Break Up Fee Agreement

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					                MITIGATING ANTITRUST RISK IN MERGER AGREEMENTS

                                Susan Creighton, Scott Sher and Paul Jin1



INTRODUCTION

        As many industries in the high technology sector experience consolidation, antitrust
scrutiny has increased, and only will continue to do so. Thus, it is all the more important for
merging parties to consider antitrust at each stage of the deal process. Counsel for the merging
parties should particularly note that antitrust risk management starts not with the announcement
of the deal, but at the earliest phase of the merger process – during the drafting of the merger
agreement.

        In this article, we endeavor to detail and explain the various portions of a merger
agreement that mitigate and shift antitrust risk between the merging parties, and offer examples
of clauses taken from actual executed merger agreements. As part of our analysis of merger
agreement best practices, we have undertaken an analysis of a substantial number of merger
agreements associated with transactions from the last twenty years that have raised antitrust
concern and summarize provisions from several key agreements.

          This article includes an analysis of the following:

               Cooperation clauses, in particular, the degree to which the parties must jointly
                present their antitrust arguments, and the degree of diligence the parties must
                exercise in quickly making antitrust filings around the world;

               “Efforts” clauses, including the degree to which the parties must litigate, divest
                or otherwise take action to resolve antitrust concerns raised by the reviewing
                competition authorities;

               Termination clauses, including requirements to continue the process through
                litigation and appeal; and

               Fee provisions, including “reverse break-up fees” and requirements to shoulder
                the burdens of an expensive antitrust review.




1
          Susan Creighton and Scott Sher are partners and Paul Jin is an associate at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati.


                                                       1 of 18
MITIGATING AND SHIFTING ANTITRUST RISK

Cooperation

        For the purchaser, and especially for the target, it is important that the merger agreement
specifies the extent to which the parties and their counsel will consult and cooperate with one
another in the antitrust process, from preliminary antitrust risk analysis to the preparation of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino filing as well as through any agency review. Cooperation clauses can ensure
that both parties will be on the same page regarding antitrust strategy, and that the interests of
both parties (and the future combined entity) will be considered “in all respects with each other
in connection with any filing or submission ... and in connection with any investigation, approval
process or other inquiry” – including, for example, in meetings with the reviewing agency, in
white papers, stipulations with the agency on timing and submission of materials, and in any
negotiation of a proposed consent decree or remedial measures.

        Generally, more detailed obligations will offer more protection to the target company, but
the desired level of specificity of cooperation clauses can depend on the antitrust risk of the deal.
For high-risk transactions particularly, parties may want to denote, for example, which foreign
jurisdictions will require filings and specify the rules for engaging with the agencies, including
reviewing the other party‟s response to all agency requests. Cooperation clauses may go so far
as to prohibit the initiation of ex parte communications with the antitrust agencies; they should at
least require prompt notice and disclosure of such communications. While the purchaser and
counsel for the purchaser usually take the lead in the antitrust clearance process, from the target
company‟s perspective, key decisions during the antitrust investigation, such as the identification
of key substantive issues or the timing of filings, should be subject to the review and approval of
both the purchaser and seller.

       Below are examples of cooperation clauses from past merger agreements. Note that
some agreements demand far greater cooperation between the parties than others, and some
allow for joint-decision making while others provide that the buyer has control over the process.

                          “To the extent permissible under applicable Law or any rule, regulation or restriction of
                          a Governmental Entity, each of the Company and Parent shall, in connection with the
Prompt Notice of
                          efforts referenced above to obtain all requisite material approvals, clearances and
Communications
                          authorizations for the transactions contemplated by this Agreement under the HSR Act
Received, Prior Review
                          or any other Regulatory Law, use its commercially reasonable efforts to (i) cooperate in
and Consultation
                          all respects with each other in connection with any filing or submission and in
Regarding Submissions
                          connection with any investigation or other inquiry, including any proceeding initiated
and Meetings,
                          by a private party, (ii) promptly inform the other party of any communication received
Opportunity to
                          by such party from, or given by such party to, the Antitrust Division of the Department
Participate in Meetings
                          of Justice (the "DOJ"), the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") or any other
                          Governmental Entity and of any material communication received or given in
Merger Agreement
                          connection with any proceeding by a private party, in each case regarding any of the
between Verizon
                          transactions contemplated hereby, (iii) permit the other party, or the other party's legal
Communications, Inc.
                          counsel, to review any communication given by it to, and consult with each other in
and MCI, Inc., February
                          advance of any meeting or conference with, the DOJ, the FTC or any such other
14, 2005
                          Governmental Entity or, in connection with any proceeding by a private party, with any
                          other Person and (iv) to the extent permitted by such Governmental Entity or other



                                                     2 of 18
                           Person, give the other party the opportunity to attend and participate in such meetings
                           and conferences.” (§ 6.4(b))

                           “To the extent permissible under applicable Law or any rule, regulation or restriction of
                           a Governmental Entity, each of the Company and Parent shall, in connection with the
                           efforts referenced above, obtain all requisite material approvals, clearances and
                           authorizations for the transactions contemplated by this Agreement and will use its
                           commercially reasonable efforts to (i) cooperate in all respects with each other in
                           connection with any filing or submission and in connection with any investigation or
                           other inquiry and (ii) promptly inform the other party of any communication received
                           by such party from, or given by such party to, the Governmental Entities regulating
                           competition and telecommunications businesses or the use of radio spectrum or
                           regulating or limiting investment and State agencies or departments or local
                           governments that have issued competitive access provider or other telecommunications
                           franchises or any other similar authorizations.” (§ 6.4(c))
                           “Subject to the terms and conditions herein provided, the Company and Parent shall (i)
                           promptly make their respective filings and thereafter make any other required
                           submissions under the HSR Act and the Communications Act, (ii) use reasonable efforts
                           to cooperate with one another in (A) determining whether any filings are required to be
                           made with, or consents, permits, authorizations or approvals are required to be obtained
                           from, any third party, the United States government or any agencies, departments or
General Cooperation        instrumentalities thereof or other governmental or regulatory bodies or authorities of
Clause                     federal, state, local and foreign jurisdictions in connection with the execution and
                           delivery of this Agreement and the consummation of the transactions contemplated
Merger Agreement           hereby and thereby and (B) timely making all such filings and timely seeking all such
between Clear Channel      consents, permits, authorizations or approvals, and (iii) take, or cause to be taken, all
Communications, Inc.,      other actions and do, or cause to be done, all other things necessary, proper or advisable
and AMFM Inc., October     to consummate and make effective the transactions contemplated hereby, including,
2, 1999                    without limitation, taking or undertaking all such further action as may be necessary to
                           resolve such objections, if any, as the FCC, the Federal Trade Commission, the
                           Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, state antitrust enforcement authorities
                           or competition authorities of any other nation or other jurisdiction or any other Person
                           may assert under relevant antitrust, competition or communications laws with respect to
                           the transactions contemplated hereby, subject to Parent's right to direct such actions and
                           things to be done set forth in Section 5.8(b) below.” § 5.8(a)
                           “Each of the parties hereto shall use its reasonable best efforts to (1) cooperate in all
                           respects with each other in connection with any filing or submission with a
Prior Review and
                           Governmental Authority in connection with the Merger and in connection with any
Consultation on
                           investigation, approval process or other inquiry by or before a Governmental Authority
Submissions, Prompt
                           relating to the Merger, including any proceeding initiated by a private party, and (2)
Notice Regarding
                           keep the other party informed in all material respects and on a reasonably timely basis
Communications,
                           of any written or material oral communication received by such party from, or given by
Prohibition on ex parte
                           such party to any Governmental Authority, or party to a proceeding, regarding the
Meetings or
                           Merger. Subject to applicable Laws relating to the exchange of information, each of the
Communications, Prior
                           parties hereto shall have the right to review in advance, and to the extent practicable
Approval of Material
                           each will consult the other on, all the information relating to the other parties and their
Proposals
                           respective Subsidiaries, as the case may be, that appears in any filing made with, or
                           written materials submitted to, any third party and/or any Governmental Authority in
Merger Agreement
                           connection with the Merger. The parties agree and acknowledge that the "Future Plans
between UnitedHealth
                           for Domestic Insurer" section (or equivalent section) of any Form A (or equivalent
Group, Inc. and Pacific
                           filing or application) and any amendments thereto and supplemental information filed in
Health Group, Inc., July
                           relation thereto to be filed with any Governmental Authority by Parent or its
6, 2005
                           Subsidiaries in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby shall be reviewed
                           and approved by the Company prior to any such filing, which approval shall not be



