2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 1 of 43 Governance Reform In Political Transition: The Case Of Nepal’s Civil Service Reform Madhu Nidhi Tiwari 1. Introduction Nepal has undergone two popular uprising within a short span of sixteen years. The first popular movement of 1990 overthrew the King led undemocratic Panchayat System and reinstated parliamentary democracy, which was abrogated by the King in 1960. The second movement of 2006 caused the end of the kingship, the unitary system of government and the parliamentary constitution of 1990. The period in between the two popular movements is marked by political instability and turbulences erupted apparently due to inter- party conflict, intra- party feuds and the insurgency (people‘s war) lunched by the Nepal Communist Party –Maoists (NCP-M). This resulted a painful and prolonged political transition—actual and perceived. The country is now governed by an interim constitution. In April 2008 election was held for the constituent assembly (CA). The CA is mandated to draft and bring out new constitution within two years time. Till then it is also to work as the legislative body. In the election the Maoist Party that has joined the main stream politics after the successful conclusion of the second popular uprising of 2006 has emerged as the single largest party with 48 seats short of majority. The Maoist led collation government is now taking command of the country‘s governance. After regaining democracy in 1990, successive governments had taken various governance reform measures in different sectors. This paper intends to describe the civil service reform and assess the major component of the governance reform agenda. It is true that governance reform is a cross cutting issue. So it has to covers all aspects of life. This paper has however confined itself to the civil service reform. This may look a lopsided approach. But it is equally true and can safely be said that the case of civil service reform (which for many people and officials in Nepal is The civil service of nearly eighty thousands employees manage three branches of government e.g. executive, legislature and judiciary. They also administer the constitutional bodies such as Public Service commission (PSC), Auditor General Office (AGO), Election Commission (EC) and Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA). The administrative heads of the local government bodies are also drawn from the members of the civil service. Police, public enterprises‘ personnel and the army, however, are not part of the civil service. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 2 of 43 synonymous to larger governance reform) is strong indicative of the state of governance reform in other sectors too. Usually transition provides opportunity to reform and at the same time it poses problems also. The paper begins with highlighting the nature of political transition. It briefly indicates both- opportunities and problems. Then it identifies the conceptual framework of Nepalese civil service reform. This is followed by brief description of reform initiatives and an assessment of reform implementation. While doing so it intends to assess /measure the achievement and the impediments to reform initiatives. World development indictors 2008 have rightly said that measuring governance is not easy. A broad concept, governance embraces many institutions and the formal and informal rule that guide there operation. Governance also involves a range of player- citizens, their elected officials and those delivering services. So assessment of governance reform rely on the views of experts and the civil servants-because they understand the principle of governance and have practical experience of the formal and informal rules of the game. (World development indictors: 2008:264). Taking into consideration of these facts this study has gathered information through formal and informal interviews with the top level civil servants, who were/are involved in formulating governance policy and supervising its implementation, the middle level officials undertaking the responsibility to implement monitor/supervise the reform activities and the employees at the districts and villages who implement the reform program at the delivery point. Similarly, the general public, members of various interest groups and civil society were also interviewed. Likewise, different secondary sources of information are also utilized to enrich the study. 2. Nature of political transition Prior to 1990 Nepal was never governed under a democratic regime; the period between 1959-60 was an exception. During this short period popularly elected representatives had governed the country under a constitution, which was patterned after the west minister model. However in 1960, the then king through as army coup abrogated the parliamentary system, imprisoned the first elected prime minister, ministers, the law makers and a large number of politicians of the first ever elected government. The king imposed a political system called Panchayat system that banned the political parties and deprived the people from democratic rights. Panchayat system did not accept any leader except the king himself. Prominent leaders of the formally banned political parties 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 3 of 43 particularly those belonging to Nepali congress a liberal democratic party whose elected government was dethrone from power and the communist parties went on lunching various forms of movements (violent and non violent) for the restoration of democracy. But the movement was never a united one until 1990. In 1990, the Nepali Congress called a non-violent movement to reinstate democratic governance. The communist forces also came together and the movement turned into a joint struggle. The popular uprising received support from all segments of Nepalese society. This compelled the king to reach to an agreement on the minimum demands of the political leaders. e.g. restoration of a multi-party democratic polity, dismissal of the Panchayat system and formation of a care taker government. Thus a government comprised of the representatives of the revolutionary political forces along with the king‘s nominees was formed. K.P Bhattarai, a senior leader of Nepali congress headed this government. The government was entrusted the responsibility to make arrangements for drafting a democratic constitution and conduct the general election. The interim (caretaker) government completed its task of bringing out a new Constitution based on West minister Parliamentary model, managed the general election in 14 months and handed over the power to a single party majority government of Nepali Congress (NC) G.P.Koirala headed the government. Despite of its comfortable majority in the Parliament, owing to intra-party power struggle in the ruling party, the country was faced with a mid-term poll in November 1994. The mid-term election came out with a hung parliament making the opposing Nepal Communist Party, United Marxist Leninist (UML) as the single largest party. The Nepali Congress (NC), which was the ruling party, was trimmed to second largest party and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) which comprised mainly the cadres and leaders of Panchayat system obtained a sizable seats with a strength to tilt the balance in the Parliament with its swing. Failing to work out a coalition, the UML formed a minority government, which faced the same faith in its nine months. Then after six months, the opposition parties made attempts to bring down the Communist government by calling for a special session of the Parliament to table a no-confidence motion. The King declared mid-term election as per the recommendation of prime minister. However, on the plea of the opposition parties, the Supreme Court reinstated the Parliament in September 1995 and the no- confidence motion was passed in the Parliament resulting in the fall of the Communist government and formation of three-party coalition. The collation was led by Nepali congress (SB Deuba) but it 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 4 of 43 comprised the stalwarts of the king led Panchayat regime- the leaders of RPP and Nepal Sadvabana Party (NSP), a Terai based regional party. Following the formation of this collation government the political scenario went on changing dramatically with permutation and combinations within and between political parties. This led to the formation yet another coalition. This time the government was led by a RPP leader (LB Chand), who was the last prime minister during the king -led regime. The UML and the NSP were the partners of the coalition.Very soon this government was topple down. Again another Panchayat stalwart (SBThapa) who had been PM many times during Panchayat regime was successful to become the PM of a democratic era with the support of NC. This coalition also did not last long. It was succeeded by another coalition headed by GP Koirala of NC. This time the partner of the collation was also a partner of the popular movement - a breakaway faction of the UML (led by BD Gautam). This collation also did not last long. . Another collation came into power. This time the main stream of the UML extended its support to a NC led coalition. It was during the second parliament that the country witnessed shifting collations, frequent motion of no- confidence, intra party factional splits and alliances, and the use of money and other unsavory methods to win parliamentary votes…Open horse-trading and defections became part of the parliamentary behaviour …such a parliamentary equation had a direct bearing upon governance. (Mahat: 2005:154) The Maoist insurgency to throw away the parliamentary system; the kingship and all other feudal institutions and practices also came into operation in this period. IN May 1999, the third parliamentary election was held. It brought the Nepali Congress in power with a simple majority. There was hope that since the parliament was not a hung one the political turbulence and the dirty games of horse-trading will not happened any more. K P Bhattery who had headed the caretaker government during 1990-91 became the PM. However, after nine months he was forced to resign to pave the way for another leader of the same party and the former PM, GP Koirala to occupy the post of PM again. But political events took a different turn. The reason is many. Firstly, growing rivalry among mainstream parties, intra party conflict, continuation of rampant corruption‘ making and breaking of governments lead to political instability. This kind of political environment helped to the CPN-M to intensify the insurgency, which in turn caused degradation in law and order situation and service delivery in the rural areas. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 5 of 43 Secondly, on June 1, 2001 the whole family and many other closed of the then King Birendra were massacred inside the royal palace.His brother Gyanendera became the new king. He began to search active role in the state affairs. Thirdly, the hostility between parliamentary political parties went on increasing and reached to the climax. The main opposition UML started demanding resignation of the PM Koirala over his alleged involvement in a corruption case purchase of Laura‘s aircraft by Nepal‘s flag carrier. To give pressure in support of its demand the opposition went on using physical forces to obstruct the proceeding of the parliament for fifty-seven scheduled sessions. Fourthly, the army did not obey PM‘s order to counter attack the Maoist insurgent. Such order was given following the event of massive attack by the Maoist at Hollery- a remote area in Mid- Western Nepal. It is widely believed that the King influenced the army‘s noncompliance. So, PM Koirla resigned from his post. Fifthly, when SB Deuba became PM, the Maoist suddenly declared a cease-fire. They also sat together with the government for a peaceful negotiation But the two parties could not reach in an agreement over the major issues which included replacing the constitution of 1991 by a new one and for this holding the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution The Maoist further intensified their armed struggle. The government declared a state of emergency on November 2001and mobilized the army. As required by the constitution the parliament endorsed this decision. As the situation did not improve in the six months the government once again seek the parliament‘s consent to extend the emergency. The opposition parties declined to support this move. The ruling party instructed the PM to withdraw the extension motion. The PM disobeying his party‘s instruction asked the king to dissolve the House of Representatives and call for a fresh election. The king did so. Nepali congress-the ruling party suspended the PM from party‘s primary membership as an action against his indiscipline. This led to split of NC into two parties. Election to the parliament could not be held on stipulated time. The deteriorating law and order situation owing to Maoist‘s insurgency was the main cause for it. This provided a pretext to the king to materialize his ambition to grab power. On October 4, 2002 the king surprisingly sacked the PM charging ‗incompetent‘ as he could not hold election. The