District Based Peace Building Dbpb Project Proposal

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					         THE DISTRICT BASED PEACE BUILDING AND
                RECONCILIATION PROJECT,

                                   AND

 THE COMMUNITY BASED PEACE SUPPORT PROJECT



                                SOMALIA




                               REVIEW REPORT




This report contains                           By Joakim Gundel
restricted information                         KATUNI Consult
and is for official use only
                                                   October 2008
                                             Review of the DBPB and CBPS projects


TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 1
1      INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 5
    1.1        BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 5
    1.2        TERMS OF REFERENCE ................................................................................................................ 6
    1.3        METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................................... 7

2      SECTOR CONTEXT ....................................................................................................................... 7
3      ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DBPB.............................................................................................. 11
    3.1        PROJECT DESIGN AND OWNERSHIP ...........................................................................................             11
    3.2        RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS ........................................................................................               12
    3.3        COST-EFFFICIENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................                 12
    3.4        IMPACT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ..........................................................................................             13
    3.5        SUSTAINABILITY AND BENEFITS ...............................................................................................          14
    3.6        LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................                      15
4      ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CBPS .............................................................................................. 19
    4.1        PROJECT DESIGN AND OWNERSHIP ...........................................................................................             20
    4.2        RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS ........................................................................................               23
    4.3        COST-EFFICIENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................................................                23
    4.4        COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT .........................................................................................              24
    4.5        SUSTAINABILITY AND BENEFITS ...............................................................................................          25
    4.6        LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................                      26
5      PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................... 31
6      A SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................... 32
    6.1        OVERALL ASSESMENT OF THE PROJECTS ..................................................................................                 32
    6.2        EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE PROJECTS .......................................................................................              32
    6.3        ELEMENTS OF A PROJECT MONITORING SYSTEM .......................................................................                      33


ANNEXES
Annex 1 List of References
Annex 2 People consulted
Annex 3 Summary of telephone interviews
Annex 4 Terms of Reference
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS



AOG           Armed Opposition Groups
ARS           Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia
CBPS          Community Based Peace Support Project
CDD           Community Driven Development
CRD           Center for Research and Democracy
DAC           Development Assistance Committee
DBF           District Basket Fund
DBPB          District Based Peace Building Project
DC            District Commissioner
DPC           District Preparatory Committee
DPIP          District Planning and Implementation Process
ICU           Islamic Courts Union
ILO           International Labour Organisation
JPLG          Joint Programme on Local Governance and Service Delivery
LOA           Letters of Agreement
LF            Logical Framework
LGD           Local Government Department
OECD          Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PM            Project Manager
PRODOC        Project Document
RDP           Somali Reconstruction and Development Program
ROLS          Rule of Law and Security
SC            Steering Committee
SCS           South-Central Somalia
TFC           Transitional Federal Charter
TFG           Transitional Federal Government
TFI           Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP           Transitional Federal Parliament
ToR           Terms of Reference
UNCDF         United National Capital Development Fund
UNDP          United Nations Development Program
UNDSS         United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNHABITAT     United Nations Human Settlements Program
UNICEF        United Nations Children‟s Fund
UNOPS         United Nations Office for Project Services
UNTP          United Nations Transitional Plan
WB            World Bank
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been implementing the District
Based Peace Building and Reconciliation Project (DBPB) and the Community Based
Peace Support Project (CBPS) in South Central Somalia since February 2006 and March
2006, respectively. This report is a review of these two projects.

The objective of the review is to assess the implementation modalities, impact, and
lessons learned from the CBPS and DBPB projects in South Central Somalia (SCS). The
purpose is to use the lessons learned to recommend improvements to the implementa-
tion modalities under the Joint program and enhance the impact of the activities in the
roll out in to the Joint UN Program on Local Governance and Service Delivery (JPLG).
The review is required to follow the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and guidelines. The
two projects will be reviewed for the period from the inception of the two projects in
2006 until mid-2008. This review does not assess the JPLG itself, but will aim at
recommendations on how the two projects and their respective objectives and activities
best fit into the JPLG. Due to insecurity at project locations in SCS, the reviewer had to
undertake 21 telephone interviews with representatives from districts in Bay, Bakool and
Gedo. In addition, consultations were held with project staff, stakeholders and
independent observers on the project on Nairobi as well as Hargeisa (See list of people
consulted in Annex 2).

The sector context analysis of local governance in SCS shows that there is a tremendous
need for stable governance structures at the local level providing stability, security and
basic social services. It also shows that this is most successfully achieved when local
governance is built from bottom-up based on civil actors and existing traditional
structures. It is also necessary to understand decentralization right in the Somali context:
Namely that we are talking about a decentral process of building governance institutions
from bottom-up, and not a devolution or deconcentration of power from a government
center. This underscores the need that the newly formed district councils must be
„owned‟ by the communities in order to be resilient to the changing political turmoil that
characterizes SCS, and are strong enough to withstand an eventual collapse of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and/or other centralized political structures.

The District Based Peace Building Project (DBPB)
The overall impression of the DBPB is that the developed approach proved successful in
achieving representative and legitimate district councils, and peaceful coexistence
between clan communities in the three regions where the project was implemented. The
project has been time consuming, but that is to the benefit of outcome and impact. In the
roll out into the JPLG, it is suggested that the DBPB implementation structure and staff
team within UNOPS remain intact in order not to disrupt its present dynamic. A small 5-
6 person steering group with key stakeholders could usefully be set up to meet monthly
and advice and monitor project progress. A strong participatory approach compensates
for lack of local level ownership. Relevance is high in relation to the need for
reconciliation and need for representative local councils. Delays occurred due to
inefficiency, insecurity and top-down interferences by key stakeholders. The
sustainability of the project is based on the strong sense of ownership by the
communities of the new councils in terms of protecting them against „external‟ efforts to
change or manipulate them.




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The most important impact of the DBPB is the sense of achieved peaceful coexistence
between communities within the districts. Hence, the project has been successful in
converting inputs to outputs despite under-funding, insufficient time, and delay factors.
It is expected that this remain the primary impact of the continuation of the project in
SCS, which is recommended.

The key to success is the bottom-up approach and community ownership of the process.
Success is achieved when enough time is given to reconciliation activities prior to
district conferences, selection of councillors and election of District Commissioners
DC‟s. Top-down interference has proved negative in this aspect and should be avoided
in implementation modalities. The Local Government Department of the TFG (LGD) as
a government institution should not be directly involved in implementation of this
project under the current context, but remain as observer and local advisor to the
UNOPS team that should ensure facilitation/-training.

Too high rates and provisions, particularly „sit-in‟ or DSA‟s raises expectations and
slows down the voluntary commitment to the process. Instead of DSA etc. participants
should only receive support for transport, accomodation and food during meetings.

The DBPB activities rolled into the logical framework (LF) of the JPLG need revision in
order to clarify objectives and reflect time and budget needs, and other changes
necessary for adaptation to the implementation modalities within the new joint program
structure. But, the project itself and the structure of the implementation team under
UNOPS should remain the same in order to avoid discontinuities. Implementation
modalities on the ground must be flexible to the varying regional contexts.

To adapt to the current situation the stakeholder group in the new JPLG Steering
Committee (SC) could be widened to include civil society, district representatives as
well as the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The TFG/Local Government
Department (LGD), and perhaps ARS representatives, should remain in the role of
observers, and endorsers of District Preparatory Committee‟s (DPC) and not be involved
directly in implementation of the project activities. A small steering group with key stake
holders (5-6 per. max.) should be set up, and meet monthly to support the DBPB project
manager (PM) and the project team specifically, and to perform recurrent monitoring of
activities and budget control.

The Community Based Peace Support Project (CBPS)
The main achievement of the CBPS project, so far, is the provision of office structures,
facilities, equipment and training to all districts in Bay and Bakool. Gedo has not been
reached. Further follow up activities has been prepared, including training and a manual
outlining an operational procedure for participatory district planning and implementation
process (DPIP) and the District Basket Fund (DBF). The latter two will form the main
tools for the continuation of project activities as they are rolled out into the JPLG.

The initial project was transformed by early 2007 with a new set of objectives taken
from the UNTP outcome 2. Still, the relationship between the intended outputs and
results is only clear in terms of supporting local governance, but is not clearly
operationalised in terms of peace building. The lack of a clear logical framework (LF) is
compensated for in the working plans for the JPLG for 2008. There is a lack of
participatory involvement in the initial needs identification in support of the new district
and regional councils. Alternative ways of implementation and monitoring need to be
considered, to widen community participation in the process, build more on existing


                                             2
traditional governance practices in the districts, and link more clearly with continued
reconciliation and peace building.

It is too early to assess the impact of the support given by the CBPS. But, it can be
observed that sustainability is limited. The rehabilitated offices are an asset for the
community, but the provided equipment is less sustainable as running and maintenance
costs exceed capability. Training may lead to council resources to the benefit of the
community. There is a risk that the procedure for the District Basket Fund can lead to aid
dependency, if the participatory community involvement is not expanded. At this stage
the expected impact can only be determined according to the overall and specific
objectives of the new JPLG which are: 1) Communities have equitable access to basic
services through local government; and 2) Local governments are accountable and
transparent.

It is necessary to apply realistic timeframes for implementation, and consider alternative
implementation modalities as contingencies given the unpredictable politico-military and
security conditions on the ground.

The lack of demand driven project design can be achieved if the DPIP is widened with
more community involvement, and is comprehensively linked with the intended
integration of the CDD program run by WB and UNICEF. The interactive community
participation in the DPIP should be expanded by involving the communities in at least
step 3 and 4 of the process cycle, and preferably by adopting a more comprehensive
community based participatory approach that links peace building with development
such as the „Nabad iyo Caano‟ approach that was implemented in a community in
Somaliland.

An effort should be put into investigating the traditional governance practices within
each district in terms of defining roles and responsibilities between the district councils
and traditional authorities and particularly in relation to recurrent conflict resolution
(including issues in relation to service delivery).

The training activities could become more relevant and interesting for the district
councilors and staff if they included issues of how to govern and manage the basic
service sectors such as water, health, education, law and order and emergency response.
This can be done in coordination with and technical input from the UN agencies
involved in the relevant sectors.

Basic training in council management should not be dependent on computer usage. The
theoretical training could benefit from more additional „hands on‟ coaching or
supportive supervision in local governance for one or more years. This can be done by
allocating national professional Somalis to each region who then can supervise the
districts of each region.

Careful coordination of the timing of training activities with the different schedules of
the different districts planning cycle is necessary to avoid delays.

In case of prolonged inaccessibility to the SCS, due to the current security situation,
alternative implementation modalities need to be sought. In the worst case scenario
suspension of the program may be necessary.




                                            3
One option could be to outsource activities fully to low profile private consultancy
groups/consortiums consisting of Somali and non-Somali based companies that shows a
proven ability to work under the precarious security situation in Somalia. This could be
done through an expression of interest for pre-assessment of potential implementation
partners, in terms the extent the international partners can ensure the capacity of the local
partners.

Because of the current insecurity it may be that the full DPIP planning process cycle
cannot be implemented in the short term. Instead of providing a standard equipment
starter package, the given support could ideally be negotiated with the new
councils/communities within a limited financial framework immediately after the new
councils are established. The eventual purchase of equipment should be carried by the
district councils as a first practical exercise in accountable procurement, under UNDP
supervision (or if outsourced by the given company/NGO).

The provided equipment such as computers, printers and generators are not necessarily
what the new district councils need most, and exceeded their maintenance and running
capabilities. Instead councils use private internet cafes etc. Stationery is typically
something that the councils can and should purchase themselves. Office furniture for
meeting purposes is also less important, as Somalis mostly prefer to sit on mats on the
floor/ground when they meet and work. Office desks and chairs are however necessary.
Transport support is essential to enable immediate service delivery. Solar panels for
electricity could be useful as an alternative to fuel driven generators. The item list for the
starter package could usefully be identified with the individual councils as their specific
needs may vary, and as long as the costs remain within a set economic framework.

While the operational procedures of the DPIP do contain procedures for local
procurement management by the district councils, there us a need for a very simple local
procurement system, until the DPIP planning process is fully implemented and sufficient
training in the procedures have been provided.

There is a need to improve the financial control tools of UNDP for more efficient and
transparent budget control and management. This is particularly relevant within the
complex structure of the JPLG to assist the project manager‟s ability to have a clear
overview of recurrent expenditure versus their budgets for the specific activities, and set
in relation to the activities of the logical framework.

Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation practices are in the process of being tightened up for the
JPLG. The observation from this review in this regard is that there is a need for
baseline/benchmarks, and clear budget control tools. Financial reporting, budget control
and budgets should follow same logic and outline to „make sense‟ and provide an easier
overview. The DBPB outputs such as reduced tension, greater understanding, and
stronger conflict resolution mechanisms within and between the communities are
subjective and need qualitative means to be measured. If access to SCS cannot be
achieved, then it may be necessary to explore outsourcing monitoring and evaluation
activities to private joint international/national consultancy groups or NGOs if not to
suspend activities until ceasefire and an actual post-conflict situation in the SCS is
achieved.




                                              4
1     INTRODUCTION

UNDP has been implementing the District Based Peace Building and Reconciliation
Project (DBPB) and the Community Based Peace Support Project (CBPS) in South
Central Somalia since February 2006 and March 2006, respectively. This report is a
review of these two projects.

The objective of the review is to assess the implementation modalities, impact, and
lessons learned from the CBPS and DBPB projects in South Central Somalia. The
purpose is to use the lessons learned to recommend improvements to the implementa-
tion modalities under the Joint program and enhance the impact of the activities in the
roll out in to the Joint UN Program on Local Governance and Service Delivery (JPLG).

This report is produced by Joakim Gundel (KATUNI Consult). The perspective and
views presented in this report represent those of Joakim Gundel and does not necessarily
reflect the opinion of UNDP or other involved stakeholders.



1.1   BACKGROUND

The District Based Peace Building and Reconciliation Project (DBPB) and the
Community Based Peace Support Project (CBPS) were designed in 2005/6 as two
projects that should contribute to the transitional process that was embarked upon with
ending of the Embagathi peace process in Kenya 2004. The objectives were on one hand
to bring the peace and reconciliation process to the districts in South Central Somalia
(SCS), and to contribute to the reconstruction of local governmental institutions and
community development. The implementation of the two projects have been ongoing
since 2006, and faced major challenges and undergone important transformations on the
way. The projects have not been reviewed since their inception. This, together with the
transition of the UN which entails that the UN agencies now have to work across
agencies on focus outcomes, such as the Joint UN program on Local Governance and
Service Delivery (JPLG) is the background for UNDP‟s request of this review.

The DBPB supports the convening of dialogue and reconciliation processes at the
district level in SCS. The dialogue process is preceded by consultations and training
workshops with members of Parliament, traditional leaders, religious leaders, women
group, civil society leaders and community-based facilitators. The district meetings
include between 80-100 local representatives who meet for an average of approximately
30 days to select a district council and elect the DC & 2 Deputies. Following the
establishment of all the District Councils in each Region, 4 representatives of each
district will attend at the Regional Conference to select a regional council and elect the
Governor and 2 Deputies. The overall objective of the DBPB is a) to establish
consultative dialogues and peace building mechanisms as a basis for developing local
development and investment plans; b) to initiate two-way communication between
Parliamentarians and their constituencies; and c) to begin the process of establishing
sustainable local government structures.

Following the establishment of the district councils, the CBPS project is designed to
support the establishment of local government structures by renovation of council


                                            5
buildings and provision of equipment. The project also provides capacity support
through training programs for district councilors and administrative staff. Following
these interventions, the aim is to provide resources to the established district councils in
order for them to carry out development and investment planning and provide service
delivery to local people. Furthermore, capacity support will be given to help establish
and revise the legal framework and guidelines for planning and implementation at the
local level.

The DBPB and CBPS will now be integrated into the new Joint Program on Local
Governance and Service Delivery (JPLG), which is a collaborative effort between
UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNCDF, ILO and UNICEF to support the efforts of
decentralization and service delivery by the Transitional Federal Government, the
Somaliland Government and the Puntland Government. The objectives of the Local
Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery Support Projects are to build peace and
improve service delivery for all Somali citizens through development of local
governance, and empowerment of local communities to participate in representative and
legitimate local governance characterized by transparency, accountability and
participation by all citizens.


1.2     TERMS OF REFERENCE

The scope of the review assignment as described in the ToR are:

      (i)     Review the potential impact of the projects in addressing the aims laid out in
              the policy framework for Somalia, in particular the Reconstruction and
              Development Plan for Somalia (RDP), and the United Nations Transition
              Plan (UNTP), and also the extent to which the activities make sense in the
              context of decentralization approaches in other countries in conflict/post-
              conflict.

      (ii)    Review the objectives, implementation modalities, stakeholder collaboration,
              results, impact, and monitoring and evaluation practices of the DBPB and
              CBPS projects.

      (iii)   Assess the extent to which the provision of equipment, material and other
              support as well as rates (salary stipends, sitting allowances, etc.) used in the
              projects follow agreed to UN guidelines, and the extent to which these
              provisions/rates benefit implementation within a wider context (with regards
              to sustainability of the project and exit options for donors, and roll-out
              opportunities), and the extent to which these provisions/rates may hamper or
              delay implementation or in other ways discourage the use of own resources in
              any part of project implementation.

      (iv)    Review the lessons learned and best practice of the various steps of the
              implementation focusing in particular on the design phase (including
              consultation with a wide range of stakeholders); clarity in project objective
              among stakeholders; implementation modalities and sensitivity to potential
              conflicts that might arise as a result of the project implementation; reporting;
              efficiency and effectiveness (within the current challenging environment and
              with a view to the peace dividend of the project); and monitoring and
              evaluation.



                                               6
      (v)   Recommend necessary revisions to the activities in the context of the
            objective of the Joint Program, and in particular with regards to planning,
            collaboration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The review is required to follow the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and guidelines. This
is the first review of the DBPB and CBPS since inception in 2006 until September 2008,
and covers the entire period since inception. . This review does not assess the JPLG
itself. Rather it looks at how the JPLG aims at incorporating lessons learned from DBPB
and CBPS



1.3     METHODOLOGY

The review was intially to be based on qualitative field based observations of the
implementation of the projects, including individual and focus group interviews on
locations in South Central Somalia. However, the planned field work was not possible as
UNDP and UNDSS could not grant travel clearance due to severe deterioration of
security at the planned locations in Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions. Instead it was agreed
to conduct telephone interviews with councilors, DCs, elders, women etc. This was done
from Hargeisa as well as Nairobi. With the help of a Somali interpretor, 21 interviews
with representatives from districts in Bay, Bakool and Gedo was carried out. In addition,
consultations were held with project staff, stakeholders and independent observers on the
project on Nairobi as well as Hargeisa (See list of people consulted in Annex 2).

The information collected through the interviews and consultation was used to inform
the sets of review criteria designated by the ToR and the DAC general evaluation
criteria. The DAC general evaluation criteria included „relevance‟, „efficiency‟,
„effectiveness‟, „impact‟ and „sustainability. These criteria were adapted to the ToR of
the review.

The DBPB and CBPS projects in South Central Somalia are carried out under very
difficult political and security related circumstances. The review applied sensitivity to
these conditions. The quality of this review is naturally compromised by the final
decision of not sending the reviewer to the field in Somalia to assess the outcomes and
make direct observations. This decision was based on UNDP‟s assessment that the
benefit of direct interaction with stakeholders could not compensate for the significant
security risk of sending the consultant to the field at this particular time. For this reason
the review is largely a desk review.



2     SECTOR CONTEXT

The situation for Somalis in South Central Somalia (SCS) have since 1990 been
characterized by fluctuating civil wars, state collapse and statelessness, intermittent
periods of local stability and peace, external intervention replaced by abandonment,
warlordism, 14 failed externally driven attempts at creating peace through power-sharing
arrangements, and survival mechanisms based upon a resilient business sector, and
community driven security initiatives including use of Sharia courts and traditional
governance. Over the years of statelessness a myriad of varying local forms of
governance emerged ranging from warlord based fiefdoms, Islamic courts, clan based


                                             7
regional administrations, and local administrations based on councils of traditional elders
in collaboration with other actors from civil society, business community and local clan
based military commanders.

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has since its inauguration in 2004 not been
able to change this plethora of varying local governance set ups. It has also failed in
terms of establishing new central Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). It failed in
achieving inclusive support on the ground in Somalia which resulted in the relocation of
the seat of the TFG three times over three years. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union
managed to spread its system of Islamic Courts rule throughout SCS, with the exception
of Baidoa and Bay region. During this period, the DBPB managed to carry through its
district based peace building process in Bay region and establish new district councils
based on the choice of the communities. While the ICU was militarily rolled back by the
Ethiopian army, which intervened on behalf of the TFG, the movement was all but
defeated. The Islamic courts administrations disappeared, but resistance against the
TFG/Ethiopian forces increased during 2007. With the collapse of the ICU, the districts
either returned to their previous clan based arrangements, or came under the authority of
TFG appointed DC‟s and Governors. The exception was Bay region where the commu-
nity based councils remained in power, and Bakool and Gedo regions which embarked
on the same process facilitated by the DBPB. By mid-2008, Bakool and Gedo had fully
joined Bay region and the process had begun in Middle Shabelle region. However, the
mosaic of varying types of local administrations remains as Benadir and Lower Shabelle
today are under appointed TFG authorities. The two Juba regions have both been under
clan based administrations until Kismayo lately has been regained by ICU. ARS/ICU are
now in control of Middle Shabelle and most of Hiran regions. Galgadud is under com-
bined clan based and ICU/ARS administrations, while the Habr Gedir/Saleeban clan has
established a clear clan based administration with a Guurti (council of elders) functio-
ning as its „parliament‟.

Within this rather confusing and changing array of power structures in SCS, there is one
message that seems to stand out quite clearly: The people of SCS have a clear and
objective need of security and political stability, they need a system of governance that
they can trust, feel is theirs, and which can provide them with law and order and basic
services. It is this basic need that is addressed by the Somali Reconstruction and
Development Plan (RDP), which is based on the analysis provided by the UN/WB
Somali Joint Needs Assessment. Hence, the RDP is designed to “support the Somali
people in their ongoing efforts to deepen peace (achieve reconciliation, peace and
security in south-central Somalia …” (RDP 2008: x). Drawing on the local Somali
experiences the RDP links this objective to the need to support locally driven efforts at
achieving peace and stable governance institutions: “…experience shows that peace and
reconciliation can be achieved through locally driven governance institutions drawing on
traditional power structures, and the involvement of civil society” (RDP 2008: 5).
Furthermore, the RDP underlines that “any reconstruction and development effort needs
to look for solutions that are adaptable within the Somali context. During the years of
state collapse, civil society and local traditional community structures have emerged as
important social and political forces, playing roles in both peace and governance and
service delivery” (RDP 2008: 6).

The above observations by the RDP emphasize a very important lesson from the past
Somali experiences which shows that the local traditional structures not only can play a
vital role in conflict resolution and consensus building, but they can also form the very
basis for a de-central (not decentralized) bottom-up process of forming governance


                                            8
structures.1 The option for carrying out such a process is legally provided for in the
Federal Charter Article 11 that provides for a decentralized system of administration
based on federalism.

The UNTP outlines the joint strategy for the UN in Somalia for 2008 and 2009 in terms
of how the UN agencies will contribute to the RDP objectives within this period. The
UNTP overall aim for the period is to support Somalis in building durable peace and
beginning reconstruction and development in their country (UN 2007). Within this
overall aim there are five overall outcomes. The relevant „outcome‟ for the two projects
reviewed in this report is Outcome 2 that states: „Local Governance contributes to peace
and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations‟.

In order to focus and concentrate the activities of the UN agencies towards each
„outcome‟ the UNTP has committed the UN agencies involved within each outcome to
place these activities under new „joint programmes‟. Hence, within local governance, the
UN has set up a Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service
Delivery (JPLG). A programme document for the JPLG has been formulated which
basically adopts the above Outcome 2 as its main objective. A new logical framework
(LF) for the JPLG has been developed replacing the unusual usage of the term „outcome‟
with the more common term „objective‟ (UNJPLG 2008b). In the same wording
Outcome 2 is now the overall objective for the JPLG two year programme. However, the
„sub-outcomes‟ have been modified and reduced into two specific objectives:

        Specific objective 1: Communities have equitable access to basic services
         through local government
        Specific objective 2: Local governments are accountable and transparent

These two specific objectives are then broken down into respectively 6 and 3 expected
results. The implication for the two reviewed projects is that the DBPB project will fall
under result 1.2 (Up to 24 districts have legitimate councils established and operational).
The current CBPS project activities under implementation in South Central Somalia
(SCS) will mainly fall under the following: Result 1.3 (up to 24 district councils‟
capacity to govern and manage service delivery enhanced); result 1.4 (targeted district
councils have awareness about options of revenue generation); and result 1.5 (all eligible
district councils have at least 1 priority service delivery project funded annually); result
2.2 (annual district plans and budgets in up to 24 councils reflect community priorities).
While result 1.2 primarily is relevant for SCS, the other expected results include plans
for Somaliland and Puntland as well.

