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Conference in Germany
On the Front Lines of the Cold War:
The Inteffigence War in Berlin
Donald P. Steury
There are only a few places on persons gathered in the shadow of
this earth where misery, hopeless the domed towers of the T-berg
ness, and toil in the struggle for to relive some of the most critical
ones daily bread and yet, at the years of the Cold War. Some were
same time, joy, hope, and great there just to see the Teufelsberg. If
expectations have intertwined any of the visitors were disap
more] closely than here in Ber pointed that it turned out to be just
lin.... It is by no means immodest another dingy government build
to claim that world history has ing, they concealed it well. In any
been made in this city. case, the broad windows of the
dining hall offered an unmatched
From Conference Welcoming view of Berlin and the surrounding
Statement by Claus Henning the mystery of
countryside, while
It is by no means
Schapper, State Secretary, Ger the place lived on in the still-
immodest to claim that manys Ministry for Internal
Affairs present security arrangements, the
world history has been barbed-wire fences, and the silent,
made in this empty rooms that bore the marks
city.
From 10-12 September 1999, the of 30 years of intelligence activity.
~9 CIAs Center for the Study of
gence (CSI) and the Alliierten
Intelli
On the dais, some of the most
(Allied) Museum jointly hosted a secret aspects of Cold War history
conference on intelligence activities were coming to life. Featuring a
in Berlin from the end of World War mix of personal recollections and
II to the construction of the Berlin scholarly presentations, the confer
Wall in August 1961. The event ence presented a broad view of
the first public conference ever Cold War intelligence operations in
hosted by the CIA on foreign soil Berlin that ran the gamut from
was staged in the former US mili agent operations, to the Berlin tun
tary SIGINT facility on the nel, to US Air Force reconnaissance
Teufelsberg (Devils Mountain), a missions. In the initial
panel, Har
Cold War landmark just outside Ber varddiplomatic historian Ernest R.
lin. The conference marked the May joined Russian military histo
culmination of a two-year coopera rian Viktor Gobarev and German
tive effort by CSI and the Alliierten Cold War historian Wolfgang
Museum. The Investorengruppe Krieger to provide a multifaceted
Teufelsberg, which owns the site, overview of the crises in 1948
provided financial and logistical (Soviet saber-rattling in March, fol
support. lowed by the Soviet blockade of
Berlin and the legendary US-British-
Donald P. Steury, a CIA Senior Warmed by the sun of a Berlin French airlift). In anotherpanel,
Historian, is Visiting Professor of Indian summer, more than 150 Cold chaired by Cambridge University
International Relations at the War intelligence veterans, histori intelligence historian Christopher
University of Southern California. ans, journalists and other interested Andrew, Benjamin B. Fischer of
1
Conference in Germany
Berlin: The Inteffigence War, 1945-1961 Conference at the Teufelsberg
and the Allilerten Museum, 10-12 September 1999
Agenda
Welcome
Claus Henning Schaper, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of the Interior
Dr. Kuno Bose, State Secretary, Berlin Senate Office of the Interior
The Honorable John Kornblum, US Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
The March CrIsis and the Berlin Airlift
Dr. Donald Steury, Chair
Professor Ernest R. May
Dr. Viktor Gobarev
Professor Wolfgang Krieger
Allied Military Intelligence in Berlin
Dr. John Greenwood, Chair
Dr. William Stivers
Lt. Col. Daniel Trastour
Col. Nigel N. Wylde
The Other Side of the Wall: KGB and Stasi
Professor Christopher Andrew, Chair
Dr. Richard Popplewell
Mr. Benjamin B. Fischer
Dr. Vladislav Zubok
Spying Without Spies
Dr. Gerald Haines, Chair
Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner
Dr. Donald P. Steury
Dr. Vance 0. Mitchell
Berlin in the Wilderness of Mirrors: Agents, Double Agents, and Defectors
Dr. Richard E. Schroeder, Chair
Ambassador Hugh Montgomery
Mr. Nigel West
Mr. Jerrold Schecter
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Wall
Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff, Chair
Professor Egon K-H. Bahr
Dr. William Burr
Dr. Vladislav Zubok
Battleground Berlin: Veterans Remember
Dr. Helmut Trotnow, Chair
Mr. Burton L. Gerber
Col. Oleg Gordievsky
Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin
Mr. Peter M. Sichel
From Dusk to Dawn: Berlin and the History of the Cold War
The Honorable Vernon A. Walters, former US Ambassador to West Germany and former
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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Conference in Germany
Panel on the March 1948 crisis and Berlin airlift.
