2005 White Paper on Nuclear Safety
Nuclear Safety Commission
2005 White Paper on Nuclear Safety (Contents)
Outline of international discussions on safety culture and activities promoted by
utilities and regulatory bodies in Japan
Chapter 1 Safety Culture in International Organization and Other Countries
Chapter 2 Safety Culture in Japan
Explanation of the main activities of the Nuclear Safety Commission and nuclear
regulatory authorities on nuclear safety regulation
Introduction of various activities for ensuring overall nuclear safety in Japan
Chapter 1 Safety Regulation Systems for Nuclear Facilities
Chapter 2 Disaster Measures at Nuclear Facilities
Chapter 3 Progress in Nuclear Research
Chapter 4 Nuclear Safety Regulation by Risk-Informed Utilization
Chapter 5 Environmental Radiation Surveys
Chapter 6 International Cooperation on Nuclear Safety
Various materials and data related to the Nuclear Safety Commission
Part 1 Fostering Safety Culture
Nuclear “safety culture” is a concept introduced by the International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) of the IAEA in its report entitled, “Summary Report
on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident” in 1986
(INSAG-1) after the accident of Chernobyl in the Ukraine (former Soviet Union).
INSAG has placed “safety culture” as a fundamental principle for ensuring the
safety of facilities. INSAG has continued to assess the concept and has published
its results as self-addressed questions for organizational components to check the
establishment of their safety culture and its declining symptoms.
Japan’s Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) commended safety culture in its
White Paper of 1994 and advocated that Japan should offer proactive contributions
to the building of safety culture. However, various accidents and other problems
took place after that, and now heated discussions are cropping up on fostering
safety culture in nuclear communities, and focus on learning the lessons that these
accidents and problems offer.
Safety is the first prerequisite in any nuclear activity. Every organization should
make sure that “safety first” is a shared concept throughout its members and that
“safety culture” based on this concept is ensured in managing day-to-day work.
Fostering safety culture plays a crucial role in ensuring the safety of nuclear
facilities; it is an important mission for regulatory bodies to note and to encourage
the licensees toward it.
The White Paper 2005 introduces an overview of international elaborations on
“safety culture” and summarizes some relevant activities of nuclear operators and
regulatory bodies in Japan. Good practices selected from among
safety-culture-building activities by nuclear operators are presented herein as
valuable lessons to other operators.
Chapter 1 Overview of Safety Culture Activities in International
Organizations and Communities
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Brief History of IAEA Activities on Safety Culture
1985 The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), later the
International Nuclear Safety Group, was established at the IAEA
1986 The Chernobyl accident in Ukraine (former Soviet Union)
INSAG-1: First reference to “safety culture” in the nuclear
1988 INSAG-3: “safety culture” ranked as a fundamental principle for
ensuring the safety of facilities.
1991 INSAG-4: Definition of “safety culture” established; concept and
development approach were elaborated.
1996 Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations Team (ASCOT)
report TECDOC-860: Organization’s self-assessment indices for
safety culture were presented.
1998 Safety Report Series No11: Three steps to develop safety culture
presented for fostering and assessing safety culture
1999 INSAG-13: Assessment frame of management systems proposed
for strengthening safety culture
2000 ASCOT report TECDOC-1141: Indices presented for monitoring
operational safety of nuclear power plants
2002 INSAG-15: Key practical issues in strengthening safety culture
2005 Draft Safety Standards DS338 andDS339: Safety culture building
measures unified in the Integral Management System
encompassing safety, environment, security, quality management,
safety culture, and economics as its key elements.
Safety Report Series No42: Fostering safety culture at maintenance
management organizations for nuclear power plants
(1) INSAG-1: First reference to “Safety Culture” in the nuclear community
The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) composed of
worldwide nuclear safety experts and convened by IAEA, documented their
analyses of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 in Ukraine (former Soviet Union) as its
report “Summary Report on the Post-accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl
Accident.” The concept of “safety culture” was referred to in this report for the first
time in the nuclear community.