king began to ignore the role of major political parties. Taking advantage of inter and intra party conflicts he started making and braking governments. From October 2002 to October 2004 three-caretaker government were 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 6 of 43 changed. On February 2005, the king imposed direct rule and seized all powers through army‘s support. He tried to justify his step in these words it was necessary due to ground reality –mainly the failure of successive governments to contain the ever expanding terrorist and maintain law and order and save the country from the danger of turning into a failed state. He imposed a state of emergency, scrapped democratic rights, imprisoned many political leaders and constituted a council of ministry under his own chairmanship. It is interesting to note that the prominent members of his hand picked ministry were those who had helped his father in 1960 to desolve the parliamentary democracy. At this juncture, on September 3, 2005, the CPN-M declared a unilateral ceasefire. But the King did not reciprocate the Maoist‘s action. The parliamentary political forces once again came together against the despotic rule of the king. Annoyed by the king‘s non-response to their unilateral ceasefire the Maoist signed a12 point MOU with the seven parliamentary party alliances (SPA). The understanding among the parties resulted declaration of joint popular movement. In April 2006,hundreds of thousands people from all walks of life spontaneously came to the streets for nineteen successive days despite the governments suppressive actions. The civil society, professionals including the civil servants and international community also extended full support. The people‘s power compelled the king to bow down. He handed power back by reinstating parliament, which was dissolved by him two years ago. He also accepted publicly that people are sovereign and source of all powers. Following this a seven party collation government was formed under the Primer Ministership of GP Koirala of Nepali Congress. The reinstated parliament stripped the king from all kind of roles. The SPA and the CPN-M with the facilitation of the civil society had started to find out ways to peaceful settlement of the civil war. Success of the April movement brought them further close that led to signing of several understanding such as a ceasefire, code of conduct and ultimately a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November21.2006 which brought the CPN-M in the mainstream politics. ―No where in the world has the transformation of an armed insurgent group into a peaceful political movement been so quick and peaceful.‖ (Ian Martin: Nepali Times: 2008) The preamble of the CPA inter alia says reintegrating our complete commitment to comprehensive multiparty democratic system of governance, individual freedom, civil liberties, human rights, complete press freedom, rule of law as well as democratic values…..Nepal Government and NCP(Maoist) have entered this comprehensive peace agreement with the 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 7 of 43 commitment to transform the ceasefire between the Nepal Government and NCP(Maoist) into a long lasting peace. Following this agreement the SPA and the Maoist reached to an agreement on a interim constitution, which has already been amended five times by now. As per the promised made in the interim constitution, the election for constituent assembly was held in April 2008. In this election the CPN-M secured 230 seats out of 601 and hence are 71 seats short of an absolute majority. The Nepali Congress got 118 and the UML has third position with 108 seats. The fourth and fifth places are occupied by two regional parties of Terai (High land southern party) Madhise Forum and Terai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party. 3.The Conceptual Framework of Reform With the regaining of democracy after thirty years, the civil service had to serve the new political system that had many values contrary to the bureaucratic culture they were accustomed to. The civil service was developed in a system that believed in active role of the King making the Palace as the nerve center of political and administrative system. Now, the civil service was required to serve a system that emphasis rule of law, the people‘s sovereignty, human rights, multi-party parliamentary system e.g. competitive politics and constitutional monarchy as cardinal virtues of the system. This called for a drastic change in the governance ideas relating to civil service management. To suggest changes in the administrative system in congruence with the new governance ideas, an Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) headed by the Prime Minister was constituted in 1992. The ODA/UK, UNDP and ILO had provided services of advisors to the Commission. In its recommendations the ARC pointed out the need to make the civil service accountable, transparent, result oriented, efficient, downsized, highly motivated and free from the disease of corruption. It had proposed more than 100 recommendations to overcome the problem facing the civil service. The key recommendations, immensely interrelated, are as follows: i) Redefine Government‘s own roles so that it can gradually confine itself chiefly to promotional and motivational activities. ii) Downsize the civil service and inject the culture of competition by transferring many of the service delivery functions hitherto carried out by government through the civil service or public enterprises to non governmental organizations (NGO), community organizations, private sector, and cooperatives iii) Take measures such as: contracting out, lease out, gradual deregulation and disinvestments (privatization). iv)Improve efficiency of the civil 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 8 of 43 service so that it can facilitate, monitor, regulate and enable the non-governmental sectors to deliver services efficiently. v) Make civil service more capable /efficient and effective to carry on activities which are required to be performed by the government itself. vi) Ensure job security vii) infuse the new bloods in the higher civil service through open competitive examination (through lateral entry). The ARC 1992 had also prepared an implementation plan, which had stipulated the time frame and the organizations responsible for undertaking various reform activities and also suggested constituting a high level Administrative Reform Monitoring Commission (ARMC), directly under the Prime Minister for the term of three years. It is seen that The ARC‘s recommendations were influenced by the interrelated concept of Managerialism (Polliti: 1990) New Public Management (Hood: 1991) , Market Based Public Administration (Lon and Roseboom:1992) and the principles of Reinventing Government (Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) that revolved around the same thematic framework- commonly known as New Public Management (NPM) . The core of this school of thought is marketisation, inculcation of the value of competition and choice in all aspects of public administration. The formation of ARC coincided with the period when many people considered NPM –―the private sectors solution to public sectors problems‖ (UN: 2008:p.44) as a panacea to get rid of bureau-pathology. Dele Olowu in connection with the introduction of NPM in African has depicted the situation of those days in these words: ―it has been spread somewhat like a religion, it was assumed to be modern, relevant and superior, so there was no need felt to prove that it suits the case concerned, to query this was held to show that you were outdated and reactionary‖. (Olowu: 2002 :1-16) The services of advisors particularly from ODA/UK may also have influenced the recommendations. So, the influence of the NPM concept is understandable. However, there were suitable modifications as per the Nepal‘s situation. For example, the job security of the employees was highly emphasized. There was no recommendation to decentralize recruitment and selection functions to the executive agencies e.g. hiring and firing authority to executive departments. This was done apparently taking into consideration of the fact that due to wide prevalence of nepotism and favoritism the Nepalese situation does not permit with the NPM type of hiring and firing system. (McCourt:1998) The importance of community management was emphasized since it was 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 9 of 43 congruence not only with the community owned government-the principle of reinventing government, but also with the Nepalese historical experience of success of community managed services. (Curtis: 1991) In fact In Nepal the bureaucracy led reform model of 1950-1980 e.g. Development Administration had not yield result to the expected extent. Owing to this ARC had asked to minimize the role of the government. But there was an internal realization that for many years to come the role of bureaucracy will remain paramount even to enable and to activate other actors. Therefore, civil service reform was also equally emphasis in the recommendations of ARC. But many professionals and practitioner had considered NPM in conflict with equity, social justice and therefore not suited particularly with reference to developing nations. Taking into consideration of the question raised about the equity and social justice the government of Nepali Congress, a socialist party by ideology, and forwarded following argument through the Eight Development Plan: As Nepali Congress (The ruling Party) is committed to democratic socialism, the development concepts will be guided by this ideology… Socialism as conceived by Nepali Congress, is not orthodox socialism where the state dictates but the one by virtue of which the state in a supporting role will bring about social and economic justice through increase in production, creation of employment and special programmes directed towards the upliftment of the socially and economically deprived poor people who are left out of the mainstream of development….. traditional state directed socialism is no longer suited to the existing global economic scenario. Therefore, the states directed and state controlled economic systems pursued for the last thirty years will be gradually phased out and policy will be adopted to carry out development through free market-oriented liberal economic systems. The Ninth Plan (1997-2002) and the Priority Reform Program presented at the National Development Forum held in Paris in 2002 identified civil service reform along with gender equity as the key priority area. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) responded it by accepting to provide program loan of 30 Million Dollars in the name of The Governance Reform Program. This project implemented from 31st December 2001 and lasted unto 15th June 2007 was a package of many inter-related activities – interventions and changes that were believed to contribute towards high economic growth and poverty reduction. The key reform agenda were: i) developing an internal capacity within the government to led and undertake the governance reform agenda ii) improving 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 10 of 43 the efficiency of the civil service iii) improving governance and reducing corruption in the government iv) enhancing the competence and motivation of the civil servants and v) establishing the process for improving performance in key ministries. The reform interventions proposed under GRP has many features similar to ARCs recommendations. However, it was also in favor of gender sensitive civil service. In fact, gender sensitive civil service was a major agenda of Mainstreaming Gender Equity Program (MGEP) of the government, which was launched under the UNDP‘s financial support. Thus GRP interventions along with MGEP intended to infuse elements supporting the concepts of New Public Administration (NPA), Responsive Governance and Representative Bureaucracy. The new public administration movement emphasizes equity and social justice. It seeks to change those policies and structure that systematically inhibit social equity and hence it is supportive to gender equity. Likewise, the concept of responsive governance supports the belief that many problems particularly in developing countries are quite different from those the NPM seeks to solve by asking administration to be imbued with business like efficiency. It focuses on creating Public values and also emphasizes management of conflicting values in public interest context. Therefore its key attribute is responsiveness rather than professionalism (UN:2005:64) and favors humanization of public administration. Hence it can be called as human governance. This concept thus in its very spirit favors gender equity which the GRP has aimed at. Representative Bureaucracy is a concept based on the assertion that the ratio of each minority at each employment in the government agency should equal that group‘s proportion in the general population. (Chandler and Plano:1982:219). It is related to the concept of social equity in that it is based on the principle of true democracy; public service should reflect the sex, ethnic, social composition of the nation so that responsive public policy can be made. (ibid). It‘s proponents pointed out four major benefits of representative bureaucracy. (i) Increased minorities and female employment increases the economic, social and political status of those group. (ii) Recipients of public service benefit because their needs are better addressed. (iii) Bureaucracy benefits from increased responsiveness to minority problems and from having a more diverse staff. (iv) The entire democratic system benefits because the bureaucracy is a closer reflection of the population in services. (ibid:219-20). 