                                                      3 of 18
                          unreasonably withheld or delayed.” § 6.03(b)

                          “Each party to this Agreement shall give the other party to this Agreement reasonable
                          prior notice of any written or material oral communication with, and any proposed
                          understanding, undertaking or agreement with, any Governmental Authority relating to
                          the Merger. Neither of the parties to this Agreement shall independently participate in
                          any meeting, or engage in any substantive conversation, with any Governmental
                          Authority in respect of any filings or submissions with or investigation, approval
                          process or other inquiry by any Governmental Authority without giving the other prior
                          notice of the meeting or conversation and, unless objected to by such Governmental
                          Authority, the opportunity to attend or participate. The Company will not make any
                          material proposals relating to, or enter into, any material understanding, undertaking or
                          agreement with any Governmental Authority relating to the Merger without the Parent's
                          prior review and approval, and the Parent will not make any such material proposal or
                          enter into any such material understanding, undertaking or agreement relating to the
                          Merger without the Company's prior review and approval, provided, however, that if
                          such understanding, undertaking or agreement is to take effect only upon the
                          consummation of the Merger, Parent shall have no obligation to obtain the Company's
                          prior approval but shall consult in advance with the Company with respect thereto.” §
                          6.03(c)
                          “Each of Time Warner and America Online shall, in connection with the efforts
                          referenced in Section 6.4(a) to obtain all Required Approvals, use its reasonable best
                          efforts to (i) cooperate in all respects with each other in connection with any filing or
Prompt Notice of          submission and in connection with any investigation or other inquiry, including any
Communications,           proceeding initiated by a private party, (ii) promptly inform the other party of any
Consultation Prior to     communication received by such party from, or given by such party to, the FCC,
Meetings, Opportunity     Franchising Authorities, PUCs, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (the
to Participate in         "DOJ"), the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") or any other Governmental Entity
Meetings                  and of any material communication received or given in connection with any
                          proceeding by a private party, in each case regarding any of the transactions
Merger Agreement          contemplated hereby, and (iii) consult with each other in advance to the extent
between America Online,   practicable of any meeting or conference with, the FCC, Franchising Authorities, PUCs,
Inc., and Time Warner     the DOJ, the FTC or any such other Governmental Entity or, in connection with any
Inc., January 10, 2000    proceeding by a private party, with any other Person, and to the extent permitted by the
                          FCC, PUCs, the DOJ, the FTC or such other applicable Governmental Entity or other
                          Person, give the other party the opportunity to attend and participate in such meetings
                          and conferences.” § 6.4((b)
                          “Each of WorldCom and MCI shall, in connection with the efforts referenced in Section
Prompt Notice of          5.4(a) to obtain all requisite approvals and authorizations for the transactions
Communications, Prior     contemplated by this Merger Agreement under the HSR Act or any other Regulatory
Review and                Law (as defined below), use its best efforts to (i) cooperate in all respects with each
Consultation Regarding    other in connection with any filing or submission and in connection with any
Submissions and           investigation or other inquiry, including any proceeding initiated by a private party; (ii)
Meetings, Opportunity     promptly inform the other party of any communication received by such party from, or
to Participate in         given by such party to, the FCC, PUCs, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Meetings                  Justice (the "DOJ") or any other Governmental Entity and of any material
                          communication received or given in connection with any proceeding by a private party,
Merger Agreement          in each case regarding any of the transactions contemplated hereby, and (iii) permit the
between MCI               other party to review any communication given by it to, and consult with each other in
Communications            advance of any meeting or conference with, the FCC, PUCs, the DOJ or any such other
Corporation and           Governmental Entity or, in connection with any proceeding by a private party, with any
WorldCom, Inc.,           other Person, and to the extent permitted by the FCC, PUCs, the DOJ or such other
November 9, 1997          applicable Governmental Entity or other Person, give the other party the opportunity to
                          attend and participate in such meetings and conferences. For purposes of this



                                                     4 of 18
                           Agreement, "Regulatory Law" means the Sherman Act, as amended, the Clayton Act, as
                           amended, the HSR Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, the Federal
                           Communications Act, as amended, and all other federal, state and foreign, if any,
                           statutes, rules, regulations, orders, decrees, administrative and judicial doctrines and
                           other laws that are designed or intended to prohibit, restrict or regulate actions having
                           the purpose or effect of monopolization or restraint of trade or lessening of competition,
                           whether in the communications industry or otherwise through merger or acquisition.” §
                           5.4(b)
General Cooperation
                           “Certain Filings. The Company and Acquiror shall use their best efforts to cooperate
Clause
                           with one another in determining whether any action by or in respect of, or filing with,
                           any governmental body, agency or official, or authority is required, or any actions,
Merger Agreement
                           consents, approvals or waivers are required to be obtained from parties to any material
between MCI
                           contracts, in connection with the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this
Communications
                           Agreement and in seeking to timely obtain any such actions, consents, approvals or
Corporation and
                           waivers, or making any such filings or furnishing information required in connection
WorldCom, Inc.,
                           therewith.” § 4.2(h)
November 9, 1997



Best Efforts to Gain Clearance

        Merger agreements will typically establish the level of commitment required from both
parties to ensure successful clearance of the various shareholder and regulatory hurdles –
including antitrust. These commercial promises to perform may mandate that the parties “take,
or cause to be taken, all action, and to do, or cause to be done, all things necessary or required by
the [antitrust agencies],” or specify certain actions that the parties are required to take or are
prohibited from taking in order to mollify objections from the antitrust agency (or even from a
private party).

        Because an agreement to merge entails covenants between the parties to pursue ends that
are not fully under their control, these promises to perform are often modified by clauses using
the terms “best efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” “commercially reasonable efforts,” or other
similar language. These clauses limit the lengths to which a party must go, for example, to
resolve any objections or challenges by the antitrust agencies. Unfortunately, such language is
vague,2 and the scope of obligations imposed by “best efforts” and related clauses is an unsettled
area of law.

        While practitioners generally consider such clauses to impose a higher level of duty than
the general contractual duty of good faith (with “best efforts” clauses imposing a higher standard
than “reasonable efforts”), courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of these provisions.
Moreover, the issue of the meaning of “best efforts” clauses has risen mostly in the context of a
licensee‟s or distributor‟s obligations to make sales of the licensor‟s or manufacturer‟s products,
and has rarely surfaced in the context of a party‟s obligations to ensure that a transaction clears
antitrust hurdles. We were only able to find one case involving whether a party used its “best
efforts” to effectuate a transaction (by gaining clearance from the FTC). In In re Gulf Oil/Cities
2
    In fact, Illinois courts have held that “best efforts,” without further definition as to what performance is
    required, is too vague to be binding upon the parties. See, e.g., Kraft co Corp. v. Kolbus, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156
    (Ill. App. Cot. 1971).


