Corporate Restraining Order Dismissal by yew19614

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									 1   Emanuel McCray
 2
     1736 State Street
     San Diego, California 92101-2513
 3   (619) 696-9838
 4
     U.S. Relator & Appellant Pro Se
 5

 6                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 7                                     FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 8

 9   (1) United States of America ex rel Emanuel )      USCA No. 06-56279
     McCray;                                      )
10   (2) Emanuel McCray, on behalf of himself and )     USDC No. 06CV1537IEG WMc
                                                  )
     all others similarly situated;               )
11
     (3) Lynn Ann Hust (indispensable)            )     Appellants’ Petition for Hearing En Banc
12                   Plaintiffs-Appellants,       )     (FRAP 35 and 40)
             vs.                                  )
13   (1) A. Joe Hageman, City Council Member, )   )
     Laramie, Wyoming;                            )
14
     (2) City Council, Laramie, Wyoming;          )
15   (3) Albany County Court; Laramie, Wyoming; )
     (4) Clark County Court; Vancouver,           )
16   Washington;
     (5) The State of Oregon;
17
     (6) The State of Washington; and
18   (7) The State of Wyoming,
                     Defendants-Appellees.
19

20          The panel’s opinion conflicts with and is repugnant to: (1) Article III, section 2; (2) the
21
     Supreme Court’s opinions in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lorenzo L. Jones, v.
     Barbara Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910; 2007 U.S. EXIS 1325; Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992);
22   Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529 US 765; and
     Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939; 1997 U.S. LEXIS
23   3719; (3) Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914 et seq.; (4) Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730; (5) Title 42 U.S.C.A. §
24
     1983; and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and consideration by the full court is therefore
     necessary as a mandatory constitutional duty to maintain the integrity and dignity of the court.
25
                                           Factual Background
26

27   a) None of the plaintiffs-appellants are poor prisoners or incarcerated.

28   b) The Complaint was styled pursuant to Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730; Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
     and Rule 19, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:



                                                     -1-
 1

 2
            United States of America ex rel Emanuel McCray; Emanuel McCray, on behalf of
            himself and all others similarly situated; Lynn Ann Hust (indispensable),
 3          plaintiffs
 4
     c) The Complaint alleged violations of the Constitution and laws of the United States as the
 5   principal conduct giving rise to the injuries sustained by each named plaintiff, to wit:

 6          Complaint for Violation of: Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1; Article 4, Section 2,
            Clause 2; Article 6, Clause 2; Article 6, Clause 3; Amendment First; Amendment
 7
            Fourth; Amendment Fifth; Amendment Sixth; Amendment Fourteenth; 31
 8          U.S.C.A. § 3729 et seq.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

 9   d) Although State judges, bankers, prosecutors, State executive officers, State legislators, City
     police officers, County Sheriffs, national newspaper and television executives were the chief
10
     actors among the criminal conspirators, none were named as defendants, to wit:
11
            (1) A. Joe Hageman, City Council Member, Laramie, Wyoming;
12          (2) City Council, Laramie, Wyoming;
            (3) Albany County Court; Laramie, Wyoming;
13
            (4) Clark County Court; Vancouver, Washington;
14          (5) The State of Oregon;
            (6) The State of Washington; and
15          (7) The State of Wyoming, defendants
16
     e) Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914(a) court fees of $350.00 were paid on July 31, 2006.
17
     f) The Complaint was dismissed in the trial court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2), to
18   wit:
19
             ***Secondly, plaintiff lacks standing because he has suffered no harm other than the
20   general harm to society when an official anywhere in the United States violates the Constitution.
     (footnote omitted) For these reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s application for a temporary
21   restraining order.
22
              Furthermore, the Court has reviewed the complaint and finds it totally devoid of points of
23   fact or law such that plaintiff has clearly failed to state a claim. Accordingly, pursuant to 28
     U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this action.
24

25   g) A three-judge panel consisting of Circuit Judges Kleinfeld, Silverman and M. Smith affirmed
     the trial court’s discretionary power to dismiss sua sponte a suit in forma pauperis under Title 28
26   U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) using the de novo standard of appellate review under Rule 12(b)(6),
     Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
27

28          ***We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
            dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.***The district court did not err