(2) INSAG-4 defined the concept “safety culture”
INSAG-3 stressed the importance of “safety culture” by ranking it as the top
fundamental principle1 in its report “Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power
INSAG-4 defined “safety culture” in its report “Safety Culture” (1991) as follows.
Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and
individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues
receive the attention warranted by their significance.
The report visualized the elements in safety culture in the following illustration.
Figure 1: Illustration of the Presentation of Safety Culture
Principle: An established safety culture governs the actions and interactions of all individuals and
organizations engaged in activities related to nuclear power.
(3) ASCOT report TECDOC-860: ASCOT Guidelines for organizational
self-assessment of safety culture and for reviews
An IAEA expert group ASCOT (Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations
Team) proposed organizational self-assessment items in its report “ASCOT
Guidelines for Organizational Self-assessment of Safety Culture and for Reviews”
(4) Safety Management System
INSAG-13 recommended concerned organizations to build a “safety
management system” in its report ”Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear
Power Plants” (1999) to strengthen its safety culture and to realize satisfactory
operating performances. Its key components are illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Components of Safety Management
(5) Self-addressed Questions for Verification
In its report “Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture” (2002),
INSAG-15 proposed sets of self-addressed questions for individual levels of
personnel working in nuclear activities to verify how they are contributing to the
fostering of organizational safety culture. Table 1 below shows one example from
each set of questions to respective levels of organizations.
Table 1: Questions for Assessing Personal
Contributions to the Enhancement of Safety Culture
Level of Example Question
Questions for members of 6 Do I have a clear picture of what is
boards of directors needed in the organization to strengthen
safety culture and to achieve a high level
Questions for chief nuclear 20 Have we published an agreed clear
officers and executive statement of our expectations for safety?
Questions for the station 22 When I ask my staff what our
director and senior expectations for safety are, can they tell
Questions for middle 23 Was safety the first item discussed in our
managers last management meeting and team
Questions for first line 28 Was safety the first item discussed in our
supervisors last team briefing?
Questions for the shop floor 19 Do I always understand a task before
carrying it out?
(6) Declining Patterns of Safety Performance
Early signs of declining performance are not readily visible and the situation
could often become more serious than anticipated. INSAG-13 and 15 place high
importance on an objective internal self-evaluation program supported by periodic
external reviews. Table 2 below shows their analyses on how safety culture
declines; they stress the importance of self-detection at its early stage.
Table 2: Typical Pattern of Declining Safety Performance
(7) Integrated Management System
The IAEA presented in 2005 a proposed integrated management system for
nuclear facilities unifying safety, environment, security, quality management, and
economics. Safety culture should be established therein.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear
Energy Agency OECD NEA
The OECD NEA takes the relationship between safety culture and regulation
very seriously. In 1998, the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities(CNRA)
of the OECD NEA established a Task Group to advance the discussion on how
a regulatory organization recognizes and addresses safety performance
problems. The Task Group published two reports, titled "The Role of the
Regulator in Promoting and Evaluating Safety Culture"(1999) and "Regulatory
Response Strategies for Safety Culture Problems”(2000). Those reports,
described below, covered the role of the regulator in promoting and evaluating
safety culture on the basis that it is not really possible to quantitatively measure
or directly regulate safety culture.
● In promoting safety culture, the regulatory body should set a good example in
its own performance.
● The regulator can evaluate the outward operational manifestation of safety
culture as well as the quality of work processes.
● When early signs of weak safety culture or declining safety performance are
observed, a graduated approach as shown below would be effective for the
The Special Experts’ Group of the Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations
held a workshop on “Systematic Approaches to Safety Management” in April
2002 and drafted a report titled “State of The Art Report on Systematic
Approaches to Safety Management,” to be issued in April 2006. This report
provides a brief explanation of the relationship between safety management and
safety culture with the following figure describing a basic concept that a
organizational safety culture influence the safety management, and vice versa.
