Citizen of the States _ legally defined

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					                   Citizen of the States
                        (legally defined)
                        ©2011 Dan Goodman


citizen of the States

Note: this definition relates to citizenship, and not to
naturalization, under the Constitution of the United States
of America, nor to the treaty making power of Congress,
under the Constitution.

a. The term “citizen of the states” is equivalent to the
term “citizen of the several states.”

        "Fortunately we are not without judicial
    construction of this clause of the Constitution (that
    is, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1). The first and
    the leading case on the subject is that of Corfield v.
    Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the
    circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania in
    1823. 4 Wash C. C. 371.

             'The inquiry,' he says, 'is, what are the
         privileges and immunities of CITIZENS OF THE
         SEVERAL STATES?   . . .'

        This definition of the privileges and immunities
    of CITIZENS OF THE STATES is adopted in the main by
    this court in the recent case of Ward v. Maryland.   .
    . .

        Having shown that the privileges and immunities
    relied on in the argument are those which belong to
    citizens of the states as such, and that they are left
    to the state governments for security and protection,
    and not by this article placed under the special care
    of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves
    excused from defining the privileges and immunities of
    citizens of the United States which no state can
    abridge, until some case involving those privileges
    may make it necessary to do so." Slaughterhouse
    Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 75-76, 78-79 (1873).

b. Therefore, there is a citizen of the States (or several
States) and a citizen of the United States since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Slaughterhouse

         "The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
    the United States, ratified in 1868, creates or at
    least recognizes for the first time a citizenship of
    the United States, as distinct from that of the
    states." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., at page

        "The proper construction of this amendment (the 14th
    Amendment) was first called to the attention of this court
    in the Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 36, which involved,
    however, not a question of race, but one of exclusive
    privileges. The case did not call for any expression of
    opinion as to the exact rights it was intended to secure to
    the colored race, but it was said generally that its main
    purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro; to
    give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of
    the States, and to protect from the hostile legislation of
    the States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
    United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of
    the States." Plessy v. Ferguson: 163 U.S. 537, 543
    (1896), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Board of
    Education of Topeka: 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

c. A citizen of the States (or the several States) has the
right to free ingress into and egress from the several
        “   . . . It is contended further that the tax
    invades the privilege and immunity of a citizen in
    relation to his freedom to travel within and without
    the city and State, and is in violation of the 14th
    Amendment to the United States Constitution.   . . . .
        Plaintiff's contentions resting on claimed
    unconstitutionality under the United States
    Constitution are equally unavailable here. Crandall
    v. Nevada (6 Wall. [73 U. S.] 35) is not at all
    applicable. A CITIZEN OF THE STATES has the right of
    free ingress and egress to and from the several
    States.” Simon v. City of New York: 22 Misc. 2d 718,
    at 720, 722 (1960).

    See Wheeler v. United States (254 U.S. 281, at 297 thru
298, 299 1920):
        “The controlling influence of the opinion in the
    Slaughter House Cases, as well as that of Mr. Justice
    Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, stands out in
    bolder relief when it is observed that in the latter
    case, following the statement of the general
    principles contained in the passage quoted in the
    Slaughter House Cases, there is found, by way of
    illustration, an enumeration of particular rights
    declared to be clearly embraced by the general
    principles, one of which is described as, „The right
    of a citizen of one state to pass through, or reside
    in any other state, for purposes of trade,
    agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.‟   .
    . .
        Undoubtedly the right of CITIZENS OF THE STATES to
    reside peacefully in, and to have free ingress into
    and egress from, the several States had, prior to the
    Confederation, a two-fold aspect: (1) as possessed in
    their own States and (2) as enjoyed in virtue of the
    comity of other States. But although the Constitution
    fused these distinct rights into one by providing that
    one State should not deny to the citizens of other
    States rights given to its own citizens, no basis is
    afforded for contending that a wrongful prevention by
    an individual of the enjoyment by a citizen of one
    State in another of rights possessed in that State by
    its own citizens was a violation of a right afforded
    by the Constitution. This is the necessary result of
    Article IV, §2, which reserves to the several States
    authority over the subject, limited by the restriction
    against state discriminatory action, hence excluding
    federal authority except where invoked to enforce the
    limitation.   . . . .
        This leads us furthermore to point out that the
    case of Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, so much relied
    upon in the argument, is inapplicable, not only
    because it involved the validity of state action, but
    because the state statute considered in that case was
    held to directly burden the performance by the United
    States of its governmental functions and also to limit
    rights of the citizens growing out of such functions;
    and hence it also follows that the observation made in
    Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, to the effect
    that it had been held in the Crandall Case that the
    privilege of passing from State to State is an
    attribute of national citizenship, may here be put out
    of view as inapposite.”

Description: Authoritative definition for the term "citizen of the States." Legal sources, including Supreme Court of the United States, are cited and linked.