                                                     -2-
 1          when it sua sponte dismissed McCray’s action. See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359,
 2
            361-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court has authority under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss
            sua sponte for failure to state a claim.)
 3
     h) The panel judges went an additional step further when it found and concluded the following:
 4

 5          “McCray does not have standing to bring this action because he does not claim to
            have suffered any “injury in fact” or any personal or individualized harm”***
 6
            ***”and as a non-lawyer, he may not bring an action on behalf of another
 7
            party”***
 8
     i) The initial issues on appeal were, and remain, framed this way:
 9
            “5. What issues are you raising on appeal?
10

11                  a. Appellants paid all court fees. The district court dismissed the complaint
            pursuant to the poor person’s statute? Under what authority might the judgment
12          be sustained given this fact?
13
                   b. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice within five
14          days of filing without giving the defendants an opportunity to appear and be heard
            as summoned. Under what authority might the judgment be sustained given this
15          fact?
16
                    c. The complaint and temporary restraining order alleged threats that
17          effectively restrain the constitutional liberty of the appellants and family members
            of the appellants. Under what authority might the judgment be sustained given
18          this fact?”
19
                                               ARGUMENT
20
                                                 POINT I
21

22                             The Judgment of the trial court is void and
                                 the proceedings are coram non judice.
23
            A trial court is without statutory power or authority to dismiss a paid civil complaint by a
24
     non-prisoner “pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A.§ 1915(e)(2)”.
25
            The “Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995” (PLRA of 1995) was enrolled under “Title
26   VIII” of H.R. 2076 (Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
     Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996).
27

28




                                                     -3-
 1          Title 28 U.S.C.A.§ 1915(e)(2) is derived from “SEC. 804. PROCEEDINGS IN FORMA
 2
     PAUPERIS” of the PLRA of 1995. As its name clearly implies, the statute applies only to poor
     prisoners.
 3
             Introduced in the U.S. Senate as S. 1279 to be “A Bill” “To provide for appropriate
 4
     remedies for prison condition lawsuits, to discourage frivolous and abusive prison lawsuits, and
 5   for other purposes.”

 6            Another telling conclusion that section 1915 applies only to prisoners can be found by
     applying math. The word “prisoner” occurs 21 times, to wit: (a)(1) = 1; (a)(2) = 3; (b)(1) = 2;
 7
     (b)(1)(A) = 1; (b)(1)(B) = 1; (b)(2) = 4; (b)(4) = 2; (f)(2)(A) = 2; (f)(2)(B) = 1; (g) = 3 and
 8   (h) = 1.

 9           The word “person” appears only five (5) times, to wit: (a)(1) = 3 times; (e)(1) = 1 time;
     and (h) = 1 time.
10

11           The words “person” and “prisoner” appear together twice only in subsections (a)(1)
     and (h).
12
            Additionally, Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 is a conditional statute that gives life to a
13
     prisoner’s statutory right to proceed with a lawsuit without paying a fee when:
14
            a person [prisoner or representative of the prisoner such as counsel, public
15          defender, etc.,] submits an affidavit that:
16
            (a) includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses;
17          (b) includes a statement that the person [prisoner or representative of the prisoner
            such as counsel, public defender, etc.,] is unable to pay such fees or give security
18          therefore;
19
            (c) states the nature of the action, defense or appeal; and
            (d) states it is the affiant’s belief that the person [the prisoner] is entitled to
20          redress.
21           In response to Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Congress banned the courts’ use
22
     of Rule 12(b)(6) when it added the failure to state a claim provision to the district court’s
     discretionary powers under section 1915, to wit:
23
             (e)(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
24
             paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--
25           (B) the action or appeal--
             (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted….
26   Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
27
             In Lorenzo L. Jones, v. Barbara Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910; 2007 U.S. EXIS 1325, Chief
28   Justice Roberts, who delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, made this observation:




                                                     -4-
 1          ***Before the PLRA, the in forma pauperis provision of § 1915, applicable to
 2
            most prisoner litigation, permitted sua sponte dismissal only if an action was
            frivolous or malicious.*** In the PLRA, Congress added failure to state a claim
 3          and seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief as grounds
            for sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis cases, §1915(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.),
 4
            and provided for judicial screening and sua sponte dismissal of prisoner suits on
 5          the same four grounds, § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).