From left: Donald Steury, Wolfgang Krieger,
Ernest May, and Viktor Gob~rev.
(Photo: W. Dune)
CSIs History Staff explored the The afternoon sessions on the sec held a roundtable discussion on
Agencys penetration of the Stasi ond day opened with a panel on Cold War espionage in Berlin. Dr.
(East German intelligence and secu
the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961. Helmut Trotnow, the museums
rity service) in the early 1950s. The Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff, director, chaired the sessiOn. Partici
a longtime expert on Soviet and pants included former intelligence
day concluded with a tour of the
East European affairs, led the dis officers from both sides of the late
Teufelsberg and a reception hosted
cussion, which included historians and unlamented Iron Curtain. The
by the Investorengruppe. from the US and Russia with
along CIA was represented by Peter
Dr.Egon Bahr of Germany. Dr. Sichel, who served in Berlin during
The second day began with an
Bahr was a close adviser to West the 1940s and 1950s, and Burton
interesting and informative panel Berlin the Gerber, a longtime (39 years)
Mayor Willy Brandt, at
on technical means of collection,
time that the Berlin Wall was former Agency officer with exten
chaired by the CIAs Chief Histo erected in August 1961. In his
panel sive experience in Soviet and
rian, Gerald K. Haines. That panel presentation, he
painted a compel European affairs. Former KGB Gen
was by one of the confer
followed ling picture of the frustration and eral Oleg Kalugin, who resigned in
ences highlightsa roundtablØ anxiety that confronted the West 1989 after harshly criticizing the
discussion hosted by CSI Deputy Berlin leadership during that crisis. KGB and now lives in the US, con
Director Dr. Richard E. Schroeder Ambassador Garthoff described tributed the Soviet
perspective. A
how intelligence influenced US unique perspective encompassing
and featuring veteran British histo
decision-making in the crisis, and both sides of the story was pro
rian Nigel West, American author
he presented new information on vided by former KGB Colonel Oleg
Jerrold Schecter, and Ambassador
the back-channel contacts Gordievsky, who defected to the
Hugh Montgomery, a veteran intel between President and West in 1985 after
Kennedy serving as a Brit
ligence officer and diplomat who Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the ish agent inside the KGB for 11
now serves as a Special Assistant to
height of the crisis. years. Attendees also took advan
the DCI. Ambassador Montgomery tage of the opportunity to tour the
participated in the Berlin Tunnel Conference attendees then visited museum itself, which features a
operation in the 1950s. the AlJiierten Museum, where they comprehensive collection of
3
Conference in Germany
At the Allied Museum, standing in front of a sec
tion of the Berlin tunnel. From left: Oleg Gordi
evsky, Burton Gerber, Helmut Trotnow, Oleg
Kalugin, Peter Sichel. (Photo: W. Dune)
exhibits on the Allied occupation of Vernon Walters, who was US Chief operational records, and raw intelli
Berlin and the divided citys role in of Mission in Germany when the gence materialsincluding two
the Cold War. Berlin Wall went down and is a German-language reports from the
former Army General, Deputy CIAs agent inside the East German
Conference participants also Director of Central Intelligence, and intelligence service.
