Toward NK,” Korea Times, 25 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 22 In a telephone call to Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on 28 February, Foreign Minister Yun Yŏng Kwan (Yoon Young Kwan) said, “It is important for South Korea, Japan and the United States to keep close cooperation to solve North Korea’s nuclear arms issue. I would like to cooperate with you closely.” See “SKorea’s (sic) New FM Affirms Close Alliance with Japan over nuclear Crisis,” Agence France Presse, 28 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 23 Shin Yong-bae, “Seoul Confirms Report on N.K. Reactor; Roh Orders Foreign Policy,” Korea Herald, 1 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 24 The Financial Times of London reported that a deal to supply Russian natural gas to North Korea in exchange for the abandonment of Pyongyang’s nuclear program was under consideration, but the South Korean government later denied this. See Andrew Ward, “Deal for Gas Pipeline Could Solve Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Financial Times (London), 31 March 2003, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com; “[언론바로보기]‘러시아가스 北지원’ 사실 아니다,” 청와대 브리핑, 1 April 2003, http://www.president.go.kr. 25 Guy Dinmore, “S Korea Urges ‘Bold US Initiative on North,” Financial Times (London), 29 March 2003, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, “Powell Rejects South Korean Idea for an Opening to the North,” Associated Press, 28 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 26 Yonhap News Agency, 31 March 2003, in “Japan Supports South Korea’s ‘Road Map’ for Resolving North’s Nuclear Issue,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com. 27 Soo-Jeong Lee, “South Korea Wants Washington to Show More Flexibility over North Korea,” Associated Press, 12 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Stephen Collinson, “US Admits Pressure from Allies, Asian Powers to Talk to North Korea,” Agence France Presse, 12 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Charles Whelan, “US Must Show More Will to Resolve Nuclear Crisis: South Korea,” Agence France Presse, 12 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com. 28 “4 월 17 일 제 34 호 청와대 브리핑,” 청와대 브리핑, 17 April 2003, http://www.president.go.kr. 29 Shin Yong-bae, “Assembly Set to OK Troop Bill: President Says Dispatch Will Reassure Investors, Defuse N.K. Crisis,” Korea Herald, 3 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; “Roh Recalls Wednesday ‘Worst Day’,” Korea Times, 4 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 30 황정욱, “북 핵보유설 중대문제,” 연합뉴스, 25 April 2003, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr. 31 Kim probably loathed North Korea and Kim Il Sung even more than President George W. Bush loathes Kim Jong Il since North Korean agents murdered Kim Young Sam’s mother when he was a young man.
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“Roh Trying to Mend Fences with US,” Korea Times, 13 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com. For a brief review of U.S. military options, see Phillip C. Saunders, “Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program,” CNS North Korea Special Collection, 27 January 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm.
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