 6           Support for the trial court’s confused judgment can be found in the District Court’s Local
     Rules; and in an unpublished opinion of the Court of Federal Claims regarding Jeffrey G. Walls
 7
     v. United States, No. 05-533C, filed July 28, 2005, which collects cases from different circuits
 8   where the rights of prisoners, paupers, non-prisoners and fee paying litigants have been
     conflated, notwithstanding the admonition of a unanimous Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
 9   319 (1989).
10
             Additionally, from Andrews v. Cervantes, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15987 (9th Cir. Cal.
11   July 5, 2007) to Barrier v. Benninger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18796 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1998),
     including, Robinson v. Burns, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61345, presided over by Chief Judge Irma
12   Gonzalez; all show deficiencies and misapplication of the in forma pauperis statute.
13
            The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void traces back to the
14   English Year Books. Bowser v. Collins, Y. B. Mich. 22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng. Rep. 97
     (Ex. Ch. 1482).
15
            This was made settled law by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke Rep. 68b,
16
     77a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1041 (K. B. 1612).
17
            Traditionally, the proposition was embodied in the phrase coram non judice, “before a
18   person not a judge”—meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not a judicial
19
     proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could therefore not yield a
     judgment.
20
            American courts invalidated, or denied recognition to, judgments that violated this
21   common-law principle long before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See, e.g., Grumon
22
     v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (CC Mass. 1828);
     Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N. Y. Ch. 1834); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273 (1835); Steel v.
23   Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447 (Pa. 1844); Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 350 (1850).
24
             In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878), the Court announced that the judgment of a
25   court lacking personal jurisdiction also violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
     Amendment.
26
             Because the judgment of the trial court is not in accordance with any law applicable to
27
     the facts of the case, the judgment must be declared
28   VOID and ordered VACATED.




                                                    -5-
 1                                             POINT II
 2
       The Three-Judge Appeals Panel is without power and authority to (1) amend the void
       judgment of a trial court; (2) rewrite the void judgment of a trial court; (3) reissue the
 3             newly created void trial court judgment as an original product; and
                      (4) affirm this newly created void trial court judgment.
 4

 5          There was not found any power or authority under Article III, the Supremacy or Oath or
     Affirmation Clauses; the Judiciary Act; the Federal Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure; or any
 6   provision of the Constitution or a law of Congress to sustain the panel’s opinion.
 7
            Moreover, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court in
 8   Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), held that:

 9          ***”[W]e recently reviewed the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a complaint
            based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and found by a 9-to-0 vote that it had, in fact, stated a
10
            cognizable claim—a powerful illustration that a finding of a failure to state a
11          claim does not invariably mean that the claim is without arguable merit. See
            Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
12
            ***Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded
13
            notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an
14          opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon.*** This
            adversarial process also crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate
15          review of a trial court dismissal by creating a more complete record of the
            case.***
16

17          ***A complaint like that filed by Williams under the Eighth Amendment, whose
            only defect was its failure to state a claim, will in all likelihood be dismissed sua
18          sponte, whereas an identical complaint filed by a paying plaintiff will in all
19
            likelihood receive the considerable benefits of the adversary proceedings
            contemplated by the Federal Rules.
20
            And, in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992):
21

22
            ***we observed that the in forma pauperis statute, unlike Rule 12(b)(6), “accords
            judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
23          legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
            factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
24
            baseless.”
25          Because the frivolousness determination is a discretionary one, we further hold
            that a § 1915(d) dismissal is properly reviewed for an abuse of that discretion, and
26          that it was error for the Court of Appeals to review the dismissal of Hernandez’s
            claims de novo. *** Because a § 1915(d) dismissal is not a dismissal on the
27
            merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the in forma pauperis
28          statute, the dismissal does not prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the
            same allegations.