                                                      5 of 18
Service Tender Offer Litigation, the court held that the “best efforts” requirement in the merger
agreement was explicitly limited by another agreement between the parties (Offer to Purchase). 3
This highlights the importance of parties defining for themselves the requirements under a “best
efforts” clause instead of relying upon a non-existent standard legal definition (e.g., should best
efforts include divestiture, and if so, of what?).

         Many courts blur the distinction between “best efforts” and other standards such as
“reasonable efforts” and “reasonable best efforts.” Indeed, several courts use “reasonable
efforts” in its definition of “best efforts.” In Coady v. Toyota Motor Distributors, the First
Circuit held that „“best efforts‟ is implicitly qualified by a reasonableness test.”4 In Stewart v.
O’Neill, the court held “best efforts” meant “all reasonable efforts.”5 Likewise, in Krobeth v.
Brent, the court held that “best efforts” meant that the party had to use “all reasonable methods”
to fulfill its obligations.6 Several court use “best efforts” and “reasonable efforts”
interchangeably. In Timberline Development v. Kronman, the court, in deciding whether a
“reasonable efforts” provision in a real estate contract was enforceable, stated that “the
requirement to employ reasonable efforts” was “generally expressed” as “best efforts.”7

         The term “reasonable best efforts” has also received inconsistent treatment. Some courts
have ignored the term “reasonable” and interpreted “reasonable best efforts” as a “best efforts”
standard, suggesting that there is no substantive difference between the two clauses.8 Other
courts have suggested that there is a substantive difference. In Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Am.
Cynamid Co., the court considered the meaning of a “reasonably best efforts” provision,
observing that the word “reasonably” must add some meaning to “best efforts.” The court held
that the word “reasonably,” at a minimum, excused the defendant from a duty to forego a
constitutional right. In In re Chateaugay (LTV Aerospace and Defense v. Thomson), the court
addressed the obligations under a “reasonable efforts” clause, and stated that it was “indisputably
less stringent than that imposed by the „best efforts‟ clauses contained elsewhere in the
Agreement.” However, the precendential value of either of these cases is tenuous. The
Stamicarbon case involved a licensing agreement, while the Chateaugay case was a bankruptcy
matter. Moreover, the court in Stamicarbon was not addressing the difference between
“reasonably best efforts” and “best efforts,” and did not state whether the outcome would have
been different under a “best efforts” standard, while the court in Chateaugay neither stated its
rationale for its conclusion nor pointed to any precedent.

       Contrary to conventional wisdom, a “best efforts” clause does not require a party to do
every conceivable action, including those detrimental to itself, to accomplish the goal. In Coady

3
    725 F.Supp. 712, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
4
    361 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2004).
5
    225 F. Supp. 2d 6, 14 (D.D.C. 2002).
6
    215 A.D.2d 813, 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
7
    263 A.D.2d 175, 178) (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). In cases involving an implied best efforts obligation, courts have
    held that “best efforts” and “reasonable efforts” are interchangeable, and a matter of semantics. See Trecom
    Business System v. Prasad, 980 F. Supp. 770, 774 n.1 (D.N.J. 1997); see also Permannce v. Kenmetal, 908
    F.2d 98, 100 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990) (deeming “best efforts” an “extravagant” phrase).
8
    See In Re Valuevision International Inc. Securities Litigation, (896 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.Pa. 1995); see also
    Hermann Holdings Ltd. V. Lucent Technologies Inc., 302 F.3d 552 (5th Circ. 2002).


                                                     6 of 18
v. Toyota Motor Distributors, the First Circuit held that a “best efforts” clause “cannot mean
everything possible under the sun”9 Similarly, the court in Triple-A Baseball Club Associates v.
Northeastern Baseball held that “[w]e have found no cases, and none have been cited, holding
that „best efforts‟ means every conceivable effort.”10 But how much is required is unclear.
Some courts only require good faith, which is implicit in every contract.11 Some courts suggest
that under a “best efforts” standard, parties must pursue “all reasonable methods.”12 Some courts
have held that “best efforts” entails measures even if they are unprofitable,13 while other courts
have held the opposite.14 For example, in the oft-cited Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing, the defendant
promised to use its “best efforts” to promote and sell products to which the plaintiff was entitled
royalties. When the defendant experienced financial difficulties, it cut costs, including
advertising costs and costs associated with other practices. This resulted in the defendant‟s
financial recovery yet adversely affected the sales of the products to which the plaintiff was
owed a royalty. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant had not used its “best efforts” to
maintain a high sales volume. The court held that while the defendant must consider the impact
of its actions to the plaintiff, the defendant was not required to ignore its own interests or
bankrupt itself.15

        Caselaw suggests that determining the obligations under “best efforts” clauses is a highly
fact-specific inquiry. The First Circuit in Triple-A Baseball Club Associates v. Northeastern
Baseball held that the standard “cannot be defined in terms of a fixed formula; it varies with the
facts and the field of law involved.” Other courts have held likewise,16 and have considered
extrinsic circumstances17 and standard industry practices.18 At the same time, one court has held
the opposite. In In re Gulf Oil/Cities Service Tender Offer Litigation, the court held that a court



9
     361 F.3d at 59.
10
     832 F.2d 214, 228 (1st Cir. 1987).
11
     See, e.g., Western Geophysical v. Bolt Associates, 584 F.2d 1164 (2nd Cir. 1978); Triple-A Baseball Club
     Associates v. Northeastern Baseball, 832 F.2d 214. However, other courts have held that more than good faith
     is required. See, e.g., Satellite Broadcasting Cable, 807 F. Supp. 210 (D.P.R. 1992); and Krobeth v. Brent, 215
     A.D.2d at 814 (stating that “best efforts” requires “more than „good faith‟ precisely because it is an implied
     covenant in all contracts).
12
     See Stewart v. O’Neill, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 14;. Krobeth.v. Brent, 215 A.D.2d at 814.
13
     See Showtime Newtorks v. Comsat Video Enterprises, 8/10/98 N.Y.L.J. 28 (co. 5) (Under either a “best efforts”
     or a “reasonable business efforts” standard, the court held that “[d]ifficulty of performance occasioned only by
     financial difficulties, even to the extent of insolvency, does not excuse performance of contract.”); 407 East
     Garage v. Savoy Fifth Avenue, 23 N.Y.2d 275, 282 (N.Y. 1968) (“where impossibility or difficulty of
     performance is occasioned only by financial difficulty or economic hardship, even to the extent of insolvency or
     bankruptcy, performance of a contract is not excused.”).
14
     See Martin v. Monumental Life Insurance, 240 F.3d 223, 235 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Holding that agreeing to use best
     efforts did not mean defendant was giving up its right to use sound business judgment); see also Van
     Valkenburgh v. Hayden Publishing, 30 N.Y.2d 34 (1972) (publisher who had agreed to use “best efforts” in
     promoting an author‟s work was not restricted from doing the same with other authors in accordance to the
     publisher‟s economic interests, even if it adversely affected the author‟s sales).
15
     601 F.2d 609, 614-15 (2nd Cir. 1979).
16
     See, e.g., Martin v. Monumental Life Insurance, 240 F.3d at 233.
17
     See U.S. Airways v. British Airways, 989 F. Supp. 482, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
18
     See Joyce Beverage of New York v. Royal Crown Cola, 555 F. Supp. 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).