Fig. A model of Safety Culture
Safety Culture in the UK
In the UK, nuclear safety regulation is controlled by the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate (NII) of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Where operators
install nuclear facilities, the Safety Case has to be submitted to and assessed by
the NII. For assessment of the Safety Case, the NII has developed the principles,
called the Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Plants (SAP).
The SAP, issued in 1992 requests, the licensee to have an effective management
system that will ensure that a high standard of safety will be maintained throughout
the various phases of its life. An important aspect of an effective management
system is the development of a safety culture which at all levels within the
organization emphasizes safety, and which by the use of managerial, supervisory,
and individual practices and constraints sustains attention to safety through
awareness of the risks posed by the plant and of the potential consequences of
On the subject of safety culture, the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear
Installations (ACSNI) defines it in their the third report, “Organizing for Safety,” HSE
Books, 1993, as follows: “The safety culture of an organization is the product of
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an
organization’s health and safety management. Organizations with a positive safety
culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared
perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of
Under such a situation, the HSE is revising the SAPs toward being better aligned
with IAEA standards, which encourage the promotion of safety culture in safety
management. A draft text has been opened for public consultation in October 2005.
Safety Culture in the United States
In the policy statement of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) in 1989, safety culture is referred to “the necessary full attention to safety
matters and the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in
any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants.”
In 1996, after affairs at the Millstone nuclear power plant, the NRC issued a policy
statement on freedom of employees in the nuclear industry to raise safety
concerns without fear of retaliation. However as Dr. Meserve, then Chairman,
stated in a speech in 2002, licensee management should foster an environment
that assures safe operation. The NRC does not purport to regulate safety culture
Since reactor vessel head degradation was revealed at the Davis-Besse nuclear
power plant in 2002, the NRC issued a requirement memorandum in 2004. The
memorandum directs NRC staff to review the status of nuclear industries on safety
culture, assess activities of licensees and enhance regulation to ensure safety
culture more decisively in organizations of licensees. Development of measures is
Analysis of Safety Culture by Dr. James Reason
Dr. James Reason, a researcher of organizational culture, shows the following
analysis and consideration on safety culture in his reports titled “Organizational
Accidents” and “Maintenance Errors”:
Safety culture is “careful culture” including “collective mindfulness” to things to
become possibly bad.
Safety culture also “informed culture.”
“Reporting culture,” “just culture,” and “learning culture” are needed to create
Chapter 2 Safety Culture in Japan
1 Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
In 1999, a Nuclear Safety Network was established as a mutual exchange
network by nuclear utilities, nuclear makers, and research organizations. To date,
its function has been taken over by the Japan Nuclear Technology Institute,
which carries out the following activities:
Peer review (mutual assessment)
Fostering safety culture
Information exchange safety information dispatch
2 Nuclear Utilities
Nuclear utilities evolve various actions taken in their facilities. Some common
examples among the actions are as follows:
Clear intentions stated by top management
Training for outstanding human resources
Implementation of ensuring safety activities
Organizational investigation of problems
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency in Ministry of Economy, Trade
and industry Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency(NISA) was launched on January 6, 2001.
Since then it has been implementing the ensuring safety through safety regulations
of nuclear installations under the code of conduct, which consists of four criteria: a
strong sense of mission, scientific and rational judgments, transparency in
operations, and neutrality and justice. A task group on nuclear safety culture was
established by NISA, and issued a report on the deliberation outcome in August
2003.The following are the contents of the report.
