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Douglas Lane The Boeing Company
Director P.O. Box 3207, MC 67-UM
Certification & Regulatory Affairs Seattle, WA 98124-2207
Commercial Airplanes
B-H300-09-DML-06
February 24, 2009
Docket Management Facility
Docket No. TSA-2008-0021
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140
Washington, DC 20590-0001
Subject: Comments to Docket No. TSA-2008-0021, Large Aircraft Security
Program, Other Aircraft Operator Security Program, and Airport
Operator Security Program
Reference: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published in the Federal
Register on October 20, 2008 (73 FR 64789); and Extension of
Comment Period published on November 25, 2008 (73 FR
71590)
Dear Sir or Madam:
Enclosed are comments from Boeing Commercial Airplanes concerning the
subject NPRM on the Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP). Our comments
have been developed by our Boeing organizations responsible for aviation
security operations, security risk assessments, and background investigation
services that have had many years of experience in the issues addressed by the
proposed rule as applicable to large commercial transport airplane operations.
While the idea of implementing an LASP for general aviation is compelling, we
maintain that the LASP, as proposed, must recognize the difference between
private general aviation operations and commercial operations. In lieu of trying
to establish a “one size fits all” approach to the LASP, we recommend that the
rules be risk-based, and focused on and scalable for the different types and
sizes of operators/airports and the unique operations conducted by individual
operators.
Our additional recommendations and suggestions are explained in more detail in
the enclosed comments.
We appreciate the opportunity to review this proposal and trust that you will
consider our comments prior to finalizing the document.
Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 2
If we can provide you with additional thoughts, insight, or information as to the
specific concerns we have laid out in these comments, please contact Ms. Jill
DeMarco of this office at (425) 237-3253.
Sincerely,
Douglas M. Lane
Director, Airplane Certification & Regulatory Affairs
Enclosure
cc:
Mr. Erik Jensen
Branch Chief—Policy, Plans & Stakeholder Affairs
Office of General Aviation
Transportation Security Administration
TSNM, TSA–28
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202–4220
Mr. Jens C. Hennig
Vice President, Operations
General Aviation Manufacturers Assn.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 1
Boeing Commercial Airplanes
Comments to TSA Proposed Rule,
Large Aircraft Security Program, Other Aircraft Operator
Security Program, and Airport Operator Security Program
COMMENT #1 of 20
Specific section General comment on proposed core requirements of the large
of the proposed
document that is
aircraft security program (LASP)
of concern.
What is the TSA’s
proposed
requirement or
text?
BOEING'S SECURITY APPROACH AND GENERAL AREAS OF
CONCERN WITHIN SECURITY
Boeing engages in a highly diverse environment for commercial
manufacturing operations, flights tests (Boeing and customer),
commercial non-revenue service airplane customer deliveries,
demonstration flights, business jet operations, and executive flight
operations from and into both international and domestic airports and
airspace while conducting both routine and unique General Aviation
(GA) operations.
Boeing agrees with other benchmarked GA operators that critical to
promulgating a regulation for the general aviation industry is
recognition of the primary difference between commercial (e.g., on-
demand Part 135) and private / corporate (i.e., Part 91) operations.
In private / corporate operations the people on board and manifested
to the aircraft are known to the operator, and typically include
What about this employees (internally vetted through company background
proposed
investigations), invited guests, or customers and, therefore, do not
requirement do
we want represent as significant a security risk as commercial passengers
changed? from the general population. Private/corporate owners and
operators of large commercial aircraft have exceptionally strong
interests in protecting these valuable and unique assets during
storage and operation and protecting client information. Boeing, for
example, maintains a large and capable security force to protect our
people, customers, guests, corporate assets (including aircraft), and
operations. For private / corporate aircraft owners and operators,
the implementation of a cumbersome security program not tailored to
or accounting for the unique GA aircraft operations involved will not
provide measurable improvements and may in fact dilute security.
Boeing considers that it is critical that this basic difference between
private / corporate and commercial revenue service passenger
operations is recognized and reflected in any regulations that are
adopted.
For private/corporate aircraft operations, from a risk management
perspective Boeing recommends that the TSA turn focus (including
enhancements when warranted by specific risk assessment) on the
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 2
provisions in 49 CFR parts1542 and 1544 that are intended to
ensure aircraft are not improperly accessed and not misused.
TSA should continue private sector engagement with industry at the
close of the comment period. Past TSA final rules suggest that,
when final rule procedures are placed into functional business
operation, elements contained within the rule have not always
anticipated the complexity and direct/indirect impacts to business
requirements and their respective unique operations. Further, final
rule guidance requires a level of detail that enables scaleable
functional deployment in the business environment and supports
industry recognized business models and meets business case
requirements. As the LASP incorporates third party vendor
elements, this suggests the critical need for open and continuous
communication between the GA operators and TSA. This dialogue
is all the more critical and should be similar to the engagement level
enjoyed by the commercial airline companies whose operations
reside at major airports at which TSA has a physical presence.
General aviation operators' ready accessibility to TSA
representatives is paramount.
Boeing supports other GA operators with the recommendation to
enhance the TSA‘s NPRM process with the concept of TSA
establishing an Aviation Rulemaking Committee consisting of both
government policy makers, government program managers, and
aviation industry representatives responsible for developing effective
aviation security programs that meet and support both U.S.
economic and security objectives. Such a committee would ideally
be instituted as a process step for all future TSA final rules, including
the LASP. Such a committee would continue DHS and TSA efforts
to enhance partnered solutions for meeting national economic and
security challenges.
The components of the LASP for private operators should be limited
to the following three primary elements:
1. Identification by the TSA of operators who are subject to a LASP,
as well as identification of the TSA principal person responsible
for the operation.
2. A one-time Security Threat Assessment (STA) and Criminal
Background Check (CHRC) of Flight Crew Members.
3. Acknowledgement and acceptance of corporate or operator
Security procedures that ensure that the passengers & property
on-board the private / corporate aircraft are known to the
operator and crew and do not pose a security threat to the
operation, especially in cases of non-revenue service operations.
Waiver inclusion is a common component of many of TSA‘s final
rules and we strongly recommend the continuing practice of waiver
inclusions in all future TSA NPRM‘s and final rules. Instead of a
“one size fits all” approach to the LASP, rules should be scalable for
the different types and sizes of operators/airports and the unique
operations conducted by an individual operator. Waivers in part can
address such needs, form a stronger cooperative partnership, and
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 3
be (and have been) a significant successful tool for operators when
unique operations unforeseen to TSA exist.
