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					GIS Day

   Elinor Ostrom
   Indiana University
   Arizona State University
Why is a Non-Geographer
Enthusiastic About GIS and
Remote Sensing
   GIS and Remote Sensing bring precision to
    analysis as well as spatial and temporal
   As a long-time field worker, I much
    appreciate what can be added to the analysis
    of complex sites when using remote sensing
    complemented by knowledge of what is
    happening on-the-ground
    Diversity is Important for
   Two types:
       Biological diversity – extensive scientific findings – well
       Institutional diversity – importance not yet accepted
   Simple institutional solutions are frequently recommended as universal
       Government ownership
       Privatize land
       Co-management
   Imposing simple policy blueprints reduces institutional diversity
   Research using multiple methods including remote sensing identifies
    variations of all 3 succeed & fail
The Advantage of Multiple Methods
   Remotely sensed images provide reliable
    measures of land-use changes within different
    management regimes, allow us to go back in
   On-the-ground studies provide evidence on
    variables associated with forest condition,
    which can be associated with institution type
    and rules – with considerable investment can
    also trace over time
   Experimental studies enable measurement of
    explicit changes in carefully designed settings
    on micro-decision-making
               From the Air
              • Remote Sensing – most frequently used
                method for over time studies of land cover
                change, and forest fragmentation

• In conjunction with GIS –
  institutional boundaries, market
  locations, roads, other drivers
• Increased data availability from
  the 1970s – enables us to go
  back in time – before and after
  studies of policy changes
• Landscape view – valuable
  complement to single-case forest
Multi-temporal Color Composites

   Multi-temporal satellite color composites
    provide a synoptic view of landscape level
    change from three dates in time
   Integrates information from the green bands
    of each image, correlated with vegetation
   Facilitates visual assessment of changes in
    vegetation extent, and degradation
   Complemented by detailed classification and
    fragmentation studies for each landscape
    Methods - Interpreting multi-temporal color composites

Grey/Black –
Stable forest

White –
Stable open areas

Red/Yellow –

Green/Blue –
Lets review findings

   From our multi-country, multi-disciplinary
    International Forestry Resources and Institutions
    (IFRI) research program using remote sensing
    & field studies.
   First to Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala
Maya Biosphere Reserve
   Four National Parks (NPs) in close proximity
   Tikal NP has large budget to pay for
    extensive fences and guards
   El Mirador protected by nature
   Laguna del Tigre severely overharvested
   Sierra del Lacandón severely overharvested
   Same formal institution:
       Two are sustainable, but different causal process
       Two are vulnerable to massive illegal harvesting
            Maya Biosphere Reserve
Multitemporal Color Composite (Dietz, Ostrom, Stern, 2003, Science SOM)
                            A                                   El Mirador-
                                                                Rio Azul NP
                            Laguna del
                            Tigre Biotope
                                                              Multiple                           Naachtun-
                                                 Laguna del   Use Zone                           Dos Lagunas
                                                 Tigre NP                                        Biotope

                                                                                      El Zotz

                                                                                                Tikal NP
                                            Buffer Zone

                           Sierra del
                           Lacandón NP      C

                                                                                  0      10 20 km          N


                           C                                                  D
Now to Uganda
    An example of sustainable Government
     Forest Reserves
        West Mengo region located in earlier Buganda
        In early 1900s, tough negotiations to settle
         private land and set up reserves in 1930s
        Local forest users use NTFP and participate
         every two decades in boundary demarcation
        Users value the forest and know the boundaries
        Very stable from 1936 to 2000
        Recent decentralization is disrupting this stability
Uganda Forest Reserves


                         0   2.5   5 km   N
To Rondônio, Brazil
    Two colonization projects assigned private property &
     obligation to preserve half of the forested land
    Established side by side in 1980s
    Southern project laid out “typical” rectangular plots. Farmers
     obliged to preserve 50% of land assigned to them
    Northern project
      Topographically sensitive layout

      Established separate forest reserves

      Private owners had full control of smaller plots

      Rubber tappers monitor the forest reserves (not
        government officials)
    Northern project is more sustainable than most Brazilian
     colonization projects that assign farmers responsibility to
     preserve 50% of forest on their own land
Contrasting Colonization Projects
     (Batistella, 2003)

                          N   0   5 10 km
                                            0   5 10 km   N
Now to India
    Todoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve
    An under-funded national wildlife reserve with
     multiple outcomes
    Stable forests in the core
    Park guards are not able to control harvesting along
     sections of the borders
    Complementary field studies find
      Consistent harvesting of non-timber forest products

      Existence of considerable conflict between guards

       and local people
        Nagendra & Ostrom, PNAS, 2006


                         Stable forest
                           TIGER RESERVE


                               Interior villages

Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1972-1989-2001, landscape
         surrounding Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve, India.
Women harvesting thatch grass from within the TATR - while
the forest ranger accompanying our research team looks on
Cattle entering the TATR boundary (marked by the yellow
topped pillar in the background) on their daily foraging beat.
Bicycles and trucks confiscated from timber poachers
stealing large logs
    Diversity of Institutions, Ecological
    Systems, and Results
   While some Protected Parks are successful
    in protecting forests, others are not.
   Depends on many factors
   In a large cross-sectional IFRI study of 163
    forests in 12 countries, no difference in forest
    density (scale assigned by forester on team
    after doing forest plots) is measured for
    Protected Parks compared to all other
    institutional arrangements (Non-Parks)
           Comparison of Forester’s Field Evaluation of
           Vegetation Densities in 163 Parks and Non-
                                                        Vegetation density