Issues to be taken into consideration by nuclear utilities (industries, research &
a Obvious message that safety be the first priority must permeate all levels of
an operating organization
b To take actions as a part of a corporate governance activity
c Improvement of an organization climate and safety activity led by top
d Enhancing motivation and identifying the importance of the safety section
e Quality assurance is a foundation of safety culture
f Accountability to citizens
g To expand decision-maker’s knowledge and to avoid falling into “groupthink”
Verification and assessment stage
(h) Top management role to be forced for the establishment of safety culture
(i) Realistic and scientific method for assessment of safety culture
Issues to be taken into consideration by regulators
(a) Improvement of rational and effective regulation, its arrangement, and its
(b) Establishment of reasonable criteria on judgments and assessments with the
qualitative and quantitative evaluation by regulators’ inspections
(c) Use of knowledge on safety culture
(d) Accountability to citizens
(e) Regulators’ mind improvement and change of their sense of values
Verification and assessment stage
h Regulators’ self-training education and self-assessment
In addition, government incorporated the quality assurance of utilities into safety
regulations in October 2003, and started safety reviews for confirmation of the
functioning of operators' quality assurance. Furthermore, for the regulatory to
implement the rational and practical regulation of the items to be checked, utilities'
self-checks were legislated as periodic utility inspections. In case of malfunction of
any equipment, the utility is requested to evaluate its reliability.
The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) is now under
consideration for safety culture self assessment tool and organizational trust model
by which nuclear safety culture in the safety regulation could be assessed.
Nuclear Safety Commission
1 First-Series Opinion Exchange Meeting on Safety Culture
As a response to the JCO accident occurred September 1999, the NSC held a
series of “(First- Series) Opinion Exchange Meeting on Safety Culture,” during
which the NSC Chairman and Commissioners visited 21 nuclear facilities
throughout the country and exchanged views with section managers and duty
supervisors on safety culture. The findings and issues collected through the
Opinion Exchange Meeting are highlighted below.
Findings gained from staff practices of fostering safety culture
(a) Do not let individuals be buried in organization; allow workers to take pride
responsibility in their work.
(b) Seek out and nurture individuals with common sense and manners to enhance
a capability of recognizing the importance of safety by one’s own sense of
(c) To encourage staff to report mistakes without any punishment.
(d) Not only to learn about troubles firsthand, but but also to experience simulated
troubles on site so that the real-world knowledge might be obtained.
(e) Organizational lessons and learning opportunities can be discovered
everywhere at the site.
(f) “Best consumed by” dates are important for success.
(g) Knowledge of the quality control system is actively introduced into the business
(h Optimization of the decision-making responsibilities should be arranged
beforehand, assuming as many kinds and varieties of situations as possible, to
ensure a proper response to whatever occurs.
(i Information collected just for collection’s sake is not significant. Who collects,
and how to use collected date are what’s important.
(j The ability to examine the self and the organization objectively at a distance
should be fostered.
Draw implications from important issues concerning safety culture proposed by
(a) To comply completely with “industry morals.”
(b) To make good use of the adversity and pressure brought on by intense and
sustained public view.
(c) Staffs should engage in ordinary conversation exchange with the media in
mind, and promote the disclosure and the transparent of the information.
(d) To let every staff engender habits that will help to perceive an overall flow of
(e) To recognize that report and consultations are shortcuts to ensuring safety.
(f) “Professional morals” and “work implementation manners” should be put into
the education training curriculum.
(g) To keep a questioning attitude in mind all the time.
(h) To support technologies/skills preservation.
(i) Top management should always recognize the most appropriate allocation of
(j) To strengthen a quality assurance system concentrating on the software of the
(k) To maintain and improve the ability of the staff and to increase the rate of direct
(l) Sharing the values of safety with cooperating companies is key for the fostering
(m)To use the latest knowledge about risk communication to communicate with
(n) It is necessary to observe self-actions from both subjective and objective
viewpoints and to ask tough questions of oneself.
2 Second-Series Opinion Exchange Meeting on Safety Culture
After the secondary piping rupture accident of Unit 3, Mihama Nuclear Power
Station, The Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc. in August 2004, the NSC held
its “Second-Series Opinion Exchange Meeting on Safety Culture” from October
2004 to April 2005 in which opinions were exchanged with a total of 154
representatives from 48 companies, all top managers of nuclear power companies,
major contractors including subcontractors, and manufacturers. The findings and
issues obtained from the Roundtable Discussions are as follows.