In order to successfully implement these proposed changes, Boeing
and industry require significant improvement in access to TSA
Transportation Sector Network security specialists. The TSA needs
to significantly enhance access and ensure adequate resources to
support implementation and follow-up. The rule should not go
forward until there is an assurance of adequate resources to support
industry compliance efforts.
Boeing‘s overall approach to aviation security advocates for a risk-
based approach that includes a continuous analysis model
measuring threat, vulnerability, and consequences. When higher
risks are identified, commensurate countermeasures and higher
threat level security postures are deployed in order to effectively
mitigate those risks to an acceptable level.
We agree with other leading large GA operators that GA
transportation security must be viewed in context of other modes of
transportation. Our current security plans are based on this
approach and have been proven successful for decades.
Why is the
change justified? Many GA operators have operations unique to their business
environment and operating purpose. Commercial manufacturing
operations subject to this rule range from flight tests to customer
deliveries of commercial non-revenue airplanes. There is concern
that the proposed LASP and its impacts to GA operators would
severely limit the ability of GA operators to meet their business
operation timelines, thus doing irreparable harm to the general
aviation industry and specifically to an operator‘s competitive edge in
an international market. Moreover, onerous and non-supported
requirements/process in a highly diverse environment may in fact
dilute the existing level of aviation security.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 4
COMMENT #2 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "C. Implementation and Compliance Schedule"
Specific section Page 64795, 1st column
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
Various parts of the proposed rule text.
The preamble states:
" … TSA proposes using a phased approach in the implementation of the
proposed rule. The proposed compliance schedule would allow for proper
and adequate support and staffing within TSA and also would allow
sufficient time for compliance on the part of the newly regulated aircraft
operators and airport operators. Following issuance of a final rule, TSA
would implement a communication plan commencing with a wide distribution
of press releases, web-site postings, and industry association briefings and
meetings. These briefings and meetings would communicate, educate, and
What is the TSA’s confirm which operators would be affected by the final rule, what actions the
proposed aircraft operators and airport operators would be required to take to comply
requirement or with the rule, and the time period within which the aircraft operator and
text? airport operators would be required to submit their applications and other
supporting documents. At that time, TSA would provide the process,
procedures, and necessary forms to the aircraft operators and airport
operators to enable the operators to apply for the large aircraft program, or
the airport partial program, via a secure web-board."
Compliance requirements would be phased-in, depending on the
specifics of a GA operator‘s geographic location or current
participation in an existing TSA aviation security program.
Boeing concurs the TSA needs to significantly enhance access and
ensure adequate resources to support implementation and follow-up.
Phased implementation should proceed at a pace commensurate
with the availability and assurance of adequate TSA resources to
support industry compliance efforts.
What about this
proposed Because many GA operators have existing security programs and
requirement do processes, Boeing considers that, rather than being mandated by
we want this regulation, GA operators should have the option of selecting
changed? their compliance phase based on corporate criteria or business
operating model (e.g., headquarters location, the aircraft basing
locations, or an existing security program). The selection option
should be performance based and therefore at the discretion of the
operator.
GA operators should be allowed to select their compliance phase
Why is the
change justified?
based on capability, performance and the defining factor most
advantageous to their respective operations.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 5
COMMENT #3 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title "Security Threat Assessment with Criminal History
Specific section Records Check for Flight Crew Members"
of the proposed Page: 64796, 1st column
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.607 - Criminal history records check
The preamble to the rule states:
"TSA proposes to require that large aircraft operators ensure that
all of their flight crew members undergo a security threat
What is the TSA’s
assessment (STA) that includes a fingerprint-based criminal
proposed
history records check (CHRC) and other analyses, including
requirement or
checks of appropriate terrorist watch-lists and other databases.
text?
The list of disqualifying crimes of the CHRC would be the same as
for the full and full all-cargo operations. 49 CFR §1544.229 and
1544.230."
Some GA operators have flight crew members, as defined under the
NPRM, that are already subject to fingerprint-based criminal history
records checks completed as a federal requirement for commercial
airplane flight crews. Some customer flight crews (rated on large
commercial aircraft) on board manufacturer-controlled aircraft are
likewise subject to a TSA aviation security program other than the
LASP. These flight crews operate under these programs whether
flying domestic or international test or delivery routes. Some GA
operators have personnel that have existing government security
clearances, based on Department of Defense (DoD)-mandated
background investigations. Boeing recommends that a waiver
clause be contained in the rule to allow affected GA aircraft
operators to submit TSA waiver requests for exclusion from STAs
where ―in lieu of‖ CHRCs are already completed.
What about this In addition, flight crews should be subject only to one STA and
proposed
CHRC. We recommend a ―TSA Vetted‖ statement on the pilot
requirement do
we want certificate as one solution for documenting pilot identification and
changed? certification.
Further, it is important to separate the approval of the flight crew
from being linked to a specific aircraft. Most operators would have a
need to manifest STA-screened members against an airplane tail
number within a database rapidly and in ―real-time,‖ in order to meet
short term turnarounds when flight test, delivery operations, or
business operations require. Flight operations for manufacturing and
delivery operations place pilots on different aircraft, particularly flight
test aircrews and aircrews receiving deliveries for their respective
companies.
The Security Threat Assessment (STA) process needs to be better
identified throughout the proposed rule. For example, how is
information that comes to the knowledge of GA operators pertaining
to the criminal history of a previously cleared/approved individual
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 6
communicated to TSA, and how is that placed in the TSA system?
STAs need to be transferable from airport to airport and carrier to
carrier with visibility for all member operators. The TSA mechanism
for flight crew member STA status must be a real time and a 24/7
accessible response system.
Boeing recommends that a waiver clause be included in the final rule
to allow operator or customer flight test technicians and engineers
who have not been subject to CHRCs, as well as proprietary armed
uniformed security officers who possess current Secret level or
above U. S. government clearance based on a DoD background
investigation, to operate on board aircraft without the flight deck
doors being closed and locked. Access to the flight deck by
company and customer personnel for manufacturing flight tests
needs to be allowed in order to validate system tests for federal and
company air flight safety requirements.
