Addressing the Intruder Detection Dilemma ARL Center for Intrusion Monitoring and Protection
Kerry Long
Lead, Advanced Development Center for Intrusion Monitoring & Protection Computational & Information Sciences Directorate U.S. Army Research Laboratory 301-394-2720 klong@arl.army.mil
What is the CIMP ?
Program management Planning/administration Standards & partnerships Technology transfer
Center for Intrusion Monitoring & Protection
Threat Assessment & Special Ops (2)
Extended analysis Situational awareness Special operations LE/CI liaison Education/training
Cyber Analysis Team (44)
Monitoring/detection Analysis processes Response/reporting Site/customer interface
Research and Development Team (5)
Applied R&D Tool assessment Technology integration Process improvement Collaborations
Systems & Sensors Engineering Team (4)
Configuration Mgmt Capacity Planning Infrastructure scanning
The ARL Center for Intrusion Monitoring and Protection (CIMP) currently monitors and analyzes network data to detect intruders for multiple Army and DoD customers
Introduction-Our Assumptions
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The number one threat to information confidentiality and integrity is the intruder who has gained access to a trusted cyber environment No matter what internal safeguards have been put in place, a successful intruder will ultimately undermine security goals There is currently no way to keep out a determined, savvy intruder from a publicly connected network
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Introduction –Our Observations
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Our nation’s R&D infrastructure is a major target for sophisticated state sponsored attackers and cyber terrorists. Assets have been compromised, critical information has been exfiltrated, our technological advantage is at risk IA community is focused on developing tools and methods to prevent intrusions from occurring. Less resources are devoted to dealing with the situation once the intrusion has occurred Research and development in all IA related areas is largely decoupled from the implementers of IA
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Introduction –Our Objectives
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To address the problem of the savvy intruder through detection rather than prevention. Plenty of others focused on prevention To develop better practical methods for detecting and dealing with intruders once they have penetrated a trusted network To couple our research and development with our operations into one constantly improving system
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How it’s Currently Done
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INFOSEC
Practitioners
U.S. Government Sponsors
DoE
Hard Problems List
DARPA SPAWAR NRL OSD NSA CIA
CECOM ARL AFIWC
AFRL ONR NIST
National Computer Security Needs
NSF NRO
Academic R&D
Fed Lab & FFRDC R&D
Industry R&D
Why We’re Different
Network Raw Data Tool Assessment New Requirements
New IDS Tools Process Modifications New Methodology
Our IDS Model
R&D Initiatives
IDS Tool Suite
Analysis Methods
Industry Best Practices Process Improvement
Tool1 Tool2 Tool3 Tool4 Tooln Beta1 … Adhoc1 ...
1st Level Analysis 2nd Level Analysis LE/CI Engagement
Security Analysts
Feedback
Reports & Situational Awareness
Real-time & Real World - Events & Activities
CIMP Toolset--Key to Success
Header Analysis
Scans with Automatic Virus Attacks
Packet-Based Signature Detection
Simple Scans
Behavior Analysis
Anomaly Detection and New Attacks
Viruses and Worms
Scans with Target Responses
New and Variant Attacks
Compromises
Session-Based Signature Detection
R&D Computer Network Defense
CND
DoD, Army, AMC, RDECOM, ARL & Customers
IDS (network & host-based) HPCC, Large Data Bases
Impact
Threat M&S Correlation Pro-active Cyber-defense
CIMP Core Competencies
University Army High ARO Research Sponsored Performance Initiatives, IA Activities Computing UCSB, GMU, Research CMU Center
Small Business Innovative Research Contracts
Mechanisms
Graph Matching Anomaly IDS Host-Based IDS Neural Nets
Dist IDS
Data Reduction
External R&D
Data Mining
High Speed IDS Vulnerability
Our current Research Initiative Interrogator
Objective
Development of a “near real-time” surveillance and analysis architecture that serves the needs of both researchers and analysts
DoD capabilities enhanced by this project
Allows new detection methods to be thoroughly tested and prototyped without adversely affecting monitoring operations. Enables rich data mining operations and true retrospective analysis
Scientific/technical approaches
• Sensors are easily configurable, inexpensive and are designed to be placed in hostile environment • Enables advanced network security analysis over extended locations/periods of time • Allows quick introduction of new tools and techniques in detecting attacks on networks • Core idea: use analysts to test new IDS concepts as part of their everyday workflow
Accomplishments
• Developed an integrated architecture that communicates securely and continuously between sensors and data repository Developed a distributed sensor monitoring and statistics tool 15 sensors currently in place operating in beta environment Designed and implemented an alerts database that allows a Network Security Officer to view and analyze alerts over multiple sites
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What We’re Striving For…
• r n a e d i v o y p u h g s c f P b t s u n r b y d e a c t i h p o • F p z h y l v f r d g i e b t a n M I C c o P L R A s u effectively by other organizations or private sector • Accelerate the integration of new methodology, technology and tools • Establish an IA lab to be the mechanism for technology development and transfer
We want to have an impact!