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 11 of 43 From the above description it can be safely said that the conceptual framework of the civil service reform was an amalgam of certain features of the NPM, the NPA, representative bureaucracy and the responsive governance. 4. Key Reform Activities and their Implementation 4.1 Capacity Building to lead reform management Institutional capacity for the management and coordinate of change initiatives are very important for successful reform. In Nepal, the Ministry of General Administration- a central ministry is responsible to lead, enhance, coordinate and implement civil service reform MOGA was therefore made the implementing agency. Moreover, as recommended by the ARC an Administrative Reform Monitoring Commission directly in the Prime Minister‘s office was created in October 1992 and was assigned the role to oversee and monitor the implementation of the reform proposal. ARC was constituted at a time when a UN support project Strengthening Institutional Capacity Building of the Ministry of General Administration was in operation. Its major thrust was to strengthen the institutional capacity of MoGA. This project got fully involved in the work of the ARC also. The UNDP supported a new project Assistance to the Ministry of General Administration and the Administration Reform Monitoring Committee for the Implementation of administration Reform It began building the database of civil servants, and made a good beginning in preparing job description of employees, apart from providing training to selected personnel in MoGA. Likewise, it also provided assistance to ARCM to undertake its responsibilities. The G.R.P. introduced under the ADB (2001-07) also envisaged a coordinating body i.e. Governance Reform Coordination Unit (GRCU) within the Ministry of General Administration (MoGA). The GRCU was headed by a Joint Secretary of MoGA, who was required to report to the Secretary of his ministry. With a view to develop the ownership of reform the GRP extend the reform management and capacity building functions beyond MoGA. Accordingly, an Efficiency Unit in Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Change Units were created in the ministries e.g. health, education and agriculture. These Change Units were viewed as lead organizations because they were given task to make necessary arrangement for implementing the Performance Based Management System in a pilot basis. So they were called Pilot Minister. The GRCU was comprised of the representatives of change units and efficiency units. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 12 of 43 The G.R.P document had expected deputation of full time officers for the change management units, well-defined roles and measurable targets to the possible extent. The willingness of these staff members to work for change was also emphasized. Moreover, they were expected to be visible by publishing their targets and activities within and outside the organization. To shoulder these responsibilities the staff members were expected to have better understanding of the processes of managing change and the destination. By nomenclature the ‗efficiency unit‘ resembles the unit created 1979 by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to advise her on ways of eliminating waste and improving efficiency in central government. In Nepal, efficiency unit understandably with similar objectives was created in the Ministry of Finance. Civil servants who were entrusted the responsibility of managing the change units at the three pilot ministries were imparted the basic knowledge about the concept, focus, approach and process regarding performance based management system in general and the performance improvement plans in particular. According to project‘s document, with a view to institutionalize the reform capability in the pilot ministries the process consultancy method was adopted. So, rather than providing them with a readymade solution, the staff member of these units and field staffs were given suitable inputs/exposures to perform the job, by the ADB consultants through series of interactive program in the form of meetings. As staff members of all the change units and efficiency unit were also required to work as the member of GRCU of MoGA. So they were given opportunity to participate various seminars, workshops that aimed at facilitating them to understand the process of the desired change. The creation of these reform management units in different ministries had intention to inculcate the sense of ownership of reform among the civil servants. Proving has however shown that more that one third of the civil servants working in the piloting ministries and the MoGA were found unaware of formation of such units in their organizations. Those who were aware also complained the non-transparency in the functioning of these units.( Tiwari: 2004:8). Further enquiry revealed a general impression that since the G.R.P was a donor assisted project aiming at bringing transparency in the operation of the civil service they had expected these units to inform about these activities as well as budget. But such was never done. Those working with the units had their own grievances. According to them there was paucity of budget to undertake the activities of these units. Moreover, no incentive was attached to the additional job. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 13 of 43 No full time officer was deputed to these units, as promised. The formal requirement was made only in paper-just to satisfy (eye washing). Neither the authority nor the responsibility of these units was clearly laid down. No extra incentive was given except the chance to attend a few foreign visit and meetings, orientations and seminars often at hotels. The big amount of money was however, spent in hiring the services of expensive consultants. This led negative motivation on the part of regular officials. 4.2 Rightsizing the bureaucracy The ARMC immediately after its formation in 1992 constituted different task forces to study work loads of various government organizations. When this process was in full swing government dismissed a large number of civil servants abruptly without mentioning any charge. Hence the chairman of the ARMC resigns from his post. The reason being his dissatisfaction with the government decision to dismiss civil servants without making public the criteria adopted for the dismissal. This caused a great set back in the speed of implementation of ARC‘s recommendations. To cut down the size of the civil service the government took various direct and indirect measures. 4.2.1. Direct Measures for downsizing the civil service Reduction of Retirement age: The Civil Service Act (CSA) of 1993, which replaced the old Civil Service Act of 1956, reduced the compulsory retirement age from 60 to 58 years. It also incorporated the provision to make retirement mandatory after 30 years of service. When the new Act was implemented more than 3,000 civil servants including the then Chief Secretary and many secretaries were separated from service. Thus, at one stroke the size of civil service was reduced by about three percent. But civil servants showed their dissatisfaction to the provision of contract and also the two retirement outlets i.e. 58 years of age or 30 years of service. The reason for the dissatisfaction for the first one was that it blocked the promotion opportunity of the younger generation. They were dissatisfaction with the second one because benefits after retirement were negligible. There was a big pressure to the government both from the politicians and bureaucrats to cut down one of the two retirement outlets. That first amendment in 1994 hence scraped the provision of hiring on contract as well as the mandatory retirement after completion of 30 years of service. Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme (VERS): The CSA incorporated a voluntary early retirement scheme applicable for a short period. However, there was no positive response to the 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 14 of 43 scheme due to many reasons. The employees did not perceive the government provided appropriate golden handshake package. Social belief that resigning the government job invites misfortune for the retire civil servants was widely prevailing. The later career jobs were rear. The scheme did not come with a plan to assist the employees with skills training so that retired employees may venture work in a new field. Owing to these causes the target to downsize the civil service by 33%, within 3 years time could no be materialized. The Government‘s policy to right size the civil service however did not change. When the G.R.P (2001-07) was implemented it once again gave top priority to reduce the size of the civil service. So, the period for voluntary retirement was extended. In 2001, the government invited applications for Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme (VERS). The target was to give retirement to 10,000 employees, (mainly the classless and clerical staffs) within three years and eliminate positions of those so retired. Again the response was very poor. Only about 2300 took voluntary retirement. Therefore, in September 2002 the government eliminated 7,350 positions lying vacant, took decision to freeze appointment of non-gazetted (class iii and iv), which was implemented from May 2003 onwards. It is interesting to note that though the positions were freezed the position holders are still working. These employees are termed as Fazil Ko karmachari (employees belonging to redundant positions) Contract Out: The cabinet approved a service contract directive in January 2003 this had allowed a number of services such as security, maintenance, mail delivery transportation, survey, vetnary , design etc. to be contracted out. The cases of contracting out of these services particularly security, maintenance and photocopy is gradually increasing but detail information is not available. Lease out: As a means for decreasing the government‘s size, and thereby, increasing efficiency the ARC 1991 had suggested leasing out of horticulture farms and other activities. As per this suggestion, in 1992/93 the government leased out to private contractors four horticulture farms and two sheep farms situated in different parts of the country e.g. mountain, hill and terai. The lease was for a period of 10 years. This decision had enabled the government to retrench a sizeable number of employees who were employed in the leased farms on contract basis. Similarly, many permanent staff could be shifted to other areas where their services were needed. Thus, on one hand there was a saving on salary paid to the employees (the figure not available) and on the other there was an earning of about one millions rupees from the leased farms. The result of one horticulture farm was somewhat encouraging in terms of productivity. But in the case of other 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 15 of 43 farms the result was very discouraging. Thus, within two years the government had to take back all the five farms on the contractors‘ request. Information furnished by the concerned officials revealed that the failure of the lease out scheme was caused due to two major factors. Firstly, the conditions set for the lease out did not allow any flexibility for the lessee to manage in a flexible way. The centripetal attitude of the bureaucracy was found mainly responsible for such impractical arrangement. Secondly, the private sector was also not competent enough to understand the consequences of the conditions set by the civil servant. Thus, the civil servants old habit and the private sectors ignorance (underdeveloped) came in the way of translating the concept of lease out into reality. This was in fact a challenge against the spirit of NPM type reform. 