Concerning the basic assumptions about the political and security conditions at the
national level that may enable or limit the implementation of the UNTP, which is based
on five key indicators of how the political situation can develop in SCS (the internal
relations in Somaliland and Puntland are not included), it is interesting to observe that
none of the questions posed can (today one year later) be answered positively. In other
words, the situation in SCS can today best described by the worst case scenario with the
implication that the UN cannot scale up reconstruction and development work. Instead
of UN beginning relocation to Mogadishu, UN national staff has been relocated to

1
  There is a problem with the application of the concept of decentralization in the Somali context, because
„to decentralize‟ requires the existence of a center, a centralized entity, from which decentralization can
happen. In SCS this is not the case, because although the TFG exist it is only a central power in name not
in terms institutionalisation. There is not really any central power to decentralize from.


                                                     9
Hargeisa and elsewhere. In addition, there is an increasing humanitarian emergency that
requires priority over other activities. In relation to the reviewed projects and the JPLG,
the implication is that as long as the current situation remains the ability of the UN to
implement directly is severely limited and activities either have to be suspended or be
out-sourced to third parties from the private or NGO sector who have the capability of
accessing the for the UN inaccessible locations of intervention. The limitation in access
will mainly affect the possibility for the UN implement both the DBPB project as well as
follow up activities as initially envisaged in CBPS and later further conceptualized in the
JPLG.

This situation is not likely to improve within the immediate short term (next three
months), unless a major breakthrough should happen in terms of inclusion of the ICU/Al
Shabaab groups that so far has rejected the Djibouti-agreement between the TFG and
ARS, and that a clear withdrawal plan for the Ethiopian armed forces has begun
implementation. An outlook for 2009 cannot be optimistic, although the best case
scenario would involve Ethiopian exit, implementation of the Djibouti agreement
modalities thought the High Level and Joint Security Committees, isolation of peace-
spoilers on both sides, and increased local stability district by district, and region by
region. This scenario however will still involve continuation of „terror‟ activities by
isolated extremists although limited by the joint security operations and will of the
communities.

The conclusion on the above observations concerning the sector context of local
governance linked with peace building in Somalia is that in SCS there is a need for
stable governance structures at the local level that provide stability, security and basic
social services. It also shows that the most legitimate and successful experiences of
achieving that in the entire Somali region, is when such governance structures are built
from bottom-up based on civil society, religious and business community support for the
efforts of existing traditional structures and governance practices. The above also show
that it is necessary to understand decentralization right in the Somali context: Namely
that we are not talking about a decentralization process of building governance as
devolution or deconcentration of power from a governmental center, but about building
district based local government from the bottom-up.

Finally, the newly formed district councils must be „owned; by the communities in order
to be resilient to the changing political turmoil that characterizes south central Somalia,
and are strong enough to withstand an eventual collapse of the TFG and/or other
centralized political structures. If the district councils can stand by themselves, they can
potentially still be incorporated into a new state structure once that is being sufficiently
institutionalized and even form its basic pillars.




                                            10
3     ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DBPB

The District Based Peace Building Project (DBPB) was conceived in 2005 as a project
that was designed to carry the results of the peace agreement and establishment of a
Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for
Somalia to the local levels by facilitating local reconciliation and formation of new
district councils from a bottom-up perspective. At the same time, the primary assumption
was that the transitional arrangement was a valid and legal basis for the ensuing effort at
rebuilding the State in Somalia. This meant that the TFC, the Parliament (TFP) and the
TFG would be the logical legal counterparts and primary stakeholders of the project. The
initial objective of the project was very ambitious and envisaged a completion of the
process throughout South-Central Somalia within 60 days to 9 months time frame. Three
years later the project is still ongoing and has only been completed 3 out of 11 regions.

The project document (PRODOC) was signed in November 2005. However, there was a
rather long inception period before it finally commenced in April 2006. In the meantime
the Islamic Courts Union battle with the alliance of warlords in Mogadishu had begun in
February 2006 and their power spread rapidly throughout South Central Somalia (SCS)
during 2006. This complicated the implementation of the program as the main stake-
holder, the TFG, ended up in confrontation with ICU because the two parties didn‟t
succeed in entering a constructive dialogue. This confrontation continued with the
intervention of the Ethiopian army on the side of TFG in December 2006, routing the
ICU. But, the opposition was not defeated and armed resistance continued throughout
2007 and is still ongoing as of today. The most recent development with the signing of
the Djibouti Peace Agreement between the TFG and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of
Somalia (ARS) which the ICU is part of forms an encouraging new political framework
for the continuation of the project, although extreme elements within both sides
including the most radical element of the ICU, known as the Al-Shabaab remains a
challenge and cause of insecurity on the ground.

This context formed a complicated political environment within which the DBPB project
management had to navigate, and caused serious delays. Despite this context and other
major hindrances, the project has been an encouraging success in the districts and
regions where it was implemented. The following is a review of the project, its main
achievements, lessons learnt and recommendations for its continuation. The overall
assessment can be viewed in the matrix in Table 1.


3.1   PROJECT DESIGN AND OWNERSHIP

The design of the project document (PRODOC) is based on a thorough problem analysis
of the need for local reconciliation and establishment of local administrations from a
bottom-up perspective. Hence, it is a well prepared project document although it does
not include a good presentation of the objectives and outputs, while the activities seem
clear (objectives described in different ways in three different places in the PRODOC).
The objectives were: (1) establish consultative dialogues and action mechanisms for
developing local peace-building and development plans; (2) initiate two-way
communication between Parliamentarians and their constituents on the TFI‟s, national
governance processes and local development priorities; and (3) begin the process of
establishing sustainable local government structures. There was a relatively clear


                                            11
relationship between budget, input, activities, output and objectives. The described
project process cycle is clear. The monitoring tools are there, but unclear in terms of
how they can be operationalised. The initial time allocated (9 months) seemed over
ambitious, as well as the budgeted amount, both being inadequate for reconciliation
processes that are inherently time demanding. The implementation modalities, in terms
of steering structure and stakeholder collaboration seemed very complicated and „top-
heavy‟. Hence, there is an inherent contradiction with the envisaged bottom-up approach
that is to be combined with a top-down approach. This has been reflected by endemic
problems between the program management and the key stakeholder, the TFG, through-
out the project period. The design lacks a risk assessment. However, there is now a
general risk assessment included in the new JPLG.

The ownership of the PRODOC is high at the top level of the stakeholders as the project
is prepared with the participation of the TFG and in line with donor interests. However,
it appears supply driven at the bottom level as they have not been involved in the project
development. This is compensated by the strong participatory approach in implementa-
tion, and the dire need for peace, law and order which calls for a high level of com-
munity acceptance of the project. With the Djibouti agreement it is vital that an inclusive
framework and ownership of the project can be established in order to continue the
project regardless of who is in military control of the given districts.


3.2   RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

The relevance of the project is very high in relation to the desperate need of the Somali
people of peace, reconciliation and to establish functioning local administrations that
truly represents the communities. Hence, the activities are still consistent with the overall
objective and intended impact. It appears very appropriate as activities addresses local
needs and increases the sense of ownership of the new councils. This is also in line with
the RDP, UNTP and Federal Charter. Under the current situation, with a very weak
central government, the establishment of functioning district councils may indeed appear
as the most viable option for building governance and ensuring social service provision
to the Somali people in SCS.


3.3   COST-EFFFICIENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION

Outputs have not been achieved in time according to the logical framework (LF) of 9
months, although within the budget framework, and at a relatively high quality.
However, the initial time frame was too limited set in relation to the ambitious outcome.
If the objective is to achieve sustainable reconciliation and peace building then the
natural requirement is a flexible timeframe. Delays occurred due to inefficiency,
instability and top-down interferences in the process on the part of the TFG stakeholder.
Insecurity on the ground caused extensive delays and additional costs as staff were on
the pay roll but for longer periods of time unable to deliver. Lack of flexibility in the use
of the budget and budget regulations was a constraint and caused delays and operational
difficulties. Activities in themselves were cost efficient, although DSA and other
allowances to participants should be reduced/avoided. The project management is
efficient with a minimal number of management staff at UNOPS in Naiorbi and Baidoa.
The number of national staff has increased to adress the need for improved monitoring
abilities, and later the changes of the implementation modality when the project entered
into Gedo region. National staff expansion makes sense, if more districts are to be
implemented simultaneously. UN Guidelines are generally followed.


                                             12
3.4   IMPACT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS

The main achievement is the selection of new local district councilors, election of
District Commissioners (DC) and Governors in all of Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions,
and in three districts of Middle Shabelle. There is a remarkable sense of ownership of the
new councils by the communities showing that the process has largely achieved peaceful
coexistence between communities within the districts and within the regions. However,
concerns remain in terms of lack of achieved reconciliation, particularly in Gedo region
where outcomes are described as power-sharing arrangements rather than the intended
dialogue and reconciliation mechanisms. See Annex 3 for a summary of interviews of 21
DCs, councilors and elders. The difference is that in power-sharing arrangements, the
contending groups lay their differences aside temporarily in order to establish a joint
administration to achieve peace. Reconciliation takes the issue of the grievances between
the contending groups a few steps further, by burying them for good through whatever is
needed to do that (justice, forgiveness, symbolic actions etc). The relative successful
achievement of the DBPB in Bay region should be seen in the light of the preceding
reconciliation between the clan-communities that ended immediately prior to the
implementation of the project there. In Bakool the process took longer as more time and
efforts was needed to achieve the same reconciliation. In Gedo region there was also a
need for more time for reconciliation, but the process seemed to be rushed through at the
end. It is important to note that the reconciliation processes needed does not end with the
establishment of the new councils, but must continue in some form.

The real difference for the communities is that for the first time in their historical
experience they now have a local administration and an indirectly elected District
Commissioner (DC) that they feel is theirs. The remaining challenges are related to the
vulnerabilities of the councils to the national level conflict that continuously threatens
peace and stability in the districts and the related attempts at taking them hostage to the
national level conflict, and their ability to embark on provision of basic social services
for and with the communities. The latter is the concern that the CBPS project is intended
to address.

Despite the continued confrontations between the Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) and
the TFG/Ethiopian forces and the new district councils related inability to protect the
communities within their districts, the new councils still appear to form a cornerstone
and a precondition for achieving the aims of building new local governance structures in
Somalia as laid out in the Reconstruction and Development Plan for Somalia (RDP), and
the United Nations Transition Plan (UNTP). However, it is still too early to assess the
wider impact of the achievements. Furthermore, it is problematical to review the extent
that activities achieved their objectives/purposes on the basis of the project outputs, as
the only clear baseline to measure the qualitative output is lack of representative local
councils and peace. Outputs such as reduced tension, greater understanding, and stronger
conflict resolution mechanisms within and between the communities are very subjective,
and need operationalization and some kind of baseline to be measured. However, new
councils have been established, and a greater sense of coexistence and power sharing
between communities has been achieved. But, they are vulnerable and can be set in
reverse by the deteriorating national level armed conflict.

Despite under funding and insufficient time that was initially allocated, delays caused by
factors external to the project itself, and factors related to the structure of the project
such as top-down interference and discontinuity among the TFG counterpart, and
inflexibility in budgetary support, the project has been successful in converting the


                                            13
inputs to outputs in the 3 regions where the project has been completed. But, it is only
overall objective 3 (begin the process of establishing sustainable local government
structures) that can be said to be clearly addressed.

The initial top-heavy steering committee and the operational group was a too complex
and over supervised mechanism to guide the project and ensure coordination. At the end
this was solved pragmatically as the operational group simply ceased to exist and the SC
took over some of its tasks. Frequent changes in formal TFG ministry counterparts
caused delays, which was compensated by maintaining personal counterpart providing
continuity. Hence, on the daily basis the project navigated through the instabilities by
having a strong communication and interaction between the program manager (PM) and
the responsible TFG deputy minister who remained the same individual throughout the
project time and thereby constituted the much needed continuity.

