Strategic Subversion
W
Description
svn (subversion) version of the rise in recent years, management tools, is the successor to cvs. Currently, the vast majority of open source software code using svn as version control software.
Document Sample


Strategic Subversion
Power Through Subversion, by Lau-
rence W. Beilenson, Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1972. 312 pp.
$8.00.
A FEW FACTS about subversion are known
even to those whose historical knowledge
is limited to a high school course or a
series of popular surveys and novels. For
instance: how the French minister Vergen-
nes aided the American colonies in their
revolt against England, how the German
General Staff moved Lenin in a sealed car
so as to spur a socialist revolution that
would knock Russia out of World War I,
and how Lenin proved himself the classic
master of the revolutionary art. Behind
these are lesser-known facts that are never-
theless essential to an understanding of his-
torical cause and effect: such as the reasons
why Vergennes continued to pour out
French treasure after the United States had
broken its alliance, the circumstances of the
revolts and revolutions that Lenin studied
in preparing his own, and the conservative
foreign policy that Lenin imposed on the
fledgling Soviet government-thus making
Stalin rather than Trotsky his true heir.
These facts, and many others about sub-
versions promoted by such diverse figures
as Catherine the Great, Louis XIV,
Queen Elizabeth I, Pitt, and Palmerston
are recounted in this book by Laurence W.
Beilenson, whose earlier book The Treaty
Trap (Washington, 1969) provided a time-
ly and documented warning against relying
on treaties for national safety. But Power
Through Subversion is not a history of that
art, much less a collection of cloak-and-
dagger stories. It is, rather, a systematic
analysis of the uses and limitations of sub-
version as a political tool and its relation
to other forms of political struggle. Despite
the wealth of historical data used for illus-
tration, the book belongs in the area of
political science, to which Beilenson makes
an original contribution. While popular in America improved the French power posi-
style, it is serious in scholarship and is im- tion, whether or not the United States re-
portant reading for those who write, teach, mained true to its French alliance.
or make decisions in matters of American It was Lenin who pioneered in the use
foreign policy and national security. of subversion as a strategic instrument of
Beilenson has formulated and demon- foreign policy rather than as a tactical aux-
strates a typology of subversion, making it iliary in war. Under the “Lenin Adapta-
possible to speak precisely about the phe- tion,” as Beilenson calls it, Communist sub-
nomenon in a total political complex. He version is global rather than spotty. It does
also demolishes a notion, dear to the hearts not merely accept the political situation in
of “operation” behavioralists, that political the target country as it develops spontane-
science can measure the chances that a gov- ously, but promotes structural changes and
ernment will be overthrown. Economic and ideological movements (including those
social determinists are fond of mustering with no ostensible connection with Com-
facts and statistics to prove that a given his- munism) that erode the target political sys-
torical event “had to happen.” But an in- tem and narrow its regime’s freedom of ac-
formed observer in the late eighteenth cen- tion. Furthermore, the spigot of Communist
tury would have concluded from objective aid is not turned on and off. The building
facts, as did the Duke of Richmond, that of revolutionary cadres is recognized as a
revolution was imminent in England, not long-term task, even though the cadres may
in France. Some may feel that Beilen- sometimes be sacrificed to immediate goals
son is going too far in declaring that the of Communist diplomacy, as the Egyptian
overthrow of a government is utterly un- Communist party was betrayed in favor of
predictable. He does show, however, that a Soviet power base in the Levant. In a
the factors that lend strength to govern- country such as the United States, the
ments and to revolutionary movements are short-run emphasis may be placed on “in’-
far more complex and volatile than is com- fluencing subversion,” particularly that
monly realized. The political scientist can- which uses reputable members of the Es-
not escape the dilemma pointed out by tablishment to defeat adequate defense
Kant that the more manageable (in modem measures and to spread the euphoric illu-
terms the more computerizable) he makes sion that Communism is no longer aggres-
his facts, the farther they depart from real- sive. Yet Communists are constantly pre-
ity. paring for “decisive subversion”-that
As Beilenson shows, rulers and ministers which overthrows a target government-
have made wide use of external subversion secure in the knowledge that although the
-support or cultivation of dissident move- time and place of opportunities cannot be
ments in rival states-throughout modem foreseen, they are as certain to arise some-
history. But they have always used it as an where as lightning is to strike again.