4.2.2 Indirect Measures for downsizing: Liberalization: In response to ARC‘s recommendation the government has gradually taken measures such as delicensing, import export liberalization and deregulation. The process of full convertibility was also introduced. Restrictions on direct foreign investment had been waived out. Some selected sensitive industries being the exception. Open and general licensing has also been introduced in the trade sector. The positive impact of the open and liberal policy of the government is evident from the rise in private sector investment in various sectors. In this regard air services, banking and financial institution provides glaring example of positive impact. A few years back it was very difficult to get air tickets in many of the domestic sectors. Those who were lucky to get tickets (by any means) also very frequently faced problems such as flight delay and cancellation. But now there are several private airlines. The numbers of flights in all the sectors where private airlines operate have increased. This has made the access to airline tickets easy. The flights are more punctual than in the past and the quality of in-flight service has remarkably improved. Many skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled people have got employment. Above all, the culture of competition has taken roots The liberalization policy has contributed in tremendous growth of banking and financial institutions. In 1990 there were only 5 commercial and 1 development bank. Out of them 1 commercial bank was fully owned by the government. Another one was partially owned. The development banks were also partially owned. But according to the data obtained from the central bank as of as of 2008 October the total number banks has reached to 178. This includes an 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 16 of 43 additional 19 commercial banks 57 development banks 78 financial companies, 12 Micro-credit banks, 16 cooperative banks and 46 NGO managed cooperatives. The growth is so soaring that the concerned circle now are now saying that ‗Nepal is over- banked‘. The leader of an IMF team who visited Nepal about three weeks back said that the aggressive lending practices of many of these institutions have made the central bank‘s task of supervising tough -needing immediate enhancement of capacity. Privatization: The government took a phase-wise approach for privatizing public enterprises. The method to be adopted for transferring the public enterprises to private sector are: (a) sale of shares of the enterprises (b) formation of cooperatives (c) sale of the assets of the enterprises (d) leasing out of the assets of the enterprises (e) involving private sector in the management of enterprises, and (f) any other modalities considered appropriate by government. The first elected government of Nepali Congress had promised to privatize all 79 public enterprises. But there was (still is ) lack of consensus not only among different political parties but also among the leaders of same party. The CPN (UML) formed a minority government for a short period after the mid term poll of 1994. It was also a partner in various collation government formed afterwards. Its policy statement said that corporations with sensitive social roles and operating in profit need not be privatized at all. It is widely held that many public enterprises have been sold on a throw away price, while on the other, the process of the sale are not properly utilized . (The Rising Nepal: Oct 26 :1998). So there was a speed break. Owing such phenomena out of the 79 public enterprises only 30 are privatized by 2008. NGO Participation: The government has been taking various policy measures to facilitate entry and growth of non-governmental organizations for delivery of goods and services in areas and sectors where they could contribute more effectively with their expertise, comparative advantage and track record. Due to this there have been tremendous growths in the size of NGO. It is estimated that at present there are about sixty thousands NGO‘s in Nepal. Since 1990 NGO has developed as a prominent force with considerable influence on government policy making. (ESP:2001: 30) Community Management: In the past, the management of forest resources was founded on the negative attitude towards the local communities or beneficiaries. They were assumed to be the destroyers of forest resources. The government officials working at various, sub-national levels were considered the protectors, promoters and mangers of the forest resource. But now 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 17 of 43 communities are encouraged to manage forest resources. Immediately after the political change of 1990, the interim government issued instructions for the hand-over of forest management responsibilities to user groups. Since then the forest management is based on a partnership (agreement) between the government and the users. Under Community Forest Development Programs, 14,389 consumer groups have been formed so far and 1,225,993 ha forest area has been handed over. From this, 1,654,529 households have been benefited. By mid-March of FY 2007/08, 81 percent physical progress has been achieved. (GoN :Economic Survey:2008:167) Likewise, in the drinking water and irrigation sectors, too, the government has accepted the policy of involving the users from pre-feasibility stage to project formulation, construction as well as operation and maintenance. The government has also adopted a policy to hand over the management of public schools to the community. It is said that by now about 7000 government schools are handed over to community. All the above approaches have intended to reduce the involvement of government officials in several service delivery and other activities and thereby helped to downsize the civil service. 4.3 Enhancing efficiency / Capacity Rightsizing the civil service in fact was intended to generate efficiency by bringing fiscal saving and utilizing the resources so saved for improving personnel management. Moreover, Infusions of talented personnel through lateral entry and talent hunting, imparting appropriate training were also considered as important activities for enhancing the efficiency in terms of capacity enhancement of the civil servants. Introduction of Lateral entry (Fast Stream): Efficiency is virtually unimaginable without having a hiring policy, which encouraged highly qualified, experienced and efficient people to reach to the top level. Nepal‘s civil service was founded in traditional closed career model. Accordingly, in the higher civil service (gazetted categories) selection through open competition Classes: The civil service is first divided into two levels: gazetted and non-gazetted. The gazetted civil servants (The term gazetted refers to publication in the Nepal Gazette of the appointment, posting, transfer, promotion and disciplinary actions of the employees belonging to this category) constitute the higher civil service responsible for advising the ministers in policy formulation and supervising its implementation. The non-gazetted civil servants perform subordinate or clerical jobs. Further, both the gazetted (higher) and non-gazetted (lower) levels are sub-divided into a 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 18 of 43 was permitted only in the class III, which was the entry point. The ARC had suggested to make provision for filling 20% of the vacancies in the higher civil service through open competitive examinations. The Commission had clearly stated that this will pave the way for the entry of highly qualified experienced and efficient people working at the non-governmental sector to enter the civil service so that the infusion of competent and efficient people who can carry on new ideas as per the change in governance ideas will be possible. The new CSA of 1993 has made provision to only ten percentages of vacancies at the higher level – Class II and I fill through open competition. Thus the concept of open career is now accepted in a limited scale. From the prospective of the working civil servant it is a fast stream or fast track to climb the career ladder. The syllabus of written examination has heavily incorporated the interrelated concepts of NPM. Good governance and other contemporary issues. Thus the successful candidates are found to have a sound and up to date theoretical knowledge about the development in the field of public affairs. But it is interesting to note that only one candidate from outside the civil service has become able to get entry through open competitive examination. The benefit of the open competition is virtually monopolized by the young insiders-working in civil service. At present out of the 53 Secretaries (or equivalent officials) more than two-thirds are the beneficiaries of the open competition. This also implies that most of our Secretaries posses a sound knowledge about the contemporary theories relating to public affairs. Information obtained from the subordinates, peer group and supervisors of those who had been elevated to the higher posts through open competition revealed that these bureaucrats are smart enough to talk about the contemporary issues and take personal advantages. But they are not able number of ranks called classes. Such classes are eight in all, four in the gazetted and four in the non-gazetted levels. Besides, there are peons (messengers) at the bottom. Services: The higher civil service is divided into ten various cadre groups called semi-services. (These are: the Nepal Administrative Service, the Nepal Judicial Service, the Nepal Rastriya Panchayat Service, the Nepal Audit Service, the Nepal Engineering Service, the Nepal Forest Service, the Nepal Health Service, the Nepal Agriculture Service, the Nepal Education Service and the Nepal Miscellaneous Service). The Nepal Administrative Service, one among the ten services, caters to general administrators of different ministries, departments and field offices. It also provides administrative support to various constitutional bodies and staff agencies. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 19 of 43 to translate their knowledge into action to the extended which would have enhanced the efficiency o f the civil service and hence benefited to the country and the common mass. Talent hunting: Up to Some years ago the need for positive recruitment e.g. talent hunting was not felt because of lack of job opportunities in other sector as well as the high social prestige associated with the job in the civil service. Gradually now there is a growing realization that without talent hunting it will be hard to get efficient employees in many positions. The PSC commands high level of trust for its objectivity in selection but literature describing career opportunities in the civil service did not existed in the past. Neither the PSC nor the MoGA had the policy to hunt the talent by contracting the potential candidates in the school, college and the other sources. From 1995, onwards though in a limited scale the PSC has started being proactive by visiting schools and colleges for disseminating information about the career in the civil service. But it is not institutionalized. The MoGA also lunched Persuasive Partnership Program while the GRP was in operation. Improvement in Training: The political change demanded a different type of competency in the civil service. They were now required to work under a pluralistic political environment with respect for human rights. So inculcation of values to commitment for the policies and program of the government in power at the same time keeping themselves neutral from the patrician politics became essential. They were also required to have ability to create enabling conditions through enacting new rules and regulations to encourage the non-governmental actors. Likewise, capacity to facilitate, monitor and regulate the quality of the services delivered by the non-governmental sectors was also desired. The training policy was therefore revised with the objective of making it need based, dynamic and better utilized. The training policy statement of 2002 had promised i) to provide training and development program to civil servants who are promoted, transferred to other positions, which changes their duties and responsibilities and ii) each ministries to develop human resource and career development plan and also allocate at least 5% of its budget under the ―salary and allowances heading‖. iii) evaluate the performance of training institute by a committee comprised of the representative of the National Planning Commission, MOGA and concerned ministries and iv) evaluation of the utilization and the impact of the training. But there is no evidence of seriousness to the desirable extent on the part of policy makers‘. Similarly, the training instituted did not pay due attention to identify the specific inputs required in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudinal change. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 20 of 43 The practice of using systematic method for identifying training needs has not been properly established. The trainers‘ or other officers‘ intuition is largely used for identification of training needs. So, training contents does not represent the actual need for different jobs. Civil servants are unable to fully utilize whatever knowledge and skills acquired through training because of resistance to change and lack of a well-founded democratic culture. (Pant and Shai: 2007). The above mentioned functions intended to improve employees efficiency and capability are however, almost totally ignored. Under such circumstances motivating factor to go for training are: 1) To score marks for promotion. 2) Economic gain through saving. 