Management Safety Alertness and Activities
To safely conduct activities in attempting to benefit from the outcome of
complicated and advanced technologies such as nuclear power utilization,
everybody in an organization must share and implement the practices of valuing
the concept of “safety first” by constantly questioning whether the current
practices of activities are appropriate from the viewpoint of ensuring safety. To this
end, top management is expected to take the leadership to organizational
composition and allocation of resources, quality assurance systems, allocation of
technology and human resources, training & technology, training, and
management systems based on technology.
Productive communications between site staff and top management
To give activities of ensuring safety substantial significance, it is crucial that
safety-related information smoothly permeate throughout the organization, and that
a system and means be provided to enable it. With the full awareness of the
difficulties involved in creating smooth communications, top management must
constantly and intentionally motivate their staff to improve the situation by ensuring
bi-directional information channels, along with appropriate and timely remedial
An appropriate level of tension is necessary between the regulators and
those being regulated, but both parties must continue to make bilateral efforts to
improve the effectiveness of regulatory activities for productively improving safety
assurance, without being content with the formalities in meeting regulation
standards in effect. It is hoped that the nuclear power licensees and the
management of contractors will maintain and promote a thoroughgoing cooperative
relationship while sharing a strong perception that ensuring safety is the
prerequisite to everything else in nuclear activities, and that it be the most efficient
means of cost optimization.
Examples of good practices by nuclear operators
(1) Site Visits by Top Management (Kyushu Electric Power Company, Inc.)
“Safety culture is not verbally transferable. Managers’ attitudes and behavior
educate their staff.”
Former Director Mr. A started upon election his surprise visit plan to two nuclear
power stations of the company, at least once per month. Over the past four years,
he visited sites 111 times. He bound himself on his visits the following principles.
− Never complain.
− Commend any good performance.
− When meeting any kind of trouble, no matter how minor, ask the most
knowledgeable person about it. Thoroughly discuss with him/her, whether
he/she is his staff or from a contractor or a manufacturer.
− Respond to any inquiries or proposals from the front. Take action to remedy
Mr. A notes, “Such (top manager’s direct contact with the front as) site visits give
incentives to and motivate site staff. Eventually, it works to ensure safety.”
Site staff expressed, at the time of NSC interview, quite a number of positive
responses to his site visits for fostering safety culture. For example:
− Site staff and top management can share relevant information.
− Proactive proposals from the site are facilitated.
− Solidarity can be strengthened between site staff and top managers, and the
operator and the contractors.
This particular case gives various suggestions in considering top management’s
commitments and managers-site staff relations in fostering safety culture.
(2) Trouble Simulator (The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)
“By experiencing a simulated environment based on very real conditions, it
becomes increasingly easier to determine and eliminate trouble before it
Site staff and contractor partners have proposed to install an “Anomalous
Symptom Experience Simulator.” It aims at providing an environment that helps
transfer senses and skills, which are verbally difficult to explain, by experiencing
simulated anomalies and troubles.
Upon installation three years later, the simulator started its service in 1999 at the
Training Center (present Technology Training Ward, QA Center) to provide
simulated abnormal environments. One-day training on the simulator is a
compulsory class in the technical freshmen’s curricula. About 70 freshmen have
taken the class over the past seven years. In addition, about 190 engineers from
each group took a half-a-day or one-day training class as of JFY2005.
The simulator was built upon a proposal by field staff as a means of improving their
skills for ensuring safety. Needless to say, it has had some significant effects. In
designing and manufacturing this simulator, site staff had enthusiastic discussions
on what anomalies exist at the station and what anomalies should be built in. This
case offers us a very commendable example in motivating site staff to creative
development and in fostering safety culture.
(3) Maintenance activities in unison by the operator and its contractors
(Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)
“Operator staff loaned to contractors heighten safety consciousness and
The operator (Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.) has been sending dozens of its
staff to the Ikata Nuclear Power Station on loan to its contractors since 2003; they
assume field work on electrical machines, instruments, and chemical and radiation
controls. By doing so, maintenance activities are performed in unison for improving
skills and building autonomous organization.
56 staff were lent out in 2003, 32 in 2004 and 15 in 2005; a total of about 150
were lent out as of January 2006. They have expressed the following favorable
comments on their experience.