Commercial airplane test flights and commercial airplane deliveries
of non-revenue-service airplanes are unique operations that require
routine flight deck access by technicians, engineers, and, in some
cases, proprietary security officers not otherwise defined in the
NPRM as flight crew members. Given the numbers, breadth, and
pace of flight test operations, it is not reasonable to run all vetted
employees, contractors, or customers for every type of commercial
Why is the airplane potentially in this position through a finger-print based
change justified? background investigation. Due diligence on the part of some GA
operators is accomplished by conducting security background
investigations on all permanently-badged personnel prior to
permitting access to company property, as well as, in some unique
circumstances providing test flights with a proprietary armed security
officer who has been additionally subject to a DoD security clearance
background investigation.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 7
COMMENT #4 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Security Threat Assessment with Criminal History
Records Check for Flight Crew Members"
Specific section Page 64796, 1st column
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
Subpart G, Security Threat Assessments for Large Aircraft Flight
Crew, …
The preamble to the rule states:
"TSA recognizes that a flight crew member may be contracted to
work for more than one large aircraft operator. We seek comment
What is the TSA’s
on whether the STA should be transferable so that the flight crew
proposed
member would need to undergo only one STA every five years,
requirement or
regardless of the number of employers the flight crew members
text?
may have within the five-year period. Potential employers would
check the status of the flight crew member’s STA through a
mechanism required by TSA."
What about this
proposed
requirement do Boeing recommends that flight crews have transferable STA status.
we want
changed?
Business operations for many GA operators to include flight tests
Why is the
change justified?
and customer deliveries would be negatively impacted if STA‘s were
not transferable for flight crews.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 8
COMMENT #5 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Page 64796, 1st column
Specific section
of the proposed
document that is
Related rule section:
of concern. §1544.103(e) - Content of a security program for a large aircraft
operator.
The preamble to the rule states:
"TSA also is considering ways to positively identify pilots
What is the TSA’s
conducting both domestic and international flight operations and
proposed
effectively link them to the aircraft they are operating. We seek
requirement or
comment and recommended methods for positively identifying
text?
pilots and effectively linking them to the aircraft they are
operating."
What about this
proposed Boeing recommends that the rule allow flexibility to companies with
requirement do internal security control processes to identify pilots against flight
we want manifests for particular aircraft.
changed?
GA operators know their flight crews and manifest them according to
Why is the the business need. Moreover, many large operators control access
change justified? to flight lines and maintain a high security posture on their airport
adjacent properties.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 9
COMMENT #6 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Watch-List Matching of Passengers"
Specific section Page 64796, 2nd column
of the proposed
document that is Related rule sections:
of concern. §1544.202 - Persons and property onboard all-cargo aircraft
§1544.245 – Passenger vetting for large aircraft operators
The proposed rule would require watch-list matching of GA aircraft
operator passengers through a TSA-approved third party auditor.
The preamble to the rule states:
"Under the current watch-list matching process, TSA provides the
No Fly and Selectee List to twelve-five, partial program, and
private charter aircraft operators to enable them to conduct the
watch-list matching. When an aircraft operator receives
passenger information that is similar to, or the same as, a name
on the No Fly or Selectee List, the aircraft operator is required to
notify law enforcement personnel and TSA in order to determine
whether that passenger is, in fact, the individual listed on the list.
The aircraft operator may not board a passenger until TSA has
What is the TSA’s
instructed the aircraft operator that the passenger is clear to board
proposed
the aircraft."
requirement or
text?
The U.S. government is in the process of assuming control over
watch-list matching in the aviation environment under the Secure
Flight Program. TSA would provide the watch-list to watch-list
service providers approved by TSA. Large aircraft operators would
transmit their passenger information to these watch-list service
providers, who would conduct the automated watch-list matching
function and transmit the results back to the large aircraft operators.
In the preamble to the propose rule, TSA invites comments on the
role that watch-list service providers may continue to have if the
responsibility for watch-list matching shifts to the U.S. Government in
the future.
Boeing considers that the proposed rule should recognize that
passengers who board general aviation aircraft are known to the
operator and crew, and are made up of employees, guests, family
members, and clients who typically have close ties to the operator of
the aircraft. Many categories of operators have internal background
investigations associated with their employment screening process.
What about this Passengers in this context are not revenue-service passengers in
proposed the commercial airline sense of the word.
requirement do
we want Further, as TSA has matured as an agency, the term ―passenger‖ is
changed? rarely defined in documentation and has taken on a general usage
that complicates federal document interpretations. In one case, the
term is defined as ―an individual on board a revenue service aircraft‖.
Much like ―cargo‖ is defined as items on a waybill vs. the definition of
―property.‖ A ―revenue service‖ identification generally is an
indication that passengers are coming from the general population,
and an operator does not necessarily personally know who or what
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 10
is on board. A ―non-revenue service‖ is an indication that an
owner/operator knows exactly who and what is on board their private
aircraft. In a risk-based model the non-revenue service aircraft
represents a significant reduction in risk, which should be recognized
and accounted for in aviation security programs. The LASP attempts
to address both categories of operations with one set of
countermeasures. The LASP, as proposed, would place a burden
on the non-revenue service GA operators by imposing a
standardized, blanket approach that fails to recognize the
effectiveness of an industry standard risk-based model.
The TSA is proposing that private operators use a watch-list service
provider (WLSP), which would involve paying a fee for service for
vetting each passenger against No Fly and Selectee lists. The TSA
Secure Flight program, unlike the LASP program, provides watch-list
vetting free of charge to operators In view of a significantly
decreased risk in the GA operator passenger population, the fee-for-
service proposal for operators should be eliminated.
The Secure Flight program in many operators' experience does not
function in real time, which would have a severe, adverse impact on
larger GA operators, many of whom have real time business
commitments and time lines. The requirement for using a WLSP to
process and handle passenger information creates an additional
impediment to timely business operations and, thus, is of great
concern. Both timeliness of passenger vetting and privacy of the
information must be addressed to the satisfaction of the air
transportation sector as a whole.
If the TSA elects to retain WSLP, then Boeing recommends that
these entities should be a voluntary option that may be suitable for
flight departments relying on flight planning service providers, while
other operators should be able to obtain passenger vetting directly
through a government service such as Secure Flight. Passenger
vetting, as proposed through a WLSP or through the Federal
government's Secure Flight program, should be instantaneous,
providing the operator an immediate pass / fail response. Ensuring
that the vetting is instantaneous is critical to meet time-sensitive test
flight and customer delivery business requirements, which are
typically predicated on the passengers‘ schedule requirement.
Large GA operators should be granted the option, based on positive
internal controls, capabilities, and oversight, to access the watch list
database to perform checks themselves. Alternatively, at a
minimum, WLSPs should be required to meet cycle time
requirements between manifest list submittals and replies to aviation
submitters, and should also be subject to a frequent TSA auditable
oversight process. This process should include an immediate TSA
point of contact to redress conflicts or rectify situations that would
significantly impact GA operator business operations and confidence
in the program.
The proposal to allow use of master passenger lists should be
retained. Passengers on private aircraft are typically known to the
operator and crew, since they fly regularly on-board the aircraft.