3) Getting rid of monotony of work. 4) Visit to foreign countries to see new places. The goal to enhance of efficiency through acquiring new knowledge, skill thus exists only in paper, not in deed. Personnel Information system: The Civil Service Record Department had started the office automation by preparing a database of gazetted civil servants belonging to various services in early 1990. This was made public by publishing the information so obtained in various volumes. It has facilitated increasing efficiency by making possible to use these records for making decisions relating to personnel management of the civil service. Researchers were also benefited by such information. But surprisingly despite the positive result the task of updating the personnel records was not continued. After few years even the records entered in the computer were not available. The GRP again made a fresh effort to develop effectiveness in record management. It was hoped that the government would link the information with important aspects of civil service management. 4.4 Performance based management system (PBMS) Job description and work Plan: As a measure to improve performance of the civil servants the ARC 1992 had pointed out the urgency of introducing systematic job description of each and every post. It had also suggested to make legal provision so that every civil servant will be required to prepare a performance plan (work plan) and summit it to his boss. It was hoped that this would provide the basis for supervisors and subordinates to understand what is expected of each employees in terms of the quality, quantity and standards of the output. Such situation in turns will make possible to measure their performance objectively. The commission further suggested using performance evaluation as a measure to provide feedback to the employees about their strength 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 21 of 43 and weaknesses relating to job performance. These suggestions, besides infusing transparency in the civil service management, intended to start the performance based management system in the civil service, which were completely lacking in the past. As per the recommendation the CSA of 1993 made the Chief of each and every organization responsible for preparing the job descriptions of their sub-ordinates and also to ensure that subordinates submit their work plan and also work accordingly. The process thus was started with the revision of the old performance appraisal system. But supervisors did not take the matter seriously. Instead of preparing the job descriptions in a systematic way they were simply guided to meet the legal requirements. The provision of introducing a system helping to perform on the basis of a work plan never came into practice. Improving Performance in the Key Ministries: Apparently, learning lesson from the failure of the earlier effort to initiate the process of the performance improvement program in a civil service wise scale, the GRP took an incremental approach in this regard. The GRP aimed to enhance the service delivery to the citizens by reinforcing a management culture and work procedures that are related to performance based management. Accordingly, ADB made available the services of consultants to provide technical support to help the piloting of Performance Based Management System ( PBMS) in three ministries viz. Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), Ministry of Culture Education and Sports (MoESC) and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC). The main objective of the technical assistance was to support in development and implementation of annual Performance Improvement Plans (PIP), including a performance improvement fund. The focus was on delivering services by sub- health posts in case of MoHP, district education office and government schools in case of MoES and two distinct Agriculture offices in case of MoAC. While the ministry of general administration was entrusted the role to co-coordinate and also to work as catalyst for the reform activities through its Governance Reform Coordination Unit (GRCU). The Change Management Unites of each pilot ministry was made directly responsible for implementing the pilot scheme. As stated in the official document the initiative was to improvement performance at micro level by considering the macro context as the given phenomenon. This was because PBMS was focused on implementing unit level, particularly the service delivery point on a pilot basis, having multiplier effect including promotions of performance culture for good governance. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 22 of 43 Discussion with the authority at the Ministry of Health who were involved in the process of designing the scheme which was prepared spending a huge amount of money in consultancy did not sustained. One of the responsible officers in the Ministry of Health who was the head of the change unit and was involved in the process of designing the scheme narrated the story in the following words We were very eager to implement the program and decided to lunch the program in three districts Kaski (Hill), Morang (Plain) and Rasuwa (Mountain). To familiarize the staff members of sub health post and the district public health with the spirit and content of the (PBMS) scheme, orientation programs were organized in all the three districts. Thenafter field staffs had began to function according to the plan. We had assured our staffs members that they will be getting performance incentives as per the evaluation of their performance. In fact, when we had lunched the program we had sufficient budget in other headings, which could have been easily transferred and used to award the cash incentives as promised by the scheme. The only question was to get authorization letter (approval) from the Ministry of Finance to spend the money for the purposed incentive. We had requested the MoF for the same. But the MoF did not respond our request. It did not send the authorization letter. Next year, we included the amount in the budget while sending proposed budget to MoF. We had also developed criteria for rewarding the performance incentive. The MoF was informed about the criteria. But concerned authorities in the MoF did not show positive attitude. Instead of appreciating our enthusiasm the concerned officer frankly said, “we do not believe that such kind of thing works here in Nepal. So, we can not give our consent to such pilot endeavor.” According to official documents the package of PIP submitted to the MoES was launched in Katmandu district education office from mid April on a pilot basis. However, when this paper writer asked the concerned officials about the progress most of them at the ministerial level were found unaware of lunching of such program. Further investigation revealed that the program was evaporated, as there was no financial resource to reward (Performance reward fund) for quality performance. Same was the case with the MoAC. 4.5 Gender Mainstreaming With a view to bring gender equity in the civil service (MoGA) and the Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare (MoWHSW) were called upon to devise new methods to 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 23 of 43 strengthening recruitment, selection and promotion criteria, with particular attention to alleviating constraints and creating new opportunity for women. The major activities targeted under the gender mainstreaming policy of Governance Reform Program and MGEP relating to gender equity in the civil service were as follows: Reservation: By amending the Civil Service Act in 2007, 33% of positions to be filled through open competitions are now reserved for women candidates. Accordingly for the first time separate examinations for such reserved positions were conducted in 2007. The result is yet to be published. Counseling/orientation workshop: This program aimed to encourage female candidates to think applying job in the civil service. It was organized in 4 major cities of Nepal during the year 2005 and 2006. A total number of 1049 eligible applicants participated in the workshop. During the program the participants (prospective applicants) were given information about the civil service system, the service conditions, examination schedules, and the process of applying for the job, curriculum and other important aspects of selection criteria through interactive methods. The MWCSW had organized the program with financial support from a UNDP project which is now phased out. Hence, although every one feels the need of such program due to its positive impact there is no guarantee of its continuation mainly due to lack of fund. Coaching Classes: With a view to help prospective applicants to improve their knowledge and skills to participate in the competitive examination MWCSW has started conducting coaching classes since 2001 onwards. By 2006 a total number of 1674 women have participated in the program organized in fourteen batches. Out of which two were for the aspirants of Gazetted class II and I respectively, Joint Secretary and Under Secretary position. The remaining twelve for aspirants to gazetted class III. Out of that number 58% participants attending these classes were able to get through in the competition and joined the civil service. Similar coaching classes were conducted for non gazetted (non officer) employees in 25 batches at 23 out of 75 districts of the country. In totality 900 women were benefited from these classes. Revision of Curriculum of the PSC’s entry-level examination. In 1995-96, the Public Service Commission had started the process of reviewing its curriculum of the entry examination (Gazetted Class III) of higher civil service. The method adopted for evaluation was a striking departure from the past in three ways. Firstly, it was gender sensitive. Secondly, it was interactive. Finally, the job analysis of various posts was done. Workshops were organized for job analysis. This was followed by individuals and group discussions. Special interactive sessions with the 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 24 of 43 women groups such as civil servants, intellectuals and college girls were also organized. The purpose was to make a gender audit of the then existing selection method and other aspects of examination system. The above programs were conducted throughout the country. After three years effort made by Public Service Commission the curriculum of gazettd III was revised on a scientific and gender sensitive basis. There after the success rate of female candidates increased. Gender friendly work environment: The code of conduct has made punishable the sexual harassment in the work place. Likewise civil servants are required to refrain from any kind of violence against women. Removal of age limit: The maximum age limit is waived in the case of women who has served for more than five years in the development projects on temporary basis. Shortening of Probation Period: The probation period of new entrants women is reduced to six months. Previously it was one year for both the female and the male candidates. Extension of maximum age: Women willing to join civil service are given a benefit of five more years. Accordingly, maximum age limit is now 40 for the women and 35 for the men. Waiving age bar for working civil servants: The working women civil servants have exemptions from the maximum age bar to become candidate in the open competition. One-year concession in eligibility for promotion: Women candidates are also given concession of one year to become eligible candidates for promotion to the higher posts. Paternity leave: Men are now entitled to get a paternity care leave of fifteen days. This provision can be considered as a landmark when viewed from the traditional norms and practice of considering child and maternity care a sole responsibility of women. Gender Focal Point / Person: A senior officer Joint Secretary or under secretary level, was appointed as gender focal person in the ministries. But discussion with the higher authorities revealed that at present no focal person is designated in many of the ministries. Gender sensitisation / orientation program: To garner interest and support from within the civil services MWSW also organized gender sensitization / orientation programs in the form of workshops. These programs were designed for general groups and specific targeted groups. The later include policy makers such as Parliamentarians, Secretaries, and Joint secretaries. To ensure participation of the ministers‘ members of the PSC and other similar authorities they were invited to chair the sessions, observe the program and give their comments /opinions on gender issues. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 25 of 43 Family friendly transfer: In case of double bread earner one partner being transferred to a new district the transfer of the other partner is also consider as a matter of right to the possible extent. Childcare allowances: The provision to provide a lump-sum amount of Rs 5000/- as child care allowance twice for a maximum of two children in career has been introduced. 