auxiliary weapon in time of war or in p r e p A central doctrine bequeathed by Lenin
aration for impending war. Such tradition- is the rule never to risk the subversive base
al subversion was spotty, being limited to by adventurous war. Except when attacked,
particular countries; it accepted political as was Soviet Russia in 1941, Communist
and social conditions in the target countries states will make war only when sure of win-
without trying to start or accelerate proc- ning-in the case of war by proxy-sure
esses of change; and it turned subversive of suffering no direct damage. Communists
aid on and off like a spigot, according to will not risk damage to their nuclei to avoid
the shortrun interests of the subverting loss of face. “If you are not inclined to
country. The first important innovator was crawl in the mud on your belly,” Lenin
Vergennes, who saw that the existence of once said, “you are not a revolutionary, but
an independent rather than a British-ruled a chatterbox. .. .” The Kremlin was not
214 Spring 1972
ready to fight about the Communist mis- United States to regain the political of-
siles in 1962, despite Khruschev’s saber-rat- fensive: something sorely needed for our
tling. (Beilenson might have added that it own morale as well as to shift the balance
would not have fought in 1962 and would of world power once more in our favor.
not fight now about a United States inva-
sion of Cuba, which is an important but by Reviewed by KURTGLASER
no means vital interest of the USSR.)
Communist global subversion cannot be
overcome, Beilenson concludes, by hoping
it will go away or ritually repeating that it The Anatomy of Silence
has done so. While the Sino-Soviet split
-which like any other may end without
warning-inhibits outright military attack The Dismemberment of Orpheus:
on the West, warfare has never been the Toward a Postmodern Literature,
preferred Communist weapon anyway. Sub-
version is actually on the increase in Asia, by Ihab Hassan, New York: Oxford
Africa, and Latin America, and it never University Press, 1971. x +
297 pp.
was dependent on monolithic direction. Nor $8.50.
can any comfort be had from the “conver-
gence” theory: what Communists want is IHAB HASSAN remarked in an essay pub-
power, not socialism. lished in the Winter 1970 Virginia Quarter-
The Lenin adaptation gives the Com- ly Review : “Finally, criticism, weighted by
munists many advantages in the global its own skepticism, lags still behind the lit-
power struggle. One is that subversion, or erature of its day.” He went on to point out
even effective countersubversion, does not how much critics--especially academic crit-
fit the political style of Western liberal- i c e r e m a i n tied down to the concepts of
ism. Another is that the nuclear stalemate organic form and fail utterly to manage
prohibits offensive war against the Com- any “sense of discontinuity.” Hassan has
munist bases. But these bases are them- tried very hard in the past few years to
selves vulnerable to subversion, if Western come to terms with the critical perform-
statesmen will make up their minds to ance, to make it accommodate the radical
grasp the weapon and to approach the changes experienced in the arts. Thus he
problem as Lenin did: analyzing the target goes so far as to suggest that criticism
political system from the inside out rather “should offer the reader empty spaces, si-
than from the outside in. Beilenson lists the lences, in which he can meet himself in the
conditions that make internal subversion presence of literature.”
feasible and, in the long run, likely in both In some of his more recent essays Hassan
the Soviet Union and China. has begun to experiment with a form which
The final chapter of Power Through Sub- he has labeled paracriticism. There is
version outlines plans for an “American something narrative and dramatic about it
Adaptation,” that is, for systematic aid by as well as didactic. It comes dangerously
the United States to dissidents in Com- close to being discontinuous and to rival-
munist-ruled countries. The details of Beil- ling the condition of art. Hassan remarked
enson’s program need not be summarized in the “Prologue” to his 1967 book, The
here: suffice it so say that the “American Literature of Silence: Henry Miller and
Adaptation” would not involve the use of Samuel Beckett that the critical act should
American troops abroad and would be rela- “endanger itself, as literature does, and
tively moderate in cost. It would not, fur- . . . testify to our condition.” This is what
thermore, do violence to republican politi- paracriticism is all about. Hassan uses it to
cal ethics. What it would do is enable the superb advantage in his Virginia Quarterly
Modem Age 215
Get documents about "