                                                     -6-
 1

 2
            Not only does the panel cleverly confuse the proper standard of appellate review, the
     panel puts words into the mouth of a perfectly written judgment, IF the plaintiffs were poor
 3   prisoners.
 4
             Moreover, the panel’s insertion of “Rule 12(b)(6)” into the trial court’s original judgment
 5   sustains the issues on appeal and confirms the appellants’ claim that: (1) Chief Judge Irma
     Gonzalez was without statutory aauthorityto dismiss the action sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
 6   § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (2) the judgment of the trial court was void. A different outcome would
     be most interesting, indeed.
 7

 8           The judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
     litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. The presence of adverse litigants with
 9   real interests to contend for is a gold standard and the requirement implicates a number of
     complementary factors making up a justiciable suit.
10

11           Thus, the panel’s insertion of Rule 12(b)(6) into facts not found by the trial court, causes
     the panel’s newly created trial court opinion to run head long into Rules 1, 3, and 4 where the
12   court is required to establish the prerequisites to exercise its Article III power over cases or
     controversies involving adversaries; and where, under Article III of the Federal Constitution, a
13
     judge is a judge, and not an adversary.
14
           Because of the following deficiencies in the trial court’s judgment, the panel’s opinion is
15   much worse in its attempt to amend the judgment to avoid declaring the judgment void:
16
            (a) The trial court’s judgment names no defendants as having appeared in the
17          action.
            (b) The trial court’s judgment does not indicate whether any of the plaintiffs
18          complied with any provision of Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R.
19
            Civ. P.);
            (c) The trial court’s judgment does not state whether any of the named defendants
20          received actual or constructive notice and failed to appear.
            (d) The trial court’s judgment cites the wrong statute in support of the exercise of
21          judicial power, sua sponte.
22
            (e) The trial court’s judgment cites no constitutional authority in support of the
            exercise of judicial power, sua sponte.
23          (f) The trial court’s judgment fails to explain why the judgment eliminated the
            United States as an indispensable party plaintiff under Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 et
24
            seq.
25          (g) The trial court’s judgment fails to explain why the judgment eliminates Lynn
            Ann Hust as an indispensable party plaintiff to the United States and its Relator
26          under Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P.;
            (h) The trial court’s judgment lacks findings of essential facts; i.e.; whether U.S.
27
            was properly before court through its relator; whether plaintiffs were poor; were
28          prisoners or were otherwise, etc.




                                                     -7-
 1          (i) The trial court’s judgment ruled that the defendants, who were not before the
 2
            court in any capacity, violated the Constitution of the United States; but fails to
            explain how or give the provisions the court found as a fact to have been violated.
 3          (j) The trial court’s judgment violates Rule 54(b), Fed. Rules of Civ. P.;
            (k) The trial court’s judgment is not fair; not right; and not just for any of the
 4
            parties.
 5
            Thus, the People of the United States cannot accept the trial court’s judgment or the
 6   panels’ opinion as acceptable judicial work. Nope. No sir. No Ma’am.
 7
           Because the panel is without any power or authority to amend or rewrite a void trial court
 8   judgment; a fortiori it may not affirm a void trial court judgment. The panel’s opinion must be
     OVERRULED and the mandate, STAYED or RECALLED.
 9
                                                POINT III
10
            Plaintiff Emanuel McCray has authority to style the Complaint and Standing
11              under the overall legal theory of the Complaint; and the trial court’s
                       dismissal of Plaintiffs United States and Lynn Ann Hust is
12                 contrary to Title 31 U.S.C.A § 3730 and Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P.
13
            The ancient maxim, the incident follows the principal and not the principal the incident is
14   applicable here.

15          When Judge Gonzalez found the constitution was violated, attached to the violation of the
     Constitution was the injury in fact suffered by the United States under the Workforce Investment
16
     Act of 1998, Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 2801 et seq., and the injury to civil rights of the whistleblowers
17   and other individuals to whom threats were communicated to prevent aid from being rendered to
     their Government and the whistleblowers.
18

19
            The complaint alleged that the Constitution was violated to cover up and prevent
     disclosure of the criminal conspiracy operating against the U.S. Treasury; that the defendants
20   planned their revenge over a one-year span; and that on May 1, 2006, ordered the victim
     grandmother be kidnapped to be murdered as an integral part of the conspiratorial aims of the
21   cabal.
22
           The violations of the Constitution at issue in the Complaint are proscribed under Title 18
23   U.S.C.A. § 2, 3, 4, 201, 241, 242, 371, 875, 1001, 1961 and 1962.
24
            The Complaint was styled:
25
            “United States of America ex rel Emanuel McCray; Emanuel McCray, on behalf
26          of himself and all others similarly situated; Lynn Ann Hust (indispensable)”.
27
            A complaint alleging the violation of Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 must be brought in the
28   name of the United States pursuant to Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730. By law, the United States was
     indispensable.