4.6 Corruption Control In late 1990 with a view to obtained measures to control corruption the government constituted a task force to suggest ways to fight against corruption. The GRP also endorsed its recommendations to strengthen the legal framework for combating corruption, enforcing its implementation and ensuring the evolvement of civil society in the government‘s anti-corruption efforts. The major focus was on the strengthening the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) in terms of enhancing the investigative capacity of its personnel and strengthening legal provisions. To ensure prompt and the decisive action against non-compliance the government promulgated /amended various laws dealing with causes of corruption and abuse of authority by public officials. Accordingly, amendments in the CIAA acts, Prevention of Corruption Act, besides enactment of Special Court Act to expedite the hearing of the cases of corruption and Political Parties Act were undertaken. A new National Vigilance Council was created and is attached to the PM‘s office. Anti-Money Laundering act is also enacted. The Political Parties Act 2002 has made political parties responsible to keep records of their annul income and expenditure and also get their account audited. The amended Prevention of Corruption Act has given special focus on preventive aspects. Consequently besides the traditional punitive actions the CIAA is undertaking following activities: Preventive and promotional: i) For effective investigation different types of guideline have been made and used. ii) Ministry of education is suggested to include ―corruption control subject in the curricula of the schools. iii) District administration offices are asked to form anti-corruption coordination committee at the district level. iv) Government offices are suggested to form ―Good Governance Unit‖. v) Working manuals of 45 department and offices have been prepared under CIAA‘s initiations. vi) CIAA conducts training, seminars and interactions programs in close consultation with governmental and non-governmental –NGOs, civic society, journalists etc. vii) Community education program for raising awareness is lunched. viii) Radio program, documentaries, folk songs, cassette are prepared and used for public awareness. ix) Basic training 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 26 of 43 on corruption control is imparted to the personnel of CIAA and its co-partner. x) Government agencies are pursued to deliver effective service to the people. 5. Assessment-The Result 5.1 Achievements Civil service downsized: In 1974 the size of Nepalese civil service was 55372 that reached to 100632 within seventeen years i.e.1990. Had this pace of growth continued the size of civil service would have reach to 148716 by now (2008) with annual growth rate of 2685.159. However, due to various efforts made for downsizing the size is reduced to 76,609. This shows a tremendous success in bringing efficiency in terms of saving in salary, benefits and other expenses for the civil servants. The reasons for success to contain the unwanted growth of the civil service are many. Firstly, about 17,000 posts were already lying vacant. So it became possible to freeze and abolish large number of posts. Secondly, self-interest of the politicians and the higher civil servants was not directly attached with it. Because the Civil Service Act of 1993 has restricted temporary appointment only to those candidates who get through in the open competition conducted by PSC. The PSC has developed a ‗system‘ due to which manipulating the result of the competitive examination is not possible. So the powerful politicians and bureaucrats have no chance to help their nearest person to get the job. The civil servants association that has emerged as a powerful force in matters relating to civil service management also did not pose problem with the hope that the working civil servants will get more salaries and benefits, once the civil service is right sized. Legal and institution measures developed: The reform program has on its credit various achievements with regards to legal and institutional arrangements. Infusion of a knowledgeable new blood: Forced retirement, reduction of retirement age and lateral entry has infused a new blood with sound knowledge in high level administration. Criteria for transfer codified: Criteria for the transfer have been codified for the first time. Job Security: The civil servants have felt themselves more secure in their job. Abrupt demission with out giving opportunity for self defense is not possible, since the supreme court has emerged as guardian for the job security in case of unjust dismissal. Supreme court verdict to reinstate employees forcibly retired by the first elected government is a glaring example. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 27 of 43 Opportunity to raise voice for professional interest: Civil servants considered the right to organize into a union as a positive development since it provides opportunity of expressing professional interested in an organized manner. Accountability: There is a favorable legal institutional framework for enhancing accountability, if they work seriously. Civil servants are now exposed to pluralistic interest, pressure groups. The parliamentary committees were also getting involved in assessing the status of important decision. Transparency: Practices of making closed-door decision do not exist any more. The interaction between civil servants, politicians and professional through seminar and other interactive programs before introducing a bill having an impact on their employment conditions is growing established. Practice of public hearing of civil servants performance is also increasing. Right to information has become a constitutional right. Emergence of pressure group called for a more transparency leading to the more visible bureaucratic functions. Non-governmental sector encouraged: Government has given a high priority in bringing the non-governmental sector to take over many of the functions, which were traditionally carried out by it. NGOs are contributing in education, awareness raising, advocacy, community development services and economic services etc. 5.2 Problems Civil service reform is not an end in itself. It is a means to achieve national goal-eradication of poverty, economic growth and delivering quality goods and services to the people in an efficient and effective way. The result in this regard is indicated by the following facts. Poverty reduction goal not achieved: In 1990 Nepal‘s about 42% population was living below poverty line. The Ninth Plan had fixed the target to bring it down to 10% by the year 2017. But at present 30% of the population is living below the poverty line. This made impossible to meet the target and therefore the government has revised this target in the interim plan. Economic growth rate not meeting the target: Nepal could not attain higher economic growth despite the five decades of planned development efforts. Though the country attained annual average economic growth of 5 percent in the Eighth and Ninth Plan periods, the growth rate remained 3.4 percent in the Tenth Plan period (2002/2003-2006/07). Amongst the projected average annual growth rate of 6.2 percent at the higher side and 4.3 percent at the lower side, Nepal‘s average annual growth was less than the lower limit. Political instability and armed 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 28 of 43 conflict adversely affected the development efforts and worsened the internal and external investment environment. (GoN: 2008: Economic Survey: FY 2007/08:19) Overall human development not satisfactory: Overall Human Development Index (HDI) with 0.035 Nepal was ranked in 140 position 173 nations in 1992. Among the SAARC nation the position of Nepal was last but one. In 2005 Nepal had 0.34 score in HDI but in terms of rank the position relegated to142- last position among SAARC nation. State of overall governance not satisfactory: The six aggregate governance indicators developed by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay shows Nepal‘s performance in overall governance by measuring six governance dimension, during the years between 1996 and 2007 reveals following: This Data Report provides a summary of the six aggregate governance indicators, together with all of the publicly available disaggregated data on which the aggregate indicators are based. The Report displays the country's performance for all available years between 1996 and 2007 in six governance dimensions: i) Voice & Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence/Terrorism, iii) Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. Each shows the country's percentile rank on one of the six governance indicators. Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. Higher values thus indicate better governance ratings. The graph also reports the margins of error displayed in the line charts by dashed lines, and corresponding to a 90% confidence interval. This means that there is a 90 percent probability that governance is within the indicated range. Underneath the line charts, the Report also displays data from all the underlying sources used for that indicator. Individual ratings have been rescaled to run from 0 (low) to 1 (high). These scores are comparable over time and across countries since most individual measures are based on similar methodologies over time. Scores from different individual indicators are not however directly comparable with each other since the different data sources use different units and cover different sets of countries. The data from the individual indicators are in fact further rescaled to make them comparable across data sources before constructing the aggregate governance indicators. To find out more about each source/organization click on the provided links. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 29 of 43 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 30 of 43 Corruption perception index not satisfactory: The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of Transparency International indicate the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people and country analysts. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). In other words higher the CPI score lower the case of corruption. The result with regard to state corruption in Nepal in the past few years is given below: Year CPI score 2004 2.8 2005 2.5 2006 2.5 2007 2.5 2008 2.7 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 31 of 43 The data indicate that in 2008 perceived corruption in Nepal has slightly come down from that of previous years. But, when compared to the year 2004 it has slightly increased. Among the 180 countries of the world the score of 2008 ranks Nepal in number 121 position. Whereas in the previous year Nepal‘s rank was 131. Thus, though there is a slight positive indication countries‘ scoring less than 3 in CPI score fall under country having rampant corruption. Thus, there is no reason to be satisfied with this data, expect hoping that the positive trained will continue. 6. Impediments to Reform (Why such result?) 6.1 Political factors Instability: The transition witnessed painful political turbulence emanating from inter- party conflict and intra-party feuds. Consequently, none of the government completed constitutionally stipulated term of five years. Within the Seventeen years after regaining democracy there were seventeen changes in government. The political instability has hampered the reform endeavor in many ways. The Prime minister being fully busy in solving the ever ending political entangles could not spare time to attend the meeting of the Administrative Reform Coordination and Monitoring Committee (ARCMC) so the meeting could not be hold as provisioned. Thus political support needed to resolve the problems relating to the civil service reform was not possible. Likewise, the ARC headed by the minister of General Administration also could not do justice to its role due to the same reason. Maoist Insurgency: The Maoist insurgency had impact in the functioning of civil service. Directly affecting few are: Killing of civil servants: According to Data furnished by Nijamati Karmachari Sangathan (Civil Servants Association) forty-five (36 from the Maoist side and 9 from the government side) civil servants working mainly at the delivery point e.g. villages and district levels were killed during the Maoist insurgency. Ban to enter the villages: Likewise, the Maoist had also imposed ban to civil servants and NGO‘s to enter the villages in many districts. Even after the Maoist joining the mainstream politics of violence did not stop. In the Terai (Southern Plain) regions various political groups have intensified their demand for more inclusiveness and autonomy even for some to the extent of cessation. This has resulted killing of additional 37 civil servants by the various factions of the Terai movement. Many criminal groups are also taking advantage of the volatile political situation. This has led to almost non-existence of mechanism to deliver services in the rural areas. The local economic activities beside the service delivery also 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 32 of 43 have come to a halt in the countryside. For example, out of about 4000 Village Development Committee (VDC) Secretaries (key officials providing services from the state side) about half are laying vacant since a long time. Behavior of political parties not supporting to reform: In a multi- party democracy supportive and positive pressure from the political parties are important factors for bringing reform in the civil service. The political parties always talk about the need and importance of the civil service reform. But their actions are not supportive to reform