Port Security Monitoring for Portland, ME and
Portsmouth, NH as Case Studies
University of New Hampshire
Electrical and Engineering Department
Course 777/877 Fall 2005
This document focuses on the chief security concerns
of marine ports. According to these concerns, the
document presents a concept of a state-of-the-art
security system that monitors commerce patterns and
supports port authorities with automated processes
such as fast communication and data exchange. The
system also addresses best-effort threat identification
that minimizes human interaction in identifying these
threats. There is also a brief summary of risk
assessment where the critical infrastructure of two
marine ports, Portsmouth, NH and Portland, ME, is
determined. Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3
Security Concerns and Aspects ...................................................................................... 4
Risk Assessment ........................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.7
Countermeasures ............................................................................................................ 5
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 15
Automatic Identification System (AIS) .............................................................. 16
Sonar ................................................................................................................... 22
Screening Technologies (X-ray .......................................................................... 27
Design Specification ................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.24
Introduction ......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.24
Detection ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.25
AAA: Authentication, Authorization, AccountingError! Bookmark not defined.25
Inspection ............................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.26
Prevention ........................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.27
C4 = Command, Control, Communication and Computers.Error! Bookmark not defined.28
Data Center.......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.28
Monitoring systems ............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.29
Near-time data warehousing ............................... Error! Bookmark not defined.30
Appendix A – Port of Portsmouth ............................................................................... 30
Appendix B – Port of Portland..................................................................................... 40
References .................................................................................................................... 49
Since September 11, 2001, the notion of security means more than ever before.
The world is faced with the concerns of terrorism and the weaknesses of current
security systems. Research and development for several security projects has been
started in many countries in order to improve the security of transportation and object
defense. As the primary target of terrorism, the United States has to be prepared for
Besides object defense, the US has to pay prominent attention to the
transportation entry points of the country, namely the airports and marine ports. In
these facilities, special care has to be taken of access control, where not just the entry
of facility objects but the entry of the whole port facility has to be secured.
In this report we propose a security system that focuses on three different phases
of security. The system is able to monitor maritime and land commerce entering port
facilities, it has to be able to highly reduce the possibility of intrusions, and it supports
effective and fast response to possible threats and alerts. First, we introduce the
concerns of marine port security. Then we present the methodology of risk assessment
we used for assessing the critical infrastructure of two ports on the eastern coast:
Portsmouth and Portland. Finally, we present several countermeasure techniques to
reduce the threat of these ports and propose an integrated system design for these
ports coupled with system concerns and restrictions.
Security Concerns and Aspects
Beyond airports, marine ports are the main entry points of the US. They conduct
huge amount of international cargo traffic which has to be extensively surveyed and
controlled to reduce the infiltration of contraband into the country. Not only is
contraband a problem, but marine ports can be a target of terrorism as well. Massive
ships traveling in large volumes of traffic is a very good hiding place for illegal
immigrants, terrorists, weapons, drugs, or hazardous materials. Besides the possibility
to use regular cargo traffic for the purposes of terrorism, a marine port is composed of
several facilities that have high role in the economical life of domestic areas. There
are oil and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tanks that store a large amount of flammable
substance. The attacking and successful blowing of which may result in severe
devastation. Most of the marine ports also have bridges that are highly loaded with
public and commercial transportation and certainly most have ferry services or other
public transportation terminals that again can be a point of attack. Overall, the ports
have to be secured from three directions. First is from waterborne vehicles
(underwater or on the surface) which may bear the threat of contraband, hazardous
materials, terrorism, and illegal immigrants. Second is land transportation as the huge
amount of cargo stored at port facilities are accessed by trucks. These trucks may be
another threat for critical port facilities. The third is human intrusion. Both the objects
that play important role in the life of the port and the public transportation services
and terminals have to be secured against malicious human access. We have excluded
airborne attacks as an attack vector simply because the defense of airspace is the task
of the air force and air-defense is out of the scope of port security.
The defense of objects can be split up into three sub security aspects. Firstly, an
object has to be secured by perimeters and measures that make prospective intruders
keep out the restricted area. This aspect of security is important to control and stem
access of unauthorized personnel and vehicles. Secondly, those who want to gain
access have to go through a screening or inspection process that may record data and
is able to recognize and filter unacceptable or hazardous materials carried on a
vehicle. These first two principles relate to the notion of access control. Thirdly,
reaction on detected intrusion or detection of undesirable materials is a crucial aspect
The three security aspects mentioned have to be applied both for object defense
inside the port and for the defense of the port as a whole. The security of the port
territory has to be separated into two sub tasks. On one hand, critical infrastructure
should be secured; on the other hand, the entrance of the whole port area has to be
well monitored and controlled. While the former can be solved with regular
perimeters, intrusion detection systems and deterrent systems, the latter requires the
usage of state-of-the art security, data recording, and monitoring solutions. The
greatest challenge of the latter is how to monitor and install a surveillance system that
is able to operate on a spread area while keeping the ships under control of the
designated authorities. A further challenge would be to install such access control
systems that are able to effectively monitor and report without generating adverse
effects on the pace of commerce and transportation.
“The weak have one weapon:
the errors of those who think they are strong”
This chapter describes the general concepts of security process which should be
implemented in the port. The chapter present the whole cycle of monitoring: starting
form detection, authorization, authentication and accounting (AAA), throughout
inspection and prevention. Also, it distinguishes the human aspect in the process of
The general purpose of security monitoring is to protect the port. A very
important objective is also to build the port security monitoring system by keeping in
mind that the whole process of monitoring should be as little detrimental to the
customers (ships, vehicles, passengers) as possible. In our design we introduce an
automated system, called smart gate, which detects ships and vehicles entering a port,
then conducts an AAA process to decide the authority of the incoming ship or vehicle.
The smart gate system takes the characteristics of the supported traffic into
consideration e.g., ships use different smart gate system components than land
vehicles; furthermore, the profile of ships or the AAA method may differ as well.
Technology can bring a huge effort in current day security aspects, but there is also a
human aspect which is very important in the whole security monitoring process. It can
bring significant advantages as well as disadvantages. The first human aspect is the
awareness of regular people who live in port area. The common sense of these people
and knowledge of normal situation in port area makes them the best countermeasure.
The only thing that needs to be implemented is the communication process so that
there would be an easy way to contact an institution who is responsible for the port
security. Another concern about the human aspect is the lack of competence and
awareness of staff. The results of ignoring information provided from the
countermeasures could be catastrophic. All of the best technologies and the fastest
detection are useless when they are operated inadequately. Trainings and procedures
provide basic, effective, and cost efficient countermeasures.
AAA: Authentication, Authorization, Accounting
The method of AAA is a feasible way to prevent the port from unacceptable
ships, vehicles, personnel, and cargo. In our system, we propose an automated
computer and communication system, called smart gate, which serves the functions of
AAA. The concept of the smart gate can be used either for ships or for land vehicles,
but the system components will differ.
The smart gate has several components that together compose the whole
functionality of the system.
Smart gate: communication system at the entrance of the port. Its
objective is fast ship inventory checking and relaying instructions of the
security center to ships.
Smart buoys: they communicate with the ships by an appropriate and
feasible RF system, so buoys are equipped with this RF interface (e.g.,
RFID) and supporting computing technology. They are also connected
to port security center by wire, so smart buoys may gain energy from the
wire link and can quickly transfer recorded information to the center.
iBoat (intelligent boat): remote controlled boat with the same equipment
that smart buoys have. It is a mobile extension of smart buoys in order to
have the smart gate operated in for example special weather conditions.
It can move to ships passing by the smart gate and can approach buoys
to transfer recorded information.