                                                    -8-
 1

 2
            A complaint alleging the violation of a federal contract must name the contractor as
     indispensable under Rule 19, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 3
            The United States’ injury in fact confers standing on relator to bring a qui tam civil action
 4   under the False Claims Act. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
     Stevens (2000) 529 US 765.
 5
           In Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939; 1997 U.S.
 6
     LEXIS 3719; Mr. Justice Thomas, in relevant part, delivered the following opinion for a
 7   unanimous Court:

 8          “That a qui tam suit is brought by a private party “on behalf of the United States,”
            see Brief for Respondent 17, does not alter the fact that a relator’s interests and
 9
            the Government’s do not necessarily coincide. Moreover, as the statute specifies,
10          qui tam actions are brought both “for the person and for the United States
            Government.”
11

12
              In every action involving the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce the
     communication of a threat, whoever causes another to engage in communicating any threat
13   proscribed under Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 875 et seq., shall be deemed an indispensable party to the
     litigation.
14

15
           In every action involving a contract, the contractor and the contracting parties shall be
     deemed indispensable to the litigation.
16
             In every contract dispute, the contractor is an indispensable party plaintiff or defendant;
17
     voluntarily or involuntarily. Lynn Ann Hust and her company is that federal Government
18   contractor who was financed by the federal Government and robbed of obligated federal monies
     to the tune of four million dollars by the defendants.
19
            A glimpse of the defendant’s crimes helps clarify plaintiff Emanuel’s standing:
20

21          Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 (conspiracy to violate the U.S. Constitution);
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Amendment First (speech, press, association, family
22          relations; conscience)
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Amendment Fourth
23
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Amendment Fifth
24          Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Amendment Sixth
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Amendment Fourteenth
25          Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and (Extradition Clause)
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and (Oath or Affirmation)
26
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 2 (conspiracy to be a principal)
27          Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 3 (conspiracy to be an accessory)
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 4 (conspiracy commit misprision of felony)
28          Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 201 (conspiracy to commit quid pro quo bribery)
            Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 241, 242 (conspiracy to violate civil rights)



                                                     -9-
 1           Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and 875 (conspiracy to communicate threats in interstate
 2
             commerce)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 2801 et. seq. (conspiracy to
 3           violate the Workforce Investment Act of 1998)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Title 42 U.S.C.A. (conspiracy to violate federal
 4
             block grant program)
 5           Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 et seq. (conspiracy to
             violate federal False Claims Act)
 6           Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1001 (conspiracy to make false statements)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1113 (conspiracy to attempt to commit murder or
 7
             manslaughter)
 8           Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1201 (conspiracy to kidnap)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1341 (conspiracy to commit mail fraud)
 9           Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1343 (conspiracy to commit wire fraud)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1344 (conspiracy to commit bank fraud)
10
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1346 (conspiracy to deprive another of the
11           intangible right of honest services)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 and 1348 (conspiracy to commit securities fraud)
12           Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 1833a (conspiracy to violate the
     banking laws)
13
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and Title 12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq. (conspiracy to violate
14   financial privacy in banking)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 1951 (conspiracy to commit extortion)
15           Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to abuse or usurp State power)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to abuse or usurp State public office)
16
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to abuse or usurp State lawyer’s public
17           franchise)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to abuse or usurp State judicial process)
18           Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to abuse or usurp State police power)
19
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to abuse or usurp official State oath)
             Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (conspiracy to violate State perjury statutes)
20
           The injury to the United States, its contractor, Lynn Ann Hust, and its relator, Emanuel
21   McCray, must also be considered in light of the following information extracted from a
22
     document making its way to one or more U.S. Attorney’s offices:

