GIS Day Elinor Ostrom Indiana University Arizona State University Why is a Non-Geographer Enthusiastic About GIS and Remote Sensing GIS and Remote Sensing bring precision to analysis as well as spatial and temporal scales As a long-time field worker, I much appreciate what can be added to the analysis of complex sites when using remote sensing complemented by knowledge of what is happening on-the-ground Diversity is Important for Sustainability Two types: Biological diversity – extensive scientific findings – well accepted Institutional diversity – importance not yet accepted Simple institutional solutions are frequently recommended as universal panaceas Government ownership Privatize land Co-management Imposing simple policy blueprints reduces institutional diversity Research using multiple methods including remote sensing identifies variations of all 3 succeed & fail The Advantage of Multiple Methods Remotely sensed images provide reliable measures of land-use changes within different management regimes, allow us to go back in time On-the-ground studies provide evidence on variables associated with forest condition, which can be associated with institution type and rules – with considerable investment can also trace over time Experimental studies enable measurement of explicit changes in carefully designed settings on micro-decision-making From the Air • Remote Sensing – most frequently used method for over time studies of land cover change, and forest fragmentation • In conjunction with GIS – institutional boundaries, market locations, roads, other drivers • Increased data availability from the 1970s – enables us to go back in time – before and after studies of policy changes • Landscape view – valuable complement to single-case forest studies Multi-temporal Color Composites Multi-temporal satellite color composites provide a synoptic view of landscape level change from three dates in time Integrates information from the green bands of each image, correlated with vegetation Facilitates visual assessment of changes in vegetation extent, and degradation Complemented by detailed classification and fragmentation studies for each landscape Methods - Interpreting multi-temporal color composites Grey/Black – Stable forest White – Stable open areas Red/Yellow – Clearings Green/Blue – Regrowth Lets review findings From our multi-country, multi-disciplinary International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program using remote sensing & field studies. First to Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala Maya Biosphere Reserve Four National Parks (NPs) in close proximity Tikal NP has large budget to pay for extensive fences and guards El Mirador protected by nature Laguna del Tigre severely overharvested Sierra del Lacandón severely overharvested Same formal institution: Two are sustainable, but different causal process Two are vulnerable to massive illegal harvesting Maya Biosphere Reserve Multitemporal Color Composite (Dietz, Ostrom, Stern, 2003, Science SOM) clouds A El Mirador- Rio Azul NP Laguna del Tigre Biotope Multiple Naachtun- Laguna del Use Zone Dos Lagunas Tigre NP Biotope El Zotz Biotope Tikal NP D B Buffer Zone Sierra del Lacandón NP C 0 10 20 km N B C D Now to Uganda An example of sustainable Government Forest Reserves West Mengo region located in earlier Buganda kingdom In early 1900s, tough negotiations to settle private land and set up reserves in 1930s Local forest users use NTFP and participate every two decades in boundary demarcation Users value the forest and know the boundaries Very stable from 1936 to 2000 Recent decentralization is disrupting this stability Uganda Forest Reserves Islands 0 2.5 5 km N To Rondônio, Brazil Two colonization projects assigned private property & obligation to preserve half of the forested land Established side by side in 1980s Southern project laid out “typical” rectangular plots. Farmers obliged to preserve 50% of land assigned to them Northern project Topographically sensitive layout Established separate forest reserves Private owners had full control of smaller plots Rubber tappers monitor the forest reserves (not government officials) Northern project is more sustainable than most Brazilian colonization projects that assign farmers responsibility to preserve 50% of forest on their own land Contrasting Colonization Projects (Batistella, 2003) N 0 5 10 km 0 5 10 km N Now to India Todoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve An under-funded national wildlife reserve with multiple outcomes Stable forests in the core Park guards are not able to control harvesting along sections of the borders Complementary field studies find Consistent harvesting of non-timber forest products Existence of considerable conflict between guards and local people Nagendra & Ostrom, PNAS, 2006 Clearing Regrowth Stable forest Clearing TADOBA-ANDHARI TIGER RESERVE Regrowth Interior villages Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1972-1989-2001, landscape surrounding Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve, India. Women harvesting thatch grass from within the TATR - while the forest ranger accompanying our research team looks on helplessly. Cattle entering the TATR boundary (marked by the yellow topped pillar in the background) on their daily foraging beat. Bicycles and trucks confiscated from timber poachers stealing large logs Diversity of Institutions, Ecological Systems, and Results While some Protected Parks are successful in protecting forests, others are not. Depends on many factors In a large cross-sectional IFRI study of 163 forests in 12 countries, no difference in forest density (scale assigned by forester