AIS (automated information system): good for ship identification, and
important data exchange before a ship gets into the range of the smart
gate. But it is inadequate for inventory exchange due to the narrow
bandwidth, and the lack of security.
Cargo monitoring software – certainly the security center needs software
that can handle the huge volume of incoming information, so effective
visualization is important, which means that security officers can easily
perceive the monitoring information and can detect the unacceptable.
This software should be capable to transfer communication from the
officers to the ships through smart gate or other RF system. It should
also present operating authorities with common operating picture, to
have some functionality so they can keep their eye on the port
Near-time data warehousing – A special database system. Besides you
can load data into it, in case having enough data from the past, the
database can support the users with anomaly detection by comparing
data of past and actually loaded data, and everything happens in a preset
time. Good for identifying possible threats.
The most important building block of the system is the process of
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA). The data displayed by the
cargo monitoring software is useless if it is not authentic. The process of
authentication should be done when loading the cargo of a vehicle or ship, and before
inspecting and downloading the inventories. Authorization is done when the port
security center personnel approved the clearance of the ship or vehicle. The decision
they make is based on the inventories and the data warehousing anomaly detection.
These two sub procedures determine the level of security which should be used at the
port or the arriving terminal when receiving the
No Inventory Object inventory
incoming ship or vehicle. The final step in AAA
is accounting. Accounting is the process of
Smart gate = fast
recording data about the inspected ship or
Terminal Response Countermeasures
vehicle. The data is moved to the database system, where the data will be used for
further inspections in the future.
Figure 1.: Block diagram and layout of secure port monitoring system
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
The aim of intrusion detection is to stop any kind of attempt of physical
intrusions. A reasonable approach is best-effort prevention. The technology helps
increase the radius of regular human senses such as sight, hearing, smell or even
thermoception. It also gives us the ability to utilize totally new ones. A system that
extensively supports the task of intrusion detection should us the following
Sonar systems (for either underwater or on-water threats)
Closed circuit television (CCTV)
High-tech door locks (biometric systems)
Supporting communication and software that can handle alarms
Nuclear detector based on muon
One of the primary aims of our port security system should be to minimize
human interaction in responses on alerts. We are able to reduce the factor of humanity
by introducing technology in the field of intrusion detection, but we should invest the
same efforts in automating the process of alert handling.
C4 = Command, Control, Communication and
Data Center - overview:
The Data Center is mainly designed to prioritize the access to the monitoring
and management application of the Ports of Portland and Portsmouth (PPP) and
secure them from unauthorized utilization.
Data Center - objectives:
guarantee of data safety
efficient services for all transmissions
guarantee of operational continuation
possibilities of adding new monitoring countermeasures without adding or
changing existing equipment
possibility of monitoring whole Data Center traffic for safety reasons
Access zone for
Internal networks Acces zone for public
Internal services zone
zone for services Network
Data Center - is divided for two equivalent main zones: one for control and the other
for public network. The whole Data Center is divided in several zones:
Access zone - provides access to the system from a certain network group (Internet or
Service zone - place where service for external network users are located. Mostly web
servers, probes, monitors and AAA servers. These servers connect external network
users to the data bases.
Interior zone - location of data bases, applications engines and storage places
Management zone - management of whole system, servers this zone has access to
every place in the Data Center
Monitoring systems are responsible for integration of all incoming information
from all monitoring elements. They also provide an interface between collected data
and staff, and passengers and port community.
There are a few basic components used in monitoring systems:
Probes, monitors, and adapters – responsible for communication and data
management between detectors, sensors and main processing system
Main processing system
Web based information portal for personnel, staff, passengers and port
The design should be scalable, redundant and secure.
Adapters, monitors, and probes should be easily extended.
The whole monitoring system should be developed in two different physical
The monitoring system elements with upon to the secure level should be placed
in appropriate zones of Data Center.
Concerns and Restrictions
The main concern will be integration of whole alarms from a variety of different
vendor’s detectors. This will be necessary to develop adapters which can
communicate and decode this information.
There are several management systems of the shelf for this. The most popular
and complex are:
– Comarch InsighNet -
– Hewlett Packard OpenView - http://www.managementsoftware.hp.com/
– Micromuse Necool - http://www.micromuse.com/sols/gov_homeland.html
Near-time data warehousing
Data warehouses play an integral part of business intelligence. Their primary
role is in enterprise decision-making. They store a huge amount of data related to the
operation of the organization, then systematize, and finally provide decision makers
with tools that enable more efficient decision-making based on stored data and their
transformations. Traditional data warehousing is used for strategic decision-making
and has several days of information delay.
In recent years, a new data warehousing paradigm appeared called “soft real-
time” or “near-time” data warehousing. The main features, which are more relevant to
a port security integrated system, are exposing data from a transactional or an
operational system in real-time, tracking of selected or deviant events, and active
sending of system alerts for the users of the data warehouse system. The notion of
“real-time” is not literal. It means that the data warehousing system is able to provide
the users with information within a preset time. That is why it is called “soft real-
time” or “near time.” Usually, the shorter the response time, the more expensive the
system implementation is.
A “near time” data warehousing system may have a key role in a port security
system. In case engineers develop data exchange interfaces through which authentic
data of ships, crew, and cargo can be recorded, the system will provide the port with
an efficient anomaly detection function. This detection functionality can notify cost
guard officers and authorities in case a certain ship has some change in cargo
according to the data recorded in the past. Certainly, in order to have an efficient
anomaly detection system, huge amount of data is needed from the past. By detecting
anomalies, the coast guard is able to direct ships to appropriate terminals, order
security officers to be in alert around a the receiver terminal. The main advantage of
such a system would be to learn about the ships, prepare for their arrivals, or to keep
them away from the port. It is worth to note that the most important premise of such a
system would be the authentic inventories or manual data recording on ships that
provides data for the data warehouse through some communication system.
In order to install a data warehousing system for a port, several premises must
be assured. Two important sub-system components must be installed. First of all,
ships need an authentic inventory system that stores several data about the ship, its
crew, and cargo, or in case this inventory system is unavailable, specially trained
coast guard crew should screen the cargo and the ship, and provide information for
the data warehouse about the ship. Unfortunately, the latter solution is quite time
consuming, so the question of authentic data source is a delicate matter.
Secondly, the collected inventory data should be forwarded to the data
warehouse by a fast communication system. This communication system can be
composed of either wired or wireless technologies, but the most efficient solution
would be a mixture of them exploiting the mobility capabilities of wireless systems
and the reliability and speed of wired systems.
Reliability, redundancy, and availability are very important features of a data
warehousing system. Usually, these features are supported by the solution provider
company, so these questions are out of scope. However, finding a good physical
location for the computer tools that provides the flawless work of the data warehouse
is an important but very flexible problem due to the fast networking technologies of
Concerns and Restrictions
The main concern about the usability of the data warehouse is the feasibility of
the authentic ship inventory system, or the manual ship screening procedure. Without
legal ship registrars there is no sense to compare the data of the present with the data
of the past.
Another concern is to draw the correct database queries by which alerts are
generated. By this way, system users can detect anomalies with high efficiency.
Near-time dataware housing is still a new and evolving technology. Currently,
Hewlett-Packard has a working solution based on Oracle database systems. They
implemented a reference system to prove the viability of near-time dataware housing
which detects credit-card tricks.
When you can see danger – it is too late...
Today’s market is exploding with new and better possibility of security
measurement. Huge amounts of countermeasures make a possibility to fulfill each
area of port security, starting with physical security, intrusion detection and
monitoring systems. It is important during the design process to find equilibrium
between cost of the system components and time of the process from one site and
quality of the security from the second.
This triangular of these parameters and cross dependency on each other limits
the possible implementation.