The local NGO, CRD, sub-contracted to implement in Bay and Bakool regions was
outstanding in developing the bottom-up approach and leading towards achieving the
objectives. But, CRD also undertook too many roles as it was facilitating, training,
providing logistical support as well as undertaking political roles in conflict resolution
and endorsement of committees. This situation was not only due to CRD itself as these
roles were given to them, although the sub-contracting of the NGO was not according to
the initial implementation modality of the initial project document. This caused friction
with the TFG as the main stakeholder, and in a few cases complications that delayed the
project. Problem was eventually solved by splitting the tasks into a) logistic support and
b) facilitation/training. For these reasons, CRD was not re-engaged after Bay and
Bakool. Hence, for the implementation in Gedo Region logistics was assigned a private
company (Jubbaland) while the newly formed TFG institution under the Ministry of
Interior, the Local Government Department (LGD) would take care of the facilitation
and training. However, LGD also caused delays due to inefficient management of funds,
and time taken to train trainers and develop competencies. It has not been possible to
make a clear review of the performance of the private company sub-contracted for
logistics in Gedo region, but critics find that a private company too may not be neutral
and still can try to manipulate the process for its own profit and political interests. But, it
seems that the new structure was not as thorough at carrying through local reconciliation
in Gedo as the CRD was in Bay and Bakool, and there may therefore be further needs to
carry through reconciliation in Gedo region.

After the ARS/ICU took control of Middle Shabelle, the project will be moving towards
another implementation structure where the LGD is not directly involved as they would
not be accepted by the ARS/ICU. With the new political reality following the Djibouti
agreement it would make sense that a new joint implementation arrangement should be
set up that can be politically acceptable by the parties the agreement, preferably within
the High Level, or Joint Security Committees. A lesson learnt is that each region may
need a specific adapted implementation modality and approach to be effective.


3.5   SUSTAINABILITY AND BENEFITS

The sustainability of the project is based on the strong sense of ownership of the new
councils by the communities. They demonstrate a strong willingness to protect their
councils against „external‟ efforts to change or manipulate them. But, for the long term
survival of the administrations they need to develop revenue capability to serve the
community. With will, the project could continue on the basis of the local Somalis own



                                              14
resources and the considerable number of facilitators trained in the process. But, moral
support in terms of starting aid and continuous attention in terms of aiding the council to
provide humanitarian and public services is important. Unfortunately there has been a
lack of coordination, overlap and linkages with the follow up project, the CBPS (see the
review of CBPS below).

Obviously, the most important criteria in terms of quality of the new councilors is the
degree that they represent the entire community legitimately, including women and
minorities. This means that there will be councilors who may lack technical
competencies, and many may indeed be illiterate. However, in a democracy illiteracy in
itself cannot and must not disqualify a candidate‟s eligibility. The eventual lack of
technical competencies and skills is one of the elements that are to be addressed by the
provision of training by the follow up project, CBPS.

Of importance for the sustainability of the new councils is how they will relate to and
interact with the existing local traditional structures. Traditional elders play a decisive
role in the process leading to the selection of councilors and will most likely continue to
perform their traditional authority after the formation of councils. The traditional
structures will most likely continue to perform the role of continuity and representation
of the community, and will particularly continue being key actors in the local conflict
resolution mechanisms. Hence, the new councils will not, and should not be seen as
complete replacements of the traditional governance systems. On the contrary their
sustainability and strengths will rely on their ability to interact constructively and make
use of the resources within the local traditional governance practices.

Too high rates and provisions, particularly „sit-in‟ or DSA‟s raises expectations and
slows down the voluntary commitment to the process. Instead of DSA etc. participants
should only receive support for transport, accommodation and food during meetings. In
Somalia, there has developed a practice of paying DSA and similar to participants which
is difficult to reverse. However, the project has worked fine on the given rates and has
not in itself been the cause of delays.


3.6   LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The project management has been skillful in navigating successfully through difficult
and changing conditions, and adapted ad hoc along the way, as a „muddling through‟
approach. However, the project should have been reviewed after the first year, in terms
of time and budget needs, implementation modalities and also because the initial
assumptions have been invalidated by the new political situation. Still, the overall
objective remains valid, although could be formulated more clearly.

The lack of a clear baseline for monitoring outcomes was a disabling factor for
monitoring of the project. Hence, ongoing monitoring and evaluation practices could be
tightened up in terms of clearer budget control tools and benchmarks.

The sub-contracting of a local NGO to implement all aspects of the project was not in
line with the PRODOC, but turned out to be a good idea in terms of developing the
approach. Establishment and use of LGD was also not in line with the PRODOC, as
capacity building of TFG institutions is not an objective of this project.




                                            15
TFG as the main stakeholder is a necessary but problematic factor as the TFG did not
provide a stable partnership and collaboration in the Steering Committee (SC) and on the
ground. To adapt to new situations the stakeholder group in the SC could be widened to
include other Somali stakeholders such civil society representatives as well as
representatives of the districts, as well as the ARS.

The last Steering Committee meeting for DBPB was held in April 2008. As DBPB is
being rolled into the JPLG, it will come under the new joint JPLG Steering Committee.
Based on past experience and lessons learned it is recommended that a small steering
group is formed with key stake holders (5-6 per. max.), which meets monthly to support
the project manager, and perform recurrent monitoring of activities and budget control.
To adapt to the current situation the stakeholder group in the new JPLG Steering
Committee (SC) could be widened to include civil society, district representatives as
well as the ARS.

The DBPB activities rolled into the JPLG LF need revision in order to clarify objectives
and reflect time and budget needs, and other changes necessary for adaptation to the
implementation modalities within the new joint program structure. But, the project itself
and the structure of the implementation team under UNOPS should remain the same in
order to avoid discontinuities. Implementation modalities on the ground must be flexible
to the varying regional contexts.

The TFG/Local Government Department (LGD), and perhaps ARS representatives,
should remain in the role of observers, and endorsers of District Preparatory
Committee‟s (DPC) and not be involved directly in implementation of the project
activities.

Benchmarks and qualitative indicators for monitoring of the DBPB should be developed
together with easy reviewable financial reporting tools that reflect activity based
expenditure. Monitoring tools for periods where access is limited due to insecurity needs
to be developed as well if implementation continues on the basis of local staff. This
could be done through outsourcing to private consultants or NGOs.

Following the Djibouti Peace Talks in June 2008, both TFG and the ARS requested that
the DBPB speed up the process in order to complete the establishment of legitimate
councils in all of South Central Somalia by the end of 2008. However, to do that may
seriously rush the process and compromise the value of the outcomes as enough time for
sufficient local reconciliation may not be allocated. The new political situation does
however require an even more flexible approach to implementation than what has
already been applied.

The best way for the DBPB project to adapt to the various possible post-Djibouti
scenarios is to release the project from dependency on the national political stakeholders
including the TFG and ARS in order for the process to proceed without dependency on
the eventual outcomes at the national level. This is crucial for the Somali communities in
SCS and for the strategic objectives of the RDP, because having legitimate local
authorities with whom external aid agencies can engage will be imperative for continued
aid to the Somali people if the present national level processes fail.

The UNOPS/DBPB program management team has the capacity to make the specific
recommendations for the necessary adapted implementation modalities for each region
based on negotiations with regional and relevant national stakeholders, as the project


                                           16
progresses. In the present structure the TFG is part of the implementation process
through the LGD, which is necessitated by the formal and legitimate role of the TFG as
main national stakeholder and partner in the process. However, the present situation
following the Djibouti process where the TFG and ARS are moving towards joint
arrangements at creating a ceasefire and improve security, enables the project to move
into regions where the TFG is not in control and the LGD cannot be directly involved.

The DBPB recently moved towards implementation in Middle Shabelle regardless that
the ICU/ARS are in control and the TFG not. This shows the opportunities of maintain-
ing a flexible approach to project implementation. TFG acceptance of such flexibility is
of course a challenge. One way to approach this is to avoid TFG or other central political
actors in playing a direct role in the political endorsements of the DPC‟s and the
eventual councils etc. Instead, a committee could be formed at the beginning of the
process consisting of the locally most important elders of the clan-communities. The aim
should be to form new councils that are legitimate from the bottom-up perspective, and
as such can function independently if necessary.

The project does have potential to work in more than one region at a time, however the
up-scaling have to be done gradual in order not to compromise quality, and will require
recruitment and training of more staff on the ground. It is important that any staff
increase does not compromise the good dynamics of the existing core staff group.




                                           17
Table 1: District Based Peace Building Project, overview of observations, lessons learnt and recommendations
Assessment Criteria   Observations                                                                      Conclusions and Lessons Learnt                    Recommendations
Project Design        Well prepared project document based on a thorough problem analysis, but          Project document should have been reviewed        The DBPB activities rolled into the
                      objectives and outputs not clear, while activities and their relation to budget   and revised after first year. Objective still     JPLG LF need revision in order to
                      are clear. Initial allocation of time and budget is insufficient. Lack risk       valid, but can be clarified, and linked with      clarify objectives and reflect time and
                      assessment. Monitoring tools are not operationalised clearly. Complicated         realistic time and budget frameworks.             budget needs. But, the project itself and
                      implementation modalities in terms of „top heavy steering structure.                                                                the structure of the implementation team
Ownership             High at the top level, but otherwise supply driven as the bottom level has        Unclear division of roles in stakeholder          under UNOPS should remain the same
                      not been involved. Strong participatory approach compensates for lack of          structure and an unstable TFG caused bad          in order to avoid discontinuities.
                      local level ownership.                                                            collaboration and discontinuities. Problem not
Relevance and         High in relation to the need for reconciliation and need for representative       solved, but addressed via „muddling through‟ Implementation modalities on the
Appropriateness       local councils. Activities still consistent with overall objective, and in line   approach and ad hoc change of implementa- ground must be flexible to the varying
                      with RDP, UNTP and Federal Charter. Very appropriate as activities adress         tion modalities.                               regional contexts.
                      local needs and increase sense of ownership of the new councils.
Cost-efficiency in    Outputs not achieved within initial time or budget framework, but at high         Key to success is the bottom-up approach and      The stakeholder group in the SC should
Implementation        quality. Note that peace interventions require flexible timeframes. Delays        community ownership of the process. Success       include civil society, district representa-
                      occurred due to inefficiency, instability and top-down interferences by key       is achieved when enough time is given to          tives as well as the TFG and ARS.
                      stakeholder. Insecurity, expat duty station being in Nairobi, and UN finan-       reconciliation activities prior to district       TFG/LGD, and ARS, should remain in
                      cial inflexibility caused delays, operational difficulties and increased costs.   conferences, selection of councillors and         the role of observers, and endorsers of
Impact and cost-      Main impact is the sense of achieved peaceful coexistence between commu-          election of DC‟s.                                 DPCs.
effectiveness         nities within districts. Succesful in converting inputs to outputs despite
                      underfunding, insufficient time, and other delay factors. CRD developed the       Top-down interference has proved negative in      A small steering group with key stake
                      bottom-up approach, but undertook too many roles. Problem solved by               this aspect and should be avoided in imple-       holders (5-6 per. max.) should meet
                      splitting tasks into logistics and facilitation/training. Logistics was then      mentation modalities. LGD as government           monthly to support the PM, and perform
                      assigned a private company while the newly formed LGD (a TFG                      institution should not implement, but remain      monitoring of activities and budget.
                      institution) would take care of the faciliation and training.                     as observer and local advisor to the UNOPS
                                                                                                        team that should ensure facilitation/-training.   Specific benchmarks for monitoring
Benefits and          The sustainability is based on the strong sense of ownership by communi-                                                            activities should be developed together
Sustainability        ties of the new councils. Concern of outcomes described as power-sharing          Too high rates and provisions, particularly       with improved financial reporting tools.
                      arrangements rather than as result of reconciliation. In Somalia, there has       „sit-in‟ or DSA‟s raises expectations and
                      developed a practice of paying DSA etc to participants which is difficult to      slows down the voluntary commitment to the        Specific risk assessment for DBPB
                      reverse. However, the project has worked fine on the given rates and has          process. Instead of DSA etc. participants         based on possible post-Djibouti
                      not been a cause of delays.                                                       should only receive support for transport,        scenarios should be applied.
                                                                                                        accomodation and food during meetings.