Each passenger that has been vetted by an operator should
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 11
automatically become part of the operator‘s master passenger list
indefinitely or until the TSA notifies the operator that the individual‘s
status has changed. Private passengers on corporate flights, private
flights, or on a demonstration flights with an aircraft manufacturer,
where the passenger has been previously vetted, should not be
subject to additional requirements at the time of the specific flight
operation.
The communication conduit to a service provider needs to be
identical and as rapid for all GA aircraft operations as it is for
commercial revenue passenger airline carriers, which is a 24/7 real
time electronic access with backups. The TSA‘s historical
performance to communicate processes and provide like service
conduits to GA operations is not consistent with business
requirements or with those services provided to commercial
passenger operations. Service provider communications need to be
directly accessible by multiple GA operator sites, not just one
centralized site. Response times need to be immediate with a
communication link to an adjudication authority for immediate
redress of issues impacting business deliveries. Further, the NPRM
does not evaluate the capacity of local law enforcement agencies to
respond to a corresponding number of increased cases of watch-list
checks; they would be responding to support 10,000 impacted GA
operators. Nor does the NPRM address business impacts related to
law enforcement not being able to meet such expanding aviation
security demands under the LASP. An evaluation and impact
analysis should be an element of the TSA overall program analysis.
An operational review and adjudication process needs to be set up
immediately. A waiver clause should be contained in the proposed
rule to facilitate a GA operator with comparable watch-list capability
to perform watch-list activities.
As a federally-mandated requirement, it should be federally funded
and not imposed as an additional burden on the GA operator who
typically will not be able to off-set the cost.
The proposed rule should identify a specific TSA office and
representative to be contacted for resolutions, and should include
detailed process steps. If there is to be a service provider in the
proposed rule, then TSA should also maintain their infrastructure and
process to measure quality performance and oversight of the service
provider and a working communication conduit for complaints and
recommendations.
The master passenger list process contained in the proposed rule is
well documented. Associated costs and payees require further
assessment.
With respect to privacy notices: GA aircraft operators would be
required to provide dates of birth (DOB), whereas commercial carrier
passengers are not currently required to provide that level of detail.
Such information, typically categorized as Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), is considered ―high-exposure‖ privacy information
that has legal ramifications for its use and protection by companies,
including GA operators. Exercising of legally-mandated privacy
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 12
protection processes would impose a burdensome and non-value-
added bureaucracy to flight operations. Additionally, the privacy
notices proposed would need to be translated into all languages for
international operations and customers. Obtaining this information
may also be impacted by a customer‘s national laws or by The Safe
Harbor Principles for Protection of Personal Information in the
European Union, of which Boeing has joined under an agreement
between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European
Commission, of the European Union.
Maintaining documents is not addressed in the proposed rule. We
recommend adopting language that provides an operator with
flexibility of options, including adopting practices accepted for the
revenue-service passenger base. Otherwise, posting a notice in
flight operations would be preferable to individual notices if it remains
a requirement. Integration into a submittal fly away form is another
option.
Once the final rule for this rulemaking is released, TSA can assist
GA operators in customer relations by providing educational
awareness material to our customer bases via industry
communication media.
This proposed rule would impose significant delays on customer
deliveries for Boeing. GA operators as a whole, with their unique
operations, are not environments conducive to procure manifest lists
far enough in advance to facilitate on-time departures.
Third Party Service Providers create an additional link in a
communication chain that may not be able to provide real-time
response and adjudication, thus creating significant flight delays and
negatively impacting customer relations and business operations.
Flight technicians, engineers, uniformed security, and just-in-time
customer deliveries will be adversely impacted when last minute
personnel changes are required. Failure of the vendor
communication system for immediate turn-around puts operators at
Why is the
change justified?
high risk. While the NPRM responsibly addresses conflict of issue
challenges with service providers, it also injects a significant and
unacceptable risk to our business operations. If a customer is lost
as a result of either unintentional or even deliberate failure to deliver
by a service provider, the consequences to the GA operators and
their customers are not comparable to a passenger airline losing a
single customer. The resulting aggregate loss of revenue of one
customer to some major GA operators or their contracted customers
could be measured in multiple millions or billions of dollars and
consequently impact the U.S. economy adversely, with little
corresponding increase in effective security. The resolution process
through a vendor is time consuming and not conducive to real-time
aircraft operations for flight tests, customer deliveries, or executive
flight operations.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 13
COMMENT #7 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "b. Watch-List Providers"
Specific section Page 64797, 1st column
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.245 – Passenger vetting for large aircraft operators
The preamble states:
What is the TSA’s
proposed "Large aircraft operators would be responsible for all costs
requirement or associated with watch-list matching, including any fee charged by
text? the watch-list service providers."
Unlike the proposed LASP rule, the Secure Flight final rule does not
require participants to incur a service fee. Why, then, would the
proposed rule require general aviation operators to pay a fee? Since
What about this federal regulations drive the requirements, Boeing recommends that
proposed federal funding should bear the cost of the service provider.
requirement do
we want Service provider fees have not been identified or established, as was
changed? done in the case of the LASP CHRCs. These costs, if imposed
would be required to meet business case requirements and inclusion
into a company‘s long-range business plan.
Creating a rule with unspecified budget requirements, that will impact
the first of the Phase 1 participants within 60 days, is not supportive
Why is the of an effective business model. Adequate lead times are required to
change justified? meet business budgetary requirements and the rule should take this
into account when determining a compliance time.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 14
COMMENT #8 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "d. Passenger information"
Specific section Page 64797, 2nd - 3rd columns
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.202 - Persons and property onboard all-cargo aircraft
The preamble states:
"This proposed rule would require large aircraft operators to
request full name, gender, date of birth, and redress number (if
available) from all passengers. Further, it would require large
aircraft operators to transmit to the watch-list service provider the
passengers’ full names, and also transmit the passengers’
genders, dates of birth, and redress numbers, to the extent they
are available. TSA has determined that an individual’s full name,
gender, and date of birth are critically important for effective
automated watch-list matching of that individual against those
individuals on the watch-list. The full name is the primary attribute
used to conduct watch-list matching and would be required for all
passengers. Partial names would increase the likelihood of false
positive matches, because partial names are more likely to match
a number of different entries on the watch-list. As a result, this
proposed rule would require individuals to provide their full names
and would prohibit aircraft operators from boarding a passenger
who does not provide a full name, date of birth and gender of the
passenger would be optional.