One of our biggest concerns was to design a secure port entrance in an
automated, time efficient and secure way. This implementation called smart gate
utilizes existing of the shelf technologies and integrates them into secure entrance
both for ships and vehicles. The goal of design process was to find a compromise
between commerce delay and the quality of the security. Moreover the process of
crossing secure gates both for vehicles, ships as well as customers, should be as less
complicated and intrusiveness.
The section below consists list of possible of the shelf countermeasures which
can be integrated in port security system. In each section there will be Technology
Introduction, Design Parameters, Concern and Restriction and Commercial Off The
Shelf (COTS) technologies. In each we tried to answer for basic questions such as:
What is the technology? What is it usually used for? In what context it is used?
Where can it fit into integrated architecture?
What technical parameter should you consider when installing it? (Operation
characteristics, features, range, robustness) Design parameters that will guide you
when you install - do not install it yet to a specific port just inform us about input
parameters that can help find ideal physical locations for the techs.
Concerns and Restrictions
What concerns and restrictions the technology has? Operating conditions?
What COTS provide the services of the given technology and companies? How
are they able to ship and install these technologies?
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) provides a means for ships to be
identified from ports or other ships with no human action. The system consists of a
transceiver on every large ship as well as ports. The transmitter portion of this unit is
aware of the ships location, direction and speed through GPS. Also the ships size,
classification, call sign and registration number among other things are transmitted.
The receiver is therefore able to track nearby ships and give information about them
to aid with navigation and communication.
The usefulness of AIS as a component of a security system is mostly as a simple
and reliable means of identification. It could be used as a method of authentication to
access the smart gate of a port.
The working range of AIS is the same as normal marine VHF radio range. The
reliable range of this system is greater than standard detection systems such as radar
and sonar because the targets should be actively transmitting. Typical range is about
20 nautical miles. Bad weather will reduce the range, similarly to radio, but no more
than radar or sonar. High locations close to the ocean with high-gain antennas will
optimize the range. Most likely this system can be installed alongside other marine
communications equipment, possibly sharing an antenna.
In addition to location and identification, AIS can provide speed, direction and
turn information. The turning information comes directly from the steering system of
the ship, and will allow for the course of the ship to be predicted more reliably than
other detection systems.
Currently, all internationally faring vessels other than passenger and fishing
boats over 65 feet entering US waters must use AIS. In addition, all international
passenger ships over 150 tons entering US waters must use AIS.
Concerns and Restrictions
The largest restriction of this technology is that it requires cooperation of the
operator of the ship. Equipment must be installed and running on a ship for it to be
tracked in this method. All location and direction data could for a ship could be faked
by feeding the transmitter incorrect data. Information on the security of transmitted
data is not readily available. The safe assumption from this is that as the system
currently operates, it would be readily possible to forge identification information
with this system as well.
On the upside, AIS provides an additional method in which to identify a ship.
Though it may be possible to misrepresent a ship via AIS, it is more difficult than
simply reporting false data over voice radio or changing the registration painted on
the ships hull. AIS does use time-based information, so it would be possible to add
non-reversible time-based encryption to the system if it does not currently have this.
With this addition, AIS would be a very reliable source of identification data.
Kongsberg is a major supplier of AIS equipment. They have several complete
systems available for sale and rent. Their basic installable system is the AIS 200.
This system consists of a transceiver module, a control unit and an antenna. GPS data
should be provided to the system by the ships main GPS receiver, but the AIS 200
also contains a backup GPS receiver which can only function if the unit is installed
with a clear “view” of the sky. All basic AIS functions are supported by this unit.
The control unit contains a keypad and a text display. It is used to enter ship data
such as crew count, destination, etc. The display can be used to show rudimentary
information about nearby vessels. For more complete display of nearby vessel data,
the AIS 200 can be interfaced with electronic chart displays and radar systems that
support the AIS interface. On a graphical display, AIS can display the visual location
as well as the size and heading of nearby vessels. Depending upon the display used, it
may be possible to select a vessel graphically to access all available AIS information
Kongsberg also makes a portable AIS unit, the AIS 200 P. This unit is designed
to be carried by the pilot and interfaced into whichever ship he currently is piloting.
Both the transceiver and the control unit are housed within a water tight, floatable
case. It only requires being connected to power and VHF and GPS antennas to be
operational. It does allow for connection to all of the same ship systems that the
standard AIS 200 allows for more complete AIS data.
Pricing information for both of these systems is available by contacting
Kongsberg directly. AIS fees are $75 per year, with an additional $375 registration
fee for US ships.
RADAR stands for Radio Detection and Ranging. It is a system used to detect
the range of particular objects. It works by transmitting radio waves then detecting the
signal that is reflected off an object back to the receiver. The radar signal can be
easily multiplied thus is suited to detecting objects at very large ranges where other
reflections would be to weak. Using radio frequency provides us less attenuation than
light in many conditions such as through clouds, fog, and smoke thus enabling
detection and tracking in such conditions.
The amount of power Pr returning to the receiving antenna is given by the radar
Pt = transmitter power,
Gt = gain of transmitting antenna,
Ar = effective aperture (area) of receiving antenna,
σ = Radar Cross Section, or scattering coefficient of target,
Rt = distance from transmitter to target,
Rr = distance from target to receiver.
In the common case where the transmitter and receiver are at the same location,
Rt = Rr and the term Rt² Rr² can be replaced by R4, where R is the range. This yields
This shows that the received power declines as the fourth power of the range,
which means that the reflected power from distant targets is very, very small.
The table below  provides the list of radar depended on the frequency range,
and wavelength range.
Radar Frequency Bands
Band Name Frequency Wavelength Notes
HF 3-30 MHz 10-100 m coastal radar systems, over-the-
horizon (OTH) radar; 'high
P < 300 MHz 1 m+ 'P' for 'previous', applied
retrospectively to early radar
VHF 50-330 MHz 0.9-6 m very long range, ground
penetrating; 'very high frequency'
UHF 300-1000 MHz 0.3-1 m very long range (e.g. ballistic early
warning), ground penetrating,
foliage penetrating; 'ultra high
L 1-2 GHz 15-30 cm long range air traffic control and
surveillance; 'L' for 'long'
S 2-4 GHz 7.5-15 cm terminal air traffic control, long
range weather, marine radar; 'S' for
C 4-8 GHz 3.75-7.5 cm a compromise (hence 'C') between
X and S bands; weather
X 8-12 GHz 2.5-3.75 cm missile guidance, marine radar,
mapping and ground surveillance;
in the USA the narrow range
10.525GHz ±25MHz is used for
Ku 12-18 GHz 1.67-2.5 cm high-resolution mapping, satellite
altimetry; frequency just under K
band (hence 'u')
Band Name Frequency Wavelength Notes
K 18-27 GHz 1.11-1.67 cm From German kurz, meaning
'short'; limited use due to
absorption by water vapour, so Ku
and Ka were used instead for
surveillance. K-band is used for
detecting clouds by
meteorologists, and by police for
detecting speeding motorists. K-
band radar guns operate at 24.150
± 0.100 GHz.
Ka 27-40 GHz 0.75-1.11 cm mapping, short range, airport
surveillance; frequency just above
K band (hence 'a') Photo radar,
used to trigger cameras which take
pictures of license plates of cars
running red lights, operates at
34.300 ± 0.100 GHz
Mm 40-300 Ghz 1 - 7.5mm 'millimetre' band, subdivided as
V 40-75 GHz 4.0 - 7.5 mm
W 75-110 GHz 2.7 - 4.0 mm used as a visual sensor for
experimental autonomous vehicles,
AESA stands for an Active Electronically Scanned Array. It is a type of radar
composed with numerous small antennas with two dimensional transmitter and
receiver functions. The combination of phase and the amplitude of signals in the
structure of antennas allow the AESA to be immobile. It simplifies the mechanical
design which uses less space than typical radar. The distributed transmit function also
eliminates the most common single-point failure mode seen in a conventional radar.