embarked on a tour of Berlin that veteran of many sensitive diplo
included the former Normannen matic troubleshooting missions
stra1~e headquarters of the dreaded during the Cold War era. Those Excerpts from Conference
East German Stasi. Few could resist who stayed to the end were treated Speeches and Panel Discussions
the opportunity to sit at the desk to a trip to the once-famous Glien
of Stasi director Erich Mielke, icke Bridgethe site of numerous On the Berlin Blockade:
adorned with of his treasures,
one Cold War prisoner exchanges Stalin severed ground links
Lenins death mask, The tour accompanied by Oleg Kalugin and between West Berlin and West
included visits to formerly divided Francis Gary Powers, Jr. Powerss Germany in June 1948. The Soviet
Berlins two Rathaser (City famous father had walked across leadership was confident that this
Halls)the so-called Red Rathaus that span when he was exchanged blockade of West Berlin would
in the city center, and the for Soviet illegal Rudolf Abel in force the Western Allies to aban
Schoneberg Rathaus, where Presi 1962. don their positions in the city.
dent Kennedy delivered his famous Instead, the US, Britain, and France
Ich bin em Berliner speech. The In conjunction with the confer mounted a massive effort to sup
tour included a visit to former ence, CSI released a collection of ply the city, which held out for
Soviet facilities in Karlshorstonce declassified intelligence docu nearly a year, at which point the
the KGB Rezidentura (Station) in ments, On the Front Lines of the Soviets backed down.
Berlin, intelligences largest
Soviet Cold War: Documents on the Intelli
foreign post during the Cold War. gence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961. I think its important to Set the
This volume gathers together long- Berlin Crisis in the general con
The conference concluded with a range National Intelligence Esti text of the Cold War.... That is, it
keynote address by Ambassador mates, current reporting and is hard to imagine a post-war
4
Conference in Germany
world in which there is not a high natural continuation of his usual On Inteffigence Operations
degree of conflict between the line of behavior. He did it all his in Berlin:
West and the East.... But] the life,. with his party comrades~ his
. .
From the end of World War II until
point that seems to me to be the associates~ with actually every the Berlin Wall went, up in August
least predetermined. . .
was the body in the Soviet Union. 1961, West Berlin served major
as a
shift from essentially the political strategic intelligencelbase for the
and] ideological Cold War in Dr. Viktor Gobarev, former Soviet Western powers. For the Soviet
1946-47] to an essentially mili and Russian Army Officer Senior KGB and the East German HVA
Risk Analyst, SAIC Inc.
taiy Cold War. The precipitant for (the foreign intelligence arm of the
that, in my view, was the Berlin Stasi), the sizable Allied intelli
crisis of 1948.... General Lucius] clay American gence presence in Berlin provided
Military Governor of Germany in opportunities for penetration of the
Berlin is really pivotal to the rest Western services.
the late 1940s, had] a mandate to
of the Cold War. It is the driverfor get along with the Soviet Union
the need for credibility and I think he wisely stuck to
The Federal Republic, with West
because. it is. an island which it.... In be very Berlin, was the only Western state
. . . .
retrospect, we can
the United States and the other that he on which Moscow~ received even
grateful did, because
Western powers are committed to
what and his more high-grade intelligence
Clay successors
defend and they cannot defend. really preserved was the essential from an allied agencyIn this
They cannot defend with conven framework of those international case, the Hauptverwaltung
tionalforces. They have to be able treaties which. .1 . strongly believe Aufklarung the HVA]than it did
to threaten that they will resort to from the KGB.... In addition to
really kept open the option of Ger
strategic nuclear warfare.... So, man reunification in 1990. receiving a very large amount of
there is this intense need for cred intelligence from the HVA, the
Without the Potsdam Agreement,
ibility which is the function of the of course, the international legal
KGB depended on East German
commitment in Berlin. And Ber support for many of its own intel
status of Berlin as a four-sector
lin remains pivotal.... It is the ligence operations.... All the
unitthe way it was managed
central point of dØtente, the Ber the Cold Warwould
heads of the Stasiup to and
throughout
lin Wall, and the fall of the Berlin including Erich Mielke were, of
not have been possible. His other
Wall is the symbol of the unravel course, not merely Stalin ist loyal
reason. .
was that Clay was a very
ing of the Cold War.... You can ists, they were Soviet agents.
unusual man in one respect: he
write, study, think about the his
really believed in the possibility of
tory of the Cold War entirely with Dr. Christopher Andrew,
rebuilding German democracy. Professor of Modern and
Berlin as its focus....