                        Very sparse     Sparse          About            Somewhat             Very
                                                       average           abundant           abundant

Officially designated      13%           21%            36%                  26%               4%
(N = 76)

Non-parks (N = 87)         6%            22%            43%                  26%               3%

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z score = 0.472, p = .979.
No significant difference.
Source: Hayes, Tanya, & Elinor Ostrom, “Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas the Only
    Way?” Indiana Law Review 38(3) (2005): 607.
Findings from Repeat Visits to
IFRI Forests
   2nd time research visit in 42 IFRI forests
     India – 5 forests

     Kenya – 3 forests

     Nepal – 10 forests

     Uganda – 18 forests

     USA – 6 forests

   Not a random sample of forests but based on a random sample of
    plots inside each forest and first study of this type
   Can now assess:
     Relative strength of formal institution on changes in DBH, basal
       area, and stem count
     Strength of regular involvement of user groups in monitoring
       forests on same forest measures
Impact of Formally Designated Tenure and Forest
Monitoring on Changes in Forest Condition: Assessment
using ANOVA
 Independent                   Change in DBH             Change in basal            Change in stem
 variables                                                   area                       count

 Ownershipa                         F = 0.89                  F = 2.52                  F = 1.00

 Involvement of user
 groups in monitoring               F = 0.28                F = 10.55**                 F = 4.66*

a Government,     community, private
b At   least one user group is involved in regular monitoring of rules of forest use
* Significant at .05              ** Significant at .01
 Source: Ostrom, Elinor, & Harini Nagendra, “Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the
     Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.” PNAS 103(51) (2006): 19230.
A Puzzle from Field Research: Why
Do Users Monitor Others?
   Voluntary effort to produce a “public good” of
    rule conformance
   Game theoretic predictions – no one will
    voluntarily contribute to provide a public good
   Earlier findings from field studies led to a series
    of laboratory experiments at IU and now
    replicated by others
    In the Lab
   When communication is not allowed in a CPR
    experiment, subjects overharvest as predicted
   When communication is allowed (or with other
    institutional mechanisms) the theory is not supported
    Much higher levels of cooperation than predicted
       Participants willing to punish others who do not keep
       Demonstrated capacity to self-organize without
        external enforcers
       Findings replicated frequently in other labs and now in
        extensive field experiments
Harvesting Common-Pool Resources in
the Lab
   Baseline experiment of complete anonymity and
    finitely repeated game
       Game theoretical prediction is substantial over-harvesting
       Prediction supported in the lab
   Adding the capacity to communicate – does not
    change prediction – in a social dilemma
    communication is only CHEAP TALK
   Subjects make good use of opportunity for
    cheap talk – especially when repeated
   They use it to agree on joint harvesting strategy
    & for verbal sanctions of unknown over-
                      Aggregate Results of CPR Experiments

 Experimental Designs using 25 Token Endowments   Average Net Yield as % of   Average Net Yield Minus Fees &   Defection Rate
                                                  Maximuma                    Fines                                (%)

 (A) Baseline Experiment:
 No Communication (3)
                                                          21                             -                           -
 (B) One-shot
 Communication (3)
                                                          55                             -                           25
 (C) Repeated
 Communication (6)
                                                          73                             -                           13
 (D) Imposed Sanctioning
 Institution (8)
                                                          37                             9
 (E) One-shot Communication & Imposed
 Sanctioning Institution (3)
                                                          85                           67                                1
 (F1) One-shot Communication
 Endogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution -
 None Chosen (2)                                          56                            -                            42

 (F2) One-shot Communication
 Endogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution –
 Sanction Chosen (4)                                      93                           90                                4

aNash   equilibrium for all designs is a net yield of 39% of maximum (Adapted from: Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992: p. 414)

   Findings related to effect of
    communication repeatedly replicated in
    other labs and in field experiments
   Participants tend to achieve higher
    outcomes when have choice about rules
    regarding sanctions
   Now working on experiments in more
    complex settings
    What Have We Learned From Field and
    Experimental Research?

   No single idealized type of governance
    structures is successful in all ecological and
    social settings
   We should NOT eliminate institutional
    diversity to save biodiversity
What We Learn from Using Remote
   Can study impact of diverse institutional
    arrangements on a particular site over time.
   Field research does provide very good
    information about a particular site at a specific
   Very hard to get really good over-time analysis
   I know encourage my graduate students to learn
    GIS and remote sensing as among their
    important tools for institutional analysis
Panaceas are Dangerous

   Relying on a single method of data collection
    and analysis can lead to miss perceptions
   Very helpful to have field work to complement
    remote sensing and vice version
   Institutional panaceas are also dangerous –
    they can become monocultures
Danger of Institutional
   Abstract concepts – government ownership, co-
   Tend to impose uniform rules
     People living in or around forest frequently not

      involved in design
     Few opportunities for experimentation and
   Rules-on-paper confused for rules-in-use – don’t
    really know what rules are being used in field
Thank You For Listening
   Thanks to many colleagues and co-authors,
    our International Forestry Resources and
    Institutions (IFRI) colleagues, and to the
    many resource users in the field who have
    helped us greatly
   Thanks to the National Science Foundation,
    MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation and
    Indiana University for supporting our research
   Questions?

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