Concerns and Restrictions
The main advantages over mechanically scanned arrays are extremely fast
scanning rate, much higher range, tremendous number of targets being tracked and
engaged (multiple agile beams), low probability of intercept, ability to function as a
radio/jammer, simultaneous air and ground modes, and Synthetic Aperture Radar.
Mechanical steering may be added to AESA radar for increased radar field of
view, however, no such equipped AESA radars currently exist. The movement
performance of the antenna would not need to be nearly as great as that of traditional
radar, as the radar sweep is not integral to the contact update rate.
Below is the list of well known radar producers.
Northrop Grumman www.northropgrumman.com
BAE Systems www.baesystems.com
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPAREMENT
Vendor Radar Raytheon
N-22 Mobile Medium- NSC 18 Radar
Product (with 9 inch PPI)
Range Surveillance Radar
Frequency agility band Band S Band S, X
100 km range and 7 km
PC based radar
Remote operation processor; High
- distance up to 300 m quality TFTs in 15,
- remotely available functions up to 300 mswitching on/off, 19 and 23.1”;
operating modes, Table Top, Deck
BITE status, Stand or Black Box
synthetic picture, versions for
target tracker commands, installations into
IFF equipment option
Land navigation system
with GPS built-in option
6ft, 7ft, 9ft X-Band,
Antenna type cosec2 12 ft S-Band
Automatic target extraction
72 tracks Up to 70
Communication radio, wire or fibre optic
equipment according to Superior target
customer’s need; detection and clutter
Two stands: for operator and suppression;
commander (for air-defense
In compliance to
Extensive BITE, easy
Other repairs, line replaceable
as IMO Ras.A823
(19), MSC 64 (67)
Built-in radar situation
Annex A and A.820
Data recording capability:
detected plots and tracks can High Speed
be registered during radar Code
It is quite difficult from the security point of reason to find some references in
maritime area. Raytheon Canada provides one existed system which integrates four
a) Long-Range HF Surface-Wave Radar (HFSWR);
b) Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS) Systems;
c) Other sensor systems;
d) Multiple-Sensor Data Fusion and displays.
Integrated Maritime Surveillance Systems – IMS is an economical, shore-based
system providing continuous, all-weather surveillance of the 200 nmi Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). More information is provided no the Raytheon Canada
SONAR stands for sound, navigation and ranging. It uses sound waves to track
objects underwater. There are two things that we could track underwater that would
violate security: a diver or an underwater vehicle such as a submarine. Divers are a
threat because they can swim up to critical infrastructure to place bombs. Submarines
are a threat because of weapons such as torpedoes and mines. We will focus more on
divers because we are securing the port more against terrorists than against other
nations with submarines. We will let the Navy take care of defending against
We will use sonar to survey the areas immediately surrounding the top five
vulnerabilities in each port. There will have to be either a human or a computer
system in place to monitor the sonar and then to alert command and control if there is
an abnormality in the water. Command and control would then have to take necessary
action. Since divers are very difficult to spot, there is a potential for false alarms. This
makes SONAR very difficult to monitor and professionals would need to be hired.
There are many design parameters to be covered. First, there are different
frequencies that can be used. One particular company chose to use either 192 kHz
signals or 50 kHz signals. There are advantages and drawbacks of each. The table
shows these advantages and drawbacks.
192 kHz 50 kHz
shallower depths deeper depths
narrow cone angle wide cone angle
better definition and target separation less definition and target
less noise susceptibility
more noise susceptibility
192 kHz is the recommended frequency for almost all fresh water and salt water
applications. It gives the best detail, works best in shallow water and at speed, and
typically shows less "noise" and undesired echoes. Target definition is also better with
192 kHz. This is the ability to display two objects as two separate echoes instead of
one blob on the screen. Although the port of Portland is a rather deep port, we do not
need to use the 50 kHz frequency. This is because we are not tracking the sea floor.
We are only concerned with the 20-30 feet below the surface where a diver would
potentially be. The cone angle is not an issue either because we can just use more
SONAR transmitters to compensate.
Concerns and Restrictions
Not only do you need to choose the more suitable frequency, you need to take in
account other factors when choosing a SONAR system. Each port has a certain
salinity. This makes it necessary to choose SONAR that can project its pulse through
higher or lower salt levels. Also, temperature plays a role. SONAR needs to be able to
work in cold temperatures during the winter. Finally, the location of the SONAR is
important. It needs to be effectively monitoring the key infrastructure. The angle of
the projected pulse needs to be taken into account as well as the current. A SONAR
system needs to be securely placed so that a strong current will not wear it out over
time. You also do not want to place it in a location that will be in the way of moving
There are many SONAR products to choose from. The first product is from a
company called C-Tech Ltd. They have created a harbor security system called the
CSDS-85 Omni® Surveillance Sonar and it is designed for the detection of
underwater intruders such as divers with open and closed breathing apparatus, diver
delivery vehicles, mini submarines, and submarines. The sonar has 360 degree field of
view, operates at 80 kHz and has ranges from 250 meters to 2000 meters. It also has
an automatic as well as manual tracking feature and a video recorder. It has automatic
system status updates. Finally, it can be mounted on a ship if necessary. It is perfect
for what we are looking for .
Next, the Swimmer Detection System Cerberus 360 was designed by a company
called Qinetiq. They claim that this system can detect and track up to 50 threat targets
automatically in depths of up to 2,100 feet and through 360°. They also say that is
simple to use and easy to manipulate with limited training. This would be perfect so
we could hire non-professionals .
Next, Westminster International has developed a swimmer detection system that
has viewing angles of 90 degrees to 360 degrees. It can detect a diver up to 700
meters away. It also has automatic detection of jamming and automatic target
detection. This product can zoom and display previous areas of detection for
reference. Finally, it can resist .5 kg blast of TNT underwater .
Remotely Operated Vehicle
Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) have become an integral tool in modern
day naval operations. From Oil rig construction to deep sea exploration, ROVs have
allowed humans to go places and do things that were thought impossible not more
than 20 years ago. They range from huge robotic monsters capable of lifting
staggering loads; to miniature devices made up of little more than a camera and
propeller that can navigate though ship wrecks that are miles away from the ocean
The most popularly known use of ROVs is ocean exploration. This can range
from searching the deepest parts of the ocean for signs of life, to investigating ship
wrecks in the open ocean. ROVs were used to navigate a maze of steal and iron
through the inside of the Titanic, recovering some extremely valuable artifacts in the
process. These exploration ROVs tend to be small and maneuverable, to better
accomplish the task of operating in tight spaces. Generally they are wireless so as not
to get tangled up inside a ship wreck. Some have robotic arms that can lift reasonable
loads (under 100 lbs), but are usually used for taking pictures.
ROVs are also commonly used by oil companies during the construction and
repair of ocean drilling equipment. These industrial ROVs tend to be larger than their
Titanic searching counterparts. ROVs used by the oil industry can lift thousands of
pounds with huge robotic arms that are manipulated by humans through remote
control. Their larger size, however, comes with consequences. The shear weight of
the devices makes them more cumbersome to control, and their large surface areas
makes them unstable in strong currents. To compensate for these draw backs, prices
are increased due to the sophisticated drive units that come with automated stabilizers
to keep the large submersivals in the same spot for long periods of time.
ROVs for port security will be used in a variety of operations. Most of the time
they will only be used for visual investigation of ships below the water line and the
sea floor for explosive devices. If upon investigation an explosive device has been
found the ROV must have the capability to remove the device with out setting it off.