23          FOURTH. Between April 15, 2005 and May 23, 2005, one or more principals
            ordered, directed and or otherwise instructed the preparation and release of press
24
            and media articles designed to paint the victim grandmother in a false light and
25          defame the character of the victim grandmother as part of a plan to kidnap,
            murder and dispose of the victim grandmother’s body without leaving a trace to
26          any of the conspirators; the commencement of said press and media articles began
            on, about or between May 20, 2005 and May 23, 2005 using the First amendment
27
            assets of the Laramie Boomerang; Casper Star-Tribune; KGWN CBS 5
28          Television; The Associated Press; Cody Café.com; Lee Enterprises; SagamoreHill
            Broadcasting; Dean Singleton’s MediaNews Group; The McClatchy Company;



                                                   -10-
 1   the Citizen Tribune, Morristown, Tennessee; the Tribune Company, Chicago,
 2
     Illinois; the Hearst Corporation; the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette; The Journal
     Gazette, Fort Wayne, Indiana; The New York Times Regional Media Group,
 3   Tampa, Florida; The Washington Post; Pioneer Newspapers, Inc., Seattle
     Washington; E.W. Scripps Company; Gannett, Co. Inc.; the Rutland Herald,
 4
     Rutland, Vermont; Advance.Net, New York, New York; Schurz Communications
 5   Inc., South Bend, Indiana; GateHouse Media, Inc., Fairport, New York;
     Bonneville International Corp., Salt Lake City, Utah; Southeast Missourian, Cape
 6   Girardeau, Missouri; Cox Newspapers, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia; ABC News; and
     Media General Inc., Richmond, Virginia.
 7

 8   FOURTEEN.              Between April 15, 2005 and May 1, 2006, one or more
     principals ordered, directed and or otherwise instructed the continued planning to
 9   kidnap for purposes of murder of the victim grandmother; said planning
     culminated in the actual kidnapping of the victim grandmother by individuals
10
     associated with the Battle Ground Police Department, Battle Ground, Washington
11   on May 1, 2006, at 22:30 p.m. Pacific Standard Time (PST).

12   FIFTEEN. Between 22:30 p.m. and 23:00 p.m. on May 1, 2006, one or more
     principals ordered, directed and or otherwise instructed the police kidnappers
13
     associated with the Battle Ground Police Department, Battle Ground, Washington
14   to recapture the victim grandmother for purposes of murder of the victim
     grandmother; said recapture of the victim grandmother occurring between 22:30
15   p.m. and 23:00 p.m. on May 1, 2006, in the vicinity of Brush Prairie, Washington.
16
     EIGHTEEN. Between 22:30 p.m. and 23:02 p.m. on May 1, 2006, one or more
17   principals ordered, directed and or otherwise instructed the police kidnappers
     associated with the Battle Ground Police Department and the Clark County
18   Sheriff’s office to use the wires in interstate commerce to send the printed
19
     information (SEVENTEEN) to the Albany County Sheriff’s office for use in
     obtaining a copy of the original warrant to aid the cover and concealment of the
20   botched kidnapping for murder; said data being transmitted using the wires in
     interstate commerce on May 1, 2006 at 23:02 p.m. PST.
21

22
     TWENTY-ONE.            Between 22:30 p.m. on May 1, 2006 and the early morning
     hours of May 2, 2006, one or more principals ordered, directed and or otherwise
23   instructed one or more individuals associated with the Clark County Prosecutors’
     Office to prepare false and fraudulent “extradition” and “fugitive” from justice
24
     arraignment papers on the kidnapped victim grandmother for purposes of aiding
25   and abetting the cover up and concealment of the botched kidnapping for murder
     by individuals associated with the Battle Ground Police Department; the State of
26   Wyoming; and the City of Laramie, Wyoming; said false and fraudulent
     “extradition” and “fugitive” from justice papers being filed on May 2, 2006 in the
27
     District Court, Vancouver, Washington.
28