This proposed requirement on passengers to provide the full name
is consistent with TSA’s proposal in the Secure Flight NPRM. In
What is the that NPRM, TSA proposed to require passengers on commercial
TSA’s proposed flights operated by full program operators and foreign air carriers
requirement or to provide their full name when they make a reservation for a flight.
text? [See proposed §1540.107(b) in the Secure Flight NPRM, 72 FR at
48386.]
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would require
operators and pilots of private large aircraft that would be subject
to this TSA proposed rule and to the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) proposed rule titled ``Advance Information on
Private Aircraft Arriving in and Departing from the United States,''
to submit their passenger manifest to CBP only and not to watch-
list service providers. TSA would deem U.S. operators of private
large aircraft to be in compliance with this proposed rule’s
requirements for submitting passenger information for watch-list
matching for international flights if the pilot submits passenger
information required under the proposed CBP regulations."
In addition, this proposed rule would require large aircraft operators
to transmit certain information from an individual‘s passport (full
name, passport number, country of issuance, expiration date,
gender, and date of birth), if it is available and was provided to the
aircraft operator.
The preamble also states:
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 15
"Under the proposed rule, individuals would not be compelled to
provide their gender, date of birth, or redress number when
requested by the aircraft operators. However, without this
information, the watch-list service provider may be unable to
perform effective automated watch-list matching and, as a result,
the individuals may be more likely to be denied boarding, or under
certain circumstances, be subject to additional screening."
The NPRM language is equivalent to telling a general aircraft owner
or their non-revenue passenger that they are not required to provide
personal identification information (PII); however, if they do not,
clearance to board will not be granted or will be significantly delayed.
Boeing notes that TSA has a consistent approach in its NPRMs and
final rules to make programs (or elements of programs) voluntary,
but failure to comply voluntarily places the operator or user in a
category where cycle times are then increased for services, resulting
in nonuse or higher costs for the service. Boeing recommends that
TSA recognize that voluntary directives are not conducive for
communications to either business executives or customers. The
term ―voluntary‖ does not express a compliance activity and
therefore is not a viable business process for dealing with these
issues. GA operators need to communicate effectively to customers
and company executives the specific PII required information based
What about this on government security requirements. We suggest that TSA state
proposed the specific PII information that is required for the watch-list check.
requirement do
we want Handling of PII within the private sector is sensitive, subject to legal
changed? constraints, and requires additional costs and procedures to protect.
Existing contractual agreements, non-disclosure agreements, and
proprietary agreements may be in conflict with this proposed rule.
Moreover, customers, especially non-U.S. customers and their
guests will not uniformly support the collection of their PII by a
vendor to be supplied to another vendor to be entered into a U.S.
federal database; nor may they be legally required to provide it by
their own national laws. Some aircraft owners do not desire their
locations to be tracked for proprietary or competitive reasons, just as
senior members of the government do not, for strategy and personal
safety reasons, desire their movement, private meetings, and
locations to be tracked. Further, for purposes of maintaining
proprietary information, many GA operators do not want operations
and personnel being tracked via a database system open to public
disclosure, since these flights may be conducted primarily for private
or sensitive business purposes. TSA needs to provide protected
processes to ensure our customers' and executives' anonymity.
GA operators conducting non-revenue service operations have
personal knowledge of the flight crews, passengers, and cargo on
board their aircraft, which mitigates the level of risk. The
requirement to produce detailed PII information is excessive to the
threat as long as the aircraft is not conducting operations that would
Why is the
change justified?
necessitate their inclusion into another security program (i.e.,
transiting through or having a destination of an airport sterile area).
As noted above, within the GA industry owners and operators of
large commercial aircraft have exceptionally strong interests in
protecting these valuable and unique assets during storage and
operation and protecting client information.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 16
COMMENT #9 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Unauthorized Persons and Accessible Weapons on
Board Large Aircraft"
Page 64800, 3rd column
Specific section
of the proposed Related rule sections:
document that is §1544.202 - Persons and property onboard all-cargo
of concern. aircraft
§1544.205 – Acceptance and screening of cargo
§1544.206 – Persons and property on board a large aircraft
§1544.207 – Inspection of individuals and property
The preamble to the rule states:
"Under the proposed security measures, the large aircraft operator
would check for weapons and check any container, cargo, or
company material that may be used to hide a stowaway, or
explosives, incendiaries, or other destructive substances or items.
What is the TSA’s
The security program would describe the method for conducting
proposed
the checks, such as visual inspection of the exterior of persons or
requirement or
containers of certain sizes and weights, with further evaluation if
text?
necessary. This proposed rule would only apply to property that
may be accessible to the cabin of the aircraft. For example, if the
property is stowed in a cargo hold that would not allow access to
the cabin of the aircraft, then that property would be exempt from
inspection."
On occasion, manufacturing test flights may have an armed
proprietary uniformed officer (having a "secret" or higher level
government security clearance) on board flight tests. Executive
flights may have an "Executive Protection Officer" on board, also
with a clearance. These personnel should continue to be authorized
to carry weapons under LASP waiver from TSA when warranted.
Commercial airplane deliveries, however, should continue to fall
under either the requirement of the Fixed Base Operator (FBO) or
sterile area, based on the customer‘s route or destination.
Manufacturer flight tests, by virtue of their required operations,
What about this require the presence of tools and equipment in the cabin. Other
proposed
operators have tools and equipment in the cabin because they either
requirement do
we want don‘t have separate cargo storage areas or because the items
changed? support their respective unique businesses. Boeing suggests that
the proposed rule should recognize instances where tools and
equipment would be allowed on board. Most GA operators, if not all,
do not believe such items pose any risk to the aircraft.
Large commercial aircraft have been used in emergency situations
(such as unstable countries) to extract employees, friends, family
and critical materiel from hostilities. This type of operation requires
armed personnel to ensure maximum protection during the process.
It is important to maintain the ability to operate without encumbrance
for these special situations.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 17
Manufacturer flight tests require unique equipment that we do not
consider poses a security risk whether, in domestic or international
airspace. Armed proprietary security officers not only do not pose a
Why is the security risk, they serve to reduce or mitigate other perceived risks.
change justified?