The design specifications for this project, therefore, should combine attributes
of both exploration ROVs and industrial ROVs. Our ROVs need have enough
maneuverability to be able to negotiate strong currents while remaining stable, small
enough to fit into tight spaces around ships at port, yet strong enough to carry
explosive devices without running the risk of dropping them to the bottom. ROVs for
port security need to be wireless so as not to run the risk of having a cable become
entangled in the screws of a ship under investigation. They should be able to endure
the punishment of operating in a variety of climates as New England is not known for
its predictable weather. They also need to be extremely reliable as the lives of many
people may rest in its ability to accomplish its tasks.
Concerns and Restrictions
The biggest concern with regards to the use of an ROV is its ability to remove
an explosive device. In an ideal world ROVs could be used exclusively for the
removal and deactivation of any explosive device found in port. However, it would
be of great concern as to the ability of an ROV to actually handle the removal of such
devices. It can be assumed that such a process would require a delicate touch, and the
ability to react to a variety of situations at a moments notice. Any ROV used in this
process would have to be extremely reliable, not failing to respond to the slightest
command of the human operator as any fault in the system could be catastrophic.
Another concern is the time and logistics required to deploy. If an ROV was
given to each of the three QRF teams, it would still take a considerable amount of
time to get the unit on scene. To ensure the safety of the deploying team, the ROV
would have to be submerged at distance from the suspected target. ROVs are not
known for their speed underwater, and would take a considerable amount of time to
actually get on site (at least with respects to the time needed to detonate an explosive
Other problems of less concern are financial issues to maintain such devices,
training operators to use them, the deployment rigs on QRF boats (and the space they
take up), and upgrades to the devices as technology advances. These concerns,
however, are common to any operation, especially in the military and security sectors.
HYSUB ATP 50 is typical of what one will find in most ROVs that meet our
The HYSUB ATP 50 - 2000 TM is an advanced offshore oil drilling support
and salvage vehicle. This vehicle has been fitted with sophisticated master slave
Length: 251.5 cm / 99 inches
Width: 142.3 cm / 56 inches
Height: 147.3 cm / 58 inches
Weight in air: 1723.5 kg. / 3800 lbs.
Diving Depth: 1828.8 m / 6000 ft.
Payload 90.7 kg (200 lb)
6061-T6 aluminum with 316
stainless steel fixtures
Flotation: Syntactic foam
Variable Ballast: Optional (hard or soft)
Electro-hydraulic (50 electric HP,
6 hydraulic thrusters)
Power Requirements: 480 VAS, 3-phase, 60 Hz, 100 KW
Control: ISE Advanced Telemetry Control System
Cameras: Colour, B/W optional; Customer's Option
Sonar: Customer's Option
Lights: 5 x 250 watt
1 x 5 function rate Magnum arm
Manipulators: 1 x 7 function SC Magnum arm
Screening Technologies (X-ray)
X-ray technology is going to be a very big part of future port security. There
are so many vessels and ships that come through every port each year that sheer
numbers alone make it impossible to inspect every container, bag, vehicle and person
that moves through the seaport. This makes it important to use intelligence factors to
target certain vessels, containers, people etc. due to particular risk factors. Once these
objects have been identified, there are a few different types of X-ray technologies that
can be implemented. X-ray technology is a form of non-intrusive inspection
technology (NIIT) and tends to focus on anomaly detection. This means that the
system is able to alert the operator when there is an anomaly present in the cargo, but
no further detail without further inspection. The best form of NIIT is a mobile unit
allowing it to be deployed anywhere at the port or on docks where cargo is being
Design Parameters and Concerns of COTS
The first type of NIIT that will be discussed is Vehicle and Cargo Inspection
Systems (VACIS). This is used to inspect the contents of trucks, containers, cargo,
and passenger vehicles for hidden contraband. It consists of 2 90 ft tracks, one holds
the radioactive source and the other holds the detector. This can scan up to 70 feet
with in 90 seconds. The scanning of 40 feet can be done in less than 6 seconds by the
manufacturer SAIC. The advantage of gamma rays over X-rays is that it is less
expensive and has a higher reliability. There are three problems with this technology,
though. The first is that it takes a long time (more than a day) to relocate. This means
that Customs Field Inspection Units primarily use it as a fixed unit and it takes up a
lot of space. Next, once a container or vehicle is identified as something that maybe
hold contraband, it must be relocated to another inspection site (wherever that may
be) which is costly and time consuming for the shipper. Finally, VACIS is a high
energy imaging system that requires special radiation training.
The next NIIT is the Mobile Truck X-ray (MTXR). It use used to scan the same
objects as the VACIS but does not require any special training and uses X-rays. It is
manufactured by AS&E and uses both backscatter and transmission technology. It
has a viewing angle of 88 degrees which provides very effective inspection and
detection of drugs and explosives. Since this system only uses a 450keV x-ray
source, it does not have adequate penetration power to view fully loaded containers.
This is a problem unless the container is not fully loaded or if a system with greater
penetration power is designed.
The Fixed Pallet X-ray System (FPXR) uses a single x-ray beam with nominal
energy to inspect cargo on a conveyor belt. It is also manufactured by AS&E and also
uses both backscatter and transmission technology. It can scan up to 1500 parcels an
hour that are up to 64 inches wide. At least two passes are needed for complete
inspection and more than two passes are needed for objects taller than the x-ray field
of view. The problem with the FPXR is that it can not actually scan pallets. For an
effective reading, it has to scan boxes or packages which comprise the pallet. Also,
there are a limitation of the detection of drugs and explosives due to the variety of
container types, the variety of the contents, the amount of clutter, and the weight
shape packing and density if it is a drug being detected.
The Mobile Van X-ray System (MVXR) is a mobile system that has capabilities
similar to the FPXR. It is the same thing except it is mounted in a van and is
“ruggedized.” Calibration and alignment takes less than 10 minutes and can handle
pallets up to three cubic feet and 300 lbs. This system has the same limitations as the
FPXR except it has an even smaller cargo load (AS&E manufactured).
The High Energy Sea Container X-ray (HESC) is a high energy x-ray system
that is used in the seaport environment. It is used to straddle containers and move
from pier to pier under its own power. It will be driven over a row of stationary
targets and can examine the full height of trucks, roll-on/roll-off units, single
containers or containers in a double stack in supposedly less than 15 seconds. Since it
is high energy it can examine the densest of cargoes.
Finally, there is explosive and drug vapor trace detectors. These are handheld
devices shaped like an iron ant the complete set up includes a Pentium computer. It is
used by drilling the detector into a small hole and having the detector sense whether
or not there is any built up vapor concentration. If there is, the container will need
further investigation because it can not detect what the exact vapor is. A problem
with theses particle detectors is that they are very sensitive and may give false alarms
Appendix A – Port of Portsmouth
The purpose of this document is to give a brief description of the ports of
Portsmouth and its key assets. Bridge, wharf, military, rail and air facilities are
discussed with special emphasis on those that compose the backbone of
communication and transportation between New Hampshire and Maine. Beyond the
description we made assessments on the aftermath of possible terrorist attacks on this
infrastructure. Finally the results of the CARVER2 infrastructure analysis software
appear in this document.
The Port of Portsmouth, New Hampshire is located on the south bank of the
Piscataqua River, opposite Seavey Island and the town of Kittery, Maine. The port is
56 nautical miles southwest of Portland, Maine and 61 nautical miles northeast of
Boston, Massachusetts. The river, formed by the confluence of the Salmon Falls and
Cocheco Rivers, flows 13 miles generally southeast to the Atlantic Ocean, and forms
a portion of the boundary between the states of Maine and New Hampshire. The
mouth of the river is known as Portsmouth Harbor. All except three of the waterfront
facilities at the port are located on the south bank along the lower 4.5 miles of the
Piscataqua River .
