Marsh v. Coleman Company
Facts: P [employee] brought action against D [employer] for breach of contact and age discrimination on 1/19/1990. P was fired on 1/20/1989. P later amended complaint and tried to bring in cause of action for fraud based on events that allegedly took place in 1985. Statute of limitations for the new cause of action was 2 years. Issue: Was the new cause of action covered under the relation back doctrine? Holding: No Rationale: Relation back doctrine applies to events where the original complaint places a defendant on notice of the new causes of action. Here, the age discrimination and the fraud causes of actions arose out of completely different transaction, occurrence, or conduct. The P, by filing the discrimination action against D did not place D on notice of the fraud claim. Therefore, the amended claim does not relate back. Note: Relation back means that you treat the amended pleading as though it was filed when the original was filed, so it can avoid a statute of limitations problem. Further P did not include fraud claim until later. o D argues that the fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations and does not have evidence to prove the claim. What is important is that if a new amendment is filed it be done with notice before the statute of limitation period. If the D should have known about the sequence of facts upon original suite then the SOL will not count because the D had adequate notice. o Relation back is barred against transactions that related entirely different to the cause of action. In this case it is not reasonable to conclude that these claims could be added. The only part that overlaps in the termination day. The conduct is based on a different set of facts and therefore cannot related back.
Rector v. Approved Federal Savings Bank Facts April 9,1999 P filed suit against D seeking 60 billion in comp. and 20 billion in punitive damages.
o Suite arose out of a 1995 agreement to sell D trust. P claims that the contract called for a purchase price 20 billion dollars more than the 3 million paid July 3, 1999 court dimissed conspiracy, RICO and fraid claims – they failed to state fraud RICO with particularity. o P filed an amended complaint. they changed 60 billion to an infinite amount. September 17, 1999 District court garnted D motion to dismiss. Sep. 27, 1999 D filed a motion for sanctions under rule 11. On September 27, 1999, Approved filed a motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The motion states that Approved served it on Rector and the Trust on June 11, 1999. In this appeal, though, Rector and the Trust contend that they did not receive the motion until September 27, 1999, in contravention of the 21-day "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11. Approved concedes that it "cannot now confirm the notice was [served] as intended." Appellees' Br. at 4 n.2. Rather, Approved states that [o]n June 11, 1999, [Approved] served[Rector and the Trust] with [its] Objections to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents, [its] initial Motion to Dismiss . .. and [its] Memorandum in Support of such motion. [It] also believed that the Federal Express package containing these three items also included a Notice of Motion and Motion for the Award of Litigation Expenses and so certified that pleading. o P did not argue that the motion was against 21 day safe harbor ruling. They argued only that they conducted appropriate pre-filing investigation. January 14, 2000 court granted sanctions and attorney fees. P appeals say the court imposed an incorrect standard in assessing rule 11.
On this record, and without any argument by Rector or the Trust about Approved's service of the Rule 11 motion, the district court once again imposed a sanction of $33,503.82. Rector v. Approved Financial Corp., Civil Action No. 99-499-A (E.D. Va. January 4, 2001). In its January 4, 2001 Memorandum Opinion, the district court explained that [t]he dismissal of the Complaints in their entirety, the finding of Rule 11 liability for frivolous claims and the finding that the attorney's fees and costs sought were reasonable, supports this award of sanctions under Rule 11. In view of Rector's deposition concerning his and the Trust's ability to pay and the continuing litigation in state court after imposition of the sanction, it is clear that all of the elements of the [In re] Kunstler[, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990),] analysis have been met and the amount of the sanction is appropriate.