                                                                                        18
4    ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CBPS

The background for the Community-Based Peace Support Project (CBPS) is similar to
the DBPB in terms of being a project in support of the transitional process after the
establishment of the TFG in 2004. The initial project document (PRODOC) was
developed in 2006, and the project commenced in June 2006 as a first phase of a pilot
project, to be executed within a limited time frame. The scope of the project was very
wide emphasizing a community-based bottom-up approach to achieve ownership of the
range of activities that could start out with peace building workshops and trainings,
followed by small community-driven, labour intensive sub-projects that can support
peace-building, reconciliation and reintegration of communities, IDPs etc. 2 However, the
project underwent a significant transformation by the beginning of 2007, which is only
documented in the annual report for 2007 (UNDP 2007). Hence, the CBPS changed
entirely from being a „community based peace support project‟ into a „district based
local governance building support project‟ that would follow up on the results of the
DBPB. Since the initial objectives of the CBPS are not directly relevant for the roll out
of the CBPS into the JPLG, the following review of the CBPS will focus on the main
achievements and lessons learnt of the transformed project from 2007 and onwards. The
overall assessment can be viewed in the matrix in Table 2. Similar to the DBPB project,
this project also faced difficulties such as insecurity and unclear stakeholder
collaboration limiting the level of implementation over the past two years.

Since the transformation of the project in 2007, the main activities carried out by the
CBPS project are:

       Rehabilitated district and regional council office buildings for 10 districts in Bay
        and Bakool regions
       Provided „starter‟ equipment package to the 10 district and 2 regional offices in
        Bay and Bakool, consisting of computers, motorbikes, furniture, generators and
        stationery
       Trained councilors and key staff of the 2 regional and 10 district councils in Bay
        and Bakool regions in the first series of training. This training programme was
        implemented in collaboration with the local consultancy company FOPAG, who
        was also involved in the training of trainers for the future training program, and
        the LGD
       Preparation and development of materials for future implementation such as the
        manual for the District Planning and Implementation Process (DPIP) for the
        District Basket Fund (DBF) and the coming training series that are to follow
        under the JPLG.

The annual report for 2007 stated that insecurity was the main constraint for
implementation of activities because it meant key international staff had to be relocated
from Somalia to Kenya for long periods (UNDP 2007). There were also logistical
problems related to paying contractors, training of trainers‟ activities and service
providers. Management gap for the first half of 2007, and delaying consultations with
government ministers also caused delays and discontinuities.

2
  The project was conceived from a different project proposal that aimed at creating community based
labour and employment programs.


                                                   19
4.1     PROJECT DESIGN AND OWNERSHIP

As mentioned above, the overall objective and project description of the initial pilot
project changed into an entirely different program described first time in the annual
report for 2007. This change did not follow good practice as it was done without a
comprehensive revision of the initial PRODOC and establishment of a new logical
framework (LF). The transformed project description replaced the community based
objective and bottom-up approach with a new objective taken from the UNTP Outcome
2 cited as being “local governance that contributes to the achievement of peace and
priority service delivery in selected locations” (UNTP 2007). Some of the activities of
the initial project were taken over by ILO, particularly the small employment generating
community projects. These will not be reviewed here, although some of this type of
activities will be integrated into the JPLG. The concrete aims of the new project were
focusing on the following 5 outputs:

      (i)     rehabilitating council buildings and providing basic office and transport
              equipment;
      (ii)    delivering comprehensive training packages for the newly established region
              and district councils;
      (iii)   enlarging the revenue bases of the new district and regional councils, and set
              up transparent financial management systems;
      (iv)    assisting the new district councils in developing Development Plans (with a
              participatory approach);
      (v)     promoting merit based recruitment of council staff including fair women‟s
              representation

Hence, the following review is based on the above transformed project design which
adopted the UNTP outcome 2, and the above 5 outputs, and not the initial project design
of 2006.

The overall observation of the transformed CBPS project design is that the relationship
between the 5 outputs and outcome 2 are clearer in terms of supporting local governance
towards achieving priority service deliveries, but remain unclear as to how the outputs
may translate into a contribution to peace, which therefore seems much added on. This
problem could perhaps have been addressed if the initial PRODOC had been revised and
given a new name/title when the project was fundamentally changed in early 2007.
Hence the community and peace elements should have been left out and the support to
building local government should have been added into the title. The lack of a clear LF
is now sought compensated for in the working plan of the new JPLG for 2009-10 into
which the CBPS activities are being rolled into (see below).

It can also be observed that the transformed project design appear to be largely supply
driven without much participatory involvement. Furthermore, there was not much
participatory involvement in the initial needs identification of the support to the new
district and regional councils, including the first „starter package‟ to the new councils
established by the DBPB.

The allocated time, budget, and implementation modalities in the project design cannot
be reviewed fairly on the basis of the frequent changes of project design. But a learnt
lesson is that for the JPLG it is necessary to apply realistic timeframes for
implementation, and consider alternative implementation modalities as contingencies
given the unpredictable politico-military and security conditions on the ground in


                                              20
particularly SCS. For instance, the basic assumption of the initial project was based on
the existence of a post-conflict scenario. This has however not been the case since 2006
where the ground conditions in SCS best can be described as being a violent conflict
scenario. The implication of these conditions and the necessary changes to the basic
assumptions needs to be reflected in the JPLG program document, and LF.

The project design applied two main implementation modalities namely: direct execution
by the project officers and secondly, through qualified local companies or NGOs. The
project staff oversees and supervises the planning, and conduct of the training
workshops. They also supervise the rehabilitation of office infrastructure for the newly
reconstituted councils. In addition, they also do the procurement and delivery of basic
office and transport equipment to the district and regional councils. The main
counterparts and stakeholders are the regional, district and municipal councils. The
Local Government Department (LGD) is the main TFG project implementation partner.
FOPAG, a local consultancy group was engaged to develop training modules, conduct
training of trainers for the cadre of local government trainers, and provide independent
field monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the training activities in all districts. In
coordination with UNDP and FOPAG, the LGD recruited and trained the cadre of
trainers that did the actual training of the new local councilors. Local companies were
sub-contracted to do the rehabilitation of office buildings.

The transformed design of the CBPS was then slightly changed in April 2008 in order to
integrate the CBPS activities into the new JPLG (UNJPLG 2008a). The new JPLG
design of April 2008 was likewise based on the UNTP „Outcome 2‟ as the main
outcome, but now applied 4 „sub-outcomes‟ under which a number of „outputs‟ where
placed (UNJPLG 2008a). By September 2008, this rather complex design was simplified
with the adoption of a new LF applied in the annual work plan for the JPLG for 2009-
2010 (UNJPLG 2008b). By replacing the unusual term „outcome‟ with the more
common term „objective‟, and the term „sub-outcome‟ with „specific objective‟ the LF
for the JPLG now appears much more clear (UNJPLG 2008b). The UNTP Outcome 2 is
now rephrased as the „overall objective‟, under which there are two new specific
objectives:

   1. Specific objective 1: Communities have equitable access to basic services
      through local government

   2. Specific objective 2: Local governments are accountable and transparent

Under these two specific objectives come respectively 6 and 3 „expected results‟. The
five outputs of the current CBPS project activities under implementation in South
Central Somalia (SCS) will - under the roll out into the JPLG - mainly fall under the
following „expected results‟ of the JPLG LF: The training activities of the old CBPS
output (ii) (see above) falls under expected result 1.3 (up to 24 district councils‟ capacity
to govern and manage service delivery enhanced); output (iii) activities will fall under
result 1.4 (targeted district councils have awareness about options of revenue
generation); output (iv) activities will fall under result 1.5 (all eligible district councils
have at least 1 priority service delivery project funded annually) and result 2.2 (annual
district plans and budgets in up to 24 councils reflect community priorities). It is not
clear where the activities of output (i) and (v) has been placed, as they are not explicitly
described under the „results‟ descriptions in the new work plan. Delivery of basic office
infrastructure and equipment is only mentioned in Annex 4 that addresses the principles
for roll out of district capacity building package, and the issue of promoting merit based


                                             21
recruitment and women‟s representation is only mentioned under the „incentive criteria
for additional district support‟.

Much of the lacking community involvement and linkages to peace building in the
transformed project is addressed by the participatory approach in the developed manual
for “Operational Procedures for the District Planning and Implementation Process
(DPIP) and the District Basket Fund (DBF)” (UN 2008) and content of the planned
training series. The manual is meant as a guideline for the new councils on how to
engage in a participatory process to develop district development plans with the
communities, which then are to be used for project proposals to the intended District
Basket Fund (DBF) - which is the main funding tool under the JPLG. The procedure
outlined in the manual has not been implemented yet and can therefore not be reviewed.
However, apart from applying a participatory approach the manual does not make any
explicit indications of how the procedure is thought to link with peace building.

Furthermore, the intended community involvement should be expanded, and it should be
applied flexibly in order not to become a rigid structure which the new councils must
apply as conditionality for access to the funds of the DBF. This can be done by
expanding the community consultations in the DPIP process with a more active and
action oriented community involvement in problem analysis, common needs
identification, prioritization and formulation of „joint community action plans‟ that links
to peace building needs. There are good learnt lessons from the Somali context that can
be applied here such as the „Nabaad iyo Caano‟ pilot project, which can be used as a
practical guide to develop such an approach (Ford, Abokor, and Abdillahi 2002). The
minimum requirement should be iterative re-involvement of the communities through at
least steps 3 and 4 (of the planning cycle, see UN 2008) to endorse prioritization made
by the district councils, and with less perspective on accessing the DBF. The issue of
potential DBF funding should not enter into the process until the communities (together
with the councils) clearly have identified their resources and gaps. Their own plans have
to show what they will embark on doing on their own before taking the steps towards
finding external funding for their resource gaps, which then perhaps could be usefully
filled by DBF provided sustainability concerns have been addressed.

But, before the DPIP process can unfold there is a need of an immediate impact support
to the new councils in SCS as a direct follow up on the results of the DBPB, because the
new councils cannot wait for the activation of the long DPIP/DBF planning cycle. Their
immediate needs are quite clear: Security, Income (food entitlements), Water, Health and
Education. Hence, their simple needs are basic advice and training (hands on learning)
on accounts and financial management and transparency, revenue collection in
collaboration with communities, and how to engage with and facilitate participatory
community based development that links with peace building for quick community plans
with immediate action orientation. These action oriented plans identifies immediately
available resources within communities and begins implementation right away, and
identifies what they need external aid to do. Such immediate impact support assessments
could usefully be done with inter linkage-/or by the CDD projects, that is intended to be
integrated with JPLG. The latter forms the basic information for project proposals for
short term funding and could most likely address the following type of needs:

      Resources for community policing management and recurrent conflict resolution
       mechanisms in collaboration with particularly traditional and religious elders
       (should link with ROLS type projects),



                                            22
         Resources for quick training in formulation of immediate action projects (i.e.
          ILO‟s waste management projects) that generate quick employment,
         Resources for quick basic training in water management and provision, with
          inclusion of existing traditional water management practices,
         Resources for quick basic training in management of local health facilities, and
          understanding of basic emergency indicators to use for targeted appeals for
          external aid and further health gaps,
         Resources for quick basic training in management of local schools and
          identification of education gaps,



4.2       RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

The transformed objective as stated in the annual report for 2007 was valid as a specific
support component to the new local district councils as they were established by the
DBPB, and is in line with the UNTP, RDP and TFG policies. But, it is not clear that the
outputs were entirely consistent with the community needs. Activities and outputs need
to be determined interactively and in a participatory way with not just the new councils
but with the communities at large. There is also a need to consider adaptation to and
involvement of the existing and often traditional practices of governance in the districts
in the new JPLG, as emphasized by the RDP, in order to increase the appropriateness of
the strengthening of local governance in Somalia. Hence, so far the appropriateness of
the project seems low, as the implemented activities and inputs do not clearly address
local needs nor seem to foster ownership. However, this can be compensated with the
participatory approach as outlined in the manual for operational procedures for the
district planning and implementation process (UN 2008) provided they are
comprehensively community based, interactive and iterative and utilize existing
local/traditional governance structures in what would be appropriate local hybrid
governance structures.