− Communications improve
− Hierarchy is lowered for information flow
− Solidarity is enhanced
This example gives us good suggestions on building collaborative relations
between the operator and its contractors, and constructing good communications
between field staff members.
“Safety Culture” can be regarded as a widely accepted concept as an
indispensable element in safety-ensuring activities in nuclear applications. To
foster safety culture, every organization in nuclear applications—including
regulatory bodies in addition to licensees—must strive to achieve safety culture in
unison at all levels.
The most important element in fostering safety culture may be the firm
establishment of an organizational culture in which every person in can fulfill their
duties with pride and responsibility. Without pride in his/her tasks, no one can
accomplish them. A hope is that every professional working toward ensuring
nuclear safety—and in particular those at the forefront—carries out his/her duties
with pride and conviction.
Second, top management should be conscious of its strong commitments to
support the building of such a culture with every professional in front having pride
and responsibilities. Top management has no excuse to delegate site staff to
ensure safety in every aspect. Clear commitments of top management and
adequately allocated resources for their realization are absolute necessities in
building an organizational safety culture.
Third, frank communications must be established between different groups:
between front staff and managers, including top management, between
experienced senior field staff and young staff, between nuclear operators and their
contractors, between regulatory bodies and operators, and between any other
organizations or groups. “Safety culture” is by nature invisible. Every stakeholder
should deepen his/her understanding of safety culture through frank
communications on what safety culture means and what is needed for its fostering.
Good practices cited in this White Paper are examples that have contributed to the
fostering of safety culture.
Fourth, “safety culture” should be considered as a living, breathing thing. Even if
it is securely established, it can easily decline. Every stakeholder should notice
past experiences, and note that self complacency—being satisfied with existing
performances—causes safety issues. Attitudes of constant self-questioning are
required of the organization and its personnel for preventing safety culture to
decline. In its full volume, the White Paper cited good practice cases in fostering
safety culture by operators in our country, considering that good models would be
a good guide to foster individual operators’ organizational safety culture. The
Nuclear Safety Commission hopes that every operator make efforts to foster safety
culture on a continuous basis by referring to the good examples cited in this paper,
or to other appropriate materials.
Work in 2005
Chapter 1 Nuclear Safety Commission Activities
The reports issued by the Nuclear Safety Commission in 2005 are presented. The
main reports are as follows:
Final report on the secondary piping rupture accident of Unit 3, Mihama Nuclear
Power Station, The Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.
Safety research expected, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Fostering safety culture in Japan's nuclear industry--Exchange of views with top
Principle of technical advice on public announcements of nuclear emergencies
In addition, the activity status of each Special Committee, the implemented
subsequent regulation reviews, and the information disclosure task force in 2005
Chapter 2 Accidents and Malfunctions in 2005
Statistics in 2005 on accidents and malfunctions of nuclear power reactors, test
and research reactors, and other nuclear facilities and their outlines are mentioned.
The number of accidents and malfunctions were 15. However the result evaluated
by the International Nuclear Event Scale for the above statistics indicated that one
case is corresponded to out of the INES scale, 13 and 1 to level 0 and level 1,
respectively. No radioactive material affected either the public or the environment
in any way.