                                                       7 of 18
can view the issue of the meaning of a “best efforts” clause as a “question of law from the four
corners of the contract.”19

        Regardless of whether the court considers the issue a question of fact or a question of
law, the parties to a merger agreement will be faced with uncertainty if they do not define for
themselves the meaning of “best efforts,” either at the hands of a jury or due to the unsettled
nature of the law dealing with “best efforts” clauses. This uncertainty has significant costs,
including exposure to litigation and an inability to properly shift antitrust risk in the merger
agreement or value the performance of the contract. Therefore, parties should consider specific
language regarding their obligations to ensure that the transaction is consummated. For example,
parties who wish to mandate or reserve the right to refuse divesting assets or licensing significant
intellectual property, or wish to prohibit additional acquisitions which could complicate
regulatory review, should include language in the merger agreement specifying such duties, as
general wording probably does not mandate that the acquiring party divest assets in order to
secure antitrust approval. When using specific language, the parties will benefit from certainty,
as the “best efforts” obligations will not be lower than what the other provisions in the contract
stipulate (floor), and the obligations can also be modified by carve outs (ceiling).



         Below are examples of best efforts clauses from past merger agreements.

Reasonable or
                            “Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, each of the parties
Commercially
                            hereto shall use all reasonable efforts (subject to, and in accordance with, applicable
Reasonable Efforts
                            Law) to take promptly, or cause to be taken, all actions, and to do promptly, or cause to
                            be done, and to assist and cooperate with the other parties in doing, all things necessary,
Merger Agreement
                            proper or advisable under applicable Laws and regulations to consummate and make
between Alltel
                            effective the Merger and the other transactions contemplated by this Agreement,
Corporation and
                            including:. . . (iii) the defending of any lawsuits or other legal proceedings, whether
Western Wireless
                            judicial or administrative, challenging this Agreement or the consummation of the
Corporation, January 9,
                            transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” § 5.9(a)
2005
Reasonable or
                            “If any objections are asserted with respect to the transactions contemplated hereby
Commercially
                            under any applicable law or if any suit is instituted by any Governmental Entity or any
Reasonable Efforts
                            private party challenging any of the transactions contemplated hereby as violative of
                            any applicable law, each of Bell Atlantic and GTE shall use its commercially reasonable
Merger Agreement
                            efforts to resolve any such objections or challenge as such Governmental Entity or
between Bell Atlantic
                            private party may have to such transactions under such law so as to permit
and GTE Wireless, July
                            consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” §7 .3(e)
27, 1998
Reasonable Best Efforts     “Parent and the Company shall each use their reasonable best efforts to . . . (v) take any
                            action reasonably necessary to defend vigorously, lift, mitigate or, rescind the effect of
Merger Agreement            any litigation or administrative proceeding involving any Governmental Entity or
between AMC                 Person adversely affecting this Agreement, the Transaction Documents or the
Entertainment and           transactions contemplated by this Agreement or the Transaction Documents until receipt
Loews Cineplex              of a final order by a court of competent jurisdiction permanently enjoining the
Entertainment, June 20,     transaction as to which all available applications for review have been taken (a “Final
2005                        Order”).” § 6.4(a)

19
     725 F. Supp. at 730.


                                                       8 of 18
Reasonable Best Efforts
                            “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Section 5.7 or elsewhere in
                            this Agreement, if any administrative or judicial proceeding is instituted (or threatened
Merger Agreement
                            to be instituted) challenging any of the Contemplated Transactions as violative of any
between Adobe Systems
                            Antitrust Law, Parent, Merger Sub and the Company shall use their reasonable best
Incorporated and
                            efforts to: (i) contest, resist or resolve any such proceeding; and (ii) to have vacated,
Macromedia, Inc., April
                            lifted, reversed or overturned any injunction resulting from such proceeding” § 5.7(d)
17, 2005
                            “Without limiting Section 7.1(a), Parent and the Company shall subject to Sections
                            7.1(c) and 7.1(d), as applicable: (i) Each use its best efforts to avoid the entry of, or to
                            have vacated or terminated, any decree, order, or judgment that would restrain, prevent
                            or delay the Closing, on or before the End Date (as defined in Section 9.1(b)(i)),
                            including without limitation defending through litigation on the merits any claim
                            asserted in any court by any Person; and (ii) each use its best efforts to avoid or
                            eliminate each and every impediment under any antitrust, competition or trade
Best Efforts
                            regulation law that may be asserted by any governmental authority with respect to the
                            Merger so as to enable the Closing to occur as soon as reasonably possible (and in any
Merger Agreement
                            event no later than the End Date), including, without limitation, (x) proposing,
between Chevron Corp.
                            negotiating, committing to and effecting, by consent decree, hold separate order, or
and Texaco Inc., October
                            otherwise, the sale, divestiture or disposition of such assets or businesses of Parent or
15, 2000
                            the Company (or any of their respective Subsidiaries) and (y) otherwise taking or
                            committing to take actions that after the Closing Date would limit Parent or its
                            Subsidiaries' freedom of action with respect to, or its ability to retain, one or more of its
                            or its Subsidiaries' businesses, product lines or assets, in each case as may be required in
                            order to avoid the entry of, or to effect the dissolution of, any injunction, temporary
                            restraining order, or other order in any suit or proceeding, which would otherwise have
                            the effect of preventing or materially delaying the Closing.” § 7.1(b)
                            “Office Depot and Staples shall each use their best efforts to (i) take, or cause to be
                            taken, all appropriate action, and do, or cause to be done, all things necessary and proper
                            under applicable law to consummate and make effective the transactions contemplated
                            hereby as promptly as practicable, (ii) obtain from any Governmental Entity or any
                            other third party any consents, licenses, permits, waivers, approvals, authorizations, or
                            orders required to be obtained or made by Office Depot or Staples or any of their
                            Subsidiaries in connection with the authorization, execution and delivery of this
                            Agreement and the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby including,
                            without limitation, the Merger, and (iii) as promptly as practicable, make all necessary
                            filings, and thereafter make any other required submissions, with respect to this
                            Agreement and the Merger required under (A) the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
Best Efforts                and any other applicable federal or state securities laws, (B) the HSR Act and any
                            related governmental request thereunder, (C) the Canadian Competition Act and any
Merger Agreement            related governmental request thereunder, (D) the Investment Canada Act, and (E) any
between Staples, Inc. and   other applicable law. Office Depot and Staples shall cooperate with each other in
Office Depot, Inc.,         connection with the making of all such filings, including providing copies of all such
September 4, 1996           documents to the non−filing party and its advisors prior to filing and, if requested, to
                            accept all reasonable additions, deletions or changes suggested in connection therewith.
                            Office Depot and Staples shall use their best efforts to furnish to each other all
                            information required for any application or other filing to be made pursuant to the rules
                            and regulations of any applicable law (including all information required to be included
                            in the Joint Proxy Statement and the Registration Statement) in connection with the
                            transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” § 6.06(a)

                            “Staples and Office Depot agree, and shall cause each of their respective Subsidiaries, to
                            cooperate and to use their respective best efforts to obtain any government clearances
                            required for Closing (including through compliance with the HSR Act and any
                            applicable foreign government reporting requirements), to respond to any government