4.3       COST-EFFICIENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION

The financial information available was sketchy and difficult to assess, as budget and
expenditure information is not linked clearly to the performed activities. Nevertheless,
the following observations can be made:

The project has been affected by management problems from the outset. This caused
delays, and resulted in discontinuities until a new consistent program manager (PM) was
identified by mid 2007. The new PM improved the structure of the project and
performance. Insecurity prevailed, resulting in inability to sufficiently monitor
construction activities of the sub-contracted companies and oversee activities, which
makes it difficult to assess the cost-efficiency of the work done by the sub-contracted
construction companies. The procurement of equipment appears relatively expensive and
the question remains: Could better cost-efficiency have been achieved if procurement
was done with and through the new local district councils instead of the UNDP
procurement structure? In any case, it would be a good practical exercise in public
procurement if the councils were directly involved in identifying the items that they need
in the starter package and carried out the procurement themselves with UNDP
supervision.




                                             23
UNDP‟s financial control tools are not easy accessible and could be developed for more
efficient and transparent recurrent budget control and management. For instance,
expenditure is not easily disaggregated into the identifiable activities according to the
LF. However, it could be observed that the activities for 2006 exceeded the budget.
Quality could not be assessed. The overall expenditure for 2007 was closer to the
budgeted amount. However, travel costs and DSA exceeded budgets considerably and
was covered by less expenditure on ALD employees. Less was spent on service
contracts, which notably does not reflect efficiency but that a number of activities were
not carried out due to insecurity and other delay factors. The quality of construction and
equipment could not be assessed.

In conclusion, the objectives and outputs were not achieved on time. UN guidelines were
followed. Procurement should be carried out by the district councils themselves with
UNDP supervision and oversight to the extent possible. Alternative ways of
implementation and monitoring need to be considered. If insecurity prevents expatriate
project staff to be sufficiently present on the ground for longer periods of time,
consideration needs to be given to either discontinuation of the project or complete
alteration of the implementation modality, because it is very cost-inefficient to have
expatriate staff placed redundant in Nairobi.



4.4   COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT

It is too early to assess the extent that the activities will foster accountability and cost
effectiveness. However, so far the cost-effectiveness appears low. The observations from
Bay and Bakool find that the project could have been better coordinated with the DBPB
program as the aim is to provide immediate follow up on the completion of the DBPB
outputs. Immediate follow up contact only happened in a few cases and the provided
support took a substantial time to arrive. This is partly due to time consuming UN
procurement regulations as well as difficulties in getting proper bid documents from
potential service providers. Not least, delayed follow up support is largely due to the
prevailing insecurity. Improved communication on reasons for delays and project
changes would have helped the understanding at the local level. Thus, the achieved
outputs are so far limited to the construction/rehabilitation of office buildings, provision
of office equipment to the district councils and regional offices, and training in the so-
called „series 1‟ program, in Bay and Bakool regions only. While the
rehabilitation/construction of office buildings will remain an asset for the districts, the
provided equipment has not been brought to use, and seems of limited importance to the
district councils. The provided training was highly valued, and more training will be of
great importance, although the best training is when it is carried out as „hands on‟
training where councilors and staff are coached and learn by doing. Due to insecurity,
Gedo region has not been addressed yet, although discussions have started. The
expectation is that an outcome of the coming training series and the DPIP Process for the
District Basket Fund is that the districts will be enabled to perform social services in
interaction with the communities. The main factors of non-achievement to date are
delays related to insecurity which has led to relocation of all UN staff and inability to
follow up on Letters of Agreement (LOA) between the districts and regional authorities
and UNDP.

It is still too early to assess the impact of the project, however based on the responses
from the districts and the project documentation the following observations has been



                                            24
made (See Annex 3 for a summary account of responses on the CBPS): Activities were
generally provided according to the designed outputs, but not as a response to the need
of the communities. Activities were generally delayed in terms of being intended as
immediate follow up to the established councils following the DBPB process. The RDP
and UNTP frameworks were followed in principle, and there is now a LF being
developed within the Joint Program. However, it appears that activities carried out so far
in itself does not yet, in this case, imply fulfillment of the intended wider impact of
producing local governance that contributes to the achievement of peace and priority
services to the communities.

The rehabilitated offices are considered an asset for the district councils, and the training
provided is welcomed but not seen as sufficient. This is based on the provision of only
„series 1‟ training. More training will be provided in the future JPLG. The standard
equipment package is assessed as representing an „overvalue‟ as the councils lack
resources and skills to run computers, and inadequate as meeting furniture etc may not
be used except for representational purpose when expatriates visit the council offices.
Hence, the main message from the interviewed councilors across the line is that the
project has so far not turned into any real difference to beneficiaries as yet.

The real performance of the district councils as a result of this project seem to rest with
the future support that eventually will come with the District Basket Fund, and the
activities of the District Planning and Implementation Process (DPIP) developed by
UNDP (UN 2008). It should be cautioned that with the intended roll out of the DPIP
there is a risk that the districts develop a dependency structure on external funds which is
not sustainable. This may happen because the district attention and energy will be
directed towards accessing these funds rather than identifying own resources and needs.
There is also a need to continuously observe how the councils in fact are performing and
what learnt lessons and guidance that can be derived. For instance, during 2007, the
Baidoa District council underwent 6-7 months of negotiations with its business
community, elders, and women etc to achieve a locally accepted revenue collection
system.3


4.5      SUSTAINABILITY AND BENEFITS

The rehabilitated offices will remain an asset for the community. However, the provided
equipment does not seem to be sustainable as the running and maintenance costs seem to
exceed capability and their usefulness seem less relevant. It is important to consider and
identify support and equipment according to the available resources principle to achieve
sustainability. The provided training may produce more skillful DC‟s and councilors to
the benefit of the community.

There is a risk that the procedure for accessing the District Basket Fund can lead to an
aid dependency structure which is not sustainable. The new councils could benefit from
„hands on‟ coaching and supportive supervision in local governance for one or more
years until councilors, and council staff are worked into practices and routines, and know
how to manage the services to the communities according to principle of good
governance and participatory community involvement.




3
    This is based on the reviewers own direct observations in Baidoa district, November 2007.


                                                      25
As mentioned in above in section 2 on the Sector Context, it is of importance for the
sustainability of the new councils that they relate to and interact with the existing local
traditional structures. The traditional structures will most likely continue to perform the
role of continuity and representation of the community, and remain the key actors in
local conflict resolution mechanisms. Hence, the sustainability and strengths of the new
councils will rely on their ability to interact constructively and make use of the resources
within the local traditional governance practices. The CBPS project did not address this
aspect sufficiently. Hence, the roll out into the JPLG should put an effort into
investigating this relationship particularly in terms of finding the best local utilization of
resources for own development.



4.6   LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the transformation of the project in 2007 the project has rehabilitated district and
regional council office buildings Bay and Bakool regions, provided „starter‟ equipment
packages in Bay and Bakool, and trained councilors and key staff in the first series of
training. Furthermore, preparations and development of materials for future
implementation such as the manual for the District Planning and Implementation Process
(DPIP) for the District Basket Fund (DBF) and the coming training series that are to
follow under the JPLG was commenced.

But, the outputs of the transformed CBPS project were not achieved on time. The annual
report for 2007 stated that insecurity was the main constraint for implementation of
activities because it meant key international staff had to be relocated from Somalia to
Kenya for long periods (UNDP 2007). There were also logistical problems related to
paying contractors, training of trainers‟ activities and service providers. Management
gaps for the first half of 2007, and delaying consultations with government ministers also
caused delays and discontinuities. Hence, a learnt lesson for the JPLG is that it is
necessary to apply realistic timeframes for implementation, and consider alternative
implementation modalities as contingencies given the unpredictable politico-military and
security conditions on the ground in particularly SCS, which is not a post-conflict but a
conflict scenario.

With the roll out into the JPLG, the lack of a clear LF is compensated for in the working
plan of the new JPLG for 2009-10. However, the lack of demand driven project design
can be compensated for through the participatory approach of the DPIP, provided it is
widened with more community involvement, for instance through comprehensive
linkages with the intended integration of the CDD program run by WB and UNICEF.

The CBPS activities remain valid as a specific support component to the new local
district councils, and are in line with the UN and TFG policies. However, activities and
outputs could be determined interactively and in a participatory way with not just the
new councils but with the communities at large. There is also a need to consider
adaptation to the existing and often traditional practices of governance in the districts.
This may be achieved with the participatory approach outlined in the manual for
operational procedures for the District Planning and Implementation Process (DPIP)
(UN 2008) provided they are comprehensively community based, interactive and
iterative and utilize existing local/traditional governance structures in what would be
appropriate local hybrid governance structures. Thus, an effort should be put into
investigating the traditional governance practices within each district, particularly in



                                             26
rural districts and their relationship with the district councils, particularly in terms of
finding the best local utilization of resources, and how roles and responsibilities between
the district council and traditional authorities etc. can be developed particularly in
relation to recurrent conflict resolution (including issues in relation to service delivery).

The interactive community participation in the „District Planning and Implementation
Process‟ should be expanded by involving the communities in at least step 3 and 4 of the
process cycle, and optimally by adopting a more comprehensive community based
participatory approach that links peace building with development such as the „Nabad
iyo Caano‟ approach that was implemented in a community in Somaliland (Ford,
Abokor, Abdillahi 2002). By widening community participation and ensuring that
provided support is based on participatory community needs and analysis of the
available resources principle, sustainability and impact can increase, and the risk of aid
dependency can be avoided. This requires careful coordination and integration with the
CDD type of activities in the JPLG, with a focus on developing the capacity of the
district councils to perform community based participatory approaches together with
traditional and civil society actors.

Training of the councilors and staff is important and may lead to improved council
resources to the benefit of the community. The suggested training scheme within the
JPLG can be improved with following recommendations: The training activities and
other technical support should be aimed at addressing governance and management
issues of the basic service sectors, such as water, health, education, law and order and
emergency response. This would make the training more interesting and relevant for the
new councilors and staff. Hence, the training series should aim at providing skills needed
for management of those sectors, in close coordination with technical input from the UN
agencies involved in the relevant sectors. It should also be ensured that all the basic
training in council management are not dependent on computer usage, but are based on
principles that can be maintained by paper and pen. The theoretical training could benefit
from more additional „hands on‟ coaching/ supportive supervision in local governance
for one or more years. This can be done by allocating national professional Somalis to
each region who then can supervise the districts of each region. Careful coordination of
the timing of training activities with the different schedules of the districts planning
cycle is necessary to avoid delays.

In case of prolonged inaccessibility to the SCS, due to the current security situation in
Somalia restricting access not only for expatriate staff but for national staff as well, the
JPLG risk management assessment should be based on the short term worst case
scenario which involves armed conflict and terrorist acts, which means alternative
implementation modalities needs to be sought, and in the worst case suspension of non-
essential and non-emergency activities.

One alternative option could be to outsource activities fully to low profile private
consultancy groups/consortiums consisting of Somali and non-Somali based companies
that shows a proven ability to work under the precarious security situation in Somalia.
One way to identify such potential groups could be by announcing an expression of
interest for a pre-assessment of potential implementation partners. The rationale of
seeking a combination of international/non-Somali and Somali private companies/NGOs
is that the criteria for the international partners‟ involvement are to ensure the capacity of
the local implementing partners. Such International-Local partnerships, whether private
companies or on NGO basis can potentially implement tasks such as training, supportive



                                             27
supervision of district councils, facilitation of community based participatory processes,
and monitoring and evaluation activities.

Activities in SCS will not be easy to implement in the short term (up to the next year)
due to the current insecurity. Hence, it is possible that the full planning process cycle
cannot be implemented in the short term as described in the manual for the DBF. Hence,
an alternative approach should be considered aiming at providing immediate short term
support to the new councils, based on participatory principles which links
community/district development plans with local peace building.

Within the JPLG, it is important to close the follow up gaps that was apparent between
the DBPB outputs and the CBPS follow up support. Hence, when the closing stages of
the formation of new district councils are approaching, the staffs who are involved in the
follow up activities such as the starter packages, training etc. need to be involved to
ensure overlap and continuity.

There is a need of an immediate impact support to the new councils in SCS as a direct
follow up on the results of the DBPB, because the new councils cannot wait for the
activation of the long DPIP/DBF planning cycle. Instead of providing a standard
equipment starter package, the given support framework should ideally be negotiated
with the new councils/communities within a limited financial framework. This can be
done by the follow up staff immediately after the council‟s are establishment. The
eventual purchase of equipment should then be carried out by the district council
themselves as a first practical exercise in transparent and accountable procurement,
under UNDP supervision (or if outsourced by the given company/NGO).