Nuclear power reactors Research reactors for electric power
Research reactors for basic study Other nuclear facilities
（Number of cases）
Trends in the number of accidents and malfunctions at nuclear facilities reported to the Nuclear Safety
Commission over the past 10 years
Part 3 Government Activities for Ensuring Nuclear Safety
Chapter 1 Safety Regulation Systems for Nuclear Facilities
This chapter presents the safety regulation system in Japan for nuclear power
reactor facilities, research and test reactor facilities, nuclear fuel facilities, process
and disposal of radioactive wastes, transport of nuclear fuel materials, and
Operator Adminisitrative agency Nuclear Safety Commission
Planning site selection First local inquiry
(Main sponsorship by Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry)
Application for nuclear reactor Ministry of Economy, Trade and Inquiry Nuclear Safety Commission
installation Industry evaluation evaluation
Consensus of the Minister of
Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology Second local inquiry
(Main sponsorship by the Nuclear
Permission of the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry
Application for construction Ministry of Economy, Trade and
plan approval Industry evaluation
Construction Construction plan approval
Welding safety management evaluation
Safty regulation verification Review of
Operation stage Start of operation
Periodical inspection subsequent
On-set inspection regulation
Periodic safety management evaluation
Reports on operation
Application for Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Decommissioning plan Industry evaluation
Start of decommissioning
Application for confirmation of
Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Completion of decommissioning
Flow from design stage to decommissionning for a nuclear power reactor facility
Chapter 2 Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities
This chapter introduces the Special Law for Nuclear Emergency, established for the
purpose of protecting the lives, assets, and health of citizens from the effects of a
nuclear emergency. This act explains the responsibilities of nuclear power
companies, the strengthening of the nation's emergency response system, and the
role of the Nuclear Safety Commission under the Special Law for Nuclear
Emergency, It is also insures organic coordination between the central government
and local government bodies, and ensures initial prompt action after an incident
Report information regarding
situations out of order
Occurrence of a nuclear emergency
Prefecture Government Prefecture Government
The Government The Government local Emergency Response Emergency Response
Nuclear Emergency local Emergency Headquarters Headquarters
Response Headquarters Response
Chief: Prime Minister Headquarters Joint Council for Nuclear
Request for advice Technical advice
Commissioners of the NSC Towns
Nuclear Safety Commission Emergency policy research committee Municipal Emergency
Commissioners of the NSC members Response Headquarters
Emergency policy research committee members Dispatch
participation Senior specialist
For Nuclear Emergency Instruction
Information supplement etc.
Instructions regarding evacuation, Designated public
taking shelter indoors etc. organizations Police, Fireman, Self-
Municipal government defense forces etc.
Citizens organizations for people
exposed to radiation
Nuclear power companies
Prevent disaster from spreading
Support for evacuation etc. Announce radiation level to public Site of accident
Relive victims Measure radiation exposure
Removal of radioactive substances
Emergency medical care for people exposed to radiation
The national exercise was carried out, and "the Law Concerning the Measures for
Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations etc." was enforced in 2004.
The comprehensive nuclear emergency exercise in 2005 (Niigata Prefecture)
Chapter 3 Progress in Nuclear Safety Research
The latest scientific knowledge is continually reflected in the safety evaluation
guidelines and safety reviews. Nuclear energy safety research contributes to the
creation and maintenance of a high-level safety regulation system. Moreover, the
"Prioritized Plan for Nuclear Safety Research" decided in July, 2004 is discussed.
Concentrated safety research field taken up from the "Prioritized Plan for Nuclear
. Regulation system field
. Light water reactor field
. Nuclear fuel cycle facility field
. Radioactive waste and decommissioning field
. Advanced reactor field
. Radiation effect field
. Nuclear disaster prevention field
Chapter 4 Nuclear Safety Regulation by Utilization of Risk Information
This chapter describes mainly the NSC and METI/NISA activities on risk-informed
regulations. These regulations represent a significant measure from the viewpoint
of well-balanced allocation of resources to attain improvements in rationality,
consistency, and transparency in safety regulation.
Chapter 5 Environmental Radiation Surveys
This chapter explains the surveys conducted by the government, including
radioactivity surveys in the areas around nuclear facilities, the response to
radioactive fallout, and environmental radiation surveys of bays, coastal areas, and
the surrounding areas of the ports for nuclear-powered warships.
Chapter 6 International Cooperation on Nuclear Safety
This chapter introduces the current situation of nuclear safety regulation systems in
various foreign countries, as well as international activities to ensure nuclear
Appendices includes information on the organization chart of the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC), main decisions of the NSC in 2005, safety evaluation
guidelines established by the NSC, results of public hearings, and dose-equivalent
distributions for employees dealing with radiation at nuclear facilities, sites for
nuclear facilities, and the operation and management status of nuclear facilities in