                                                       9 of 18
                             requests for information . . . The parties hereto will consult and cooperate with one
                             another, and consider in good faith the views of one another, in connection with any
                             analyses, appearances, presentations, memoranda, briefs, arguments, opinions and
                             proposals made or submitted by or on behalf of any party hereto in connection with
                             proceedings under or relating to the HSR Act or any other federal, state or foreign
                             antitrust or fair trade law. Staples shall be entitled to direct any proceedings or
                             negotiations with any Governmental Entity relating to any of the foregoing, provided
                             that it shall afford Office Depot a reasonable opportunity to participate therein.
                             Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Section 6.06, neither Staples nor Office
                             Depot nor any of their respective Subsidiaries shall be required to take any action that
                             would reasonably be expected to substantially impair the overall benefits expected, as of
                             the date hereof, to be realized from the consummation of the Merger.” § 6.06(b)
                             “... Parent shall offer to take (and if such offer is accepted, commit to take) all steps
                             which it is capable of taking to avoid or eliminate impediments under any antitrust,
                             competition, or trade regulation law that may be asserted by the FTC, the Antitrust
                             Division, any State Attorney General or any other governmental entity with respect to
                             the Merger so as to enable the Effective Time to occur prior to September 15, 1999 (the
                             "Outside Date") and shall defend through litigation on the merits any claim asserted in
                             any court by any party, including appeals. Without limiting the foregoing, Parent shall
                             propose, negotiate, offer to commit and effect (and if such offer is accepted, commit to
Specified Obligations
                             and effect), by consent decree, hold separate order, or otherwise, the sale, divestiture or
                             disposition of such assets or businesses of Parent or, effective as of the Effective Time,
Merger Agreement
                             the Surviving Corporation, or their respective subsidiaries or otherwise offer to take or
between Browning-
                             offer to commit to take any action which it is capable of taking and if the offer is
Ferris Industries, Inc.,
                             accepted, take or commit to take such action that limits its freedom of action with
and Allied Waste
                             respect to, or its ability to retain, any of the businesses, services or assets of Parent, the
Industries, Inc., March 7,
                             Surviving Corporation or their respective subsidiaries, in order to avoid the entry of, or
1999
                             to effect the dissolution of, any injunction, temporary restraining order or other order in
                             any suit or proceeding, which would otherwise have the effect of preventing or delaying
                             the Effective Time beyond the Outside Date. At the request of Parent, the Company
                             shall agree to divest, hold separate or otherwise take or commit to take any action that
                             limits its freedom of action with respect to, or its ability to retain, any of the businesses,
                             services, or assets of the Company or any of its subsidiaries, provided that any such
                             action may be conditioned upon the consummation of the Merger and the
                             transactions contemplated hereby...” § 5.12(b)
                             “Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7.10 of this Agreement to the contrary,
                             the Acquiror and the Company each agree to take, or cause to be taken, all action, and to
                             do, or cause to be done, all things necessary or required by the United States Federal
                             Trade Commission (the "FTC") or the United States Department of Justice (the "DOJ")
                             in connection with the expiration or termination of the waiting period under the HSR
                             Act as a result of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement; provided, however,
Specified Obligations        that nothing set forth in this Section 7.11 shall be construed so as to preclude, prevent or
                             otherwise limit the Acquiror or Newco from instituting or prosecuting or defending a
Merger Agreement             suit or claim in good faith with respect to any suit, objection, requirement or other
between Albertson’s, Inc.    action by the FTC, the DOJ, any other such governmental authority or any private party
and Buttrey Food and         with respect to the transactions contemplated hereby. The Acquiror shall pay all filing
Drug Stores Co.,             fees incurred in connection with such filings under the HSR Act. Each party hereto shall
January 19, 1998             promptly inform the other of any material communication from the FTC, the DOJ or
                             any other government or governmental authority regarding any of the transactions
                             contemplated hereby. If either the Acquiror or the Company or any of their respective
                             affiliates receives a request for additional information or documentary material from any
                             such government or governmental authority with respect to the transactions
                             contemplated by this Agreement, then such party shall endeavor in good faith to make,
                             or cause to be made, as soon as reasonably practicable and after consultation with the



                                                        10 of 18
                             other party, an appropriate response in compliance with such request. The Acquiror
                             shall advise the Company, and the Company shall advise the Acquiror, promptly in
                             respect of any understandings, undertakings or agreements (oral or written) which it
                             proposes to make or enter into with the FTC, the DOJ or any other governmental
                             authority in connection with the transactions contemplated hereby. Except as otherwise
                             provided in this Section 7.11, the Acquiror agrees to resolve any objections as may be
                             asserted with respect to the transactions contemplated hereby under the Antitrust Laws
                             (as defined hereafter) by the applicable government or governmental authority
                             (including, without limitation, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ or the FTC)....” §
                             7.11(a)



Divestiture Limitations

         The target may wish to articulate clearly that the buyer must “make any and all
divestitures that are a prerequisite to the FTC, DOJ or EC‟s clearance of the transaction.” The
purchaser, by contrast, may wish to specify that “reasonable best efforts” does not require it to
sell, license or otherwise dispose of or hold separate “any material portion of the business or
assets” involved. Materiality itself may be calibrated as relative to the company or assets being
acquired, or more broadly to the entire business of the combined companies. Alternatively,
rather than agreeing to divest specific assets or divisions, the acquiring party may place a ceiling
on its divestiture obligation by reference to a specific sales level. Such a clause would permit the
buyer to retain crown jewel assets or divisions with sales exceeding this sales threshold (without
naming the crown jewels).

        Specific provisions detailing the limits of the parties‟ best efforts duties are necessary to
ensure that expectations are in line with reality. However, more detailed and express divestiture
provisions, of course, may signal to the agencies that the parties have antitrust concerns about
their deal, and are willing to accept certain remedies if pushed. Careful judgment is required
here.

         Below are examples of divestiture limitations clauses from past merger agreements.

                             “In furtherance and not in limitation of the covenants of the parties contained in this
                             Section 5.3, if (i) any objections are asserted with respect to the transactions
                             contemplated hereby under any law, rule, regulation, order or decree, (ii) any
                             administrative or judicial action or proceeding is instituted (or threatened to be
Risk Allocated to Buyer
                             instituted) by any Governmental Entity or private party challenging the Merger or the
and Seller (both parties
                             other transactions contemplated hereby as violative of any law, rule, regulation, order or
required to make
                             decree or which would otherwise prevent, delay or impede the consummation, or
divestitures if necessary)
                             otherwise materially reduce the contemplated benefits, of the Merger or the other
                             transactions contemplated hereby, or (iii) any law, rule, regulation, order or decree is
Merger Agreement
                             enacted, entered, promulgated or enforced by a Governmental Entity which would make
between Sirius Satellite
                             the Merger or the other transactions contemplated hereby illegal or would otherwise
Radio Inc. and XM
                             prevent, delay or impede the consummation, or otherwise materially reduce the
Satellite Radio Holdings
                             contemplated benefits, of the Merger or the other transactions contemplated hereby,
Inc., February 19, 2007
                             then each of XM and Sirius shall use its reasonable best efforts to resolve any such
                             objections, actions or proceedings so as to permit the consummation of the transactions
                             contemplated by this Agreement, including, subject to Section 5.3(b), selling, holding
                             separate or otherwise disposing of or conducting its or its Subsidiaries‟ business or asset