The ability to operate in special events with adequate protection is
essential to meeting unforeseen needs.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 18
COMMENT #10 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Sensitive Security Information"
Page 64801, 3rd column
Specific section
of the proposed
Related rule section:
document that is
of concern. 49 CFR part 1520, in general
§1520.5 - Sensitive security information
§1544.305 -- Security directives and information
The preamble to the rule states:
"Protection of Sensitive Security Information (SSI), as codified at 49
CFR part 1520, would apply to each aircraft operator operating
under the LASP. Airport and aircraft operator security programs and
related amendments; Security Directives and Information Circulars;
technical specifications of security screening and detection systems
and devices; among other types of information, constitute SSI under
current §1520.5 and are prohibited from public disclosure. Watch-list
service providers’ instructions to the large aircraft operators would
What is the TSA’s also be SSI. The SSI regulations would apply to LASP’s as well.
proposed
requirement or Access to SSI is strictly limited to those covered persons with a need
text? to know, as defined in 49 CFR §§1520.7 and 1520.11. In general, a
person has a need to know specific SSI when he or she requires
access to the information to carry out transportation security
activities that are government-approved, -accepted, -funded, -
recommended, or -directed, including for purposes of training on,
and supervision of, such activities or to provide legal or technical
advice to airport operators, aircraft operators or their employees
regarding security-related requirements. Accordingly, the protection
of SSI would apply to each large aircraft operator operating under a
security program pursuant to § 1544.101(b)."
Boeing recommends differentiating to the greatest extent possible
What about this actual SSI information (procedures, training materials, threat
proposed information, etc) from general non-SSI practices and procedures.
requirement do
we want TSA providing clear SSI guidance supported by specific information
changed? would be more effective for communications and security
requirements management.
To maximize communication among large employee workforces (up
to 160,000 people), large GA operators such as Boeing use on-line
web-based systems to communicate processes and desktop
procedures for quality and certification process consistency.
Why is the
change justified?
We consider that most TSA training, process documents,
information, etc., can be shared more widely to enable our business
practices while ensuring the select SSI information is managed
effectively. Thus, only actual SSI information would require a need-
to-know process and controls to be put in place. Boeing would like
to keep the special process exceptions to an absolute minimum.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 19
COMMENT #11 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Page 64804, 1st column
Specific section
of the proposed
Related rule sections:
document that is
of concern. §1542.113 - Airport tenant security program
§1544.225 - Security of the aircraft and facilities
The preamble text states:
"In addition to the two types of airports in the proposed rule text,
TSA requests comments on whether other types of airports should
also be required to adopt a security program, such as the partial
program.
For example, should TSA require airports that regularly serve
What is the TSA’s
aircraft used in private charter operations–aircraft with MTOW of
proposed
over 45,500 kilograms or a passenger seating configuration of 61
requirement or
or more seats–to adopt a partial program? If TSA were to adopt
text?
such an approach, how should TSA determine whether an airport
“regularly serves” a large aircraft with MTOW of over 45,500
kilograms or a passenger seat configuration of 61 or more seats?
Should TSA require airports that serve any large aircraft with
MTOW of over 45,500 kilograms or a 62 passenger seat
configuration of 61 or more seats to adopt a partial program,
regardless of frequency?"
Regarding the partial program, Boeing considers that the term
“regularly served” airports requires further definition in order to fully
assess the NPRM. Boeing further considers that the definition of
airport requires an understanding of operations and remoteness.
Boeing for example utilizes Moses Lake (in Washington state) for
many flight test operations. The classification of this airport due to
size or "regularly served" is much less important than the security
afforded by its remoteness and Boeing‘s interest to protect flight test
aircraft. Additionally, remote operations occur with large GA aircraft,
such as in Alaska to support oil field operations. The same sets of
standards are not conducive or warranted based on size of aircraft or
What about this frequency of service. Conversely, even smaller aircraft operating out
proposed
of Reagan National Airport in Washington DC may have more
requirement do
we want relevance to security. The selected list of airports and any future
changed? inclusions impacted by the LASP should be reviewed under a refined
risk-based model. There appears to be inconsistency in how some
airports arrived on the LASP impacted list when they appear to pose
minimal risks to national security. Many airports used by GA
operators, large and small, have limited or nonexistent resources at
their locations to support the LASP airport security requirements.
Inclusion on the LASP impacted airport list has the potential to
prevent LASP aircraft use in cases where the airport could not
economically meet LASP requirements. This would in turn adversely
impact the business operations of the GA operators.
It is critical that the proposed rule identify the responsibility, authority,
and accountability (RAA) for airport security programs as an airport
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 20
manager function and not as that of an airfield tenant. There should
also be an adjudication and redress process for airfield tenants for
instances in which TSA audit findings identify airfield management
failures, so as to permit continuity of tenant business operations
under a temporary waiver until corrections can be made by the
airfield management.
Again, a one size fits all approach is not warranted. The relationship
is more associated with types of operations, people involved, and
remoteness than aircraft size or being ‗regularly served‘. For these
types of operations from a risk management perspective, Boeing
recommends that the TSA turn focus (including enhancements when
warranted by specific risk assessment) on the provisions in 49 CFR
parts1542 and 1544 that are intended to ensure aircraft are not
improperly accessed and not misused.
Why is the
change justified?
It is important to recognize that security is layered. For remote,
under-developed airfields, it may make more sense to secure aircraft
and operations than the airfield.
Airfield tenants should not be held liable nor have their business
operations placed at risk due to adverse TSA audit findings levied
against airfield management RAAs under the LASP. This is
especially important to clarify flexibility in interpretation of
requirements based on specific operations and unique security
requirements.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 21
COMMENT #12 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "B. Proposed Requirements for Certain Airports"
Page 64804, 2nd column
Specific section
of the proposed
document that is
Related rule sections:
of concern. § 1542.113 - Airport tenant security program
§ 1544.233 - Security training for security coordinators & crew
§ 1544.235 - Training Program – Individual security related duties
The preamble to the rule states:
"In addition to the proposed amendments to §1542.101(b) and (c),
TSA is seeking comments on whether the content requirements of
What is the TSA’s the partial program and the supporting program should be
proposed amended. For example, TSA is considering whether it should
requirement or require airport security coordinators at locations with partial
text? programs to undergo the same security training that airport
security coordinators at locations with a supporting or complete
program under §1542.3 undergo or whether a shorter training
program would be appropriate."
Boeing considers that, in general, training for all audiences should
be significantly shorter, and a waiver exception should be available
for GA operators with existing security training to avoid unnecessary
What about this duplication of training.
proposed
requirement do Establishing and maintaining sustainment training affects existing
we want labor contracts and requires long-range business planning. Further,
changed? not all GA operator locations have security supervision personnel; to
require them will impact staffing requirements and necessitate
additional contract negotiations with security contractors.
LASP requirements should be scalable for all airports and airfields.
In a risk-based model, GA operations present less of a risk than
commercial passenger aircraft operations.