initiatives. Instead they have been preoccupied with party building by granting power, status, money, jobs, and other material rewards to their parties‘ clients. The Parties have come to revolve around a circle of vested interest. (ESP; 2001: 22) Such behavior of the political parties encouraged corruption and created climate not conducive to bring positive changes in the attitude and actions of the civil servants. Politicization of civil service: Politicization of bureaucracy was a major characteristic of the Panchayat regime. However it did not end up with the re-establishment of democracy. During the Panchyat regime Civil Service was openly used to suppress the democratic voices. They were also used in the political process such as manipulating so-called election, indoctrinating the leaders and workers of banned political parties to join and favor Panchayat polity, keeping vigilance on the activities of the democratic forces and making effort to divide the democratic forces. The concept of political neutrality therefore did not arise since the King was all-powerful. Formal rules and informal norms both demanded full fledge loyalty to the King and undemocratic Panchayat system. Multi party system demands commitment towards constitution, laws, human rights etc, but neutrality in matters of partisan politics. Civil servants complained that a large number of their colleagues are not complying with this professional norm; their behavior is rather just the opposite. Surprisingly, the politicians also expect civil servants‘ support not only in formulating policies and programs (as per their election manifesto) but also demand to go beyond e.g. support their self- interest and the interest of their party. A recent article written by the ex-general secretary and the powerful leader of the CPM (UML) published in a vernacular daily news paper provides further prove of the politicization. He has said that “there is a wide spread tendency to politicize every sector. Consequently, our government bureaucracy has been turn into a mechanical structure, which is incompetent, ineffective, dynamisms less, creativity less, worthless. An institution which 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 33 of 43 is required to be imbued with the feeling of public service is itself giving trouble and creating problems to the people‖ (kantipur oct.26,2008 p7) . Non-professional Activities of Employees Association: Report of the parliamentary committee comprising the top leaders of major political parties has shown that employees association are functioning like sister organizations of political parties. The leaders of the employees‘ unions have a decisive say in matters such as placement to lucrative jobs, selection of heads of the key Ministries and departments. Many civil servants say that the top leadership in the civil service is found more keen and receptive to please the union‘s leaders than the general public. These bureaucrats do not hesitate to fulfill their irrational and non-professional demands. 6.2 Administrative factors Frequent Changes of MoGA leadership: Continuation of the administrative leadership is essential for successful implementation of civil service reform, particularly at the ministries, which has to provide leadership in implementing the program. Records show that between 1992 to 2008 October the administrative leadership i.e. permanent secretary of MoGA, was changed fourteen times. In other words, fourteen different persons assumed the leadership role in the ministry - average tenure of a leader was thus less than one and half year only. It is interesting to note that none of the change expects one was necessitated due to the incumbent secretary reaching her\\his retirement age, which is compulsory at the age of 58. The concerned officials said that the frequent changes of guards have adversely affected policy formulation; enactment of necessary laws and other activities needed for timely implementation of reform agenda and thereby achieve the stipulated goals. The important but impotent status of MoGA: According to some officials of the MoGA although their ministry was assigned the lead role in the governance reform they had no say in the management of budget. As mentioned earlier every year they used to request the finance ministry to allocate reasonable amount of budget required to perform their role properly. This was needed for conducting various programs to sensitize civil servants, politicians, civil society and the general public about the contents and the goals of the reform programs. But they always failed to get the needed budget. This became part of the reason for not getting support as well as positive pressure (such as demand for service delivery as promised) from the stakeholders, which assumes high value in making the reform effort effective. They leveled this phenomena as ―the important but impotent status of MoGA.‖ Recent event of bargaining among the political parties for 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 34 of 43 formation of collation government provides additional evidence to this phenomenon. There was a deadlock for weeks to form collation government. Bargaining for important ministries was the main cause of the deadlock. In this process MoGA was never figure out to the priority list of any party. Too much job security: Prior to restoration of democracy The Civil Service Act had allowed termination of service without giving chance for self-defense. The new civil service act promulgated in1992 abolished such undemocratic provision. But now job security has reached to the extent of no action agenst those civil servants who do not bother to serve people-their real master. According to one scholar such situation has compelled the concerned circle to ask question ― is protection of less than one percent of the population at the cost of the nation justifiable?‖ Who will protect the rest of the population particularly those who are very poor? (Moily:2007:340) Non-transparent performance evaluation system: Studies have shown that confidential performance rating system had created fear of undue discrimination among civil servants. Further, it had deprived the civil servants of knowing the rating of their performance on the job by supervisor and also did not provide the employees opportunities to know the way of improving their performance. Moreover, the phenomenon of confidential rating had encouraged sycophancy and chakari. So most employee have pointed out the discrimination in their performance rating as the major cause of low moral and motivation in the civil service. Incentives confined to the elites: One study has indicates that incentives are confined to the elites civil servants; high placed elite bureaucrats and technocrats. (Ghimire:2008:66-67) It was found that the elite civil servants are ever ready to use large chunk of the resources (loan or grant) for frequent foreign visit. Formally such visits is intended to ―learn lessons of success or failure‖, ―sharing of experience and ideas‖. But there is no practice of sharing with the civil servants back home, what has been learned during the visit, nor the actions gives any evidence of utilizations of such learning. Many frankly admit that it is often like a pleasure trips-dividend for the top or the other important position or linkage with powerful person. Rewards and punishments are not related to performance: Civil servants working at delivery point say ―while at work if you take special care of the powerful clients, your performance in terms of quality of service, non-delivery of services and non-responsive behavior to the client-common people does not matter, it is excused. It will not meet any punitive action.‖ As rewards and 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 35 of 43 punishments are not related to performance there will be no incentive to bring change in the working methods behavior as desired by the governance reform. This state is caused primarily because nepotism and favoritism still prevail and are deeply rooted in the social norms and values. An official is to be despised as lacking in human feeling if s/he does not acknowledge it as his duty to see that his friends and relatives are helped by him to get rewards and also to help avoid punishment for their misdeeds. Lure of power intoxication: Most civil servants suffer from the lure of power intoxication. The tendency of being protective to their self privileges caused them not to use their consigns. Nor they care for the policies and promised proclaimed. They are ever ready to acknowledge the illegitimate desires\orders of minister, powerful politicians and higher officials to the extent of misuse of power so that they can either snatch the lucrative jobs from their colleges or retain such lucrative jobs. This tendency is particularly high among the higher civil servants and among those who expect only lucrative jobs. Feudalistic Mentality: Many civil servants still have feudalistic thought. They fell themselves as the master of the common mass particularly, the uneducated poor who do not have any connection to elites. In delivering services their behavior indicate they are not serving the people rather showing some generosity by delivering services to them. The problem of feudalistic mentality is more acquit at the top levels. In this regard following statement of one sensible Secretary of Nepal Government is quite revealing, ―I wish I was not reached to the level of Secretary to experience the feudal culture more closely. Had I been retired in the lower post I would not have been a part of many misdeeds against the people –died in a foolish paradise. Self-centered attitude: The civil servants are well known for their self-centered attitude. Every one is habituated to judge reform agenda totally keeping in mind her/his narrow self-interest. A few exceptions are there but they are lost in the huge selfish mass. Pleasing the boss first, people last type behavior: Most civil servants confess that the tendency to see what pleases the political boss or higher officers are their prime concern than what benefits the people. This tendency is seen at every stage e.g. while providing advices on policy matters, decision making, ‗supervising implementation, soliciting feed back from co-workers and subordinates reviewing the progress etc. The root causes, according to them is: If their subordinates‘ actions (argument, suggestions, decisions) although is based on objective eye, does not tally with the preconceived notions and vested personal interest of their superiors- 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 36 of 43 political and administrative, they are leveled as non-cooperative, unhelpful, outdated, change resister, reactionary etc. Therefore, there is a general tendency to avoid such unpleasant situation leading to emotional upheaval on them and threat to their career advancement. Wide prevalence of eye washing behavior at the top level: Many civil servants say: The higher brass don‘t forget to repeat in a sermon telling manner, the concepts of people centered service, good governance and new public management. They also repeatedly say that our bureaucracy is non-functioning; not delivering services and suffers from all sorts of bureau-pathology. They never say we have achieved this goals or that goal. We did wrong while doing this or that. They neither confess their mistakes nor promise to correct behavior or actions. But when the time to prepare the progress report comes they are skilled enough to use such words ―government is serious to implement this policy very soon‖, ― the government is ready to take action‖, and so and so on. The donors are also habituated enough to get satisfied with these words of assurance and promises. In fact they also need a job for a long stay in this beautiful country, which they love very much. Salary low and social acceptance to corruption: Nepalese civil servants are one among the lowest paid in the world. Earning through illegal means is not unacceptable to the society. A person who fails to make money, when he had a chance to do so (even by illegal means) is considered a nincompoop. Bureaucratic apathy to change: As mentioned earlier failure of PIS in all three piloting ministries was absolutely due to the bureaucratic apathy toward change. Lack of budget for awarding monetary incentive to best performers was the apparent reason for the failure of this reform scheme. Had the bureaucracies in the MoF been committed to change, the money required for rewarding quality performance for incentive could have been easily allocated from their own level. There was no need to ask the minister or other political master to allocate the fund, nor was the amount unaffordable. Similar case relating to leading reform management is already mentioned above. This leads us to reach the conclusion that it is not only the political environment but the bureaucracy itself is apathetic towards reform. No sense of shared responsibility: There is a system of regular (at least once a month or week) meeting of secretaries to discuss on policy, agenda, review, implementation, bring coordination and resolve inter ministerial conflict. The Chief Secretaries presides over the meetings. After listening to many present and ex- secretaries one normally reaches to the conclusion that instead of showing the sense of shared responsibility the meetings often gives the impression that it is not a 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 37 of 43 meeting of a group of responsible administrative leaders who sit together to resolve the problem. But it is a collection of individuals where each is trying to maximize his or her own benefits or the benefits of other relatives, friends, and patrons. Reform activities demand a group effort, a comrade spirit to fight against the rough. But the phenomenon described here is inimical to reform process. Lack of interactive culture: Lack of long history of democracy has had direct impact on the functioning of the civil service, which is understandable. Observation of a few formal staff meetings and informal chatting at various districts and the center smacked ―the boss knows best‖ method of working (governance). Further inquiry confirmed that higher the level of bureaucracy greater this style of operation. A large majority of bosses, no matter what is their competency level, consider themselves as the most competent person to give sermon on any subject including reform agenda. They start preaching the subordinate about the need for honesty, client orientation and change. They neither listen the sub ordinates‘ suggestions/advice nor bother about translating their words into reality. Lack of sustainability: Despite the positive output of reform effort produced in the form of laws, institutions, policies, development of software for record management, training and foreign exposes etc they have not been implemented, utilized or updated in a proper perspective. The glaring example is the PIS system. The first effort of 1990 was totally discontinued. This resulted the GPR to start the work from start. But it is learned that after the phasing out of GRP there is slackness in making the record system up-dated and functional. Lack of concern to enter the relevant information is again surfaced. 