The waterways used for this shipping is Portsmouth Harbor and the first few
miles of the Piscataqua River. Petroleum products, liquefied petroleum products
(LPG), gypsum rock, steel cable, lobsters, salt and coal comprise the majority of
waterborne commerce at the ports. The most common ships are oil carriers, both
international and coastwise. These ships arrive frequently, except during the summer.
There are more vessels served: liner, passenger ships, container ships, feeder vessels,
and barges. Gypsum and salt shipments also arrive from other domestic ports with
The military installations are Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Portsmouth
Harbor US Coast Guard Station. At Fort Point, on New Castle Island, at the mouth of
the Piscataqua River, U.S. Coast Guard Station Portsmouth Harbor keeps a watch on
Portsmouth Harbor, the upriver Great Bay, and all points between Cape Porpoise and
the Massachusetts and New Hampshire border. The Coast Guard Station runs an
important lighthouse for navigation of the port, as well as being the base for 1 cutter
and 1 helicopter.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is one of the most important strategic points
within Port of Portsmouth areas. It is located in Seavey Island, in the entry of the
Portsmouth harbor, with access to the mainland by two bridges that connect it to
It is used for overhaul, repair, modernization, and refueling of LOS ANGELES
Class nuclear powered submarines. It is also the Ship Availability Planning and
Engineering Center for the LOS ANGELES Class.
The Shipyard plant equipment value is approximately $500M.
There are several Bridges located in the Port of Portsmouth area. Major bridges
are: The Memorial Bridge, The railroad and U.S. Highway 1 Bypass Bridge and The
Interstate Highway 95 Bridge. Each spans the Piscataqua River between Portsmouth
and Kittery. The I95 bridge is important as the primary conduit for road traffic for
connecting all points north and south on the seacoast.
Two Seavey Island Bridges serves the communication to the Seavey Island
where the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is located.
The Dover PT Bridge connects the Portsmouth area with Western Part of NH
The last Bridge we list in this document we call Railway Bridge. Its function is
to provide the rail transport to and from the Port terminals which are located along the
right bank of the Piscataqua River.
Below is table where all of them are listed with priorities. (1 – most important)
Table 1. Critical Bridges in Portsmouth
Nr Name Type Road Location Priority
The Memorial Lift U.S. Highway 1 3,5 miles above
Bridge the mouth of the
The railroad and Lift U.S. Highway 1 4 miles above
U.S. Highway 1 Bypass mouth of the
2 Bypass Bridge river 1
The Interstate Fixed Interstate 95 4,5 miles above
Highway 95 mouth of the
3 Brigde river 1
Seavey Island Fixed Local Connection to
Bridges Seavey I from
4 Kittery 2
Dover PT Fixed U.S. Highway 4, On the west of
16 Portsmouth along
River, above the
5 Little Bay 2
Railway Bridge Fixed Railway Between Inter.
connnection to 95 and U.S Hwy
the petroleum 1 Bypass Bridges
facilities located along the
along the right Piscataqua River
bank of the
6 Piscataqua River 2
There is one Airport located in Portsmouth area – The Pease International
Airport. It is used to passengers/cargo transportation. It is located on the west side of
Portsmouth. The Airport serves: Passengers transport (Allegiant Air, Pan American
Airways, Boston-Maine Airways), cargo facilities (utilized by Pan Am services),
military base (The KC-135R equipped New Hampshire Air National Guard ).
The marine terminals of Portsmouth Harbor consist of several cargo, military,
fishing and passenger docks. The principal cargoes handled by the commercial docks
are fuels and minerals. The fuel docks are run by Sprague Energy, PSNH, and Irving
Oil. The mineral docks are run by National Gypsum and Granite State Minerals.
Other cargo docks are run by Simplex Wire and Cable and the NH State Port
Authority. Passenger service is handled by Isles of Shoals Steamship Company and
NE Charter Boats. In the next two subsections we summarize those that handle
hazardous materials, and large number of passengers.
Portsmouth has four active, non public terminals that receive dangerous
materials. The flammability of these materials can be a threat for citizens and other
infrastructures in the surroundings. Sprague Energy Corp., River Road terminal wharf
with 11 petroleum tanks (848500 barrels) is close to the route 4 Dover Bridge, while
Irving Oil Portsmouth Plant Wharf with 6 oil tanks (552000 barrels) is next to the I95
bridge. There are two more notable terminals that need special care due to the
materials they receive. The first is the are the Avery Lane Terminal Wharf that has 5
petroleum tanks operated by Sprague Energy Corp. (466650 barrels) and 2 high
capacity Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) tanks operated by SEA-3 Inc. (587000
barrels). The second is the Gosling Road Wharf that has three Sprague tanks (342000
barrels) , two storage tanks at Schiller Station (195000 barrels), and 2 storage tanks
that serves the Newington Power Plant (566000 barrels) .
Portsmouth has one terminal that is open to public. It is located on the
Piscataqua River, three nautical miles form the open sea. In general the terminal
accept bulk cargo (scrap, salt, wood chips), break bulk (industrial and machinery
parts, construction materials), project cargo (power plant components, vacuum tanks)
and container cargo. 
All of the terminals are connected with a rail system.
Table 2. Critical Portsmouth Terminals
Nr Name Flammable CI nearby Densely
materials Populated area
1 River Road Terminal Wharf yes yes no
2 Avery Lane Terminal Wharf yes no no
3 Gosling Road Wharf yes no no
4 Portsmouth Plant Wharf yes yes yes
5 DPH Market Street Terminal no yes yes
There is one railway system located in Portsmouth area - Boston and Maine RR
(GuildFord Rail System). It connects terminals from the both sides of Piscataqua
River to the main railway that connects to Boston Maine RR. The first part of the
railway is located along the Piscataqua River on the New Hampshire side. The second
part crosses the river using the railroad and U.S. Highway 1 Bypass Bridge.
Map – Critical Infrastructures – Key Assets
The Critical Infrastructure consists of the fuel docks, military installations, and
the I95 Bridge. The River Road (1), Avery Lane (SEA-3, 2), and Gosling Road (3)
terminals are the furthest from the ocean. They receive mainly oil, LPG, petroleum
products, and coal. Immediately downstream from the I95 Bridge is Irving Oil, which
receives oil and gypsum products (4). Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (12) is located on
Seavey Island in Kittery, ME and houses a submarine repair facility as well as
medical facilities. The I95 Bridge (7) is important as the primary conduit for road
traffic for connecting all points north and south on the seacoast.
The most likely targets for an attack are the Irving Oil storage area (4), the
Memorial Highway Bridge (9), and the Route 1 Bypass Bridge (8). The Irving Oil
terminal has several large oil storage tanks. The proximity of these tanks to the I95
bridge make them the most likely target in the Portsmouth area. A successful attack
on this could cause an explosion or severe fire. This could cause loss of life, disabling
of I95 for months, and loss of petroleum products and much of the ability to receive
petroleum products for this region. Disabling I95 would disrupt trucking as well as
much of the significant tourism industry in Maine. The loss of oil stores combined
with the loss of the point of reception of oil would increase prices and possibly cause
shortages of oil products for the region. This is also true for the Sprague Energy
Both the Memorial Highway Bridge and the Route 1 Bypass Bridge are lift
bridges. With clearances of 19 feet and 10 feet respectively, with their lift sections
down, these bridges would block much of the commercial trade out of this port. The
Route 1 Bypass Bridge could block all of the petroleum terminals, and the Memorial
Highway Bridge could block all cargo, passenger and much of the fishing industry.