on team after doing forest plots) is measured for Protected Parks compared to all other institutional arrangements (Non-Parks) Comparison of Forester’s Field Evaluation of Vegetation Densities in 163 Parks and Non- Parks Vegetation density Very sparse Sparse About Somewhat Very average abundant abundant Officially designated 13% 21% 36% 26% 4% parks (N = 76) Non-parks (N = 87) 6% 22% 43% 26% 3% Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z score = 0.472, p = .979. No significant difference. Source: Hayes, Tanya, & Elinor Ostrom, “Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas the Only Way?” Indiana Law Review 38(3) (2005): 607. Findings from Repeat Visits to IFRI Forests 2nd time research visit in 42 IFRI forests India – 5 forests Kenya – 3 forests Nepal – 10 forests Uganda – 18 forests USA – 6 forests Not a random sample of forests but based on a random sample of plots inside each forest and first study of this type Can now assess: Relative strength of formal institution on changes in DBH, basal area, and stem count Strength of regular involvement of user groups in monitoring forests on same forest measures Impact of Formally Designated Tenure and Forest Monitoring on Changes in Forest Condition: Assessment using ANOVA Independent Change in DBH Change in basal Change in stem variables area count Ownershipa F = 0.89 F = 2.52 F = 1.00 Involvement of user groups in monitoring F = 0.28 F = 10.55** F = 4.66* rulesb a Government, community, private b At least one user group is involved in regular monitoring of rules of forest use * Significant at .05 ** Significant at .01 Source: Ostrom, Elinor, & Harini Nagendra, “Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.” PNAS 103(51) (2006): 19230. A Puzzle from Field Research: Why Do Users Monitor Others? Voluntary effort to produce a “public good” of rule conformance Game theoretic predictions – no one will voluntarily contribute to provide a public good Earlier findings from field studies led to a series of laboratory experiments at IU and now replicated by others In the Lab When communication is not allowed in a CPR experiment, subjects overharvest as predicted When communication is allowed (or with other institutional mechanisms) the theory is not supported Much higher levels of cooperation than predicted Participants willing to punish others who do not keep agreements Demonstrated capacity to self-organize without external enforcers Findings replicated frequently in other labs and now in extensive field experiments Harvesting Common-Pool Resources in the Lab Baseline experiment of complete anonymity and finitely repeated game Game theoretical prediction is substantial over-harvesting Prediction supported in the lab Adding the capacity to communicate – does not change prediction – in a social dilemma communication is only CHEAP TALK Subjects make good use of opportunity for cheap talk – especially when repeated They use it to agree on joint harvesting strategy & for verbal sanctions of unknown over- harvesters Aggregate Results of CPR Experiments Experimental Designs using 25 Token Endowments Average Net Yield as % of Average Net Yield Minus Fees & Defection Rate Maximuma Fines (%) (A) Baseline Experiment: No Communication (3) 21 - - (B) One-shot Communication (3) 55 - 25 (C) Repeated Communication (6) 73 - 13 (D) Imposed Sanctioning Institution (8) _ 37 9 (E) One-shot Communication & Imposed Sanctioning Institution (3) 85 67 1 (F1) One-shot Communication Endogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution - None Chosen (2) 56 - 42 (F2) One-shot Communication Endogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution – Sanction Chosen (4) 93 90 4 aNash equilibrium for all designs is a net yield of 39% of maximum (Adapted from: Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992: p. 414) Replications Findings related to effect of communication repeatedly replicated in other labs and in field experiments Participants tend to achieve higher outcomes when have choice about rules regarding sanctions Now working on experiments in more complex settings What Have We Learned From Field and Experimental Research? No single idealized type of governance structures is successful in all ecological and social settings We should NOT eliminate institutional diversity to save biodiversity What We Learn from Using Remote Sensing Can study impact of diverse institutional arrangements on a particular site over time. Field research does provide very good information about a particular site at a specific time Very hard to get really good over-time analysis I know encourage my graduate students to learn GIS and remote sensing as among their important tools for institutional analysis Panaceas are Dangerous Relying on a single method of data collection and analysis can lead to miss perceptions Very helpful to have field work to complement remote sensing and vice version Institutional panaceas are also dangerous – they can become monocultures Danger of Institutional Monocultures Abstract concepts – government ownership, co- management Tend to impose uniform rules People living in or around forest frequently not involved in design Few opportunities for experimentation and learning Rules-on-paper confused for rules-in-use – don’t really know what rules are being used in field Thank You For Listening Thanks to many colleagues and co-authors, our International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) colleagues, and to the many resource users in the field who have helped us greatly Thanks to the National Science Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation and Indiana University for supporting our research Questions?