Now when you think back on
Contemporary History
1945 when he started this job, Cambridge University
Professor Ernest R. May
and up to 49, and] put yourself
Diplomatic Historian
Harvard University in the position ofthesepeople and
On of October 1945, I
the first
of those times, this was a pretty
was assigned to Berlin. as]. the
imaginative and, in many ways,
. . . .
Did Stalin really want to begin a
a pretty hopeless enterprise to get
acting head of OSS in Berlin, a
war, starting with the Berlin unit ofpro ha bly something like
involved in and to try to carry
Blockade, before with the
and eight intelligence officers, and
out, and to believe in. Clay did
March crisis? After analyzing the another twelve support people.
believe in that and. we owe him . .
Soviet documents, Ill say cer Our targets were: ferreting out
agreat deal
tainly no.... His intention] was to Nazis who had gone under
challenge Western powers, espe Dr. Wolfgang Krieger,
ground, members of the German
cially the United States, in Intelligence Service, members of
Visiting Professor of History
Berlin.... For Stalin, it was just a Toronto University the Gestapo, and most
5
Conference in Germany
importantly, finding scientists important aspect of the situation planning, stay-behind activities,
and technicians whom we could was; of course, the vast amount of rat lines-escape routes]for
ferret out to the West and sympathyfor the Western Allies as downed American and allied
thereby] deny to the Russians.... a result not only of the airlift, but the
pilotsin event of a military
Our targets changed according to then in 53, the repression of the
confrontation....
the information we collected on 17th ofJune East German] rebel
the changes in the political situa lion against the occupying Soviet With the passage of time, war
tion in East Germany. We did not forc~s. It did not create a wave of plans began to fade into the back
target the Soviet movements of sympathy for the Soviet occupi ground as more strategic
troops. until it became obvious ers, and made Berliners and even
..
objectives loomed. As a conse
that the Soviets were intent on
the others in the Soviet Occupa
quence, during] the... SOs,
tion Zone much more responsive
imposing aSoviet-style govern certainly the mid-to-late 505,
ment in East Germany. and willing to help.... Now at the
human operations in Berlin took
same another aspect
time. . . of this
a much broader approach to
We had from the start very environment which was so con
ducive to human
intelligence requirements and the
good contacts with people in the successful
sea rchfor information. The fur
government, because of the war operations was the evolution, cer
ther factor that made this such a
time] contacts we had. Through tainly on the American side and
Im sure on the British and golden operating area was the
contacts with the German resis
French sides well, of a more
as ready access at that time across
tance] we knew people who were
the border of the sectors within
senior officials in government focused approach to require
ments and the need for certain the city, less so into the Soviet
agencies during the Nazi time.
kinds of information.... In the Zone, but still access was reason
Largely anti-Nazi, and therefore
first period of the initial base in ably easy. Certainly for an East
ultimately anti-Communist; and
as realize, in this
Berlin, the focus of operations Berliner to come into West Berlin
you may
was on essentially two things. it was no problem at all unless he
country i.e., Germany] a large
One, the huge black-market was of] a very small number
one
portion of the civil servants were
taken the post-war operation and. secondly, the offunctionaries who were sup
by
. .
over
sea rchfor Nazi war criminals
administration. There was the de posedly preventedfrom doing so,
and other miscreants. but with a modest amount of
Nazification process, but ~fyou
were not guilty of any crimes; or imagination, they, too, could
no one in the Berlin Base in
had not] been a senior Nazi offi cross the border. It meant for a
that eraspoke Russian. There was
cial,you had to continue to run ready app roach for East Berlin
no focus on the Sovietsin fact;
the country and the people who ers. .
willing to help the Allies and
.
they were still considered our
ran before ran it afterwards.
it thuslprovided an enormous pool
allies. As a result; there was a
Because of that we had very good of individuals who were anxious
very narrow attention span to the
contactsnot only in Berlin, but to tell their stories. Who not only
requirements for intelligence....