Disabling a lift section of a bridge is a much less difficult task than taking a bridge
down altogether. Cutting power or damaging the mechanics of the bridge could
accomplish this. The primary impact of disabling either of these bridges would be the
maritime shipping. Road and rail traffic across these bridges is not of critical
importance. The amount of time an attack on one of these bridges could close the
harbor for could range from a few days for disabling the electrical systems, to several
weeks if significant mechanical damage was accomplished.
Other targets that may seem like good targets, but are not significant are the
military installations. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is not active enough to warrant the
risk of an attack. The duties of the Coast Guard Station could mostly be handled by
other nearby stations, and loss of the lighthouse would be more of an inconvenience
than a major danger for ships navigating into the harbor.
Below is attached map of Potential Critical Infrastructures  and a table where
all of them are prioritized (1 – most critical).
Figure 1. Key asset positions
All critical assets are listed in table below
3. Táblázat: Key assets and CARVER2 score
Nr Name Address Type of CI Priority Carver 2
1 Sprague 126 River Terminal 2 160
Energy Corp., Road
2 Sprague 78 Patterson Terminal 1 156
Energy Corp., Lane
3 Sprague 29 Gosling Terminal 2 160
Energy Corp., Road
4 Gold Bond Michael Terminal 1 246
Building Succi Drive
5 DPH Market Market Street Terminal 1 240
6 Dover PT - Fixed Bridge 2 240
7 The Interstate - Fixed Bridge 1 290
8 The railroad - Lift Bridge 2 150
9 The Memorial - Lift Bridge 1 170
10,11 Seavey Island - Fixed Brige 2 115
12 Naval Base - Naval Base 2 115
13 The Pease - Airport 1 246
Table 4 shows the possible threats for each main critical asset, the asset
vunerability, the consequences of a possible attack, the countermeasures that can be
used against the attacks, and the C4 that integrates countermeasures.
Table 4. Threat, vulnerabilities, consequences and countermeasures
Target Threat Vulnerability Consequences Countermeasures C4
Avery Lane, Small Boat High Possible Sonar, human Sensors ->
SEA-3 destruction of security sensor
Terminal facility and clusterhead -
surrounding > command
area (50 center ->
deaths, range security
By foot Same Same Motion detectors, Same, and
cameras, fences, explosive
human security, detector ->
explosive local security
RPG Same Same Cameras, large -
Truck/car Same Same Fence, human Explosive ->
security, explosive human
SEA-3 ship Small Boat High Possible Cameras, human Cameras ->
destruction of security command
Ship and center ->
Crew Same Same Screening Screening,
procedure, limited intrusion
access to critical detection and
areas, cameras, cameras->
human security ship
RPG Same Same Armor -
Irving oil Same as High Same as SEA3 Same as SEA3 Same as
Terminal SEA3 and possible SEA3
Irving oil Same as Same as SEA3 Same as SEA3 Same as SEA3 Same as
ship SEA3 (50 death, 0.2 SEA3
I-95 Bridge Explosives High Destruction of Explosive and Sensors ->
planted at the I95 bridge (250 motion sensors, sensor
supporting deaths, short linked to a clusterhead -
points of the range) response team > command
bridge center ->
RPG Low Disabling I95 Armor, bridge -
for a while (10 structure
Truck/car Low Same Armor, bridge -
Lift Bridges Boat Med Blocking of Cameras as Cameras ->
waterway and deterrent, move security
secondary lift systems away
roads (20 from water
Truck/Car Med Same Cameras as Same
lift systems away
By foot Med Same Cameras, motion Sensors ->
DPH By foot High Probably many Scanning Sensors,
Market victims (500 explosives and intrusion
Street deaths, few biological detection,
Terminal hundred feet weapons, cameras, bioweapon
range) human security detection ->
Certainly the defense of terminals and bridges is not just about locally installed
sensors and cameras. These sensing devices usually indicate direct threat for a certain
asset. The installations of prevention technologies that can filter anomalies far-off an
asset, such as authentication and authorization technologies, also have to be integrated
into an efficient system. The sensing devices and the prevention system have to be
assembled into an integrated security solution that is able to process alerts and notify
quickly the responsible security forces.
There is significant critical infrastructure within Port of Portsmouth area,
including military, civil and business area of interests. All of them are located inside
the Portsmouth Harbor, or along the Piscataqua River. The defense of this
infrastructure is an issue that we have to face. The loss of some of this infrastructure
from a possible attack could affect directly the economy of the country. A great step
in prevention would be an integrated system that can protect the entrance harbor of
the Port, and separate terminals, bridges, and other key assets as well.
Appendix B – Port of Portland
This paper is a brief, preliminary report on the Port of Portland, Maine. It
includes a physical description of the port, an aerial photo, a list of key infrastructure,
and a description of probable terrorist targets. This paper is strictly intended to
familiarize the reader with the area and bring to light obvious areas of concern that
will need to be addressed.
The port of Portland, ME is located at approximately 37 25.8’ N, 122 5.3’ W.
With a city population of 64,000 and a metro population of 230,000 people it is the
largest city in Maine. It sits on the coast of the Atlantic and is approximately a 2 hour
drive from Boston, Mass.
The port itself is technically a part of Cisco Bay, dotted by islands until it gives
way to the Atlantic Ocean. The port is approximately 4.5 miles in length from east to
west, and approximately .7 miles in width from north to south (at its widest point).
An aerial photo of the port can be found in Annex A for a better understanding
of the layout of the port.
The key infrastructure of the port of Portland fall into three categories: bridges,
port terminals, and air travel.
The port of Portland is home to seven bridges, which include:
1. Thompson Point Bridge
2. Veterans Memorial Bridge
3. Vaughans Bridge
4. Portland Bridge
5. Tukey Bridge
6. Martin Point Bridge
7. Makworth Point Bridge
Bridges 1, and 5 are a part of I-295, the major highway which runs
through the heart of Portland.
Bridge 1 is in close proximity to the Portland International Jetport, and
bridge 4 is in close proximity to the main port terminals.
Bridge 3 is an historical landmark and may not be in use anymore.
There are 16 major commercial terminals in the port of Portland. The majority
are located at the entrance of the port on the Northern side. Other terminals are
scattered throughout the port, and range from docks for ferries to tanker docks for the
loading and off-loading of the many petroleum products stored in the holding tanks.
Terminal 4 is the main terminal for cargo ships, located on the northern edge of
the port (see pg 2 of Annex B).
Terminals 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, and 11 are all points to off/on load various petroleum
products. They are also the locations of the many holding tanks (see pg 2 of Annex
The holding tanks themselves are also key infrastructure and are the clusters of
white dots shown on the map found in Annex A. An example of such is circled on the
For a list of the 16 major terminals, and a brief description of each, refer to
There is only one Airport in Portland, the Portland International Jetport. It is
labeled on the photo in Annex A, and is located only a few hundred meters off the
port water line.
Unfortunately there are many, many open targets for terrorists to attack. As one
can see from the aerial photo, petroleum holding tanks are located throughout the
port. The tanks, upon visual inspection, have little to no security protecting them.
Annex C lists security measures taken after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York.
The Shore-side security may look good on paper, but in reality is next to non-existent.
Many facilities have only a chain-link fence between the tanks and a terrorist.
Terminal 7 from annex B (pg 2) is also the location of tanks that don’t even have a
fence, and worse yet, are located directly on the water line (as are the majority of the
tanks). A small bomb detonated on these containers could cause a huge oil spill into
the port, shutting down operations.
The same can be said for terminal 4(second page of annex B) at the ferry
terminals. Ships carrying people and vehicles boast no visible security, leaving them
open to any number of attacks from land and sea. The seven bridges in the area are
equally unprotected. Any ship or boat could easily stop underneath, plant a bomb,
and destroy all seven bridges.