                                           -11-
 1   Arthur David Curtis, Bar #6092, is the “responsible elected official” for the Clark
 2
     County Prosecutor’s Office; 1013 Franklin Street; PO Box 5000, Vancouver, WA
     98666-5000; phone: (360) 397-2261; fax: (360) 397-2230.
 3
     TWENTY-SIX.            Between May 2, 2006 and June 1, 2006, one or more
 4
     principals ordered, directed and or otherwise instructed one or more individuals
 5   associated with the Clark County Prosecutor’s Office to prepare a false and
     fraudulent “extradition” and “fugitive” from justice “warrant and 60 day
 6   commitment” paper on the kidnapped victim grandmother for purposes of aiding
     and abetting the cover up and concealment of the botched kidnapping for murder
 7
     by individuals associated with the Battle Ground Police Department; the State of
 8   Wyoming; and the City of Laramie, Wyoming; said papers ultimately dated June
     1, 2006 were signed and presented on or about June 2, 2006 by Grant Eugene
 9   Hansen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, Bar
     #5167; admitted 10/18/1973; 1200 Franklin St, Vancouver, Washington 98660-
10
     2812; phone: (360) 397-2261; fax: (360) 397-2230.
11
     THIRTY-ONE.           Between June 1, 2006 and June 15, 2006, in response to a
12   massive information artillery barrage (MIAB), one or more principals ordered,
     directed and or otherwise instructed Jared Miller of the Casper Star-Tribune, a
13
     subsidiary of Lee Enterprises, to issue a news report ostensibly to cover up and
14   conceal the botched kidnapping for murder by individuals associated with the
     Battle Ground Police Department; the State of Wyoming; and the City of
15   Laramie, Wyoming; said news report appeared in the Casper Star-Tribune on line
     on June 15, 2006.
16

17   THIRTY-TWO.            On June 22, 2006, in response to a MIAB, defendant A. Joe
     Hageman took full, complete and absolute responsibility for the false and
18   fraudulent “charges” in an email defendant Hageman caused to be transmitted to a
19
     U.S. relator on June 22, 2006, in San Diego, California and elsewhere in the
     United States.
20
     THIRTY-THREE. Between June 2, 2006 and July 31, 2006, one or more
21   principals ordered, directed and or otherwise instructed one or more individuals
22
     associated with the Clark County Court system to appoint a judge to preside over
     a hearing one or more principals scheduled for July 31, 2006 regarding the false
23   and fraudulent “extradition” and “fugitive” from justice “warrant and 60 day
     commitment” papers signed by Grant Eugene Hansen; said hearing being held on
24
     July 31, 2006 and presided over by State Judge John Francis Nichols; Bar #6240;
25   admitted:11/6/1975; Clark County Superior Court; PO Box 5000; Vancouver,
     WA 98666-5000.
26
     THIRTY-FOUR.           The above information has been shared with more than 209
27
     public and private officials during the MIAB. Exhibit 1, pages 1; 20-21; 61-67;
28   70-71; 74-77; 79; 83-85; 95-98; and 107-108. Based on information and belief, no




                                            -12-
 1          person so notified has attempted to comply with the federal misprision statute; in
 2
            violation of Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 371 and 4.

 3          THIRTY-FIVE.            Ms. Mary Junck, Chairman, President and CEO, Lee
            Enterprises, has made no effort to inform the Federal Securities and Exchange
 4
            Committee in any of its filings with the SEC that it could have a potential
 5          financial problem with the Casper Star-Tribune’s and the Associated Press’s
            participation in the criminal conspiracy to kidnap and murder a grandmother to
 6          prevent the disclosure of the violations of the WIA of 1998.
 7
            THIRTY-SIX.             Again, at its “Annual Meeting of Stockholders” held on
 8          February 21, 2007, at the Figge Art Museum, Davenport, Iowa, Ms. Junck and
            other corporate officers failed to inform its shareholders of the potential financial
 9          problem with the Casper Star-Tribune’s and the Associated Press’s participation
            in the criminal conspiracy to kidnap and murder a grandmother to prevent the
10
            disclosure of the violations of the WIA of 1998.
11
            Hence, the Complaint was perfectly styled in accordance with statutory law under Title
12   31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 et seq.; Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; and Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P.
13
          WHEREFORE, the United States, by and through its relator, Emanuel McCray and
14   Emanuel McCray, pray and demand:

15          (1) that this matter be reviewed by the full court at its earliest convenience;
16
            (2) that Chief Judge Irma Gonzalez be given the opportunity to correct what
17          appears at present to be a simple mistake; and

18          (3) the court grant such other further relief as consistent with justice.
19

20                                                     Dated this 5th day of September 2007
                                                                        Original signed
21                                                                      Filed:
22                                                                        Emanuel McCray
                                                                          Appellant, Pro Se
23

24

25

26

27

28




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