                                                       11 of 18
                             in a specified manner, or agreeing to sell, hold separate or otherwise dispose of or
                             conduct its or its Subsidiaries‟ business or assets in a specified manner, which would
                             resolve such objections, actions or proceedings.” § 5.3(d)
                             “In furtherance and not in limitation of the covenants of the parties contained in
                             Sections 6.4(a) and 6.4(b), if any administrative or judicial action or proceeding,
                             including any proceeding by a private party, is instituted (or threatened to be instituted)
                             challenging any transaction contemplated by this Agreement as violative of any
                             Regulatory Law, or if any statute, rule, regulation, executive order, decree, injunction or
                             administrative order is enacted, entered, promulgated or enforced by a Governmental
                             Entity that would make the Mergers or the other transactions contemplated hereby
                             illegal or would otherwise prohibit or materially impair or delay the consummation of
Risk Allocated to Buyer      the Mergers or the other transactions contemplated hereby, each of Phillips and Conoco
and Seller (both parties     shall cooperate in all respects with each other and use its respective reasonable best
required to make             efforts, including, subject to Section 6.4(a), selling, holding separate or otherwise
divestitures if necessary)   disposing of or conducting their business in a specified manner, or agreeing to sell, hold
                             separate or otherwise dispose of or conduct their business in a specified manner or
Merger Agreement             permitting the sale, holding separate or other disposition of, any assets of Phillips,
between Phillips             Conoco or their respective Subsidiaries or the conducting of their business in a specified
Petroleum Co. and            manner, to contest and resist any such action or proceeding and to have vacated, lifted,
Conoco, Inc., November       reversed or overturned any decree, judgment, injunction or other order, whether
18, 2001                     temporary, preliminary or permanent, that is in effect and that prohibits, prevents or
                             restricts consummation of the Mergers or the other transactions contemplated by this
                             Agreement and to have such statute, rule, regulation, executive order, decree, injunction
                             or administrative order repealed, rescinded or made inapplicable so as to permit
                             consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. Notwithstanding the
                             foregoing or any other provision of this Agreement, nothing in this Section 6.4 shall
                             limit either Phillips's or Conoco's right to terminate this Agreement pursuant to Section
                             8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.1(i) or 8.5 so long as such party hereto has up to then complied with its
                             obligations under this Section 6.4.” § 6.4(c)
                             “Notwithstanding anything else contained herein, the provisions of this Section 7.01
                             shall not be construed to require either party to undertake any efforts or to take any
                             action if the result thereof would give Acquiror the right to decline to consummate the
                             transactions contemplated by this Agreement pursuant to Section 8.02 by reason of
                             giving rise to a Substantial Detriment.” § 7.01(b)

                             “... there shall not be instituted or pending any action or proceeding by any
                             governmental authority (whether domestic, foreign or supranational) before any court or
Risk Allocated to Buyer      governmental authority or agency, domestic, foreign or supranational, (i) seeking to
and Seller (neither party    restrain, prohibit or otherwise interfere with the ownership or operation by Acquiror or
required to make             any Subsidiary of Acquiror of all or any portion of the business of the Company or any
divestitures if necessary)   of its Subsidiaries or of Acquiror or any of its Subsidiaries or to compel Acquiror or any
                             Subsidiary of Acquiror to dispose of or hold separate all or any portion of the business
Merger Agreement             or assets of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries or of Acquiror or any of its
Between Exxon Corp.          Subsidiaries, (ii) seeking to impose or confirm limitations on the ability of Acquiror or
and Mobil Corp.,             any Subsidiary of Acquiror effectively to exercise full rights of ownership of the Shares
December 1, 1998             (or shares of stock of the Surviving Corporation) including, without limitation, the right
                             to vote any Shares (or shares of stock of the Surviving Corporation) on any matters
                             properly presented to stockholders or (iii) seeking to require divestiture by Acquiror or
                             any Subsidiary of Acquiror of any Shares (or shares of stock of the Surviving
                             Corporation) if any such matter referred to in clause (i), (ii) or (iii) hereof could
                             reasonably be expected to result in a substantial detriment to the Acquiror and its
                             Subsidiaries (including the Company and its Subsidiaries), taken as a whole (any such
                             substantial detriment being referred to in this Agreement as a "Substantial
                             Detriment");...” § 8.02(b)



                                                       12 of 18
                             “Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other provision of this Agreement, nothing in
                             this Section 6.3 shall (i) limit a Party's right to terminate this Agreement pursuant to
                             Section 8.2 (a) or (d) so long as such Party has theretofore complied in all material
                             respects with its obligations under this Section 6.3 or (ii) require Parent to (x) enter into
                             any "hold-separate" agreement or other agreement with respect to the disposition of any
Risk Allocated to Seller
                             assets or businesses of the Parent or any of its subsidiaries or the Company or any of its
(buyer not required to
                             subsidiaries in order to obtain clearance from the FTC or the DOJ or any other antitrust
make any divestitures if
                             or competition authorities to proceed with the consummation of the transactions
necessary)
                             contemplated hereby; or (y) consummate the transactions contemplated hereby in the
                             event that any consent, approval, authorization or non-objection of any Governmental
Merger Agreement
                             Entity obtained or sought to be obtained in connection with this Agreement is
between Synopsys, Inc.
                             conditioned upon the imposition of any other significant restrictions upon, or the
and Avant! Corp.,
                             making of any material accommodation (financial or otherwise) in respect of the
December 3, 2001
                             transactions contemplated hereby or the conduct of the business of the Surviving
                             Company or the Parent (including any agreement not to compete in any geographic area
                             or line of business or any agreement to license technology to third parties) or results, or
                             would result in, the abrogation or diminishment of any authority or license granted by
                             any Governmental Entity.” § 6.3(c)
Risk Allocated to Seller
(buyer not required to
make any divestitures if
necessary)
                             There was no divestiture clause in this merger agreement. The DOJ challenged this
                             merger and required the parties to make substantial divestitures. CBS ultimately agreed
Merger Agreement
                             to the divestitures, although the merger agreement did not require them to do so.
between CBS/Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. and
Outdoor Systems, Inc.,
May 27, 1999
                             “Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, nothing contained in this
                             Agreement shall be deemed to require HP or Compaq or any Subsidiary or affiliate
                             thereof to take or agree to take any Action of Divestiture (as defined below) which
                             would be reasonably likely to materially adversely impact the benefits expected to be
Risk Allocated to Seller     derived by HP and its Subsidiaries (on a combined basis with Compaq and its
(buyer not required to       Subsidiaries) as a result of the transactions contemplated hereby or would be reasonably
make any material            likely to materially adversely affect HP and its Subsidiaries (on a combined basis with
divestitures if necessary)   Compaq and its Subsidiaries) following the Merger (a "RESTRICTED
                             DIVESTITURE"). For purposes of this Agreement, an "ACTION OF DIVESTITURE"
Merger Agreement             shall mean (i) making proposals, executing or carrying out agreements or submitting to
between Hewlett-             Legal Requirements providing for the license, sale or other disposition or holding
Packard Company and          separate (through the establishment of a trust or otherwise) of any assets or categories of
Compaq Computer              assets that are material to HP, Compaq or any of their respective Subsidiaries or the
Corporation, September       holding separate of Compaq capital stock or imposing or seeking to impose any
4, 2001                      limitation on the ability of HP, Compaq or any of their respective Subsidiaries, to
                             conduct their respective businesses or own such assets or to acquire, hold or exercise
                             full rights of ownership of Compaq's business or (ii) otherwise taking any step to avoid
                             or eliminate any impediment which may be asserted under any Legal Requirement
                             governing competition, monopolies or restrictive trade practices.” §5.6(e)
Risk Allocated to Buyer      “Parent and the Company shall, from the date hereof until the Outside Date, use their
(buyer required to make      respective reasonable best efforts to avoid the entry of, or to have vacated or terminated,
divestitures if necessary)   any decree, order, or judgment that would restrain, prevent or delay the Closing.
                             Notwithstanding the foregoing, Parent shall have the sole and exclusive right to
Merger Agreement             determine, at its option, whether to contest through litigation on the merits, negotiation
between MGM-Mirage           or other action any position or claim, including any demands for sale, divestiture or
and Mandalay Resort          disposition of assets or business of Parent or, effective as of the Effective Time, the