One of the lessons learned is that the provided equipment is less sustainable as running
and maintenance costs exceed capability. Computers, printers and generators are not
necessarily what the new district councils need most. Instead councils will use private
internet cafes for their limited need of sending emails and documents. Stationery is
typically something that the councils can and should purchase themselves, perhaps for a
small starter grant. Office furniture for meeting purposes is also less important, as
Somalis mostly prefer to sit on mats on the floor/ground when they meet and work.
Office desks and chairs are however necessary. Transport support is essential, and
perhaps a small pick-up or lorry that can be used for multiple purposes could be useful to
enable the councils engage in immediate service delivery. Solar panels for electricity
could be useful as an alternative to fuel driven generators. But, in general the item list of
the starter package should be identified with the individual councils as their specific
needs may vary, as long as the agreed package remains within a set economic
framework.

The operational procedures outlined in relation to the DPIP and the DBF does contain
procedures for local procurement management by the district councils. However, until
the planning process is being implemented and sufficient training in the procedures have
been provided enabling councilors and staff to follow these technical procedures, a more
simple local procurement system could be established in order to enable accountable
procurement practices which the district councils will need from their outset.

This could perhaps also enable the district council to procure „their starting package‟
themselves. Technical skills to use and operate equipment needs to be in place before
they are procured. Instead of one big package, the procurement of equipment items could
be broken down into several smaller „blocks‟ making it possible to follow the procedure


                                             28
of acquiring three quotations for each. Two procurement committees could be formed:
One by the district council consisting of a number of councilors and one leading
financial, administrative and logistics staff member. The other one should be a
community procurement monitoring committee, which could be selected on the day the
DC is being elected. This committee could consist of two women, two businessmen, two
elders, and one youth representative. Any quotations should then be passed by the
district and community procurement committees. An email with full quotation
information (items, quantity, and price, name and contact info of provider etc.) should
then be sent to the UN project manager for approval. The community procurement
committee as well as the monitoring agent must confirm that the purchased items have
been delivered where after the sum can be released to the District Council.

If UN project staff cannot access the district on location monitoring of the purchased
item and account books etc. then monitoring could be out-sourced to a local private
company that does not have its base or origin in the given district.

The DPIP should involve and be coordinated with agencies that are providing sector
support (health, education, water and sanitation) so that the districts can lead their
process and engage with these providing agencies if their assistance is relevant for the
given district according to its own plans.

There is a need to improve the financial control tools of UNDP for more efficient and
transparent budget control and management. This is particularly relevant within the
complex structure of the JPLG to assist the project manager‟s ability to have a clear
overview of recurrent expenditure versus their budgets for the specific activities, and set
in relation to the activities of the logical framework.




                                            29
Table 2, Community-based Peace Support Project: overview of observations, lessons learnt and recommendations
Assessment           Observations                                                           Conclusions and Lessons Learnt                    Recommendations
Criteria
Project Design       The initial project design is improved with the new LF for JPLG.       The initial lack of project clarity was a main    Time, budget and implementation modalities
                     The relationships between activities, outputs and objectives are       reason for unclear implementation compounded      need to be flexible and adaptable to the changing
                     clearer in terms of supporting local governance. The activity          with management problems. Good management         limitations of the real security conditions.
                     overview in the LF is very general. Monitoring tools are under         practices such as revising the PRODOC and LF
                     development.                                                           when the project is changed could have resulted   Alternative implementation modality that either
Ownership            Low. Appears to be supply driven without much participatory            in more efficiency and project clarity.           work through an international-local consultancy
                     involvement in project design. Furthermore, there is very low                                                            groups or LNGOs need to explored.
                     user involvement in identification of the „starter package‟ to new    Somalia is not in a post-conflict situation, hence
                     districts.                                                            ongoing security limitations has been a hindrance Community participation in the DPIP should be
Relevance and        The project is relevant in terms of support to the district councils  for project implementation which continued to be widened.
Appropriateness      established by the DBPB, and in line with UN and TFG policies.        based on a post-conflict assumption.
                     But, is unclear in terms of matching community needs. The                                                                New councils established should be followed up
                     appropriateness could be higher if activities and inputs were         The supply driven project development had a        immediately with a quick identification of the
                     determined more from demand side. It is too early to assess the       negative impact on the level of participatory      given districts specific „starter package‟ needs.
                     extent of accountability and cost effectiveness.                      involvement in the project, which could have
Cost-efficiency in   Relatively low. The objectives and outputs have not been              improved the relevance.                            District councils should do procurement on their
Implementation       achieved on time, but the budget frames has still been spent. The                                                        own under supervision by monitoring agents.
                     quality cannot be determined. UN guidelines were followed, but        A combination if insecurity and equipment and
                     better rates may be achievable through altered procurement            training that could not immediately be translated Traditional governance should be explored and
                     practices.                                                            into increased district council service delivery   included in local governance development.
Impact and Cost-     Impact cannot be assessed at this stage. The cost-effectiveness is    meant that the project activities could not yet be
effectiveness        low. Output achievements have not been timely, mostly due to          seen to have any substantial impact.               Training activities should exemplify with service
                     insecurity and management gaps.                                                                                          sectors, such as water, health, education etc.
                                                                                           Sustainability and impact can increase if aid
Benefits and         Sustainability is limited. The rehabilitated offices are an asset for dependency is avoided, and support is based on     Training should apply simple management
Sustainability       the community, but the provided equipment exceeds maintenance participatory community need and analysis of the techniques that are not computer dependent.
                     and running cost capability Training skills may benefit of the        available resources principle.                     More hands on supervision would be useful.
                     community. The DPIP process for the DBF can lead to aid
                     dependency.                                                                                                              Clearer financial control tools needs developed.




                                                                                              30
5   PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The DBPB has been managed by UNOPS in Nairobi, which allocated one project
manager and two technical administrative support staff for the task, who are responsible
for the overall management and monitoring of the program. In addition there is a
National Coordinator based in Somalia. UNOPS have built a small but well-engaged and
experienced national team that now has worked together since 2006. The UNOPS
organization works well for the DBPB program, hence to split it up in order to integrate
into the JPLG would risk the qualities and experience in this team. Since the DBPB is
not going to be integrated with other JPLG activities, but as activity precedes the
implementation of all other JPLG activities in SCS, there is no reason to change the
present structure. Since the SC for DBPB has ceased to exist and the JPLG SC will be
the new SC for DBPB, it is suggested that a small steering group is established that can
meet monthly in support of the project and perform budget control etc.

The CBPS has been managed by UNDP, which allocated one project manager under the
program manager for the local governance program. The project manager is ideally
stationed in Baidoa, but due to insecurity mostly located in the UNDP Somalia offices in
Nairobi or at other duty stations in Somalia/-land outside SCS. Given the present
security situation there is no alternative to the temporary location of the project
managers in Nairobi.

However, it should be noted that the cost-efficiency of remote management can be very
low when it is not possible to perform direct supervision and monitoring of activities.
Therefore, alternatives to project management from Nairobi should be considered for the
roll out of the project into the joint program. Such alternatives could include contracting
an agency to manage the project on behalf of UNDP. This could either be an
international NGO in collaboration with a Local NGO or an international Consulting
Company in partnership with a local consultancy group.

Within the joint program, all the local governance support should be coordinated through
the Project Coordination Unit. The joint management structure of the JPLG seems to be
very complicated, will require close and constant coordination between a multiplicity of
actors from agencies involved in the Joint Program. That is in itself time consuming. In
addition coordination with agencies external to the JPLG but who will be involved in
support to the local government needs to be considered.




                                            31
6     A SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following section summarizes the overall conclusions and recommendations made
by this review. These conclusions and recommendation are of a generalized character.
For the more elaborated and detailed recommendations for each project, please see the
recommendations following each project in Sections 3 and 4 respectively.


6.1   OVERALL ASSESMENT OF THE PROJECTS

The overall impression of the DBPB is that the developed approach proved successful in
achieving representative and legitimate district councils, and peaceful coexistence
between clan communities in the three regions where the project was implemented. The
project has been time consuming, but that is to the benefit of outcome and impact. In the
roll out into the JPLG, it is suggested that the DBPB implementation structure and staff
team within UNOPS remain intact in order not to disrupt its present dynamic. A small 5-
6 person steering group with key stakeholders could usefully be set up to meet monthly
and advice and monitor project progress. A strong participatory approach compensates
for lack of local level ownership. Relevance is high in relation to the need for
reconciliation and need for representative local councils. Delays occurred due to
inefficiency, insecurity and top-down interferences by key stakeholders. The
sustainability of the project is based on the strong sense of ownership by the
communities of the new councils in terms of protecting them against „external‟ efforts to
change or manipulate them.

The main achievement of the CBPS project so far is the provision of office structures,
facilities, equipment and training to all districts in Bay and Bakool. Gedo has not been
reached. Further follow up activities has been prepared, including training and a manual
outlining an operational procedure for participatory district planning and implementation
process (DPIP) and the District Basket Fund (DBF). The latter two will form the main
tools for the continuation of project activities as they are rolled out into the JPLG. The
initial project was transformed by early 2007 with a new set of objectives taken from the
UNTP outcome 2. Still, the relationship between the intended outputs and results is only
clear in terms of supporting local governance, but is not clearly operationalised in terms
of peace building. The lack of a clear LF is compensated for in the working plans for the
JPLG for 2008. There is a lack of participatory involvement in the initial needs
identification in support of the new district and regional councils. Alternative ways of
implementation and monitoring need to be considered, to widen community participation
in the process, build more on existing traditional governance practices in the districts,
and link more clearly with continued reconciliation and peace building.


6.2   EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE PROJECTS

The most important impact of the DBPB is the sense of achieved peaceful coexistence
between communities within the districts. Hence, the project has been very successful in
converting inputs to outputs despite under funding, insufficient time, and delay factors. It
is expected that this remain the primary impact to be strived for with the continuation of
the project in SCS.




                                            32
It is too early to assess the impact of the support given by the CBPS so far. But, it can be
observed that sustainability is limited. The rehabilitated offices are an asset for the
community, but the provided equipment is less sustainable as running and maintenance
costs exceed capability. Training may lead to council resources to the benefit of the
community. There is a risk that the procedure for the District Basket Fund can lead to aid
dependency, if the participatory community involvement is not expanded. At this stage
the expected impact can only be determined according to the overall and specific
objectives of the new JPLG which are: 1) Communities have equitable access to basic
services through local government; and 2) Local governments are accountable and
transparent.


6.3   ELEMENTS OF A PROJECT MONITORING SYSTEM

The DBPB outputs such as reduced tension, greater understanding, and stronger conflict
resolution mechanisms within and between the communities are subjective and need
qualitative means to be measured. It is therefore recommended that qualitative tools
indicating achieved outputs and impact are developed for monitoring and evaluation
purpose.

Monitoring and evaluation practices are in the process of being tightened up for the
JPLG. There is a need for baseline/benchmarks, and clear budget control tools. Financial
reporting, budget control and budgets should follow same logic and outline to „make
sense‟ and provide an easier overview, particularly in terms of direct indication of which
activities the budget lines relate to.

Financial control tools should be developed for the JPLG for more efficient and
transparent recurrent budget control and management that clearly reflect budget vs.
activity expenditure.

If access to SCS cannot be achieved, then it may be necessary to explore outsourcing of
project monitoring to either private joint international/national consultancy groups or
International/Local NGOs.




                                            33
    ANNEXES




i
                                                                                ANNEX 1


LIST OF REFERENCES

/1/   UN 2007, United Nations Transitional Plan for Somalia 2008-2009, July 2007.

/2/   OECD-DAC, DAC Criteria               for   Evaluating    Development      Assistance,
      www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation

/3/   UN 2008, Operational Procedures for the District Planning and Implementation
      Process and the District Basket Fund, April 2008, UNDP with Somali counterparts
      and UN Joint Program partners

/4/   Ford, Abokor, Abdillahi 2002, Nabad iyo Caano (Peace and Milk) Linking Peace
      Building and Development in Decentralized Somaliland, by Professor Richard Ford,
      Adan Abokor and Shukri Abdillahi, Center for Community Based Development
      (Clark University, USA) and International Cooperation for Development (Hargeisa,
      Somaliland, October, 2002.