The Portland International Jetport, which is home to an assortment of airliners,
both commercial and private, also depends on a chain link fence for security. The
main threat here, however, is not the chance of someone breaking into the airport, but
from someone armed with an RPG at the end of the run way or at any point in the
port. The flight patters of outgoing aircraft take them directly over the port, leaving
them exposed to RPG attacks from any number of locations. This fact is particularly
unnerving (and ironic) when one considers the fact than any aircraft inbound to the
North East is diverted to this airport if it is suspected to contain terrorists on board.
What is even more shocking is the ease of which a terrorist could commit these
attacks, and many more, with the very distinct possibility of not being caught. On any
random Saturday afternoon, in broad daylight, it is entirely possible to plant bombs on
a large number of holding tanks, tankers at dock, and a number of bridges, never the
while being stopped or questioned. Were bombs to be planted at all these targets,
rigged with cell phone detonators (like those being used against US forces in Iraq)
linked to a single number, it is entirely plausible for a terrorist to take down the entire
Port of Portland with a single telephone call while on a plane leaving for the
This may be a bit of a “dooms day” scenario, but it outlines the vulnerability of
the port itself, let alone the threat due to the vast amount of unchecked cargo
containers that come to port each day. In 2001 the Port of Portland was home to
173,116,302 barrels of petroleum, 31,064 vehicles, 45 cruise ships, and thousands of
containers. If this vast economy of trade and commerce was disrupted in such a way
as described above, or by any number of other scenarios, the impact would be felt
throughout the country.
Map of Portland commercial docks and description of Docks 1-5.
1. DEAKES WHARF
General Marine Ship Repair, 207-772-5354
2. BERLIN MILLS WHARF
Gowan Marine Ship Repair, 207-773-1761
3. PORTLAND FISH PIER
City of Portland Dockage 207-541-6900
Vessel Services Ice, Fuel, Net Repair, 800-773-7050
Ship Repair, Electronics,
4. UNION WHARF
Brown Ship Chandlery Commercial Gear 207-772-3796
Maine Liferaft & Inflatable Commercial Gear 207-772-8095
Portland Trap Traps 207-774-4896
Custom Float Docks 207-772-3796
The Bait Lady Bait 207-871-0551
5. HOBSON'S WHARF
A.L. Griffin Ship Chandlery Commercial Gear 207-772-0165
6. MAINE WHARF
Chase Leavitt & Co Life Raft Service 772-3751
Map of Portland Terminal Information
Chart not to be used for navigation
1. Cargill Petroleum 6. Mobil Oil Terminal
2. Gulf Oil Terminal 7. Motiva Terminal
3. International Marine Terminal 8. Portland Fish Pier
(click here for a detailed diagram)
9 & 10. Portland Pipe Line Pier
4 Maine State Pier One (9) and Pier Two (10)
(Portland Ocean Terminal,
Casco Bay Lines) 11. Sprague Energy Terminal
5. Merrill Marine Terminal
Security Implemented after 9-11
Coast Guard vessels will escort cruise ships, international ferries and tank vessels
with Grade A or B cargo, in the Captain of the Port Portland Zone on a selective
basis. In Portland Harbor vessels will be escorted from inside Cushing Island to their
Crew and passenger lists will be faxed to the local MSO and MSFO for forwarding to Coast
Guard Intelligence and will continue to be faxed to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service for review prior to clearance. Faxes should be sent not later than 24 hours prior to the
The following vessels arriving from a foreign port, other than Canada, will be
boarded by a Coast Guard boarding team prior to entry: Tank vessels carrying a
grade A or B cargo and cruise ships.
Any vessel that arrives from Canada whose voyage originated in the U.S. or has
visited the U.S. previously and has not made any passenger or crew changes may
proceed straight to their terminal.
All cruise ships and vessels carrying a grade A or B cargo will be boarded at the
pier by the local MSO or MSFO prior to offloading/ transferring.
All gates in and around waterfront facilities shall remain closed and locked to limit
access and will be immediately secured after every use.
Adequate fencing shall encompass the perimeter and infrastructure of all facilities.
Fencing will not have holes or come unattached from fence poles.
Adequate lighting shall be used to illuminate the perimeter and infrastructure of all
facilities as well as vessels docked at the facility.
Facilities shall increase their security to ensure that there are two persons on the
facility during hours which the facility is open with a vessel at their pier or during
trucking operations. One of these persons will monitor incoming and outgoing
traffic. At least one person must be on the facility at all other times.
Facilities and vessels shall confirm the identification of all individuals entering or
boarding the facility or vessel.
Any facility that has seen evidence of sabotage or subversive activity is required to
immediately report this information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Captain of
the Port, and local authorities.
Stores being loaded on cruise ships and tank vessels shall be opened and inspected
by appropriate facility personnel or licensed officers of the vessel.
A gangway watch will be posted at all times while a cruise ship, international ferry
or tank vessel is moored at a facility.
Shore leave will be permitted for foreign crewmembers on board tank vessels or
freight vessels at the discretion of the respective facility management. Shore leave for
all crewmembers on foreign cruise ship or international ferries will only be permitted
if type II or III screening is available. Proper screening will include verifying the
identification of crew members with a picture identification at the entrance to the
terminal and screening of all materials brought onto the facility or aboard vessels.
Access to all waterfront facilities shall be limited to individuals on official business.
PIER WATCH/WATERFRONT SECURITY:
A PIC or vessel crewmember will make rounds of the vessel and may be tasked
with gangway watch in lieu of having two watch standers. They will remain vigilant
to threats from the waterside and shore side to ensure security of the vessel and
Vessel patrols* will be required when there are 2 or more vessels in a pre-
designated zone** of which one or more contains a Grade A or B cargo including
gasoline and Jet-A.
The Coast Guard and Maine Marine Patrol will continue to patrol the harbor.
Security Zones will be placed out to 80 yards from each water front facility and out
to 50 yards around cruise ships, international ferries and tank vessels while they are
moored at a facility.
Pier pilings will regularly be checked at low tide.
* (Vessel patrol crews will be equipped with search lights, flashing amber light or other distinctive light other than
blue, VHF radio and cellular phone.)
**(Zone 1 includes Portland Pipeline and Gulf, Zone 2 includes Motiva Enterprise, Zone three included Global
Petroleum, ExxonMobil and Sprague Energy.)
The following restrictions have been rescinded as of 1200 September 26, 2001:
1) Coast Guard vessels will escort cruise ships, international ferries and tank
vessels with Grade A or B cargo, in the Captain of the Port Portland Zone
2) All cruise ships and tank vessels will be boarded outside the port by armed law
enforcement boarding officers and marine inspectors prior to entry.
3) Two or more vessels carrying a Grade A or B cargo can not be simultaneously
docked in a zone.
4) Facilities shall increase their security to ensure that there are two persons on the
facility at all times, 24 hours a day. One of these persons will monitor incoming and
Captain of the Port representatives will make rounds of all facilities to ensure
compliance with these security measures. These rounds will include inspecting
facilities and vessels to ensure security measures are in place. Discrepancies will be
noted and acted upon in an appropriate manner to include shutting down transfers
between vessels and facilities.
(The specifications found in Annex C are a product of the Army Corps of Engineers and can be found
on their website at www.usace.army.mil)
1. Statewide Security Assessment of Florida Seaports submitted by Camber
Corporation for The Office of Drugs Control Executive Office of the Governor,
2. Security Applications of X-ray Inspection Systems, Bill Baukus, November 2005
12. US Army Corps of Engineers Institute of Water Resources, Ports of Portland,
Maine and Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Ports on the Kennebec and Penobscot
Rivers, Maine, Port Series NO. 1, Revised in 2001