6.3 Donors’ role Donor’s dominance role in implementation-Consultant and report focused approach: Politicians, civil servants, academician and consultants do not forget to point out "the lack of sense of ownership‖, ―donor driven program‖ as the major causes of reforms failure. According to them the donors perception of priority does not always confirm to that of the recipient. (Mahat:2005:XVI) According to one study civil servants perceived that ―the heart of the reform was engrossed by money concerns... if there is no reforms no money is coming in from outside‘‘. Money and reforms often arrive together. (Ghimire: 2008: 66-67) 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 38 of 43 So far as the case of GRP is concerned the acquit problem was not with the reform agenda but it was with the implementation approach and arrangement. Though MOGA was made responsible for implementation, it had no role in the way of carrying activities and the budget management. According to MoGA personnel the donor as usual took the approach of hiring expensive consultant to do such activities, which could have been done by civil servants with very low cost (incentives). According to some concerned civil servants during the GRP (2001-07) dozens volumes of report were written. Many of them were theoretical. But hardly a dozen persons have the opportunity to go through these reports expect those who are attached in the task of preparing the volumes. The working of donor also lack desirable transparency in matter related to budget management. 6.4 The actions of non-governmental actors Tendency of cartelling -Syndicate: One of the major theoretical assumptions of the reform is the internalization of competitive culture by all stakeholders / sectors. This requires inter alia the end of practices inhibiting competition. The Nepalese private sectors have failed to a large extent, to demonstrate competency\capability in this regard. The recent case of transport syndicate system testifies this fact. Despite years of protests from various quarters against the anti competition practice the syndicate system is still prevailing in many parts of the country, particularly in the Western and the Far Western region. The law prohibits Syndicate. The Supreme Court has also issued an order few years back (2006) for enforcement of this law. Owing to this government had issued directives and expressed commitment to stop this unlawful and monopolistic practice. However, recently people in the Far Western Region have had to lunch anti syndicate agitation as per the spirit of free market and fairness rules of competition. The existence of powerful syndicate has driven up the prices of many goods and services. Despite a long agitation the unholy alliance or bribe made it possible for a few businessmen to take advantage of free market denying the rest of the stakeholders its benefits. This has only help to create an unfavorable impression among many private sectors, (HMT: Aug 13:2008) and has also created problems in achieving the goal of infusing competitive culture. A syndicate by definition is an organization of producers or sellers of goods or services of similar nature to reap a monopolists‘ profit by jointly manipulating price, controlling output or killing competition or blocking new entrants. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 39 of 43 Lack of judicious role by most NGOs: Infusing competitive culture by encouraging non- governmental sector to deliver services and undertake the development was a major concerned of the reform. However, studies have shown that many of the NGOs are not doing justice to their role. Despite good performance there is allegation that most NGOs are not transparent in terms of their budget and activities. According to one study (2001) two thousand NGO‘s are affiliated to political parties of which approximately 1800 are aligned with the CPN (UML) and the rest to Nepali Congress. NGOs are formed with the three objectives of getting rich quickly form donor patronage, providing an alternate platform for political parties, and benefiting the target groups. A further objective is sometimes to avoid paying taxes as NGOs have a tax-free status. The politically aligned NGO‘s operate as the local representatives of the political parties and carry out many of their specific programs at local level. (ESP:2001: 29-30) Professional bodies not functioning as critical mass: There are a few professional organizations. These bodies in fact are engaged in organizing seminars, training, and research. But such activities are mostly guided either by ritualistic functions or arranging seminars, training with the objective of generating resources for their own operation. They have not been serious in follow up activities with regard to the outcome of their own activities- discussion, findings etc. Moreover, at many critical juncture they have failed to show their presence as the critical mass-developing image as able and powerful body contributing concretely in the process of civil service reform. 7. Concluding Remarks Despite long suffering and sacrifice for democracy, the democratic leaders, are not showing strong will to develop a ―system‖ which will enable the civil service to assuming its responsibilities as per the norms of the democratic governance. The leaders rather prefer to make the bureaucracy a parasite. The civil servants particularly at the top level are also equally responsible for this phenomenon. This is understandable from the fact that instead of discouraging the politicians for such actions they rather encourage the politicians to repeat such deeds so that it provides opportunity for them (bureaucrats) to favor their own relatives and friends at the same time it also makes possible to be in good list of the political boss. The task of transforming the civil service from a non responsive to a responsive one is therefore prolonged. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 40 of 43 The efforts for governance reform during the prolonged transition have however provided many lessons to learn from. These include: i) A reform activity which is not against the personal interest i.e. career advancement, job security, opportunity for lucrative jobs to oneself and to the nearest and dearest of the civil servants are likely to get implemented successfully despite many political turbulences and administrative behavior not overall friendly to reform - success of downsizing is a glaring example. ii) The transition has provided opportunity for introducing new governance ideas. The conceptual framework of the governance reform and the affirmative actions for gender equity would have not been in the present form if the political changes had not occurred. But translating the ideas into reality in the form of positive impact on general peoples‘ life does not get much success when there is political instability, internal conflicts, self-centered attitudes of politician and bureaucrats. iii) Politicians with a track record of long struggle for democratic cause (people right) do not show the same concern for people once they reach to power if the political situation is volatile and the other actors are self-centered and underdevelop. iv) Civil servants exposure abroad, training and sound knowledge etc. does not guarantee their engagement with full commitment to reform and change (as a permanent government) if there is no positive pressure from the external environment and lack of proper reward and the punishment practices inside the system. v) Tremendous growth of NGOs is not a contributing factor to healthy competitive environment, rather it may lead to more corruption and politicization, if politicians and bureaucrats are highly self centered and the private sector also falls in the same category (Syndicate system) vi) If the fear of loosing votes is high, the progress is possible even when the political behavior is not very responsive. (Gender Mainstreaming). vii) The report generating (but not translating it into action) approach to reform does not help in poverty alleviation, economic growth and control of corruption rather it defames the word ―reform‖ itself. viii) Political transition provides pretext to civil servants to behave in an unaccountable feudalistic way. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 41 of 43 ix) The politicians during the must give top priority to change the mental set of their own and that of civil servants so that in matters of solving people problems they may not try to escape blaming each other. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 42 of 43 References 1. ADB (2001), Report and recommendation of the president to the kingdom of Nepal for the governance reform programme. 2. Curtis Donald ( 1991), Beyond Government: Organizations for Common Benefits, London Macmiamillan Education Limited 3. Dele Olowu ( 2002) , Introduction New public Management: An African Reform Paradigm?, Development vol. xxvii nos .,3and4 ,2002 pp 1-16.Council for the development of social Science research in Africa 4. ESP (2001): Pro Poor Government Assessment Nepal 5. Ghimire, Chandra (2008), Transformation Of New Public Management: Shaping A Hybrid In Nepal?, Thesis submitted to the Department of Administration and Organization Theory In Partial Fulfillment for Award of Master of Philosophy in Public Administration 6. "Governance MattersVII: World Wide Governance Indicators for 1996-2007" (June 2008) in www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 7. GoN (2008) : Economic Survey: Fiscal Year 2007/08. 8. Mahat, Ram Sharan (2005), „In Defense of Democracy: Dynamics and Fault of Nepal‟s Political Economy: New Delhi: ADRUIT Publishers. 9. McCourt, W. (1998), „The New Public Selection? Competing Approaches to the development of the Public Service Commission of Nepal‟ in www.man.ac.uk/idpm/ppm.wp8.htm/ 10. Moily: M Veerappa (2007): Administrative Reform in India: The Indian Journal of Public Administration vol,LIII No.3 july sept 2007 p340 -44 11. Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is transforming the Public Sector. Reading, Mass: Addison –Wesley 12. Pant, Sushil Kumar and Shahi, Sapana (2007): Public Administrations‟ Preparedness in Carrying Out Human Rights Functions: June 2007. 13. Rodinelli Dennis A (2007) : ― Governments Serving People: The Changing Roles of Public Administration in Democratic Governance in Public Administration and Democratic Governance (2007) United Nations. 2e9ba125-d6de-489a-8e15-965e3dee16fa.docPage 43 of 43 14. Tiwari, Madhu Nidhi (1999) Productivity in Government in Dinesh Pant et.al eds- Current Issue on Producitivity Kathmandu: National Productivity and Economic Development Centre. 15. -------- 1996: Government Cadres In Transition: The Nepalese Experience. Paper Presented in EROPA 43rd Executive Council Meeting and Seminar, Hanoi-Vietnam. 16. UN (1992), Human Development Report 17. UN (2007/08), Human Development Report 18. UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2005): Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Performance. World Public Sector Report 2005. 19. UN (2008), People Matters Civic Engagement in Public Governance, World Public Sector Report 2008. 20. Various Issues of The Rising Nepal, The Kathmandu Post, The Himalayan Times, Nepali Times .
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