                                                        13 of 18
Group, June 15, 2004         Surviving Corporation or their respective subsidiaries, asserted by the FTC, the
                             Antitrust Division or other governmental authority in connection with antitrust matters
                             or Gaming Laws which would operate to hinder or delay the Effective Time. Parent
                             shall have the sole and exclusive right to direct and control any such litigation,
                             negotiation or other action, with counsel of its own choosing, and the Company agrees
                             to reasonably cooperate with Parent with respect thereto. Notwithstanding the
                             foregoing, in the event any such litigation, negotiation or other action is not reasonably
                             capable of being resolved by the Outside Date, Parent shall propose, negotiate, offer to
                             commit and effect (and if such offer is accepted, commit to and effect), by consent
                             decree, hold separate order, or otherwise, the sale, divestiture or disposition of such
                             assets or businesses of Parent or, effective as of the Effective Time, the Surviving
                             Corporation, or their respective subsidiaries or otherwise offer to take or offer to
                             commit to take any action which it is capable of taking and if the offer is accepted, take
                             or commit to take such action that limits its freedom of action with respect to, or its
                             ability to retain, any of the businesses, services or assets of Parent, the Surviving
                             Corporation or their respective subsidiaries, in order to avoid the entry of, or to effect
                             the dissolution of, any injunction, temporary restraining order or other order in any suit
                             or proceeding, which would have the effect of preventing or delaying the Effective
                             Time beyond the Outside Date. For the avoidance of doubt, Parent shall take any and all
                             actions necessary in order to ensure that (x) no requirement for a waiver, consent or
                             approval of the FTC, the Antitrust Division, any authority enforcing applicable Gaming
                             Laws, any State Attorney General or other governmental authority, (y) no decree,
                             judgment, injunction, temporary restraining order or any other order in any suit or
                             proceeding, and (z) no other matter relating to any antitrust or competition law or
                             regulation or relating to any Gaming Law, would preclude consummation of the Merger
                             by the Outside Date.” § 5.12(c)
                             “Unless otherwise agreed to by El Paso Parent and Enterprise MLP, if as a condition to
                             obtaining an agreement from any Governmental Entity not to seek an injunction
                             preventing or delaying the consummation of the Merger Transactions or to satisfy any
                             condition to a consent or approval of any Governmental Entity necessary for the
                             consummation of the Merger Transactions, such Governmental Entity shall require the
                             divestiture (or the execution of a consent decree that contemplates such a divestiture) of
                             any asset of (x) any of the El Paso Field Services Entities (a "Required FS Divestiture"),
                             (y) Enterprise MLP or any of its Subsidiaries other than the El Paso Parent Consent
                             Decree Assets (a "Required Enterprise Divestiture") or (z) GulfTerra MLP or any of its
                             Subsidiaries (a "Required GulfTerra Divestiture" and, together with the Required
Risk Allocated to Buyer
                             Enterprise Divestitures, the "Required MLP Divestitures"), or any combination thereof,
(buyer required to make
                             then the following provisions shall apply: (a) If requested by Enterprise GP, El Paso
divestitures if necessary)
                             Parent is required pursuant to the Parent Company Agreement to cause (or to agree in
                             the consent decree to cause) any Required FS Divestiture to be consummated; (b)
Merger Agreement
                             Enterprise GP agrees to cause (or to agree in the consent degree to cause) an aggregate
between Enterprise
                             amount of Required MLP Divestitures up to $150,000,000 in value; (c) notwithstanding
Products and GulfTerra
                             Section 5.17(b), if the Governmental Entity permits the consummation of either a
Energy Company,
                             Required FS Divestiture or a Required MLP Divestiture, then El Paso Parent is required
December 15, 2004
                             pursuant to the Parent Company Agreement to cause the consummation of the Required
                             FS Divestiture; and (d) if the Governmental Entity permits the consummation of either a
                             Required GulfTerra Divestiture or a Required Enterprise Divestiture, then Enterprise
                             GP shall have the right in its sole discretion to select the divestiture to be consummated.
                             Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement (i) Enterprise MLP and
                             (with Enterprise MLP's consent) GulfTerra MLP shall have the right to divest any assets
                             as may be required to prevent an injunction preventing or delaying the consummation of
                             the Merger Transactions or to satisfy any condition to a consent or approval of any
                             Governmental Entity necessary for the consummation of the Merger Transactions, (ii)
                             subject to clause (iii) immediately below, GulfTerra MLP agrees to effect promptly any



                                                       14 of 18
                             GulfTerra Required Divestitures recommended by Enterprise MLP, (iii) unless
                             otherwise agreed by GulfTerra MLP, all Required GulfTerra Divestitures shall be
                             conditioned on the closing of the Merger, and (iv) unless otherwise agreed by Enterprise
                             MLP, all Required Enterprise Divestitures shall be conditioned on the closing of the
                             Merger.” § 5.17
                             “Except as otherwise provided in this Section 7.11, if any suit is threatened or instituted
                             challenging any of the transactions contemplated hereby as violative of any Antitrust
Risk Allocated to Buyer      Law, the Acquiror shall take such action (including, without limitation, agreeing to hold
(buyer required to make      separate or to divest any of the businesses, stores, products or assets of the Acquiror or
divestitures if necessary)   any of its affiliates or of the Company or the Subsidiary) as may be required (i) by the
                             applicable government or governmental authority (including, without limitation, the
Merger Agreement             Antitrust Division of the DOJ or the FTC) in order to resolve such objections as such
between Albertson’s, Inc.    government or governmental authority may have to such transactions under such
and Buttrey Food and         Antitrust Law, or (ii) by any court or similar tribunal, in any suit brought by a private
Drug Stores Co.,             party or governmental authority challenging the transactions contemplated hereby as
January 19, 1998             violative of any Antitrust Law, in order to avoid the entry of, or to effect the dissolution
                             of, any injunction, temporary restraining order or other order that has the effect of
                             preventing the consummation of any of such transactions.” § 7.11(a)



Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) Clauses

        The use of MAC clauses (or, material adverse effect clauses) is an additional way for
parties to allocate risk during the pendency of a transaction. Similar to “best efforts” clauses,
there is no bright-line legal standard for determining whether a MAC has occurred, and what is
“material” is typically a question of fact. It is best to define these terms in the agreement.

         Oftentimes, the target in particular bears the brunt of the risk should an announced deal
fail to consummate. If a deal fails to close, the target‟s market position may be severely
weakened, and the target is likely to have experienced losses of personnel, suppliers, and
customers. Moreover, the target has lost out on other opportunities to grow, invest, or be
acquired. Thus, the target should seek to seek to limit its risk and give the buyer as few
contractual “outs” as possible. One important way to accomplish this is to limit the definition of
what constitutes a MAC. In addition to standard carve-outs such as changes due to natural
disasters, acts of war, and changes applicable to the overall economy (global, U.S., or even
regional) or industries in which the target operates, the target should seek to carve out specific
changes due to the acquisition itself. For example, the definition of MAC should expressly
exclude changes due to personnel changes, damaged supplier relationships, or customer losses,
and disruption to the business due to the expenditure of resources required to gain regulatory
approval. In transactions where the antitrust risk is high, and a second request and a long
antitrust investigation are likely, these carve-outs are especially important.


Termination Clauses

        Virtually every merger agreement has a clause outlining the various reasons one or both
parties may terminate, such as for bankruptcy, failure to satisfy conditions to the closing, or
expiration of a drop-dead date for any reason – including delays due to antitrust difficulties.


                                                        15 of 18
Where antitrust problems are anticipated, the target (or the buyer) may also seek an event-based
right to terminate – for example, when the competition agency: launches a formal investigation;
announces that it will challenge the transaction; obtains an initial court order barring the deal; or
obtains a final, nonappealable court order prohibiting the transaction (which can be years down
the line).

        Strategic considerations must be assessed when setting the drop-dead date, and the level
of antitrust risk of the transaction is an important factor. When the transaction presents few
competitive issues, the purchaser faces less risk that the target will be able to walk away from the
deal before the transaction is cleared by the antitrust agencies. The target may desire the added
security of being able to terminate the deal at an earlier date, thus avoiding both the potentially
detrimental business consequences associated with deal uncertainty and the lost sales and
opportunities that result from a longer pre-closing phase of the merger.