also in Eastern Germanyto were willing to talk, explain what
With the establishment of CIG,
Government officials. they did, tell about their careers;
and then CIA in 1947, there was
but also] readily volunteered the
some clearer focus on the need
Peter Sichel, names of their friends who stayed
Former OSS and CIA officer
for intelligence. But.. the interest .
was mostly directed towards the
behind but who would be willing
threat of war and the immediate to help the West if approached in
The era under discussion here, tactical concerns about what the proper way.... Until the Wall
1945 to 61, was really the golden Soviet forces were up to. . .
and a went up, that continued and it
age for human
espionage in Ber great deal of the effort of the Ber meant that we had numerous
lin.... The first and most lin personnel was on war opportunities to approach mdi-
6
Con ferene in Germany
viduals and to acquire the kinds Austrian and Swiss and British separate peace treaty with the East
of assets we needed. It did require and other passports. There were German government and withdraw
a high degree of selectivity.... two factories, one in East Berlin ing Soviet forces from Berlin. This
and another outside Moscow, was seen as the opening move in
Ambassador Hugh Montgomery, which producing dozens
were an attempt to push the Western
Special Assistant the DCI
to and dozens of] valid blank pass Allies out of Berlin.
ports, West German passports for
The
the numerous illegals. And also I During the late 1950s and early
refugees, as they were com
was able to follow their training 1960s, East- West tensions over
ing out 0/East Berlin, went
on the territory 0/the GDR from Berlin were the most critically dif
through a refugee processing
the KGB Rezidentura in] ficult and complex foreign policy
point, which sort of worked like
the
Karlshorst.... It was extremely problems/aced by US Presidents.
old-fashioned card system. We
sophisticated. For example, the Although by no means as risky as
could put stops into the system
passports were blank, but the the Cuban missile crisis, the Ber
based on things we were inter
names, identities, dates, all the lin crisis helped make this period
ested in, based on targets, and
officials and stampsit was the most dangerous days 0/the
anyone who hit one of those stops
always real. There was always a Cold War. Intelligence analysts
would be called in and we could
real identity behind it.... And believed that the Soviets did not
debrief the person. Sometimes we
another because seek Berlin. Neverthe
thing, a big part war over
would be trying to recruit that
of the audience is American here, less, over/our years... US
person. to go back and not be a
. .
I can tell you that in the early Presidents and other] US leaders
refugee, depending on what their
19 70s.... I was still attached to wondered whether the Berlin
circumstances were, and work for
the business of the illegals, my problem would lead to open con
us there. Sometimes we were ask
department had one]. .1 think he
. flict. But conflict was avoided
in,g them for the names and
is still alive. He was very, very and both sides found ways to live
numbers offriends and col with disagreement over Berlin.
happy that day. Smiling and even
leagues, family members. Then laughing. He said, Today is my
we would use the refugee to Dr. William
most happy day 0/my life. Come, Burr,
invite, in] a certain aythat come and see it. And he pulled Senior Analyst,
National Security Archive
is, to get] a secure message across out the drawer 0/his desk and got
to the target to come over here out..his]American blank pass
and be interviewed and then pos
port. It took ten years, from 1961 The second Berlin crisis cannot
sibly recruited. to 1971, to produce, because it be understood other than by look
was so complicated. So compli ing at Khrushchevs
personality.
Burton L. Gerber, cated. But they produced it and The major explanations (for pro
former senior US intelligence there was no difference. Just
officer voking the crisis] could o:nly be
impossible to find the found in Khrushchevs head, not
difference in any policy papers, nor in any
1 was connected with the. .
pro policy analysis. In/act, we dont
duction and] training of East Oleg Gordievsky, have any documents that con
former Soviet intelligence officer,
German illegals, KGB illegals, vincingly present. any schematic
. .
British agent and defector
and Soviet citizens. . .
and] East preparations or calculations that
German citizens. I/I had more explain a radical change in pol
time I would be able to tell about On the 1958-61 Berlin Crisis: icy towards Germany in 1958,
the very vast coopera In November 1958, Soviet Premier inside the Kremlin, inside even
tion. between the KGB and the
. .