Why is the For private/corporate operations, from a risk management
change justified? perspective, Boeing recommends that the TSA turn its focus
(including enhancements when warranted by specific risk
assessment) on the provisions in 49 CFR parts 1542 and 1544 that
are intended to ensure that aircraft are not improperly accessed and
not misused.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 22
COMMENT #13 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "B. Proposed Requirements for Certain Airports"
Specific section Page 64804-05, 3rd column
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§542.113 - Airport tenant security program
The preamble to the rule states:
What is the TSA’s
proposed " … TSA is also considering whether airport operators should be
requirement or required to undertake a risk-based self assessment of their
text? security programs."
Boeing does not consider that a standardized risk-based self-
assessment program across 10,000 operators with differing
operations, scope, and size will provide meaningful outcomes.
Additionally, a generic approach across so many operators with
different resources, assets, and tools would not, by its very nature,
What about this allow for a meaningful analysis of countermeasures to reduce those
proposed
risks. For years, DHS has attempted to produce vulnerability and
requirement do
we want consequence models with varying effect for low frequency users
changed? without risk management experience. Such a risk assessment
model for GA operators would have to be generic to the point of
having minimal value to the majority of operators, which would result
in just an additional administrative requirement with no substantive
mitigation of a threat.
Many GA operators already conduct significant risk-based self-
assessments based on industry standards, and have corresponding
mature procedures and processes to address outcomes of these risk
Why is the assessments. Such assessments are typically more sophisticated,
change justified? are more frequent, and exceed TSA‘s risk assessment model.
Boeing recommends that a waiver exception be available for GA
operators with existing risk programs to avoid unnecessary and
duplicated efforts.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 23
COMMENT #14 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "D. Third-Party Audits for Large Aircraft Operators"
Page 64805, 2nd column
Specific section and
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Section title: "Section 1544.243 Third Party Audit"
Page 64814, 1st column
Related rule section:
§1544.243 - Third party audit.
The proposed rule would require each aircraft operator to contract
with an auditor approved under 49 CFR part 1522 to conduct an
audit of the aircraft operator‘s compliance with the regulations and
the security program. Except as approved by TSA, each aircraft
operator would be required to cause the initial audit to be conducted
within sixty days of the approval of the aircraft operator‘s security
program under §1544.105 ("Approval and amendments to the
What is the TSA’s security program").
proposed
requirement or Additionally, each aircraft operator would be required to cause an
text? audit to be conducted 24 months after the aircraft operator‘s most
recent audit conducted to meet the requirements.
Finally, each aircraft operator would be required to provide the
auditor access to all records, equipment, and facilities necessary for
the auditor to conduct an audit of the aircraft operator‘s compliance
with this chapter and its security program.
Boeing considers that auditing should be a federal agency
governance function that should not be delegated to a third party
vendor. Most, if not all GA operators are in agreement that relieving
the federal audit burden to the private sector and delegating service
providers to grant privilege to GA operators at the GA operator's cost
is not seen as conducive to effective federal oversight and
surveillance. Further, the NPRM neither provides a cost analysis for
audit costs, nor specified if audits are required for every site that a
GA operator operates out of or just one site for like operations. It
What about this appears that the more complex the operations and the more sites a
proposed GA operator has, the more costly the audits. These issues require a
requirement do more precise explanation.
we want
changed? The auditor, regardless, would be required to be a U.S. person (U.S.
citizen, U.S. national, or lawful permanent resident) to meet export
control compliance when applicable. Third party auditors would be
required to execute a non-disclosure agreement and would be
subject to a quality oversight to ensure that they would not be
prejudicial against the affected GA operator and that no conflict of
interest exists.
As a comparison, the existing Twelve-Five Standard Security
Program (TFSSP) has been in place for years and successfully
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 24
relies on government inspectors for oversight.
Boeing requests that TSA consider an agency workforce to provide
operator oversight; moreover, the requirement for an audit should be
waived or considered as having been met if the operator has been
audited in the preceding twenty-four months via a previous or
existing program.
It is recognized that the TSA is trying to use alternative ways of
making this rule workable by proposing use of non-government
auditors. However, security oversight and compliance is a uniquely
governmental function and we are concerned about operators
having to contract and pay outside contractors for federally-
mandated security oversight. The use of non-government auditors
Why is the generates a risk of inconsistently applied processes and ―unofficial‖
change justified? interpretations of regulations among the GA operator community.
Third party companies routinely use sub-contractors to conduct work
under federal government contracts. These sub-contractors often
work for or provide services to multiple companies, thus increasing
the risk of conflicts of interest that may not be identifiable in the
LASP program requirements for the auditors.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 25
COMMENT #15 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Section 1540.301 Withdrawal of Approval of a
Specific section Security Program"
of the proposed Page 64808, 2nd column
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1540.301 - Withdrawal of approval of a security program
What is the TSA’s
proposed In this section, TSA proposes to provide an adjudication process for
requirement or negative audit findings.
text?
What about this Boeing recommends this section be revised to provide greater
proposed process detail on the adjudication of a negative finding, and allow
requirement do GA operators to continue operations under an interim corrective
we want action plan, especially in cases of negative findings against an
changed? airport entity versus a GA operator.
The GA operator should not be placed at business risk due to airport
Why is the
change justified?
management failures that the GA operator may not be aware of or
have any governance role over.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 26
COMMENT #16 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Specific section Section title: "Section 1544.101 Adoption and Implementation"
of the proposed Page 64809, 2nd column
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.101 – Adoption and implementation
The preamble to the rule states:
"Currently TSA regulations exempt most [government charter]
operations from the Private Charter Security Program. See 49
CFR §1544.101(f)(1)(ii). The rationale has been that such
charters can, and do, carry out procedures on a regular basis to
address the security concerns at issue. The U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) and Federal agencies use private charter
operations to transport persons and property in furtherance of their
government missions. … TSA is concerned, however, that the
What is the
chartering government agency may not always understand that it
TSA’s proposed
would be responsible for security of the operation. Unlike with
requirement or
public aircraft …, a government charter may be for a short
text?
duration, even one flight at a time, and thus normal safety
regulations continue to apply. Accordingly, the rule would make
clear that TSA would exempt government charter operations from
complying with the LASP, only if the government takes security
responsibility for the following:
(A) The aircraft;
(B) Persons onboard; and
(C) Property onboard."
We recommend revising the text as follows:
"Currently TSA regulations exempt most [government charter] and
DOD private contractors (with accepted DOD security
What about this processes) operations from the Private Charter Security Program.
proposed See 49 CFR §1544.101(f)(1)(ii) …"
requirement do
we want
Upon approval of documented procedures submitted to TSA, Boeing
changed?
recommends that these operators be authorized the same exemption
status, especially as it pertains to manufacturer flight test operations
over domestic and international airspace, as well as demonstration
flights.