         Where a transaction presents substantial antitrust risk, both parties must assess the costs
and benefits of a protracted battle with the antitrust agencies. The timing of a right to terminate
is crucial, especially from the target‟s perspective: does the target want to hold the purchaser‟s
feet to the antitrust fire, risking its own engagement in a long and protracted legal battle that may
end badly? Or is it best to have an escape hatch early in the process, perhaps without full
visibility into the most likely outcome of the antitrust investigation? The purchaser, for its part,
must consider whether the right to terminate due to antitrust delays should be within the sole
discretion of the target, which may have the incentive to get out at the first sign of trouble and
collect a substantial break-up fee. Both parties should consider whether an automatic, unilateral,
or bilateral extension of the drop-dead date may be appropriate to manage the risk.

Break-up Fees

        Break-up fees may be negotiated to compensate either party for failures by the other
under its respective representations and warranties. The purchaser, for example, may be entitled
to a break-up fee should the target‟s board or shareholders later reject the merger, or accept a
competing offer. Princess Cruises, for example, paid Royal Caribbean $62.5 million when its
Board withdrew its recommendation to accept Royal Caribbean‟s proposal, and instead opted to
accept Carnival‟s subsequent offer. Buyers also offer break-up fees as the price for dropping out
of the deal in the event of material adverse changes. Monolithic Systems Technology, for
example, settled its suit against Synopsys for payment of the $10 million break-up fee, when
Synopsys cancelled the merger agreement shortly before closing. Breakup fees in mergers can
vary, but most often cluster in the 2% to 3% range of total deal value.

         The target company may also seek payment of a reverse break-up fee in the specific
event that the transaction is blocked for antitrust reasons, or delayed by antitrust review beyond a
negotiated “drop-dead” date (typically six to nine months after signing). In this situation, break-
up fees are intended to compensate the target for the sales and development opportunities
sacrificed during the aborted merger process, while providing more incentive for the purchaser to
give its best efforts to gain merger clearance. The magnitude of a reverse break-up fee should
reflect the anticipated damage if the deal falls apart or is challenged, which is of particular



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concern to the seller, since this outcome could potentially cripple the target and make it
extremely difficult for the target to continue as a business if it lost significant customers and
important employees during the pendency of the transaction. The target can negotiate an
antitrust break-up fee by including a separate antitrust break-up fee provision or by including
express language that requires the purchaser to pay the standard break-up fee if the transaction is
terminated due to antitrust concerns. The purchaser, on the other hand, may wish to stipulate
that the standard break-up fee does not apply in situations where the deal is blocked or
abandoned due to antitrust concerns, which protects the purchaser in transactions where the
antitrust risk is high or uncertain, and also provides more incentive for the target to give its best
efforts to cooperate in the antitrust process.

        Both purchasers and targets should be cautious in only relying upon a reverse break-up
fee to allocate antitrust risk. First, it may be difficult accurately to gauge the dollar amount of
sales and development opportunities sacrificed during the aborted merger process; in some
situations, no agreeable dollar amount may cover the risk. Second, purchasers can sometimes
obtain insurance for reverse break-up fees, which creates a moral hazard and may lessen the
incentive for purchasers to give its best efforts to obtain regulatory clearance. Therefore, reverse
break-up fees may increasingly become larger and larger in order to provide the desired shift in
antitrust risk (which, obviously, would raise flags with the agencies). In two recently-announced
deals, the parties negotiated extremely high reverse break-up fees. In Microsoft‟s acquisition of
aQuantive, the negotiated reverse break-up fee was $500 million, which is more than
aQuantive‟s 2006 revenues and represents approximately 8% of the purchase price. Likewise,
Monsanto would have been required to pay Delta and Pine Land $600 million, which represented
40% of the purchase price, if the Department of Justice blocked the transaction.. This may
reflect a refinement in the market‟s understanding of the corresponding incentives of reverse
break-up fees, although it is far too early to deem this a trend. Reverse break-up fees will remain
an important means of shifting antitrust risk, but when parties are negotiating the merger
agreement, reverse break up fees should be used in conjunction with best efforts clauses and
divestiture limitations provisions.


Payment of Regulatory/Antitrust Fees and Expenses

        Oftentimes, parties do not consider the extraordinary costs of an extended, formal
antitrust investigation, which may multiply with simultaneous review by the competition
agencies in the US, Europe and others of the 80-odd nations with merger control regimes today.
A Second Request investigation in the US alone can cost each party several million dollars in
legal fees, economic consulting fees and document production expenses. Litigating a later
government challenge to the merger can double those expenses. It may therefore be prudent for
smaller target companies to negotiate for the buyer to pay a portion or all costs of any formal
antitrust investigation or litigation.

        Again, sellers are particularly at risk if, after incurring the high costs of an antitrust
investigation, the merger is not consummated. In addition to a break-up fee designed to
compensate the target for lost sales and development opportunities, the target company may seek



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to have the purchaser pay the expenses associated with negotiating and entering into the merger
agreement if the merger is not consummated due to antitrust concerns. Purchasers may seek to
place a limit on the amount of expenses it will pay.

         Below are examples of expense clauses from past merger agreements.

                            “Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Section 6.02 shall require, or be
                            construed to require, Purchaser or any of its Affiliates to agree to (i) sell, hold, separate,
                            divest, discontinue or limit, before or after the Closing Date, any assets, businesses or
                            interest in any assets or businesses of Purchaser, the Company or any of their respective
                            Affiliates, (ii) any conditions relating to, or changes or restrictions in, the operations of
                            any such assets or businesses which, in either case, could reasonably be expected to (x)
                            result in a Material Adverse Effect or (y) materially and adversely impact the economic
Merger Agreement            or business benefits to Purchaser and its direct and indirect stockholders of the
between Ply Gem             transactions contemplated by this Agreement or (iii) any material modification or
Industries, Inc. and        waiver of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. “ § 6.02(c)
Alcoa Home Exteriors,
Inc, September 22, 2006     “In the event the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are not consummated as
                            a result of Purchaser‟s or any of its Affiliates refusal to agree pursuant to Section
                            6.02(c), then as the exclusive right of Seller under this Agreement, Purchaser shall pay
                            within three (3) days to Seller, Seller‟s direct, out-of-pocket costs of negotiating,
                            entering into, and complying with this Agreement, including all reasonable payments
                            made by or due and owing by Seller for external legal counsel and professional
                            consultant advice relating hereto; provided, that the payment obligations of Purchaser
                            under this Section 6.02(d) shall not exceed $1,000,000.” § 6.02(d)
Merger Agreement
                            “Parent agrees to pay to the Company (i) its reasonable, actual, verified expenses (not in
between USA Waste
                            excess of $375,000 plus the expenses of Arthur Andersen referenced in Section 3.7)
Services, Inc. and
                            related to the transaction contemplated hereby if Parent terminates this Agreement
TransAmerican Waste
                            because it is required to sell, divest, dispose of, or hold separate assets or businesses
Industries, Inc., January
                            with aggregate 1997 revenues in excess of $6,250,000 ...” §7.6(c)
26, 1998




CONCLUSION

        Perhaps the most common mistake, particularly in smaller or rushed transactions that
may carry antitrust exposure, is not involving competition counsel early in the process and
addressing these alternative clauses in an informed manner. Counsel can ascertain the likelihood
and extent of antitrust review, and where protections should be built into merger agreements to
offset the effects of potentially lengthy delays in the process. Counsel can also advise at the
outset on how best to anticipate and protect against an agency challenge and formulate remedies
to resolve expected competition objections. Early involvement of antitrust counsel can help
manage client expectations and prevent unnecessary, and often costly, consequences in the later
stages of a transaction.




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