/5/   UNJPLG 2008a, Joint Program Document for the Local Governance and
      Decentralised Service Delivery Program, UN April 2008

/6/   UNJPLG 2008b, Joint Program on Local Governance - Workplan and Budget
      2009-2010, Final Draft, UN September 2008

/7/   RDP 2008, Somali Reconstruction and Development Plan, UN/World Bank,
      January 2008

/8/   UNDP 2007, Annual Report of the Community-based Peace Support Project,
      UNDP Somalia

      In addition annual and monthly reports, as well as financial information reports for
      both projects supplied




                                            ii
ANNEX 2

People consulted

Interviews and consultations in Nairobi

Abdirahman Raghe, Administrative Director, Interpeace
Caroline Rusten, Program Manager Local Governance, UNDP
Fahma Ahmed Nur, Deputy Minister, MNSHA, TFG
Francis Luwangwa, Project Manager CBPS, UNDP
Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud, Director, Somali Institute of Management and Administration
Khalif Farah, Project Officer, UNDP
Mohamed Barre, Project Manager CBPS (fmr), UNDP
Musse M. Afrah, National Coordinator DBPB, UNOPS
Oker ?, Interpeace,
Said Ahmed, Project Officer Local Governance, UNDP
Saverio Bertolino, Project Manager DBPB, UNOPS
Stefano Dejak, Italian Ambassador to Somalia

DBPB Presentation at SSS meeting, by Saverio Bertolino

Hargeisa Consultations

Shirwac Mohamed, Somali Peaceline
Francis Wagaba, Local Governance UNDP

Telephone interviews from Nairobi and Hargeisa

Gedo
Mahamed A. Hashi, Garbaharey, Acting DC
Mohamed Hirsis Dhude, Bardera, DC
Malaq Mohamed Hussein, Luuq, Elder
Hussein Elmi Nuur, Luuq, Elder
Khalif Salaad, Luuq, Councillor

Bay
Abdirahman Kuule Hassan, Baidoa, Councillor
Malaq Mohamed Ibrahim Garoore, Baidoa, Elder
Malaq Issak Jeelow, Baidoa, Elder
Yonis Moallim Mohammed (Ali Dareen), Berdale, DC
Hawo Adan Gurdaale, Berdale, Councillor
Muhubo Hussein Hassan, Buurhakaba, Councillor
Qasim Abdi Haji, Buurhakaba, Councillor
Dahir Haji Abdulle, QansahDhere, Councillor
Ali Hassan Saney, Acting DC, Dinsoor
Nuurow Mad Issaq, Councilor, Dinsoor



                                          iii
Bakool
Moallin Issak Jiis, Wajid, DC
Mohamed Moallin, Xuddur, DC
Moalin Mohamed Nur, Tieglow, DC
Hassan Nuur, Ceel-Barde, DC
Yusuf Qorane Biyoday, Ceel-Barde, Councillor
Max'd Kheyr Salad Daud, Rabdhure, DC

Other
Yussuf Moallim Badiyow, CRD - Baidoa
Hassan Baashi, UNDP, Baidoa




                                         iv
                                                                                   ANNEX 3

Overall summary of interviews

The District Based Peace Building Project

All found that the process that led to the establishment of the council was good, with the
exception of Gedo region where one or two districts found problems with the procedures.
The reason given was that the procedures and selection was biased towards the dominant
clan communities. Although the minority clans did get representation, this was regarded as
under representation and unbalanced. Hence, the outcome was not perceived as a
reconciliation outcome but as a minimal power sharing arrangements. The need for peace is
more important, hence the minority communities accept the outcomes as well. This
problem was particularly in Luq district in Gedo region and Dinsoor in Bay region.
Buurhakaba mentioned strong personal rivalry during the election of DC, but considered
that as normal and emphasized the democratic and participatory process involving women
and youth, transparency and the use of secret ballot boxes for the election as very positive
making the election outcome very free and fair, although the latter depend on a fair
composition of the selected councilors. Involvement of elders was also generally
considered as a vital and important aspect of the process.

Generally the establishment of new district councils was perceived as good for establishing
peace and for dialogue and reconciliation mechanism between clan communities, However,
it is seen as insufficient in itself for maintaining the vital security, and law and order that
clearly motivated peoples participation in the process.

The time allocated, and spent for the process in each district was generally considered as
being enough and sufficient, except Luuq were the process was considered as being rushed
through.

The overall response is that the process and the outcome were based on a proper
reconciliation process, however there were quite a number of modifications that can be
worrying in terms of sustainability of the outcome and to the extent that the achieved
reconciliation and peace can hold in the long term. For instance, a few district mentioned
that the process was based on participatory power sharing arrangements rather than actual
reconciliation. Only the mix of traditional methods and power sharing among communities
with input from civil society made it possible to form the new district administrations. This
means that in a number of places, the underlying issues of conflict between the
communities were not tabled and addressed, but the need for peace was more important so
weaker communities accepted the power sharing arrangements. That was particularly the
case in Gedo region. In Bay and Bakool region, it was also mentioned that in several cases
the outcomes was a participatory power sharing arrangement rather than based on a
thorough reconciliation process, but for a different reason than in Gedo region, and Dinsoor
district. The reason was that the clan communities in Bay and Bakool had already
undergone a major internal peace and reconciliation process immediately prior to the start
of the DBPB project in Bay region in 2006. Hence, several districts in Bay and Bakool
mention that they did not achieve peace or reconciliation, because it was already there. But


                                              v
they did achieve representative local administrations that enjoy the full support of their
entire community, which in itself is an outstanding achievement. Whether reconciliation
happened prior to the project, or through the project, what is important is that the main
outcome is a general feeling the new district administration and the councilors do reflect the
community composition, and overall very representative and inclusive and the community
feel a very strong ownership of the district councils and administrations, which makes them
very sustainable and resilient towards external pressures related to external military groups
that are contending at the level of national conflict. Hence, in several districts there is not
peace due to the conflict between TFG/Ethiopian army and the ICU/Shabaab and other
AOGs on the side. In other words, there is internal peace and wish for coexistence between
the clan communities, and it seems that they are very determined to protect their
administrations collectively.

The overall outcome in the observed districts is being perceived as positive. Under
representation of certain clan communities (incl. one where the clan was weak but in fact in
majority in numbers) and minorities only seemed to have happened in 25% of the observed
districts. All the districts found that they have largely achieved internal peace, and stand
very strong in terms of resolving any conflicts that should occur between the communities
within the districts. The districts on Bay and Bakool has over the past 10 months come
under severe „external‟ pressure as the contenders in the national level conflict between the
TFG/Ethiopian army on one side and the ICU/ARS, Al Shabaab and other AOGs on the
other. This is an immense challenge to the new districts, which indeed show an impressive
level of resilience to this „external‟ pressure. The pressure and attempt at making the
administrations side with one or the other side is immense, and particularly the Al Shabaab
has issued threats to the DCs that they should resign. However, except a few instances, the
support from the population to the new local administrations are very strong, the elders are
instrumental in showing the community support, which demonstrates that the councilors are
seen as the full representatives of the community which no „outside‟ entity can change,
neither AOG or the TFG.

In Bay and Bakool, all respondents praised the performance of CRD highly. The few
mistakes made were not seen as problematic from their points of views. In Gedo, the
response on the performance of the implementers was more mixed, as Juba was seen to
perform well, as well as UNOPS staff. One comment mentioned that staff was mostly
considering their own fees.

They find themselves as able to deliver services, but say they need support. Due to the past
10 months insecurity not caused be elements within the communities, it has been difficult
to commence on any public services. But, except for increased insecurity due to the
overriding armed conflict in a number of districts, not much has happened since the
completion of the DBPB. No collapses, but also only very little increases in service
performances. While the most common response is that it is too early to say what the
outcome of the DBPB project is, several emphasized that they have achieved more peaceful
coexistence between the communities with the district. In a few places there was a concern
that the „loosers‟ of the elections would lose patience, especially if the councils would not
be able to soon begin to deliver more equal services to communities. The moral of the
administrations are declining due to lack of support and inability to operate under the


                                              vi
insecure circumstances. One district emphasized that the main difference is that the
community now feels that the leadership really represents them.

The general perception is indeed that, to the extent that the objective of the DBPB was to
achieve the establishment of truly representative local administration selected and elected
by representatives of the people in a democratic and transparent manner, and the
establishment of a peaceful coexistence between the communities within the district, and
that the process and the council can function as a mechanism for dialogue and conflict
resolution. Only, weakness in regard to this observation is that is has not been possible to
interview ordinary people, or other organizations within the districts, which possibly could
have a different view. The sitting DC‟s and councilors must be considered biased.

The overriding need of security and law and order, was seen as a key factor for success,
meaning that people went actively into the process to achieve this. That can also be a
critical point and a weakness in the long run, if the new administrations are not capable of
improving security, law and order. The other main factor seen as vital for success was the
pro-active engagement of civil society actors.


The Community Based Peacebuilding Support Project

In Bay region, the kind of support that the councils have received from the CBPS project
include office rehabilitation, facilities and equipment such as furniture stationary,
motorbikes as means of transport and training. All basic equipment for the DC and council
itself, but no community support or supervision has been given, which could serve the
community needs. It only serves the council work narrowly. Similarly in Bakool region,
they have received office rehabilitation, facilities and equipment such as generators,
computers, communication equipment and motorcycles and basic training. No support has
been given to any districts in Gedo region as yet. .

In some case the support is reported to have arrived 30 days after the establishment of the
councils, in most case longer period, and in a few very long time. In Gedo region the
districts have waited for nearly 6 months to see any support.

The provided support is seen as basic and minimal for the council and enables office work.
However, while office buildings are clearly good to have and there definitely is a call for
more training, the given support does not reflect the most urgent needs of the communities.
Meeting tables and chairs are good for meetings with external partners (foreigners) etc., but
when the councilors are meeting on a daily basis they usually sit on the floor on mats, the
traditional Somali way. Desks and computers can be useful, however the computer literacy
is not high and most work can be done with paper and pencil. Computers and printers can
be expensive to run, and in most cases the council cannot afford to run the generators for
electricity because they do not have enough income for fuel. Mobile phones can be very
useful, while the motorbikes serve transport needs partially. The councils own revenue base
is very small and they can therefore hardly afford running a modern, even if rudimentary,
equipped office. What they really need is direct support for the social services that they
need to perform for the communities such as law and order, health, education and


                                             vii
emergency responses. Hence, the income that they can collect themselves from the
community goes almost entirely to staff salaries and district security and conflict resolution
support, and then a few other activities. The given training is viewed as good, but more
direct coaching with councilors and council staff on how to run a local administration
would be much more preferred as it would be more practical, less theoretical and be
directly related to the council activities within sectors (health, water, education etc.).

In Gedo they are not optimistic about the viability of the new councils if useful support
does not begin to arrive. In Bay and Bakool there were very mixed feelings, as the
provision of office facilities and equipment generally was seen as OK, but they had no
resources to run and maintain it, still lack more training, capacity building and recurrent
support to actually do something for the community. Hence, the support serves only the
bureaucratic side of council work, but not to help provide humanitarian and social services.
Need more training, capacity building and supervision. All respondents found that they had
not been heard, or in any other had a say in determining the kind and type of support that
was given to the district through the CBPS project. Hence, it was just package that raise
expectations as it was presented as carrot or „peace dividend‟ as a reward for forming the
district council in the first place. Hence, there has been no community involvement or other
participatory approaches applied to identify community needs and logically the support
does not necessarily reflect community needs either. That confirms the suspicion of a
supply driven project.

UNDP seems to be encouraging modern „external‟ ways of governance and 'participatory
approaches‟ rather than adapting to and utilizing resources from the traditional Somali
means of governance. Several respondents emphasized that interaction and adaptation of
the local governance system with traditional ways could be a quick of achieving results
because the traditional ways of governance are functioning, known by the people and easily
implemental – particularly in the rural districts. UNDP did apply training in participatory
approaches, but did not take perspective to utilize or adapt with traditional forms of
governance. That is a waste of potential resources. One respondent said “UNDP encourages
participatory interaction with communities for service delivery, but do not regard the
traditional ways of governance we know”.

All respondents found that it is too early to say what impact the support may have. In Gedo
there has to be any support first.




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Description: District Based Peace Building Dbpb Project Proposal document sample