Nikita Khrushchev threatened to Khrushchevs close circle.... One
Stasi in the production offalse abrogate what remained of the psychological explanation. . .
is
West German passports, and quadripartite regime by signing a that Khrushchev was a person
7
Conference in Germany
who was increasingly dissatis German Berlin administration dur Im 60 years old. Ispent 22 years
fied. . .
with the results of his ing this tragic period, which of my career in the KGB,
foreign policy in general, but par physically divided families and cut advancing]from Lieutenant to
ticularly for his normalization of off the livelihoods of thousands of Colonel.... Ifinished my career in
relationships with the United Berliners. London as acting head of the
States.... KGB station in London. Mean
It took hours to convince the while, in the last years of my
Khrushchev faced a huge prob Allied] commandants to give career as an operations officer
lem of legitimacy inside the orders that would put] at least in.. the
. KGB, I was also a British
Communist Bloc and inside the some armed, uniform.ed people in secret agent, working for the Brit
Soviet Union.... He. . . defeated the jeeps patrolling the line. It took ish Secret Intelligence Service
opposition, which constituted the more than 24 hours before the until my downfall, when I was
vast majority of the Politburo, but commandants got permission to found out, seized, and taken
he clearly couldn tfihl Stalins from London. Sent from London
transmit a small, weak protest to
shoes....Domestically he expected their Soviet colleagues on the to Moscow and/put under house
to move more successfully. than arrest....
. .
other side in East Berlin. It took
Stalin had ever planned towards
more than 48 hours before
Communism. Inside the Bloc he It started pro ha bly in Berlin, The
the. High Commissioners, the
. .
aimed improving relationships
at 11th ofAugust, 1961, larrived
four Ambassadors, established the
primarily with China and Yugo here in Berlin young di~lo
as a
protest from Bonn to East Berlin.
slavia. By 1958,.. Khrushchevs matic trainee. First I had a
It took 72 hours before the first
personal diplomacy towards conversation with a man who
protests came from Washington,
Yugoslavia and particularly later became Soviet Ambassador
Paris, London, to Moscow. This
towards Mao, towards China, to Germany, and he said, You
was the reality. After three days,
was in deep, deep trouble.... know what, ~f you want me to
Khrushchev had to do
when it was absolutely clear for
something describe the situation to you here,
the Eastern side and the Commu
to improve his credentials as a the whole republic is sitting on
nists that no major tough
statesman, something radical.... their suitcases.If something dras
reaction could be expectedfrom tic doesn t happen in the near
the Western side, they started to
Vladislav Zubok, future, no people will be left in
Senior Research Fellow, build up the Wall.
the republic. by] Christmas....
.
National Security Archive
Then there was another man, a]
Dr. Egon Bahr, Second
former adviser to
Secretary, who obviously
On the Berlin Wall: knew what was going to happen.
Mayor Willy Brandt
East German troops closed the sec The night of the 13th Iheard the
tor border between East and West tanks and the artillery equzpment
Question from the audience: and other
Berlin over the night of 12-13 heavy military vehicles
Duringi the three days that the in the direction of the
August 1961, first with barbed wire going
and then began building the Berlin barbed wire was up, before the Brandenburger Tor. Next morn
Wall. The Allied powers felt unable Wall went up, what would have ing I went for a walk I went to
to respond, except through mili happened had the West German the Brandenburger Tor and there
tary action, which probably would people come forward, and with it was. Barbed wire, guards,
have led to war. Egon Bahr was their own wire cutters, for exam many troops, tanks hidden on the
Press Secretary and adviser to West ple, began removing the barbed As a young and ideal
corners....
Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt (later wire on their own? istic student, I was really very
West German Chancellor). At the depressed. Excited over the politi
conference, Dr. Bahr gave vent to Oleg Kalugin, former KGB Gen cal scale of the event but very
the frustrations experienced by the era!]: They would have been shot. depressed because of the German
8
Conference in Germany
people.... I dont know how it was thundering in its crater. The final Clay, General Clark] bawled him
in 1989, but in 1961 the great eruption is at hand. isaid, It is, out... but didnt report it back to
majority of the people in East Ger but its not the one youre looking Washington. But Soviet intelli
many were against Communism, for gencepresumably with East
against the system, against the German operativeshad seen
tyranny, and they took it very Ambassador Vernon Walters, and photographed this exercise
Ambassador to Germany, 1989-91,
seriously as a new serious test of and this intelligence] was pre
former DDCI, adviser to several
their resilience, their prepared sented, know now from other
we
Presidents
ness to fight.... The churches were former Soviet officials, to the
full.... It made a tremendous Politburo afew days before the
impression on me. But mean The Berlin Wall was torn down on tank confrontation at Check
while, I had given already the 9 November 1989. point Charlie], about the 20th or
promise to become an officer of 21st of October.... So we have, I
the KGB. But the mood of the On the Tank Confrontation think a rather interesting situa
German people remained in me, of October 1961: tion in which intelligence had
and when, in 1968, the Soviet On 27-29 October 1961, a border provided rather strong circum
and other East European crossing incident involving a US stantial evidence for a faulty
troops. . .
invaded Czechoslovakia, State Department officer on official conclusion on the part of the
Isaid, This is the end of it. I business escalated into a standoff Soviet leaders with respect to our
dont want to work for that between US and Soviet tanks at intentions.
regime. Checkpoint Charlie.
Ambassador Raymond Garthoff,
Oleg Gordievsky, Our lead tanks in the tank con
former intelligence analyst,
Former KGB officer
had bulldozer
Senior Fellow, Brookings
frontation]
Defector to the West Institution
attachments for the puipose of
clearing away trucks or barbed
1 had lunch with the Soviet wire, whatever kinds of impedi The Soviets normally] did not
Ambassador. . .
on November 1st], ments might have been
that have their tanks in East Berlin.
here in Berlin, and Isaid to him, placed temporarily in the road, On the day in question, two
You try and win over the
want to but they also could have been teams, each team made up of a
Germans, and you built that wall used for hitting the Wall. A few CIA officer and a State Depart
that keep husband and wife, and days earlier,] General Clay had ment officer, went to East Berlin
father and mother and children ordered the commandant in Ber separately, with no communica
apart. He said, That wall serves lin] to have the American tion between them, with firm
a useful puipose, and it will be Engineer Company set up a mock instructions as to what they
here in a hundred years. I said, section of the Wall in the forest would do and what risks they
Mr. Ambassador, ~fyou really and use some tanks with bull would take, and when they would
believe that, youve lost contact dozer attachments to practice be back to West Berlin. . .
one of
with, reality. By this time, there knocking down the Wall.... This them] in themoi~ning, one in the
were millions ofpeople fleeing the exercise]. . .
had not been autho late morning.... The first team
DDR the German Democratic rized from Washington and, did indeed find the tanks with
Republic, or East Germany], com indeed, was not known by any out markings. Unclear as to what
ing out through Hungary. The one Washington. General
in they were. Observation didnt
Embassies in Prague and War Bruce Clark, the Commander in help. But they watched them, and
saw and everywhere else were Chief of US Forces in Europe, the CIA case officer got an idea
filled with people. I said, You learned of it. and was very
. .
and threw a rock at one of the
know, your party song, the Inter angry. Even though he had once tanks. The top popped off and a
nationale, says, the volcano is been a subordinate of General lieutenant came up and he yelled
9
Conference in Germany
out, Chto eta? What was point they did hear one of the
that?]. In the meantime, the other outside people speaking into the
team found them, at just about tank in Russian. So this informa
the time the world wasbeginning tion was brought back, and so
tofind them as they approached they did know that. . .
the
Checkpoint Charlie.... That team tanks.. facing were
. they were
noted that there was no commu Russian. It did make a differ
nication going on between the
ence,of course~ whether you
tanks, but they had kept open were] dealing with Russian or
those microphones that exist on with East German tanks.
the side of tanks so the infantiy
can communicate with the tank Burton L. Gerber,
commander. They got up as close former senior US intelligence
as they could, and at a certain officer
10
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