Government private charter operators are provided an exemption to
the LASP based on the fact that they are subject to approved
security measures. However, some GA operators maintain a level of
security approved by and comparable to the DoD and other
government agencies.
Why is the A federal oversight agency such as TSA providing exemptions to
change justified? government contract operators implies that the LASP is not being
applied equally across the board to comparable GA operations.
Since the process exempts government agencies with accepted
(DOD based) security processes, the TSA has a basis for exempting
equivalent private sector operations and should do so within the
proposed rule.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 27
Although federal private charter operators are exempted from the
security programs, the private sector has no opportunity for approval
of comparable security programs. The government charter flies
without compliance responsibility or risk, based on a known and
identified flight crew, passengers, and property. The GA operator in
the private sector carries the compliance responsibility, risks, and
costs of this program in spite of the fact that the operator, especially
those conducting non-revenue service operations, also knows who
and what is on board their aircraft. Again this suggests a governing
agency with conflicts of interests, and imposing regulation without
basis in facts and risk assessment.
Boeing‘s security processes meet or exceed government
requirements plus meet Boeing‘s enterprise safety and security
needs. Additional requirements, oversight, and process are not
warranted. Additional process requirements will put Boeing at a
relative economic disadvantage regarding this rule as compared to
the other three large aircraft manufacturers outside the U.S.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 28
COMMENT #17 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Section 1544.103 Form, Content, and Availability"
Specific section Page 64810, 1st column
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.103 - Form, content, and availability
The preamble to the rule states:
"TSA is also proposing not to include the requirements in
What is the TSA’s
§§1544.209 and 1544.211 regarding the use of metal detection
proposed
devices and X-ray systems that are in the current private charter
requirement or
program. Because private charter operators currently do not use
text?
these devices or systems in their screening processes, it would be
unnecessary to include those requirements in the LASP…. "
Boeing supports this risk-based approach; however, in cases where
What about this a customer delivery transits through or has a final destination of an
proposed airport sterile area, the customer would need the flexibility to screen
requirement do in accordance with existing Private Charter Standard Security
we want Program (PCSSP) procedures. Inclusion of a waiver to the LASP
changed? program for submittals would be a good element.
Technology tools such as metal detection devices and x-ray systems
Why is the
change justified?
are not necessary to support and meet the intent of LASP security
requirements.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 29
COMMENT #18 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Section 1544.202 Persons and Property Onboard All-
Specific section Cargo Aircraft"
of the proposed Page 64811, 1st column
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.202 - Persons and Property Onboard All-Cargo Aircraft
The preamble to the rule states:
"Current § 1544.202 requires each aircraft operator operating
under the full all-cargo program and the twelve-five program in all-
What is the TSA’s cargo operations to apply the security measures in their security
proposed programs to persons who board the aircraft and their property.
requirement or “Cargo” is defined as property tendered for air transportation
text? accounted for on an air waybill. Company materials and other
property not under an air waybill are not cargo; rather, they are
property that would be subject to proposed § 1544.206, as
discussed in section II.A of this preamble … "
What about this Boeing supports the definition of ―cargo‖ versus ―property‖ that is
proposed applied within the LASP; it is risk-based and sound. Commercial
requirement do airplane customer deliveries often incorporate government,
we want company, privately owned property, or a nation‘s disaster relief
changed? supplies.
Why is the Exemption from cargo screening requirements is justified under a
change justified? risk-management based methodology.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 30
COMMENT #19 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Section 1544.237 Flight Deck Privileges"
Specific section Page 64812, 1st column
of the proposed
document that is
of concern. Related rule section:
§1544.237 - Flight Deck Privileges
The preamble to the rule states:
"Section 1544.237(b) that currently allows for access to the flight deck
by FAA air carrier inspectors, authorized representatives of the
National Transportation Safety Board, and U.S. Secret Service
agents. This NPRM proposes to amend § 1544.237(b) to include
Department of Defense (DOD) commercial air carrier evaluators who
What is the TSA’s may seek admittance to the aircraft flight deck. TSA proposes to
proposed amend §1544.237 to harmonize with FAA regulations at 14 CFR
requirement or §121.547. DOD commercial air carrier evaluators will assess the
text? effectiveness of a carrier’s operations department, including crew
coordination and safety awareness. …
The current regulations apply to full-program and full all-cargo
program operators. Partial program operators are not required to
comply with §1544.237.
Boeing considers that TSA should not address flight deck privileges
for partial program participants. Occasionally, some GA operators
have armed proprietary security on board flight tests, and armed
What about this proprietary executive protection personnel on executive flights, both
proposed
categories with Secret or Top Secret government clearances.
requirement do
we want Manufacturer engineers and technicians, subject to corporate
changed? backgrounds checks, and also often possessing a DoD clearance,
also routinely require access to the flight deck to meet mandatory
government and industry flight test requirements.
GA aircraft, specifically non-revenue service flights should not have
flight deck restrictions. GA Owner/Operators require access to flight
Why is the decks for a myriad of legitimate business reasons. The majority of
change justified? aircraft in this category for GA operators as a whole are
manufactured without cockpit doors.
Enclosure to Letter B-H300-09-DML-06
Page 31
COMMENT #20 of 20
Preamble to the rule
Section title: "Section 1544.607 Criminal History Records Check"
Page 64816, 1st column
Specific section and
of the proposed
document that is Section title: Total Fee
of concern. Page 64818, 1st column
Related rule section:
§1544.607 Criminal history records check
TSA is proposing to charge a fee for the adjudication of the Criminal
History Records Check (CHRC) services: $74 per flight crew
person, recurring on 5-year cycle. Flight crew members or
What is the TSA’s individuals authorized to perform screening functions who have
proposed
requirement or
undergone a criminal history records check under §§1544.229 or
text? 1544.230 would be "grandfathered" on a limited basis, such that they
would not be required to undergo a STA until five years after TSA
provided the results of their original CHRC.
Boeing recommends that the federal government bear the burden of
TSA CHRC services for federally-directed security programs,
specifically in cases where duplication of an existing CHRC from
another federal agency occurs. The use of language indicating
What about this “grandfathered on a limited basis” [i.e., preamble description of
proposed
requirement do
§1544.601, Scope and Expiration, page 64815] should instead
we want read “grandfathered, except in warranted cases.” Personnel who
changed? have been subject to a U.S. Government background investigation
and possess a current security clearance should also be exempt
from the TSA STAs as long as the background investigation remains
current (typically a 5- to 7-year period).
Operators should not bear the burden of duplicated government
Why is the
change justified?
regulatory STA requirements due to the absence of a consolidated
federal database.
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